

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE 127111

COUNCIL BILL 120845

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; and authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2024 surveillance impact report and 2024 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software.

WHEREAS, Section 14.18.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), enacted by Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, requires City Council approval of a surveillance impact report (SIR) related to uses of surveillance technology; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.020 applies to the proposed Real-Time Crime Center technology to be used by the Seattle Police Department (SPD); and

WHEREAS, the Seattle Police Department conducted policy rule review and community review as part of the development of the Real-Time Crime Center SIR; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.080, enacted by Ordinance 125679, also requires review of the Real-Time Crime Center SIR by the Community Surveillance Working Group, composed of relevant stakeholders, and a statement from the Chief Technology Officer in response to the Working Group's recommendations; and

WHEREAS, development of the Real-Time Crime Center SIR and review by the Working Group have been completed; and

WHEREAS, the City of Seattle is exploring new technologies to help deter and detect criminal activity in specific locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime is concentrated; and

1 WHEREAS, the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Project is a new public safety
2 program that will combine a Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System with Real-Time
3 Crime Center (RTCC) software together in one view; and

4 WHEREAS, the CCTV cameras will only monitor public places like the street, sidewalk, and
5 other public areas and signs will be posted identifying their presence; and

6 WHEREAS, Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-
7 time information and analysis; integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls,
8 records management, and other information into one single view; and

9 WHEREAS, the group of new technologies is one component to an overall One Seattle Safety
10 Framework and will help the City’s public safety response to aid victims, hold
11 accountable those responsible for gun violence, alert real-time crime center staff to a
12 serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and
13 convey that information to officers who are responding in the field; and

14 WHEREAS, the Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety and SPD will collaborate to
15 retain academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an implementation and
16 outcome evaluation of the pilot project; and

17 WHEREAS, the police department will create a public-facing dashboard that will update
18 frequently and report on the uses of the technologies; and

19 WHEREAS, at the end of the pilot project, a determination will be made about continuing the
20 project, making changes to the project design, discontinuing the project, or moving the
21 technology to another location where gun violence, human trafficking, or persistent
22 felony crime is concentrated; NOW, THEREFORE,

1 **BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

2 Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of
3 the Seattle Police Department’s Real-Time Crime Center software. The City Council accepts the
4 2024 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as
5 Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as
6 Attachment 2.

7 Section 2. The Seattle Police Department shall, as part of the Technology Assisted Crime
8 Prevention Pilot project, provide a report to the Public Safety Committee or its successor on the
9 evaluation assessments that will be conducted at the end of 2025 and at the end of 2026 as
10 detailed in the Surveillance Impact Report.

11 Section 3. Should the Seattle Police Department choose to utilize the features of the Real-
12 Time Crime Center pilot project that allow for private camera integration, the Department shall,
13 as part of the project, provide a report to the Public Safety Committee or its successor on the
14 Department’s implementation plan and policies for the integration of private cameras to the
15 Real-Time Crime Center.

16 Section 4. The Council requests that the Seattle Police Department (SPD) include in any
17 contract with a vendor for the implementation of Real-Time Crime Center software technology
18 terms: 1) a requirement that the vendor immediately notify SPD if the vendor receives a warrant
19 or subpoena seeking SPD Real-Time Crime Center data for any purpose, including purposes
20 related to reproductive healthcare or gender-affirming medical services; and 2) a requirement
21 that the vendor retain legal counsel to challenge any such warrant or subpoena and advise of
22 outcome or existence of warrant after expiration. SPD shall notify the Council upon receipt of
23 information related to a vendor warrant or subpoena described in this section. SPD shall provide

- 1 the Council with a copy of the Real-Time Crime Center software vendor contract once executed
- 2 but no later than December 31, 2024.

1 Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code
2 Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

3 Passed by the City Council the 8th day of October, 2024,
4 and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this 8th day of
5 October, 2024.

6 

7 President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this 10th day of October, 2024.

8 

9 Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

10 Filed by me this 11th day of October, 2024.

11 

12 Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

13 (Seal)

14 Attachments:

15 Attachment 1 – 2024 Surveillance Impact Report: Real-Time Crime Center

16 Attachment 1 Appendix B-G – SIR Real-Time Crime Center

17 Attachment 2 – 2024 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: Real-Time Crime Center

2024 Surveillance Impact Report

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department

Surveillance Impact Report (“SIR”) overview

About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the “Surveillance Ordinance,” on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City’s executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in [Seattle IT Policy PR-02](#), the “Surveillance Policy”.


How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department (“Seattle IT”). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.



				SIR and submitted to Council.	
--	--	--	--	-------------------------------	--

Privacy Impact Assessment

Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment (“PIA”) is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

1.0 Abstract

1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot is one component of an overall strategy of addressing felony crime at specific places. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, and enhanced lighting and cleaning.

This SIR covers the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software, one part of this pilot, and provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one “pane of glass” (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and community safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects – enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions. RTCC also aids in investigations by aggregating multiple

data sources into one location, helping provide detectives with actionable information that increases the quality of investigations and prosecutions, leading to increased accountability for criminal offenders.

1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

The City's police staffing crisis, now in its fourth year, has resulted in over 700 officers leaving SPD since 2019. As of January 2024, 913 police officers are available for deployment in the city, the lowest number of in-service officers since 1991 and significantly below per-capita staffing relative to comparative jurisdictions. Low staffing levels also affect investigations, which hinders police effectiveness in solving cases and holding violent criminals accountable.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic places, and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Implementing technology tools to bolster policing capabilities, as one part of a holistic crime prevention and reduction plan is essential to address ongoing gun violence, vehicle theft, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime at specific places, including within our most victimized communities.

Real-time crime center software brings several technologies deemed surveillance technologies (CCTV, ALPR, etc.) into one platform. In addition, some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies, if enabled. As a note, SPD will not use AI facial recognition technologies. Finally, the software stores information from these technologies either in the cloud or on-premise, creating some risks around data security and retention.

Due to these factors, the City of Seattle Privacy Office has deemed the technology surveillance technology, which triggered this review.

2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview provides the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed.

2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

The theory of change supporting the pilot project is that these technologies (1) bolster police effectiveness in public places where crime is concentrated when used with other crime prevention efforts, including increased police patrols, enhanced lighting, graffiti mitigation, and others (CPTED), (2) deter criminal behavior when public notice is posted, and (3) gather evidence to hold offenders accountable. These efforts can improve public safety and enhance the public's confidence in the city government's ability to maintain safe neighborhoods.

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police

effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigation staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department.

RTCC software can help mitigate staffing shortages for both patrol officers and detectives by providing more reliable and accurate data on incidents in real-time.

The benefits of the RTCC for a victim(s):

- RTCC staff can use multiple technologies (CCTV, etc.) to pinpoint the location of crimes and identify the location of victims.
- RTCC staff can assess the scene before officers responding, helping speed up the deployment of emergency aid or lifesaving assistance.

Increased investigative information helps lead to justice for victims. The benefits of RTCC technology for a community:

- Increased investigative evidence can aid in the capture and prosecution of offenders, leading to reduced violence and fewer firearms on the street. Increased evidence can also help exonerate the innocent.
- Integration with CCTV cameras and real-time crime center software can provide detectives with precise information about suspect vehicle, appearance, and location, increasing correct identification of suspects and reducing unnecessary traffic stops and adverse interactions with the public.

The benefits of RTCC technology for an officer:

- Real-time crime center software can facilitate a coordinated, precise response to suspect apprehension, increasing the safety of arrests for all involved. The technology provides a data-driven orientation to police response and staffing.

Here is one example of how SPD might use the RTCC software to more efficiently utilize separate data sources to aid victims, capture dangerous suspects, and help remove firearms from the streets:

A RTCC officer receives an alert through CAD and the RTCC software that there are gunshots on Aurora Avenue North. The software shows a map of the area on her monitor, with the associated dispatch call superimposed on the screen. Her map screen also automatically shows the feeds of the closest three CCTV cameras, as well as nearby patrol car locations. She uses the RTCC software to enlarge the feed for the cameras north of the incident and sees a black Honda Civic moving at a high rate of speed in a northerly direction on Aurora.

Using the software, she quickly pulls up the camera recording where the gunshots were reported and visually ascertains that the shots were fired from a black Honda and that there is a person down on the ground. She advises over SPD radio that there is a possible gunshot victim and gives a description of the Honda and the license plate. She sees from the live camera feeds that the Honda is turning west on 125th Street,

and that there is a patrol vehicle on that street 10 blocks west of Aurora and one 15 blocks south of the scene on Aurora. She advises over the radio that the suspect is heading west on 125th St. She goes back to the live camera view and surveys the shooting scene. The person is still down. No one else is at the scene. She relays via radio what she has seen through the RTCC software.

After the incident, she uses the RTCC software to create clips of all scenes showing the incident and the vehicle travel before, during and after the incident and uploads them from the RTCC software to the SPD digital evidence system.

At the same time this is happening, the officer driving north on Aurora gets dispatched to a possible shooting scene. The dispatcher informs her that there is a victim on the ground and the RTCC officer has observed no other people around the victim. The officer arrives on scene, exits her vehicle, takes a quick scan of the scene to confirm that the scene is secure. She grabs a first aid kit in her trunk, then runs to the victim on the ground and renders aid. In the background, she can hear the Fire Department sirens coming toward her. She radios dispatch and tells them the scene is secure for the arriving paramedics.

After the shooting scene is secure, a homicide detective arrives at the scene. Officers are using their flashlights and struggling to find bullet casings. The detective pulls up the RTCC application on his phone and brings up the information for the incident. He walks towards the officers and shows them the video – they move up the road a bit and eventually find the casings judging by the location of the vehicle in the video. The detective is satisfied there were no witnesses after watching the video again and proceeds with his work at the scene.

2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

Academic research related to the effect of real-time crime centers is limited because of their fairly recent implementation; however, a [2023 John Jay College of Criminal Justice study](#) showed that a real-time crime center in Chicago, IL increased case clearance rates 5% for violent crime, 12% for property crime, and 11% for overall crime. The authors concluded that “RTCCs may provide investigative benefits to police through the integration of technologies and data, thus enhancing case solvability.”

An extensive [evaluation](#) of the Chicago Police Department’s use of a RTCC was completed by the RAND in 2019. This evaluation is meaningful because it highlighted the successes and failures of the CPD centers and made specific recommendations to increase their effectiveness.

Other studies on the effects of technologies integrated with RTCC software, such as CCTV, are discussed in their respective Surveillance Impact Reports.

SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the RTCC implementation through standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions

of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies (CCTV/RTCC/enhanced ALPR) will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.

This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the “total cost of ownership of public safety,” Equity, Accountability, and Quality (“EAQ”), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

2.3 Describe the technology involved.

The core functionality of RTCC software involves integrating multiple sources of information into a single “pane of glass” (a single view). The sources of information that are being integrated with the software are current or expected SPD technologies such as the department’s CAD system (computer-aided dispatch), closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), automatic vehicle location (AVL) system, body and in-car video cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPR), digital evidence platforms, and 911 call systems.

Most of the technology comes into play around a mapping function which provides the overlay for all the other technologies. The mapping system includes roads, building layouts (when provided), and other layers like beat/sector boundaries. Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications, as well as mobile applications for use in the field.

While most integrations between RTCC software and department applications occur between vendor APIs, some RTCC vendors use hardware for CCTV cameras that allow for the recording of the camera video, providing the ability to playback CCTV in the RTCC environment. RTCC software for CCTV cameras can also provide in-application video analytics that use machine-learned algorithms to analyze camera feeds and, using object recognition, locate specific items, people based on clothing, or vehicles based on description. This technology complies with the city of Seattle's AI rules for use, requiring a "human in the loop" at the initiation and evaluation of the results. SPD will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends.

Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies. This option would be fully voluntary at the discretion of the camera owners. Private camera owners can also set up conditional sharing, meaning they can determine the parameters of what, how, and when their camera feeds are shared. Some vendors also provide a registry so that private camera owners can share the location of the camera, but not the video feeds, so agencies can easily

canvass for videos after an incident. The system can then allow SPD to send an email to all registered cameras in an area requesting relevant video. There is no obligation to share footage if a system is registered.

Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle and Reverse 911 and could be used in large-impact situations such as traffic re-routing, chemical spills, or other life-safety disruptions.

There are also features that allow a rapid video response to calls for service. For example, a community member that calls 911 may be sent a link to their phone to opt-in to a video chat with a 911 operator or officer to provide face-to-face communication to help facilitate accurate officer response and/or medical aid instruction. The caller would need to opt-in to allow the use of their camera, microphone, and GPS. This service could be used in an active shooter situation to help officers assess the situation or other rapidly changing emergency environments.

Other potential features include tools that enable incident planning and real-time management across the department, including freehand sketching of maps, iconography, and differing views for different groups of users, and editing access across a variety of connected devices. Integrating graphical illustration tools with live video and team geolocation creates a flexible and holistic view of emergent incidents, streamlining response capabilities. This feature would help incident commanders utilize mapping capabilities to better manage large-scale events.

Another potential feature allows officers to listen to 911 calls directly, helping to bring small details within the words, tone, or background that can aid responders in achieving desired outcomes. This feature would utilize 911 call recording already in use at the Seattle 911 call center.

Finally, some RTCC software systems have services that allow members of the public to anonymously submit multi-media tips by texting pictures, text, or video to a publicized number. Tips are then stored in the system for examination and potentially used as evidence.

2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.

The mission of the SPD is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, equitable, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively.

The RTCC software helps provide responsive police services to victims, witnesses, and members of the community by providing responders with more accurate and robust

information that does not require significant staffing additions. Using technology that enables quicker, complex, and effective police response aligns with the SPD mission and will benefit the community as a whole.

2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

At the time of writing, planning is still underway for exactly who would use the RTCC software. The vision is for SPD to staff a real-time crime center with a combination of sworn officers and civilian staff, eventually transitioning to a more civilian-staffed model. Due to the wide functionality of RTCC software, it is likely incident commanders with appropriate training will be the primary users of the software, supported by sworn and civilian staff. The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.

3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

The RTCC will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access. Data and information obtained through the RTCC may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#).

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

The SPD does not currently have any policies related to RTCC. As the RTCC will be the platform for different technologies, such as CCTV, any video recordings that are captured will only be preserved as evidence if it is determined a crime has been committed.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on

several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies.

Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

The use of CCTV will comply with [SMC Chapter 14.12](#), Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes. All existing SPD policies related to technology and Criminal Justice Information Systems will apply to the RTCC. ([Policy 12.050](#)). All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only and personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with SPD policies.

Access to the RTCC will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive SPD-developed training in the use of the RTCC and related policy, operation, and procedures prior to receiving system access.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

4.0 Data Collection and Use

4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single window view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

The desired deployment date is mid-2024. SPD's vision is to have a RTCC staffed by a combination of sworn and civilian staff that will monitor the RTCC software and provide information to patrol officers and detectives. Access may be given to detectives and patrol officers in certain situations and with appropriate training. The system will be used by incident commanders at the scene of major crimes and other events requiring police engagement.

The SPD Technology and Innovation Unit will be the initial owner of the system and will manage implementation.

4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The technology will be in continuous operation.

4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

The installation of the RTCC software is permanent and will operate 24/7.

4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?

There will be no new physical objects or sensors collecting data as part of the RTCC software package. It integrates existing data sources into one centralized platform. Some of the data sources feeding into the RTCC do have physical equipment that is visible to the public, such as CCTV cameras.

4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems, [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.

Other law enforcement agencies have used similar RTCC platforms to share information during serious incidents that span jurisdictions. For example, an active shooter in the City of Atlanta was apprehended in a neighboring county that was using the same RTCC platform as the City of Atlanta.

Any direct usage by a different jurisdiction will be consistent with SPD policy.

4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?

RTCC software will be accessed and used for serious incidents happening in real-time to provide information to patrol resources. It will also be used to provide a comprehensive picture of numerous SPD systems to investigators.

Data held in the RTCC system may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#).

4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?

RTCC software data will be stored within secure City of Seattle facilities under the administration of the Seattle Information Technology Department. If cloud storage is utilized, it will follow city security guidelines and only be accessible to outside parties as part of system maintenance and support only when authorized.

Various measures will be in place to protect data from unauthorized access.

- Data Encryption
- Access control mechanisms (meeting CJIS requirements*)
- Strict user permission settings
- Industry standard network security measures (meeting CJIS requirements)

The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General upon request.

* Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets requirements for organizations that access or use criminal justice information. These requirements are referred to as "[CJIS requirements](#)" and are developed and audited for compliance by the FBI.

5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

5.1 How will data be securely stored?

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

The retention period for data stored by RTCC software will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will be saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors, will be allowed as needed.

5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

Per SIR section 5.2, RTCC data collected without evidentiary value will be automatically purged by the system after 30 days.

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon “individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual’s right to privacy.”

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the OIG, can audit for compliance at any time.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney’s Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) (“PRA”). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record

information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests “for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies.”

Discrete pieces of data collected or compiled by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor’s Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers to execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by [SPD Policy 12.055](#). This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to criminal activity as part of investigations, and to comply with legal requirements.

6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes No

6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department’s procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [CFR Title 28, Part 20](#), regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#) (auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#) (Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Sharing agreements must meet the standards reflected in [SPD Policy 12.055](#). Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [CFR Title 28, Part 20](#). In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#).

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the RTCC software platform may be used.

6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

Real-time crime center software data comes from various SPD systems and is blended into one single view/location. Accuracy of data flows over APIs are checked at the point of development and monitored by system administrator and system logging thereafter. The system administrator is responsible for monitoring API versioning and change management to proactively plan and avoid issues. In addition, as data is being received and analyzed in the RTCC, specially trained individuals are reviewing and assessing the data and making judgments about the quality, accuracy, suitability, and value of the information being collected.

6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

Both the content and means of collection of information that may be utilized by the RTCC is regulated by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 7 of the Washington State Constitution, case law interpreting the same, [Washington's Privacy Act](#), [RCW 9.73](#), [CFR Title 28, Part 23](#), and Seattle's Intelligence Ordinance, [SMC Chapter 14.12](#).

7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

[SPD Policy 12.050](#) mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

[SMC 14.12](#) and [SPD Policy 6.060](#) directs all SPD personnel that any documentation of information concerning a person’s sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The purpose of policy 6.060 is “to ensure that the collection and review of such information serves a legitimate law enforcement purpose and does not unreasonably infringe upon individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual’s right to privacy.” SPD would only document sexual preferences or practices, political or religious activities if it is related to an unlawful act occurring, for example; as seen in a child pornography investigation.

Additionally, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures. The policy states that “employees shall not make decisions or take actions that are influenced by bias, prejudice, or discriminatory intent. Law enforcement and investigative decisions must be based upon observable behavior or specific intelligence,” as well as outlining specifics related to this area.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

As stated above, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management system, and other information into one platform. With the nature of data obtained through the RTCC, there is some risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes that allow for authorized auditors, including the Office of Inspector General, to inspect use and deployment of the RTCC software. Additionally, the Office of Police Accountability can conduct investigations of possible violations of City and SPD privacy-related policies and laws.

8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Sharing of digital evidence outside the department is primarily done through SPD’s digital evidence management system. Records of when data was shared and who it is shared with is

noted in the system audit logs. Digital evidence shared outside of the digital evidence management system (e.g., using media such as DVDs, thumb drives, etc.) is done through SPD's Digital Forensic Unit, which logs requests.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

The Office of Inspector General conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.

Financial Information

Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current potential

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
Q3 2024	Q4 2024	\$300,000	\$0	\$100,000	General Fund

Notes:

The SPD’s 2024 budget includes \$1.8 million for the use of CCTV/ALPR technologies. Since RTCC software integrates these technologies into one single “pane of glass” for effective use, SPD will use a portion of these funds for acquisition of the technology. At the time of writing, the procurement process has not yet been started, so the costs above are estimates.

1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current potential

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD

Notes:

At the time of writing, the planning process has not yet been completed.

1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

The use of RTCC software may help mitigate SPD’s shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the RTCC software and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities.

No funding beyond city General Fund dollars has been identified for this technology.

Expertise and References

Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report (“SIR”). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
Atlanta		Currently in use
Detroit		Currently in use
Mesa, AZ		Currently in use
Orange County, CA		Currently in use
Washington DC		Deployed February 2024

2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link

Bureau of Justice Assistan ce RTCC Informa tion		https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/RealTimeCrimeCenterInformation.pdf
---	--	---

Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) and engagement for public comment worksheet

Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

In addition to completing the RET template sections below, the 2024 Council Budget Action SPD-900-A requested that the Executive, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) co-prepare a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis for these technologies, pursuant to the process that the Executive has already created to comply with the Surveillance Ordinance. Please see Appendix B: Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis.

Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments’ (“Seattle IT”) Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative (“RSJI”) is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

1.0 Set Outcomes

1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?

- The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.

There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.

The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.

The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot, including the RTCC, is one integrated component to this overall strategy of addressing this issue. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, enhanced lighting, and enhanced cleaning.

The technology will be used for the following purposes:

- Closed-Circuit (CCTV) camera systems will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults, and other offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent, and removing deadly weapons from the street, thereby reducing the risk of harm to the public.
- Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software helps provide situational awareness to increase officers' and the public's safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase the reliability of the location of victims and suspects, enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

Potential impacts on civil liberties include but are not limited to:

- Privacy concerns associated with surveillance of people, vehicles, and license plates in public places.
- Misuse of collected video and information/mission creep.
- Lack of transparency with the public on what is being done with recordings.
- Loss of personal autonomy with surveillance of an area.

To mitigate these potential community concerns, SPD will:

- Post signs indicating that police surveillance and video recordings are occurring.
- Notification of the technology being used will be shared with the neighborhoods where it is deployed through community meetings and active canvassing with street fliers.
- Ensure technology is being used for crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent crimes in the surveillance area.
- SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions.
- CCTV technology will only monitor public places, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks.
- Recorded material from CCTV cameras or the compilation of data at the RTCC, will only be kept for 30 days unless it is evidence of criminal behavior, in which case it will be transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence storage system. ALPR data will be maintained for 90 days and then deleted unless it contains evidence of criminal behavior.
- Provide access to CCTV, ALPR, and SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) user and device logs to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for compliance audits.
- The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.
- The Office of Police Accountability may conduct investigations of violations of SPD policies and laws related to privacy.

Additionally, the technologies will only be implemented once the City's surveillance ordinance requirements are met, and the City Council authorizes the use.

1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just*

right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.


1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

The following neighborhoods are being considered for deploying the CCTV technologies. Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.


- all Seattle neighborhoods
 - Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th**
 - Ballard
 - Belltown**
 - Beacon Hill
 - Capitol Hill
 - Central District
 - Chinatown/International District**
 - Columbia City
 - Downtown Commercial Core**
 - Delridge
 - First Hill
 - Georgetown
 - Greenwood / Phinney
 - International District
 - Interbay
 - North
 - Northeast
 - Northwest
 - Madison Park / Madison Valley
 - Magnolia
 - Rainier Beach
 - Ravenna / Laurelhurst
 - South Lake Union / Eastlake
 - Southeast
 - Southwest
 - South Park
 - Wallingford / Fremont
 - West Seattle
 - King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual Aid)
 - Outside King County (Mutual Aid)

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

Downtown & Belltown Area *(Potential location)*



Chinatown-International District Area (Potential)



**Aurora Avenue North Corridor
(Potential; Aurora Ave, 85th to 145th Streets)**



1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?

Race/Ethnicity	Aurora	Chinatown International District	Belltown	Downtown Commercial	Citywide
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	0.4%
Asian	14.0%	49.2%	30.4%	16.8%	16.9%
Black/African American	8.9%	8.6%	5.5%	11.1%	6.8%
Hispanic or Latino of Any Race	11.3%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	8.2%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Multiple Races	7.9%	5.8%	4.9%	5.6%	7.3%
White	56.2%	27.2%	50.8%	56.1%	59.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; OPCD

Note: Geographical areas provided are 2020 Census Block Assignments of [Urban Villages](#) within the Downtown Urban Center, with the exception of Aurora. Aurora’s boundaries are based on ½ mile buffer from Aurora between Meridian and Greenwood, and from 85th to 145th.

1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?

CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as other accountability measures. This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias.

These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. They are focused on individuals only if they are present in these areas.

1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

Data from the technology may be shared outside SPD with other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters under the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter [42.56 RCW](#) (“PRA”).

Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. To mitigate this possibility, SPD has established policies regarding disseminating data related to criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter [42.56 RCW](#)), and authorized researchers. Further, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior.

1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

As with decisions around data sharing, data storage and data retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. Video from CCTVs will be stored for 30 days unless imagery is needed for investigations or to comply with legal requirements. Further, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, and other accountability measures.

1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you/ have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.

The most important unintended possible negative consequence related to the implementation of CCTVs and the RTCC is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unreasonable surveillance. To mitigate this risk, SPD is enacting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under which SPD may utilize CCTVs and Real-Time Crime Center software. Access to user and device logs will be given to the OIG so they can audit the use of these technologies.

To prevent unintended outcomes, the City will develop and post signs in areas that are covered by the cameras' view to alert the public to their presence and use. Active canvassing in pilot locations and passing out street fliers will occur to further inform the public about the use of the technologies in the impacted neighborhoods. Additionally, the Office of the Inspector General will have access at any time to monitor and evaluate the use of these technologies. During the public outreach sessions described below, the City will listen to feedback from the public and provide responses during the technology review process.

The potential positive impact will be reduced serious crime concentrated in the locations where the technologies are deployed. If achieved, these reductions will create a safer environment for everyone who lives, works, plays, or visits these areas.

2.0 Public Outreach

2.1 Organizations who received a personal invitation to participate.

Please include a list of all organizations specifically invited to provide feedback on this technology.

A 4 Apple Learning Center, ACLU, Alliance for Pioneer Square, Amazon, Asian Counseling and Referral Services, Ballard BIA, Beacon Business Alliance, Belltown Community Council, Broadview/Bitter Lake CC, Build Lake City Together/Akin, Chief Seattle Club, Chinese Information Service Center, CID BIA, Crown Hill, Downtown Seattle Association, Dunn Lumber, Duwamish Valley Youth Corps, Epic Life Church, Ethiopian Community in Seattle, Ewing & Clark, For North Seattle, Friends of Little Saigon, Friends of Waterfront, Green Lake Community Center, Greenwood Community Center, Haller Lake Community Club, Home Depot Aurora, Korean Community Service Center, Licton Springs CC, Lowe's Aurora, Magnolia Chamber of Commerce, Matt Talbot Center, NAACP, North PCT Advisory Comm, Black Coffee NW, Phinney Neighborhood Association, Pike Place Market PDA, Pioneer Square Alliance, Jackson Place Community Council and Central Area Neighborhood District Council, PSQ Residence Council, Public Safety Council Chair, Queen Anne Block Watch Network, Queen Anne Community Council, Seattle Association, Seattle Chamber of Commerce, Seattle Chinatown-International District Preservation and Development Authority, Seattle Public Schools, Seniors in Action President, SoDo BIA, South Lake Union Chamber of Commerce, SPD African-American Council, Tecta America, U District BIA, Uptown Alliance, Urban Renaissance Group, Visit Seattle, VOCAL- WA, We R Seattle, WPAC, Yelser Terrace Community Council, and GSBA.

The Department of Neighborhoods, Human Services Department, and Office for Civil Rights were also asked to share with their community outreach list.

2.1 Scheduled public meeting(s).

Meeting notes, sign-in sheets, all comments received, and questions from the public included in Appendix C, D, E, F, and G.

Location	Webex virtual meeting and in person option at the Bertha Knight Landes Room located on Floor 1 of City Hall (600 Fourth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104)
Time	February 12, 2024, 12:00 pm

Location	Webex virtual meeting and in person option at a Community Center (details will be posted online shortly).
Time	February 27, 2024, 6:00 pm

Additionally, the City convened 15 neighborhood-specific organizations meetings to discuss the technology and receive feedback and questions. See the list of organizations below:

- SPD’s North, South, East, and West Precinct Advisory Councils
- NAACP
- Seattle Chamber of Commerce
- Greater Seattle Business Association (GSBA)
- Community Police Commission (CPC)
- African American Community Advisory Council
- East African Advisory Council
- Filipino Community of Seattle
- Emerald City Bible Fellowship Church
- Downtown public hearing
- Bitter Lake public hearing
- CID Community Safety Council (Including Friends of Little Saigon, CIDBIA, Seniors in Action etc.)
- For North Seattle
- ACLU
- Businesses and visitors along Aurora Ave North

3.0 Public Comment Analysis

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on April 12, 2024.

3.1 Summary of Response Volume

Total responses to the public form (<https://forms.office.com/g/yxJeiSh1JR>): 754

Question	Responses
1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?	734
2) Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of space in section one)	241
3) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?	506
4) Do you have additional comments/questions re what value do you see in this technology?	149
5) What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?	522

6) Do you have additional comments/considerations that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?	185
7) Do you have any additional comments or questions?	145

8. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Age Range

[More Details](#)


● Prefer not to identify	68
● Under 18	1
● 18 - 44	394
● 45 - 64	112
● 65+	63



9. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Neighborhood

[More Details](#)

● Prefer not to identify	79
● Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th	26
● Ballard	31
● Belltown	8
● Beacon Hill	36
● Capitol Hill	63
● Central District	60
● Chinatown/International District	24
● Columbia City	19
● Delridge	1
● Downtown Commercial Core	7
● First Hill	13
● Georgetown	1
● Greenwood / Phinney	24
● International District	5
● Interbay	2
● North	15
● Northeast	36
● Madison Park/ Madison Valley	8
● Magnolia	11
● Queen Anne	13
● Rainier Beach	13
● Ravenna / Laurelhurst	25
● South Lake Union	5
● Southeast	6
● Southwest	2
● South Park	7
● Uptown	7
● Wallingford / Fremont	27
● West Seattle	36
● King County	33
● Outside King County	6



10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

[More Details](#)


● Prefer not to say	108
● Woman	249
● Man	172
● Non-binary	61



11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

[More Details](#)

● Prefer not to identify	92
● Black / African American	11
● Hispanic / Latino	23
● Asian / Asian American	73
● Native Hawaiian or Pacific Island...	5
● Indigenous	9
● White or Caucasian	398
● Another race/ethnicity	7
● Other	7



3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix E.

3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix E.

3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix E.

3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.

Please see Appendix E.

3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Please see Appendix E.

4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on April 12, 2024.

4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

Concerns that have been raised through public comment and engagement will be addressed in SPD policy. SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for RTCC.

5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

The goals of this project are:

1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in specific geographic areas where the technologies are deployed.
2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
3. To measure and minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

We will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur because of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the Inspector General, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts.

Further, the City will retain outside academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an evaluation plan related to the use of the technologies.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group (“working group”), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

“Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement.”

Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

From: The Community Surveillance Working Group

To: Executive & Seattle City Council

Date: 07/26/2024

RE: Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for CCTV and RTCC

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment is completed by the Community Surveillance Working Group (“working group”), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

“Provide to the executive and the City Council a Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submission of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of

receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement.”

Executive Summary

Seattle IT provided the Working Group with the finalized Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) on June 4th, 2024, with an initial submission deadline of July 16th, 2024. Subsequently, the Working Group requested a two-week extension to July 30th, 2024. This document is the Working Group’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for both Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), given that they are two technologies that rely closely on each other in practice, as set forth in [SMC 14.18.080\(B\)\(1\)](#), which we provide for inclusion in the final SIR submitted to City Council.

The Working Group conducted a review of all provided materials within the SIR, including the SIR proposal from Seattle Police Department, letters from Seattle community organizations, and public comments. After reviewing the information, a majority of the working group is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies as described in the SIRs. The amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions both warrant pause on pilot deployment. Of the six members considering the CCTV and RTCC pilots, three are explicitly ‘against’, two are ‘unstated, with broad concern’, and one is ‘for CCTV within stated pilot, and for RTCC’. This sentiment reflects the high degree of apprehension expressed by a vast majority of the public’s comments. The City received a substantial number of public comments, both in-person and submitted electronically, regarding the potential misuse of these technologies. These comments were overwhelmingly negative and voiced a serious concern and lack of trust within the community as a whole of the Seattle Police Department’s plan to expand the use of surveillance technology. These views were not unanimous, as there was a small number of commenters who were supportive of the pilots, primarily citing the impacts of gun crimes in their communities. Yet, considering our assessment as well as input from public comment and community organizations, the working group believes that going forward with these acquisitions may serve to further erode with a significant portion the public’s trust in SPD and negatively affect community relations.

This document provides the Working Group’s concerns, recommendations, and outstanding questions regarding the consideration of CCTV and RTCC technology usage by SPD. Our assessment focuses on the following major issues, for which we provide more detail in the body of the document:

- 1. Possible infringements on reasonable expectation of protection from warrantless “unreasonable search” creating potential conflicts with The Fourth Amendment.**
- 2. Possible impact on First Amendment Right that might deter public engagement (peaceful protest, assembly, etc.)**
- 3. Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle.**
- 4. Apparent lack of public input for definition of deployment areas, specifically regarding proximity to sensitive public resources including open meeting spaces and medical centers.**
- 5. Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns.**
- 6. Concern over possible slippery slope regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals.**
- 7. Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices.**

- 8. Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data.**
- 9. The need for better definition of justification/success metrics and concrete timelines by which to measure them.**
- 10. Lack of clarity on policy areas that the SIR relies upon for future “general guidance” such as the Omnibus Surveillance Policy.**
- 11. Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit.**
- 12. Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of specific crime definitions and geographic reach.**

We thank the Public Safety Committee Chair, Seattle CTO, and Seattle City Council for their time and consideration of this Civil Liberties Assessment as a crucial piece of the SIR process.

Sincerely,

René Peters (Position #1, Co-Chair) Kayleigh

McNiel (Position #2, Co-Chair) Wendy

Novotne (Position #3)

John Yun-Kuang Chen (Position #4)

Carolyn Riley-Payne (Position #5) Alex

Maestretti (Position #7)

Key Concerns

1. Possible infringements on reasonable expectation of protection from warrantless “unreasonable search” creating potential conflicts with The Fourth Amendment.

Per the Fourth Amendment, citizens have a right to be free from unreasonable, warrantless searches when they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court of the US has held that citizens have a privacy interest in the whole of their movements, including those in public (See: [U.S. v. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 310, 138 S.Ct. 2206](#)). We consider the question “How could CCTV impact these rights?”

If the integration of live-monitored CCTV surveillance feeds (including use with RTCC) would result in the tracking of individuals as they move throughout areas of the City, it could raise constitutional concerns in light of recent Fourth Amendment case law establishing that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy to their movements in public. See [Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore](#) and [U.S. v. Carpenter](#).

In *Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle*, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, sitting en banc (all judges present), ruled that the Baltimore Police Department’s (BPD) aerial surveillance program, which included the surveillance of Baltimore residents movements, violated the Fourth Amendment (*Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep't*, 2 F.4th 330, 341 [4th Cir. 2021]). BPD contracted with a private company to pilot a surveillance program aimed at combating high rates of homicide and violent crime. The pilot involved 3rd party planes equipped with powerful wide-angle cameras flying over the entire city of Baltimore during 12 hours of daylight. The Fourth Circuit found that this persistent surveillance of outdoor movements invaded people’s reasonable expectation of privacy, explaining that “allowing the police to wield this power unchecked is anathema to the values enshrined in our Fourth Amendment.”

The Fourth Circuit based its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in *U.S. v. Carpenter*, which held that it was unconstitutional for law enforcement to obtain a person’s cell phone location data without a warrant because such information can be used to track the “whole of [a person’s] physical movements,” creating an “intimate window” into their life, including their “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”

While the technology at issue in both these cases is notably different than what SPD seeks to utilize here, the lack of clarity in the SIRs regarding the use of these proposed technologies raises concerns that such surveillance could reveal the intimate details of a person's life by tracking their movements throughout the City. As such, more review of this issue is warranted.

2. Possible impact on First Amendment Right that might deter public engagement (peaceful protest, assembly, etc.)


The working group believes there may be similar concerns with SPD’s deployment if the true potential and use of this technology results in the tracking of individual’s movements throughout the City. Furthermore, the use of CCTV surveillance, coupled with a RTCC’s enhanced license-plate readers, could be used to target protesters, deterring Seattle residents from exercising their First Amendment right to peacefully assemble and protest. Notably, the eastern

edge of the proposed “Downtown & Belltown Area” surveillance zone includes Westlake Park, which is frequently utilized as a public gathering space for protests, demonstrations, and other political and cultural events.

3. Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle.

The use of surveillance technologies inherently opens the door for outsized impact on immigrant, POC, and minority communities. These impacts can come to bear via inaccuracies in the technology itself (heightened statistics of incorrect recognition of subjects of color are well-documented), and simply by increasing the likelihood that citizens of color will be exposed to implicit biases during interactions with law enforcement or exposure to the criminal justice system.

With regard to the CCTV SIR, the placement of the proposed surveillance zones themselves may serve to put minority communities at higher risk. Per [2020 Census data organized by the University of Washington](#), the CCTV deployment areas have significant overlap with some of the highest-percentage minority population centers in King County. Virtually the entire Chinatown-International District zone comprises an area with a 77% non-white and 57% Asian population. The Downtown & Belltown zone overlaps areas with non-white populations as high as 58% and Black populations as high as 12%. The Aurora Avenue North Corridor zone overlaps areas of 49% and 63% non-white population, as well as some of the highest percentages of Hispanic/Latino population in the metro area (as much as 16%). This increases the chances that communities of color, immigrant community members, and other marginalized groups will be impacted by these technologies.



It is concerning that SPD does not substantially address this within its SIR, positing that “these technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.” People living in these communities, especially those who are unhoused, do not have a choice as to whether they are in a public place while going about their daily lives. Furthermore, when considering the City Council-defined inclusion criteria in the Racial Equity Toolkit, which expressly aims to “highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology”, SPD did not consider that the criteria “The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups” was met. By virtue of the coverage information above, as well as many of the other themes in this assessment, it is troubling that SPD appears to assert that there is no uneven impact with the proposed technology.

The working group expresses concern for collection of data on the “un-involved public” who are not a part of any in-progress or perpetrated criminal activity. It is mentioned in the SIR that “minors (children) are present in public spaces, SPD may record video with children present, however, because disclosure of images of any minor is presumed highly offensive, images of an identifiable minor are almost always exempt from public disclosure”. Yet, SPD provides no information on how a public disclosure exemption would work. First is the question of how confirmation of a minor’s presence within video data would be accomplished – without any stated age target, presumably measuring whether or not a member of the public is below the age of 18. It is already well documented that [children of color are often perceived to be older than their true age](#), creating an area of concern with this prospect. In that same vein, there is plenty of research on how image-based AI recognition misidentifies minority subjects at higher rates.

4. Apparent lack of public input for definition of deployment areas, and notification of technology presence, specifically regarding proximity to sensitive public resources including open meeting spaces and medical centers.

Public engagement is a key gateway leading to this working group to render a proper Privacy & Civil Liberties Assessment. It is a broad concern that the evaluation and implementation of this technology requires more public input in crucial areas, including but not limited to:

- How areas of coverage are determined.
- Identifying sensitive community resources, such as public meeting areas and medical centers.
- Communication of surveillance technology presence.

In the SIR, SPD notes a number of different possible public areas that they seek to deploy the technology, including “places like sidewalks, streets, parks” and “other public areas”. The verbiage around what constitutes an appropriate public space is vague, and furthermore, the definition of “public” is subjective and could differ between SPD and community members. The lack of a definitive list of acceptable spaces for deployment risks unstructured reach for SPD to make their own determinations. The creation of an exhaustive list of accepted location types,

that is reviewed collaboratively with communities, and clearly published, would be a measure that could increase public understanding and trust.

On the matter of coverage area determination, SPD notes in the SIR that “Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.” Yet, the methodology behind matching crime data to hyper-localized boundaries is very opaque. These data were not presented to the working group in any of the SIR documentation.

It is also apparent that there were missed opportunities to engage the public during the formulation of the surveillance areas. This presents an issue, as these areas defined by crime statistics include sensitive community resources, such as the aforementioned Westlake Park. Another example lies near the “Aurora Avenue North Corridor”, where the surveillance area directly borders the Planned Parenthood Northgate Health Center. This puts citizens seeking critical health care services directly in the line of fire of surveillance, when there is a long and well-documented history of [tracking](#), protests, and [violence](#) against these health centers. A quick search on the effective range of some models of PTZ cameras, as referenced in the SIR, shows that they are able to “[identify license plates and people from ~140m away](#)” and that there “is a sufficient level of detail to positively identify” a person (Model example: Uniview IPC94144SFW-X25-F40C). Thus, there is warranted-concern that a CCTV pilot deployed in this area could not only be used to identify vehicles but even individuals seeking healthcare services at Planned Parenthood Northgate Health Center.



With earlier communication and review of these proposed pilot zones with the public, there may have been opportunities to flag these sensitive overlaps, and for SPD to determine coverage areas that avoided them. As it stands, this serves as another potential disparate impact to a BIPOC and marginalized community.




Another area of concern with this SIR is that there is not a detailed plan for reasonable notification of CCTV usage for the public. The basic requirement should be that there should be some type of signage, visual cue, or other easily-understood signal that 1) cameras are present, and 2) they are operational/being actively operated. The SIR states that “The cameras themselves will be visible to the public, and signs will be placed to alert the public to their presence and use“. Yet, this gives way to a number of other considerations. In the case of a visual/posted sign or flier, what is the correct verbiage to accurately describe the scope of the camera usage? Signs and fliers posted in English will not be sufficient to notify non-English speakers that they are in a surveillance area. This is especially concerning given the fact that the

areas that have been chosen for consideration are home to a high concentration of many immigrant communities with a high amount of non-English speakers or citizens who are non-EFL. Signs may also have very low noticeability after daylight hours – understanding if the CCTV cameras themselves have lights to indicate their placement to passers by would be helpful, but the SIR doesn't contain information on any specific SKU or model. Neither signage nor lighting would be an effective notification for somebody who has a visual impairment, or is blind. As it stands, this too serves as another potential disparate risk to Seattle's BIPOC and differently-abled communities.

5. Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns.

The SIR describes that cameras “can range from simple fixed cameras to more sophisticated cameras with pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) as well as other capabilities (infrared night vision, high definition imaging, etc.)”, but it is difficult to render a full assessment from a technology standpoint when there is not specific information on the vendors, models, and specifications of the devices in question.

Providing information on the vendor(s) would allow the working group to understand more about their previous history of deployments, clients, partners, etc. Providing information about the specific models of cameras (product names, SKU #'s) would allow the working group to consider the full range of capabilities such as maximum viewing/zoom range, image fidelity (ability to discern individuals/objects at distance), and visibility (chassis, operation lights, etc). The SIR provides maps of the surveillance coverage areas, and while it is unstated, we assume that this represents the potential physical placement of the cameras and not the viewable range of the cameras. The width of the Aurora Avenue North Corridor (pictured below) measures roughly 650ft at the intersection of Aurora and 105th. We have already established above that some camera models have effective ranges of over 140m (about 450ft). The true coverage of the zones should reflect the possible placement of cameras, including the effective camera range (see picture of 105th and Aurora, camera ranges if placed on the edge of the shaded area represented by orange boxes). For this, the specifications of the cameras need to be well-understood. This underlines why the full technical specifications of all involved technologies would be very helpful context to have in-hand before considering a pilot rollout – the inability to gauge the actual footprint of the technology poses a public risk.



Another reason why it's important to have vendor information in-hand prior to evaluating the SIRs is that, once installed, each vendor may have a different process of updating functionalities and software. SPD should have a published protocol on how to manage this. If a vendor rolls out new features/functions that need to be physically installed, or can be remotely installed via a software update, should that new functionality trigger a new SIR loop? There may be a risk that software updates could automatically roll in an unapproved functionality. This is another area that risks an uncontrolled expansion of surveillance reach.

Possible evidentiary issues are unclear due to lack of specifics surrounding the CCTV camera capabilities; if these cameras record sound as well as video, they may not be admissible under the Washington Privacy Act without a much clearer warning than the posted signs. See [Lewis v. DOL \(2006\)](#). In *Lewis*, the WA Supreme Court held that the WA Privacy Act RCW 9.73 requires that officers inform detainees that the officers are recording their conversation. Courts exclude police body cam and ICV videos when the audio and video recording admonishment is not clearly captured on the video. While *Lewis* was specific to in-car video recordings of interactions with law enforcement during traffic stops, the admonishment requirement could be applied to police-operated CCTV cameras that record sound. As such, if a court finds the posted signs are inefficient to notify individuals that their conversations are being recorded, these videos could be excluded.

The worry is that lack of specifics in these areas means that acceptance of the SIR as written may also constitute somewhat of a 'blank check' when it comes to SPD/the City purchasing devices with advanced surveillance capabilities. Information on vendors and models should be made publicly available with opportunity to provide input, for transparency.

6. Concern over possible slippery slope regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals.

The SIRs contain multiple elements of ambiguity with regards to exactly which AI tools ("Edge-Based Analytics capabilities") can be used on raw CCTV footage during and after recording. While the SIR mentions that "SPD will not use AI facial recognition tools", it also notes that other aspects of AI may be used such as: "object recognition (e.g., identifying vehicles or people by the clothing they are wearing or items they may be carrying)" as well as "in-application video analytics that use machine learned algorithms to analyze camera feeds and, using object recognition, locate specific items, people based on clothing, or vehicles based on description"

Clearly, there is a wide range of items that can be recognized, tagged, and logged with this technology. The ability to track personally identifiable aspects of individuals is an evident concern, but also concerning is that the verbiage of the SIR does not provide clarity on if there is a definitive list of specific targets of analysis, as well as assurance that other items won't be added in the future. In a February community meeting, SPD said that it "would not use any biometric identification tools", but without a publicly-available list of analysis types for accountability, there is concern that other types of AI analysis may be implemented without formal approval cycles, such as a tool that could hone in on a person's height/weight measurements, or gait patterns as they move through public spaces.

Additionally, due to Washington's public disclosure laws, bad actors could access information about

community members through [Public Disclosure Requests](#) (PDRs) for the CCTV video. This system could potentially be misused by abusers exposing victims of gender-based violence to further harm, harassment and stalking. Undocumented community members may be targeted by federal agencies seeking a work-around to Seattle’s policy of being a “sanctuary city.” Those seeking safe reproductive health care could be targeted by out-of-state agencies or actors seeking to harness CCTV footage as evidence against them in states which may soon criminalize reproductive health care.

7. Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices.

The working group flags a significant risk to civil liberties posed by third-party involvement in camera deployment. The inclusion of these devices risks opening a “Pandora's box” of uncontained expansion of CCTV coverage, and the SIR does not provide a sufficient risk mitigation plan for their implementation.

Similar to the problem of not understanding which vendors SPD would plan to purchase camera equipment from, there is even less control on what vendors third parties implement in their own respects. Many of these parties have had different models of cameras installed for short and long term operation at the time of this assessment. When evidence created by these cameras would go on to be used in criminal investigations, it is extremely important to establish a baseline or range for which cameras are acceptable. Differences in quality can be the difference between a correct identification and a mistaken identification – the difficulty that would come with enforcing a uniform standard across third-party cameras makes their integration problematic. There is no understanding of how SPD would logistically integrate a third-party camera into their system, and how they would make sure that the data transfers are done in a secure manner that can be maintained. SPD does not provide any information as to how many third party cameras that they would aim to integrate (whether it be a small amount to test if they can be integrated correctly, or a ceiling on how many they would integrate). There is no established way for accountability parties such as the OIG to interact with entities that provide access to their third-party cameras.

This risk is pronounced due to the fact that even with proposed SPD-owned CCTV cameras, the general policy for their use is incomplete, leaving no way to determine that the third-party feeds meet standards (quality inconsistency, data storage inconsistency, placement and notification inconsistency, etc). The working group thus broadly feels that inclusion of third party cameras is inappropriate, especially for a pilot stage rollout.

8. Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data.

With regard to the people reviewing the CCTV/RTCC data, there were a number of concerns surrounding privacy policies and access accountability. The SIR notes that “only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system” but there is a need for better understanding of what the qualifications to become authorized (if different than simply being an SPD officer or OIG member), as well as details about the training that these individuals undergo. Clarity on what types of training need to be completed, and at what frequency, would help to match areas of concern with proficiencies that the training aims to provide. The RTCC SIR notes that “The vision is for SPD to staff a real-time crime center with a

combination of sworn officers and civilian staff, eventually transitioning to a more civilian-staffed model”. Thus, there is a need to understand any differences between training that sworn staff and civilian staff receive. What are the qualifications of civilian staff to gain access to information, and do they need to clear a higher bar to have access due to the fact that they do not have the ability to enforce the law? Will they need to complete background checks? It is important that standards such as SPD Policy 12.050 and Security Awareness Training (and Level 1, Level 2, etc.) be clearly explained and understood in the context of AI technology.

The methodology behind how individuals access CCTV and RTCC systems is also left relatively opaque within the SIRs. SPD Policy 12.050 appears to provide some guidance on user logs and query, but any pilot would need to be abundantly sure that access protocols such as proper authentication, time-logging for searches, types of searches, etc. are clearly collected and top line data shared with the public.

Data retention time is another area of concern. There are apparent mismatches between the retention time for data. Retention time is stated as of 30 days for “dispatch, CCTVs, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems” at one point in the RTCC SIR while another part of the same document states that “ALPR data will be maintained for 90 days”. The working group also expressed concern around the 30 day retention time itself, and would prefer for there to be a shorter retention time to minimize exposure to possible bad actors or misuse. A shorter retention period would have a range of positive impacts for privacy - from reducing risk of inadvertent disclosure, to forcing a level of priority in capturing evidence only for the most serious infractions.

All in all, surveillance of this kind could enable police to track the movement of individuals as they go about their daily lives, exposing such intimate details as where they live, where they work, what stores they shop, what parks they take their children to, and who they engage with in the community. Once this data is collected, there is risk that it would be misused to target individuals who may not have been on law enforcement’s radar otherwise. Clear, specific, publicly available standards are needed to limit the misapplication of the technology. These policies must be constantly reevaluated and improved as time goes on.

9. The need for better definition of justification/success metrics, concrete timelines by which to measure them, and public transparency about collected data.

The SIR lays out three main improvement themes: deterrence, response, and investigation.

- With regard to deterrence, the assertion that the presence of CCTV will deter violent and persistent felony crimes in the surveilled areas is dubious. There is no information to suggest a strong linkage between video footage used as evidence and metrics such as: correctly identified suspects, convictions, how often footage is accepted as evidence in trials. SIR-mentioned study results do not demonstrate effectiveness of cameras:
 - The Fayetteville 2023 study points to a moderate clearance increase

- The Dallas study concludes that implementation is not cost-effective for clearance rate increase (limited to thefts, not violent felonies)
- The 2019 New York study points to a significant-to-modest decrease in crime, but specifically for crime in residential areas and car parking properties. It also warns that cameras “should not be used as a standalone crime prevention measure”

Many, if not all, of the currently proposed areas currently have privately owned and city-owned cameras already. The SIR documentation lacks strong metrics and outcomes to show that either currently in-place cameras or proposed cameras have provided/will provide enough positive deterrence, response, and investigation improvements to justify their installation.

- With regard to response, the assertion is that CCTV will allow responders to more effectively identify perpetrators, secure the scene, and bring resources to bear (medical, etc). This assessment has already underlined concerns such as recognizing and quantifying the risk of misidentification (which has both a higher likelihood and an outsized impact in communities of color).
- With regard to investigation, the assertion is that detectives will be able to ID suspects, and prosecutors will be able to use CCTV as evidence to secure convictions. This is again a dubious assertion without data points such as: number of pieces of evidence retained, amount of video evidence used in prosecutions, rate of successful convictions or pleas compared to base rate.

Another layer of critical public visibility that the SIR does not explain in detail is publicly-visible data on usage and access. In the RTCC SIR, SPD notes that “SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions” As part of the SIR process, it would have been useful if SPD had presented prototypes for what such a dashboard would look like, and provide information on exactly how members of the public would access them (what city website would this dashboard be accessible from?). Furthermore, in the spirit of public transparency, any CCTV stream should be publicly accessible. An example of such a setup exists on the [WSDOT real-time cameras webpage](#), which shows camera views on a set refresh rate such as 2 or 5 minutes. As it stands in the submitted SIRs, the lack of deliberate and well-defined measures to improve data and collection visibility puts any Data Analytics Team/City Auditor in a poor position to report for things like the annual equity assessment, and would broadly undercut public trust.

Timeframe is another crucial aspect to any pilot, and it appears that the SIRs may not provide a clear mechanism for the pilot to end. The CCTV SIR states that “outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of two”, but this in itself may not address any go/no-go mechanism behind the assessments. This Civil Liberties Assessment touches on the need for very clear metrics and understanding of how they will be measured. So too must there be clear actions at each checkpoint in the pilot deployment. Specifically, what are the actions that will

occur if not met, such as uninstall/decommissioning of the technology? Furthermore, who will be the “outside academic experts”, what will their areas of expertise be, and how will the public be able to input on the formation of that review group? The working group flags the need to verify and ensure a clear endpoint for any pilot, such that initiating a pilot won’t allow indefinite usage and/or expansion without a built-in control.

10. Lack of clarity on policy areas that the SIR relies upon for future “general guidance” such as the Omnibus Surveillance Policy.

Another concern is the lack of a sound policy that ensures compliance with the parameters of the pilot programs in question. Approval of the use of these technologies without first establishing a policy governing their use and operation poses substantial risk that they be misused to compromise individual rights and liberties of Seattle community members. While drafting such policies is likely time consuming, their absence only adds to the concern voiced by many in the community that these acquisition requests are being rushed through without proper diligence and community input.

Currently the SIR notes the following regarding governing policy:

“SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here.”

It is difficult for the working group to render an informed opinion on the true civil liberties impact of these technologies when the core governance is incomplete. Between the two SIRs, SPD refers to the to-be-written omnibus policy seven individual times for questions relating to 1) processes required prior to technology use/access, 2) legal standards that must be met before the project/technology is used, 3) addressing concerns from the public, and 4) potential unintended consequences and steps to take to ensure that these consequences won’t occur.

Each of these questions is critical for understanding the scope of controls behind the pilots, and the protocols to measure and respond to their impacts to the community. Without an understanding of the timing of the omnibus policy rollout, the protections it puts in place, who is inputting, and how the community has a chance to input, the approval of these technologies without this crucial aspect completed would be premature.

11. Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit.

A well-established network of professional and community oversight entities is important to drive accountability and transparency with a technology deployment within said communities. The lack of a clear plan for an oversight network, or a plan that relies on internal reviews within SPD, are insufficient to foster public trust. The SIR gives responsibility to SPD unit supervisors, as well as “any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General can audit for compliance at any time”.

Because the OIG appears to be the primary auditor for these pilots, the relationship between SPD and OIG needs to be very well understood in order to determine how robust of an accountability insurance there is. Although the OIG will have the ability to initiate an audit at any time, it is unclear exactly how the audit process works. An understanding of what the audit is composed of, such as questions, metrics, and scoring scale, would be helpful. Furthermore, there is an open question on what the OIG's "anytime access" means. Does it mean that they are able to remotely look at the same feeds and metrics that SPD sees, or that they have to physically appear at SPD offices to initiate an audit? If there is a delay between the announcement of intent to audit and the access to the information itself, there is a risk for malpractice by the information handlers. It is also unclear how often the OIG, on average, would initiate audits. The working group recommends that there be a mix of scheduled (such as monthly or quarterly) and unannounced audits to maximize accountability.

A useful function of the OIG, for example, might be to take over or oversee the creation of the aforementioned group of "outside academic subject matter experts" such that SPD (the subjects of the review in essence) are not solely responsible for sourcing their own reviewers. This would be a great measure for increasing public trust.

Within the context of "any appropriate auditor", the definition of appropriate may be subjective subject to SPD's judgment. There should be a clear outline of what makes an auditing organization able to initiate an audit. This way, any public interest groups, community organizations, or even national bodies for accountability, could know what information to provide SPD to help with accountability.

12. Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of: specific crime definitions and geographic reach.

Whether it is through uncontained inclusion of devices such as third party cameras or lack of clear pilot timelines, the inability to control the scope of the proposed pilots is a leading area of concern. This also applies to the definition of crimes used for justification of the technologies, and the amount of coverage that the surveillance technology would have in the city.

The working group has concerns about the definition of crimes presenting an opportunity to expand the justifications for technology use within the pilot. While crimes such as gun violence and human trafficking may be more apparent, the SIR also points to "other persistent crimes" which the working group sees as potentially broad in definition. Knowing what is included and excluded in this category, and if there is a definitive list of offenses, would aid evaluation of the proposal. Limiting the possibility of additional justifications to be added after the fact is important to maintain a clearly defined pilot, and to be able to produce transparent documentation for the public.

The working group also has concerns – especially given many of the other areas such as pilot governance, AI technology risks, and community input – that the amount of deployment locations would multiply the risk presented to citizens. Multiple working group members have

questioned the rollout of four CCTV locations (Aurora, Belltown, Chinatown, Downtown) given the lack of definition in key areas. Specifically, these questions center around why there is no proposed option to limit the scope of the pilot to one of these areas. A smaller rollout would limit negative impacts to the public while gaining tangible data and insights. Upon positive results (this necessitates an improved and fully developed review/assessment process as described above), the City would consider expansion and another round of proposals for said expansions. The high degree of concern in the areas above make the larger rollout proposed in the SIR a worrisome proposition.

Recommendations

- 1. Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle.**
 - Produce a map that reflects neighborhood demographics (minority community percentage) and then overlay them with the coverage areas of the video cameras.
 - Revisit the Racial Equity Toolkit with acknowledgement of disparate impact on communities of color.

- 2. Apparent lack of public input for definition of deployment areas, specifically regarding proximity to sensitive public resources including open meeting spaces and medical centers.**
 - Further expand and engage in ongoing outreach to affected communities before the implementation of the pilot program. Establish regular quarterly meetings with impacted communities to ensure transparency, foster trust, and reduce potential impact on.
 - Schedule periodic meetings (quarterly for instance) with each community area to sense difficulties, concerns, incidents, risk to sensitive community resources, related to the technology implementation.
 - Ensure that notice of surveillance is accessible to all. Ideally, signs should be in multiple languages common in the surveilled communities. Imagery on the signs should clearly indicate that video cameras are recording and these signs should be in well-lit areas or illuminated to ensure notice is available regardless of the time of day.
 - Develop a community-reviewed plan for notice of surveillance to differently-abled individuals and validate it with public interest groups with expertise in design for differently-abled individuals.

- 3. Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns.**
 - Produce detailed information on the requirements put on CCTV cameras, vendor information, and full specifications (effective range, infrared, night vision, pan-tilt-zoom functionality, etc).

- Ensure that the following are made publicly available: How many cameras exist within surveillance zones, names of the manufacturers, vendors, model names, and model numbers of camera devices.
 - Create publicly shared data on how many cameras devices SPD owns, how many people have access to the cameras, and collect data on how long it takes the SD to review data and dispose of the footage.
 - Create a published protocol on how to manage hardware and software updates to any installed technology to limit uncontained expansion of surveillance capability. If a vendor rolls out new features/functions that need to be physically installed, or can be remotely installed via a software update, should that new functionality trigger a new SIR loop?
 - Require further clarity on the specifics of a potential new RTCC before approving it: There has not been enough information provided by SPD regarding the specifications of this technology to determine whether it will provide any measurable benefits over the RTCC technology SPD currently employs.
- 4. Concern over possible slippery slope regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals**
- Do not engage in live-monitoring of CCTV footage unless an active emergency or event is taking place. This would limit the potential for individuals to be targeted with surveillance for low level property crimes. A policy directive could state that AFTER an event is reported to SPD, a detective or screening Sergeant may send a request to RTCC personnel to pull the CCTV footage for review in relation to the serious offense reported in the area. This would preserve the evidentiary purpose of this technology to investigate and solve serious violent crimes such as gun violence while limiting the potential impact on civil rights and liberties.
 - Consider a practice of exempting the public by default unless there is a crime occurrence within a timespan by eliminating personally identifiable data (faces) from data on a running basis and only unlocking via court order.
 - Require transparency and review for any automated analytic tools and ensure unapproved tools are not available.
 - Produce a published list of all models utilized as part of analysis of CCTV streams, as well as provided information on the datasets that were used to train that model.
 - Review and reapply learnings from GDPR (European standard for data protection)
- 5. Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices.**
- Do not allow private 3rd-party camera feeds to opt into the CCTV and RTCC system.
- 6. Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data.**

- Do not engage in live-monitoring of CCTV footage – only access via a specific time-marked request after a crime is reported.
- SPD should submit design proposals for the dashboard format and they should be reviewed before deployment. They should be accessible, detailed, updated in real time, and easily found.
- Locations where police actions and data requests occur should be marked and searchable through time on a map interface.
- Reduce storage time and retention of CCTV recordings to 14 days to limit potential impact on civil liberties and possible data abuse. Formulate a review process for reducing the impact on victims and vulnerable community members.

7. The need for better definition of justification/success metrics and concrete timelines by which to measure them.

- Come to more clear metrics on what the city would be tracking to answer the question “what does success look like?”. This includes understanding the measurement units of each of these metrics and they should be agreed and determined BEFORE technologies are rolled out.
- Institute a hard-stop date regarding pilot deployment. For example, limit any pilot program to one year: shortening the pilot program and requiring lengthy tracking of data related to its use will help in reducing the potential impact on civil rights and liberties while allowing the City to evaluate the effectiveness of this technology.
- Provide a rubric for effectiveness assessments. This will include acceptable ranges or clearances for each metric. The plan will also have a protocol for creating a score by which to grade continuation of the pilot or cancellation of the pilot. A clear plan for pilot cancellation needs to be defined, including logistics for uninstallation, etc.
- Ensure transparency in use: Track all law enforcement actions resulting from the use of these technologies and publicly publish results in a quarterly report.
- Any CCTV stream should be publicly accessible. An example of such a setup exists on the [WSDOT real-time cameras webpage](#), which shows camera views on a set refresh rate such as 2 or 5 minutes.

8. Lack of clarity on policy areas that the SIR relies upon for future “general guidance” such as the Omnibus Surveillance Policy.

- Require SPD to formulate and publish clear policies outlining the use, operational management, and limitations of this technology BEFORE being allowed to employ it into the community (including the Omnibus policy). The publishing process needs to have community input.

9. Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit.

- Define a periodic audit by OIG, and ability to initiate ‘unannounced’ audits simultaneously.
- Mandate quarterly auditing through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with OIG to ensure ongoing compliance with policies, City ordinances, and pilot program parameters.
- A useful function of the OIG, for example, might be to take over or oversee the creation of the aforementioned group of “outside academic subject matter experts” such that SPD (the subjects of the review in essence) are not solely responsible for sourcing their own reviewers. This would be a great measure for increasing public trust.
- There should be a clear outline of what makes an auditing organization able to initiate an audit. This way, any public interest groups, community organizations, or even national bodies for accountability, could know what information to provide SPD to help with accountability.

10. Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of specific crime definitions and geographic reach.

- Produce documentation outlining specific definitions of the crimes, and corresponding reasons why each technology is well-suited for addressing that crime need to be outlined.
- Limit CCTV use to only the serious violent offenses outlined in the SIR as the motivation for this pilot project.
- Limit any pilot program to one location: limiting the pilot program to one community will reduce the potential impact on civil rights and liberties for Seattle community members. It will further ensure that the pilot program remains a test program aimed at a particular purpose. The decision on which location will be selected should be made based on data regarding violent crimes in the area and input from the affected community.
- Create true coverage maps of the zones that are reflective of not only the possible placement of cameras, but also the effective camera ranges.

Questions

- 1. Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle.**
 - Why isn’t ‘disproportionately impacts POC’ checked in the RET given the clear contextual indication that these deployment areas for CCTV impact POC communities?
 - How will SPD respond to privacy concerns for victims and marginalized community members when PDRs for CCTV are requested by those with the intent to harass or harm them?
- 2. Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns.**
 - With this, there should also be an understanding of the ‘permanence’ of the installations. With camera infrastructure and RTCC installation, these are costly and if they don’t work, what will happen?

- 3. Concern over possible slippery slope regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals.**
 - The CCTV SIR mentions at least 43 WA municipalities already use this or some form of CCTV. What are those municipalities and to what extent are they using CCTV?
 - Are there or will there ever be plans to use personally identifiable aspects of human likeness (body type, height, projected weight, etc) to identify people with AI in the video footage?
 - How would children’s image be excluded from disclosure?
 - Is the data collected via the patrol car camera device connected in any way to the street cameras in targeted areas?

- 4. Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices.**
 - Explain the process by which private owners of video security systems will be sharing streams from their cameras. Will these videos be “public” in nature? If these owners are business owners, will individuals receive notice of such recordings?

- 5. Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data.**
 - What is the average holding time for state cases where video evidence is used?
 - How will a PDR or records request affect the retention time of CCTV video? if a request is received within the 30 day retention window, will that mean the video will be destroyed after it is released or will it continue to be retained?
 - Statement: “Video recordings will be kept on the cameras for 30 days, and not retained for a longer duration unless manually extracted by authorized personnel via the video management system software.” – Is there no obligation for an authorized personnel to dispose of any manually extracted data if there is no crime observed after 30 days?
 - Statement: “Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.” – Does this supersede normal deletion times?

- 6. The need for better definition of justification/success metrics and concrete timelines by which to measure them.**
 - Does SPD or the city have an already in-place network of cameras deployed in these same surveillance areas? What have been the issues and positive results from accessing these cameras?
 - How many cases per year are created by the data gathered from on street camera devices in other targeted areas?
 - What parameters will be used to determine success? CCTV SIR indicates that SPD will evaluate and terminate the pilot if it is not successful and that assessments will be completed at the end of 1 year and at the end of 2 years. Who will be responsible for these evaluations?

- Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to assist in evaluation: How will these subject matter experts be selected and what criteria will need to be met to establish them as experts?
- If the City Council does not approve the CCTV technology acquisition, how would the different possible versions of the proposed RTCC tech differ from the RTCC SPD currently uses?
 - Without acquisition of the CCTV program, what is the benefit of a new RTCC and would that decrease the projected cost of the new program?
- If CCTV is not approved, what is the impact on RTCC – is it rendered ineffective?
- What makes the potential 2024 rollout of RTCC pilot different than what already has been in place since 2015?
- “The SPD does not currently have any policies related to RTCC” – how is this possible if it’s [been installed since 2015](#)?

7. Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit.

- What is the realistic staffing required in order to maintain and run this system? Does it take officers off of the street?

8. Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of specific crime definitions and geographic reach.

- How is a geographic location identified as a high-crime area? Specifically, what are the quantitative and qualitative benchmarks or thresholds for consideration?

CTO Response to Working Group Assessment

Memo

Date: August 2, 2024
To: Seattle City Council
From: Rob Lloyd, Chief Technology Officer
Subject: CTO Response to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for CCTV and RTCC by the Community Surveillance Working Group

Purpose

This document is prepared pursuant to the Surveillance Ordinance ([SMC 14.18.020 G.](#) and [SMC 14.18.080](#)) stating, “Prior to submittal of a SIR to Council, the CTO may provide a written statement that addresses privacy rights, civil liberty or other concerns that are raised in the impact assessment created by the Working Group pursuant to Section 14.18.080.” This memo outlines the Chief Technology Officer’s (CTO’s) response to the Community Surveillance Working Group assessment on the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software. The two new technologies proposed by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) are components of an overall *One Seattle* Safety Framework and strengthen the City’s public safety response to aid victims, hold accountable those responsible for gun violence, alert real-time crime center staff to serious criminal events, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey situational awareness to officers responding in the field.

Background

The Information Technology Department (ITD) meets the objectives of the Privacy Principles and Surveillance Ordinance by providing oversight and transparency about the use and acquisition of specialized technologies with potential privacy and civil liberties impacts. All City departments have a shared mission to protect lives and property while balancing potential negative impacts of technology use and data collection on individuals. This requires appropriate use of privacy-invasive technologies through technology limitations, policy, training, and departmental oversight.

The CTO’s role in the SIR process has been to ensure that all City departments are compliant with the Surveillance Ordinance requirements. As part of the review work for surveillance technologies, ITD’s Privacy Office has facilitated the creation of the Surveillance Impact Report documentation, including collecting comments and suggestions from the Working Group and members of the public about these technologies. ITD, SPD, and the Mayor’s Office have also worked collaboratively with the Working Group and the public to answer additional questions that arose during the public comment period and SIR review process. Of note, the public input process, program design, and responses for the proposed technologies involved 17 public meetings and feedback from both community members and activists.

Technology Purpose

The City of Seattle is exploring new technologies to help detect, deter, and interdict crime in discrete locations (e.g., hotspots) where gun violence, human trafficking, and violent crime are persistent. The Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Project is a new public safety program that will combine a

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System with Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software together in one view.

The SPD CCTV camera systems are proposed to be installed at locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent violent crime is concentrated. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas. Signs acknowledging use of the cameras will be posted in the immediate area of deployment, and street fliers will be distributed. Privately-owned security systems will be able to voluntarily share video of storefronts and areas where the public has access with SPD.

Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one single view. The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

The pilot program will be deployed to three of the five major crime hotspots in Seattle — Aurora Avenue North, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core, including parts of Belltown. Sensing and data-driven technologies must be matched with proper controls, training, and community engagement to ensure use preserves both public safety and equity.

Working Group Concerns

In their review, the Working Group highlighted the following issues:

- 1) Possible infringements on reasonable expectation of protection from warrantless “unreasonable search” creating potential conflicts with The Fourth Amendment;
- 2) Possible impact on First Amendment Right that might deter public engagement (peaceful protest, assembly, etc.);
- 3) Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle;
- 4) Apparent lack of public input for definition of deployment areas, specifically regarding proximity to sensitive public resources including open meeting spaces and medical centers;
- 5) Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns;
- 6) Concern over possible slippery slope regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals;
- 7) Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices;
- 8) Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data;
- 9) The need for better definition of justification/success metrics and concrete timelines by which to measure them;
- 10) Lack of clarity on policy areas that the SIR relies upon for future “general guidance” such as the Omnibus Surveillance Policy;
- 11) Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit; and
- 12) Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of specific crime definitions and geographic reach.

The Mayor’s Office, Police Department, and Information Technology Department understand the concerns raised by the Working Group. To address these, the pilot program will be implemented with

several protections addressing privacy concerns or unintended consequences. This includes limiting surveillance to public places in specific geographic areas where the identified crimes are concentrated, visible appropriate language signage, prohibiting the use of AI facial recognition, minimizing retention periods, broad neighborhood outreach before and during the pilot project, a rigorous and independent implementation and outcome evaluation led by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and outside academic subject matter experts, and reporting to the public on the project's performance and outcomes.

The Privacy Impact Assessment and Racial Equity Toolkit section of the SIR document answers the issues about the collection, use, sharing, security, and access controls for the data part of the pilot program. The policy, training, and technology controls proposed by SPD adequately mitigate the potential privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the Working Group provided ongoing monitoring is established. As a pilot program, it has clear set goals and evaluation measures under a *Continuous Impact Assessment* framework with outside academic subject matter experts. SPD's proposed public-facing dashboard must update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies to maintain the proposed level of transparency.

Response to Community Surveillance Working Group Assessment:

SPD and ITD look forward to working together with the City Council to achieve the three goals of (1) greater public safety, (2) protecting the privacy and civil rights of our residents, and (3) providing transparency to our public. Emerging technologies require new levels of community engagement and co-building safety solutions with neighborhood input, as well as working with companies to create necessary controls and transparency in the tools and data cities choose to use. In consultation with SPD, the following sections respond to the Working Group comments and recommendations with additional edits to the published SIR.

- 1) Possible infringements on reasonable expectation of protection from warrantless “unreasonable search” creating potential conflicts with The Fourth Amendment.
 - Section 1.2 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 1.2: SPD's proposed CCTV camera systems would capture video of identifiable individuals, some of whom may be unaware of the recording, despite signage. Without appropriate safeguards, this raises significant privacy concerns which has resulted in this review. Recognizing these concerns, SPD proposes the CCTV camera systems will be utilized in a limited fashion, in locations with risk trends, and only in public-facing locations. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas, and visible signs acknowledging use of the cameras will be posted.

- 2) Possible impact on First Amendment Right that might deter public engagement (peaceful protest, assembly, etc.)
 - Section 1.2 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 1.2: SPD's proposed CCTV camera systems would capture video of identifiable individuals, some of whom may be unaware of the recording, despite signage. Without appropriate safeguards, this raises significant privacy concerns which has resulted in this review. Recognizing these concerns, SPD proposes the CCTV camera systems will be utilized in a limited fashion, in locations with risk

trends, and only in public-facing locations. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas and visible signs acknowledging use of the cameras will be posted.

- 3) Risk of disparate impact of surveillance technologies on minority communities within Seattle.
 - Section 1.3 of the CCTV Racial Equity Toolkit addresses this issue.
 - Section 1.3: SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department is assigned to actively manage performance measures reflecting the “total cost of ownership of public safety,” Equity, Accountability, and Quality (“EAQ”), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform development of more effective Evidence-Based Policing (EBP), the technologies are location-specific, deployed based on concentrated Priority 1 criminal activity, rebalanced by analysts for equity, and narrow in view, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used and signed. These mitigating factors reduce, to the extent possible, disparate impact of potential police actions.
- 4) Apparent lack of public input for definition of deployment areas, specifically regarding proximity to sensitive public resources including open meeting spaces and medical centers.
 - Section 2.0 of the CCTV Racial Equity Toolkit addresses this issue.
 - Section 2.0: The City’s public engagement and input process included two citywide public meetings, 15 neighborhood meetings, and feedback from organizations such as the NAACP, ACLU, and advisory groups from the pilot areas. In addition, the six Community Safety Forums held across the city from April to May also included opportunities for public comment on the technologies.
 - The pilot locations under consideration are at three of the five major hotspot locations in Seattle: Aurora Avenue North, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core including parts of Belltown. These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated.
- 5) Lack of specifics as to the sourcing and capabilities of the proposed technologies in both CCTV and RTCC SIRs, reflecting broader privacy concerns.
 - Section 2.3 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue. Technical specifications with the technology solution occur after Council approval of the SIR and are finalized during the contract process with the potential vendor.
 - Section 2.3: Each CCTV system consists of the following, with some variance depending on the specific technology/vendor solution that is selected.

- Cameras: these can range from simple fixed cameras to more sophisticated cameras with pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) as well as other capabilities (infrared night vision, high-definition imaging, etc.).
 - The City will initiate the use of standard contract terms providing the following:
 - Prohibit collecting data that is not within the public view. This includes any data not readily visible from a public area or public property;
 - Prohibit monitoring individual or group activities legally allowed in the State of Washington and/or protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
 - Prohibit sharing with immigration authorities or use in the investigation of any matter related to immigration status of an individual;
 - Prohibit engaging in automated citations or other automated enforcement without manual review from SPD staff;
 - Prohibit selling any data generated by ALPR to any entity; and
 - Stating data ownership and right to use from camera operations and/or activity shall remain at all times the City's.
- 6) Concern over possible “slippery slope” regarding the use of different types of artificial intelligence to monitor personally identifiable aspects of individuals.
- Section 1.2 and 2.3 of the RTCC Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 1.2: SPD will not use AI facial recognition technologies.
 - Section 2.3: This technology complies with the city of Seattle's AI rules for use, requiring a "human in the loop" at the initiation and evaluation of the results. SPD will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends.
- 7) Privacy, quality, and governance risks presented by the inclusion of third-party CCTV devices.
- Section 1.1 and 3.1 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 1.1: Privately-owned security systems will be able to voluntarily share video of storefronts and areas where the public has access with SPD. This option would be fully voluntary at the discretion of the camera owners. Private camera owners can also set up conditional sharing, meaning they can determine the parameters of what, how, and when their camera feeds are shared. Some vendors also provide a registry so that private camera owners can share the location of the camera, but not the video feeds, so agencies can easily canvass for videos after an incident. The system can then allow SPD to send an email to all registered cameras in an area requesting relevant video. There is no obligation to share footage if a system is registered. SPD would also allow registrants to revoke permission at any time.
 - Section 3.1: The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized and trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system. Video may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050. Staff shall also ensure that all records retention rules are properly followed.

- 8) Lack of clarity around the sworn/civilian reviewers monitoring the video streams, and the data retention policies of that data.
- Section 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, and 5.3 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 3.1: The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system.
 - Section 3.3: CCTV camera systems will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive training in the CCTV video management system prior to authorization. All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.
 - Section 4.1: Until data is extracted from the CCTV system’s local storage, the data is temporarily stored on the device. Video may only be extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes (such as a dispatched call for service or investigations of crimes), as governed by SPD Policy 12.050. Video recordings will be kept on the cameras for 30 days, and not retained for a longer duration unless manually extracted by authorized personnel via the video management system software. Private, 3rd party video, if used, will be subject to the 30-day retention on SPD storage, unless used as evidence for a criminal investigation. SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.
 - Section 4.2: CCTV video recordings are automatically purged by the system after 30 days unless the footage holds evidentiary value related to criminal activity or assists in the pursuit of a criminal investigation. Additionally, the CCTV camera systems will maintain a complete audit log of activities (including but not limited to personnel access and video extraction logs) and would be subject to an audit by the Office of Inspector General at any time.
 - Section 5.2: Per the Washington Secretary of State’s Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, the required records retention period for surveillance video that does not involve a specific incident is “Retain for 30 days after last recording or until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner, then Destroy.” Data associated with criminal investigations will be saved as evidence in SPD’s digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.
 - Section 5.3: As noted in section 5.2 above, CCTV data stored by the city will be automatically purged by the system after 30 days for any data that is not determined to be related to criminal activity/investigation. Data collected from a private security system will only be stored by the City for 30 days unless it contains evidence of criminal behavior.

- 9) The need for better definition of justification/success metrics and concrete timelines by which to measure them.
- Section 4.4 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment and Section 5.0 of CCTV and RTCC Racial Equity Toolkit addresses this issue.
 - Section 4.4: The technology will be in continuous operation for the duration of the pilot program. The possible initial pilot areas under consideration are Aurora Avenue North, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core including parts of Belltown. The exact duration of the pilot will be evaluated under a Continuous Impact Assessment framework. Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of year two.
 - Section 5.0: The goals of this project are:
 1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area.
 2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
 3. To minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
 4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.The Seattle Police Department will report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur as a result of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over- or under-policing.
The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the City Auditor, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the Auditor and the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts. Further, the City will retain outside academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an evaluation plan related to the use of the technologies.
- 10) Lack of clarity on policy areas that the SIR relies upon for future “general guidance” such as the Omnibus Surveillance Policy.
- Section 4.1 of the CCTV and RTCC Racial Equity Toolkit addresses this issue.
 - Concerns that have been raised through public comment and engagement will be addressed in SPD policy. SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, standard contract terms for vendors, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for CCTV.
- 11) Lack of clarity in oversight structure, specifically regarding the Office of the Inspector General and its ability to audit.

- SMC Chapter 14.18.060 addresses this issue.
 - The Inspector General for Public Safety — in regard to SPD, the City Auditor, and other departments — shall conduct an annual review of the City's use of surveillance technology and the extent to which departments are in compliance with the requirements of this Chapter 14.18 and with the terms of approved SIRs.
- Furthermore, the Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety and the City Auditor will collaborate to retain academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an implementation and outcome evaluation of the pilot project. Seattle IT sees use of the proposed technologies as requiring termination if the project does not support progress toward the defined public safety outcomes. The evaluation results are due for reporting by the Police Department at the end of the first year, and a final report due to be published at the end of the second year.
- Section 4.2, 4.10, 5.4, and 8.2 of the CCTV Privacy Impact Assessment addresses this issue.
 - Section 4.2: Additionally, the CCTV camera systems will maintain a complete audit log of activities (including but not limited to personnel access and video extraction logs) and would be subject to an audit by the Office of Inspector General at any time.
 - Section 4.10: The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General upon request.
 - Section 5.4: Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD. Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General can audit for compliance at any time.
 - Section 8.2: OIG conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.

12) Lack of clearly defined scope in the form of specific crime definitions and geographic reach.

- Section 1.2 of the CCTV and RTCC Racial Equity Toolkit addresses this issue.

Working Group Recommendations:

In consultation with SPD, the following recommendations by the Working Group are included as part of the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Project work plan, or as items to work with the City Council on potential amendments to the SIR. We have incorporated additional edits to the recommendations.

- Schedule periodic meetings (quarterly for instance) with each community area to note difficulties, concerns, incidents, and risks to sensitive community resources related to the implementation of surveillance technology. This shall be an ongoing practice for sensing technologies in neighborhoods.
- Ensure that notice of surveillance is accessible to all. Ideally, signs should be focused on imagery and follow sign conventions and clearly indicate that video cameras are recording

and these signs should be in well-lit areas or illuminated to ensure notice is available regardless of the time of day.

- Produce detailed information on the requirements put on CCTV cameras, vendor information, and full specifications (effective range, infrared, night vision, pan-tilt-zoom functionality, etc.).
- Ensure that the following are made publicly available: How many cameras exist within surveillance zones, names of the manufacturers, vendors, model names, duration of installation, and model numbers of camera devices.
- Require further clarity on the specifics of a potential new RTCC before approving it: Additional information should be provided by SPD regarding the specifications of this technology to determine whether it will provide any measurable benefits over the RTCC technology SPD currently deploys to some areas.
- Require transparency and review for any automated analytic tools and ensure unapproved tools are not available.
- Ensure transparency in use: Track law enforcement actions resulting from the use of these technologies and publicly publish results in a quarterly report.

Submitting Department Response

Description

Provide the high-level description of the technology, including whether software or hardware, who uses it and where/when.

Purpose

State the reasons for the use cases for this technology; how it helps meet the departmental mission; benefits to personnel and the public; under what ordinance or law it is used/mandated or required; risks to mission or public if this technology were not available.

Benefits to the Public

Provide technology benefit information, including those that affect departmental personnel, members of the public and the City in general.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Considerations

Provide an overview of the privacy and civil liberties concerns that have been raised over the use or potential mis-use of the technology; include real and perceived concerns.

Summary

Provide summary of reasons for technology use; benefits; and privacy considerations and how we are incorporating those concerns into our operational plans.

Appendix A: Glossary

Accountable: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

Community outcomes: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

Contracting equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

DON: “department of neighborhoods.”

Immigrant and refugee access to services: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle’s civic, economic and cultural life.

Inclusive outreach and public engagement: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

Individual racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

Institutional racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

OCR: “Office for Civil Rights.”

Opportunity areas: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

Racial equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person’s race.

Racial inequity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person’s race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

RET: “racial equity toolkit”

Seattle neighborhoods: (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.


Stakeholders: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

Structural racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

Surveillance ordinance: Seattle City Council passed ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the “surveillance ordinance.”

SIR: “surveillance impact report”, a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance [125376](#).

Workforce equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.



Appendix B: Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis

Appendix C: Public Hearing Notice(s)

Appendix D: Public Comment from the Public Hearings

Appendix E: Public Comment from the Online Form

Appendix F: Letters from Organizations

Appendix G: Public Comment from Other Sources

Appendix B to G for Att 1 - SIR Real-Time Crime Center

- Appendix B - Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis
- Appendix C - Public Hearing Notice
- Appendix D - Public Comment from the Public Hearings 02-12-2024
- Appendix D - Public Comment from the Public Hearings 02-27-2024
- Appendix E - Public Comment from the Online Form - Word Format
- Appendix F - Letters from Organizations - ACLU April 2024
- Appendix F - Letters from Organizations - Community Police Commission Statement 03.21.24
- Appendix F - Letters from Organizations - Legal Voice 4.12.24
- Appendix F - Letters from Organizations - Seattle Solidarity Budget
- Appendix F - Letters from Organizations - WashIP April 2024
- Appendix G - Public Comment from Other Sources



Seattle
Office for Civil Rights

Derrick Wheeler-Smith, Director

May 22, 2024

Dear Committee,

I'm pleased to share with you the final analysis of our RET/SIR for the crime prevention technology pilot. This comprehensive analysis examines the impact of the pilot program on different groups within our community, with the goal of ensuring equitable outcomes and identifying areas for improvement. Our team has worked diligently to assess the data collected throughout this process, focusing on key metrics such as community engagement, enforcement actions, and overall perceptions of safety. We believe the insights provided in this report will be instrumental in guiding future implementation and policy decisions.

We are committed to fostering equitable and inclusive approaches to crime prevention and welcome any feedback or questions you may have regarding the findings. Thank you for your continued support and collaboration.

Best,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Derrick Wheeler-Smith".

Derrick Wheeler-Smith
Director
City of Seattle, Office for Civil Rights



Seattle Office for Civil Rights

Derrick Wheeler-Smith, Director

MEMO

TO: Public Safety and Human Services Committee
CC: Tim Burgess, Deputy Mayor
FROM: Dereck Wheeler-Smith, Director
DATE: May 22, 2024
SUBJECT: Final RET/SIR Analysis for Crime Prevention Technology Pilot Program

Executive Summary

Background

City Council directed the Executive, the Office for Inspector General, and the Office for Civil Rights to co-prepare Racial Equity Toolkits on the Executive's proposed use of Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) technologies in the Crime Prevention Technology Pilot (CPTP). Despite the best efforts of all parties, we were unable to reach a consensus on the substance and process of the RETs.

The Executive has since retracted its request for AGLS. As a result, we have omitted our analysis of that technology, though it is available upon request. We have analyzed the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) technology that SPD proposes integrating with CCTV.

Purpose and Limitations of Our Analysis

This document highlights SOCRs concerns about the CPTP and offers suggestions for limiting the technologies' harm, should they be implemented. We also offer suggestions for reaching impacted communities and focusing on racial equity in stakeholder engagement. Our analysis is based on research and consultation with subject matter experts but does not reflect the extensive stakeholder engagement that a full evaluation of this proposal/RET requires.

SOCR Concerns

- Insufficient outreach to pilot communities
 - The technologies are not effective for combatting gun violence and human trafficking.
 - Placement of surveillance technology in disproportionately BIPOC neighborhoods is likely to worsen racial disparities in criminal legal system.
 - Lack of clarity on what crimes surveillance will be used to investigate.
 - Lack of clarity on what automated analytic tools will be used and how unapproved tools will be avoided.
 - Private security system opt-in has potential to circumvent review and restrictions.
-

- Storage arrangements may lead to surveillance data capture by those looking to prosecute gender-affirming care, reproductive care, or immigration violations.
- Lack of information on acquisition and operating costs of technologies.

SOCR Recommendations

- Expand outreach to pilot communities
- Prioritize investment in programs and services proven to reduce violence
- Limit CCTV use to serious violent offenses.
- Do not allow private camera feeds to opt into the system. If they are allowed, require them to meet standards of City installations.
- Ensure that notice of surveillance is accessible to all.
- Require transparency and review on all automated analytic tools and ensure unapproved tools are not available.
- Reduce storage time and keep all storage on site to avoid abuse of data.
- Track all actions resulting from these technologies and publish results for the public.
- Meet regularly with surveilled communities to share updates and receive feedback.

The Technologies

The Executive proposes these technologies to address “gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes”:

1. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) – cameras are placed to record areas of emphasis in an effort to capture criminal activity. Being pitched to combat “gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes.”
2. Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) – software that “integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, gunshot detection, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one ‘pane of glass’ (a single view).”

CCTV would be implemented in four pilot areas: Aurora Ave. N. 85th to 145th, Belltown, Chinatown/International District (CID), and Downtown Commercial Core. RTCC software is not neighborhood-specific and would apply to the whole city.

The City is also contemplating expansion of its Automated License Plate Reader program, which would feed more data into the RTCC, but that expansion is not covered in these SIRs/RETs.

SOCR Concerns About the Technologies

Closed Circuit Television

1. **Ineffective for stated purpose and labor-intensive**

CCTV is being pitched as a response to “gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes.” However, research has shown that CCTV use is effective primarily for property crimes in parking lots and residential areas. [A study reviewing 40 years of CCTV research](#) found “no significant effects observed for violent crime. Public safety agencies combatting violent crime may need to consider whether resources would be better allocated toward other crime prevention measures.” Some in the City have taken inspiration from a Newark pilot program that saw reductions in violence, but that was combined with such labor-intensive measures (live monitoring, supervision of live monitoring staff, and extra patrols for monitored areas) that “all components proved unsustainable over time.”¹

2. Racial disproportionality

The proposal places CCTV cameras in neighborhoods that are disproportionately BIPOC. Given their demographic makeup, these are communities that are [likelier to have had negative experiences with police](#). Cameras and signs about surveillance may create a feeling of being constantly watched that prevents residents from enjoying public spaces. For example, while residents of wealthier, whiter neighborhoods enjoy their parks undisturbed (such as by using them for political expression, or having a beer at a barbecue), residents of the pilot neighborhoods may be deterred from such activities that are their constitutional right, or that are customary, if not legal.

Finally, how will widespread surveillance affect residents’ perceptions of their own community? What will it tell young people who play sports in these parks about the City’s perception of them? Will that affect how they perceive themselves? Will people be less likely to use public spaces that are apparently so unsafe as to require constant surveillance?

3. Illusion of Consent

The SIRs state the technologies “will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used,” and cites this supposed choice as “a mitigating factor that reduces, to an extent, the potential disparate impact of police actions.” However, this justification does not create community consent for a surveillance regimen and fails to consider that many people (e.g. the unhoused, those reliant on public transit) must use these spaces. Further, it creates a disparate impact to make people in these neighborhoods choose between enjoying public spaces and avoiding constant surveillance while residents elsewhere do not face such a choice.

4. Notice Accessibility and Dystopian Atmosphere

If notice of surveillance is going to be accessible to residents who are blind and low vision, it will likely need to be provided in audio format as well, in multiple languages. Constant audio warnings of surveillance in public spaces will create a dystopian atmosphere.

¹ Piza et. al., Surveillance, Action Research, and Community Technology Oversight Boards: A proposed model for police technology research, available upon request.

5. Unclear limits on use

Will there be restrictions on which offenses CCTV can be used for? The current proposal says it will be used for “gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes,” or, at another point, “other persistent crimes.” Other persistent felony crimes could include something as minor as selling a small amount of drugs, the prosecution of which is a [known policy failure](#) and driver of racial disparities. “Other persistent crimes” raises the possibility of the technology’s application to misdemeanors as minor as drug possession or criminal trespass. A non-negotiable commitment to limiting CCTV use to gun violence, human trafficking, and e.g. serious felonies involving bodily harm, might reduce racial disparities and some discomfort with the pervasive surveillance.

6. Data Storage and Protection of Vulnerable People

The proposal involves storing recordings for up to 30 days. Such a long period of storage may subject the recordings to capture by parties seeking to circumvent laws that protect against the disclosure of materials for/cooperation in prosecution of abortion, gender-affirming care, or immigration violations.² The long storage period might also enable stalkers to obtain the data.

- **Public Records Act**

If an investigator, prosecutor, or stalker believes that someone might have been captured on a CCTV recording, they can request that recording via the state Public Records Act. Protective laws will not prevent disclosure in these instances.

- **Subpoenas and Protective Laws**

If any recordings are stored in the “cloud,” investigators and prosecutors pursuing reproductive health care, gender-affirming care, and immigration cases may be able to successfully subpoena those records from the cloud host in an out-of-state court. If the judge seals the subpoena and/or issues a gag order, the City will have no way of finding out that this has occurred.

7. Lack of Clarity on “Edge-Based Analytics” and Other Algorithmic Tools

The proposal includes the use of “edge-based analytics,” which are tools that provide automated analysis on data before it is transmitted to a centralized server or storage. Such algorithmic tools have the potential for racial bias. While the City’s commitment not to use facial recognition technology is a good start, the proposal should be clear on which tools will be used so that the public and city officials can evaluate those. Additionally, the proposal should be clear on how the city will avoid prohibited tools. Ensuring the City can omit algorithmic CCTV tools with potential for racial bias would be preferable to tools already integrated into the software, where compliance is dependent on SPD not accessing them.

² For protection of reproductive and gender-affirming care, see [RCW 7.115](#). For protection against cooperation in immigration cases, see [the Keep Washington Working Act](#).

8. Integration of Private Cameras

The SIR notes that privately owned security systems will be able to share video of storefronts and places to which the public has access. This raises many issues: How can we be assured that these cameras will not capture private/sensitive locations? How can we be assured they will not incorporate prohibited or unreviewed algorithmic tools?³ What sort of notice will private owners be required to provide to those in the area? What sort of review will be required before a private owner can begin sharing their feed?

Real-Time Crime Center

1. SPD Already Has RTCC Technology

The SIR does not address the fact that SPD has had [Real Time Crime Center software](#) since 2015. Transparency would require highlighting this, the return on investment so far, and the need for new software. Given SPD's commitment (described in the SIR) to monitoring new technologies for both effectiveness and adverse or inequitable consequences, the agency should share those results in the proposal.

2. Limited Effectiveness

Research indicates that RTCCs have improved case clearance rates modestly for violent crimes, with a larger effect for property crimes.⁴ Again, it would be helpful to have data from SPD's current use of RTCC technology.

3. Data Storage and Protection of Vulnerable People

RTCC technology has the same potential vulnerabilities as the CCTV technology listed above. Public Records Act requests and out-of-state subpoenas for cloud-stored data could lead to abusive uses of collected information. The potential for abuse is even greater with the RTCC than with the CCTV, as it will also contain Automated License Plate Reader data, which can help track someone's movements throughout the city.

Cost Estimates for Technologies

³ For example, some private camera systems incorporate [Automated License Plate Reader \(ALPR\)](#) and [facial recognition technology](#).

⁴ For example, [a study of Chicago's RTCC](#) found a 5% improvement in clearance rates for violent crime, vs. 12% for property crime.

The SIRs do not provide cost estimates for acquisition or operation of these technologies. Providing such estimates is [required by the Surveillance Ordinance](#) and is necessary for policymakers and the public to properly evaluate the proposal.

Cost estimates are particularly important given the City's budget deficit, and the ongoing and anticipated cuts to programs that have been shown to reduce violence. For example, Seattle Public Library recently announced that, as a result of budget issues, it will [cut 1,500 library operating hours](#) over an eight-week period. Research has found that the presence of libraries reduces nearby crime, that increases in library operating hours reduce crime rates (including for homicide and aggravated assault), and that as national funding rates for libraries increased over a 21-year period, crime rates decreased by a nearly equivalent percentage.⁵

Racial Equity Toolkit

Racial Equity Toolkits are a required component of the Surveillance Impact Reports and an important tool for connecting with community and evaluating how a technology or policy might affect racial equity. The City offers a [broad outline](#) for conducting an RET, involving setting racial equity outcomes, gathering information from stakeholders, and identifying strategies to create greater racial equity/minimize harm. The outline also calls for regular monitoring of policies for racial equity impacts and regular communication with stakeholders.

This document cannot serve as a complete RET report because the City has not yet completed the necessary stakeholder engagement.

1. Racial Equity Outcomes

The SIR's RET begins with a brief discussion of whether the deployment of these technologies brings "risks for race- or ethnicity-based bias." Asking whether deployment of the technologies could result in racially disparate impacts is a good starting place. BIPOC communities are disproportionately subject to both community and state violence.⁶ They are also disproportionately [arrested, prosecuted, held on bail, subject to probation, and sentenced to jail and prison time](#). The proposed technologies have the potential to exacerbate all those disparities. However, to assess the likely effects of the City's proposal, as well as any appropriate mitigation strategies, requires both deep analysis of the proposal and extensive outreach to the pilot neighborhoods. This outreach should place particular emphasis on BIPOC and other intersecting, vulnerable communities, to understand their experiences, goals, and concerns.

As the sections on each technology note above, there are several elements of the proposal that could worsen racial disparities. First is the placement of CCTV in neighborhoods that are disproportionately BIPOC. The focus on public spaces means the surveillance may be even more likely to capture BIPOC individuals, as they are disproportionately represented among both the [unhoused](#) and [transit users](#), two

⁵ A good summary of the research on this can be found [here](#).

⁶ See, e.g., [here](#) and [here](#). This continues to be true [in Seattle as well](#).

groups required to spend a lot of time in public places. Depending on the analytical tools they incorporate, the technologies themselves may contain risks of racial bias.

The integration of existing criminal legal system data may also exacerbate disparities, especially given the racial makeup of the pilot neighborhoods. For example, deployment of police for CCTV-driven investigations may lead to investigatory stops or ALPR data that identify outstanding warrants for missed court dates, leading to jail time. By contrast, people in non-pilot neighborhoods could wait to quash their warrants when they have obtained legal counsel or the money to post bail if their quash is unsuccessful, and thus would be less likely to end up in custody when leaving the house to run an errand or go to work.

2. Opportunities for Further Exploration in Existing RET

The SIR's RET does not address these potential racial equity outcomes with the depth they warrant. For example, it cites SPD's policy prohibiting biased policing as a protective factor against racial bias or racially disparate outcomes. While such a prohibition is a necessary policy, it did not prevent the disparities that have kept SPD under a federal consent decree for more than a decade. Similarly, Chicago's prohibition on biased policing did not prevent the marked AGLS-associated racial disparities that are the [partial basis of a current lawsuit](#).

Just as the RET suggests that posting notice of surveillance creates consent helps to mitigate any racial disparities, it is similarly casual in its discussion of disparate impacts in policing, noting the contribution of factors such as poverty, inadequate education, and lack of economic opportunity. However, it does not examine how disparities in enforcement increase these factors. For example, jail time can lead to , and [education](#), and [increase the risk of overdose death](#) for those returning to their communities. Criminal records make it difficult for people to get jobs (and the effect is [much greater for Black job applicants](#)), which leads to more poverty, which leads to worse schools, and so on. The RET is correct to identify that policing does not exist independently of society's biases and inequities, but that is not a reason to absolve policing or end the inquiry.

Ultimately, many of the equity questions are qualitative and subjective. While we can look at studies to measure the efficacy of these technologies for reducing crime, it is not as easy to measure the psychological and social effects of constant surveillance on a community. How will cameras and notices of surveillance affect self-perception of community? Will community members be more or less likely to spend time in surveilled places? How do community members weigh the benefits and drawbacks of these technologies? These questions must be answered through sincere stakeholder engagement to ensure that the technologies are not exacerbating disparities for people of color, low-income, unhoused, and other impacted communities.

3. Stakeholder Engagement

The City owes the communities it intends to surveil accurate information and extensive, patient engagement to enable them to understand these complex technologies and to take a leadership role in deciding whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposal. The same is true for a Racial Equity Toolkit.

The conversations should specifically explore how these proposals will affect racial equity, how they might be modified to improve racial equity, and what else the City might do to improve racial equity. Ideally, of course, such engagement would precede a technology proposal and would focus holistically on community concerns, experiences, needs, and goals.

Stakeholder engagement should be neighborhood-specific and seek out those who disproportionately suffer from community and state violence, who are overrepresented in the criminal legal system, or who are otherwise marginalized (e.g. BIPOC, unhoused, LGBTQ+, disabled, and immigrant communities).⁷ The following is a list of potential means of ensuring their participation:

- Contact known leaders/organizers, community-based organizations, service providers, faith leaders, mutual aid collectives, and other similar entities to get their insights on how to engage these communities.
- Provide notice of meetings where target audiences can access the information sufficiently in advance.
- Eliminate barriers to meetings (day/time, transportation, childcare, etc.).
- Respect people's time and expertise via compensation, when possible. At least provide food.
- Consider a variety of forms of engagement – public meetings, canvassing, focus groups, surveys.

Stakeholder engagement should also involve subject matter stakeholders:

- Violence interruption stakeholders (e.g. Rainier Beach Action Coalition, King County Regional Peacekeepers Collective, Community Passageways)
- Civil Liberties stakeholders (e.g. ACLU, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Freedom Foundation)
- Orgs that focus on equity and/or work with over-criminalized/marginalized groups (e.g. Seattle/King County Coalition on Homelessness, Lavender Rights Project, NWIRP, Creative Justice, Rainier Beach Action Coalition, Massage Parlor Outreach Project, Freedom Project, Proactive Persistent People for Progress (P4), Disability Rights WA, CID Coalition, People Power WA)

4. Advance Opportunity or Minimize Harm

Any list of potential strategies to create greater racial equity or minimize unintended consequences is premature without a thorough stakeholder engagement process. SOCR has serious concerns about the cost and efficacy of these technologies and their ability to be implemented equitably. However, if the pilot area communities and the City decide to proceed with the proposal, here are some preliminary suggestions for minimizing harm:

⁷ A good blueprint for a public engagement process is the [CID Public Engagement Toolkit](#), developed with a grant from the Department of Neighborhoods, “by and for community stakeholders...to collectively engage, make decisions about and advocate for community interests when faced with issues, concerns or projects that could impact the CID.” It is flexible and customizable and intentional about centering equity.

- Prioritize investment in programs and services proven to reduce violence (e.g. housing, violence interruption, basic income, libraries, health care.).
- Limit CCTV use to investigating serious violent offenses.
- Do not allow private camera feeds to opt into the system.
- If private camera feeds are allowed to opt in, ensure their placement, notice requirements, and analytic tools receive the same level of review as those of public cameras.
- Ensure that notice of surveillance is accessible to all, including residents with disabilities and residents who do not read or speak English.
- Require transparency and review on all automated analytic tools.
- Ensure unapproved analytic tools are not available on the technologies; do not rely on voluntary compliance.
- Reduce storage time to avoid abuse of data.
- Keep all storage on site to avoid abuse of data.
- Track all actions resulting from these technologies (not just arrests and prosecutions) and the racial demographics of the members of the public who are surveilled, stopped for questioning, etc. Publish this information so it is publicly available without request.
- Meet regularly with surveilled communities to share updates and receive their feedback. Conduct outreach and arrange meetings to ensure less-resourced/more vulnerable community members attend.

Conclusion

SOCR is grateful to the Council for the invitation to participate in this RET, and to the Executive and the Office of the Inspector General for their partnership in attempting to co-prepare it. We hope that this document will help City officials and community better understand these technologies and have an informed, equity-centered dialogue on whether/how to proceed with them.

Appendix B - Public Hearing Notice

Surveillance Technologies Under Review Website

<https://seattle.gov/tech/data-privacy/surveillance-technology/surveillance-technologies-under-review>

City of Seattle Events Calendar:

<https://www.seattle.gov/tech/about-us/seattle-it-events>

FEBRUARY 2024

Event	Date	Time
 Public Hearings for the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Technologies	Feb. 12	12 p.m.
 Community Technology Advisory Board meeting	Feb. 13	6 p.m.
 Public Hearings for the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Technologies	Feb. 27	6 p.m.

TechTalk.Seattle.gov

<https://techtalk.seattle.gov/2024/02/02/public-comment-period-opening-for-the-technology-assisted-crime-prevention-pilot-technologies/>

Update (3/25/2024): Public comment period extended to April 12.

The City of Seattle is exploring new technologies to help deter and detect criminal activity in specific locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime is concentrated. The group of new technologies will help the City's public safety response to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence, alert real-time crime center staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey that information to officers who are responding in the field.

The **Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot** project is a new public safety program that will combine a Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System with an Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) integrated with Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software together in one view.

The possible pilot areas under consideration are on Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core.

The City of Seattle has published the draft Surveillance Impact Reports (SIR) for the group of new technologies in the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot (Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System, Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS), and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC)), as required by the [Surveillance Ordinance](#).

Appendix B - Public Hearing Notice

The City of Seattle is looking for the public's input on the SIRs to listen to community feedback and ensure the City's policies responsibly govern the use of these technologies.

The public comment period runs from February 5 to 29. There are three ways for residents to provide input:

1. Residents can submit their comments on each technology online at [City of Seattle Privacy website](#) using the three survey forms:
 - CCTV — <https://forms.office.com/g/y7jRUZSRNm>
 - AGLS — <https://forms.office.com/g/MrNnnUbPSg>
 - RTCC — <https://forms.office.com/g/yxJeiSh1JR>
 2. Seattle residents can also mail comments to Attn: Surveillance & Privacy Program, Seattle IT, PO Box 94709, Seattle, WA 98124
 3. Public Hearings: The City is holding two public hearings in February to allow attendees to learn more about the technologies and provide public comments. Links and times for the event dates below can be found on the events calendar on the [City's Surveillance Technologies website](#).
- **Monday, February 12, 2024, 12- 1p.m.**
 - [Webex Virtual Meeting](#) with the option of providing public comments in person at the Bertha Knight Landes room in City Hall (600 4th Ave, Seattle, WA 98104).

Join from the meeting link

<https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?MTID=m9c5dde3f0c3b1a38bb207291a1f95eb0>

Join by phone

+1-206-207-1700,,24956893473## United States Toll (Seattle)

+1-408-418-9388,,24956893473## United States Toll

- **Tuesday, February 27, 2024, 6- 7p.m.**
- The public hearing is at the Bitter Lake Community Center (13035 Linden Ave N, Seattle, WA 98133) and will also be accessible [online](#).
 - Join online using Webex: <https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?MTID=m03152c11d3cb3c422a3bafef8669ac0e>
 - Join by phone

Appendix B - Public Hearing Notice

- +1-206-207-1700,,24939343177## United States Toll (Seattle)
- +1-408-418-9388,,24939343177## United States Toll

The public hearings will begin with a presentation about the three technologies. The public comment period will follow the presentation.

This public input period is a valuable part of our process. The City of Seattle is committed to being transparent and accountable. Hearing from residents is part of the process. We welcome your thoughts and comments and look forward to hearing them. The complete list of technologies for review can be found on the [City's Surveillance Technologies website](#).

Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot:

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System: The Seattle Police Department (SPD) proposes closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera systems to help deter and detect criminal activity. The CCTV camera systems are proposed to be installed at specific locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime is concentrated. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas and signs will be posted identifying their presence. Privately-owned security systems can also share video streams of public areas with SPD.

Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS): The Seattle Police Department (SPD) proposes an Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) to accelerate the response capabilities of police and EMS personnel to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence. AGLS utilizes microphones/sensors placed in a defined geographic area that are programmed to detect the sound of gunshots and locate and alert police to the incident.

Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC): Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, gunshot detection, 911 calls, records management system, and other information into one "pane of glass" (a single view). The software is used to alert real-time crime center staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey that information to officers who are responding in the field.



City of Seattle

Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot — Public Hearing on Feb. 12, 2024

The following document captures the public comments and questions provided at the February 12 public hearing and is organized into three sections:

- 1) Answers to specifically stated questions during public comment. Please note that where the transcription was inaccurate, the audio recording was reviewed, and we have attempted to manually correct transcript errors in the table extracts below to the best of our ability.
- 2) Complete transcript from the Webex meeting during the public comment section.
- 3) Handwritten public comment provided at the public hearing.

Answers to specifically stated questions during public comment.

Name	Question	Response
Cynthia	Question: (Based on cloud based context) How specifically will SPD prevent the RTCC platform for being used by judges and other states to get around Washington state's shield law?	Request for information as part of a criminal investigation in another jurisdiction would be denied in regard to reproductive health care, per the Washington Shield Law. In other instances involving potential laws in other jurisdictions that are not consistent with City of Seattle and/or Washington State laws, SPD can decline to participate in the investigation. Information captured by these systems is retained for 30 days and it is subject to Public Disclosure.
Cynthia (cont)	Question: Given that SPD had an RTCC since 2015, will the 2024th, if passed be a 2nd, real time crime center, or will SPD replace their existing real time crime center with a new product? Question: And aside from the features that utilize technologies, SPD doesn't already have such as ALPR and CCTV, which of the features listed in the SIR are already being used by while	SPD will be replacing their existing RTCC with a new solution/product. Other technologies that will be used by the RTCC software that are currently in use (CAD, RMS, AVL, 911 calls, etc.) are shared

	<p>other law enforcement agencies have access to the SPD RTCC?</p> <p>Question: And if not, then will SPD share data with external entities, including other law enforcement agencies, via the RTCC directly, or will only existing data sharing channels be used such as those for evidence, and wanted bulletins?</p> <p>Question: In the CCTV SIR, SPD say that they will not use ai face recognition tools less also, will SPD also not use any gait recognition or other biometric identification tools?</p> <p>Question: If no biometric identification tools will be used, then when will they be administratively disabled system wide? Or is it the responsibility of individual users of the system to know when to adhere to a policy advising, not to use such since the CCTV serve proposes having access to privately owned CCTV camera feeds?</p> <p>Question: And also says elsewhere that signage will be posted. Then, does this mean that will be posting such signs on private property next to where those cameras are located?</p>	<p>with other agencies within legal guidelines or as required by law. [</p> <p>Data is shared with other agencies within legal guidelines or as required by law. At this time, sharing of the data coming into RTCC would be shared through existing channels.</p> <p>SPD will not use facial recognition AI or other biometric identification tools. Any use of future technologies of this sort would need to go through the Privacy & Surveillance Assessment process, per SMC 14.18.</p> <p>Typically, vendors have an administrative panel that disables certain functions such as biometric identification. If such system-wide disabling is not available, then SPD would enforce through policy.</p> <p>Signs acknowledging use of cameras will be posted and visible to the public at all pilot locations. The exact locations of the signs is still to be determined depending on the pilot locations.</p>
Cynthia (cont)	<p>Question: In the item 2.1 in the CCTV SIR says that the reason for using these cameras is to deter and detect felony criminal behavior. Does this mean that the SBD will only be using the cameras for instances of serious felony crimes?</p>	<p>The cameras would be used to detect persistent felony criminal behavior, gun violence, human trafficking or any other serious or violent criminal activity.</p>

	<p>Question: Will the examples of the proposed signage for the CCTV cameras be added to the SIR? Will added to the SIR such that the signs will look like, what they will say, how large they will be?</p> <p>Question: And where are they placed in relation to the cameras themselves?</p> <p>Question: Will there be signs in multiple languages?</p> <p>Question: And will there be an auditory announcement and vicinity of the cameras so that blind and low vision residents are also informed of the camera's presence?</p>	<p>Currently the SIR does not include examples of signage. Design of the signs is to be determined.</p> <p>Signs will be placed in close proximity of the camera in locations viewable to the public.</p> <p>Currently the SIR does not include examples of signage. Design of the signs is to be determined.</p> <p>Design of the signs is still to be determined.</p>
<p>Donna</p>	<p>I am not here to argue for the use against or for surveillance software rather. I'm here to ask that You do 2 things to uphold your public commitment to serve the needs of safety in this community</p> <p>1st off, I want to ensure that you have reviewed all of the data available on these. Not just those that support your suggestion, or your needs, or your ideas about what you want to do.</p> <p>Secondly, I would ask that you slow this process down and proactively seek more information from the most vulnerable communities and those most most affected by the presence of gun in gun violence.</p> <p>There is no research right now about what kind of outreach has been done, or will be collected from affected communities as part of the racial equity toolkit process as always when deploying new surveillance technology. We must consider the potential impacts on the most marginalized and vulnerable my request then is that these decisions be conducted in a</p>	

	<p>thorough, equitable transparent and accessible manner. These decisions are too large and too long lasting to be rushed or to be made by just a few people or the loudest voices.</p>	
<p>Kathleen</p>	<p>I know that there have been several incidents in the last couple of years where calls were made seeking police response that was ultimately untimely or did not occur. Her 2 of them more prominent incidents occurred 1 of them occurred last September with a hate attack on the wing and then in 2022 there was a shoot out on 8th Avenue, South 1 night in between lane and Dearborn in front of resulted in several staff cars. Being shot, there was a home for Asian elders and both. Cases multiple calls were made by fluent English speakers for police response, and they gave accurate information about the ongoing event, and the CO location where the response was needed. And again, it was either untimely or didn't occur. And these are not the only 2 cases.</p> <p>Question: And so given all of that, and given our experiences and given that your staffing issues are and to be solved in the short term, how will SPD and mayor Harrell's office work to make sure that this need for efficiency in dispatch and precision of policing in all cases both where witnesses are available and where these technological tools are used?</p> <p>Question: How will you ensure that the efficiency is put into place and what are your ideas for increasing that as you use these in real world applications so that people are responded to?</p>	<p>SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the AGLS/ALPR/CCTV implementation through performance metrics native to the platforms (true positive indications of the discharge of a firearm as verified by objective evidence), as well as standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.</p> <p>SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the AGLS/ALPR/CCTV implementation through performance metrics native to the platforms (matching AGLS alerts with evidence collected by responding officers to verify the accuracy of the AGLS system), as well as standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of</p>

	<p>Question: how will you ensure that the tech tools are not elevated for a response, because the calls are coming from a place where the tech tools are there and you can use them? But in fact areas outside of those with appropriate human cause for help are responded to?</p>	<p>trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.</p> <p>AGLS/ALPR/CCTV will be used primarily as support for patrol after SPD units have been dispatched and as potential sources of evidence for investigations. Initial dispatching and investigative response will not change, although the technological tools are hoped to deliver a more efficient and effective response.</p>
<p>Agnes</p>	<p>Omission the timeline you outline is not consistent with the process outlined in your own surveillance technology policies and procedures. The report is to be done in stages. Stated as a sequential process, it appears your own process as being compressed with essential steps happening, concurrently, leaving inadequate information available for informed public comment.</p> <p>Context: The draft report is to be reviewed by the surveillance advisory, working group before being submitted to the council. However, the information I could find on this group indicates that the 7 member group has not met since mid 2023. it does not have full membership to achieve a quorum.</p> <p>Question: How can the surveillance impact report, be completed and submitted to council without this element?</p>	<p>All mayoral appointments for the Community Surveillance Working Group have been completed and filed with the</p>

	<p>Also, the acquisition and implementation timeline is. Very rushed, you're expecting a 2nd, quarter acquisition and implementation in the 3rd quarter yet. There is no longer procurement process.</p> <p>Context: There's no, there is not yet a procurement process underway in, in terms of your own document, in terms of the racial equity toolkit question, the inclusion criteria does not flag potential that the technology disparately impacts disadvantage groups. Yet the racial demographic information included in your report, and your initial report shows potential areas where the technology is to be used are not representative of citywide demographics.</p> <p>Question: How then can there be no potential for disparately impacts?</p> <p>And most importantly we need to know the current data and the potential locations where the project is to be in implemented so that we can compare it to data collected to see whether or not this pilot project is in fact Useful.</p> <p>The data should be available on a regular basis to meet the goals of transparency cited in the report for full transparency and accountability. We should know in the potential target areas. The current incident of gun violence, human trafficking, and other felony crimes, and I would say human trafficking as that. Is normally used and not how it's used by the city current 9:1:1 calls current public response times crime, clearance rates and community satisfaction the most prevalent. Problematic area to evaluate is likely be the goal of minimizing crime displacement outside of the pilot area. The impact report must address how that will be evaluated, especially given that this calls for placement of technology and signage in specific</p>	<p>City Clerk's Office. With those appointments, the Community Surveillance Working Group is in quorum status.</p> <p>The group of Surveillance Impact Reports (SIR) for the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot project will be reviewed by the Community Surveillance Working Group when it reaches that stage in the overall SIR process.</p> <p>The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP)</p>
--	---	--

	<p>areas. This seems like it's ready, made to move the activity associated with public safety concerns outside of the target area as if we have seen with other issues addressed by the SPD.</p> <p>Our group who believes in the mayor's belief that we, everyone, should be safe perhaps we disagree on how to make that happen. Our ask is that adequate public notice and outreach for public hearings regarding these technologies, rather than the current perception, and appearance of a rush to check a box regarding public input.</p> <p>And that there's adequate information to respond to the, to a complete surveillance impact report as expecting that areas I've identified as an inadequate would be addressed.</p>	<p>competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.</p> <p>It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.</p> <p>These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.</p>
Rose	Context: Justification for this technology was 2 things or 3 things. I think I don't worry the surveillance will only be concentrated in poor communities. Um, this is shameful to me that	

	<p>that's all I'll say. 2, don't worry if you're not committed any crimes we won't be watching, um I guess that's sort of the typical justification and I, is that in writing I don't know 3. Don't worry this is only for a year then we'll analyze this data and I guess for that, I do have just lots of questions.</p> <p>Question: Is that true? Is that in writing? Is this tech only going to be established for a year?</p> <p>And then we'll stop it while we analyze the data effectively. And that kind of leads me into the overall thing is I support these earlier comments. I think we need to slow down and review the data on this, and just please provide the resources to the community that you're using to determine that this could positively impact gun violence. I think that's kind of the your overall just here and then yeah. Also just reach out to the communities that you're saying, you're gonna target talk to the people that live there. These are your duties right? Is review the data to talk to the people. Um. Yeah, I guess that's all I have to say, thank you.</p>	<p>The exact duration of the pilot program is to be determined. Time is needed to gather data around crime stats in the pilot areas. A decision will be driven by the evaluation plan. If effective the technology will extend beyond.</p>
<p>Matt</p>	<p>Part of what that said is that the office of civil rights has to be collaborating with the mayor's office in preparing the racial equity toolkit for these technologies. And so far in all of the materials. And in this meeting that I've seen, I don't see any evidence of the involvement of the office for civil rights, this concerns me greatly.</p> <p>Context: I also want to say that part of the language in this council budget action is calling for, let's see public hearings for community input and, and testimony inviting for dissertation from the city council Targeted community outreach um, so it's a little bit confusing for me.</p> <p>Question: Is this the public hearing? Is this the targeted community outreach?</p> <p>Question: Was there any outreach done to any of the communities that are being considered for, um, trying out this technology?</p>	<p>Pilot areas under consideration are Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core.</p> <p>The targeted outreach are with communities near the potential pilot locations and equity-focused organizations. SPD conducted outreach with the demographic advisory councils and crime prevention coordinators.</p> <p>We have also asked the Office for Civil Rights, Office of Inspector General for Public Safety, Community Police Commission, Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, Department of Neighborhoods, and the Human Services</p>

	<p>Um, so I have any questions. Is about process as many others have raised today and so I hope you really will slow down and, um, get everything together before you proceed. Thank you.</p>	<p>Department to continue working with us in reaching out to their respective community lists.</p> <p>This is one of two public hearings. The second public hearing is 2/27/2024, 6:00 p.m. at the Bitter Lake Community Center. The public hearings scheduled for 2/12 and 2/27 complies with SMC 14.18 and the proviso Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) language in Council Budget Action SPD-900-A. SMC 14.18 requires the lead department for the SIR to complete at least one public community meeting with the opportunity for public comment. This public engagement process is consistent with SMC 14.18 and the additional requirements of the proviso.</p>
<p>Erica</p>	<p>Additionally, I am interested to know why it was so difficult to find any information on this hearing.</p> <p>With that my trust in the surveillance technology being used responsibly is extremely low. This meeting was not listed on the council's website.</p> <p>It was a huge pain to try to find it</p>	
<p>Stefan</p>	<p>I guess my question regarding this is, you know, a question,</p> <p>Question: how can ask for our trust when we know how they feel about us as civilians? especially concerning the lack of care and accountability for the killing of Kundula. We even heard and saw that with the with technology that was in that car, um. You know, cause death is 1 of the person was done with existing technology. I wonder what the expansion of that will do.</p>	<p>Some ways SPD is mitigating potential impacts on civil liberties are: posting visible signs of police surveillance/video recordings, a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies (where cameras</p>

	<p>How can we trust that if we seem to be unable to use the current technologies at hand to enforce public safety, that we would be able to do that with an expanding of technologies?</p> <p>You know, as well, as the mental distress of residents, being watched at all hours of the day, and being listened to on certain effects, it feels like instead of fighting crime we now view everyone as a criminal in these areas, and they must be watched as well as the cost of this. It seems like a very flagrant promise of not to be looking when we know that this power has been and will be abused. I know I refuse to live in a perpetuated police state here and I question that this was the best move by leadership available, was to go through this. Question: You know, my questions are also, you know, what are the metrics? So, this progress, and how can we trust as these numbers will not be inflated in order to continue and perpetuate these very serious situations that we're looking at here? as well as when we have the evidence that these technologies, when implemented often fail and end up costing us as taxpayers more money than they do in the protection. The study as well mentioned, the McCarthy justice proves that time and time again.</p>	<p>are recording, mapping of where AGLS alerts are, arrests), only monitor public places (sidewalks, streets and parks) and provide access to user and device logs to OIG for compliance audits.</p> <p>SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the AGLS/ALPR/CCTV implementation through performance metrics native to the platforms (true positive indications of the discharge of a firearm as verified by objective evidence), as well as standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.</p>
<p>Cynthia (same as above)</p>	<p>Thank you yeah. Thanks for the opportunity to ask and comments some more. So it places unclear I do oppose all 3 of these technologies, and my questions are kind of highlighting the lack of clarity for some things inside the surveillance impact report.</p> <p>Question: So some additional questions would be item 4.4 and the CCTV sir so that there's an evaluation plan will, that evaluation plan be getting added to the appendix in the SIR so the public can see that and review it?</p>	<p>SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the AGLS/ALPR/CCTV implementation through performance metrics native to the platforms (true positive</p>

	<p>Context: Item 3.3 in the sir doesn't mention any privacy specific training for the CCTV system such as training that advises that the cameras must not have their pan-tilt-zoom altered to look inside private residences or stalk/ harass individuals or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons.</p> <p>Question: Will SPD be creating privacy training, specific to the CCTV system?</p> <p>Context: The SIRS says that SPD plans to retain the data for 30 days, retaining the CCTV data for such a long period of time, enable stalkers to issue public records requests potentially repeatedly for CCTV data to use against their victims. But 30 days is the maximum retention period not the minimum. And the exact guidance, and the retention schedule is for 30 days after the last recording Or, until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner.</p> <p>Question: Is SPD saying that it takes 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location?</p>	<p>indications of the discharge of a firearm as verified by objective evidence), as well as standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.</p> <p>Upon selection of a vendor, training will be provided on how to appropriately use the technology. The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system.</p> <p>30 days is the maximum amount of time that SPD wanted to retain data per the 30-day retention on SPD storage. Recordings will be kept local for 30 days no longer. Referencing PDRs, data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act,</p>
--	--	---

	<p>The CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determined for crime occurred like, say, 48 hours.</p> <p>Question: Will there be granular access controls, such as regarding, not everyone with read access to the CCTV system feeds, would be able to change the pan tilt zoom of the cameras.</p> <p>Context: Item 1.7of the SIR the says that SPD is acting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under, which may utilize CCTV is in the real time crime center software.</p> <p>Question: Where is that draft policy? And when will it be included inside the sir for the public to review what alternatives to the has previously implemented or considered?</p> <p>Question: Why was a suite of costly likely ineffective surveillance technologies, selected over community driven, crime, diversion solutions?</p>	<p>Chapter 42.56 RCW (“PRA”). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing it to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.</p> <p>The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system.</p> <p>SPD policy specific to SPD software is currently under discussion and will be finalized after SIR is adopted by the Seattle City Council and the technology is acquired.</p> <p>Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and require a holistic crime-prevention strategy.</p>
--	---	---

	<p>Context: In the RTCC SIR and the item 2.3 activities the sources of information that are being integrated include automatic vehicle location system</p> <p>Question: Is the AVL that is planned to be integrated in the RTC only gps data from SPD own vehicles or will it have private vehicle gps data?</p>	<p>These technologies give us additional tools to address the continuing criminal behavior at these locations, together with: Increased police patrols; continued investments in community-based public safety initiatives such as violence interrupters; enhanced lighting; more frequent street and sidewalk cleaning; and other crime prevention efforts.</p> <p>The SPD AVL system contains only locations of SPD vehicles logged in the dispatch system.</p>
<p>Cynthia Continued</p>	<p>Context: Item 1.3 of the RTC sources and technologies are location specific. But a place with a play space focus, meaning that they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces to an extent the possible disparate impacts of potential police actions.</p> <p>Question: So, aside from telling residents to stay home, what measures will SPD be taken to mitigate the risk of racial bias and new surveillance technologies, especially given that the pilot location selected by are disproportionately communities of color?</p> <p>Question: Has SPD already issued a request for proposal or request for bids for the RTCC? Those are the questions I have. This is such a rush process. I haven't even gotten to the acoustic gunshot location system. So this is just what I have for now, but thank you.</p>	<p>Some ways SPD is mitigating the risk are: posting visible signs of police surveillance/video recordings, a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies (where cameras are recording, mapping of where AGLS alerts are, arrests), only monitor public places (sidewalks, streets and parks) and provide access to user and device logs to OIG for compliance audits.</p> <p>The procurement process for acquiring the technologies is currently in the planning stages.</p>
<p>(NB: Jane spoke prior to Cynthia so this is out of order) Jane</p>	<p>Context: Alrighty, um, and I just wanted to kind of like point everybody's attention to the future to the laws that are being passed in many states and cities against me and my community. Um.</p>	<p>In an instance where a request for information as part of a criminal investigation in another jurisdiction that is not consistent with City of Seattle and/or Washington State laws,</p>

	<p>And that the Republicans who will probably win the presidential election, either this election cycle, or the next, I promise to enact nationally.</p> <p>Question: And I guess, I'm just wondering where, where this will end if those things become legal and my existence becomes illegal? Will you These systems to punish my existence, you know, we'll use these systems to punish people for abortion care? Like, I was mentioned earlier. Um, there have been no private citizens who have come here today to express their support. I'm expressing might've sent along with everybody else. And I am just well, I mean, I understand, but</p> <p>Question: I'm confused as to why this solution was chosen when there are, there literally are proven solutions to alleviate the factors that lead to the kinds of crime, uh, essentially trying to prevent?</p> <p>In the 1st place, if 30 years of military technology, surveillance, technology increased brutality has not failed to prevent crime in any meaningful way. Why are we being asked to go along with your foolish assumption that this will be used to prevent crime in the future</p>	<p>SPD can decline to participate in the investigation. Information captured by these systems is retained for 30 days and it is subject to Public Disclosure.</p> <p>The Technology-Assisted Crime Prevention Project technologies are the technological component of crime prevention initiatives.</p> <p>Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and require a holistic crime-prevention strategy.</p> <p>These technologies give us additional tools to address the continuing criminal behavior at these locations, together with:</p> <p>Increased police patrols, continued investments in community-based public safety initiatives such as violence interrupters enhanced lighting, more frequent street and sidewalk cleaning, and other crime prevention efforts.</p>
--	--	---

Complete transcript from the Webex meeting during the public comment section.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:16

Sorry, they can't hear us online so give us 3rd, we're getting them unmuted. Okay. I'm sorry about that.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:25

Okay, you can hear me now. Um, so for those online sorry about that, please, please use the raise hand feature or if you're on the phone star 3 to raise your hand.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:36

Um, and as as I mentioned.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:40

Comments submitted will be logged and responses will be posted online as part of the please remember roughly 2 minutes or so per comment. So we can get through.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:49

Uh, everyone here so with that, why don't we start in person? Um.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:54

And we have the sign in sheet here. Let's see. Um, looks like Pat.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:21:59

Peterson Peterson.

Thank you, um, 1st, I have a lot of questions and 1 is that it looks like to me there have not been enough studies. About this our legacy evidence of the studies, and how they worked I think that after a fact, uh, study or data collection that you mentioned.

Will be after the fact also with regard to SBD, I think anyone can look at the and see how many how many of these concerns are trust based on.

Every day with very few are.

We repercussions and also, it seems like the city when we talk about. So we don't have enough officers.

I don't know why it isn't acknowledge that so many quit after the 2020 protest after it was proven in court that, uh, the SBD violently harmed people. So, perhaps that's why a lot of people quit and why.

People don't want to work here. We have many many tactics that work.

To reduce all of these things, there are community organizations that have been very successful, helping people to reduce violence and communities. I don't think we need this at all. I'm very concerned about the effects this will have on people.

Bertha Knight Landes

Okay, thank you so much. We're going to do a few in here and then we'll kick it off.

Sorry um, and then we'll kick it Online in just a minute. Okay. Uh, next is Cynthia space.

Bertha Knight Landes

Okay, hi in the RTC, sir, I mentioned that it might be cloud based data, stored off premise has the potential risk of being subject to legal request for that data from the platform provider, such as subpoena or warrant request for data for view. Was used by Andrew CCTV of people visiting Seattle from Utah or other states for reproductive health care SSP to using cloud based solutions for handling or storing. Any of the city surveillance data puts people at increased risk. Especially women, immigrants and trans folks. How specifically will SPD prevent the RTC platform for being used by judges and other states to get around Washington state's shield law.

Given that has had an RTC since 2015. well, 2024th, if passed be a 2nd, real time crime center, or will SPD replaced their existing real time crime center with a new product. And aside from the features that utilize technologies, Expedia doesn't already have such as and.

Which of the features listed in the server are already being used by while other law enforcement agencies have access to the.

And if not, then we'll SPD share data with external entities, including other law enforcement agencies, via the RTC directly, or will only existing data sharing channels be used such as those for evidence, and wanted bulletins in the CCTV sir says, that they will not use ai face recognition tools less also, not use any gate recognition or other biometric identification tools. If.

In the system, if no biometric identification tools will be used, then when will they be administratively disabled system wide? Or is it the responsibility of individual users of the system to know when to here to a policy advising, not to use such since the CCTV serve proposes having access to privately owned CCTV camera feeds.

And also says elsewhere that signage will be posted. Then, does this mean that will be posting such signs on private property next to where those cameras are located?

In the item 2 dot 1 in the ccw user says that the reason for using these cameras is to deter and detect felony criminal behavior. Does this mean that the SBD will only be using the cameras for instances of serious felony crimes?

Well, the examples of the proposed signage for the CCTV cameras be added to the server.

I need to finish this really quick. We added to the service such that the signs will look like what they will say how large they will be. And where are they replaced in relation to the cameras themselves? Will there be signs in multiple languages? And will there be an auditory announcement and vicinity of the cameras? So that blind and low vision residents are also informed of the camera's presence Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

Donna Donna. Okay.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:26:52

Good morning my name is Donna Stringer, and I'm here as a representative of proactive, persistent people for progress a community group in Seattle, working on democracy both locally and nationally. You have a number of pieces of data and research and.

You will receive comments both pro and con, about these issues.

I am not here to argue for the use against or for surveillance software rather. I'm here to ask that. You do 2 things to uphold your public commitment to serve the needs of safety in this community 1st off. I want to ensure that you have reviewed all of the data available on these.

Not just those that support. Your suggestion, or your needs, or your, um. Ideas about what you want to do. Secondly, I would ask that you slow this process down and proactively seek more information from the most vulnerable communities and those most. Most affected by the presence of gun in gun violence. There is no research right now about what kind of outreach has been done, or will be collected from

affected communities as part of the racial equity toolkit process as always when deploying new surveillance technology. We must consider the potential impacts on the most marginalized and vulnerable my request then is that these decisions be conducted in a thorough, equitable transparent and accessible manner. These decisions are too large and too long lasting to be rushed or to be made by just a few people or the loudest voices.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:28:46

Thank you. Okay, thank you so much. Um, we are going to try to get some of the comments from the folks who are joining online, or dialed in.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:29:00

So, let's see, you need the mic just 1 SEC.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:29:09

Okay, we will start with Kathleen Johnson and then Casper, Milo and Matt. Okay and I'm going to meet you. 1st, Kathleen. Sorry we're having a bit of an interesting sound situation.

Kathleen Barry Johnson she/her

1:29:25

All right, thank you for this meeting and this information and thank you for posting materials online in language. My organization historic self downtown is a state created organization. That exists to promote good governance and mitigate the negative impacts of land, use decisions in large scale, public development. And pioneer square and I hear your concerns about efficiency and the ability to accurately dispatch officers and emergency services, particularly in light of recruitment and retention issues regarding experience. I know that there have been several incidents in the last couple of years where calls were made seeking police response that was ultimately on timely or did not. Her 2 of them more prominent incidents occurred 1 of them occurred last September with a hate attack on the wing and then in 2022 there was a shoot out on 8th Avenue, South 1 night in between lane and Dearborn in front of resulted in several staff cars. Being shot, there was a home for Asian elders and both. Cases multiple calls were made by fluent English speakers for police response, and they gave accurate information about the ongoing event, and the CO location where the response was needed. And again, it was either untimely or didn't occur. And these are not the only 2 cases. And so given all of that, and given our experiences and given that your staffing issues are and to be solved in the short term, how will SPD and major harold's office work to make sure that this that's need for efficiency in dispatch and precision of

policing in all cases both where witnesses are available and where these technological tools are used. How will you ensure that the efficiency is put into place and what are your ideas for increasing that as you use these in real world applications so that people are responded to. And how will you ensure that the tech tools are not elevated for a response, because the calls are coming from a place where the tech tools are there and you can use them. But in fact areas outside of those with appropriate human cause for help are responded to.

Casper

1:31:45

Good morning my name is Casper. I live in the central district 90,144, and I will be giving comment on behalf of the Seattle alliance against racist and political repression. We are an organization of individuals living in Seattle, committed to the protection and preservation of civil liberties everywhere with a focus on. Within the city we are opposed to the implementation of technology assisted crime prevention, a surveillance tech. S. P. D. has failed to build a trusting relationship with the community's they police and we have no reason to think the use of surveillance will keep us any safer on the contrary has a problem with its officers abusing their position to stop and harass others. In 2021 officer, Andrews sports was placed on administrative leave after the department reviewed credible stocking allegations. In 2022 officer, detective, Greg Tomlinson, according to the apa's own findings, engaged in conduct, becoming of a Seattle police officer through his continuous unwanted attention to another police officer. In 2023 officer, Marcus Jones was placed on, was disciplined for stalking at domestic violence victim. He met while responding to her 901 call. These individuals are still police officers and will be in a position to access incoming surveillance technology. Furthermore, these are certainly not the 1st or only cases of their. Find 1 need only Google, Seattle, police and stopping to see how long this has been an issue. The police do not have the trust of the community. We do not trust that the police won't use this technology to stop harass and intimidate Seattle residents. In closing the Seattle alliance, as opposed to the use of CCTV cameras, acoustic gun, location systems, and real time climb center software. Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:33:37

Thank you, Casper, Milo, we're going to go to you and then Matt will come back around after some more in person. So I'm going to go ahead and unmute.

Milo Kusold they/them

1:33:44

You Hi, my name is Milo. I live in Capitol Hill district 3, and I am here because I'd like to publicly oppose the proposal to you. Cctv, Shotspotter, and real time crime center in the name of public safety. My issue,

with this idea is that it stems from the fact that these tools promote and enable racist profiling. They have been proven by other cities who have tried to use them to be ineffective. And I find it annoying that this plan seems like a waste of money. We could be using that money to find solutions that actually promote public safety. So, for CCTV, the study, I'll reference in your own impact document states that it has quote, observed effects for violent crime. And other studies have shown that it doesn't promote public safety, but instead dangerously increases, racial profiling for ShotSpotter or it's very clear based on other cities attempts to use technology that it simply does not work in Chicago, initial police response, initial or police responses to 88.7% of ShotSpotter alerts. Found no incidents involving a gun, the false alarms caused to show up more frequently to marginalized neighborhoods in a heightened state thinking that there's gun violence, which is not a winning formula for police to foster good relationships. But the people, they are hired to serve this technology is a waste of money for the city and seems hot. It seems likely to waste our limited staff police forces time, chasing false alarms. Regarding our, it used it uses privately on cameras along them to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police such as having to get warrants. This creates conditions that are right for police abuse with little to no oversight. This is problematic as our police force strives to win the trust of our citizens after countless instances that they lost that trust. Such as laughing and downplaying the murder of. As an alternative I would like to see violence, interruption programs and more investment in mental health treatment, substance, abuse treatments and affordable housing. The current proposed tech tools are cheap flow to appease the public with, by AI, washing them to believe that progress is being made instead of actually taking the time and effort. To address the issues that cause people to turn to violence and worst of all all of them have been shown to contribute to increased racial profiling on that basis alone. And given that your plan is to use it. Then see, people get profiled after the folks likely heard you have been profiled and basically all consequences. I don't believe that this proposal should be allowed to continue. Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:35:49

Okay, thank you. We're going to kick it back to some in person comments.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:35:56

Um, the s. P.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:36:01

Thank you, I just wanted to bring back the idea of how important it is to really inform and receive feedback from the communities that will be most affected by those namely the residents and the businesses of the neighborhoods where we're going to be implementing this technology.

And, um, since this is such a rough rush process, I'm not sure that the people that are actually living there working there that have their livelihoods, there are really informed of what this would do and how it would affect them or even get a chance to really put their opinion forth and I'm sure that many of them would comment that this. Biology would not only feel extremely invasive to their daily lives, but it also might not actually prevent crime so much as just documented. And I know that is facing a huge obstacle and challenge right now with so much distrust in their services from the community from the city of Seattle that has been going on in the past few years. And that's Uh, limited your staffing in your capacity, but maybe that just indicates that that is really where you need to be focusing your resources and repairing and rebuilding those relationships and receiving and really listening. To the feedback that the community is giving, which is just emphasizing and consistently saying that we really want real people oriented solutions and community resources provided instead of just replacing those solutions with machines and technology.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:37:33

Thank you. Okay.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:37:37

I believe it's Agnes. Okay.

Bertha Knight Landes Yes, my name is Agnes govern and I'm also a member of in a Seattle resident. I also want to speak to the process as others are speaking to other issues with the technology itself. This public hearing is based on an incomplete initial draft, making it impossible to knowledgeably. Here is what is missing and what I would expect to have time to comment on the data research. You cite, in fact that a very quick browsing of it basically says it benefits as primarily and it's used in car parks and residential areas, and narrowly targeted to vehicle crimes and property crimes. This is not how you are suggesting it be used. There is no evaluation plan regarding meeting of the goals. There are no references listed for governments who can speak to their implementation experience. There are no academic consultants or other experts listed and there are no organizations listed as inviting to participate in this public process. That seems the most egregious. Omission the timeline you outline is not consistent with the process outlined in your own surveillance technology policies and procedures. The report is to be done in stages. Stated as a sequential process, it appears your own process as being

compressed with essential steps happening, concurrently, leaving inadequate information available for informed public comment. The draft report is to be reviewed by the surveillance advisory, working group before being submitted to the council. However, the information I could find on this group indicates that the 7 member group has not met since mid 2023. it does not have full membership to achieve a quorum. How can the surveillance impact report, be completed and submitted to council without this element? Also, the acquisition and implementation timeline is.

Very rushed, you're expecting a 2nd, quarter acquisition and implementation in the 3rd quarter yet.

There is no longer procurement process. There's no, there is not yet a procurement process underway in, in terms of your own document, in terms of the racial equity toolkit question, the inclusion. Criteria does not flag potential that the technology to sparingly impacts disadvantage groups. Yet the racial demographic information included in your report, and your initial report shows potential areas where the technology is to be used are not representative of citywide demographics. How then can there be no potential for. Spirit impacts and most importantly we need to know the current data and the potential locations where the project is to be in. Implemented so that we can compare it to data collected to see whether or not this pilot project is in fact Useful the data should be available on a regular basis to meet the goals of transparency cited in the report for full transparency and accountability. We should know in the potential target areas. The current incident of gun violence, human trafficking, and other felony crimes, and I would say human trafficking as that. Is normally used and not how it's used by the city current 9:1:1 calls current public response times crime, clearance rates and community satisfaction the most prevalent. Problematic area to evaluate is likely be the goal of minimizing crime displacement outside of the pilot area. The impact report must. Address how that will be evaluated, especially given that this calls for placement of technology and signage in specific areas. This seems like it's ready, made to move the activity associated with public safety concerns outside of the target area as if we have seen with other issues addressed by the SBD, our group. Who believes in the mayor's belief that we, everyone should be safe perhaps we disagree on how to make that happen. Our ask is that adequate public notice and outreach for public hearings regarding these technologies, rather than the current perception, and appearance of a rush to check a box regarding public input. And that there's adequate information to respond to the, to a complete surveillance impact report as expecting that areas I've identified as an inadequate would be addressed. Thank you for this opportunity.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:42:08

Thank you. Okay, let's do 1 more here. Then we'll go to online. Um, looks like Dr rose.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:42:18

Yeah, yeah.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:42:27

Okay, wrote this to try to help uh, yeah, my name's rose king. I live in district 3. I have 2 jobs in Seattle. I teach bio Kim at the University of Washington, and I work at a young adult shelter.

I value data driven solutions and I care very deeply. I came to them today, because I'm highly concerned that this technology will be solar, used to further persecute, harass, Administrate the poor and marginalized in Seattle. Which are already the people most likely to be bothered by police here. I don't believe that we can fight gun violence with further police violence. I don't believe it will work. Um, what do and do. Research shows that they do increase, so called protective Pat downs and searches, which is why the MacArthur justice center has filed a class action lawsuit against they do enable misuse by law enforcement officials, which has already been seen in Washington D. C and elsewhere. Uh, what do these not do they do not reduce gun violence and do not get victims to safety quicker again as shown by research. So these are not treating the actual problems. What I heard today is justification for this surveillance. Technology was 2 things or 3 things. I think 1 don't worry the surveillance will only be concentrated in poor communities. Um, this is shameful to me that that's all I'll say. 2, don't worry if you're not committed any crimes we won't be watching, um. I guess that's sort of the typical justification and I, is that in writing I don't know 3. Don't worry this is only for a year then we'll analyze this data and I guess for that, I do have just lots of questions. Is that true? Is that in writing? Is this tech only going to be established for a year? And then we'll stop it while we analyze the data effectively. And that kind of leads me into the overall thing is I support these earlier comments. I think we need.

To slow down and review the data on this, and just please provide the resources to the community that you're using to determine that this could positively impact gun violence. I think that's kind of the your overall just here and then yeah. Also just reach out to the communities that you're saying, you're gonna target talk to the people that live there. These are your duties right? Is review the data to talk to the people. Um. Yeah, I guess that's all I have to say, thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:44:57

All right, thank you. All right back to you. Some online comments.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:45:04

Okay, Matt, I'm going to go ahead and unmute you.

matt he/him

1:45:10

Hi, thank you. Um, you know, I, um.

matt he/him

1:45:17

I'm just wanting to add my voice to support some of the comments that have already been made so eloquently. I didn't have time to write my comments out. So, apologies if this is a little rough. Um, but essentially, I just wanted to add my voice to those that are calling for this process to be slowed way down. Um, it seems like. It's being pushed through really quickly without proper consultation with the communities that are going to be most affected by the technologies. And in fact, I mean, from the presentation today, it sounds like you haven't even really decided which communities. These technologies will be, um, tested on in this next year. You keep saying either Aurora or the, um, I mean, how could we be like, halfway through the month where it's supposed to be the process for community feedback on these technologies and you guys haven't even figured out. Neighborhood the technologies are going into, um, so I think it's really important to, like, just slow the heck down with this. Um. The other thing I'm very concerned about process wise is that, you know, I've been following this since, um, the the budget was approved last year and just to remind everyone, when the money was put aside the 1.5Million was put, aside for this pilot program, there was a council budget action that came along with it. Um. It was 900 a, if anyone wants to look it up.

Part of what that said is that the office of civil rights has to be collaborating with the mayor's office in preparing the racial equity toolkit for these technologies. And so far in all of the materials. And in this meeting that I've seen, I don't see any evidence of the involvement of the.

For civil rights, this concerns me greatly. Um, I also want to say that part of the language in this council budget action is calling for, let's see public hearings for community input and, and testimony inviting for dissertation from the city council Targeted community outreach um, so it's a little bit confusing for me. Is this is this the public hearing? Is this the targeted community outreach? Was there any outreach done to any of the communities that are being considered for, um, trying out this technology? Um, so I have any questions. Is about process as many others have raised today and so I hope you really will slow down and, um, get everything together before you proceed. Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:47:58

Okay, thank you. I know we are at 1, but we want to make sure that the other folks who have their hands raised, or have.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:48:08

Sign up on the side, it was, you'd get a chance so if that works for you guys, we'll just keep going, um, another online.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:48:16

Okay, Casey, I will be unmuting you.

kc

1:48:21

Hello, my name is Kelly. I'm a resident of district 4, and I'm commenting to fully oppose the piloting and use of surveillance technologies, as mentioned by previous commenters a study conducted by the MacArthur justice center into the use of technology, such as ShotSpotter out of Chicago. Over a period of approximately 21 months from July 2019 to April 2021 found that, quote, 89% of ShotSpotter reports led police to find no gun related crime and 86% turned up. No crime at all amounting to about 40,000, dead end ShotSpotter deployments and quote. The city of Chicago's office of the inspector general conducted its own research. And found that, quote, data examined by Las does not support a conclusion that ShotSpotter is an effective tool in developing evidence of unrelated crime. And this technology, and especially considering the proposed locations of both and CCTV. Is predominantly if not solely used to surveil and harass communities of color, especially black and Latino communities. Evidence of over 68 metropolitan counties that adopted technology found that over a period of 17 years from 999 to 2016. this technology has no significant impact on fire unrelated homicides or arrest outcomes. And that is only 2 seconds faster than a 901 call from a 2017 study. To Seattle, specifically the use of technology and the proposed contract with ShotSpotter presents a significant concept of interest re, personnel. Lynn, the corporate vice president of emergency call management at Motorola solutions, who holds a significant financial investment in ShotSpotter. Was chair of the board of the Seattle police foundation from 2022 to 2024. I would find it difficult to believe that having a person with vested financial interests in both SBD and ShotSpotter technology would not present a conflict of interest. If the city of Seattle is invested in the wellbeing of its citizens, perhaps it could redirect funds from the 17Million dollar budget increase allocated to so called ghost staff positions that are fully funded yet remained vacant. These funds could be directed towards measures that address the root causes of crime, which include a lack of safe, stable and long term housing. Voluntary drug treatment and health care, and overall meeting the basic needs of all people. If SBD is truly interested in preventing crime, enforcing the laws of this country, and the quality of public safety. Perhaps the surveillance technology should be trialed and

tested on personnel. Among whom, and could includes the officers who killed and March, the death of jannati can do, who have not faced any significant consequences.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:51:12

Okay, thank you. Eric we're going to unmute. Unmute you now.

Erica Olson

1:51:22

My name is Eric Olson. I'm a homeowner in district 3, and I also wanted to stage my comment against investing city resources in the CCTV, or I do not want my tax dollars to be spent on ineffective technology. That will lead to more bias policing and police abuse. If you want to reduce crime, invest in. Our community instead Additionally, I am interested to know why it was so difficult to find any information on this hearing. With that my trust in the surveillance technology being used responsibly is extremely low. This meeting was not listed on the council's website. It was a huge pain to try to find it. I'm glad that everyone here was able to find it and able to comment and able to add such intelligent comments. And I really look forward to the answers to all of these questions. Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:52:12

Wonderful Thank you. And Felicia you are up and we will meet you.

Falisha

1:52:19

I am my name is Falisha. I'm a resident of the central district 9. 802. my neighborhood has been heavily impacted by gun violence, especially in recent months, and I have fully approached this proposal. I want to reiterate that this process has been rushed and that the communities have affected, have not had an adequate amount of time to examine this proposal. And voice their opinions, and that, it doesn't seem that there has been adequate outreach to communities where this, um, surveillance would be enacted. Increase the violence in public spaces would not prevent a crime, but would rather increase policing and harm caused by policing on marginalized communities, including people of color and house folks, low income folks and unarmed protesters. I want to name that the police force has a monopoly on violence, including gun violence, violence, conducted by community. Members has been proven sociological studies to be a result of historical and systemic harm through property lack of access to basic means, such as healthcare and housing and the systemic impacts of racism the funding that would be utilized for this proposal to prevent crime would be better utilized if devoted to the root causes of crime,

including affordable housing Healthcare social services and Other services that would meet the actual needs of people and improve their wellbeing. Thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:53:39

Okay, thank you. We'll jump back to some other folks in the room here.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:53:55

Hi, my name is Stefan and, um. I guess my question regarding this is, you know, a question, how can ask for our trust when we know how they feel about us as civilians, especially concerning the lack of care and accountability for the killing of gundula. We even heard and saw that with the With technology that was in that car, um. You know, cause death is 1 of the person was done with existing technology. I wonder what the expansion of that will do. How can we trust that if we seem to be unable to use the current technologies at hand to enforce public safety, that we would be able to do that with an expanding of technologies? You know, as Well, as the mental distress of residents, being watched at all hours of the day, and being listened to on certain effects, it feels like instead of fighting crime. We now view everyone as a criminal in these areas, and they must be watched as well as the cost of this. It seems like a very flagrant promise of. Not to be looking when we know that this power has been and will be abused. I know I refuse to live in a perpetuated police state here and I question that this was the best move by leadership available, was to go through this. You know, my questions are also, you know, what are the metrics. So, this progress, and how can we trust as these numbers will not be inflated in order to continue and perpetuate? Um. These very serious situations that we're looking at here as well as when we have the evidence that these technologies, when implemented often fail and end up costing us as taxpayers more money than they do in the protection. The study as well mentioned, the McCarthy justice proves that time and time again. So, thank you for the opportunity to comment and I appreciate the folks who are willing to also show their faces upon here in criticism.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:56:04

Okay next we have a G.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:56:14

Is this can you hear me.

Bertha Knight Landes

Um, hi, um, not my real name, but, um. I already don't trust the please, um, as a Trans women, you know, as a white transmd, and I'm still pretty privileged, but I don't really, um, feel safe.

Alrighty, um, and I just wanted to kind of like point everybody's attention to the future to the laws that are being passed in many states and cities against me and my community. Um.

And that the Republicans who will probably win the presidential election, either this election cycle, or the next, I promise to enact nationally. And I guess, I'm just wondering where, where this will end if those things become legal and my existence becomes illegal. Will you.

These systems to punish my existence, you know, we'll use these systems to punish people for abortion care. Like, I was mentioned earlier. Um, there have been no private citizens who have come here today to express their support. I'm expressing might've sent along with everybody else. And I am just well, I mean, I understand, but I'm confused as to why. Um, this solution was chosen when there are, there literally are proven solutions to alleviate the factors that lead to.

The kinds of primary, uh, essentially trying to prevent. In the 1st place, if 30 years of military technology, surveillance, technology increased brutality has not failed to prevent crime in any meaningful way. Why are we being asked to go along with your foolish assumption that this will be used to prevent crime in the future? Um, going back to the misuse. Of non policy, I just want to point out like many people have that. You murdered Jonathan over a year today and there still has been no Justice or accountability under your existing laws and policies, you rattle off a litany of new laws and policies. I have 00:00:confidence those with any kinds of justice. No matter.

You know, how enshrined in law and legal coder I was at a child for a community activist a few weeks ago. And while the jury was hung, they all agreed unanimously that his actions were not.

We're, we're just we're authentic even though they were illegal.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:58:37

Can I get.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:58:46

Can the folks online still hear us in the room? Okay. All right. Cool. Let's do 1 more online. I think it's a.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:58:58

Seattle voting citizen is up next.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:59:02

Unmute okay Seattle, voting citizens, you're up.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:59:43

Okay, um, we.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:59:48

We'll circle back if you're hitting remains up, we can't hear you.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:59:52

Seattle voting citizen.

Bertha Knight Landes

1:59:56

Um, let's see.

Bertha Knight Landes

2:00:01

We will try to troubleshoot some technical issues online. Um.

Bertha Knight Landes

2:00:06

I think that there was another comment here. Um, would you like to okay? Well, I'm trying to troubleshoot that.

Bertha Knight Landes

2:00:13 (Cynthia)

Thank you yeah. Thanks for the opportunity to ask and comments some more. So it places unclear. I do oppose all 3 of these technologies, and my questions are kind of highlighting the lack of clarity for some things inside the surveillance impact report. So some additional questions would be item 4.4 and the CCTV sir so that there's an evaluation. Plan well, that evaluation plan be getting added to the appendix and the source of Republican see that and review it. Item 3:9:3 in the sir doesn't mention any privacy specific training for the CCTV system such as training that advises that the cameras must not have their

zoom altered to look inside private residences or stock harass individuals or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons. Well, be creating privacy training, specific to the CCTV.

The services that plans to retain for 30 days, retaining the CCTV data for such a long period of time, enable stockers to issue public records. That request potentially repeatedly for CCTV data to use against their victims. But 30 days is the maximum retention period not the minimum. And the exact guidance, and the retention schedule is for 30 days after the last report.

Or, until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner is saying that it takes 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location, the CAD in data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determined for crime occurred like, say, 48 hours. Or There'll be granular access controls, such as regarding, not everyone with read access to the CCTV system feeds, would be able to change the pan tilt zoom of the cameras. I don't 1.7of the, and the says that SBD is acting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under, which may utilize. Cctv is in the real time crime center software. Where is that draft policy? And when will it be included inside the serv for the public to review what alternatives to the has previously implemented or considered? Why was a suite of costly likely ineffective surveillance technologies, selected over community driven, crime, diversion solutions and the item 2.3activities. The sources of information that are being integrated include automatic vehicle location system is the AVL that is planned to be integrated in the RTC only jps data from SBD own vehicles or will it have private vehicle? jps data.

Bertha Knight Landes

2:02:32

Item 1 dot 3 of the, and the RTC sources and technologies our location specific. But a place with a play space focus, meaning that they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces to an extent the possible disparate impacts of potential police actions. So, aside from telling residents to stay home, what measures will SPD be taken to mitigate the risk of racial bias and new surveillance technologies, especially given that the pilot location selected by are disproportionately communities of color.

Has SPD already issued a request for proposal or request for bids for the? Those are the questions I have. This is such a rush process. I haven't even gotten to the acoustic gunshot location system. So this is just what I have for now, but thank you.

Bertha Knight Landes

2:03:13

All right, thank you. And that's all for in person list, but I do think we have 1 more online. So, Rubin, we are going to unmute, you.

Reuben Gelblum

2:03:25

Great. Can you hear me? Yes. Okay, great. Thank you. I was the person in line before, but, uh, didn't haven't had into loud my microphone access so thanks for letting me to speak again. Um.

Yes, so my name is Ruben Goldblum. I'm a licensed clinical social worker, and I've been a Seattle resident for 9 years. I'm calling in today to state. My strong objection to all 3 of these proposed technologies. As others have already said these technologies technologies have been shown to not be effective at their stated goals. And in fact, have a demonstrated.

Record of leading to worse, more violent and more racist responses by police. Additionally these are being pushed through in a rush undemocratic process. And what's worse in the context of an already tight budget where other programs are being cut. Sbd has shown itself to be an unaccountable and wasteful department that regularly. Engages in disproportionate violence, especially towards poor black brown and queer residence of our city here are just a few headlines from the divest SBD website. Just from the last few months SBD print tech mishandled evidence, falsified lab records. Seattle cop arrested for, after crashing into a ditch cop, chased the Phone car through South Seattle and nearly 100 miles per hour cut punched women who swallow drugs to save him. 6th, highest paid cop caught napping on the job in a bustling. And again, this is just from October. This is who we're supposed to trust with this. Grossly. And large surveillance system, why don't we reject Funds to support people who actually live in Seattle through housing, health care and direct income things that are actually proven to improve lives and reduce crime. Thank you for your time.

Reuben Gelblum

2:05:16

Okay, thank you. Are there any other folks online with a hand up.

Reuben Gelblum

2:05:23

Okay, well I'm going to pass it back.

Reuben Gelblum

2:05:29

To Nick. Okay. Thank you. Everybody for attending listening to the presentation and commenting. We will take the comments and respond to them any questions and post them online. And the links that we that we, we pasted in this.

Reuben Gelblum

2:05:49

Patient and are available on the surveillance website it.

Reuben Gelblum

2:05:55

The surveillance website, um, with that, um, we'll conclude today's meeting Thank you everybody for coming. Thank you.

Handwritten public comment provided at the public hearing.

Affects everybody in the
city, not just criminals.
Community I want this test,
we want real sustainable programs
A not a way to regain the
public's trust

inform of receive feedback
of residents & businesses
affected

~~A~~ - invasive, does not
prevent crime
just documents

A SPD facing huge ^{it} challenge w/
militant from the comm.
needs to focus their
attention on building those
relationships
feedback.
listen to
we have been expressing
instead of replacing real
people-orientated solutions w/ machines.

Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

- § OVER-SURVEILLANCE OF THE PUBLIC CAN LEAD TO MISUSE OF INFORMATION AND INVASIVE MONITORING OF THE PUBLIC.
- § Lack of public awareness and consent to implementing this system.
- § Misusing public funds on technology instead of people-oriented solutions and social services.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

ACTIVELY GO INTO THE COMMUNITIES CONSIDERED AND AFFECTED BY THIS TECHNOLOGY (CHINATOWN, AURORA, BELLTOWN) AND INFORM THEM OF THE PROGRAM. THE CITY NEEDS TO DIRECTLY RECEIVE THEIR FEEDBACK AND GENERAL APPROVAL TO IMPLEMENT SUCH AN IMPORTANT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM!

Other comments:

- § AI and surveillance technology will not restore the community's trust in the Seattle Police Department.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

- § What alternative solutions to crime were considered by the department before selecting this technology?



Public Records Act Notice:

Information provided to the City of Seattle is considered a public record and may be subject to public disclosure. For more information see the Public Records Act, RCW Chapter 42.56.

0615

Name	Please indicate below if you would like to provide public comment
Pat Pedersen	✓
Cynthia Spiess	✓ (multiple questions)
Donna Stringer	✓
✓ ESPITIA	✓✓
* A Hamwell	✓
✓ Agnes Green	✓
Dr. Rose King	
Nikhil L	
David Felde	
Liz Nimmo	✓
Stephan Ehr	✓
Jakee Dee	
Brant L	

Questions from Public Comment/Chat/Comment sheets

Name / Source	Question	Response
<p>Speaker 1/Bitter lake Ctr</p>	<p>Yet the 40 year meta analysis cited by the itself. Conduct that concludes that seems to be the cameras had no significant impacts on volume.</p> <p>And city in town centres there, we're going to even significant impact on your property crime, which is supposedly not the focus, but considering all that, what are these cameras really for? It is also worth mentioning that, according to the University of full 9 out of 10 people. Sorry? Surveilled by TV. Camera operators were men. Or out of 10 for teenagers, black people were at 1.5to 2.5times more likely to be surveilled than expected based on population makeup as we all know United States is a very biased society. How can we trust people to do the right thing? In these cases?</p> <p>It's also worth mentioning that human trafficking was mentioned. And as as well, as common knowledge by now, if they mean sex, human trafficking. We know that doesn't occur by connecting in a way a fan, but in the home. Actual human trafficking is just immigrants coming to America and are we supposed to be a safe haven for them? How will the cameras help them? So, again, it's been shown that what really reduces crime across the board is unconditional housing food, medical care, save living supplies, accessible, recreation and community. Why waste money on something we know doesn't work something likely to be used to prosecute people who are only trying to get by</p>	
<p>Speaker 7 / Bitter Lake</p>	<p>So, wrap up with this question, why. Why invest in a crime response technology instead of further investing they've already proven</p>	

	strong prevention work being done with communities when we know that violence and corruption programs reduced violent crime by up to 50%.	
Nikhil / Online	Uh, the question of is, like, will this technology be effective? Will it be make us safer? Will we know that right?	
Speaker 11 (Annie) / In Person	Automated surveillance tools, give the false promise of efficiency. Yeah. In reality are ineffective and costly. Chicago has ended their contract with ShotSpotter. Why are we rushing to start? 1?	
Speaker 12 / in person	Moreover, why is this hearing being closed so far away from the community's most affected by them? Why are we watching to implement these technologies without proper public comment or oversight?	
Cheyne / Online	I will try to keep this brief so that people who are currently living in Seattle, 1, more time I would just ask the question of If this moves forward after hearing so much opposition here tonight. What what does that really mean about public hearings? What is the point of them if this moves forward when there has been such overwhelming. Negative feedback, uh, thank you.	
"a" / Chat	can you explain why the public comment period for these is so short?	
Caedmon	Can someone answer whether this public engagement is THE community engagement required by the racial equity toolkit? Or is this public comment hearing in addition to the racial equity toolkit engagement?	
Ashley Chilling	"destroying the recordings after 30 days" will that be enshrined in a contract, in a law? will there be audits?	
a	I would appreciate it if the moderators of this event ensure that any "public commenters" who receive compensation from SPD disclose that during their comment	

a	(above comment)Eleonor, could you please respond to why my request to have commenters who are compensated by SPD disclose that wasn't honored?	
Chris	why is the hearing in bitter lake?	
Chris	why isn't it closer to the heart of Seattle?	
E	concentration alone does not merit investment in crime prevention. Gun violence and Trafficking happen in all neighborhoods. Is there some way to publicly access information/control to about what systems are used in their neighborhoods?	
E	could City invest in a co-operative, publically accountable tech company to collaborate with public safety departments. No private companies and public safety!	
Jacky	I REJECT this proposed program. The proposed money for this project could be MUCH better used on a variety of resources (housing, education, food security, healthcare, etc.), things that are actually proven to support community safety. Putting money towards those resources is a means of PREVENTATIVE care, addressing the root of issues and reducing crime.	

In person Room Transcription

Uh, uh, we're gonna get started, I think. After we have a, we don't have we have a limited time in this room so I want to I want to get the meeting going. Start off with some introductions. My name is Nick. The the project manager, civilian project manager at Seattle police department.

Um, long time, Greenwood, resident, about 20 years. Here talking tonight about the surveillance technology public. Comments impact review for the technology is the state prime prevention pilot.

We have some people that are going to be presenting online 1st, and then we'll do public comment.

So, online we have Kerry from the mayor's office.

Uh, and from we have captain James Britt as well as a deputy chief. Eric Barton.

I hope folks can hear us we're, we had to bring up an audio visual system here. So we have a microphone here at the front. Speaker here, so I'm going to try to speak very loudly. Can you hear me back there? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We're gonna we're gonna we're gonna move forward with a

meeting. You can you can we have time for public comment after after the presentation so you can get hold of your comments until after the meeting. We'd appreciate it. I understand we're going to have a comments after that. After the, the presentation, and you can, you can comment, uh, make your comments there and then. So, did you have the, the next slide? Please so. Public records notice, um, this, this meeting is being recorded. It is online as well as here in person so we're gonna we're gonna start record on the meeting on line. So so folks can take notes. I just want to make that clear. We're, we're going to start recording now. So everybody's aware. And just a reminder that the information here is, including the public comments is considered public record and so as publicly disclosable. Next slide please, uh, for folks online. some, some basics here, uh. You can there's a chat on the side as well as you will be muted and you'll be unmuted when if you want to comment. Once we call your name, we'll unmute you and you can give your comment in terms of audio. There is a. Down at the bottom on the toolbar, there's a 3 dots. If you click on that, you'll be able to change your audio settings. If you're if you can't hear us. Um, you can you can, uh, choose your options for that. Um, next slide please. So, for those of you who are dialing in to the Webex meeting to the online meeting, once the meeting starts, if you would like to comment, you can press star 3 on your phone to raise your hand. And once you raise your hand, you'll hear a prompt telling you that you raise your hands, asks the question. And you can also hear a list of commands on your phone if you press star star. If you no longer want to leave a comment or the host has already called you then press star three to lower your hand again this is folks calling in on the meeting on their phone start three to raise your hands start to deliver

Next slide please. So, for everyone here in person, if you'd like to comment, uh, please.

Sign in on the common sheet where Henry is at that table up there and indicate that you want to speak. And then we'll add the time for public comment after the presentation, the host will call your name when, when it's time to speak, we're going to do 5. In terms of comment, public comment, we're going to do 5 people in person and then 5 people on Monday. So all of their name back and forth between online and in person. Excellent some ground rules both for folks here and then online as well be respectful of diverse opinions and experiences. Please be an active listener during the presentations. If anyone is exhibiting disruptive behavior, intimidation, or aggression, you may be muted if you're online or ask to leave. If you're here. Um, and if you are asked to leave, or if you're muted, you can leave your comments, uh, online, or by letters as well. Uh, and this is important to keep your comments under 2 minutes. We have a lot of folks here in person. We have a lot of folks online just a reminder this. So, for these surveillance impacts reviews. Um, these happen regularly for new technologies throughout the city uh, we, all these meetings are 1 hour since we have so many folks here, we can extend it. However, we only have this room till 8 o'clock, and so at 7:30: We need to start taking stuff down. So, hopefully we can get everybody's comments.

Heard here, um. But, please keep it under 2 minutes we'll be letting, you know, when, uh, you are 10 seconds, go Sarah over here a little raise your hand. Yeah, so please keep it under 2 minutes. And if there are too many people, and we have to we have to shut down the meeting. You can always comment online. Uh, There'll be some links where you can go and and leave your comments. Next slide so, city channels, definition of surveillance. Surveillance is defined as technologies that observed or analyze the movements behavior, or actions of identifiable individual in a manner that is reasonably likely to raise concerns about civil liberties, freedom of speech or association racial equity for social justice. Certain technologies, such as police body cameras and technologies for everyday offices are excluded from the law. So next slide please. So, I just want to remind everybody that the surveillance impact review process. This is why we're here tonight presenting and getting public comments on this process. So, the 1st, 1 was a draft in review of the surveillance and impact reports that they're posted online. Uh, and the city's website, the current step is that is a public comment period after that we do some analysis we're going to compile these comments.

And finalize this sales impact reports. There's a working group reviews, uh, for community members. Um, they will, uh, uh, complete a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each 1 of these technologies goes back to the city technology officer who does a response executive overview.

And then it'll be sent to the council. Right? So this is a long step in a multi stage process that is outlined in city in city ordinances. So we're we're right here we're, we're in a public comment, period.

Um, it goes through, uh, uh, a couple of steps and then eventually ends up at the city council, right for them for them to weigh in on it. Next slide. Please again, you can also comment online. There's a, there's a link there. Um, and, uh, just a reminder that there are 3 technologies that we're talking about, there's, there's 3 technologies that, that, that this, uh, they're going to be discussed at this meeting 1 is, uh, post circuit, uh, television, er, otherwise referred to as. The other 1 is acoustic gunshot location system, or we're going to refer to an in case. You hear that. And then the 3rd is real time prime center, or. What we refer to it, but you hear a lot the, uh, the acronyms.

So again, 3 technologies, CCTV. Uh, the gunshot detection or and the real time prime set. So these are the 3 technologies that we're talking about tonight. You can always mail comment you can comment on each 1 of those technologies online. Uh, or mail comment, uh, to, uh, to the Seattle I. T. Next slide please. So, public hearing format is going to present. The 3 technologies that I talked about CCTV, gunshot detection, or in real time, Prime center, and then we'll have time for public comment afterwards. Next slide. All right so, with that, I'm gonna hand it over to Kerry, Keith, uh, from the mayor's office.

Kerry Keefe

The public safety director for Seattle, and the mayor's guiding principle is that everyone in Seattle deserves to be safe and live without fear of being a victim of crime. Data shows that gun violence, human trafficking and other persistent felony behavior is concentrated in specific locations. And to effectively address these locations, a comprehensive and holistic crime prevention, step strategy.

Is required this strategy includes the 3 crime prevention technologies. That you'll hear more about tonight together with increased environmental improvements and that includes, um, safer, cleaner, sidewalks, cleaner streets. Enhance lighting and other public safety measures, such as the continued investment of community based. Crime and violence interrupters, this pilot project will focus on a defined area with high occurrence of gun violence, human trafficking. And or persistent felony behavior, the locations chosen will be guided by data with preliminary assessments, identifying the 3rd Avenue from Union to Virginia. The pike, Pike, pine and parts of belt town. Aurora Avenue North, and the Chinatown international district as potential pilot. Locations these 3 technologies enhance the investigative capabilities and provide additional tools for police. To address continuous criminal behavior. The CCTV camera has no facial recognition. Capability it was, it will be public facing on streets, sidewalks and parks where there's no expectation of privacy. Notices will be clearly posted of the camera's presence. Cctv will assist the investigators and collecting evidence related to Sirius. And violent crimes, including homicides, assaults and other felony fences. It will help please locate suspects as well as clear innocent parties. The system will direct officers and to a more precise location.

Of gunfire incidents and enhance the evidence collection. And quicker aide response studies have shown that the Technology as promising and preventing crime and assisting. Criminal investigations when coupled with Another crime reduction measures, such as the empire mental improvements I mentioned earlier Public support and increased patrol the will provide a centralized location. For real time information analysis that integrates multiple information sources. And this will provide will come into a single pane view that will allow officers to focus our efforts. And verified locations and accurate descriptions. During this pilot, period, a broad base of data will be collected and analyze to make an evidence space determination if the desired outcomes are being met. And that includes a reduction in criminal behavior. Quicker response times improved evidence collecting. And reduction of 901 calls as well as the increased community satisfaction and security. Thank you.

Britt, James

Good afternoon everyone I'm captain Jim with the Seattle police department. Very briefly. I'm going to introduce deputy chief, Eric Barton, who is going to speak briefly about the Department's goals and missions related to this technology. We'll speak very briefly on the technology. I know. You guys want to get to public comments. We'll get there very shortly. Chief.

Eric Barden

Good evening Eric Barden deputy chief uh, very interested to hear input comments and questions this evening. our goal is with our Current severe staffing footage to maximize our efficiency and effectiveness focusing our efforts on. Precisely On people that are committing crimes and. Thereby reducing the number of contacts with people who. Are in the area, or might some other way be caught up in an attempt to. Diagnose who's responsible for committing crimes. So, we're hoping that in our extreme staffing shortage that we can. Improve our effectiveness efficiency and ability to provide public safety for. Uh, the residents and visitors to our city right there.

Britt, James

They could if we can go to the next slide please, we'll get right into the technology. The 1st, technology we're going to be speaking about this evening is close circuit TV cameras to see how police department proposed is closed circuit TV camera systems to help deter and detect criminal activity. The CCTV camera systems are. I apologize. The CCTV camera systems are proposed to be installed at specific locations where gun violence, human trafficking and persistent felony crime is concentrate the cameras will face towards the street sidewalk and other public areas, and signs will be posted identifying their presence privately on security systems. Can also share video streams of public areas with however, those sharings will be At the discretion and decision of each of the business under camera owners. They'll be able to determine when they're shared, how they're shared. How often they're shared when is allowed to access them and have full control over the footage in that regard next slide please. Why we wish to use it CCTV camera systems will assist investigators and collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults and other felony offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent and are moving deadly weapons from the street. There. By reducing the risk of harm to the public next slide please. The data collected CCTV data is temporarily stored in the system for a maximum of 30 days, unless it includes evidence of a crime, and is then stored in secured electronic storage for evidence. Sbd policy governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented. In a general offense or incident. This report next slide please the protections we understand at and we take very seriously the concerns that these technologies can raise related to privacy and civil liberties. So, we are very serious about the protections put in place to ensure that that privacy is upheld in order to minimize inadvertent collection of data. The CCTV cameras. Placed to capture events in plain view, in public areas, whereas a matter of law no reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Video recordings are automatically purged for 30 days unless the footage is collected as evidence in a criminal investigation. Additionally, the CCTV camera systems will maintain a complete audit log of activities,

which can be. At any time by the office of the inspector general for public safety next slide please. There are various related policies, state, federal and local laws as well as policies that govern the usage of this technology. The, uh. I won't go through this entire list, but for anybody who is interested in getting the details, it is available within the, within the slideshow that's posted to the site. I'm moving rather quickly because I know we want to get to public comments so nobody wants to sit here and hear me talk all night. Go ahead to the next slide. Please. The 2nd technology is acoustic gunshot location systems otherwise known as. SPD proposes to accelerate the response capabilities of police and EMS personnel to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence utilizes microphones sensors, placed in defined geographic areas that are programmed to detect the sound of gunshots and locate and alert to police. To the incident next slide please. Why we wish to use this will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to the incidents of gunfire and provide precise location information to responders. This information will direct officers and EMTs to a more precise location enhance collection of evidence that helps lead to justice for victims. And remove the legal. Terms from the community next slide please data collected acoustic, gunshot, location systems, capture audio above 120 decibels. Well, above the normal decibel level of human conversation, this audio is collected for a brief time. And after the incident. As well, as during the incident, the system calculates the location of where the shots occur s. P. policy governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a general offense or incident offense report next slide. Please. The protections only authorized. Oh, I g, and users can access the data wallet resides on the devices. Access to the systems and technology is limited to authorize personnel by a password protected log in credentials data may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes as governed by SBD policy and will be securely stored in a cloud based environment. The retention period is determined by whether the data holds evidentiary value data without evidence. Value is overwritten in 30 days next slide. Please. And once again, there's related policies and state local and federal laws that govern the use of this technology and it's the data collected next slide. Please. The 3rd and final software we're going to be talking about this evening is real time prime center. Our software provides a centralized location for real time information and analysis at its core software integrates dispatch. Camera officer location, gunshot detection 901 calls. Records management systems and other information into 1 pane of glass a single view. If you will, the software is used to alert real time crime center staff to a serious criminal event. See, multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view and convey that information to officers who are responding in that. Excuse me in the field next slide. Please why we wish to use this technology. Rtc software helps provide situational awareness to increase officers and the public safety. And reactivity, reactively, investigate incidents, having real time accurate information in 1 place helps increase reliability of the. Location of victims and suspects enabling quicker aid and safer

apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions. Next slide. Please. The data collected by the RTC software, the RTC software integrates data from other systems like CCTV, automated license plate, readers, records, management systems, dispatch geographic information systems and 901 calls in a centralized location for real time information and analysis access. To the systems, and technology is limited to authorize personnel by a password protected log in credentials next slide. Please. The protections in place, only authorized and users can access the software platform access to the system and technology is limited to authorize personnel. By a password protected log in credentials data in the system may only be viewed, or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes as governed by policy. The retention period is determined by whether data holds evidentiary value data without evidence value is overwritten in approximately 30 days next slide. Please. Once again, the related policies include state, federal and local laws as well as policies to govern the use of this technology and the data created next slide. Please. The overall purpose is what chief Barton mentioned at the beginning of this conversation, which we're calling. Uh, uh. Precision policing with fewer staffing on the streets and fewer officers able to respond. We have to use data informed capabilities to make sure that we are responding quickly, investigating, thoroughly identifying the correct suspects, arresting them safely and using the information available to effectively prosecute those. That are. Responsible next slide. Please. Additionally, it's important for us to make sure that we are grading the effectiveness of this technology, both in its positive, and its potentially negative effects. The Seattle police department is conscious of the potential for disparate impacts technology can have on various communities in addition to the metrics that we will be using to. With the effectiveness of these technologies, the Department's performance analytics and research unit will be monitoring the data in real time to identify unintended impacts on these communities, including over and under service and will adjust the use of these technologies to minimize or eliminate these impacts as much as possible next slide, please. I'll go ahead and hand back over to Nick's in the room that concludes my piece of the presentation. Thank you everybody for your time. Tonight. We look forward to your comments.

Bitter Lake Room

All right, thank you. So, we're into the excuse me the public comment section so what I'm going to do as I was saying before we're, we're. Um, AV, set up a little, a little rough here. So, for folks here in the public. Doing the public comment I'll call 5 of you up. If you want to come to this area, cause the microphone is right here. So people online can hear you and then we'll, we'll circle through 5. we'll go do 5 online and then 5 in the audience here. So, I have a sign in sheet I'll call a 5 people here on mine again. If you want to, if you. Want to come in on mine, raise your hand online and the Webex. So the 1st, 5 people here, we have Morgan caps. Excuse me uh, Peter content. Um, done sorry

about the differentiation in, you. Um, and so, yeah, just go ahead. And if those 5 folks want to come up here and you can, you can either, uh.

Address the crowd, or the or the speakers however, you prefer just speak loud. Yeah, remember 2 minutes leads. Yep. Okay. Great.

Bitter Lake Speaker 1:

I'll start with cameras. According to the flyer got when I walked in CCTV camera systems will be just to collect evidence related serious and violent crimes. Yet the 40 year meta analysis cited by the itself. Conduct that concludes that seems to be the cameras had no significant impacts on volume.

And city in town centres there, we're going to even significant impact on your property crime, which is supposedly not the focus, but considering all that, what are these cameras really for? It is also worth mentioning that, according to the University of full 9 out of 10 people. Sorry? Surveilled by TV. Camera operators were men. Or out of 10 for teenagers, black people were at 1.5 to 2.5 times more likely to be surveilled than expected based on population makeup as we all know United States is a very biased society. How can we trust people to do the right thing? In these cases?

It's also worth mentioning that human trafficking was mentioned. And as well, as common knowledge by now, if they mean sex, human trafficking. We know that doesn't occur by connecting in a way a fan, but in the home. Actual human trafficking is just immigrants coming to America and are we supposed to be a safe haven for them? How will the cameras help them? So, again, it's been shown that what really reduces crime across the board is unconditional housing food, medical care, save living supplies, accessible, recreation and community. Why waste money on something we know doesn't work something likely to be used to prosecute people who are only trying to get by. However, they can thank you.

Bitter Lake Speaker 2:

Hello, my name is Peter Condit. I live near Aurora and 85th street. I'm against surveillance in my neighborhood, or anywhere in Seattle. I do not want please and artificial intelligence systems to listen to, or watch my family as we go about our lives surveillance leads to self censoring and a loss of individuality and creativity. Surveillance is the opposite of a public good. The harmful impacts of these technologies and policing in general. I have fallen and will continue to fall disproportionately on individuals who have already experienced violence from white supremacy and colonialism. SPD commissioned to study in 2021 that showed that stops black and native satellites over 7 times, more often than white Seattle. And please have a pattern of killing people they interact with black lives matter indigenous lives matter. City Council should not approve these surveillance technologies and

should instead defund SPD. There is ample evidence that the millions of dollars of these technologies cost would be more effectively spent on community, led public health, health and safety programs guaranteed. Basically. Thank you for listening. I think it refresh.

Bitter Lake Speaker 3:

John sorry. Oh, yeah, okay. I'm just talking to this. Yeah. Oh, awesome. Cool. Hello. My name's I live, I work do mutual Wade, middle friends make new ones.

For high war posters here someone let me know I'll, uh, uh, walk uncles and across the Jackson. I'm friends with the blue man. Uh, I do my general hanging out in the Chinatown in the National district. Um. i want to let you know that this isn't the first time our neighborhood has this discussion of liberty versus security when we have that discussion in the summer of two thousand and nineteen um those discussion from it's hard because she couldn't guarantee that the plan cameras wouldn't be used for states available just like it would be the ones in more Bourne authoritarian country working from. I want to let, you know that cameras don't prevent crime. I'm employed by the largest property owner in the neighborhood. We have. When something happened, it was my job to look at cameras because at that time, I was the youngest. I have no more, um. It was a slow, long, agonizing task and it doesn't plan to prevent anything. Um, I was there in canceled alley when the windows on the wing was matched. I was horrified by the attacked, but 4 or 5, my response for retribution.

My parents taught me better recommendation is team to. These cameras are punitive, let's leave with love and hope as our parents tried to teach us as we strive to teach our own. So, we can heal, we can use that money the ones for the punitive cameras that don't work in a deficit year and put that money back into community and give it to folks to serve the community. Give it to give those resources to our communities who need it. That's the best way. To heal to prevent crime, it's not gonna be just a band aid like these cameras that don't work, but a reinvestment in our community can actually give us some hope give our community is a way to heal rather than plan to be negative.

Thank you.

Bitter Lake Speaker 4

I just want to say that I, too am disappointed that the community members are not in here. In person. My name is yen. She her, I'm a community member, living shopping, grocery, shopping, organizing, and trying to challenge national districts and as a problem taxpayer, I am not a supporter of this unnecessary spending currently there. Already highly police presence, and little Saigon terrorizing people additional surveillance will not prevent crime and learning from history of Chinatown, international district organizing. This community has always provided for themselves as the city has

intentionally neglect them. My partner is part of international district emergency. Whom, in previous years, the uncles and aunts would show up at incidents before the fire, or the police department would arrive. All of the nonprofits and service providers that exists in were created out of a need. That the government wasn't serving, I'm here to ground you in history of community, providing for themselves, healthcare, housing, safety, let's investment community relationships, and keep us safe instead of technologies. That is too expensive technologies that don't work technologies that are embrace this technology that automatically call police. A community that doesn't trust. Please, let's continue to outsource. Let's continue. That's not continue to outsource. Give me a relationship and activation 2 technologies that have proven not to work. Cctv recordings to prevent crime means that there is some basic microphones and black and brown communities. Rtc needs policing by data. I'm surprised in the budget deficit here that we're even discussing investment. Technology when, so, when public services will be cut, let your legacy be 1, that doesn't continue to fail. That doesn't continue failed technology investment, rather that 1 that address root causes.

Bitter Lake Speaker 5

Hello. Good evening my name is Martin and the founder of mother's police accountability.

Doing this work for 34 years, and I'm here to speak so for the black community, but a weeping mother's her mother 2 are fine, but the mother children who have been killed and mothers has been calling for cameras in the high profile area for since 2014. when police or tool was here people. People in the daytime, because they know they're not going to go to jail. And so we can have everybody to talk about bypass about the black community, but have they been to a funeral how many times have they set with mother to a client? Because their children had been killed? I mean, look at all the violence in Seattle and so we support this technology. I must fully scalability doom and I sat with many. Others whose children have been killed in Seattle since since if we add up all the bodies and call all the names of the people who've been killed in Seattle since 1990, we'd be ashamed of ourselves to talk about what what communities don't need. Thank you very much.

Thank you, we're, uh, we're gonna go to 5, uh, folks online now. So, with that, um, Eleanor.

Bounds, Eleonor

Yeah, of course, thank you. Um, I see, it looks like I'm just going to go by the queue, which I think is chronologically. So we'll start with Milo Scott DJ. Atlas and Vivian, and so I'll just unmute you and let you know, before I do, thank you so much.

Milo Kusold they/them

Oh, hi, my name is Milo. I live in Capitol Hill district 3, and I would like to publicly oppose the proposal to use CCTV ShotSpotter in real time crime center. In the name of public safety, my issue with this stems from the fact that these tools promote and enable racial profiling, they have been proven by other cities who have tried to use them to be ineffective. And it feels like a complete waste of money when we could be using that money to find solutions that actually promote public safety.

The referenced in your own, in fact, documents state that it has no observed effects for violent crime. And other studies have shown that it doesn't promote public safety instead dangerous and increases racial profiling. For ShotSpotter, it's very clear based on other cities attempts to use the technology that simply doesn't work in Chicago initial police responses to 88.7% of ShotSpotter alerts found no incidents involving a gun. These false alarms calls police to show up more frequently to marginalized neighborhood in a heightened state, thinking that there's gun violence, which is not a winning formula for police to foster good relationships with people that are here to serve. The technology was a waste of money for the city and seems to highly likely to waste our limitedly staff police horses time. Chasing false alarms, which is exactly what you were saying. It's supposed to help with. Regarding it uses privately on campus, allowing them to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police such as having to get warrants. This creates conditions that are right for police abuse with little to no oversight. This is problematic. As our police force strives to win the trust of our citizens. After countless instances they lost that trust, which is laughing and downplaying the murder of can do that. As an alternative I would like to see that the violence interruption programs. And more investment in mental health treatment, substance, abuse, treatment, and affordable housing.

The current proposed tech tools are cheap ploy, appease the public by AI, washing them to believe progress is being made instead of taking the time and effort to actually address the issues that cause people to turn to violence. And worst of all, all of them was shown to contribute to increased racial profiling. On that basis alone and given that your plan is to use it and then see people get profiles after folks had already likely been profiled by it. And face legal consequences I don't believe this proposal should be allowed to continue. Thank you for your time.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you Milo Scott Sternberg. Sternberg. Sorry. Forgive me. I'm going to unmute. You.

Scot Sternberg

Thank you um, my name is Scott Sternberg. I live in in hill. Um, all respect to, uh. The mothers and fathers and victims of. Violent crimes, and including state sanctioned violence, the city council to reject. Any funding piloting, implementation and use of these technologies. Cctv RTCC. An, they

posed a significant threat to civil rights and liberties. The ballpark, black, indigenous people of color, and immigrants are already subject to disproportionate, disproportionate rates of violence by SBD.

Even after a decade under a consent decree.

Scot Sternberg

These technologies represent a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle.

Numerous independent studies over the last 25 years. Deployments of these technologies have failed to result in any evidence of reduction of violent crimes. They have technologies like ShotSpotter have high false positive leading to false arrests and creates many unnecessary contacts. Between police and innocent civilians. There are many anecdotal stories of the harms that these technologies have inflicted on communities. I heard the city council to vote no to funding and implementation of these technologies. It is critical to make investments in meaningful community interventions and supports violent crimes can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance, abuse, treatment, facilities, access to affordable housing food and. Rotating income equity no. To funding and implementation of increased surveillance. Yes, to community investment and investments in our community. Thank you.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you, Scott. Bj less. I'm going to meet you and I just want to thank you all for keeping to the 2 minutes. I know that that's a lot to put in there. So thank you so much. And BJ please do. Go ahead.

BJ Last he/him

My name's PJ last I want to start off by saying it's really disappointing that there are fewer public hearings then even the number of technologies being up for consideration, that really says you guys don't actually want public input on this as, for 3 technologies is it's a false positive machine. That does nothing, but send police chasing things on wild use cases. And that's true. Regardless of the brand ShotSpotter 90% false alert rate in Chicago. 97 Atlanta flock another system. 92% fall. So alert rate when they're during a 6 month pilot pilot in champagne, Illinois, and this. Technology causes massive harm. We all remember Adam's, Plato, the alarmed 13 year old that the Chicago police department chase down and murdered while he was unarmed, because they were responding to a ShotSpotter alert. So this is a technology that has already killed at least 1 person and I say, at least, because just last month, the cops actually shot at. An armed child, it'd be a costly responding to a ShotSpotter alert and hurt a large sound. Cops have also been called running over gunshot victims while responding to for alerts. Cctv, we have studies from the UK to Dallas shown, have no, do not reduce violent crime, or cause any increase in clearance rates. At the same time. They call us

massive harm as 1. example. Washington D. C, police were caught using CCTV camera footage to try to blackmail game and RTC. This destroys seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city for anyone, whether that's women's seeking abortion, healthcare immigrants or anyone seeking transgender healthcare. Because it is designed to make sharing between law enforcement agencies as frictionless as possible removing need for warrants or even other ways to try to get approval to share information across. Groups it also really removes public oversight. And possibly violates the surveillance ordinance, because it removes public control private cameras, being integrated public doesn't get any control over where those go. They also like to brag about rolling out new algorithms. That's something that public will have new input on actually coming out and knowing that that is coming into their city. And the talk of these 3 tacks being something new shows, the constantly shifting goalposts of surveillance, each 1 of these texts on their own score it was going to like, 1st. Prevent crime, then it was proven that didn't happen and it would gather evidence that didn't happen. And now it's okay if you buy all of these together, it just shows all of that surveillance does is justify more spending on surveillance.

Bounds, Eleanor

Yeah, sorry yeah Atlas I apologize. I'm not sure what happened, but yeah, yeah Atlas, I will be unmuting You.

Atlas R

I am Atlas, I'm a 2 spirit indigenous person. Muckleshoot I wholly wholeheartedly reject all of this technology that the police Seattle police department is saying, would. Improve any of our lives we know that the police has had been built on protecting private property and brutalizing black and indigenous people in our communities as well as + and 2 spirit people. As somebody who's a software engineer and has been in technology for over a decade I know that as I have worked on these and algorithms, not for policing, but for other purposes that they are built on racist data sets.

Every single part of these algorithms are coded as ways to racialized profile and commit violence against our communities. This is a huge waste of our time, our tax money and our, um, emotional capacity as well as a community. This, all of this effort, all of this round and round that we're doing should be about allocating funds to community to. Policies and to groups that actually work to prevent violent crime and any other, um, incident that the police may want to criminalize. That is also a result of lack of housing, uh, lack of basic needs being met. We need to abolish the police. And

this is a clear effort to incarcerate black and indigenous people to continue to profit on modern day slave labor. That is all I completely rejected.

Bounds, Eleonor

So Atlas, Vivian I'm going to go ahead and mute you or was that? 5? I'm Susan.

vivian

Hi hello. Hi, thank you. My name is Vivian. I work in C. um, I'm open to learn more about this technology program. We have seen it in our store. Um, the CCTV helped people to feel safer. So, I'm interested to learn more about it, um, about the pilot program and what it can actually.

To the community, um, so, yes, that's my comment - Thank you.

Bounds, Eleonor

Okay, I think we're going to go back to the room.

Bitter Lake Room

You here can you hear me? I can hear you that. They just sent me. Okay.

Thank you. So, Brian taluka Jackie Matta Erica price. Um, I'm sorry, I can't read the last name. Thank you. Camille. Baldwin Bonnie and renaissance.

Bitter Lake Speaker 6

Right. Brian Luca I lived on a green lake.

I have nothing to fear. From technology that helps identify. And apprehending convict criminals.

Why I am not a criminal. I have no intention of ever being a criminal. I want technology to help.

Capture the bad guys and gals. It is, unless you are all willing victims. Of the next petty or serious crime. You'll be against killing technology. To get the bad guys, perhaps a 100 years ago or so.

You'd be in this room fighting against taking fingerprints. Think about are you all willing victims?

I'm getting that feeling. I know.

Bitter lake Speaker 7

Hi, my name is Jackie. I'm a resident of district 3. I came come here today to voice my strong opposition to all 3 of the proposed surveillance technologies. These technologies have shown to be ineffective, a study cited in the city's surveillance impact report itself mentioned that CCTV has no

measurable impact on violent crime and is more targeted for use in car cards. For example, which is not in line with how the city is proposing to use this technology. A study by the MacArthur justice center ShotSpotter usage in Chicago found that 86% of reported shots resulted in no crime fund.

And indeed, Chicago has elected to cancel their contract with water in 2024. In addition, these technologies are likely to target people of color and marginalized people this combined with a lot of trust and accountability and is a recipe for disaster. For example, we've recently learned that Seattle police officer who murdered by running her over, in his cop car will not face any charges unacceptable. I urge you to instead focus on building trust with the community. I echo comments from others here that we need to focus on community based. To reduce violent crime at their root, such as affordable housing and healthcare, instead of wasting money on these ineffective and basic technologies. Thank you. So, I want to start my comment by pointing out that in a meeting, discussing reporting and data collection. I can't actually report my own gender on this form. So I could get that. And if that was the downside, I apologize, but this comment is going to be pedantic, because I'm a headache, and I'm annoyed, I'm annoyed that so many of us did the work to find research evaluating these technologies for these proposals have moved forward with close to no research backing up there as the benefits. We've heard plenty about sight plenty about studies, covering the hearts of software, not just ShotSpotter and all of the other software here, but I think it's worth highlighting the inaccurate and negligent statements made by surveillance impact reports for 1 that they're frequent comments about the decibel minimum for audio requirements, uh, really make no sense adjustable measurement. Still allowed net stuff, a sound with a particular location at this point where it's being recorded. Um, and adjustable measurement is no guarantee of what these microphones pickup and the assertion of the contrary is ridiculous. Furthermore, it's no guarantee that the hardware will pick up a gun shot at ball. Let alone not record something that is not a gunshot. But more importantly, the reassurance is that the software won't pick up human speech is a big red thing. Well, it's a dangerous risk. What's a larger risk is the much documented evidence that hardware largely inaccurately reports non gunshots as gun. SPD claims that their use of this technology in conjunction with the other surveillance that they're proposing means that the reams of data showing us aren't relevant, but this is ridiculous. If this technology as proposed, we'll trigger the use of surveillance, talk for the unwarranted observation and data collection of civilians. False positives from are more relevant. Not last to this conversation on this proposal, it's unintelligible irresponsible that did not deem this wildly research, uh, wildly researched box relevant to their recording and the submission is indicative of their approach to all of these technologies. I want to make sure I give others time. So, wrap up with this question, why. Why invest in a crime response technology instead of further investing they've already proven strong prevention work being done with communities when we know that violence and corruption programs reduced violent crime by up

to 50%. By contrast, we know that misrepresents gunshots at least 90% of the time they can only respond to crime, not productive. As CBA provides no data to show. This technology works. So plenty of research shows, it hurts. Why should this city invest in technology when its benefits are entirely theoretical? But its harms are very real.

In person Speaker 8

So, my name is Camille. I'm a longtime Seattle resident. I've been here 29 years, and I am very concerned about this massive surveillance. Technology of the city is trying to procure. These technologies undercut our values as a sanctuary city and I am particularly concerned with the software. These softwares recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions, including capturing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner software can turn any camera into an automatic license plate reader. Anti abortion groups have a long history of using license plate data. Rtc software is meant to allow. This knowledge to the status to be shared across law enforcement agency, there is nothing preventing a 3rd party agency and an anti abortion state to use this data to predict criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Technology that also puts our immigrant populations at risk. Ice has a history of violating local sanctuary laws and this software and see if we procure the software, we cannot control the data. We do not protect that population. It also presents a threat to our Free speech, right and there is precedent for this. In 2021. LAPD requested both camera data, targeting black lives matter protesters. In New York City, there is evidence that NYPD use with facial recognition. Technology to surveil black lives matter protesters. Good violence is a serious issue and of the utmost importance and it deserves a significant and urgent response and there are many community based evidence based interventions that are effective that the, the. He could be scaling up and investing and This technology is proven ineffective, expensive and harmful. Thank you.

In Person Speaker 9

Hello. Yeah, that would be me. I report for the community sign on letter. What I've just given them is a sign on letter to Seattle, solidarity budget, put together um. Online and here in a room with 1220 individual signatures, 17 community organizations signatures with all of their constituencies members, and their basis that are in direct opposition of this 3 surveillance technologies being implemented here in the city of Seattle. In addition to that, like, our friend just share, we have 43 citations in this document alone, and in our call to action, there are volumes more citations and in.

These surveillance impact report, they left boxes empty when they had an opportunity to provide evidence of their claims. There's so much that can be saved. About this, but the things that are

coming to my mind. Is that my sister and my brother in law with her 5 children live right? Over the hill over there. And my mother lives right over the hill over there and then I grew up in these neighborhoods, and we were in. A panel last night, and y'all should definitely check out the panel that we hosted. It's on YouTube, it's on Seattle, solidarity budgets website where we were talking about the problems and issues with this technology as well as the community based solutions that will actually help rectify the harms in the communities and 1 of the. Things that was brought up was like, house arrest allows not only for the monitoring and tracking of the individual that they put the bracelet on, but their entire family, their teachers, their friends, all of their community members. So, even when 1 person is being to build all those people are being surveilled and this is just a further continuation of criminalization. And the other thing that comes to mind is that. Bruce Harrell, both as a mayor, and as a city council member has been attempting to push ShotSpotter, push, ShotSpotter and this technology into our communities for a long time, and usually goes through the legislative bill process. But this time he's moved it into passing a budget. And then instead of putting it at. Beats where they wanted to put it the other times, they put it in some North and communities with less people of color so that it wouldn't have to go through the same requirements and the right to equity.

A memo for the city of Seattle, central staff. Identified that Bruce would like to move these technology from the locations that they are within 1 year. And that means that it's already going to be approved by that point. So it's not going to have the same sort of opposition and community and scrutiny and then you're going to move it right into the communities that we're exactly talking about right now. And you want me to stop talking and I get that and there's a lot of other people here.

I disagree with this technology and over 1200 people do as well as well as the people in here and that are online. Yeah.

Britt, James

Eleanor, could we call up the next 5 people in the online.

Bounds, Eleonor

Please Thank you. Of course. Yep. Ethan, I'm going to go ahead and unmute you. I know you had your hand raise and I accidentally lowered when I was something else. So we're going to mute you and thank you so much for keeping to the 2 minutes.

Ethan Campbell

Let me see if Campbell and I live in and work in, I oppose all 3 of these technologies, but I want to speak about CCTV. As a researcher uses quantitative methods day in and day out. I'm concerned by the extent to which the city is neglecting the current body of academic research, finds that

widespread CCTV is not effective. A deterring or investigating serious and violent crime. The city's draft site's only 1 study, which is a good 1, an extensive meta analysis from 2019 of the past 40 years of research on this technology 76 studies and all. I just wish the city actually read it.

As others have raised this review, concluded that quote no significant effects were observed for reductions in violent crime or disorder. Cctv use was associated with only very modest changes in fecal property and drug crime. Small effects that were observed only for residential areas, and parking lot settings that are not like, where the city plans to deploy CCTV cameras, proceeding environments. The review did not find any benefits. For crime prevention from CCTV use with 79% 79 of the relevant studies. Show a non significant or undesirable effects. The city's draft, both MIS, characterizes this meta analysis and overstates its findings. It would not pass peer review in any reputable venue. The city also misses the reviews conclusion that quote a body of research on the Investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop. In fact, a 2023 study, looking at the impact of CCTV around Dallas finds that it is likely not cost effective in terms of increasing clearances. I strongly urge the city to follow the research by rejecting wasteful spending on this technology. Thank you.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thanks, Ethan. Um, Nolan, I'm going to unmute you.

Okay, I can come back to you. Um.

I mute you and then we can come back to Nolan. did you, um, join, uh, cause I can't seem to unmute you did you join via phone or? Um.

A different way that, because I don't have the option to unmute you. So if you, I'm not exactly sure what's going on there, but I'll move to T, and then maybe we can try to figure that out if that's okay.

Tee Sannon

Hi, I'm Tee Shannon, the technology policy program director at the ACLU of Washington. I'd like to raise 2 main concerns 1 about effectiveness and potential for harm and another about the review process. The Apple deserves public safety solutions that work. Research shows that surveillance technologies, acoustic, gunshot, location systems and CCTV cameras do not reduce gun violence and violent crime. Instead of making our community safer we know from other cities that all 3 of the technologies under review, violate people's privacy and civil liberties and disproportionately harm black and brown communities. Just last month the police officer in Chicago was responding to a false gunshot and fired a gun at the child who was playing with fireworks. Because these technologies are ineffective and harmful. There are a waste of funds that could be spent on solutions

that actually work. This is why cities like Chicago are ending their contracts with technologies like ShotSpotter. We in Seattle should learn from them. The ACLU of Washington is also concerned with the current review process. The risk equity tool kit requires the city to meaningfully engage with communities that will be most impacted by these technologies. This involves reaching out to communities and having an open dialogue with them about their concerns. The current public comment process is too rushed and too restrictive to achieve this engagement. The city also needs to ensure that the community surveillance working group is fully staffed and is going to have the time to produce their recommendations to the city council as per the Seattle surveillance ordinance.

We urged the 3 to not invest in these technologies, given the research, the known risks, and raise equity concerns. Thank you.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you. I'm, I'm going to mute the I think there were 2 joins. So let's see if this is the correct 1. can you. Perfect awesome. Okay. We figured it out.

JM

I was just going to this, you guys as technology, but maybe it's on my end, but, you know, with this stuff, there's not much verification, but with any mess up with technologies, you guys are proposing lives could be lost. So, thank you ran for sharing the context around. Other politics and maneuvering that's being done to, um. To push the ShotSpotter and all these surveillance take through in this budget shortfall year. I think that's really interesting jarring. Um, for us to know at a time when social services are about to be cut, we have these expansions of police surveillance system. So, my name is, I'm here from I live well, I don't. Trying to town, but I work, um, in the Chinatown and there's a lot of folks who have been saying that Chinatown supports the surveillance technology. I'm here to say, there's a lot of us who don't. And actually, as my Friend had shared earlier that there were campaigns that were explicitly meant to oppose the surveillance technology. So I want to just remind everyone about that. And a lot of us in the neighborhood do not want increase surveillance. We want actually the money to be invested in long term solutions and there were promises of safe. Sites that's been talked about again and and again, and again, and for so long, that still has not happened and the fact that there's no Seattle King County, public health mobile stations around the neighborhood is just jarring. So, if you guys could just replace a cop car with a mobile clinic that would really help the safety in the neighborhood and. We really reject this attempt to just go to easy answers and to just use these technologies, who knows what kinds of kickbacks are happening within the city is a dark place. I'm not sure you guys can know, um, probably know better, but in the meantime. It might be really helpful for to get your own house in order and to tell your own cops to stop using technology to

stock everyday people and to abuse the use of technology that you already do have. So, I just want to say explicitly that there are people in the who just do not trust the police and refuse to let some folks and Voices speak for the neighborhood, so please use the money that was intended for this surveillance technology to think about more constructive longterm solutions for the neighborhood. Thank you.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you Nolan, let's give it a go.

Nolan

Okay, hopefully people can hear me. Um, yeah, I'm Nolan, I live in Capitol Hill um, like most of the people that talked before me, I also pose these technologies. Uh, I just wanted to say that a quick online search of brings up all these articles about Chicago police, opening fire on an unarmed. Held after a faulty call I think it's ridiculous that Seattle, once the fund, the system that Chicago has already proven not to work and these technologies do not promote public safety. I do not support them. And this is a bad investment. Ah, that's it.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you. Okay. Um.

Bounds, Eleanor

Let's go to nickel, Nick. I forgive me. Um.

Nikhil L

Hello can you hear me? Hi. Hello. My name is Nicole. I live in the Chinatown international district, and I'm here in opposition to the 3 proposed technologies. i1st half want to say that the, uh. Private sector partnership, uh, undermines the legitimacy of this entire Process and proposal the fact that there are corporations set to profit off of this that are looking to partner with the increased surveillance and overall increased militarization of The Seattle police department, um, undermines any sort of democratic process. Any ability for us to, uh, to oppose these corporations that have an incredibly strong grip over our political process through their donations and through, um. General, their, their partnership with the, with the city, and with the state um, I also totally confused by the premise of what we're talking about here. Uh, the question of is, like, will this technology be effective? Will it be make us safer? Will we know that right? Now, uh, we are not. Safe, uh, every day, um, we see our people, our community, um, in the streets, um, dying from their conditions, you

know. Lack of housing is makes people unsafe a lack of access to. Medical treatment into social, basic, basic social services makes people unsafe. The endless. Prison pipeline and commercial system, um, terrorizing our, our youth makes us unsafe and the Seattle police department perpetuating this enforcing this. And protecting the interests of those in power, those profiting off of, uh, um, our, our labor in our, in our, our, our, our plate and, uh, the destruction of our communities. Um. This is what makes us unsafe and so, even if, uh, whatever esoteric. Uh, study, or or whatnot um. Seattle, the city of Seattle is able to pull out to prove the effectiveness of. Uh, CCTV, uh, the, the crime center, um, and, uh, the acoustic gunshot detection technology, even if they say that it makes the police more effective. Uh, we know that we don't want the police to be more effective, because they are designed exactly to terrorize this. And prevent us from, um. From uplifting ourselves and protecting our own communities just a few hours ago. People were arrested at the city, uh, at city hall, for voicing their demand for housing for migrants in our community. Um, so we know what happens when we actually ask for what we need, and we know how the Seattle police. Department responds and he asks for what we need. Um, so if we can take even just. A half a step backwards and look at the full picture in which we are not safe right now, um, we will not be safe with the Seattle police department, continuing to pull in public funds, our tax dollars, and all of our resources towards increased militarization and surveillance. Oh, that's it.

Britt, James

I believe at this time, we'll head back over to the in person meeting at the lake community center Nick. If you would like to get the next 5 ready all on mute the room.

Smith, Sarah

Okay, stick to more like 1 and a half minutes. Yeah, we're not, uh, 2 minutes. Please keep it to 2 minutes. Um, so. Yeah, so do you. Doing.

Smith, Sarah

Class mapping, so we can just okay. Let's yeah, let's try to get some folks up here to speak. But now. Me, I'm sorry.

Smith, Sarah

It's either Lou or Lee. Okay. And then, uh, after that at any Lou set Taylor, generic fan and accordingly.

Smith, Sarah

While this microphone is muted is the conversation happening in the room? Not on the record.

Uh, I believe it's so folks can hear you here because we're when they're speaking, but is the conversation happening here still being recorded for public record wow this microphone.

Smith, Sarah

Um, that I'm not sure of you mean, okay, it doesn't seem that way.

In Person 10

I want to start off on making 1 thing. Very clear as SPD has never faced any significant budget cuts.

They started by crying about being understaffed and saying they need more money and more toys to play with. If nobody wants to go make 6 figures a year working for, that's their call, because they messed up. They all get a cry to us for millions of dollars of more equipment, because they've soiled their, their relationship with the community. Does not alert police to go and violence according to Chicago's Cook County state Attorney's office software technology is expensive and not making a significant impact on shooting incidents. Researched by the MacArthur justice center at the northwestern school of law from the 86% of ShotSpotter alerts let the dead end deployments. Spot I will send police crawling for offenses where there are none. This is dangerous for people who are given the Department's history of extremely racist practices. I think Sarah are asking us that there are millions into invasive technology. That is not true. People say, meanwhile we've sent to the city or not 88 compliant. There are few public bathrooms. No benches to sit on. People are starving and dying in the streets. Surveillance does not fix the poverty that is at the root of most crime in the city. It says, talks with twitchy trigger fingers on wild goose cases. Do not want this technology you're going against the people if you enabled surveillance on their dime.

Bitter Lake Location

Okay.

In Person 11

Hi, my name is Annie. I live in Mount Baker district 2, and also part of the community. Um, I'm here to express my concerns about the proposed surveillance technology. As a software engineer who has worked on an automatic speech recognition, I'm deeply aware of the dangers of this tech without careful implementation. It will increase racial bias and invasion of privacy. And here in Seattle will only increase violence and abuse of power. Automated surveillance tools, give the false promise of efficiency. Yeah. In reality are ineffective and costly. Chicago has ended their contract with

ShotSpotter. Why are we rushing to start? 1? It is deeply irresponsible to buy into this security product without properly consulting. The community whose tax dollars would be set on useless policing guidance. Instead of. Services that would actually improve community safety. And while I'm just as concerned about safety as any other Seattle resident, this cannot be the solution. We need to focus on effective community based crime prevention programs, not rely on ineffective surveillance tech.

In Person 12

Hello, my name is South Taylor, and I was in the Capitol Hill. I would like to voice my opposition to these technologies. These new technologies will be ineffective, but their stated goals. They will be used to incarcerate people without Jessica, particularly people of color, and create criminals where there are none. The these technologies, and the data that they collect can only be used to harm the communities that they prefer to help. Moreover, why is this hearing being closed so far away from the community's most affected by them? Why are we watching to implement these technologies without proper public comment or oversight? Money spent on these ineffective harmful technologies can instead be used ineffective, proven community, driven solutions with people out of poverty. The true danger to public safety, the rights of privacy is a default state merely being in a public space is not a justification to surveil people. No, 1 should be treated like a criminal simply for existing in a public space. Thank you.

In Person 13

I'm Jim. Nick Mann from worker's world party.

People say, no to making Seattle, a surveillance city the surveillance technology proposed by the mayor's office would put people under a high tech spine network invading people's privacy. Privacy is their own business. It's yours, this technology would no doubt target the homeless who are stuck living outdoors and it would be subject to monitoring when the homeless are already subject. To the city of Seattle led harassment and terror and sweeps of their property and denial of their civil and human rights. The whole focus here is on suspected crime in the streets instead of crime in the corporate suites. Working people are robbed and terrorized by crime in a corporate Suisse to crimes of waive staff and other anti labor violations, violations of labor, environmental loss and corporate interference and dominant in all areas. Of society, we also demand that the city not take away the minimum wage, uh, laws and other pro labor benefits. For the Uber and Ryan shared drivers Seattle must not legislate Drivers back to poverty wages. It's why are they looking at this. This morning for cameras cameras. That's correct.

In person 14

So, 1st off. I'm appalled that. The black community wasn't informed. More about this meeting I, um. We need them here because their voices are the voices that need to be heard. We're the ones that are losing our young black men and women, I'm sick of people that don't look like us don't live in our neighborhoods. Think they can speak for us hijack every moment. The reason why we're here is because of, uh, we don't have a police department is because of groups like this, that high. Our movement when George was murdered, so we don't have a police department so we need these tools to help our community. The black community wants it. We need it. They, they can go home to their homes. They're not in our neighborhoods. They're not dying. I've sat just like a mother Walden with mothers and fathers weekly over their young black children that have been murdered. These cameras, or whatever it is, would help maybe solve some of these murders. I want all of them to sit with a mother. They don't speak for us and Bruce, I'm asking you do not. Listen to the black community, we need to listen to us for once. We weren't listened to doing George Floyd and look at us. We're here now I am. Beyond that that this is happening, why was at a meeting last night that we put on 2 white men, the rest black, every black person there wants this and 1, white 1, white guy against it. Listen to the community that needs it and wants it.

Smith, Sarah

So. I want to go to the online.

Bounds, Eleanor

More okay. All right we will start with tea.

I'm gonna unmute you. Um, and then I'll let, you know, in the chat about 15 seconds before time.

t

Hi, thank you. I have lived in Seattle for my whole life, but I'm actually calling from Chicago right now. Which just a week ago actually canceled a contract with. Um, Shotspotter, because has everyone else has mentioned it utterly failed. It costs the city. Um. don't even know how much money, but money that could have been spent elsewhere and should have been spent elsewhere. It did not make people safer. Um, I'm going to read an excerpt from an article by Laurence, uh, score. From, um, Vanderbilt about the issues with ShotSpotter, the shop spotter program is a recent technological development and predictive policing. It was adopted in the city in 2018. however, the program is riddled with inaccuracy and has largely failed to produce evidence of gun crimes. Shotspotter frequently alerts, false positives and out of the over 5 50,000 ShotSpotter alerts deployed in 2021.

Only 9.1% on the alerts, provided evidence of a gun related to that. As many other people have said already, there's no evidence these technologies work and in fact, there is. So much evidence, um, that they don't work. I have no confidence that anything I'm saying here will be taken seriously. So I want to direct the rest of my time. To addressing the people who came to this meeting to say. Thank you for showing up I think that, um. The energy here is awesome and, like. Even if they're not listening to us, we have the power and the ability to keep working and keep working on this issue and to keep making Seattle safe because we know what makes our cities say. And it's not police that's all. I have to say.

Bounds, Eleanor

Thank you T, um, I'm gonna move on to Karen.

karen

Hi, my name is Karen. I'm calling in just to express. My opposition to all of these technologies. Um, I don't think we need a pilot program when it's been piloted in other cities and it's clear that this is just a wedge to get this technology into our city to be later abuse transformed. Everyone knows it's much easier to just transform some. Thing into facial recognition or whatever. You know, as soon as soon as the cameras are already in place, um, they're not gonna hold all these hearings for that. That's for sure. So we don't need to pilot this. We know scientifically that it doesn't work. And the community has been saying, we don't want this. Thank you.

Britt, James

Ellen, or do you have our next step.

Bounds, Eleanor

Sorry, Shane or Diane Anderson Shane I think it.

Cheyne Anderson

This, uh, Hi there. Yes, I'm Cheyne. Uh, Hello. Okay. Um, so I have to be up front about saying that, like, I'm not Currently living in Seattle, I did live in Seattle a few years back in, uh, around Pikes place. I am opposed to the use of this technology in Seattle for many of the same reasons that have already been said by everyone here Um, so I will try to keep this brief so that people who are currently living in Seattle, 1, more time I would just ask the question of If this moves forward after hearing so much opposition here tonight. What what does that really mean about public hearings?

What is the point of them if this moves forward when there has been such overwhelming.

Negative feedback, uh, thank you.

Bounds, Eleonor

Thank you, um, s, I'm going to go ahead and unmute you.

Bounds, Eleonor

Um, s, and I don't have a name. So, uh, did you.

Did you want to do did you want to go um.

Okay, perhaps we'll try Bonnie and then come back.

Bonnie

Hi, my name's Bonnie. I'm a resident of the central district district 3, and I strongly oppose the implementation of all 3 of the proposed surveillance technologies. Law enforcement agencies have a history of misusing and abusing CCTV, peer reviewed studies show that. Spotter is ineffective and increases bias, policing an RTC software has the potential to violate civil rights and undermine democratic values. We know. For a fact that community based solutions like investment in secure and affordable housing, liveable wages, food, access and more are the things that. Reduce violence, these types of community programs are already working. For example, the work of Rainier beach action coalitions restored resolutions. Project has reduced violence by 33% percent in our community residents of my neighborhood and others are already feeling the impact of city and police. It causes a distrust of government, it creates isolation from community and it offers no longterm solutions to underlying causes of violence. I don't know how many more ways or in how many different ways we can say that the Seattle community does not want these technologies implemented. This money needs to fund actually impacted communities, not be outsourced to external companies. Especially during a deficit year, it's ridiculous to even be discussing funding these technologies as public services. Like, jumpstart are being cut, defund the police refund communities. Thank you.

Bounds, Eleonor

Thank you and I know your audio's not working. So do you want to maybe put your comment in the chat? Would you be comfortable doing that?

Bounds, Eleonor

Um, okay, thank you. Then we would love to get that that way. Okay.

Right, and I know, um, since Bonnie did you want to speak and then we can go back to the room.

Um, I just 1. okay, the room is now on.

Smith, Sarah

Okay, so I'm sorry to say, but we have to start breaking down this room um, making an offer.

Instead of the reason that we couldn't make sure that everybody had an opportunity to speak how long it was going to take to clean up the space. I'm wondering if some folks in the room would it.

Like right around the space really quickly. Absolutely. A lot of us do this as part of our job we'll do. We'll do 5 more public speakers. I did the 5 more or less done here. And then if you guys want to help with chairs.

Smith, Sarah

1:30:27

If we have to folks, you want to go home to work at community center.

Smith, Sarah

Um, so 5 point we have Lindsay. What's. oh, I'm sorry I didn't want to speak, uh, outside.

Send the Kathryn 1:2:3 4 and then Ella. I don't know if that's sharp. Sean. So, where is he.

You can just make sure you can stand here. Just make. This is the microphone, right? So they can hear.

In Person 15

My name is Lindsay, and I live in Fremont, the lobbyists will tell you how these technologies produce crime and keep our communities safe. But the reality is that they prioritize effective to be the safety solutions, ignore, root causes of violence and further harm, already marginalized communities as you've heard earlier. Chicago's mayor recently announced their. The default ShotSpotter in 2024, which costs the city 49 Million dollars since 2018 in part due to its pivotal role in the murder of 13 year old. Adam Toledo. In 2021, ShotSpotter alerted Chicago, Chicago, police of a suspected gun shot at Adams residence Based on bring camera footage Adam was playing with a firework and a basketball, but pose no harm to police officers. Adam was shot dead that day. Just for being a kid.

I strongly oppose all 3 proposed technologies as a resident of Seattle, because they are not intended to keep me or my neighbor's safe. I urge you to alternatively, invest in community resources like housing, healthcare and other social supports. Thank you.

Smith, Sarah

Okay. Okay.

In Person 16

I am your neighbor best I live in North gate and district 5 and it's a neighborhood that is 1 of the top areas in the city for violent crimes for gun violence. Um, so it it, it affects me. Personally, something there's so much to speak on with this, but something that hasn't been spoken to enough that I want to amplify is. The concern for harm that this surveillance technology can cause. I'm a physician and I'm opposed to all of the technology that's being considered by. Surveillance is not safety. In fact, data shows that many people that are exposed to surveillance technology, feel less safe. The feeling of being watched. Does not lend to community I want the city council, and for all of us to consider the psychological impacts of using this kind of technology of being surveilled.

As friends have spoken to the technology has been proven. To not be effective to not reduce violent crime to, uh. Target black and brown communities poor neighborhoods. I have specific questions about, uh. So many questions, like, what would your metric be for success? How would you know, if you're failing if you're using this. Cost over time their subscriptions for the services. We need to use money on what's been proven to work, which is investing in community. Focusing on community, based harm reduction and safety. There are programs that are already being implemented in this city. Mr. Gregory Davis has talked about the importance of investing in our most valuable technology, which is our youth. I would like to see the city use the money. And focus more resources on supporting community, uplifting youth. You came at us saying that there's a problem with staffing. Jonathan means a lawyer involved in the mccarthur justice center study on ShotSpotter. Said in multiple studies, ShotSpotter has been found to not produced on violence even when using conjunction with other surveillance technologies like surveillance cameras. It also does not make police more efficient or relieve staffing shortages. Yeah, it's exactly the opposite. This articles in Urbanist you can read it. No surveillance.

Smith, Sarah

Okay.

In Person 17

My name is clotted I live in Fremont. My profession is technology both in software engineering, and this and product management roles.

I completely oppose these 3 technologies. We have witnessed increased authoritarian fascism and state repression right here in our city of Seattle. This month at a protest against the Israeli American

genocide of Gaza and Palestine, Seattle police, violently assaulted a 62 year old woman, Seattle police through our sacred elder to the ground where she sustained a head injury. Seattle police, brutalized our cherished elder while. She was non violently. And democratically. Protesting is really not theism and American taxpayer funds, wasted on genocide. The police do not keep us safe. Seattle police endanger are most precious souls. We do not trust the police. We, the citizens of Seattle refuse this wasteful and shameful surveillance package and demand funds, be allocated to social welfare programs not increase authoritarian criminalization programs. We reject the technologized militarization of our police force. Do not fall for the sexy marketing and single pane of glass buzzwords. I work in tech. Let me give you the insider perspective. We love using these marketing terms and buzzwords to sell to government. We love winning large, expensive contracts at the expense of the tax, paying public by upselling and over promising the capabilities of our dysfunctional buggy and unaccountable technology product. The city of Chicago is actively divesting and ending its contract with ShotSpotter and system systems are costly, inaccurate error. Prone statistic do not waste community funds on this, feed our children. Instead. How's our homeless and our poorest instead heal and protect are sick and injured and disabled instead last. Month, I spent over 1000 dollars of my personal money to close refugees from Central and South America and Africa seeking sanctuary and talking with the church has threatened to sweep these people and even the rest of many of them to day some of the poorest and most disadvantaged people present in our community, spend public money on public benefit. Waste our money on these constantly policing surveillance programs. Okay.

Smith, Sarah

Hello.

In Person 18

Hi, I'm Sarah. My sign says fun. Housing, not cop surveillance. Um, I'm coming on strong opposition to this special thank you. Solidarity budget and the amazing teaching with leaders in the community that got me out of my house today. To oppose the thunder I am from Michigan, I grew up in us in a town that was being funded for everything. We didn't have a police force and fortunately community kept me safe every day and that's what we're here to do. Not the cost community. Kept me say, and that's what we're going to do to keep each other safe. We saw Erin personnel self emulate proposal, assigned this week. And there's an empty pulled out a fire extinguisher and send to the cop who pulled out the gun. We don't need guys, we need fire extinguisher. It looks like here, we don't need ShotSpotter. We need safe haven for trans, abortion seekers in our activity, or. He's on, we need to hear her health and substance your clinics in the staff to do the work. We need to start a justice. We

probably need homeless, sweet, sweet housing, including those silent secret y'all arrested today at city hall. Thank you for the community with me, thank you for the time.

In Person 19

Hello. I'll be really brief. I just hope that everyone takes this opportunity to really listen to the community members that came out today. Especially people that are most impacted by violence. I'm worried that you won't. I'm worried that the people that came out here, their voices are going to be lost. I know all of us don't agree with each other. I personally oppose these technologies, but. The fact that people came out of here today, just to voice what they were feeling and their experience is it's really powerful. So. I do hope that that gets taken into account. I do worry that it doesn't. Um, and this hearing is for nothing, but. I hope so, and I'm really inspired by the people that came here today. So thank you.

In Person 20

Alright, thanks. Everybody give me some. 2nd, I'm Andrew Swartz resources to stock and harass his ex girlfriend. I was still on department enroll, and we want to give him CC TVs and in real time crime center I don't f***. Think so. Coming from the table there, you can go online and fill out the Commons as well.

Tang, Vinh

I think everyone that's still online. I am going to close the Webex meet, which will end the meeting for everyone have a great night.

Comment Submitted Via Chat:

Scot Sternberg	At its core, these technologies violate the 'commitment' of the city to be a 'sanctuary' city. It places immigrants. who provide so much to our communities, at risk. It does not make our communities safe!
Brad	I'd like my household's opinon to be noted: Two Nothgate residents and my partner is a biz owner in Belltown. We do not support any of these 3 technologies presented tonight. SPD has done NOTHING to show us that they are trustworthy. My household and biz will feel MUCH LESS safe with these in place. Please ensure that our voice is heard and both of the adults in my household are opposed to these 3 technologies. Also, continuing

	<p>to say "understaffed" is not a valid point from our perspective. We do not support our current law enforcement - they have proved time and time again that they are not trustworthy. SPD does not have our support for these technologies.</p>
JB	<p>Please do not move forward with any of these proposals that have no evidence of "helping" our community and plenty of evidence that these technologies may harm some in our community AND take needed funds away from efforts that actually do help our community.</p>
Evelyn	<p>I don't understand why the city is even considering any of these technologies when we *know* that they don't work. All of the research agrees on this. The city is in a deficit and you want to spend millions of dollars on technology that does not function? It makes no sense! My household and I reject this program in the strongest possible terms.</p>
Scot Sternberg	<p>No to surveillance, no to state sanctioned violation of civil liberties, No to state violence!</p>
Ezra Zelizer	<p>As a social worker in Seattle, I am extremely against this surveillance technology. Social support systems in Seattle are extremely strained and in desperate need of more funding. Putting more money towards surveillance does not address the reasons crimes are committed, but increasing access to housing, food, and other basic essentials does. Vote no to the extreme surveillance and civil rights violations that this bill would bring.</p>
Alexis	<p>Was my public comment not going to get counted? If so, I'm going to share here: Thank you to everyone who spoke out against this technology tonight, you give me hope and cement the fact, like T and so many others said, that we keep us safe, not police. I'm Alexis, a resident of District 3 and I join my neighbors and comrades in wholly rejecting all three surveillance technologies shared here tonight. I specifically want to put in to record data about ShotSpotter or AGLS since far too often our elected leaders won't listen to our collective pleas: A study reviewed ShotSpotter deployments for roughly 21 months (from July 1, 2019, through April 14, 2021) in Chicago and found that 89% of ShotSpotter's reports led police to find no gun-related crime and 86% turned up no crime at all, amounting to about 40,000 dead-end ShotSpotter</p>

	<p>deployments. There were over 40,000 dead-end deployments over 21.5 months...</p>
Alexis (cont)	<p>ShotSpotter is deployed in the 12 Chicago districts with the highest percentage of Black and Latinx residents. 2021 study of 68 large metropolitan counties that adopted ShotSpotter over the course of 17 years—from 1999 to 2016—found that “implementing ShotSpotter technology has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes.” ShotSpotter is only 2.2 seconds faster than a 911 call, according to a 2017 study. Chicago paid \$33 million for a three-year contract with ShotSpotter in 2018 and has been valued now, as of 5 days ago, at roughly \$57.5 million. I also want to clarify that yes, Chicago’s mayor did announce that the city planned to shut down ShotSpotter but walked that back and will now spend \$8.6 million to extend the city’s controversial deal with ShotSpotter for nine final months — shelling out significantly more than the city paid for the entire past year of service.</p>
Alexis (cont.)	<p>We know what works: community-driven and evidence-based solutions and the evidence continues to tell us that these surveillance technologies do not work.</p>
s	<p>I oppose these technologies, I live in Cap Hill and work in the CID. Funds should be allocated back into our communities as we already know that these technologies do not work. Additionally these technologies partnered with the development and establishment of Cop City in Lacey, WA is incredibly frightening and disturbing.</p>
Linnea	<p>My name is Linnea I’m a resident of capital hill and a software engineer working in AI. This is now my second time asking the city not to implement shotspotter or AGLS, now adding CCTV and RTCC. These technologies pose a serious threat to Seattles status as a sanctuary city. The combination of CCTV and RTCC creates the conditions to turn any camera into an automated license plate reader, which anti-abortion groups have a noted history of abusing. As other anti abortion states step up their criminalization of people seeking reproductive healthcare, the threats to their safety will only increase with these technologies. I was lucky enough to be able to come to Seattle from Texas in part to get away from anti abortion laws- how dare the city take away this</p>

	<p>sanctuary not only to people seeking an abortion but also queer people seeking healthcare, and immigrants. With the rest of my time I want to read in a few not so fun facts. One, according to the south Seattle emerald the shotsp</p>
<p>Linnea</p>	<p>One, according to the south Seattle emerald the shotspotter CEO donated to both of Harell's mayoral campaigns. And we wonder why shotspotter keeps coming up. Two, when dayton Ohio considered adding just one of these technologies they held 13 public comment sessions while Seattle is only hosting two for three techs. Who exactly has the city sought feedback from, aside from the paid lobbyists representing the for-profit companies behind these techs? Like Renaissance pointed out, over 1200 people have signed on in opposition to these technologies. We are speaking very loud and very clear: don't add these techs. Fund real violence prevention programs instead.</p>
<p>Cause Haun</p>	<p>As a D1 resident, I urge you to stay true to Seattle's values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective, Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. There are many effective programs that will increase safety if they are resourced anywhere near the amount that is provided to SPD. We do not want to be surveilled in our daily lives, regardless if we are in the public sphere.</p>
<p>Neha</p>	<p>I would like my household's and my public comment to be recorded here as well: We are vehemently opposed to the technology proposed and implore you to understand that reactive measures designed to racially profile and psychologically harm communities of color CANNOT be a safety solution. As a brown educator and a resident of Capitol Hill, the primary focus of my classroom is restorative justice and proactively creating a community that is self-sustaining, justice-oriented, and accessible to every person. If my preschoolers can do more to ensure the safety of their classroom at the age of 4, I implore you all to take a page from their book and give the money allocated for these technologies to</p>

	<p>intentional, meaningful community services. It is only through proactive, preventative, and consistent investment into community services that we can keep each other safe.</p>
Neha	<p>These technologies will do nothing to make SPD "more efficient and effective" at keeping us safe but will make them more effective at harming us and making us fear for our lives every moment and in every space of our communities. Surveillance is not a way to protect people, empowering them with sustainable funding and community support is.</p>
Emaan Haseem	<p>Im here in opposition to all 3 of the technologies proposed I'm joining remotely as I've just come back from a protest on UW campus where I as a tech worker condemned the use of racist AI tech against Palestinians. A people who we, at Seattle city council just a few months back, collectively passed a ceasefire resolution for. I'm a constituent from Capitol Hill, a software engineer, and a Muslim who grew up in Dallas, Texas. From my own experience and while living in my muslim, south asian & Arab, community in Dallas I learned all too well the over policing and constant surveillance of my neighbors. And I echo the calls of my black, indigenous, brown siblings who also decry against the ineffective surveillance that if anything just breeds more distrust in the community Ad making more permanent the systems that work to incarcerate black, brown, indigenous, marginalized bodies. In fact from my hometown Dallas comes the research that concluded: increased CCTV presence does not corre</p>
Emaan Haseem (cont)	<p>- late to keeping people safe. In the end I stand against the funding of this technology, which has proven to be ineffective. And instead I demand the city instead invest in local community efforts that have proven to decrease crime rates and nurturing people off of the streets, out of incarceration, and into warm and well fed homes. Investing in each persons hierarchy of needs before institutionalizing racist policing efforts. Additionally I find it ridiculous that when cities like Detroit, MI has held 13 public hearings to provide space to their people when proposing these technologies, Seattle has only provided 2 hearings and rushes decisions in this surveillance tech. While inadequately informing the marginalized communities that this technology will be employed upon. shame.</p>

Public Records Act Notice:

Information provided to the City of Seattle is considered a public record and may be subject to public disclosure. For more information see the Public Records Act, RCW Chapter 42.56.

	Name	Please indicate below if you would like to provide public comment
1	Morgan Capps	Yes
2	Peter Condit	Yes
3	KACHTHA DAUH	Yes
4	Yin Yin	Yes
5	Rev. Walden	Yes
6	BRIAN DELUCA	YES
7	Jackie Makdah	yes
8	Erica Bryce Cannatelli	yes
9	Camille Baldwin-Bonney	yes
10	Renaissance	Yes
11	Bernie Kay	no
12	Lu Bierillo	Yes
13	Annie Lu	YES
14	Beth Taylor	Yes
15	Jim McMahon	Yes
16	Victoria Beach	Yes
17	Lindsey Lozoskie	YES
18	Beth Quintana	YES
19	Matt Offenbacher	YES NO
20	Khalid Elassaad	YES
21	SARA McCLASLIN	YES
22	Ella Shahm	YES

23	The Rev. Diakonda Gurning	NO.
24	Jacqueline Manalastas	Yes
25	Beth Ku	Yes
26	James Gaul	yes
27	Agnes Govean	yes
28	Gary Lee	YES
29	SANDY HA	YES
30	Shiyue Zhang	yes
31	Clara Rofkenberger	Yes
32	Sophie Debs	YES
33	Madeline FX	yes
34	Maeve Walls	Yes
35	BRIAR STRATAS	YES
36	GREGORY DAVIN	YES
37	Cynthia Spiess	Yes
38	Jodie Nathan	Yes YES
39	CAMERON FRASER	YES YES
40	Just Royer	Yes
41	Jonathon Dryker	yes
42	Elena Miteva	no
43	Taylor Riley	yes
44	Tim Marrison	yes
45	Abra Soke	No
46	Vie Seraph	no
47	Howard Gale	YES
48	Kenia Diaz	no
49	Wanda Rodriguez	NO
50	CM Weber	Yes comment ^{against} surveillance
51		
52		
53		

LOTS of
speakers didn't
get a chance
to give
comment.

Have another
meeting -
extend to process!!

Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

- Cost - This money would be much better spent on Community Interventions that to not increase amount of profiling.
- Inefficient - Studies show that technology like Cetr do not work in the way you advertise.
- The study that SPD themselves cited found ^{for Cetr} "no significant effects..."

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology? NONE!

- Response to #1 continued! ... observed for violent crime" so why infringe on our privacy in this way? For what?
- Studies show that ASES has failed to result in any evidence of a gun crime 90-97% of the time?? so what is the point? Why is this in BIPOC communities more frequently?
 - In 2014, people were caught using Cetr to spy on people. How would you

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

- Community privacy - A study shows that black folks are more likely ^{to be profiled.} ~~prevented this?~~
- Racial profiling increasing + BIPOC folks being disproportionately impacted in a way that is harmful not helpful.
- It is expensive, we do not need more money to lock people up, we need money to help the community by funding community programs

Other comments: that one shown to work under these 3 surveillance tech!

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

There is little evidence this will reduce violent crime.

There is plenty of precedent that shows this technology is going to harm those who are already struggling - people taking drugs on the street because life is hard and they have nowhere else to do it, people stealing for food and other supplies, and almost definitely against homeless encampments.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

We already know what works. Giving people homes, food, supplies, community - these have incredible effects on reducing crime. Focus on that.

Other comments:

There will be no "shortage" of police personnel if they are unneeded. (they mostly already are.) Sweeping homeless people is not a good use of resources.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

- IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF TAX DOLLARS
- INVASIVE & PRIVACY VIOLATION
- INEFFECTIVE (PROVEN IN USE BY OTHER CITIES)

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

NONE

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

- COST
- PUBLIC COMMENT & CONCERNS ARE ADDRESSED
- USE THE SUGGESTIONS COMMENTERS WHO OPPOSE BROUGHT UP

Other comments:

- NO CCTV
- NO GUNSHOT DETECTION / SHOT SPOTTER
- NO RTCC

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

- WILL ANOTHER MEETING BE HELD SINCE NOT ALL PUBLIC COMMENTERS HAD A CHANCE TO SPEAK?
- WITH THE OVERWHELMING OPPOSITION TO ALL THE TECH -
NO LONGER PROPOSED WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

- it is not proven to reduce crime.
- it uses racially biased technology.
- it has unknown $\frac{1}{2}$ ongoing costs/subscriptions
- it is ~~devisive~~ divisive to community
- it gathers data, violated privacy

- targets certain neighborhoods

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

NONE

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

- cost
- impact on community
- humanitarian impact
- psychological impact of being surveilled (feeling watched, unsafe)
- investing in youth $\frac{1}{3}$ community
- \rightarrow people not tech!

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

- who stores data? where? for how long?
- who has access to data?
- what are metrics for success? failure?
- how does AGIS distinguish gunfire from other, similar sounds?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Technology will be used for the wrong reasons, & not for prevention/safety of the community.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None, it can be harmful to marginalized & BIPOC communities.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

That this technology will not be useful, instead invest the funds in organizations that focus on prevention work to reduce violence/crime.

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

1/4/18



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

These technologies will be ineffective at their stated goals. They will be used to 'incarcerate' people without just cause, particularly people of color. They will create criminals where there are none.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None. They will be actively harmful to the communities they purport to help. The data collected by these technologies can only be used to harm.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Money spent on these ineffective, harmful technologies can instead be used on effective, proven community-driven solutions which lift people out of poverty, the true danger to public safety.

Other comments:

The right to privacy is a default state. Merely being in a public space is not a justification to surveil people. No one should be treated like a criminal simply for existing in a public space.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

~~Why are~~ Why is this hearing being held far away from the communities they will most affect? Why are we rushing to implement these technologies without proper public comment or oversight?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Lots of concern - CID doesn't
want it.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None - we ~~lost~~ lose value. don't invest in it.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

they going to be thinking of re-election as always...?
Invest in community, not cameras

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Body camera hasn't prevented police violence, How will more CCTV, AGLS, etc not prevent crime.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

none waste of Tax dollars

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Consider Funding Communities to keep themselves safe instead of increasing police budget

Other comments:

Do not cut social services when that's what is needed for our communities.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

Is this the most creative idea you have to keep us safe?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

- uses racially biased tech.
- proven failures in other cities
- not enough police to cover calls from new tech
- ability of AGLS to differentiate between gunshots and fireworks etc.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

N/A
NOPE

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

As a city resident I should not have to pay for this draconian surveillance.
The police should focus on community.

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

As a born and raised Washington State Cricana, I have felt over policed my entire life in this state. I strongly refuse surveillance in my city. I want funds for community. We want affordable housing, proper substance abuse resources and so much more!

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Absolutely none. The only "value" would be the continued murders ~~decrease~~ at the hands of SPD and police as a whole to black and brown communities.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

This will oppress me and my community even more. Stop killing and over policing black and brown people.

Other comments:

Defund SPD. We want funds and proper resources for our community.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

Why don't you care about us or consider us? Instead of helping you're making it easier for police to kill me.



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Lack of evidence for the effectiveness of extensive surveillance technology that ~~targets~~ ^{statistically} marginalised peoples. No expectation for privacy concerns "in public spaces" — Who decides that???

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

The only visible purpose for this technology is to push targeted criminalised communities to less gentrified areas instead of actually being helpful to community through funding the public services, education and healthcare. ^{build a safe}

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

The research other American cities have conducted through experimenting with these technologies.

Other comments:

AI technology is proven to be a mass data collection experiment that often relies on learning from harmful patterns that are the fruit of a system built on discrimination and oppression of marginalised communities with NO SUBSTANTIAL OVERVIEW of the reasoning.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification? AI is using.

When did we democratically decide privacy concerns don't exist in public space?



For the record I was told sign-in was over, and no chance I would be able to speak.

Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

we know cops responding to this tech have already killed a child. This tech was already bought by a new parent company only days ago. ~~SPD~~ SPD and the city have no control over who else becomes a parent company and how the terms of agreements will change. ~~This~~ This country has a recent history of putting our ~~people~~ Japanese American community members in internment camps.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None.

This tech endangers civil liberties. This tech has already been abused by people who have access to it. SURVEILLANCE IS NOT safety. our queer nightlife spaces have recently been RAIDED. I'm also super worried about the ability for ~~the~~ hateful individuals to be able to

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

"add their own cameras" to surveil a planned parenthood (attainable by law enforcement in other states w/ draconian laws against women, or medical centers surveilling families seeking gender affirming care.

Other comments:

SPD is VIOLENT w/o accountability. They haven't proven they won't abuse this power.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

They'll answer they will.
I was unable to speak.
NOT enough time.



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Value
None

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

"minimize desperate impact as much as possible." -SPD
This is the issue. The treat of desperate impact.
Human life & civil liberties are paramount & any threat
of violence isn't okay. causes massive harm

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

^{the} value of human life & why you consider
yourself a leader if you are willing to say yes
to this harmful, dangerous, & violent technologies.

Other comments:

abolish SPD & develop new
community resources.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

What will it take for you to ~~stop~~
become anti-racist & allocate
funds to our communities for meety
basic needs.



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Criminalization of low-income communities,
Racial profiling
Will create an open-air tech prison

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Absolutely none - it only has a negative value of
destruction

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

I am afraid that the over-reliance on technology and surveillance will only increase a sense of fear and distance from SPD and the community they serve. We should be building relationships. We should see our communities not watch them.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

The only value I see is that this money could be spent in different ways that get at the root cause of crime. We should invest in communities.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

As Seattle is one of the wealthiest cities in the US we have high rates of homelessness. Technology should be used to looking at ways to get at the root cause of crime. This expensive technology perpetuates the prison-industrial complex. Not keeping communities safe.

Other comments:

Surveillance technology and AI technology is often created on racially biased data sets because our SPD is racially biased. We should be making sure most at-risk communities get investment not surveillance.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

I am not innately against technology but all technology does have unintended consequences, often taking lives. This is not experimental or innovative - it is risky and dangerous and should be used wisely. ~~I don't think we should keep it~~ ^{it should be done!}



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

it will demonstrably harm communities all over Seattle. It is entirely ineffective & wasteful

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Literally none.

It will actually make things worse.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

To absolutely & unequivocally
SHUT IT DOWN!

Other comments:

there is no scenario where this will do anything but hurt residents & ~~the~~ corrupt officials pockets!

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

Why is the city considering implementing this instead of social programs that actually help?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Rather money for 2nd two technologies is used for teen programs & education to prevent federal use.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Would like footage that police will actually use in difficult areas. Doesn't have to remain, though, forever. But good to have strong, clear images of CCTV. At least in my neighborhood, people were able to quickly tell 911 when there were gunshots. I'm not excited about HES, but again feel it could be used for very short time, perhaps.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Not used after a period of time once some clearing of drug dealing & violence are cleared.

Other comments:

People who totally reject cameras don't live next to federal camps, who haven't had their lives & businesses turned up side down.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

If it is clear cameras are there, why will criminal activity continue there, as opposed to them moving to alternate location?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

It is a complete waste of money (in a time of serious shortage of funds) on technologies that have not been shown in studies to have any real impact on reducing violent crime, helping solve burglaries, or any impact on clearance rates & crime! Instead, investing in this technology will just continue to disproportionately negatively impact black & brown communities

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None - It ~~is~~ makes more sense to invest in community-based violence interruption programs that have shown a positive impact on reducing crime & harm in communities

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

The lack of real evidence it works indicates it is completely irresponsible to spend any \$ on this.

Other comments:

Invest in the real things that prevent, reduce & appropriately address harms in communities - adequate housing, access to food, employment opportunities, healthcare & daycare access, decently funded education & youth engagement programs to name a few!

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

I am against all 3 technologies. They are a waste of \$ & resources, community services should be prioritized. ACLU has several reports against AGLS, AGLS's like shot spotter turn down independent

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None

reviews. They use machine learning & I suspect their training data is flawed. AGLS's are placed in certain areas which

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

attend public comments

look @ ACLU & actual data

can distort gun statistics & create circular statistics justifying over policing. Michael Williams

Other comments:

Spent a year in jail for murdering charges had his case base on shotspotter ~~Admitted~~ dismissed by prosecutors

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

for not enough details. Sending police with expecting shootings escalate situations like the multiple innocent people shot & a gun pulled on Aaron



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

INVASION OF PUBLIC PRIVACY
INACCURATE INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION
WRONGFUL WASTE OF SOCIAL FUNDS
(USE)

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

I DON'T SEE ANY VALUE. THIS IS DANGEROUS!!

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

TO TOTALLY NOT CONSIDER IT.

Other comments:

THIS MONEY CAN BE SO MUCH MORE USEFULLY USED IN
NON AGGRESSIVE SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

WHY IS THIS BEING PROPOSED. JUST STOP THIS PLEASE



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

It is proven to increase bias & racial profiling & violence toward communities of color instead of helping solve crime. Crime is solved by resourcing communities to care for people - that has been proven to be effective. Surveillance and collected data, not subjected to laws in place requiring protection of our privacy, harm us all, especially highly targetted people.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology? None

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

We need to put all funding possible into community solutions including mental health, housing, community organizations working with young people and families to provide needed resources. These are proven effective in reducing crime and making people's lives better.

Other comments:

These technologies have already been tested in other cities and have been shown ineffective at best, and harmful instead. We can't afford to spend our ~~resources~~ taxpayer money on anything but real solutions that address the root of the problem.

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

Why are you considering this when it is proven ineffective at stopping crime, and is proven to harm Black, Indigenous, and People of Color who will be even more targetted?

Why don't you instead consider putting this funding into proven community preventative



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Invasion of privacy
violation of our rights

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Breach of our privacy + ability to
live free

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

infringing on peoples rights/
safety!

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

NONE

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

STOP IT FROM
HAPPENING

Other comments:

DO NOT DO THIS

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

This tech is not proven to increase safety in a community instead, it creates excessive surveillance in minority areas

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

None

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

You would be harming your citizens instead of helping.

Other comments:

FREE PALESTINE!

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Shot spotter is not effective and has been proven to be too sensitive. Cities that already installed are removing

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

none

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

what they could use the money on instead (housing, gardens, services)

Other comments:

we need housing for refugees now!

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

That it may not be used for
vandalism, break-ins, and
graffiti.

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Lot's of value !! That it helps
prevent crime : ~~free up~~ ~~human~~
~~power~~ helps police officers.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

To employ the technology
in the CID. First!

Other comments:

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?



Comments for inclusion in the Surveillance Impact Report

Please provide your comments on the technology below. Please note, these comments will be included in their entirety in the final Surveillance Impact Report.

1) What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

This technology that is framed as crime stopping is nothing more than surveillance to watch over ~~and~~ the community. This tech is a violation of public safety^{privacy} and does not make it more safe. STOP SURVEILLANCE CITY!

2) What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

NO VALUE ADD. This technology gives SPD unnecessary access to the every day lives and activities of the people of Seattle. I don't believe this tech will actually do anything to reduce crime.

3) What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

Every dystopian story you can think of - such as 1984. Increased surveillance results in increase in fear and violation of public safety and well being. The opposite of what it's being proposed as.

Other comments:

The IDF uses ~~a~~ similar technology against Palestinians. We see what the US ~~is~~ is enabling there and does not escape us that it can (and will) happen here. ~~More~~
The proposed technologies DO NOT MAKE ME FEEL SAFE

Are there any questions you have, or areas you would like more clarification?

Where is the data that shows this technology actually ^{accurately} benefits the people of Seattle.





To:

Mayor Harrell, Senior Deputy Mayor Burgess, Director Wheeler-Smith, and Director Judge:
bruce.harrell@seattle.gov; tim.burgess@seattle.gov; oig@seattle.gov; lisa.judge@seattle.gov;
civilrights@seattle.gov; Derrick.Wheeler-Smith@seattle.gov; council@seattle.gov

We are writing as a concerned coalition of community members and organizations in response to the City's intent to acquire and/or expand elements of three surveillance technologies: CCTV, an acoustic gunshot location system (AGLS) such as ShotSpotter, and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) already uses CCTV cameras to monitor traffic and Seattle Police Department (SPD) can and has frequently accessed them¹ according to the city.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences. Whose Streets Our Streets (WSOS), a local BIPOC organization who has been conducting community based and participatory research has identified that the current level of surveillance has "a psychological effect on the people being surveilled."² We expect this negative psychological impact will vastly increase should the City of Seattle expand its surveillance technology programs. This coalition strongly urges you to instead substantially increase investment in equitable and evidence-based strategies for gun violence prevention while also offering meaningful support to victims and survivors.

We have serious objections and questions regarding both the deployment of these technologies and the review and approval process currently taking place. Below, we have outlined the several grave concerns we have about the use of these technologies in our communities.

ShotSpotter is proven to be an ineffective technology, as seen in several independent, peer-reviewed studies.

- In independent studies, ShotSpotter deployments have failed to result in any evidence of a gun crime 90%³ to 97%⁴ of the time, an abysmal rate that isn't improved by the addition of CCTV.⁵

¹ <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CityAuditor/auditreports/063021SDOTCCTVFinalReport.pdf>

²

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/626333ed8468a817435804e8/t/6482976ef9ddb612f87c5e50/1686280046690/WSOS+automated+enforcement+summary.pdf>

³ <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technology.pdf>

⁴ <https://www.scribd.com/document/524249684/Atlanta-Internal-Report-about-ShotSpotter>

⁵ <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-018-9339-1>

- A large meta-analysis examined ShotSpotter in 68 cities from 1999 to 2016 and found that ShotSpotter “has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes.⁶” Other research finds that acoustic gunshot technology doesn’t get victims of gun violence⁷ to safety faster⁸ and doesn’t reduce violent crime while greatly increasing demands on police resources.⁹

ShotSpotter increases biased policing.

- Technology like Shotspotter with high false positives leads to false arrests and a sharp increase in policing in already over-policed neighborhoods creating many unnecessary contacts between police and residents. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is asking the Department of Justice to review¹⁰ if Shotspotter is being selectively deployed to justify the over-policing of mainly Black neighborhoods.¹¹ This is a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle as Black, Indigenous, and People of Color are already subject to disproportionate rates of violence by SPD,¹² even after over a decade under a consent decree.
- Chicago found that not only did ShotSpotter increase the number of pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions¹³ when officers were responding to ShotSpotter, but some officers used the mere presence of ShotSpotter in a neighborhood, even without a ShotSpotter alert, as enough reason to conduct “*protective pat downs.*” ShotSpotter increases biased policing. This is why the MacArthur Justice Center¹⁴ has filed a class action lawsuit against ShotSpotter.

ShotSpotter causes harm and increases police violence.

- There are many anecdotal stories of the harms acoustic gun technology has inflicted on other communities. In Chicago, Danny Ortiz¹⁵ was arbitrarily arrested and jailed by police who were responding to a ShotSpotter alert.
- 13 year old Adam Toledo¹⁶ was chased, shot, and killed by a Chicago police officer in response to a ShotSpotter alert.
- Michael Williams¹⁷ spent about 11 months in Cook County Jail - contracting COVID twice - after CPD asked ShotSpotter to change the location of an alert in order to charge him with murder.

⁶ <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33929640/>

⁷ <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technology.pdf>

⁸ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8592377/>

⁹ <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-019-09405-x>

¹⁰ <https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24034716/epic-letter.pdf>

¹¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20240106100542/https://www.wired.com/story/shotspotter-doj-letter-epic/>

¹² <https://policescorecard.org/wa/police-department/seattle>

¹³ <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technology.pdf>

¹⁴ <https://endpolicessurveillance.com/>

¹⁵

<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-shotspotter-chicago-police-20220721-2td263exqfexxenxidbgvfkv4y-story.html>

¹⁶ <https://southsideweekly.com/end-the-citys-shotspotter-contract/>

¹⁷

<https://apnews.com/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithm-technology-police-crime-7e3345485aa668c97606d4b54f9b6220>

- In Rochester, the police colluded with ShotSpotter to change evidence to frame Silvon Simmons¹⁸ for attempting to kill a police officer, after Mr. Simmons was chased and shot three times by a Rochester police officer.
- In January 2024,¹⁹ Chicago police opened fire on an unarmed man because they heard a loud noise while responding to a Shotspotter alert.
- We also note the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR)'s complete dismissal of the many studies showing the harms caused by AGLS technology. Combining a harmful technology with other technologies (with their own harms) does not mitigate the overall potential of harm, and experimenting on a population that has already suffered extensively from police brutality, over policing, and police bias is irresponsible at best.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV

- In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.²⁰
- CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.²¹
- Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.²²

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

- In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime²³ " and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."
- A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances²⁴ " due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.
- Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK²⁵ found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.
- In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.²⁶
- Only 1%²⁷ to 0.2%²⁸ of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

¹⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-rochester-trial/>

¹⁹ <https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2024/1/29/24055103/chicago-police-cpd-shooting-gunshots-gun-crime-south-side-gresham-copa-investigation>

²⁰ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/dcpolice/stories/stowe25.htm>

²¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-27887275>

²² <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-27/when-police-abuse-surveillance-cameras>

²³ https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=ij_pubs

²⁴ <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-021-09477-8>

²⁵ <https://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/system/files/documents/colin-paine.pdf>

²⁶ <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33929640/>

²⁷

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations>

²⁸ <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf>

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values.

- RTCC software, like Fusus,²⁹ recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner.³⁰ There are typically two options³¹ a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage³² how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
- The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network³³ undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
- RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse,³⁴ as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor³⁵ track record ³⁶ on preventing³⁷ their officers from abusing law enforcement data.
- RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms³⁸ and integrations with third-party applications.³⁹ This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

CCTV, RTCC, Shotspotter, and other surveillance technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

²⁹ <https://www.context.news/digital-rights/privacy-or-safety-us-brings-surveillance-city-to-the-suburbs>

³⁰ <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time>

³¹ <https://connectatlanta.org/>

³² <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23570937-honolulu-community-security-program-general-public-1-2>

³³ <https://www.dailynews.com/2023/06/16/police-surveillance-using-private-security-cameras-in-real-time-stirs-big-brother-fears/>

³⁴ <https://www.404media.co/fusus-ai-cameras-took-over-town-america/>

³⁵ <https://southseattleemerald.com/2020/08/20/opa-documents-show-current-spd-officer-misused-internal-police-data-to-try-to-get-a-date-caused-anxiety-and-concern/>

³⁶ <https://www.thestranger.com/cops/2023/11/17/79264716/all-complaints-sustained-against-a-seattle-police-officer-who-allegedly-stalked-ex-girlfriend>

³⁷ <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/seattle-police-officer-pleads-guilty-to-charges-stemming-from-s-trip-club-probe/>

³⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20240117201613/https://www.fusus.com/blog/how-artificial-intelligence-at-the-edge-is-transforming-video-surveillance>

³⁹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20240123202037/https://www.fusus.com/about-us/fusus-current-interoperability>

- RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader⁴⁰ which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information,⁴¹ including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people⁴² - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

We urge you to stay true to Seattle's values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence⁴³ in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Investing in these programs would also put money into the actual communities most impacted by gun violence instead of giving that money to a company located in a different state. Seattle should heed the lessons learned from the many other cities that have already discontinued their contracts for AGLS based on its ineffectiveness and the several concerns laid out above and follow their lead by not implementing these technologies.

As laid out in Council Budget Action SPD-900-A in the 2024 budget, the RET must be conducted in concert among the Executive's Office, the Office of Civil Rights, and the Office of the Inspector General. Given the documented impacts of acoustic gunshot detection technology and CCTV in increasing biased policing and over-policing of marginalized communities and the chilling effect of RTCC software on civil liberties, we want there to be a robust process that involves ALL THREE bodies in an active partnership as required by law. This process should include in-depth review of independent peer-reviewed studies and consultation with other municipalities that have discontinued use of AGLS to understand potential pitfalls and unintended outcomes. Additionally, if the AGLS and CCTV will be moved from their initial proposed locations, each move must include a robust and deliberate public process.

Importantly, impacted communities must be engaged in a proactive way that works well for us. We are concerned by a tendency to choose just a few token representatives to speak for an entire group. Likewise, we are concerned that only two very short public forums on these SIRs are being planned, at times that might be difficult for people to attend, and that require attendees to sit through sales pitches by the companies profiting from these technologies that are branded as "education."

Further, we have no information about how much outreach has been or will be done or feedback collected from affected communities as part of the RET process. As always when deploying new surveillance technology, we must consider the potential negative impacts on the most

⁴⁰

https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/MNCO-FUSUS_2024_Informational_Report-ADA.pdf?ct=1705616491

⁴¹ <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/virginia-supreme-court-sees-through-police-claim-license>

⁴² <https://sis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/>

⁴³ <https://cls.gmu.edu/defenses/1067>

marginalized and vulnerable. This includes but is not limited to special outreach needed to BIPOC communities, our neighbors who are unhoused, sex workers, disabled people, queer and trans people, undocumented people, and people who are impoverished.

Our primary demand is to halt investment in these policing technologies, but if the city moves forward with its current objectives, then it is imperative that the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and the associated Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) be conducted in a thorough, equitable, transparent, and accessible manner. These decisions are too large and too long-lasting to be rushed or to be made by the few.

By the Undersigned,

ORGANIZATIONS:

1. 350 Seattle
2. A Center for Restorative Solutions
3. ACLU Washington
4. Amazon Employees for Climate Justice
5. A Sacred Passing Death Midwifery and Community Education
6. Awake Church
7. Backbone Campaign
8. Ballard Mutual Aid
9. Be:Seattle
10. Black and Pink Seattle/Tacoma
11. Black Brilliance Research
12. Buddhist Peace Fellowship—Seattle
13. CARW
14. CARW West Seattle Neighborhood Cohort
15. Central Neighbors
16. Central Seattle Greenways
17. CID Coalition
18. Coalition for Rights & Safety for People in the Sex Trade
19. Coalition of Anti-Racist Whites
20. Collective Justice
21. Conspiracy of Geniuses and RAD Care
22. Creative Justice
23. Cultures Connecting
24. Defend the Defund
25. Experience Education
26. Gender Justice League
27. Got Green
28. Greenwood Mutual Aid
29. House Our Neighbors
30. Institutional Climate Action
31. International League of People's Struggle seattle
32. Kids Are Kids
33. LEAP YEAR PARTY
34. Lifewerq Project
35. Massage Parlor Outreach Project
36. No New Washington Prisons
37. Northwest Animal Rights Network (NARN)
38. Northwest Community Bail Fund
39. No Tech For Apartheid
40. People Power WA
41. QLaw Foundation of Washington
42. Real Change
43. Sacred Community Connections
44. Seattle Abolition Support
45. Seattle Bike Blog
46. Seattle Caucus of Rank and File Educators
47. Seattle Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)
48. Seattle Raging Grannies
49. Seattle Transit Riders
50. Services Not Sweeps Coalition
51. SHARE (Seattle Housing and Resource Effort)
52. Sketch House Games
53. Soapbox Project
54. Students United for Palestinian Equality & Return at UW (SUPER UW)
55. Subvert UD
56. Surge Reproductive Justice
57. Sustainable Student Action
58. Tech 4 Housing
59. The Rhapsody Project
60. Transit Riders Union
61. University Friend's Meeting
62. Urban Indians Northwest
63. Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle
64. UW Law Students for Palestinian Liberation
65. Wallingford Indivisible
66. WHEEL (Women's Housing, Equality and Enhancement League)
67. Whose Streets? Our Streets! (WSOS)
68. Wrestle Yr Friends
69. Young Women Empowered (Y-WE)
70. Zero Hour

INDIVIDUALS:

1. Aarin Wilde
2. Aaron von Reyn
3. Aaron Wheeler
4. Abigail Graber
5. Aby Marsh
6. Achala Devi
7. Adaline McCormick
8. Adam Peltier
9. Adi Stein
10. Adrienne Banks
11. Ahra Nam
12. Aidan Carroll
13. Aidan McDonald
14. Aimee Graesser
15. Aiyana Mehta
16. Aja Alabastro
17. AJ Carothers
18. AJ Setala
19. AJ Wynne
20. Akiksha Chatterji
21. Akshita Vaidyanathan
22. Alaina Kwan
23. Alaina McCallum
24. Alana Sendlakowski
25. Alanna Hart
26. Alberto Arriola
27. Alessio Tosolini
28. Alexa Evans
29. Alexander Hartanov
30. Alexandra Caamano
31. Alexandra
Loessberg-Zahl
32. Alexandra Spencer
33. Alexandria Gates
34. Alexandria Smith
35. Alex Berger
36. Alex Fay
37. Alex Gomez
38. Alex H
39. Alex Huynh
40. Alexis Ashe
41. Alexis Mansanarez
42. Alexis Modula
43. Alex Lande
44. Alex Murray
45. Alex Stonehill
46. Alex Thompson
47. Alex Titus
48. Alex Webster
49. Alex Woerschling
50. Alfie Norling
51. Alice Friedman
52. Alice Gao
53. Alice Hassel
54. Alice Liu
55. Alice Mar-Abe
56. Alice Nicholson
57. Alicia
58. Alison Eisinger
59. Alison Howard
60. Allen Burgess
61. Allie Sullivan
62. Allison Jurkovich
63. Allison Kamino
64. Allison Masangkay
65. Allison Mills
66. Allister Layne
67. ally parks
68. Alora McGavin
69. Al Smith
70. Alyce
71. Amanda Agrellas
72. Amanda Heffernan
73. Amanda Hubbard
74. Amanda Locke
75. Amandalynne Paullada
76. Amanda Sorell
77. Amaryah Wolf
78. Amber Ogata
79. Amelia Ross-Gilson
80. Amelia Taylor
81. Ammar
82. Amy Elder
83. Amy Harrington
84. Amy Jiravisitcul
85. Amy Sundberg
86. Amy Truax
87. amy vong
88. Ana-Claudia Magana
89. Ana Maria Campoy
90. Andi Ridings
91. Andrea Chin
92. Andrea Marcos
93. Andrea O'Ferrall
94. Andrea Paz
95. Andrea Portillo
96. Andrea Speed
97. Andrea Vargas
98. Andrew
99. Andrew Eckels
100. Andrew Garcia
101. Andrew Harrison
102. Andrew Smith
103. Andrew Thomas
104. Angela Yu
105. Angeles Barham
106. Angel McCullough
107. Anna
108. Anna Ludwig
109. Anna Reed
110. Anna Schmidt
111. Ann Dorsey
112. Anne Campbell
113. Anne Dwyer
114. Annette Klapstein
115. Annie Christensen
116. Annie Doubleday
117. Annie Leiter
118. Annie Lu
119. Annie Pham
120. Anteia DeLaney
121. Anthony
122. Anya Gavrylko
123. Apurva Mishra
124. Ardina Boll
125. Ariana de Leña
126. Ariana Marshall
127. Ariel Alon
128. Arryn Davis
129. Artemis Lonan
130. Ash
131. ashiana stoll
132. Ash King
133. Ash King
134. Ash King
135. Ashlee Grant
136. Ashley Seni
137. Atlas Rain
138. atlas tan
139. atticus sumabat
140. Audrey Bell
141. Audrey Kelly
142. Audrey Rohwer
143. Austin Price
144. Austin Werner
145. Avery Swearer
146. Ayotunde Johnson
147. Bailey Disher
148. Bailey Griffin
149. Bailey Pruss
150. Barbara Phinney
151. Barbara Wight
152. Barrett Leider
153. Bean Yogi
154. Beau Black
155. Beauregarde Reed
156. Beck Brunstetter
157. Beckett
158. Bee Keyser
159. Belinda
160. bemny
161. Benjamin Danielson
162. Benjamin Gillott
163. Bennett Ellis
164. Bennett Walkes
165. Bennie Gross
166. BETH BRUNTON
167. Beth Quintana
168. Betsy Foley
169. Betsy Foley
170. Bill Daniell

171. BJ Last
 172. bob barnes
 173. Bobby Righi
 174. Bob Kutter
 175. Bokang Zhu
 176. Bonnie Feldberg
 177. Braden Pence
 178. Bradley Paul-Gorsline
 179. Bradley Pooler
 180. Brandi Hair
 181. Brand Mace
 182. Brandon
 Bowersox-Johnson
 183. Brandon Pedro
 184. Brenna Stroup
 185. Brent McFarlane
 186. Brent Williams
 187. Brian Camero
 188. Brian Mabe
 189. Brian Taintor
 190. Bri Castle
 191. Bridget O'Brien
 192. Bri Leslie
 193. Bri Lit
 194. Britney
 195. Britney Phan
 196. Brooke Christiansen
 197. Bruce Jackson
 198. Bruce Shherman
 199. Bryan Edenfield
 200. Bryleigh Apple
 201. Bry Osmonson
 202. Cailin Dahlin
 203. Caitlin Guenther
 204. Caitlin Molenaar
 205. Caitlyn Ngadisastra
 206. Cal Foster
 207. Cally Nicholls
 208. Calvin Read
 209. Cameron Fraser
 210. Camille Baldwin-Bonne
 211. Camille Beasley
 212. Candace Braley
 213. Candice Rose
 214. Carissa Knipe
 215. Carl A Meyer
 216. Carly Brook
 217. Carly Greyell
 218. Carly Rademacher
 219. Carmen Carrillo
 220. Caroline Bryant
 221. Caroline Cates
 222. Caroline Conley
 223. Caroline Poole
 224. Carolyn Akinbami MD
 225. Carolyn Le
 226. Carolyn Paul-Gorsline
 227. Carrie Grossman
 228. Carrie Hawthorne
 229. Carrie Lafferty
 230. Carrie Lippy
 231. Carrie Matthews
 232. Carson Boden
 233. Carter Hemion
 234. Carter Yee
 235. Casper Sparks
 236. Catherine Parker
 237. Catherine Pedigo
 238. Catherine Swedberg
 239. Cause Haun
 240. Cause Haun
 241. Cecelia Black
 242. Cecil Haskell
 243. Cecil Seferos
 244. Celie Forrester
 245. Charlene Lauzon
 246. Charles Cockburn
 247. Charles Therrell
 248. Charlie Richter
 249. Charlie Shih
 250. charlotte fumer
 251. Charlotte McIntosh
 252. Chava Monastersky
 253. Chelsea Chamberlain
 254. Chelsea Johnson
 255. Chelsie Porter
 256. Cherry Leung
 257. cheryl schneiderhan
 258. Cheyne Anderson
 259. Chili Judge
 260. Chloe Huber
 261. Chris Comte
 262. Chris Lovings
 263. Chris Rivers
 264. Chris Speckhardt
 265. Christina Ellis
 266. Christina Nowak
 267. Christina Nowak
 268. Christina Ruggles
 269. Christina Twu
 270. Christopher Chan
 271. Christopher Comte
 272. Christy Hill
 273. Cinda Stenger
 274. CJ Risman
 275. Claire Schwartz
 276. Clara Berridge
 277. Clara Cantor
 278. Clarence Thompson
 279. Coco CM Weber
 280. Colette Boilini
 281. Cole Wilder
 282. Colin Morrin
 283. Colleen Heidorn
 284. Collin Denbow
 285. Connor Stein
 286. Constance DeRooy
 287. Constance Voget
 288. Courtney Aiken
 289. Cristina Doi
 290. Crow Delavan
 291. Crystal Tam
 292. Cynthia Brothers
 293. Cynthia Roig
 294. Cynthia Spiess
 295. Dan "Workers Strike
 Back" DiLeva
 296. Daniel Brant
 297. Daniel Gilman
 298. Daniel Hernbrott
 299. Daniel McLeod
 300. Daniel Nelson
 301. Daniel Sepulveda
 302. Daniel Zizza
 303. Darcy Ruppert
 304. Daria Parodi
 305. Dave McCaul
 306. David
 307. David Berlow
 308. David Kipnis
 309. David Nixon
 310. David Shokenu
 311. David Stoesz
 312. David Westberg
 313. Davina Kerr
 314. Deanna Ren
 315. Deb Carstens
 316. Delia Ward
 317. Demiana Shenouda
 318. Demiana Shenouda
 319. Demian Godon
 320. Denise Henrikson
 321. Denise Sterchi
 322. Derek
 323. Derek Brown
 324. Derek Dexheimer
 325. Deserae Abed-Rabbo
 326. Desiree Andersen
 327. Destanie Ruhl
 328. Devoni Whitehead
 329. Devon Pimentelli
 330. Diana Robbins
 331. Diana Schooling
 332. Diane Hood
 333. Dianne Laguerta
 334. Diego Gonzalez
 335. Dina Dahbany-Miraglia
 336. Donovan Ho
 337. Dorothy Parshall
 338. Doug Cole
 339. Douglas Indrick
 340. Dylan Flesch
 341. Dyneeca Adams
 342. E.N. West
 343. Eden Chapman
 344. Eduardo Gonzalez-Vega
 345. Eila Strand
 346. eileen mccann
 347. Eleena McRae
 348. Elena Romero
 349. Elena Rumiantseva
 350. Elena Shearer
 351. Eliana Horn
 352. Elizabeth Arias
 353. Elizabeth Carley

354. Elizabeth
 Kiyari-Thompson
 355. Elizabeth Quintana
 356. Eliza Brumer Cohn
 357. Eliza Cohn
 358. Eliza Furmansky
 359. Eliza Grant
 360. Ella Shahn
 361. Ellen Finkelstein
 362. Ellen Kissman
 363. Elyse Gordon
 364. Emaan Haseem
 365. Emerson Rogers
 366. Emiko Kawakubo
 367. Emil Minakata
 368. Emily Chu
 369. Emily Chu
 370. Emily Hazelton
 371. Emily Johnson
 372. Emily Johnston
 373. Emily McRen
 374. Emily Smith
 375. Emily Stone
 376. Emily Turner
 377. Emma Bateman
 378. Emma Cooper
 379. Emma Goidel
 380. Emma Seely
 381. Emma Shorr
 382. Emma Young
 383. Emmett Petsche
 384. Em Rose
 385. Erica Cannatelli
 386. Erica Cartwright
 387. Erica Hall
 388. Erica Olson
 389. Erica Richardson
 390. Erica Weiland
 391. Erika Jaymes
 392. Erika Straus-Bowers
 393. Erika Sweet
 394. erin alberts
 395. Erin Cadena
 396. Ethan Campbell
 397. Eugene Takahashi
 398. Eva Bhagwandin
 399. Eva Doell
 400. Evan McLain
 401. Eva Salcedo
 402. Evelyn Lemoine
 403. Evelyn Sizer
 404. Evelyn Smith
 405. Eve Sizer
 406. Eya Lazaro
 407. Ezra Zelizer
 408. Fallon "Ashen" Wilson
 409. Faolán Rollosso
 Halbhuber
 410. Fatima Elzein
 411. Feiya Wang
 412. Felix B
 413. Ferdinand Reeder
 414. Fiona O'Leary
 415. Fiona Reilly
 416. Fiona Smith
 417. Fiona Yu
 418. Forest Shomer
 419. Francesca
 Favorini-Csorba
 420. Frances Yih
 421. Franklin mabel
 422. Frederick Seymour
 423. Freya Batez
 424. Gabriela salaben
 425. Gabriel Kennedy-Gibbens
 426. Gabriella Vincent
 427. Gaby Desatnik
 428. Gail Simon
 429. Garrett McCulloch
 430. G D Abbott
 431. George Samora
 432. Gillian Maxwell
 433. Gillian Rose
 434. Gillian Spangler
 435. Giulia pasciuto
 436. Glen Anderson
 437. Goli Joshua
 438. Gordon Philip Baldwin
 439. Grace
 440. Grace Chai
 441. Grace Flores
 442. Grace Hope
 443. Grace Huang
 444. Grace Liatti
 445. Grace Williams
 446. Gracia Heilmer
 447. Graham Golbuff
 448. Grant Wilson
 449. Greg Covell
 450. Greta Treistman
 451. Griffin Brandstetter
 452. Guillermo Zazueta
 453. Habib Loew
 454. Hailey Swearingen
 455. Hali Bellisario
 456. Halle Thompson
 457. Hallie Sykes
 458. Hannah Katz
 459. Hannah Scholes
 460. Hannah Scott
 461. Hannah Scott
 462. Hannah Wilson
 463. Hannah Yale
 464. Hans pinkham
 465. Harley Munsie
 466. Haven Barnes
 467. Hayden
 Agnew-Wieland
 468. Heather Lippert
 469. Heather Stone
 470. Heather Ward
 471. Heidi Acuña
 472. Heidi Freidman
 473. Heidi Whalley
 474. Helen Potter
 475. Hendrix Mcginty
 476. Hilary Simonetti
 477. Hoda Eldifrawy
 478. Hope Freije
 479. Howe
 480. Ian Gauntt
 481. Ian Jamison
 482. Ilona Brose
 483. Ilsa Govan
 484. Imani israel
 485. Ingria Jones
 486. Iridius Izzame
 487. Iris Bordman
 488. Isabella Medina
 489. Isabella Palacios
 490. Isa Stewart
 491. Izzy Christman
 492. Jaci Leavitt
 493. Jack Hogan
 494. Jackie Makdah
 495. Jackson Barnes
 496. Jackson Siebert
 497. Jacky Nakamura
 498. Jacob Baca
 499. Jacob Black
 500. Jacob de Guzman
 501. Jacob Dutton
 502. Jacob Leavitt
 503. Jacob Mihalak
 504. Jacob Pohns
 505. Jacob Sarb
 506. Jacob Stuiwenga
 507. Jacob Tsyppkin
 508. Jade Weise
 509. Jaeden Noll
 510. Jae Foxglove
 511. Jai Broome
 512. Jaime Hoe
 513. Jake Mutter
 514. James Baldwin
 515. James Hatten
 516. Jamie Lan
 517. Jamie Marks
 518. Jane Bullard
 519. Janet maker
 520. Janet Munin
 521. Jared Moore
 522. Jasmin Eng
 523. Jasmine Zhu
 524. Jason Achurra
 525. Jason Lang
 526. Jason Walsh
 527. Jax Braun
 528. Jayden Lee
 529. Jay Moore
 530. JC Fretz
 531. Jean M Schwinberg
 532. Jeanna Stone
 533. Jeanne Ripp
 534. Jeannie Mounger
 535. Jeff Coyne


536. Jeff Higgins
 537. Jeff McDowell
 538. Jeffrey Chiu
 539. Jeffry Berner
 540. Jeff West
 541. Jen Blackwood
 542. Jeng Tcheung
 543. Jenna Lee
 544. Jennie Li
 545. Jennifer Beeter
 546. Jennifer Fingles
 547. Jennifer Managhan
 548. Jennifer Nemhauser
 549. Jennifer Primm
 550. Jennifer Valentine
 551. Jennifer Widrig
 552. Jenny Katz
 553. Jenny Le
 554. Jen Van Dijk
 555. Jesse Floyd
 556. Jesse Roth
 557. Jesse Swingle
 558. Jessica Green
 559. Jessica Mogk
 560. Jessica Trupin
 561. Jessie Jabornik
 562. Jessie Lawton-Crane
 563. Jessie McKenna
 564. Jess Kim
 565. Jess Kim
 566. Jess Rock
 567. Jess Sarsfield
 568. Jess Wallach
 569. Jill Eckhart
 570. Jim Bernthal
 571. JJ L.
 572. Joanna
 573. Jodie Nathan
 574. Jodi Taylor
 575. Joe Beda
 576. Joel Hildebrandt
 577. Joelle Craft
 578. Joelle Pretty
 579. Joe Molloy
 580. Jo Harvey
 581. John
 582. John Bito
 583. John Duksta
 584. John Gilbert
 585. Johnny Mao
 586. Johnny McCaffrey
 587. John Stone
 588. John Tullius
 589. Joice Tang
 590. Jona Schuman
 591. Jonas Dodge
 592. Jonathan Hartman
 593. Jordan Faralan
 594. Jordan Goldwarg
 595. Jordan Sullivan
 596. Jordan Van Voast
 597. Jordyn Seni
 598. Josephine
 Alexander-Cooper
 599. Joseph Roberts
 600. Josh Diamond
 601. josh martinez
 602. Joshua Swanson
 603. Joshua Wise
 604. Josh Wiese
 605. Josiah Howard
 606. Joyous Levien
 607. Joy R
 608. Jude Watson
 609. Julene Weaver
 610. Julia Buck
 611. Julia Farmer
 612. Julian Lepke
 613. Julia Paleski
 614. Julia Prado
 615. Justice Wormum
 616. Justin Blau
 617. Justin Koiner
 618. Kaelin Mason
 619. Kae Unterseher
 620. Kai Fukutaki
 621. Kaitlin McCarthy
 622. Kaitlyn Welch
 623. Kalila Jackson-Spieker
 624. Kane Manning
 625. Karen Bichler
 626. Karen Crow
 627. Karen Engelbrecht
 628. Karen Mccaw
 629. Karina Delaine
 630. Kashina Groves
 631. Kass Wolcott
 632. Kate Balling
 633. Katelyn Mullikin
 634. Katharine Knutzen
 635. Katherynn Nguyen
 636. Katherine Bax
 Michalakakis
 637. Katherine Busz
 638. Katherine Chilson
 639. Katherine Kauffman
 640. Katherine Kirk
 641. Katherine Manbeck
 642. Katherine Solomon
 643. Katherine Woolverton
 644. Kathleen Anderson
 645. Kathleen Barnes
 646. Kathleen Boroughs
 647. Kathryn Compton
 648. Kathryn Greaser
 649. Kathy Zheng
 650. Katie Carter
 651. Katie Gower
 652. Katie Jendrey
 653. Katie McCarthy
 654. kat kranzler
 655. Kat Metrovich
 656. Katrina England
 657. Katrina Go
 658. Katrina James
 659. Katrina James
 660. Katrina James
 661. Katrina Spade
 662. Katya Schexnaydre
 663. Katya Wilson
 664. Katy dichter
 665. Katy Dichter
 666. kaye breeman
 667. Kayla Mendoza Chui
 668. Kaylie Treskin
 669. kelly bjork
 670. Kelly Hickman
 671. Kelly Johnson
 672. Kelly Martineau
 673. Kellyn Grassel
 674. Kelly Norton
 675. Kelly Oberbillig
 676. Kel Mossman
 677. Kelsea Dill
 678. Kelsey Blackstone
 679. Kelsey Funkhouser
 680. Kelsey McGrath
 681. Kelsey Peronto
 682. Kelsey Timmer
 683. Kelsi Kaczmarek
 684. Kendall Lincoln
 685. Kendra Appe
 686. Kendra Peterson
 687. Kendrick Tang
 688. Kennedy Dresh
 689. Kenneth Tran
 690. Kenney Tran
 691. Kenny Phan
 692. Keshia Elder
 693. Kevin Cruse
 694. Kevin Gallagher
 695. Kevin Xu
 696. Keyara Demers
 697. Kiana Fukuyama
 698. Kieran Wharton
 699. Kim
 700. Kimberly Chen
 701. Kira Benson
 702. Kira Smith
 703. Kirsten L. Schneider
 704. Kirsten Schumacher
 705. K Norton
 706. Kristen Faiferlick
 707. Kristi Boes
 708. Kristin
 709. Kristina Chu
 710. Kristi Nakata
 711. Kristine Ford
 712. Kristin Mannschreck
 713. Kristin Mowery
 714. Kristopher Samaniego
 715. Kristopher Stewart
 716. Kwan Wah Lui
 717. kylie wong
 718. Kyndal arkley
 719. Lachlan Hill

720. Lake Hernandez
 721. Lara Ruegg
 722. Lashanna Williams
 723. Laura Finkelstein
 724. Laura Gibbons
 725. Laura Lehni
 726. Laura Rapalski
 727. Laura Rodriguez
 728. Laurelle Banta
 729. Lauren Barkley
 730. Lauren Cooper
 731. Lauren Dorsch
 732. Lauren Freidenberg
 733. Lauren Herber
 734. Lauren Kay
 735. Lauren McCulloch
 736. Lauren Murdock
 737. Lauren Ring
 738. Lauren Turblom
 739. Lauren Vorona
 740. Laurie Bohm-Gibson
 741. Leah Eister
 742. Leah Eister Hargrave
 743. Lee Gingras
 744. Leena Yin
 745. Lee Riddell
 746. Lee Stetson
 747. Lee Swedin
 748. Leif Paris
 749. leighanne mcquarrie
 750. Leigh Riibe
 751. Lena Jones
 752. Leo Barros
 753. Leon West
 754. Leo Russell
 755. Leo Segovia
 756. Leslie Barber
 757. LeTania Severe
 758. Levi Fuller
 759. Levi Muhm
 760. Lex Van Horn
 761. Liam Niehus-Staab
 762. Liam Nold
 763. Liberty Harrington
 764. Lila Burns
 765. Lillian Donahoe
 766. Lily Haverstein
 767. Linda Bevis
 768. Linda Hendrix
 769. Linda Strout
 770. Linda Vong
 771. Lindsey Hand
 772. Lindsey Lozoskie
 773. Linnea
 774. Linnea Scott
 775. Lisa Kauffman
 776. Lisa Marcus
 777. Lisa Morrow
 778. Lisa Niemann
 779. Lisa Nikodem
 780. Lisha Mohan
 781. Liza Burell Mack
 782. Liz Campbell
 783. L Lin
 784. Loren Peterson
 785. Lore Thomson
 786. Louie Zibelli
 787. Lucas O'Bryan
 788. lucas schmidt
 789. LUCILLE GROLEAU
 790. Lucinda Stroud
 791. Lucy Cress
 792. Lucy Fink
 793. Luke DeRoche
 794. Lydia Hswe
 795. Lydia S.
 796. Ly Huynh
 797. Lynne Hyerle
 798. Lynn Levine
 799. Lyn Smith
 800. Lyns Runyan
 801. M. Dayton
 802. M. K. Russell
 803. Mackenzie Brown
 804. Madalyn Omalley
 805. Maddie Min
 806. Maddy Goodro
 807. Maddy Kennard
 808. Madeleine Rackers
 809. Madeleine Schulz
 810. Madeline Burbage
 811. Madeline Fox
 812. Maggie Bishop
 813. Maggie Karaya
 814. Magnolia Klee
 815. Mahala Howard
 816. Maia Mares
 817. Maida Kennedy Xiao
 818. Makenna Lehrer
 819. Mallory Jordan
 820. Mara Page
 821. Marcella
 822. Maren Costa
 823. Margaret Crosson
 824. Maria Abando
 825. Maria Hernandez
 826. Maria King
 827. Mariam Elbortoukaly
 828. Maria Nuccio
 829. Mariel Angulo
 830. Marina Edney
 831. Marin Plut
 832. Marisa Brunelli
 833. Marisa Manso
 834. Marisa Manso
 835. Marissa Stone
 836. Marivic Borromeo
 837. Mark Belanger
 838. Mark Dillenkofer
 839. Mark Foltz
 840. Marla Murdock
 841. Marlie Somers
 842. Marni Sorin
 843. Marshall Bender
 844. Martha Bishop
 845. Mary Dimond
 846. Maryellen Redish
 847. Mary Mullen
 848. Mary O'Connor
 849. Mary O'Connor
 850. Mary Reeves
 851. Matthew Cloner
 852. Matthew D Horwitz
 853. Matthew Laun
 854. Matthew Offenbacher
 855. Matt Wright
 856. Maureen
 857. Maxwell Doggett
 858. Maya Esquivido
 859. Maya Hahn
 860. McCoy Patino
 861. McKane Andrus
 862. Meera Lee Sethi
 863. Megan Carlson
 864. Megan Tully
 865. Meg Cummins
 866. Meghan Reckmeyer
 867. Mei'lani Eyre
 868. Melani Baker
 869. Melissa Kagerer
 870. Melissa Lound
 871. Melissa Miller
 872. Meredith Nimz
 873. Meredith Ruff
 874. Michael
 875. Michaela Guzzetti
 876. Michael Lampi
 877. Michael Mellini
 878. Michael Moynihan
 879. Michaud Savage
 880. Michelle Fairour
 881. Michelle Giarmarco
 882. Michelle LeSourd
 883. Michelle Molina
 884. Miguel Escobar
 885. Miguel Fernandez
 886. Mihai Eseau
 887. Mikaela Freundlich
 888. Mikey Redding
 889. Mike Zanine
 890. Milena Matthews
 891. Milo Charpentier
 892. Milo Kusold
 893. Mindi Tambellini
 894. Miranda Johnson
 895. misty forest
 896. Mitchell Lafaive
 897. Miya Cohen-Siege
 898. Miyah Rosenfeldt
 899. Molly Mattingly
 900. Molly Miller Petrie
 901. Morgan Capps
 902. Morgan Hoke
 903. Moses Rifkin
 904. Moses Rifkin
 905. Na'Quel Walker

906. Nancy Helm
 907. Naomi Natsuhara
 908. Naomi Price-Lazarus
 909. Nastassia Barber
 910. Natalie Dupille
 911. Natalie estrello
 912. Natasha Breidenbach
 913. Natasha Crepeau
 914. Nate Buck
 915. Nat X
 916. Neha Hazra
 917. Neisha bhagwandin
 918. Nell Gross
 919. Nellie Joselyn
 920. Nichole Snyder
 921. Nick Wagner
 922. Nicole Bradford
 923. Nicole Engle
 924. Nicole Minkoff
 925. Nicole Southwell
 926. Nicole
 Thomas-Kennedy
 927. Nicole Zeller
 928. Nikhil Lonberg
 929. nikkita oliver
 930. Nina Ozbek
 931. Nisma Gabobe
 932. Nivi Achanta
 933. Noah de Leeuw, PhD
 934. Noé Loyola
 935. Noel Rivard
 936. Nolan Price
 937. Noor Alzamami
 938. Nora Vralsted-Thomas
 939. Nurhaliza Mohamath
 940. O. Rose Benedict
 941. Ocean Sky
 942. Olivia Grove
 943. Olivia Grove
 944. Olivia Heath
 945. Olivia Lederman
 946. Omen Jackson
 947. Orin Dubrow
 948. Orion Chen
 949. Orion Rose
 950. Owen Kovarik
 951. Page Bates
 952. Pamela Ehrlich
 953. Pam Heyman
 954. Pam Orbach
 955. Pardes Lyons-Warren
 956. Patricia Pedersen
 957. Patrick Brown
 958. Paula Sjunneson
 959. Paulette
 960. Paul Faucher
 961. Paul Feldman
 962. PAUL KIM
 963. Pennie O'Grady
 964. Peter Condit
 965. Peter Klett
 966. Phillip Collins
 967. Phil Neff
 968. Phoenixville,
 Pennsylvania, United
 States of America
 969. Piedra Manier
 970. PJ Phillips
 971. Porscha Anderson
 972. Preston Hampton
 973. priya dhawka
 974. Quinn Qian
 975. Quinton Singer
 976. R. Boswell
 977. Rachael Ludwick
 978. Rachael Robinson
 979. Rachel Anne Seymour
 980. Rachel Beda
 981. Rachel Braunstein
 982. Rachel BRumer
 983. Rachel Glass
 984. Rachel Gordon
 985. Rachel McDonald
 986. Rachel Spence
 987. Rae Jing Han
 988. Ranny Nguyen
 989. RaShawndra Doby
 990. Ray Gordon
 991. Ray Power
 992. Rebecca Deutsch
 993. Rebecca Haberkorn
 994. Rebecca Lavigne
 995. Rebecca Leisher
 996. Rebecca Ryser
 997. Rebecca Yin
 998. Reid Smith
 999. Reilly Rosbotham
 1000. Renee
 1001. Renee Lamberjack
 1002. Reuben Gelblum
 1003. Rev. Carter Smith
 1004. Rev. Ellie Leech
 1005. Rev. Steve Jerbi
 1006. Rey Hauser
 1007. RG Tuomi
 1008. Rhys Hutton
 1009. Richard Figinski
 1010. Richard Moreno
 1011. Richard Voget
 1012. Rich Voget
 1013. Riley Freedman
 1014. Riley Rheta
 1015. Riley Wilmart
 1016. River Talt
 1017. RJ Dumo
 1018. Roberta Garcia
 1019. Robert Brown
 1020. Robert Drucker
 1021. Robert Evans
 1022. Robert Schentrup
 1023. Rochelle Berg
 1024. Rosa Palumbo
 1025. Rose Hatfield
 1026. Rose King, PhD
 1027. Roslyn Martinez
 1028. Roxy
 1029. Rozi Romanesco
 1030. Ruth Elan
 1031. Ruthie Carroll
 1032. Ryan Brooks
 1033. Ryan Driscoll
 1034. Ryan McMorrow
 1035. Sabina Rai
 1036. Sacha Jacobson
 1037. Sadé A. Smith
 1038. Sadie
 Scott-Hobson
 1039. Sadie
 Scott-Hobson
 1040. Sage Walund
 1041. Saina Hussain
 1042. Samantha
 Coleman
 1043. Samantha Shafer
 1044. Samantha White
 1045. Samara Almonte
 1046. sam bhagwandin
 1047. Sam Foote
 1048. Samuel Rapoport
 1049. Samuel So
 1050. Sandra VanderVen
 1051. Sandy Vo
 1052. Sara Bliss
 1053. Sara Darlington
 1054. Sara Elgabalawy
 1055. Sara Hanneman
 1056. Sarah Bolton
 1057. Sarah Kavage
 1058. Sarah Kreshtool
 1059. Sarah Lippek
 1060. Sarah Potter
 1061. Sarah Rudy
 1062. Sarah Vershon
 1063. Sara Nishikawa
 1064. Sara Pizzo
 1065. Sara Stogner
 1066. Sarra Loew
 1067. Savannah Martinez
 1068. Sayr Watson
 1069. Scot Sternberg
 1070. Scott Funkhouser
 1071. Scott McClay
 1072. Scott Meyer
 1073. Sebastian Kimberk
 1074. Seema Ardakan
 1075. Sejal Soni
 1076. Selene Russo
 1077. Serena Tran
 1078. Sergio chavez
 1079. Seth Krantzler
 1080. Seth Taylor
 1081. Seth Warn
 1082. Shan Contreras
 1083. Shanilla Morgan
 1084. Shannon Pickard
 1085. Shannon Ren

1086.	Shannon Stebbins	1132.	Sunny Davey	1177.	Tramy Nguyen
1087.	Sharon Kim	1133.	Susana Simmonds	1178.	Tristen Wartonick
1088.	Sharon Lieberman	1134.	Susan	1179.	True Patterson
1089.	Sharran Moynihan		Blythe-Goodman	1180.	Tula Kurashige
1090.	Shary B	1135.	Susan Koppelman	1181.	Tula Kurashige
1091.	Shayla Riday	1136.	Susan Moskwa	1182.	Tyler Kipling
1092.	Shayne Lippard	1137.	Susanna Waldrop	1183.	Tyler Morrison
1093.	Shelby Branam	1138.	Suzanne Nevins	1184.	Valentina Warner
1094.	Shelby Daugherty	1139.	Suzie Strait	1185.	Valerie Bak
1095.	Shemona Moreno	1140.	Sweller Weller	1186.	Vanessa Reyes
1096.	Sheridan Sogge	1141.	Sydney Provence	1187.	Vanessa Rosenberg
1097.	Shiloh Silverberg	1142.	Sylvia haven	1188.	Vanessa Skantze
1098.	Shirley Leung	1143.	T.K. Anney	1189.	Veronica Martinez
1099.	Shraddha Shirude	1144.	Tahni Nikitins	1190.	Vickie H. Woo
1100.	Shreya Sharma	1145.	Tara Beach	1191.	Vickie Woo
1101.	Shyanne Steele	1146.	Tara Peters	1192.	Vicki McMullin
1102.	Sidney Ross	1147.	Tasha Faber	1193.	Victoria Aukland
1103.	sidonie wittman	1148.	Tatyana Emery	1194.	Victoria franklin
1104.	Sierra Smith	1149.	Taylor Hilton	1195.	Victoria Urias
1105.	Simon Knaphus	1150.	Taylor Klekamp	1196.	Vida Behar
1106.	Sindri Woodard	1151.	Taylor Quach	1197.	Virginia Weihs
1107.	Singgih Tan	1152.	Taylor Riley	1198.	Vox Valentine
1108.	Siri Rigsby	1153.	Teddy McDonald	1199.	Vyom Raval
1109.	S Kessler	1154.	Tegan Von Neupert	1200.	Way Sum
1110.	skye d'aquila	1155.	Teresa Manz	1201.	Way Sum
1111.	Sonia Hossain	1156.	Teresa Sweeney	1202.	Way Sum
1112.	Sophia Keller	1157.	Tesha Zietlow	1203.	Wendy Wern
1113.	Sophia Keller	1158.	Tessa Fier	1204.	Wesleigh
1114.	Sophia Miyazaki	1159.	Tess Mueller		Richardson
1115.	Spencer Rawls	1160.	Thena Seer	1205.	Whitney Kahn
1116.	Spencer Riddering	1161.	Theo Moon	1206.	William Daniell
1117.	Spencer Ward	1162.	Theo Yih	1207.	William Siegel
1118.	Stacey Wiese	1163.	Thomas Moriarty	1208.	Winne Luo
1119.	Stanley Feliciano	1164.	Tiffany Ha	1209.	Wyatt Duclos
1120.	Stefanie Brendler	1165.	tika	1210.	Yuan Tao
1121.	Stella Biehl	1166.	Timothy Keeler	1211.	Zachariah Brosius
1122.	Stella Biehl	1167.	Tim Taft	1212.	zach frimmel
1123.	Stella Simonet	1168.	Tobey Solomon-Auger	1213.	Zac Russillo
1124.	Steph Hagerty	1169.	Tom Neill	1214.	Zarine Kharazian
1125.	Steve Leigh	1170.	Tom Sheehan	1215.	Zar stackhouse
1126.	Steven Hampton	1171.	Tor Shimizu	1216.	zee zelinski
1127.	Steven Nielsen	1172.	Tova Gaster	1217.	Zeynep Ertugay
1128.	Sue Han	1173.	Tracey Loyd	1218.	Zoe Haverstein
1129.	Sue kay	1174.	Tracy Stewart	1219.	Zoe Wahbeh
1130.	Suman Grewal	1175.	Tracy Tran	1220.	Zolaire Arcade
1131.	Summer Stevens	1176.	Tracy VanSlooten		

Based on the zip codes of every signer of this letter, **87.25%** are from Seattle:



Singers from Seattle Represented the following Zip Codes:

- | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|
| 98016 | 98118 | 98146 |
| 98101 | 98119 | 98155 |
| 98102 | 98121 | 98166 |
| 98103 | 98122 | 98168 |
| 98104 | 98123 | 98177 |
| 98105 | 98125 | 98178 |
| 98106 | 98126 | 98181 |
| 98107 | 98131 | 98188 |
| 98108 | 98132 | 98194 |
| 98109 | 98133 | 98195 |
| 98112 | 98134 | 98198 |
| 98115 | 98136 | 98199 |
| 98116 | 98144 | |
| 98117 | 98145 | |

Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot

Me: Gary Lee Chinatown Block Watch / Public Safety Council

And I want to say that the CID Community is **Strongly in favor of Technology Assisted Crime Prevention, and** Supports and Appreciates the work the SPD does in our neighborhood.

On November 13th, I submitted over 745 signatures from residents, business owners, and workers in the CID **to the** City Council requesting that **they** approve the budget request for **this** Pilot project, **and** that **they** implement this pilot project in the CID. – This is a copy for you.

As mentioned in the presentation, earlier, the Chinatown International District is one of the high crime neighborhoods under consideration.

This is an **opportunity** for the City to **mitigate** the **harms** and **crime** it **has**, and **is**, drawing to our neighborhood, because of the City's inadvertent, OR PURPOSEFUL OVERCENTRATION of homeless shelters and human services **in, and within** walking distance, of the CID.

I am here today to **invite you to**, and continue to request – that **this Pilot project** be implement in the **CID first!**

I think I heard that this technology is only going to be used for felony crimes! I think that should not be the case **if** breaking store front windows and graffiti are **not** felonies.

We are tired of what the CID has become over the last 5 years.

Look at Little Saigon!! Does that look like a normal/vibrant commercial district to you??!!! Are boarded up storefronts still “normal” outside of the CID?!! **Its all because of crime.**

We are afraid of being shot at and attacked while standing at a bus stop, or walking to a bus stop, or just walking on the street.

We are tired of our store front windows being broken, over, and over again. Insurance companies have stopped insuring business in the CID because vandalism and break-ins are so rampant.

We are tired of having to repaint over graffiti - over, and over again.

This Technology Assisted **Crime Prevention** Pilot project should be implemented first in the **Chinatown International District** in order to:

Help **Prevent crime**, as in - reduce crime, as in - hopefully make our neighborhood safer, as in - help restore our neighborhood to be “Normal” and **SAFE!!**

We believe the CID is the best place for a Pilot project - to **study the Technologies’** impacts on **Crime Reduction** – because there is **plenty of crime** happening there.

Thank you.

On Monday, November 13, 2023, 2:35 PM, Gyle111 <gyle111@aol.com> wrote:

City Council Members,

I am Gary Lee, Chair of the CID Public Safety Council. I am representing the 745 residents, business owners, and employees who have signed the attached letter/petition in support of the Mayor's budget technology request.

As a community, we strongly favor the use of technology and crime prevention, and we urge you to fully fund the Mayor's request. We understand this is a pilot project, and also hope this technology will come to the CID Neighborhood first, as we believe this is one of the neighborhoods with the highest crime rates in the City.

Sincerely,
Gary Lee
CID Public Safety Council Chair

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date 日期	Print Name 名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
11/6/2023	Jinmei Ruan	JR	206-693-0733
11/6/2023	Xiao Ying Li	Xiao Ying Li	206-578-2353
11/6/2023	Qinghong Pan	Qinghong Pan	206-578-2354
11/6/23	Xing Xian Yu	Xing Xian Yu	206-239-8773
11/6/23	Shi C Huang	Shi C Huang	206-235-1351
11/6/23	Aizhen Liu	Aizhen Liu	206-661-2747
11/6/23	Zhikai Yu	Zhikai Yu	586-438-8644
11/6/23	Chunxia Lu	Chunxia Lu	206-604-9743
11/6/23	Siman Chen	Siman Chen	206-393-8690
11/6/23	Bing Liu	Bing Liu	206-533-1429
11/6/23	Guojun Geor	Guojun Geor	206-992-1083
11/6/23	Jieying Chen	Jieying Chen	206-861-6038

CID Community support for Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request.

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/6/23	Qizhan Wu	Qizhan Wu	206-306-6344
2	11/6/23	Huiyi Cai	Huiyi Cai	206-476-8394
3	11/6/23	Shiwei Tang	Shiwei Tang	206-432-7010
4	11/6/23	Lun Tang	Lun Tang	206-476-8891
5	11/6/23	Yue Tang Lee	Yue Tang Lee	206-433-4576
6	11/6/23	Xiao Lian Huang	Xiao Lian Huang	206-664-1177
7	11/6/23	Qi Pan TAN	Qi Pan TAN	206-880-8816
8	11/6/23	Huidong Hu	Huidong Hu	206-379-5981
9	11/6/23	Zhongming Hu	Zhongming Hu	206-403-0895
10	11/6/23	Fenghao Xie	Fenghao Xie	206-434-0597
11	11/6/23	Zhaocan Hu	Zhaocan Hu	206-790-9157
12	11/6/23	Zhuohua Hu	Zhuohua Hu	206-499-4764
13	11/6/23	Jiayun Lei	Jiayun Lei	206-306-3543
14	11/6/23	Jinyuan Zou	Jinyuan Zou	206-866-8279
15	11/6/23	Shuang Li	Shuang Li	206-802-5351
16	11/6/23	Zhenzhou HAN	Zhenzhou HAN	206-432-6688
17	11/6/23	Fengfan Li	Fengfan Li	206-306-6234
18	11/6/23	Wang Kwong Tang	Wang Kwong Tang	206-306-6234
19	11/6/23	Zi Tuan Liu	Zi Tuan Liu	206-407-9814
20	11/6/23	Wei Xin Huang	Wei Xin Huang	206-223-1522
21	11/6/23	Ruizhen Wu	Ruizhen Wu	206-741-9693
22	11/6/23	Tian Jun Deng	Tian Jun Deng	206-408-2561
23	11/6/23	Ruixiang Wu	Ruixiang Wu	206-741-9579
24	11/6/23	Yue zhen Huang	Yue zhen Huang	206-484-8919
25	11/6/23	Ruizhan Deng	Ruizhan Deng	206-423-5252

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

Date Print Name Signature Phone Number

1	11/6/23	Bijun Jia		206-330-1568
2	11/6/23	Guo Ping Jia		206-375-9979
3	11/6/23	Jacitha Ren		206-794-2989
4	11/6/23	Binghan Jang		206-441-7741
5	11/6/23	Wanli Mai		206-473-0834
6	11/6/23	Zihui Yang		206-432-7837
7	11/6/23	Chicki Sitis		425-691-8138
8	11/6/23	Jicun Li		206-369-7827
9	11/6/23	Yan Liang		206-478-8668
10	11/6/23	Jane Liang		206-556-8871
11	11/6/23	Jin Hui Tan		206-539-9253
12	11/6/23	Hai Ling Chen		206-306-5258
13	11/6/23	Lizhong Li		206-307-1714
14	11/6/23	Meijun Li		206-307-1714
15	11/6/23	Shizhen Wu		206-307-1714
16	11/6/23	Bing Wang Cen		206-255-2525
17	11/6/23	Shizheng Li		206-206-6758
18	11/6/23	Jayne Hui		11-557-8115
19	11/6/23	Jayne Hui		206-510-8037
20	11/6/23	Hong Ying Lee		206-166-5618
21	11/6/23	Huiwen Sit		206-367-5111
22	11/6/23	Chuck Tse		206-321-4688
23	11/6/23	ANDERSON SP HANG		206-747-6128
24	11/6/23	Zhenxiang Li		206-307-4609

520大樓 602

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

	Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
0	11/7/23	Li Shouuo yaron		206-538-9559
1	11/7/23	Liang Li Yoww 102	SHAO	206-536-3305
2	11/7/23	Quun Sia fang 104	LI	206-636-4456
3	11/7/23	Wang Gui mei 105		206-499-6184 105
4	11/7/23	Wal Qun Lo 105		206-499-6184 105
5	11/7/23	Dai Shan Xing 201		206-709-9117
6	11/7/23	Chen Xiao Huang 200		206-422-8200
7	11/7/23	Su King Shen 204		206-777-5208
8	11/7/23	Tang Xiu Yong 308		206-777-5228
9	11/7/23	Chiang Huan Liu		206-398-3341
10	11/7/23	Tang Dong Xig 405		206-500-3574
11	11/7/23	Ng Hai Twa 407		206-680-8456

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
1	11/7/23	Liang Lai Xia 404	Xi Lai	206-609-5423
2	11/7/23	Ng Lai Fu 1404	Ng	206-980-8958
3	11/7/23	Kong Yen Kam 1408	Kam	206-938-6244
4	11/7/23	Liang Ling ai 501	Ling ai	206-905-0037
5	11/7/23	Chen pei ying 507	peipei	206-218-2384
6	11/7/23	Huang Su ming 603	Su Ming	206-371-6289
7	11/7/23	Huang Hua Liang 204	Huang	206-226-9928
8	11/7/23	Wu Jin zhen 705	Jin zhen	206-407-8905
9	11/7/23	Guo mei lan 706	Lan	206-227-4157
10	11/7/23	Tang Yuk 802	Tang Yuk	206-377-9008
11	11/7/23	Huang Qiu Xing 804	Qiu	206-432-0116
12	11/7/23	Zhu mei fang	Lan	206-965-0948
13	11/7/23	Qiu Yang Kai 909	Yang	206-623-6139
14	11/7/23	Zhen zhi 54 907	Zhen	206-623-0139
15	11/7/23	Ma Ru Jun 112	Ma	206-508-6008
16	11/7/23	Zhen Hui Yung 207	Hui Yung	206-240-1382
17	11/7/23	Liao ai ai 901	Liao	206-235-0233
18	11/7/23	Wang Yi Yun	Wang	206-458-9606
19	11/7/23	Zong mei Yu	Mei Yu	206-758-8556
20	11/7/23	Chen mei Hui	Chen	206-769-8556
21	11/7/23	Liu King Tai	Liu	206-259-0070
22	11/7/23	Le Hui Fang	Hui Fang	206-407-8851
23	11/7/23	Dang Tin Kai	Dang	206-861-3974
24	11/7/23	Mei Ying	Mei Ying	206-721-8615

25

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/7/23	Li Deji	Li	206-676-7889
2	11/7/23	Liu Rui ling	Rui	206-676-7889
3	11/7/23	Lu Mui	Mui	206-678-8772
4	11/7/23	mei zhe ou	mei	206-349-2380
5	11/7/23	Liu Ya Qing	YQ	206-667-5018
6	11/7/23	Yong Ming Chan	YMC	206-495-0105
7	11/7/23	Xi Shen	Xi	206-375-6269
8	11/7/23	Huang Mei Rong	Huang	206-229-9169
9	11/7/23	Liang Yan Fang	Fang	206-407-8481
10	11/7/23	Lan Guo Ru	Ru	206-407-0627
11	11/7/23	Wu Hui Hu	Hui	206-280-2758
12	11/7/23	wu yang niao	YN	206-280-2756
13	11/7/23	yu Baoqiang	Bao	206-697-7209
14	11/7/23	Wu Lixian	Lixian	200-445-0313
15	11/7/23	Lei Jin Cong	Jin	206-446-0313
16	11/7/23	Tan jin long	Tan	206-938-6210
17	11/7/23	Li yu zhai	Zhai	206-326-0466
18	11/7/23	Xie Meiyuan	Meiyuan	206-370-5331
19	11/7/23	Lee Tseai Kan	Kan	206-467-3069
20	11/7/23	Zi mei yan	Zi	206-623-3049
21	11/7/23	Lion Suzhen	Suzhen	200-240-8868
22	11/7/23	Ha Kiet Trinti	Kiet	206-382-1550
23	11/7/23	Li Shonugan	Shonugan	206-602-2362
24	11/7/23	Tan Fang Juan	Fang	206-682-7678

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
11/8/23	Jin Zhu Chen	Jin Chen	206-446-6094
11/8/23	Tina Zhu Chen	Tina Chen	206-284-4528
11/8/23	Kean Shui Seta	Kean Shui	206-887-3536
11/8/23	Wei Ming Mok 葉志明	Mok	206-441-4729
11/8/23	RAY LEU	Ray Leu	206-325-7751
11/8/23	CHAO DENG	Chao Deng	206-292-8828
11/8/23	WOON KWONG TANG 鄧煥光	Tang	206-706-6234
11/8/23	SAI LAN HOEN	Sai Lan Hoen	206-693-6108
11-8/23	JIMMY LEMUS	Jimmy Lemus	206-288-8281
11/8/23	Fengya Xie	Fengya Xie	206-457-7218
11-08-23	Lai Yin Ha	Lai Yin Ha	425-246-4849
11/8/23	Paula Nelsen	Paula Nelsen	206 538 2750

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

	Date 日期	Print Name 寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
1	11.6.23	GEZI LAI		360-908-0378
2	11/6/23	Yi Juan Liang		206-539-6015
3	11/6/23	ZHANXIANG ZHU		206-5028548
4	11-6-23	JINGHUALI LEE		206-482-8601
5	11-6-23	SHI GENG LI		206-859-3572
6	11-6-23	XIU YI GUAN		206-601-9361
7	11-6/23	HAI YU LIANG		248-854-9275
8	11-6-23	HAI Q. GUAN		206-973-9811
9	11-6-23	Zewdita Muliyil		206-890-9892
10	11-6-23	Doan Chow Tse		206-383-3149
11	11-6-23	Wai Tse		206-385-3149

202 6th Ave

<202大厦居民签名表>

页共30页

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

日期

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11-6-23	shuyan peng	shuyan peng	206 536 631
2	11-6-23	yunying Huang	yunying Huang	206 451 9374
3	11-6-23	LAISEWONG	LAISEWONG	206-734-2282
4	11-6-23	HUAN MIN GUAN	HUAN MIN GUAN	206-883-1090
5	11-6-23	AIHAO LU	AIHAO LU	206-883-1090
6	11-6-23	lizhen zhou	lizhen zhou	425-344-9323
7	11-6-23	chang ying Gu	chang ying Gu	206-557-8056
8	11-6-23	JIN LI RENG	JIN LI RENG	206-913-8840
9	11-6-23	WU TAN LIN	WU TAN LIN	206-805-9717
10	11-6-23	MEI SHONG HUANG	MEI SHONG HUANG	206-745-9646
11	11-6-23	ZHEN LI ZHAO	ZHEN LI ZHAO	(206) 682-2067
12	11-6-23	HU WANG LIN	HU WANG LIN	(206) 483-4343
13	11-6-23	Zhang Ho Tan	Zhang Ho Tan	206-235-5066
14	11-6-23	Li Ai Tan	Li Ai Tan	206-235-5066
15	11-6-23	HUA LI	HUA LI	206-383-5804
16	11-6-23	YU TANG LI	YU TANG LI	206-353-4276
17	11-6-23	LUN AN TANG	LUN AN TANG	206-353-4276
18	11-6-23	Kyle Lee	Kyle Lee	206-381-8776
19	11-6-23	Sue Lee	Sue Lee	206-381-8776
20	11-6-23	SU P LI	SU P LI	206-280-5297 <206-557-5297>
21	11-6-23	Ann	Ann	206-280-5297
22	11-6-23	Su Juan Chen	Su Juan Chen	206-291-3323
23	11-6-23	Su Qiu Wu	Su Qiu Wu	206-381-3298
24	11-6-23	Dun cheng Xue	Dun cheng Xue	206-381-3298
25	11-6-23	Fu Hong Lei	Fu Hong Lei	206-331-5579
26	11-6-23	Cai Zhen Chen	Cai Zhen Chen	206-331-5579
27	11-6-23	Wen Mai	Wen Mai	206-381-8310
28	11-6-23	Xue Tan	Xue Tan	206-381-8310
29	11-6-23	Jin Quan Wu	Jin Quan Wu	425-344-8824
30	11-6-23	HUI HUAN	HUI HUAN	206-280-5297-91626

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

	Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
1	11/8/23	Qiu Feng Peng	Qiu Feng Peng	206 903 6534
2	11/8/23	Siu Sang Wang	Si	206-264-1464
3	11/8/23	Xiu Tan	Xiu	206-778-3883
4	11/8/23	Yin Liu Liu	YL	206-403-3329
5	11/8/23	Ruiji Li	Ruiji Li	206-602-8582
6	11/8/23	Xiao Han Gu	GH	206-334-3277
7	11/8/23	Jesse H Wang	Jesse H Wang	206-409-2381
8	11/8/23	Hazuki Hozu	侯秀红	206-234-8714
9	11/8/23	Li Gan	李甘	501-285-4183
10	11/8/23	Rui ZHAN DENG	邓瑞浩	206-423-5252
11	11/8/23	OU, Shi Gui	欧石桂	206-883-0873
12	11/8/23	Zhong Tan	Zhong Tan	206 953 0758

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

	Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
1	11/8/23	THIEN NIZEN LE NIZEN	THIEN NIZEN LE NIZEN	1246 212 6295
2	11/8/23	JIZHAI WU	JIZHAI WU	206-375-9973
3	11/8/23	MAKUN SZETO	MAKUN SZETO	(206) 465-1445
4	11/8/23	Siu Gan Wong	Siu Gan Wong	(206) 264-1464
5	11/8/23	Chiu, yuet Ming	Chiu, yuet ming	206-328-1145
6	11/8/23	Jin Wei Li	Jinwei Li	206-709-4155
7	11/8/23	XIUYIN ZHAN	XIUYIN ZHAN	206-722-0233
8	11/8/23	Pik-Fong Chan	Pik Fong Chan	206-557-8294
9	11/8/23	CHEN CAI JUAN	LIZHENSIZH	206-860-1276
10	11/8/23	Rui Jian Li	Rui Jian Li	206-385-3090
11	11/8/23	CAI JUAN CHEN	CHEN CAI JUAN	206-466-8379
12	11/8/23	SL	SL	206-623-1109

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date 日期	Print Name 书写名字	Signature 签名	Phone Number 电话
1	11/8/23	Min Ying Zhu	Min Ying Zhu	206-372-6228
2	11/8/23	P. Tobacco	Philip	206-246-7873
3	11/8/23	Yie-Liu	Yie Liu	206-489-6976
4	11/8/23	Y. L. FANG	Y. L. FANG	206-883-2003
5	11/8/23	Wong W	W	206-883-2003
6	11/8/23	Dejan Cai	Dejan Cai	206-383-2199
7	11/8/23	Yu Chen	Yu Chen	206-434-2424
8	11/8/23	Andy Dong	Andy Dong	206-354-2679
9	11/8/23	King Wu	King	206-996-6469
10	11/8/23	Rong Li	Mi Rong	206-703-5720
11	11/8/23	Guan Dai Hao	Guan Dai Hao	206-453-8885
12	11/8/23	Yan Qiong Cai	Yan Qiong Cai	206-355-3090
13	11/8/23	Mei Ying Lu	mei ying lu	206-872-6027
14	11/8/23	YOU FENG	YOU FENG	206-697-8558
15	11/8/23	YAN LI	YAN LI	425-2867034
16	11/8/23	MEI QIU LI	MEI QIU LI	206-330-3602
17	11/8/23	PEI AXA YUAN	PEI AXA YUAN	206-853-2919
18	11/8/23	ZHAO HUA HUANG	ZHAO HUA HUANG	206-819-4144
19	11/8/23	ZHONG HUA XU	ZHONG HUA XU	206-7080134
20	11/8/23	Hui Mei Cheng	Hui Mei Cheng	206-769-9296
21	11/8/23	Soo Kwong	S.K. W	206-498-6063
22	11/8/23	YU YE MA	YU YE MA	206-303-7298
23	11/8/23	Lianping Zhao	Lianping Zhao	206-495-2649
24	11/8/23	ZHU J LIN	ZHU J LIN	206-536-5412

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/6/23	Wei T.	Wei Guang Lin	206-939-8288
11/6/23	Wei T.	Wei Tian Liu	206-334-4446
11/6/23	Jianghua Fang	Jianghua Fang	206-886-7503
11/6/23	YANTING LI	Yanting Li	206-735-7328
11/6/23	JIEQIANG LEI	Jieqiang lei	206-206-0170
11/6/23	Yumei Wu	Yumei Wu	206-291-0876
11/6/23	LIEW LY	LIEW LY	206 536-9750
11/6/23	LY NGA	LY NGA	206-536-9750
11/6/23	Li Xinghua	Li Xinghua	206 8612681
11/6/23	Gib Wu	Gib Wu	206 372 7905
11/6/23	LIANGHUA FANG	LIANGHUA FANG	206 422-3252
11/6/23	YANTING LI	YANTING LI	206 255 2421

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/6/23	Karl Deng	Karl Deng	206 403 5332
2	11/6/23	MANAI Huang	ManAi Huang	206-712 8417
3	11/6/23	Zhihua Zhao	Zhihua	206-712-3372
4	11/6/23	Jianwei Chen	Jianwei Chen	206-384-5534
5	11/6/23	Wei Xima	Wei Xima	206-455-3877
6	11/6/23	MAN LIT WONG	MAN LIT WONG	206-455-5930
7	11/6/23	Kaixun Huang	Kaixun Huang	206-334-2291
8	11/6/23	Tekshuan Wong	Tekshuan Wong	206 480 7193
9	11/6/23	Lee Yung Ng	Lee Yung Ng	206 581 2161
10	11/6/23	Fung Cheuk Wong	Fung	206 707 5744
11	11-6-2023	Lisa Yu	Lisa Yu	206-722-9831
12	11-6-2023	CHOI H WONG	Choi Hing Wong	206-722-9831
13	11-6-2023	WEN Z YU	Wen-zhi Yu	206.722.9831
14	11-6-2023	Guanan Huang	Guanan Huang	206 712 5844
15	11-7-2023	Yuanqiang Khan	Yuanqiang Khan	206 883 7698
16	11-7	Maqie Yuch	Maqie Yuch	206 383 4338
17	11.07.23	ALEX HANG	ALEX HANG	206.624.4821
18	11-07-23	ROSE LIU	Rose Liu	(206) 623-0733
19	11/7/23	Amy Ang	Amy Ang	(206) 623-0733
20	11/7/23	Minh Diep	Minh Diep	206-356-5330
21	11/7/23	Cindy Jue	Cindy Jue	206-856-0724
22	11/7/23	Bai Xin Liu	Bai Xin Liu	206-687-0040
23	11/7/23	Yan Lian ZHAO	Yan Lian ZHAO	206 370-9184
24	11/7/23	Yan Ling ZHANG	Yan Ling ZHANG	206 434 2643
25	11/7/23	Xiaochang Cao	Xiaochang Cao	206 468 2494

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/7/23	Zhi Huang	Zhi Huang	(206) 9724-2275
2	11/7/23	Huang Chen	Jia Lan Huang	(206) 682-7486
3	11/7/23	Jia Lan Huang	Jia Lan Huang	(206) 682-7486
4	11/7/23	Juan T. Chen	Juan	(206) 355-5410
5	11/7/23	Wen Guang Chen	Wen	(206) 422-8956
6	11/7/23	Jui Yu Chen	Jui	(206) 7351-1691
7	11/7/23	Jin Bi Huang	Jin Bi Huang	206-403-7251
8	11/7/23	ALBERT CHUN	Albert Chun	(206) 335-8309
9	11/7/23	ANNA MAK	Anna Mak	(206) 660-2232
10	11/7/23	Qing Lin Li	Qing Lin Li	206 307 5890
11	11/7/23	FENG MING	Feng	206 823 8448
12	11/7/23	Ai Xia Li	Ai Xia Li	206 313 7583
13	11/7/23	Chou Sek Mei	Chou Sek Mei	206-330-9190
14	11/7/23	Cyndi Lan	Cyndi Lan	206-624-7581
15	11/7/23	Wenkang Huang	Wenkang Huang	206-624-7581
16	11/7/23	XIAO Huang	XIAO Huang	206-491-8883
17	11/7/23	YAN JIAN	Yan Jian	206-725-2012
18	11/7/23	JZB XZAZHANG	Zhi Zhang	(206) 521-2933
19	11/7/23	Shi Bing Shao	Shi Bing Shao	(206) 992-6566
20	11/7/23	Xi Chen	Xi Chen	(415) 609 5514
21	11/7/23	Liting Li	Liting Li	206-816-5408
22	11/7/23	Zhuang Tai	Zhuang Tai	206-519-2835
23	11/7/23	Carthony Huang	Carthony	425-489-7815
24	11/7/23	leaven Jo	leaven	206-354-4732
	11/7/23	Hui Trans	Hui	206-778-0892

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/7/23	YANHUI ZHU	Zhu	425-829-8012
2	11/7/23	Shaoqun	Huang	425-829-9675
3	11/7/23	Mai Yin He	Yin	206-369-0528
4	11/7/23	Di JIANG HUANG.		206- 211 623-5877
5	11/7/2023	XIAOJING CHEN	Xiao Jing	206-623-1670
6	11/7/23	Bee Gan		206 822 8401
7	11/7/23	You Feng Guo	YOUFENG GUO	206-697-8558
8	11/7/23	Christina Wu		206-778-4513
9	11/7/23	Vicim		206-778-4513
10	11/7/23	Shan Fagan	Shan Fagan	206-973-3005
11	11/7/23	Sulata Waj	Waj	206-456-5149
12	11/7/23	Shi Fangwa	Shi	206-456-5149
13	11/7/23	mei jiao	mei	206-456-5149
14	11/7/23	Dong Zhen	Dong	206-456-5149
15	11/07/23	Guoqing Yan	Guoqing Yan	206-456-5149
16	11/07/23	Mo Qi Chung	Mo Qi Chung	206-456-5149
17	11/07/23	Pei Wen Wu	Pei Wen Wu	206-456-5149
18	11/7/23	陳桂芬	Chen Gui Fen	206-456-5149
19	11/7/23	Fung Wan Lee	Fung Wan Lee	206-456-5149
20	11-7-23	RUPYI CHEN	RUPYI CHEN	206-456-5149
21	11-7-23	蔡蕤琼	Lai Ding Zhai	206-456-5149
22	11-7-23	Linh T Do	Linh T Do	206-456-5149
23	11-7-23	Juanchar Chen		206-334-3957
24	11-7-23	Chee Feng	Chee	206-456-5149
25	11-7-23	Keyla Zabala	Keyla	206-456-5149

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/7/2023	Maria Kelly	Maria Kelly	206-456-5149
2	11/7/2023	Marlene Panopio	MP	206-488-6290
3	11/7/2023	Jie Zhen Cai	蔡洁贞	206-456-5149
4	11/7/23	KISS WOO	KISS WOO	626-703-9549
5	11/7/23	Zhi Yan	Yan	206 676 2258
6	11/7/23	Wai Chan	Wai Chan	206 354 1649
7	11/7/23	Jing Jing Lin	Jing Jing Lin	206-631115
8	11/7/23	Cris Krisoloso	Cris Krisoloso	206 779-1136
9	11/7/23	Shen Meijia	Shen Meijia	206 389 3804
10	11/7/23	Jimmy Romy Chen	Jimmy Romy Chen	204 476 8397
11	11/7/2023	Gina Morales	Gina Morales	206 372-7462
12	11/7/23	Johnny Wu	Johnny Wu	206 601-9538
13	11/7/23	Melanie Jule	Melanie Jule	206 536 8868
14	11/7/23	Andrew Ng	Andrew Ng	206 890 1288
15	11/7/23	Qiao Lian Wu	Qiao Lian Wu	253-397-5368
16	11/7/23	Yipeng Zhao	Ryan	253-397-5603
17	11/7/23	Jian Ye	Jian Ye	206-372-9393
18	11/7/23	CHUN BING LEE	Chun Bing Lee	206-769-9568
19	11/7/23	Terence Tam	Terence Tam	206-682-5080
20	11/7/23	VANEA GULKA	Vanea Gulka	206-720-9934
21	11/7/23	IVAN Toupin-fouder	Ivan Toupin-fouder	206-853-9224
22	11/7-23	Gen Fei Yang	Gen Fei Yang	206-326-0602
23	11/7/23	HUAN QIAN	Huan Qian	206 5023282
24	11/7/23	YAOLU CHEN	Yaolu Chen	206 251 4887
25	11/7/23	Wei Liu	Wei Liu	206 483 8166

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request. 11/6/2023

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date 日期	Print Name 書寫名字	Signature 簽名	Phone Number 電話
11/8/23	Hui Xian He	Hui Xian He	206-313-7823
11/8/23	Yunx Wu	Yunx Wu	206-331-9039
11/8/23	Jianhua Li	Jerry Li	206-331-9039
11/8/23	Huang Din	Chris Huang	206-614-1586
11/8/23	Nguyen bao thai	thai	206-670-8560
11/8/23	ZHEN WU HUANG	ZHEN WU HUANG	206-370-2124
11/8/23	Cui ping zhong	Cui ping zhong	206-434-1278
11/8/23	Ruilan Zhao	Ruilan ZHAO	206-335-5624
11/8/23	Huan Pengyu	Huan Pengyu	206-251-7029
11/8/23	LE YU WONG SZE TO	LE YU SZE TO	206 354-4835
11/8/23	Ai Qiu Wu	Ai Qiu Wu	206 334-2941
11/8/23	LIV C LU	LIV C LU	206-652-1348

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11-5-23	CHAN YI LAM	Cham ye Lam	206-351-4998
11-6-23	YI ZHEN LIANG	yi zhen liang	206-650-6731
11-6-23	LIAN YU HE	Ji gu He	504-975-1619
11-6-23	DA MU	Sue Mu	(206) 823-4118
11-6-23	XIAO DENG	Xiao Deng	206-975-1619
11-6-23	FENGCHAO	W	206-376-9968
11-6-23	YU YE	yu ye	206-545-3228
11-6-23	JIN QI ZHANG	Jina zhan	206-582-9881
11-6-23	XIAO WU	Xiao Wu	206-460-1658
11-6-23	WAYNE CHEN	Wayne Chen	206-446-0347
11-6-23	YI	W	206,503-6229

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

Date 日期 Print Name 書寫名字 Signature 簽名 Phone Number 電話号

1	11-6-23	cheney	cheney	425-270-0288
2	11/6/23	CHEN YUEJUAN	CHEN YUEJUAN	206 566-2929
3	11/6/23	chunli deng	chunli	(425) 708-1199
4	11/6/23	chengze he	chengze he	(425) 239-9628
5	11/6/23	RUKANG HE	RUKANG HE	(425) 240-7261
6	11/6/23	shuxian luo	shuxian luo	(425) 240-7260
7	11/6/23	Ling Gao	Ling Gao	206-306-5581
8	11-6-23	Bo Ye Wu	Bo Ye Wu	206 591-0840
9	11/8/23	YU SU E	YU SU E	206-227-1739
10	11/8/23	ZHUO NUWU	ZHUO NUWU	206-946-0478
11	11/8/23	Jian Mai	Jian Mai	(206) 933-6680
12	11/8/23	YIN YEN YEE	YIN YEN YEE	206-325-2521
13	11/8/23	Feng Jee Shum	Feng Jee Shum	206-288-9528
14	11/8/23	MEI HUANG	MEI HUANG	206-565-2898
15	11/8/23	HUNG	HUNG	206-512-3816
16	11/8/23	RU XIA WEN	RU XIA WEN	206-488-9677
17	11/8/23	Wan zhanjunlin	wan wulin	206-721-7811
18	11/8/23	yan lei jin	yan lei jin	206-721-7811
19	11/8/23	SU RUCHEN	SU RUCHEN	509-859-2614
20	11/8/23	zhang	zhang	206-624-8023
21	11/8/23	Feng zhang Chao	Feng zhang	206-414-6216
22	11/8/23	ZHANG ZHU	ZHANG ZHU	206-604-6077

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date 日期	Print Name 姓名	Signature 签名	Phone Number 电话号
1	11-6-23	Beth Ku	Beth Ku	206-859-1917
2	11-07-23	Cesheng Wu	Cesheng Wu	206-682-2823
3	11-07-23	Qilian Wu	Qilian Wu	206-682-2823
4	11-07-23	Miao Mei Zhao	Miao Mei Zhao	206-682-2823
5	11-07-23	Yi Yan Chen		206-682-2823
6	11-07-23	Zhi Ying Fu	Zhi Ying Fu	206-682-2823
7	11-07-23	YU HU/LAO	YU HU/LAO	206-682-2823
8	11-7-23	CHUNHAO	CHUNHAO	206-682-518-7176
9	11-07-23	Yan hong He	Yan hong He	206-682-2823
10	11-07-23	Tan Kwang Huang	Tan Kwang Huang	206-682-2823
11	11.07.23	Alan Cui		206-501-0132
12	11-07-23	Zhen Zong Cui	Zhen Zong Cui	206-359-1618
13	11-07-23	Jin Zhang	Jin Zhang	206-354-3226
14	11-07-23	SHU XIAO CHEN	SHU XIAO CHEN	206-345-5075
15	11-07-23	PING-WAI CHOW	Ping Wai Chow	206-527-1469
16	11-07-23	HUNG SOON LEE	Hung Soon Lee	206-527-1469
17	11-07-23	FLORETTE LAM	Florette Lam	(206) 784-5188
18	11-7-23	Rui Yu	Rui Yu	206-389-7099
19	11-7-23	Xiu Wang	Xiu Wang	206-389-7099
20	11-7-23	Mei Ho	Mei	206-389-7099
21	11-7-23	Wuan Wang	Wuan	206-389-7099
22	11-7-23	Ying Zhang	Ying	206-389-7099
23	11-7-23	Hong Ho	Hong	206-389-7099
24	11-7-23	Mo chi	Mou	206-389-7099
25	11-7-23	ching man Wong	CHINGMAN WONG	206-521-8933

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
1	11/6/23	Qin Shaohua	Qin Shaohua	206-965-8927
2	11/6/23	Juan Juan Chen	Juan Juan Chen	206-407-9734
3	11/6/23	Qin Dingkun	Qin Dingkun	206-574-8684
4	11/6/23	Amy Gu	Amy Gu	206-412-2362
5	11/6/23	Rong Huan Xu	Rong Huan Xu	206-581-3359
6	11/6/23	Yuzhu Xu	Yuzhu Xu	206-327-7722
7	11/06/23	Huakun Xu	Huakun Xu	206-612-9170
8	11/06/23	Hualian Xu	Hualian Xu	206-234-9199
9	11/06/23	Huafeng Xu	Huafeng Xu	206-327-7713
10	11/6/23	Meihua Xu	Meihua Xu	206-327-7719
11	11/6/23	Huang Lici	Huang Lici	206-816-4860
12	11/6/23	CHEN HAN HONG	CHEN HAN HONG	206 779-1302
13	11/6/23	Su Mei Chen	CHEN SU MEI	206-436-9827
14	11/6/23	Kai Qun Zhao	Kai Qun Zhao	206-218-4871
15	11/6/23	Shuyang Liang	Shuyang Liang	206-218-4877
16	11/6/23	Wan Guang Liang	Wan Guang Liang	206-218-4871
17	11/6/23	Raymond Wu	Raymond Wu	206-265-0201
18	11/7/23	Kit Wah Choi	Kit Wah Choi	206 390 4655
19	11/7/23	Fengmei Chen	Fengmei Chen	503-888-8578
20	11/7/23	Nolly Sunada	Nolly Sunada	808 445 2002
21	11/7/23	Joslin Sayachith	Joslin	206 499 1507
22	11/7/23	Ming Luo	Ming Luo	206 886 8821
23	11/9/23	Andy Wu	Andy Wu	206 886 7398
24	11/7/23	Grace Liu Wenzuo	Grace Liu Wenzuo	206 910 9146
24	11/7/23	Wenzuo Zhao	Wenzuo Zhao	206 910 9146

我们支持布鲁斯 - 11/6/2023

	Date 日期	Print Name 书写名字	Signature 签名	Phone Number 电话
1	11/06/23	An Li		(206) 304-5031
2	11-6-23	Shi Guan Li		206-304-5031
3	11-6-23	Amy Zeng		206-682-2823
4	11-6-23	Zhen Yong Cai	Zhen Yong Cai	206-682-2823
5	11-6-23	Alan Cai	Alan Cai	206-682-2823
6	11-6-23	Michelle Cai	Michelle Cai	206-359-1628
7	11-6-23	Xiao Juan He	XIAOJUAN HE	206-458-4929
8	11-6-23	Yue Lian Huang	Yue Lian Huang	206-423-8046
9	11-6-23	JIAO E ZENG	JIAO E ZENG	425-616-8365
10	11-6-23	BAO LAN YU	BAO LAN YU	2488549276
11	11-6-23	CHUAN AN LIANG	CHUAN AN LIANG	206-372-1431
12	11-6-23	ZHUO JIN LI	ZHUO JIN LI	206-280-2594
13	11-6-23	GAI MU YANG	GAI MU YANG	206-372-1431
14	11-6-23	Melani Oreyudos	Melani Oreyudos	206-475-8905
15	11-6-23	Ying Mei Kuang	LIANG YING MEI	206-854-7763
16	11-6-23	Quan He Wu	QUAN HE WU	206-412-2067
17	11-6-23	FENG YI HU	FENG YI HU	206-412-2067
18	11-6-23	LIPING HUANG	LIPING HUANG	206-483-9698
19	11-6-23	HUA ZHAN LI	HUA ZHAN LI	206-353-4832
20	11-6-23	KAM TAI CHIA CHUN	Kam Tai Chuan	206-802-5093
21	11-6-23	Yan Fen Huang	yan fen huang	206-438-4433
22	11-6-2023	An Du	An Du	206-302-8100
23	11-7-23	SAMUEL FREDERICK		206 234 4616
24	11-7-23	Kelly Lu		206 234 1780
25	11-7-23	Tracy Chau		206-621-1029

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯·哈雷尔市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视 (CCTV)，该系统具备枪响定位 (AGLS)。自动检测车牌 (ALPR) 系统。该自动检测车牌 (ALPR) 系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我们是 CID 的居民、企业主或员工，我们支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/8/2023	DONALD LEE	<i>Donald Lee</i>	281 630 7792
11/8/23	YUE FONG LAM	<i>Yue Fong Lam</i>	206 234-9621
11/8/23	Midori Liu	<i>Midori Liu</i>	936 203 1102
11/8/23	Richard Taylor	<i>Richard Taylor</i>	252-328-6247
11/9/23	Jay Taylor	<i>Jay Taylor</i>	252-831-8316
11/6/0	Stephen Boslos	<i>Stephen Boslos</i>	206-427-9575
11/8/23	Doreen Deaur	<i>Doreen Deaur</i>	253 709-7447
11/8/23	Katherine Reich	<i>Katherine Reich</i>	253-230-6350
11/8/23	DAVID MCKIN REICH	<i>David McKin Reich</i>	206 387 6243
11/8/23	Marya Monagan	<i>Marya Monagan</i>	261-521-9876
11/8/23	TERMAN MARTIN	<i>Terman Martin</i>	206 978-7401

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视 (CCTV)，该系统具备枪响定位 (AGLS)。自动检测车牌 (ALPR) 系统，该自动检测车牌 (ALPR) 系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/7	Kember Fowles		(509) 304-8400
11/7	Sybil Fowles		(509) 304-8500
11/7	DEBORAH UNO		(206) 322-7339
11/7	Trudy Sano		206.245-3131
11/7	Agnes Chow		206 696 1010
11/7	Tomio Moriyama		206-799-2700
11/7	Like Li		201-887-3032
11/8	NAM LE		832-461-3294
11/8	MARC RUSSELL		206.578.8189
11/8	KATHRYN KURTZ		206 370 2435
11/8	AMOLRA LIM		
11/8	Angelic Jaurazi		(425) 445-8440

286
S/S
2

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.











This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request

我們支持布魯斯，哈雷市長提出的一項技術經費申請。這項技術包含了最新的閉路電視（CCTV），該系統具備槍响定位（AGLS）。自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統，該自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統和西雅圖警察局的警車配置的為同一套系統。

這套閉路電視系統安裝在馬路，行人道，和商店外來觀察罪案。希望這套閉路電視系統能夠協助西雅圖警察局查案和做到預防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市長的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/10	Karen Ng		206 624 1123
11/10	Ngock Wong		206 264 4841
11/10	Kandor Wong		206 264 4841
11/10	Yinwen Geng		206-818-1688
11/10	TERENCE NUNDA		206 355 4422
11/11	MADDISON HEREE		425 780 8508
11/11	KALENE YANAMURA		253-797-7293
11/11	JAY YANAMURA		253-332-3603
11/11	ADEN LOPEZ		NO
11/11	Gail Bonicatti		206-819-8822

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.









This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/7/23	TOM DAVIS		(206) 682 8539
11/7/23	Khyan		206 565 5869
11/8/23	Boya Lin		248-767-1182
11/8/23	Eunah Seo		206-24-0277
11/8/23	S.Y. Kim		"
11-08-23	Elias		"
11/08/23	Raquel		"
11/08/23	Efrain		"
11/08/23	Kevin		"
11/08/23	Viridiana		"
11/8/23	NICKY		206-816-2066
11/10/23	Olivia		"

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
10/8/23	CRAIG ISHINO	Craig Ishino	206-779-5957
10/9/23	Sonathan Holzinger	[Signature]	206-697-6653
10/18/23	[Signature]	[Signature]	206-623-2889
10/18/23	Zeyuan Tan	Zeyuan Tan	206-324-8105
11/8/23	John Lee	[Signature]	206-475-9251
11/8/23	Xuan P Tran	[Signature]	206-941-9952
11/8/23	Luis Cruz	Luis Cruz Bortez	(206) 825-0705
11/08/23	Sokhe Park	[Signature]	206-403-5146
11/8/23	Si Nga Hu	[Signature]	206-816-8182
11/8/23	WAI	[Signature]	206-698-4764
11-8/23	Marina Vu/20	[Signature]	206-470-9519
11-8/23	[Signature]	[Signature]	206-307-8344

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.










This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11-8-23	JULY FANG		206-622-3388
11-8-23	YUMIN CHEN		206-622-3388
11-8-23	QIBING KONG		Yue Ling wen
11-8-23	"		206-407-6037
	Ashley		206-351-7110
11-8-23	Zhenling	ZX	206-899-9879
11-8-23	YAN LAI ZHOU		206-466-9427
11-8-23	Bosheng Huang		206-578-7428
11-8-23	Ting cheng MA	Tc	206-899-9878
11-8-23	Jing Chen		206-883-1235
11-8-23	XIAO ZHEN		206-375-9593
11-8-23	Jiaer	Jiaer	206-235-5374

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.













This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/8/23	Ken Daffa		
11/8/23	Connie Yu		
11-8-23	Cris Paconascu		(206) 308-0694
11/8/23	Mason Kim		(360) 789-0476
11/8/23	Mate Lee		425 209 9591
11/8/23	Alejandro Galviz		206-478-1383
11/8/23	Andrew Kim		253-886-4448
11/8/23	Lewis K Kim		253-772-3067
11/8/23	Smyeon. Rone		(206) 620-1318
11/8/23	Abman Kim		206-677-2828
11/8/23	Delone Williams		206-374-2150
11/8/23	MEGUMI TANIGUCHI		206 661 5000

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.





This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/8	Lynn Chang		206-682-4500
11/8	Danni Huang		206 383-8809
11/8	Beatrice Kumasaka	Bea Kumasaka	206/448-3472
11/8	Usa Kumasaka - Mitchell	Lisa Kumasaka - Man	206/478-7469
11/8	Yan Yu Wu	Yan Wu	206-474-4096
11/8	WEXIN CHEN	WEXIN CHEN	206 823 7996
11/8	WEI PAN	WEI PAN	206 495 8163
11/8	Johu Agudo Pinz		206 786 2032
11/8	LIU ZUO LI	Zuo Liu	206-302-8835
11/8	RICHARD CHANG	R	206-682-4006
11/8	Yongkang zhan		206-384-0825

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.













This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11-8-23	Chunhua Wu		206-889-0053
"	Wen Sheng		206-468-3006
"	BRIAN MYERS		206-880-8654
"	Alex Koch		206-948-5420
"	Cameron Sheday		(408) 384-1374
"	Fiona Chow		(206) 788-3700
"	Indigo LM		425-306-7202
"	Phu Nguyen		206-531-5232
11-8-23	Julie Ralls		562-448-8071
11-8-23	Jose Ramirez		206-778-3189
11-8-23	MOM WU		206-890-1117
"	Analy Nguyen		206-712-0753

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.














This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/08/23	Hui (Lena) Chen		206-518-7421
11/08/23	Emily Yang		206-294-2880
"	Peter Leok		206-430-4776
"	Aixian Chen		206-218-3179
"	Lily Tam		425-480-9031
"	Jacky Hui		206-667-8760
"	andy Lau		206-667-8760
"	Boice Gang		206-513-8314
"	amy/4 wen		206-513-9578
"			206-362-1108
"	Forbing Ben		206-518-4476
"	Yanyi Yang		206-889-0053

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.











This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/18/23	Finkhili		
"	Paulian		
"	Jony		206 996 539
"	Joana Chong		
"	HONG UM		800 749 549
"	FELIPE BARRA		
"	ANDREW TIPPINS		909 568 76 79
"	Megan DeLeon		253 985 5177
"	Robert Capps		253 589 7277
"	Yidun Lu		
"			
"			

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11-12-23	Emily C		206-621-2006
11-12-23	SUNSH		206-988-6978
11-12-23	Joseph Dancy		808 277-1018
11-12-23	COLYANNONG		206-8169173
11-12-23	SUNPOLU		206-7518103
11-12-23	SUN KUONGB LUI		206-9811049
11-12-23	Fua Gi		615-269-8910
11-12-23	JTang	JIAN HUANG	206-8228-6888
11-12-23	Niam		206 839 1118
11/12/23	Muy		206 670 6483
11/12/23	Chloe Tran		206 530 4266
11/12/23	Theo Bickel		206-788-3694

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.













This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我們支持布魯斯，哈雷市長提出的一項技術經費申請。這項技術包含了最新的閉路電視（CCTV），該系統具備槍響定位（AGLS）。自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統，該自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統和西雅圖警察局的警車配置的為同一套系統。

這套閉路電視系統安裝在馬路，行人道，和商店外來觀察罪案。希望這套閉路電視系統能夠協助西雅圖警察局查案和做到預防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市長的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/12	Rachael Tiow		916.626.9776
11/12	Huong Phan		509 795 003
11/12	Tiffany Chim		206 353 6200
11/12	Anna Lam		921-888-1186
11/12	Rheanna Terri		253 397 2901
11/12	DONALD BOUSH		206 - 498-1029
11/12	IKuko Masaka		206-291-5007
11/12	Reabr '01		206 231 8797
11/12	Selvin Caal		206 677 0706
11/12/23	XIAQUN LI		206 434 9164
11/12/23	Zishan Gan		206.883.7038
11/12/23	Hai Bin Xie		206 883 8398

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.













This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/12/23	Tram Bui		206-624-7189
11/12/23	Ha Bui		206-624-7189
11/12/23	Hang Duong		206-624-7189
11/12/23	Shi Guo Qian		206-223-8528
11/12/23	Nanbin Xu		206-223-8528
11/12/23	Vivian Li		206-778-2388
11/12/23	Yu Ma		206-827-2208
11/12/23	Yao Xing Ma		206-625-1408
11/12/23	Miaosu Chen		206-602-6008
11/12/23	Steven		206-602-6008
11/12/23	Eddie		206-442-7847
11/12/23	Thanh Duong		206-485-3481

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.











This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/12	Bao CAR		206-653-5508
11/12	Baohua Tan		206-8999970
11/12	HAOBI HUANG		206-229-2372
11/12	Bao Bin 41804180		206-6230728
12/12	Chau		206-221-0232
12/12	Hock J. Wu		206-3900091
12/12	Liming ma		188-539-7515
12/12	Fangk LC		206-448-9699
11/12	Jia Lan Huang	Jia Lan Huang	206-788-6488
11/12	Jin Huo 9	Jin Huo 9	206-624-2275
11/12	Mist Huo 9		
11/12	Jimmy Huynh		(682) 365-6548

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.











This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我们支持布鲁斯，哈雷市长提出的一项技术经费申请。这项技术包含了最新的闭路电视（CCTV），该系统具备枪响定位（AGLS）。自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统，该自动检测车牌（ALPR）系统和西雅图警察局的警车配置的为同一套系统。

这套闭路电视系统安装在马路，行人道，和商店外来观察罪案。希望这套闭路电视系统能够协助西雅图警察局查案和做到预防犯罪的作用。

我們是 CID 的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市长的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/12/23	Rueben Tiou		707 4077531
11/12/23	Ciana		206-226-4824
11/12/23	Francis Yap		
11/12/23	Erin Hwang		
11/12/23	Sam Peon		206 340 8838
11/12/23	Christine Su		006 625 1688
11/12/23	Trotter		206 883 9413
11/12/23			206 68 25080
11/12/23	RONNIE KWONG		206.992.2396.
11/12/23	CAKE HOUSG		206 223-2766

We support Mayor Bruce Harrell for technology budget request. The technology includes the newest closed-circuit television (CCTV) technology which is equipped with acoustic gunshot locator system (AGLS). A system called automated license plate readers (ALPR). The automated license plate readers (ALPR) are the same system installed in Seattle Police Department Patrol vehicles.

This closed-circuit television (CCTV) on roadways, street and outside of businesses to monitor criminal activity. Hopefully the closed-circuit television (CCTV) will deter crime and assist in investigation of a crime.

We are residents, business owners or employees of the CID. We support the mayor's request.

我們支持布魯斯，哈雷市長提出的一項技術經費申請。這項技術包含了最新的閉路電視（CCTV），該系統具備槍響定位（AGLS）。自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統，該自動檢測車牌（ALPR）系統和西雅圖警察局的警車配置的為同一套系統。

這套閉路電視系統安裝在馬路，行人道，和商店外來觀察罪案。希望這套閉路電視系統能夠協助西雅圖警察局查案和做到預防犯罪的作用。

我們是CID的居民、企業主或員工。我們支持市長的要求。

Date	Print Name	Signature	Phone Number
11/12	Hailey Hu	Hailey Hu	206 485 7481
11/12	Thi Ho	Thi Ho	206 485 7481
11/12	ZYATAN AVERIET	Zyatan Averiet	206-488-2444
11/12	Dawn Uy	Dawn Uy	206 619 7024
11/12	Fu Peng Liu	Fu Peng Liu	206 785 6936
11/12	Fu Noan Liu	Fu Noan Liu	206 785 6936
11/12	Wang Zhong	Wang Zhong	206 785 6936
11/12	Fan Hua Zhu	Fan Hua Zhu	206 785 6936



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney
- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst
- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North *gate*
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney
- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst
- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino *Chicana*
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle)
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify



Neighborhood

- Ballard
- Belltown
- Beacon Hill
- Capitol Hill
- Central District
- Columbia City
- Delridge
- First Hill
- Georgetown
- Greenwood / Phinney

- International District *WORK*
- Interbay
- North
- Northeast
- Northwest
- Madison Park / Madison Valley
- Magnolia
- Queen Anne
- Rainier Beach
- Ravenna / Laurelhurst

- South Lake Union / Eastlake
- Southeast
- Southwest
- South Park
- Wallingford / Fremont
- West Seattle
- King county (outside Seattle) *live*
- Outside King County
- Prefer not to identify

Race/Ethnicity

- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Prefer not to Identify

Age

- Under 18
- 18-44
- 45-64
- 65+
- Prefer not to identify

Gender

- Female
- Male
- Transgender
- Prefer not to identify

Public Comment Microsoft Form






Form Respondents: 754

Form Total Responses: 2482

Privacy Inbox: 141 General & RTCC

8. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Age Range

[More Details](#)


 Prefer not to identify	68
 Under 18	1
 18 - 44	394
 45 - 64	112
 65+	63



9. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Neighborhood

[More Details](#)


● Prefer not to identify	79
● Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th	26
● Ballard	31
● Belltown	8
● Beacon Hill	36
● Capitol Hill	63
● Central District	60
● Chinatown/International District	24
● Columbia City	19
● Delridge	1
● Downtown Commercial Core	7
● First Hill	13
● Georgetown	1
● Greenwood / Phinney	24
● International District	5
● Interbay	2
● North	15
● Northeast	36
● Madison Park/ Madison Valley	8
● Magnolia	11
● Queen Anne	13
● Rainier Beach	13
● Ravenna / Laurelhurst	25
● South Lake Union	5
● Southeast	6
● Southwest	2
● South Park	7
● Uptown	7
● Wallingford / Fremont	27
● West Seattle	36
● King County	33
● Outside King County	6



10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

[More Details](#)


● Prefer not to say	108
● Woman	249
● Man	172
● Non-binary	61



11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

[More Details](#)

● Prefer not to identify	92
● Black / African American	11
● Hispanic / Latino	23
● Asian / Asian American	73
● Native Hawaiian or Pacific Island...	5
● Indigenous	9
● White or Caucasian	398
● Another race/ethnicity	7
● Other	7



10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

[More Details](#)


● Prefer not to say	108
● Woman	249
● Man	172
● Non-binary	61



11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

[More Details](#)

● Prefer not to identify	92
● Black / African American	11
● Hispanic / Latino	23
● Asian / Asian American	73
● Native Hawaiian or Pacific Island...	5
● Indigenous	9
● White or Caucasian	398
● Another race/ethnicity	7
● Other	7



ID	Email	What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?
1	anonymou s	Seems to be the best of all worlds. Would give the most data in a time sensitive manner..but as I noted in the other surveys--privacy concerns are my biggest issues. As well, will there be calls of placement of cameras, etc as "racist" as most likely, they will be in low income areas--places with the highest crime (per stats).
2	anonymou s	Crime dashboards have no real evidence of working and are only likely to embolden police to more efficiently harass already marginalized communities
3	anonymou s	It inherently violates the surveillance ordinance. This technology constantly adds additional algorithms & other items. These additions would not be going through the surveillance impact review process. It has not been proven to reduce crime or increase clearance rates It is dependent on the existence of other invasive surveillance technologies (most notably CCTV) It eliminates public knowledge & approval of other surveillance technologies & their expansion Endangers anyone traveling to Seattle to access abortion or trans healthcare
4	anonymou s	Need more info on this. Nothing specific I can find about what it is and how it's used.

5	anonymou s	From 2016 to 2020, SPD's budget went up by 35% - and did you know they only spend about 4% of their time investigating crime? Stop blowing massive holes in our city budget by buying whatever overblown Minority-Report system this thing is, and start addressing the root causes of crime - raise wages, tax corporations, set aside land for public housing, and provide community services outside of SPD's corrupt and violent purview.
6	anonymou s	Sounds like an expensive waste of money.
7	anonymou s	Sounds more like the movie Minority Report than something we need.
8	anonymou s	It's another waste of money to react to crime rather than preventing it. We know how to prevent crime, and spending money on violent responses to crime is not it. This money could easily be spent on more housing or services for those most at risk of engaging in violent crime.
9	anonymou s	RTCC technology is dangerous for our city. Using privately owned cameras will allow private companies to bypass laws that limit and protect citizens from police. This will lead to major violations of your constituent's civil rights. Additionally, it is VERY concerning that the city has only consulted with RTCC sales representatives, not any violence prevention experts or community members who are most impacted by policing.
10	anonymou s	I'm worried it will be used to violate citizens civil rights and liberties. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. And poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
11	anonymou s	1) It is ineffective. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. Shotspotter has been proven over and over to be ineffective, as has CCTV. 2) It is a massive threat to civil liberties. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. It would potentially created a chilling effect on free speech and violate our principles as a "sanctuary city" for abortions and un documented immigrants. 3) It creates an environment for abuse of the technology by SPD. There is little to no transparency, accountability or oversight built into this technology, so it would be up to SPD to choose who, what and when to surveil.
12	anonymou s	Not the solution: Real time, after the crime is already happening and people are hurt. Why react when you can prevent? I'm a psychologist and educator and there's a lot of research on what actually helps make communities safer. It's about community based programs, access to services, ways to wok with other organizations. We can treat people who are identified as at-risk if the funding and programming was there. Patients tell me when they are being threatened or want to hurt someone. Some people might need therapy or medications. Mental health work incredibly effective. In fact, look up lithium and crime rate research. Even with just trace amounts in water supplies it has reduced crime, suicide etc. Treatment, social work, and community support can be powerful. Theres so much unhealed trauma and hurt people hurt people. Your plan allows for retraumatization and removing people from communities, thereby weakening and fragmenting the communities as the traumas accumulate.
13	anonymou s	Not only will this amplify existing biases in policing, disproportionately targeting marginalized communities, but AI-assisted technologies are also very racially biased at their core because it reflects the structures its programed within. This is a waste of money, and will actively make the community less safe.
14	anonymou s	It is unconstitutional in it's application. Right to privacy is guaranteed by the 14th amendment. This tech has the potential to violate civil liberties, will undercut Seattle's status as a sanctuary city, and will not meaningfully aid law enforcement in solving nor preventing crime
15	anonymou s	1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. a. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

b. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

c. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

d. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

2. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

a. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

b. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

a. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

b. In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

16
anonymou
s

the general concept of combining information streams into one aggregate feed is fine. However, I vehemently oppose the surveillance implied by it's use, here. CCTV and automatic shot detection systems are invasive and ineffective in addressing actual issues.

17
anonymou
s

This can potentially be abused to harrass and control individuals or groups of people. Yes, it is 'password protected' but humans can be very lax about using strong passwords. How do we know the system won't be hacked? How do we know someone in the SPD won't abuse it?

RTCC software has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

18
anonymou
s

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

19
anonymou
s

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. As a queer woman, one of the reasons I came to Seattle to Texas was the protections it provides to women seeking an abortion. As the older sibling to a trans person, it is incredibly important to me that trans youth can come to Seattle and seek gender-affirming care. Technology like RTCC puts these populations at a higher risk of policing and criminalization at a time when the federal government has made their intentions clear in attacking the bodies of women and trans people.

20
anonymou
s

21
anonymou
s

We need this technology to help make the CID safe.

My concerns about RTCC software, such as Fusus, center on its potential to violate civil rights and liberties and to block communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately-owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights.

22
anonymou
s

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. Furthermore, surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

23
anonymou
s

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

This is a toolkit for mass surveillance of Seattle residents and visitors. It violates our civil rights, enrolls many private entities in government surveillance, and is a waste of our money. It is especially dangerous for communities of color, for a variety of reasons related to ingrained racism.

24	anonymou s	The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and eat up scarce public money, preventing programs that actually reduce violence from getting funded and continuing disinvestment in communities.
25	anonymou s	This is a direct violation of privacy. Taking data from private cameras is corrupt.
26	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.
27	anonymou s	There are MANY more effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. This technology is downright creepy and has immense opportunity for biased policing and incorrect identification of people. This technology may also violate civil liberties and existing laws. This is unacceptable.
28	anonymou s	It's a misplaced use of public money. This isn't what is needed or helpful. We need healthcare, housing, and social services as investments of the public dollar. We expect leadership not to waste it on busy work and gadgets like this.
29	anonymou s	Video surveillance technology is extremely vulnerable to abuse, and contributes to racial profiling, and private tech companies have no accountability to the community. Not only does this system pose a risk that officers will use it to commit stalking and harassment campaigns against their own partners and families, it also presents a huge risk of abuse by independent hackers and data brokers who will sell the information they collect to abusers outside the police force.
30	anonymou s	Ineffective means such as this technology is not going to help. Not only this, but the invasion of privacy to yield low results is not a good way to earn trust from the city's constituents.
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. 3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there

were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

		<p>scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p>
34	anonymou s	<p>The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and eat up scarce public money, preventing programs that actually reduce violence from getting funded and continuing disinvestment in communities</p>
		<p>I am a software engineer with a PhD in computer science.</p> <p>RTCC software will hurt the SPD's accountability.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When officers make poor decisions and hurt people, they will try to divert some of the responsibility to the RTCC. They will try to use arguments like "I thought he had a gun because the RTCC said there was armed violence in the area, so I was afraid for my life and killed him in self defense." (All RTCC software makes mistakes and will give false positives.) 2. RTCC software comes with continual updates that add new algorithms and update existing ones. To be transparent and accountable, an RTCC implementation would have to come with the following. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. No substantive update is installed and used without vetting under the Surveillance Ordinance. b. All machine learning models used must be made available to the public for inspection, including all training data used to produce the model, as well as the trained model. This is crucial because image recognition algorithms and RTCC software broadly is full of assumptions and may have major bugs that pose public safety problems. The public has a right to know what code is being used to surveil us.
35	anonymou s	
36	anonymou s	<p>This is a violation of people's privacy. It is racist technology. It is creepy. It is a waste of money.</p>
37	anonymou s	<p>I'm concerned about the history of abuse of power associated with RTCC technology. RTCC has been used without the knowledge of the cameras' owners before, which undermines the civil rights of both the camera owners and those filmed by the cameras. As someone who's lived in Seattle for just over a year, I've felt watched everywhere I went, which has severely negatively impacted my mental health. I haven't been able to find privacy or security even in my own home. I strongly feel that RTCC technology implementation would strengthen that negative impact.</p>
38	anonymou s	<p>is this just for expense and show or will you arrest an djail and prison the shooters?</p>
39	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software has many fundamental ethical issues including:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. undermining citizen's privacy by allowing police to bypass warranty requirements 2. utilizing facial recognition software that has been proven to be racially biased in many cases, and for which there is no transparency 3. creating an unclear source of responsibility when someone is harmed and this technology is being used, potentially allowing for guilty individuals to repeat the same harmful actions 4. creating a dangerous precedent for the erosion of fundamental rights to privacy and free speech
40	anonymou s	<p>Do not let private companies collect information and recordings of your citizens. There can be no oversight, and it's a waste of my tax dollars to fund such a thing</p>
41	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all</p>

		<p>community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p>
		Combining data automatically can be full of flaws including timestamps and exact location of occurrence. This could easily lead to mistakenly dispatching officers on false believe that more or worse crime is happening in an area.
42	anonymou s	Combining data is unlikely to result in PREVENTION of crime: only possible detection of multiple crimes occuring in one area at the same time.
43	anonymou s	I do not want this technology in my city, this is a violation of civil rights and liberties.
		<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values.</p> <p>RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p>
44	anonymou s	
45	anonymou s	It does not prevent crime or help prevent crime. It is just another meaningless investment in a bloated and over funded department.
		<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p>
46	anonymou s	Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights
47	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies

		undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.
48	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. It also undermines Seattle's status as a sanctuary city by potentially sharing citizens' data with private companies.
49	anonymou s	The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and eat up scarce public money, preventing programs that actually reduce violence from getting funded and continuing disinvestment in communities.
50	anonymou s	Expensive toys
51	anonymou s	Creating surveillance in this city will not keep it safe, it will endanger citizens who are struggling most and violate our civil rights. This is a waste of money that could be spend on proven programs, statistics show that this will not reduce gun violence.
52	anonymou s	The risk of having access to many cameras WITHOUT A WARRANT or CONSENT from the owner of said camera is clearly trying to skirt around protections for citizens
		<p>1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights</p> <p>2. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>4. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence, many of which the County and City are already funding! Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could maintain support of these effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. These community-based alternatives are up effective, yet new and need time and continued support to solidify and scale.</p>
53	anonymou s	

54	anonymou s	RTCC software is privately owned and thus gets around important limits on police in order to prevent civil liberties violations. This technology increases surveillance on vulnerable populations, including undocumented people, people seeking gender affirming care, and people seeking abortions - for which Seattle is designated as a sanctuary city. This goes directly against this mandate.
55	anonymou s	Investment in people makes communities safer, not surveillance. This initiative is being rushed, there are no credible studies that support the effectiveness of such initiatives, and there are many studies showing that surveillance (especially by fallible technology based on racist datasets) do particular harm to people of color. This is not a good way to spend our money.
56	anonymou s	I do not want to live in an even more surveilled city; there are already cameras on just about every building already, and now the city wants to pour even more funding with our tax dollars into more surveillance? A dystopian surveillance center? How about putting it towards programs that have been shown to actually improve people's lives and reduce crime such as housing, healthcare, and guaranteed basic income.
57	anonymou s	This is the scariest of the new proposed surveillance technologies. I have only concerns and nothing good to say. Accessing cameras without warrants/consent is a serious privacy violation and poses very real threat to anyone who is already likely subject to police abuse or over-surveillance. There is not enough oversight to the tool, and the constant AI updates means that technology will be implemented that hasn't been vetted which violates Seattle's surveillance ordinance.
58	anonymou s	This is invasive of every individual's privacy and with the police and cities' unconscious bias against certain races, disabilities, sexualities, etc. these communities of people will be unfairly targeted. Our city should not turn into a dystopian novel of big brother but with how the police treats its citizens and now this technology, that is the direction it is going. The people implementing this should be ashamed of what they're turning the beautiful emerald state into.
59	anonymou s	No concerns, it is much needed and I look forward to seeing this much needed resource in my community.
60	anonymou s	None
		zero.
61	anonymou s	Yes. The disingenuous Seattle City Council has given the city to criminal marauders. Residents need the city back.
62	anonymou s	The city attorney better prosecute offenders.
63	anonymou s	None. Good ideas.
64	anonymou s	I am concerned about the impact of the RTCC on all communities, particularly communities that have been historically over-targeted by police. I am also concerned about privacy, including data privacy, and the possibility that this technology could lead to illegal invasions into privacy by police, hackers, or other 3rd parties.
65	anonymou s	Invasion of privacy, weaponization of technology
66	anonymou s	None
67	anonymou s	Racial profiling and privacy
68	anonymou s	As always actions should be independently reviewable. An accountable police department is a trusted department. Misuse of technology should be identified and there should be corrective actions and consequences for intentional misuse.
69	anonymou s	None
70	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing

represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

71
anonymou
s

72
anonymou
s None

73
anonymou
s None

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

74
anonymou
s

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments

		<p>restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
75	anonymou s	I think this will increase policing bias and I'd rather funds be used to set up more social services for unhoused community members.
76	anonymou s	Are there enough officers?
77	anonymou s	No concerns.
78	anonymou s	None
79	anonymou s	None
80	anonymou s	There is a high risk of the technology being hacked into and fall into the wrong hands. A breach of a centralized database of every citizen's data threaten our privacy and security, not protect it. Sensitive personal information would be at risk if put in the wrong hands.
81	anonymou s	This fusion center can only be effective with more police officers. Extra cameras and gunshot detection tech only steals our privacy and exposes us to hacking and abuse. Please abandon the other measures and hire more police officers.
82	anonymou s	It will lead to more biased policing. We don't need more policing, we need the police to be held accountable for the violence they enact on a daily basis. More arrests does not mean more safety. Stop filling your quotas.
83	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. It is undemocratic and intrusive.
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	Is this about the license plate tracking system? If so, I'd like to make sure we are restricting this to immediate dangers. I think this system should be used in case someone is murdered, there's a terrorist activity, etc. but we need to be careful. Law enforcement should not be able to overabuse this system for petty crimes. Police need to be doing their job for regular enforcement. This system should only be used in the event there is a horrific crime and we need to match up surveillance equipment CCTV with a vehicle at the scene. Police should only be pulling this information with a warrant!
86	anonymou s	None - It is great that a technology hub such as Seattle is finally adopting the necessary technology to centrally manage crime. Police officers lives don't need to be in the line, and yet capture a lot of information about criminal network without ever stepping into the street. No need to worry about confrontation, or making the wrong move when decisions need to be made in splits of a second.
87	anonymou s	I oppose this technology. It has massive privacy issues, and the constitutionality of the technology is unclear. So you could spend millions on this technology and in 6 months have a court tell you to take it all down. It's a incredible risky proposition, that in reality has very little upside even if by some small chance our corrupt leftists activists courts do approve of this big brother surveillance state 1984 George Orwellian nightmare fuel technology, it will not stop crime. It will only cause the people to distrust their leaders even more. Now please stop this silliness.
88	anonymou s	No concerns. I feel more strongly that we need the acoustic detection and the CCTV cameras, but if research supports this to support the police, I would be in favor.
89	anonymou s	None
90	anonymou s	This technology will put vulnerable people at risk. The proposed RTCC tech (ex. Fusus) relies on AI features and integrations for things like image recognition, and machine learning algorithms are heavily

		racially biased, among other ethical concerns. Adding new features this way also eliminates the opportunity for public input or even internal review.
91	anonymou s	It is extremely and unequivocally violent.
92	anonymou s	I believe it has a high risk for abuse in overpolicing minority communities while at the same time not providing nearly enough benefit to outweigh that risk.
93	anonymou s	If this system has free access to too many information sources, it invites abuses of authority. Staff utilizing this system will themselves need to be monitored to catch such abuses.
94	anonymou s	As someone with a doorbell camera, I do not want things like that being seen and used by the police or anyone else. I use it for protecting and watching my personal property, but I do not want it to be used by others. I also think that this is not going to fix any of the problems it seeks to respond to. Putting more people in jail, having to process more people, and incarcerating people is expensive and not a good use of our city budget. I would rather these funds be used for climate action, crime prevention (not response), housing, parks, or so many other things.
95	anonymou s	It is disappointing that the city is trying to rush ineffective and dangerous gunshot detection technology to Seattle's streets, along with closed-circuit tv and real-time crime center technologies that have the potential to violate privacy and undermine civil liberties. Such extensive surveillance systems chill free speech, deter free association, fuel racial disparity in policing, and provide a false sense of security at the cost of privacy and race equity. Given these risks, it is crucial that communities that are disproportionately impacted by these technologies have their voices and concerns heard. We are deeply concerned that the city has provided less than a month and only two hearings for public comment. We call on the city to slow down and meaningfully engage the public in the surveillance ordinance's mandated review process.
96	anonymou s	We are spied on enough. This does nothing to stop crime
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	None
99	anonymou s	Police will use this technology to surveil innocent citizens
100	anonymou s	This will not actually make our communities safer. All it will do is invade the people's privacy and give the police excuses to increase harassment of minorities. This money could be better spent actually investing in our communities to reduce the inequities that are at the roots of their problems rather than dehumanizing them with harsh surveillance.
101	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works,

		<p>and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p>
10 2	anonymou s	The financial and social cost is too large, without much benefit to the community. This also will disproportionately negatively impact POC.
10 3	anonymou s	no issues, do it now please!!
10 4	anonymou s	This is a waste of funds. Let's instead invest in high-quality child care, improving schools, health care for healthy and supported communities to thrive.
10 5	anonymou s	Using a network of private and public cameras is un-democratic and dangerous. Take a look at what happens on Next Door -- profiling of people who "look suspicious." Look at what Sheriff Ed Troyer did down in Tacoma to the black newspaper carrier in his neighborhood.
10 6	anonymou s	It is a misuse of public funds on technology with unproven (or disproven) effectiveness for solving complex social problems, and has the potential to do tremendous harm to those subjected to it.
10 7	anonymou s	<p>The Real Time Crime Center technology will not keep us safe, and it is not effective. I have three main concerns with this technology: 1) RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. 2) These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. 3) Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>We are using the wrong tools to try to make our communities safer.</p>
10 8	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p>
10 9	anonymou s	This is creepy as hell. Police shouldn't have carte blanche to access any footage from anywhere they like. This opens the door to police being able to view footage without a warrant and without consent of the camera owner.
11 0	anonymou s	Another lazy non-solution to the reduction of crime.
11 1	anonymou s	This will expand policing, disproportionately harm BIPOC and marginalized people, and takes money away from social services that could create real safety.
11 2	anonymou s	<p>This technology is a direct attack on the civil liberties of the people of Seattle. It can allow police to access camera footage without a warrant and without the consent of the camera owner (1, 2). This opens up additional room for police abuse (2), when the trust in SPD is already extremely low. It leans heavily on AI and unvetted surveillance tools that undermine Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance (3). This technology also endangers populations that the city claims to want to protect like the undocumented or those seeking abortion care. It also doesn't work to prevent violent crime (4).</p> <p>(1) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time (2) https://www.404media.co/fusus-ai-cameras-took-over-town-america/ (3) https://www.fusus.com/blog/how-artificial-intelligence-at-the-edge-is-transforming-video-surveillance</p>

		(4) Piza, Eric L., et al. "CCTV surveillance for crime prevention: A 40-year systematic review with meta-analysis." <i>Criminology & public policy</i> 18.1 (2019): 135-159.
113	anonymous	This technology has the very real potential to cause harm to communities of color; there is no evidence that it actually reduces violent crime; and it will take resources and money that should be spent and directed to measures that will not violate our civil liberties and disproportionately harm communities of color.
114	anonymous	Other jurisdictions manage to do the same thing: - More transparently - Using much less data - Retaining much less data - Retaining data for a shorter period - With stricter guidelines for "evidentiary value"
115	anonymous	Why does Seattle (and specifically the SPD and not any other organization in the city) need this much data for this long when other cities are able to do the same with less?
116	anonymous	That the information it gathers will be used for other unintended purposes.
117	anonymous	Major waste of money on fancy technology that does nothing but enable the police to spy on citizens. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
118	anonymous	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights
119	anonymous	Awful invasion of privacy. Do NOT make this hellscape.
120	anonymous	It seems as if SPD has done little to no research into the effectiveness of this technology, let alone the horrifying ways it turns civilian cameras into surveillance tech for policing. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. With other states already requesting Washington and/or Seattle turn over medical records for people seeking care in our sanctuary city -- it's clear that this level of surveillance does not benefit residents. This does not make us safer and it's a waste of money.
121	anonymous	The use of this technology directly violates several human rights concerning a right to know what information is being recorded, where it is being stored, who is recording it and what it is being used for. It also violates the collection, compiling and investigation of footage of citizens and suspects without the issue of a warrant. The use of this technology would directly violate the city's surveillance ordinance, because it harvests and trains AI and other private technologies using unvetted techniques which are available to the wider public. The use of this type, any type of newly proposed surveillance technology will be compromising and dangerous to individuals seeking asylum in our city- anyone undocumented or seeking health and reproductive care that is restricted in other states will have their image, voice, license plates, etc. recorded and accessible in the police database which will make it very

		difficult to protect many already vulnerable community members. AI training using images against someone's will is a large moral issue that requires a lot more discussion and consideration before it's used widely in public. People have already been facing a lot of terrible backlash from the training and use of AI technology around their bodily image, including fabricated pornographic images and other compromising, unpleasant and damaging content. Harvesting people's likeness and storing it in what is frankly not a very secure place where it can and will be sold to other private corporations that are developing technology like this is a massive violation of anyone's right to have control or say in how their image is used.
12 2	anonymou s	The ever encroaching security state, and abuse by police and others to target minorities and the venerable.
12 3	anonymou s	I am against the use of this technology because it means a loss of privacy for Seattle residents, it expands police power, it increases already bloated police spending, and it can be used to target anti-cop protestors like me.
12 4	anonymou s	Monitoring of real-time crime center has value if it is set up, staffed and has the proper tools and training to handle crime while in progress. Most importantly, staffing of first responders that are equipped and trained properly need to be available, which under current staffing levels is not likely the case. The City needs to train SPD and SFD to work together in accordance to conditions at crime scenes. The City needs to have clear policies about when and how to bring in outside resources when crimes exceed City's ability to manage.
12 5	anonymou s	The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
12 6	anonymou s	This technology has been shown to be racist and biased. I am concerned that people of color will be unfairly and unduly targeted and subject to unnecessary harm. The police have already shown themselves to be racist and biased, inflicting unthinkable harm to individuals and communities of color. This technology is another tool they will use to justify the harm they commit every day.
12 7	anonymou s	This technology is an incredible overreach for a department that hasn't proved to this city it can be trusted with power and authority. It's also a wild circumvention of our constitutional rights as individuals in this country. This technology significantly increase the police's ability to observe and investigate individuals without a warrant. Regardless of the concerns about crime, protecting our privacy and agency is crucial for keeping this democracy from entering darker forms of government, and this technology pushes us far in the wrong direction.
12 8	anonymou s	I oppose more surveillance. I support investing in communities, mental health, housing, etc to actually reduce crime.
12 9	anonymou s	Support. No concern
13 0	anonymou s	I have nothing but concern about the use of RTCC and I 100% oppose the implementation of this technology in our city. The potential for infringement on civil rights and liberties is too great with RTCC software, such as Fusus. It also prevents communities from determining what kinds of surveillance is used in our neighborhoods. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Plus, RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime
13 1	anonymou s	I think this is long overdue. My concern is more about implementation and cost. For example, how long will it take to roll out, how much will the initial investment be, and what about the maintenance costs.
13 2	anonymou s	Over policing rather than investing in our communities and funding solutions that help long-term
13 3	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

		<p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p>
134	anonymou s	This is essentially tech that privatizes policing, no corporate surveillance tech
135	anonymou s	This seems like a technology that will have disproportionate impact on residents of color.
136	anonymou s	No concerns
137	anonymou s	I do not want privately owned cameras used in any police work unless a warrant is approved by a court. My main concern is privacy, but I also currently do not have enough faith in SPD to trust them with this technology. I also have seen to evidence to suggest that this technology will have a meaningful impact on crime rates, arrests, or response time. The cost likely doesn't justify the use of the technology.
138	anonymou s	It is a waste of resources on unproven technology that fails to do what it claims to do. It's a transparent attempt to bypass warrants to spy on protestors and marginalized communities. There is no guarantee this data could not or would not be used maliciously by either the city or individual hackers. There is no guarantee this footage could not be "lost" or altered by SPD and other agencies, as has already happened in other cities that have used this technology.
139	anonymou s	Its invasive and the police don't do anything with the information they already have.
140	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned about the implementation of the RTCC, given that it represents an enormous encroachment on personal privacy; an exorbitantly expensive investment in technology that is either improperly tested, proven ineffective at its stated goal, or both; and a gateway to the implementation of far more dangerous technologies in the future. Decades-long, systematic studies on surveillance technologies have shown no meaningful reduction in violent crime (see Piza et al., CCTV surveillance for crime prevention. A 40-year systematic review with meta-analysis, 2019), while other studies conclusively show a causal link between inequality/poverty and violent crime (see Fajnzylber et al., Inequality and Violent Crime, 2002). The money that would go into this ineffective program should therefore be redirected into communities experiencing high levels of crime, in the form of community investments, restorations of vacant land, providence of affordable housing, direct income support for individuals and families, and funding of public services, including community non-profits.
141	anonymou s	This technology has the potential to violate civil rights, it goes against democratic values, it is an invasion of privacy that will lead to police abuse, and it is not proven to decrease crime. The research shows that it is ineffective.
142	anonymou s	We need to spend our limited resources on real solutions for our communities health and well-being needs which are the root cause of violence, not on surveillance technologies (which have been shown not to prevent violence anyway and instead increase bias in policing).
143	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.
143	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

		<p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights</p>
14	anonymou 4 s	<p>Claiming to use monitoring devices to keep residents safe is a clear invasion of privacy and does nothing to address the cause of the issues in this city. As a lifelong WA resident I have seen 4 decades of this city and prior to an influx of under taxed tech workers and companies, we did not have the current issues. Our issues lie in misuse of funds, not taxing appropriately, allowing politicians and police officers to have zero consequences for illegal actions. Citizens are not the issue and do not need to be policed through this monitoring.</p>
14	anonymou 5 s	<p>The use of private cameras integrating into this system has an elevated concern for privacy violations.</p>
14	anonymou 6 s	
14	anonymou 7 s	<p>Cops can't even stop themselves committing crimes like running over innocent pedestrians so how will this help at all.</p>
14	anonymou 8 s	<p>I am adamantly opposed to this technology. It is of dubious value and greatly increases the amount of data that the police department will collect on innocent civilians.</p>
14	anonymou 9 s	<p>Most evidence for RTCC effectiveness, however, is anecdotal, and there is a real lack of studies into how effective they really are. Again, academic research on the impact of real-time crime centers is limited and shows modest improvement in case clearance rates at best.</p>
15	anonymou 0 s	<p>This will further Seattles progress towards a police state.</p> <p>There appears to be no mechanism to ensure the veracity of information in the iBade system when the source of the information is updated. For example, assume an individual is prosecuted and found by a court of law to have not committed the alleged crimes. I didn't see any mechanism in place to ensure the duplicated data is maintained to accurately reflect the current investigation status. This can lead to improper inferences and actions by officers acting on old incorrect data.</p> <p>Rather than duplicate the data, a better approach would be to provide a portal to the underlying systems. Indeed, doing this would be "real-time", as opposed to the delayed manual mechanism to copy the data into yet another disparate system. This is data science 101, and SPD should do better than to propose amateurish high labor solutions.</p>
15	anonymou 1 s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works,</p>

and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced

15 2	anonymou s	It violates my civil rights. It's dystopian. It doesn't keep people safe. It's reactive. It puts money into the pockets of surveillance tech companies instead of the people struggling to live in this city.
15 3	anonymou s	There is a strong potential to violate civil rights with this technology. Seattle is so proud of being a sanctuary city - please do not undercut it with this unproven technology that turns Seattle into a surveillance city.
15 4	anonymou s	It amounts to illegal and unethical surveillance of marginalized people that need direct help, not technology designed to put them in prison and ruin their lives.
15 5	anonymou s	Other cities who have tried it have said it was not cost effective
15 6	anonymou s	It puts abusable systems in place on the dime of those who are liable to be victimized by it. Furthermore, it is not a myopi, ineffective solution to the problems it is proposed to solve and may serve to disincentivize proper action to those problems.
15 7	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.
15 8	anonymou s	Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights As with increased CCTV presence generally, I believe surveillance will be unequally applied and used mainly to curtail the civil liberties of those who are already the most vulnerable in the community

		rather than those causing the greatest harm. It's nothing more than another form of the same philosophy that increased policing will solve problems, which has already failed countless times.
15	anonymou 9 s	Increasing the police-surveillance network in Seattle contributes to the erosion of civil liberties and freedom of speech by continuing to implement a surveillance-state like state of residence in Seattle. The specific implementation of the RTCC in question allows for the deputization of private businesses and individuals to contribute to the surveillance network by linking cameras and cuts out community members from input and oversight into this process. Additionally, utilizing a RTCC software like Fusus that continuously adds new technologies like AI recognition may run afoul of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance requiring SIRs for new surveillance technology if such additions (and usages of such additions) are not adequately and publicly disclosed to the public.
16	anonymou 0 s	I am deeply concerned that this technology will infringe on people's privacy, not actually help prevent crimes, and be misused by the Seattle Police Department which has shown itself to abuse the law and not be meaningfully held accountable.
16	anonymou 1 s	As https://www.wired.com/story/real-time-crime-centers-rtcc-us-police/ describes, "Most evidence for RTCC effectiveness, however, is anecdotal, and there is a real lack of studies into how effective they really are. In Detroit, a National Institute of Justice study concluded that Project Green Light—a part of the Detroit Police Department RTCC that established cameras at more than 550 locations, including schools, churches, private businesses, and health centers—helped decrease property violence in some areas but did nothing to prevent violent and other crimes. "
16	anonymou 2 s	I do not think that the city should implement an expensive, enormous surveillance system that does not keep people safer.
16	anonymou 3 s	This is a waste of taxpayer money and a violation of privacy. This money would be more effective at preventing crime if it were spent funding schools, parks, or lawyers working to dismantle the SPOG. Please find effective ways to hold the SPD accountable and professional instead of suppressing protests and free speech.
16	anonymou 4 s	Based on other cities' use of this technology, it will not achieve its stated goals, will be a giant waste of money, and will erode the privacy we currently enjoy through mass surveillance.
16	anonymou 5 s	This technology poses a particular danger to criminalizing vulnerable populations such as undocumented people, sex workers, trans people, and people seeking abortions. Once the data is collected by these systems, it is difficult to ensure it won't be used in harmful ways or shared with other law enforcement agencies, including ICE. Even though Seattle has an ordinance that requires all requests from ICE be referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel, this isn't sufficient to protect against data exchange. Officers may share data in spite of the policies in place, or the data might pass through several other agencies, including those out-of-state, before ultimately reaching ICE. A data privacy problem already exists in Seattle due to the recent "dramatic expansion of vehicle surveillance" last fall, when council members approved the purchase of many more license plate readers. Preventing this data from being shared once collected is very difficult, if not impossible. RTCC software has the potential to exponentially worsen this problem due to the large amounts of data it collates.
16	anonymou 6 s	It is ineffective, proven is several US cities who are cancelling contracts.
16	anonymou 7 s	I am very concerned about the ability of the company who offers RTCC technology to bypass laws and restrictions that normally protect civil rights and liberties, including an ability to view camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns and undermines democratic values. I am concerned about RTCC cameras gathering enough information to create profiles full of sensitive content about people, such as the place they work, the place they live, and their religious affiliation. I am worried about RTCC's lack of transparency; since the cameras are privately owned, there is no over-arching system of accountability for either private consumers who expand the camera network or the officers who watch the cameras. I am also concerned about the integration of third-party applications with RTCC's AI capabilities. Finally, I am concerned that this technology will be expensive and ineffective at actually reducing crime—two of the information sources that RTCC would integrate (CCTV and ALPR technologies) have already been proven to have no effect on crime reduction while requiring a massive amount of police resources.
16	anonymou 7 s	It's been proven to do more harm than good in cities similar to Seattle

		Jeremy Bentham wrote about a dystopian prison called the Panopticon in 1791, imagining a hellish prison in which all prisoners knew that they were potentially being constantly observed by a single, centralized enforcer in a central watchtower. He used this thought experiment as an example of how we build systems of control to discipline, control, and punish human behavior, and to enforce unnatural norms without the willing consent of the governed.
168	anonymou s	The RTCC is a 21st century realization of the panopticon. You've taken the cautionary tale and made it real.
169	anonymou s	1) Fiscal responsibility - this program costs a lot and will cost more. We can better use taxpayer dollars. 2) Racial disparity - due to existing racial disparity, and the use of RTCC to lead investigators to things like "known associates" of the subject, investigators will end up intensely targeting those who have had previous contact with the system, and these people will be disproportionately black and brown. Storing and using "All previous law enforcement contacts" and "family relationships or known hangouts" (https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/Tech/Real-Time-Crime-Center-Project-PIA-FINAL.pdf), given the degree of racial disparity in things like traffic stops, is inherently racist -- were I, an old white lady to be investigated, it would come up with zero. I know for a fact that same could not be said for my equally law-abiding black neighbor.
170	anonymou s	This is a Orwellian Big Brother waste of money. If you need the level of "safety" that a police state offers please move to China(!) The crime rate there is super low and seems consistent with your centralized government vision. We don't want it in the USA.
171	anonymou s	This technology is a completely untested privacy violation. RTCC like Fusus incorporate privately owned cameras into its surveillance system. Not only does this inhibit transparency of police activities, it is a massive violation of civil liberties that bypasses warrants or consent of camera owners. In addition, it's an untested technology so it's effectiveness can't be assured. Based on case studies of similar technologies, such as CCTV surveillance and AGLS, which do not reduce crime, it's doubtful RTCC will either. The city has not done any research on the ramifications of implementing this technology, which has been condemned by experts as a dystopian violation of privacy and civil liberties. Instead of wasting funds on this, the city should invest in community led efforts to reduce violent crime, such as violence interruption programs.
172	anonymou s	studies have shown this doesn't actually reduce crime, what it does do is put BIPOC communities at further risk of police violence and violate everyone's privacy/civil liberties, instead of wasting funds on that try investing in community-led efforts like violence interruption programs
173	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values. * RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. * The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. * RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data. * RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
174	anonymou s	We do not want this invasive technology informing law enforcement activities. Every citizen has a right to privacy no matter where they are. The use of technologies like this overturns our civil liberties and turns the city into an over-policed zone that is actively hostile to people existing in public space.
175	anonymou s	The evidence shows that RTCC does little to decrease crime, but could seriously hurt individual's data privacy, in addition to being used against vulnerable communities.

176	anonymou s	This technology is incredibly invasive to our communities, and will only increase policing in neighborhoods where police have historically and systemically harmed civilians. This technology has been shown to be ineffective in actually preventing violence
177	anonymou s	It's ineffective, expensive, and won't help police respond appropriately because SPD is already so unprofessional, ineffective and violent.
178	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk by violating their privacy. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
179	anonymou s	Need the other technologies (CCTV and AGLS) to make this effective
180	anonymou s	RTCC relies on aggregating technologies (ShotSpotter, ALPR, CCTV) that do not have a strong evidence base for reducing violent crime but DO demonstrate the ability to victimize marginalized communities that already experience increased police surveillance. This is not only a waste of funds, it is damaging to the very constituents this city says it is trying to protect.
181	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."
182	anonymou s	In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
183	anonymou s	RTCC inherently violates the surveillance ordinance by constantly adding new algorithms without them going through the SIR process.

		<p>RTCC's incorporation of private cameras removes people's control over where the city places cameras. This opens the door to bad faith individuals putting cameras in sensitive locations (ex. outside of abortion clinics, gay beaches, or other healthcare facilities)</p> <p>RTCC is designed for different law enforcement entities to share information as easily as possible. This would destroy Seattle's ability to act as a sanctuary city for women seeking abortion, transgender people seeking healthcare, immigrants, and the entire LGBTQIA+ community</p>
184	anonymou s	I am concerned about how this data collection is increasing surveillance of all members of our community and will be gathering sensitive information about citizens transportation patterns which can be a breach of private and lead to lots of sensitive information about personal life just from seeing where someone is traveling to.
185	anonymou s	The police are a harmful institution that we should not be giving more tools to.
186	anonymou s	It completely removes the ability for local communities to invest in their own safety and control their lives. I'm deeply worried by the notion of giving a private company control over the information that our police department receives.
187	anonymou s	RTCC technology would absolutely violate the reasonable privacy of Seattle's citizens, as well as the ethical duties of a Sanctuary City.
188	anonymou s	This technology does not prevent or help solve crime, according to studies across multiple countries. Instead, it would unjustly target communities of color and give Police more power than they already have. Money going into this technology should be going into communities and areas that actually prevent crime like mental health and housing.
189	anonymou s	no
190	anonymou s	
191	anonymou s	Feel safer
192	anonymou s	RTCC has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and does not take communities into account. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Meta analyses have shown that RTCC technologies like CCTV and ShotSpotter DO NOT WORK.
193	anonymou s	It has been shown to be ineffective and better tools are available
194	anonymou s	SPD having access to private cameras could be used to obtain information or conduct searches without a warrant, which has civil rights implications. Additionally, surveillance technology like this could be shared with ICE and put undocumented people in danger. This is invasive, expensive, and creepy. I don't want my tax money to pay for cops to have more power to spy on people.
195	anonymou s	None
196	anonymou s	<p>This proposed system poses a serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p>
197	anonymou s	I do not consent to the government surveilling me in public or private spaces. I do not consent to having my face and body recorded and potentially stored in government databases. I do not consent to the ways in which this information could be used to harm or target me and my communities in the future. This will not protect us, this will be used to let police and government track us and prohibit our rights of free speech, public assembly, and simply existing as a human in public. We must invest in community building practices, not the creation of a surveillance state.
198	anonymou s	This is a violation of my privacy and my civil liberties. I absolutely do not support this technology, and definitely not in my city. In a time when incredible controversies about AI, private cameras, and civil liberties abound, this is not something I want my city government to waste money on.
199	anonymou s	violation of civil rights

200	anonymou s	big big concerns. i do not like it. it feels like we are becoming a police state rather than supporting our community with what it actually needs (housing, food, education); and we KNOW by investing in these other things that crime will ultimately go down because people's needs are being MET.
201	anonymou s	None
202	anonymou s	This technology is going to result in over policing of marginalize communities and will do nothing to address the root causes of crime - which are food insecurity, unstable housing/shelter, and lack of healthcare. We should be putting our taxpaying dollars towards addressing inequities in resources for our communities, not technology that has been demonstrated to be ineffective and dangerous for our communities.
203	anonymou s	Violation of civil rights, police misconduct, waste of city resources on bogus technology.
204	anonymou s	
205	anonymou s	<p>This is perhaps the creepiest of the 3 bad technologies that the City is trying to rush through right now.</p> <p>First, RTCC software has only been shown to increase case clearance rates by 5% for violent crimes. So again, it doesn't work for the purpose the City is saying they want the technology for.</p> <p>What it does do, though, is vastly increase the surveillance in Seattle by collecting huge amounts of data from a variety of surveillance sources, including privately owned cameras. This exposes sensitive personal information and has huge privacy implications that the City apparently doesn't even want to pretend to discuss or grapple with.</p> <p>This technology poses a threat of criminalizing vulnerable populations in our city, including people seeking abortions, undocumented people (and we're supposed to be a Sanctuary City!), sex workers, trans and LGBTQ folks, unhoused folks, low or no income folks, etc. None of which, it seems, have been engaged with in any meaningful way to discuss the ramifications of this technology on their basic lives and freedoms, even though the required RET should have obviously led to such engagement. The RET process for this technology has been a total joke and an embarrassment to the City. And this when we might be looking at the national criminalization of abortion and crackdown on undocumented folks in the near future. Adopting this technology at this stage in time would be deeply irresponsible.</p> <p>The way this software works makes it very difficult, if not impossible, not to share the data. Law enforcement agencies pass data onto other law enforcement agencies, and people's private lives become anything but private. Not only would this potentially criminalize and harm vulnerable populations, but it would also chill people exercising their rights to free speech and protest. The right to protest is already under attack from the Republican party at this time, and this software could make the problem worse. We also have to assume racial bias is baked into the algorithms being used by the software, which will lead to disparate impacts.</p> <p>Further, we don't even know what RTCC the City is going to buy, but if they buy Fusus, it is constantly changing its algorithms, meaning the continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools, which is probably against the law due to the Surveillance Ordinance.</p>
206	anonymou s	A RTCC would drastically expand the surveillance network in Seattle, undermining democracy and our sanctuary status, despite being proven functionally useless as a form of crime reduction/solving.
207	anonymou s	the fact that it creates a surveillance umbrella across seattle accessible only to law enforcement who have been shown to abuse this type of technology in the past, instead of using it to do their actual job, like stalking former partners. Surviellance of communities is less about safety and more about an attempt to control behavior. The only reason this technology is being considered is because the police have acted with such disrespect to the citizens of seattle over the last 5 years that people dont trust them. And instead creating a public safety network citizens trust, we are trying to surveil communities to solve crimes instead. the core of this problem is the behavior of the police themselves. If they get their act together people will give them the information they need, trying to use RTCC to surveil us wont solve that problem or solve crime.
208	anonymou s	No concerns.

20	anonymou 9 s	None
21	anonymou 0 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.
		<p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p>
21	anonymou 1 s	
21	anonymou 2 s	It's a balancing act with how much crime filth and homelessness.
		<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values.</p> <p>RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>CCTV, RTCC, Shotspotter, and other surveillance technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p>
21	anonymou 3 s	
21	anonymou 4 s	By utilizing privately owned cameras, RTCC technology is inherently opaque, as it bypasses laws and restrictions that typically limit police, like viewing camera footage without consent from the owner. This also makes it far more challenging to have effective oversight about how these tools are used or

		misused. Added surveillance also does not aid law enforcement in solving crimes. Investing in RTCC is not only expensive, but ineffective and threatens vulnerable populations.
21 5	anonymou s	please do not implement or pay for this technology, it's nigh useless, it infringes on privacy, and it contributes to biased policing
21 6	anonymou s	It is a waste of time and resources that doesn't address the actual problem of police response times, which has been shown to be deliberate dereliction of duty (eg: waiting 20 minutes before even leaving the union HQ to respond to a priority one shooting call). Seattle officers have been refusing calls to collectively punish the public for defunding and calls for third party oversight. The failure doesn't lie with lack of equipment.
21 7	anonymou s	No concern if this is used as explained.
21 8	anonymou s	Seattle has an existing RTCC program. I am concerned about whether updates and expansions to our system are actually necessary. I would like to see concrete data related to the current RTCC system, including its effects on law enforcement response since its implementation in 2017. I am also concerned about SPD working with private entities to accomplish RTCC upgrades. I want to know what is being done to protect the cybersecurity of RTCC currently. I am also highly concerned about integrating useless and potentially harmful add-ons to RTCC including the proposed AGLS technology. AGLS is likely to overwhelm the RTCC with false positives, which I worry will reduce its effectiveness for law enforcement.
21 9	anonymou s	stop trying to surveil black and brown neighborhoods. maybe if you guys tried community based solutions, housing people, and not criminalizing them we could get somewhere toward safer communities.
22 0	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.

		<p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>RTCC software is expensive. RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p>
221	anonymou s	There is limited evidence that this works to reduce crime, especially violent crime, while increasing overpolicing and over surveillance of marginalized communities.
222	anonymou s	I do not support a Real Time Crime Center, or the expansion of said center. I believe that this RTCC idea provides too many opportunities for abuse, of the rights and privacy of individuals. I believe that allowing access to more cameras, data and personal information inevitably becomes a genie which we can't put back in the bottle. It allows for too much gray area and violations of rights/privacy.
223	anonymou s	None.
224	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
225	anonymou s	How soon can this pilot program begin. Seattle needs to explore all possible options to reduce violent crime.
226	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p>
227	anonymou s	I'm very concerned about the city investing in technology that is ineffective instead of in supporting people who need help

228	anonymou s	This is a civil liberty nightmare, turning privately owned cameras into tools of surveillance. In a sanctuary city, how will this put undocumented people at risk? When protest is a first-amendment right, how will this be used to target protestors? Only 0.2-1% of the license plates captured by RTCC are on a "hot list", which exemplifies that you're proposing spending millions and millions of dollars to violate the civil liberties of everyone in order to target a few people.
229	anonymou s	Not being given details, I wonder what all it involves. Might it end up concentrating on what is happening on the street and focus on people of color without good reason? Might it include inappropriate surveillance tools?
230	anonymou s	So many. This is some scary stuff. RTCC software recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. Given SPD's track record, I don't think we should enable them to further their harm and abuse in our communities.
231	anonymou s	The disproportionate policing and harm caused to communities of color.
232	anonymou s	I am concerned that this technology violates civil liberties by allowing police access to data and images without a warrant. It shuts people out from having a say about how technology is used in policing. I am concerned by the lack of oversight in the use of this technology. This technology can collect a vast amount of personal, private information about people who are not suspected of any crimes, such as where they work, where they pray, who their friends are, what medical care they access, and more. This is alarming and distressing.
233	anonymou s	I am concerned this will lead to more police presence in my neighborhood of Rainier Beach. More police presence does not lead to increased safety. The effectiveness of this technology does not seem legit.
234	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
235	anonymou s	None whatsoever.
236	anonymou s	I am against the city acquiring this technology
237	anonymou s	I'm concerned: 1. that this technology will be used primarily and unfairly, even if unintended, against people of color. 2. more surveillance doesn't necessarily equal safety and creates new problems like infringement on civil rights. 3. this technology isn't scientifically proven to reduce the crime that this program seeks to reduce 4. surveillance changes society, and I don't want to live in a surveillance state 5. I don't want my tax dollars spent on surveillance, I want them spent on gun violence prevention programs that have statistically meaningful success rates.
238	anonymou s	I don't have any concerns.
239	anonymou s	My first concern is that this technology could be used for mass surveillance purposes. My second concern is that the system could be compromised and the collected data accessed by hackers.
240	anonymou s	I am VERY concerned about hwo RTCC has the very real potential to violate civil rights and liberties. We already have documented evidence from other cities about how RTCC allows the private companies and police to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. One of the biggest concerns is how this will compromise Seattle as a sanctuary city and put those who are undocumented or those seeking abortion care here at high risk of idenification and surveillance. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies, which is terrifying for any of us who care about privacy, autonomy and civil rights.
241	anonymou s	This technology destroys Seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city for immigrants, women, and the LGBTQIA+ community because once this data is collected by a 3rd party that uses cloud storage there's

		<p>no keeping it from being access by other entities. This technology's main purpose is to make data sharing as easy & frictionless as possible</p> <p>This technology violates the surveillance ordinance by rolling out new features. These new features are incompatible with the surveillance ordinance since each one would need to go through a SIR.</p> <p>Removes public control from police surveillance by allowing private individuals to setup cameras & then give the police a live video feed.</p>
24	anonymou 2 s	<p>Again, I see enormous potential for the abuse of this technology. There is simply nothing that would prevent officers from using this technology for their own personal aims, and not for the good of the city. Furthermore, it will result in resources being devoted to the wrong areas. Any attempt at fixing the problem of crime that just criminalizes more people will fail to get the results that are promised.</p>
24	anonymou 3 s	<p>Waste of resources. Just criminalizing poor people. Give money to put people in homes.</p>
24	anonymou 4 s	<p>This technology can and has been used in neighborhoods around the country with majority populations of people of color and used to enforce laws in an inequitable fashion, penalizing them unfairly, and in turn making these communities feel targeted and less safe. The technology is not reliable enough to guarantee evidence of criminal wrongdoing and indeed has been used to incorrectly convict people innocent of the crimes they have been accused of.</p>
24	anonymou 5 s	
24	anonymou 6 s	<p>Real time crime center software such as Fusus undermines civil liberties and residents right to privacy. It skirts around due process for police receiving camera footage and allows them access to people's private footage. There is little to no oversight how police use this footage so police can easily abuse their power. Surveillance tools like this constantly add unvetted AI updates that we know are ripe with bias and harm us all. Studies of CCTV have shown already that surveillance does not stop crime or help law enforcement in solving crime. Rather they put our most vulnerable community members such as our undocumented residents and people from other states seeking abortion in our sanctuary city at risk. Not only this but RTCC software is expensive. Please use this money to invest in actual evidenced based community solutions such as scaling up the violence interruption program in Rainier Beach. A scaled up program like the safe passages program would go a long way for helping our communities actually becomes safer from gun violence. We could be a leader in the northwest showing other cities and organizations how to effectively increase safety and reduce harm to communities.</p>
24	anonymou 7 s	<p>Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) technology has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties. It blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. Surveillance technology also has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights.</p> <p>In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>Furthermore, these technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people at risk to use and abuse of data by ICE.</p> <p>The city council needs to invest in community supports, NOT surveillance</p>
24	anonymou 8 s	<p>I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.</p>
24	anonymou 9 s	<p>This technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be</p>

		used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state.
250	anonymou s	Make sure your clear on your priorities, are we really wanting to become a surveillance state like China? Does this technology serve the greater good?
251	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
252	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
253	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
254	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
255	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
256	anonymou s	privacy and civil rights be damned. "They won't notice if we chip away at them a little at a time.
257	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
258	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
25	anonymou 9 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
26	anonymou 0 s	
26	anonymou 1 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
26	anonymou 2 s	This technology could be implemented to violate privacy and civil liberties and heighten the government's ability to surveil all of its residents --- not just dangerous criminals. The tradeoff is not one I support. It could be abused to collect personal information about people that is wholly unrelated to criminal activity. I don't not want to live in a surveillance state or feel like Big Brother is constantly watching me.
26	anonymou 3 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
26	anonymou 4 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
26	anonymou 5 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
26	anonymou 6 s	I strongly oppose Software and data acquisition. I believe there is a very strong potential to violate privacy civil liberties, and to undermine our democratic processes. I don't want to live like the Chinese in fear, and without a sense of personal freedom or autonomy. We the public have no control over where this broad Based data acquisition goes who will view it how long it will be stored or to what end it might be utilized. Recent history has shown us that as administrations change so to do the rules affecting protocol the best safeguard to this data is to not collect collected in the first place. I am unconvinced that it increases public safety. I do not believe this is a judicious use of public monies.

267	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
268	anonymou s	Loss of privacy and broad distribution of private data.
269	anonymou s	What? the current centers are "real" - sounds like a sales pitch.
270	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
271	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
272	anonymou s	Surveillance is not the answer to crime. I strongly oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
273	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
274	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned about the use of RTCC in our Seattle neighborhoods. This expansion of Seattle's surveillance infrastructure is a violation of privacy and civil liberties for city residents and visitors. The extensive data collection by this technology would put vulnerable and marginalized communities at risk.
275	anonymou s	I strongly oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
276	anonymou s	Over policing, surveillance

277	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
278	anonymou s	Use of this software has the potential to capture way too much information about people who are going about their business. BIPOC communities, people seeking abortions, all sort of people can be swept up in data collecting, and we know how difficult it is to keep data secure.
279	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
280	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values.
281	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
282	anonymou s	I adamantly oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. This technology will violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. This is dystopian police state technology and should not even be considered! Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
283	anonymou s	That it may be data analytics run amok, without rigorous controls and enforced controls on how it is used. Experience teaches that technology of this type can and will be overused, misused, abused. Once we give away expectations and rights of privacy and freedom, we can't get them back.
284	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
285	anonymou s	
286	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
287	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
288	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
289	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
290	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>-RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>-RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>-RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>-RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>-Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>-In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>-RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p>

		<p>-Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>-This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>-ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>-In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p> <p>-In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.</p> <p>-Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p>
29 1	anonymou s	Only using it with mass surveillance technologies.
29 2	anonymou s	Please reject all attempts to deploy real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Although profitable to the private companies that are promoting real-time crime center (RTCC) software it does not improve the quality of life for Seattle citizens.. Please do not purchase or deploy real-time crime center (RTCC) software technology.
29 3	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29 4	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29 5	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29 6	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29 7	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people,

		including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29	anonymou 8 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29	anonymou 9 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
30	anonymou 0 s	I do not want my tax dollars to go towards this type of surveillance. We know it does not make people safer, rather it makes communities of color feel less safe. I want my tax dollars not to go towards a corporation, but towards members of my community working to make our city a better, more just place.
30	anonymou 1 s	This is unmeasured and unnecessary surveillance that will impact all Seattle residents negatively. It will subject innocent citizens, especially in the neighbourhoods already most at risk for overpolicing, to additional interactions with law enforcement and have their private days be subject to review and recording by the city and its private contractors.
30	anonymou 2 s	I don't have trust that the use of RTCC will be well stewarded. There is a lack of transparency in how the data will be used. I have concerns that this can be abused
30	anonymou 3 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
30	anonymou 4 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, violates civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
30	anonymou 5 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. I am deeply concerned that this technology would be used intentionally or inadvertently to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. This extensive data collection

		<p>and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state.</p> <p>This is a complete violation of privacy. The fact that people can't go very many places anymore without a camera somewhere is changing human behavior. Everyone feels (and knows) they are being watched. The creates "self-censoring" which curtails creative individualism. This destroys culture and any sense of freedom. It is draconian.</p>
306	anonymou s	<p>I have significant concerns about privacy and oversight of this technology. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time). These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Additionally, I am concerned about the nature of tech requiring new updates on a regular basis, and how our city's budget will be impacted more and more over time.</p>
307	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
308	anonymou s	<p>I am concerned that this technology will not be effective in its stated goal and will be a violation to the civil rights and liberties of our people. RTCC software have a tendency to use privately owned cameras which bypass laws and restrictions and enables them to view footage from a camera without consent from the owner. Cameras can also be turned into automated license plate readers which is a serious violation of the personal security of our people, who have no say in how and where RTCC technology should be used. Studies consistently show that surveillance technology has no positive effect on crime, while discrimination from these technologies becoming more prevalent as a result; such as RTCC limiting documentation of ICE's crimes of repeatedly violating local sanctuary laws.</p>
309	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
310	anonymou s	<p>I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.</p>
311	anonymou s	<p>incarceration of unhoused and BIPOC individuals</p>
312	anonymou s	
313	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed</p>

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31 4	anonymou s	I have a strong opposition to using this technology in Seattle or anywhere. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31 5	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values.
31 6	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31 7	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31 8	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned about this technology, and I oppose its use in Seattle. I oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31 9	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle.
32 0	anonymou s	Please invest in public health.
32 1	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
32 2	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
323	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
324	anonymou s	Increased surveillance of citizens. Excessive data collection about citizens such as where they live, work and their activities. Over-policing of communities at risk.
325	anonymou s	this is not China or Russia! tracking citizens does nothing for general safety.
326	anonymou s	This is a waste of money and not even proven to be effective. This increases surveillance of people in our city for no benefit.
327	anonymou s	I do not want the City of Seattle to deploy or invest in this surveillance technology. This technology could be used to continue structures of over-policing and over-criminalizing marginalized communities in our area which is against the core of Seattle. I would not feel comfortable with this surveillance technology that is not proven to help keep people safe, and would cause Seattle to become a surveillance state where peoples personal information and privacy is at risk.
328	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermine democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and can be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state. I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
329	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
330	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
331	anonymou s	It poses too great a risk in violation of the privacy of people who have not committed crimes.
332	anonymou s	It is focusing our attention and money on the wrong thing. Research shows that crime is a result of poverty, and the best way to fight crime is to invest in social services to reduce poverty. I want my tax money spent helping people, not spying on them.
333	anonymou s	I can't see that this technology has any real benefit other than to the corporate entities that peddle it. It is an invasion of privacy to the general public and has the potential to harm innocent individuals.
334	anonymou s	I think this is a waste of funds please consider spending funds on something more worthwhile, like building our homeless support network. What are you actually trying to accomplish with this. It is not going to be used in the way you are advertizing. I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil

		<p>liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
335	anonymou s	<p>As a Capitol Hill resident and someone born and raised in this beautiful city I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
336	anonymou s	<p>RTCC is surveillance overreach and undermines civilians' right to have a say in whether we are constantly surveilled by a network of cameras. This also puts Seattleites at risk in our sanctuary city, targeting undocumented people and those seeking abortion or transgender medical care. It has been used to surveil protesters in violation of their first amendment rights. It is also known that the technologies it draws from are not effective at reducing crime. This is also an expensive subscription product which should not be considered at a time when we are facing a budget shortfall, especially given the ineffectiveness of the technologies it supports.</p>
337	anonymou s	<p>We don't need a new center of surveillance, because we don't need additional surveillance.</p>
338	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p>

		<p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>4. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot</p>
33	anonymou 9 s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. RTCC software is expensive. There are many more effective tools that can be used instead. This is a waste of money and resources.</p>
34	anonymou 0 s	<p>Civil rights violations, misuse by a police force that has demonstrated its irresponsibility, expense for the city that is ongoing and takes money out of our city, and ineffectiveness at preventing or solving crime. Very concerned about potential unintended consequences of AI. This is a pandora's box.</p>
34	anonymou 1 s	<p>I'm concerned about the overreach of compiling information from multiple cameras, recording and license plate readers. I think that it's an overreach of the state to take camera footage without a warrant or consent from the owner. I'm concerned about the lack of oversight for footage and how it's used. I'm also concerned about the use of AI and how racist AI has been proven to be so far.</p>
34	anonymou 2 s	<p>A real-time crime center is the most dystopian idea on the table to improve public safety. I am not willing to sacrifice my right to privacy in a free nation for technology that is unlikely to prevent crime.</p>
34	anonymou 3 s	<p>Watching something take place on a screen or with map and random data fed into the images does not make residents or visitors safer. It adds to the layers of cognition that police officers are not required to have to get their jobs (e.g. no college degrees, no advanced subject-matter expertise or training) -- increasing the likelihood of bad decisions and erroneous outcomes. Unless the hiring processes are going to be changed so that officers will need ongoing certification in data analysis, statistics, anti-bias training, and frequent vision testing for visual acuity, this technology is just another computer game-style toy.</p>
34	anonymou 4 s	<p>RTCC poses a threat to our core civil liberties as private citizens. Instituting this technology would constitute a gross overreach, allowing law enforcement access to a vast network of surveillance technology. These technologies also make use of untested, unvetted artificial intelligence algorithms that may disproportionately target and misidentify non-white people.</p>
34	anonymou 5 s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
34	anonymou 6 s	<p>It's an invitation for civil rights abuses. It turns our city into a panopticon. It provides an insidious way around the 4th amendment by making use of private surveillance cameras. It's based on unproven technology. It's expensive. It further normalizes surveillance. When it doesn't work, police will ask for more unproven technology at more taxpayer expense. We should focus on crime prevention not</p>

		<p>detection and enforcement. We should do this by providing social services that alleviate the proven causes of crime. It puts police in an office, disconnected from their communities.</p>
347	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
348	anonymou s	<p>I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.</p>
349	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology</p>
350	anonymou s	<p>Need to see report at year mark about value of technology</p>
351	anonymou s	<p>Privacy-targets certain communities, hence a lot of bias</p>
352	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
353	anonymou s	<p>These technologies waste police resources and public funds on unproven promises of crime reduction, all while increasing the chances of police violating people's civil liberties, particularly those all ready marginalized in our communities.</p>
354	anonymou s	<p>This technology really scares me. From my understanding, RTCC softwares such as Fusus gain access to private camera footage, and it can be obtained without permission or consent from the owner. And</p>

		<p>this includes from footage such as Amazon Ring. I really do not understand how this is even constitutionally legal honestly, how is not a blatant violation of privacy? This is also a relatively new technology so not much guidance exists over police oversight/ accountability, so it really creates some disturbing conditions for police abuse. This type of software also uses AI, so it is constantly new image recognition algorithms and integrations. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>This technology is very freaky! AI is so unregulated anyway, and I think it is a horrific idea to introduce new, unfettered technologies into the realm of police surveillance. This is just a recipe for disaster, and I do not see how it will make communities feel safer. ESPECIALLY without clear, transparent measures to hold police officers accountable in place.</p>
355	anonymous	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
356	anonymous	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
357	anonymous	<p>The RTCC is an invasive surveillance measure being posited as a crime reduction solution. Allocate financial assets to support affordable housing, living wages, and mental health care instead of this dystopian technology meant to impulsive punitive responses instead of addressing the root issues of crime in Seattle - that it is prohibitively expensive to live here.</p>
358	anonymous	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
359	anonymous	<p>It is a dangerous and unacceptable violation of our civil liberties to use footage from privately owned cameras without requiring a warrant, consent, or other restrictions that normally limit police. Also, this technology is expensive and I do not believe it will be worth the cost. Surveillance technology like this is not a real solution: the cost to effectiveness ratio, and the undermining of public trust, makes it not worth investing in. Fund real community-based solutions.</p>
360	anonymous	<p>Hello, I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
361	anonymous	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed</p>

BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

		Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
363	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
364	anonymou s	Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.
365	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology
366	anonymou s	The data we already have fails to protect citizens.
367	anonymou s	It's proven to be ineffective and racist.
368	anonymou s	This technology is only going to put marginalized and vulnerable groups at risk. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. ICE also has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
369	anonymou s	I write to express MY STRONG OPPOSITION TO DEPLOYING REAL-TIME CRIME CENTER (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that THIS TECHNOLOGY HAS THE POTENTIAL TO VIOLATE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIC VALUES.
370	anonymou s	Poor use of public funds
371	anonymou s	How do we even have a Community Surveillance Working Group?? If I wanted to be surveilled by police I'd move to an authoritarian police state (oh wait...)
372	anonymou s	I do not want police to have access to mass surveillance tools. I do not want them to be able to access personal security footage, such as doorbell cameras, without consent or without obtaining a warrant. I do not want my money being wasted on this technology. I do not see any evidence that this technology will create more safety for us, and in fact I am seeing evidence that it will NOT have any meaningful impact, other than violating our civil rights.
373	anonymou s	I have big concerns about how these technologies will infringe on civil rights. I do not trust police to use footage for the benefit of citizens, and in fact I think it's much more likely that illegal surveillance will take place and be used to falsely indict people. I'm also concerned about oversight of the software and its use. I do not trust this in the hands of the police department, and I wouldn't want such widespread surveillance to be in the hands of any public or private agency. Furthermore, this software violates Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
373	anonymou s	Software like this threatens Seattle's status as a sanctuary city. The ability to track license plates puts undocumented people and those seeking abortion care at risk:

-https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/MNCO-FUSUS_2024_Informational_Report-ADA.pdf?ct=1705616491
-<https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/>
-<https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/virginia-supreme-court-sees-through-police-claim-license>

I see many potential concerns with this technology. RTCC software has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and obstruct communities from seeing what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. This would allow companies to bypass the laws and restrictions that usually require warrants or ongoing consent from owners. This creates the conditions that would promote police abuse since there is little oversight for how the police should use it and little documentation or auditable logs. Police enforcement has been known to use cameras to target protesters and have no regard for use of warrants to secure data.

This technology also has the potential to endanger undocumented people and those seeking abortion care. Seattle is a sanctuary city and is one of the reasons I love to live here but this technology can put peoples lives at risk through surveillance, anti abortion groups are known to use license plate tracking and RTCC allows for data to be shared across law enforcement agencies meaning other parties could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking safe reproductive care. ICE is also known to violate sanctuary city laws and RTCC software data could be used by ICE.

Also this is an expensive and ineffective system to reduce crime rates. A 40 year systematic review shows that CCTV surveillance has no reduction in violent crimes and has yet to show substantial supporting evidence to investigatory benefits. So with this there is no reason we should be spending money on this system that could cost Seattle 250 million dollars and instead invest that money into programs we know that work and can actually save the city money. Like community violence interruption programs.

37
4

anonymou
s

37
5

anonymou
s

violates freedom & privacy, enables autocracy, and fascism, wastes much needed funds.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

37
6

anonymou
s

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

37
7

anonymou
s

I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC

		communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
37	anonymou 8 s	This software will violate civil rights and liberties. Our city has enough abuse from police, there is no reason to add to their arsenal of tools.
37	anonymou 9 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.
38	anonymou 0 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
		<p>1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>2. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p>
38	anonymou 1 s	ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
38	anonymou 2 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software is expensive. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence.

38 3	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
38 4	anonymou s	My concerns are about civil rights broadly and specifically about using privately owned cameras to bypass police needing to get a warrant. Often times the RTCC software companies do not get permission from the camera owners either. I am already concerned about SPD's lack of accountability, exemplified with the consent decree. This technology would be opaque in how it is being used for the public. RTCC software adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third party apps, which would be in violation of Seattle's surveillance ordinance. In LA and NYC police have used Ring and CCTV footage to target Black Lives Matter protestors. Given that the city just paid BLM protestors, journalists etc. \$10 million dollars due to their violent targeting, I do not trust SPD to be judicious and avoid targeting journalists and racial justice protestors. Additionally, surveillance technology does not actually help solve crime. Lastly, RTCC is expensive and operates on a subscription model. Not only does Seattle face a deficit, corporations that operate by this model are likely to continue to increase the price in the future, leading Seattle with a large and increasing bill for an ineffective "solution".
38 5	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
38 6	anonymou s	The criminal punishment system is a racist system. Without addressing that root issue, these technologies will only further deepen the harm the criminal punishment system causes. These programs have little to no evidence that they actually 'work.' There is, in fact, evidence that they do not work. The City is already facing a budget deficit. I would rather see the limited amount of funds the city does have used to house homeless people and create safe injection sites for drug users. It's unclear to me why the Mayor and Council would instead choose to invest in a public 'safety' approach that has proven to fail and is racist, as stated above.
38 7	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
38 8	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
38 9	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

		<p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
3900	anonymou s	<p>Absolutely do not implement this technology. The amount of harm and violence programs like this have brought to other cities give a CLEAR example as to why spending our tax dollars to pay for a failed system would be an abomination to the city of Seattle.</p>
3901	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
3902	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>

39 3	anonymou s	<p>concerns about the ability of other states and federal agencies to circumvent Seattle's shield laws and access this surveillance footage to target people seeking abortion care, transgender individuals, and undocumented people.</p> <p>SPD acknowledged in its Surveillance Impact Report that real time crime centers have little evidence to support their effectiveness. They point to one study that shows such centers have an association with increased case clearance rates. Seattle's existing RTCC opened in 2015, but SPD's case clearance rates for both violent and property crime stayed relatively flat from 2014 to 2019, according to the FBI National Incident Based Reporting System.</p>
39 4	anonymou s	<p>This is exactly the AI we have been warned about. Under no circumstances should any party have access to my doorbell camera without my explicit permission. This undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus</p>
39 5	anonymou s	<p>It will be an expensive surveillance toy, given to a police force with a deep history of abuse, and will not improve safety.</p>
39 6	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
39 7	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
39 8	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
39 9	anonymou s	<p>SPD officers have used surveillance technology to sexually harass community members in the past, and several SPD officers have troubling histories with domestic violence. Additionally, officers are not fired or seriously punished when this happens. The potential for any surveillance technology to be misused is very high.</p>
40 0	anonymou s	<p>ALL surveillance is a BAD IDEA. We need a real police presence, not technology. Reinstate the powers of the police.</p>
40 1	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
40 2	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermine democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed</p>

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants, or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
40	anonymou 3 s	I want to express strong opposition to the implementation of this RTCC software. The potential damage to civil liberties is substantial. We don't need another technical solution, we need real support and care
40	anonymou 4 s	Horrible idea, do NOT waste your money on this useless and ineffective technology.
40	anonymou 5 s	It is unconstitutional and serves only to criminalize poverty. We should be spending money on housing, drug treatment, mental health care, and health care and THEN see what crimes we are left with.
40	anonymou 6 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
40	anonymou 7 s	Effectiveness and the amount of money it will require
40	anonymou 8 s	I strongly oppose deploying RTCC software in Seattle. This technology has the potential to violate civil liberties and democratic values. It could be used to capture extensive personal information about people and contribute to the historic over-policing of BIPOC communities. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
40	anonymou 9 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
41	anonymou 0 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
41	anonymou 1 s	The potential for abuse and possibility of revealing citizen's personal information should qualify this technology as unnecessary and against city's privacy and surveillance laws.
41	anonymou 2 s	I oppose using this software in Seattle. This technology will violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democracy at a time that we can't really afford to do those things. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. You can bet that this will be used to overpolice Black people, undocumented immigrants a and (in the event of a second Trump administration) people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
41	anonymou 3 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
41	anonymou 4 s	This is not the kind of over-policing that will reduce gun violence. The potential integration of AI technology will only worsen racialized violence by the police in our communities.

415	anonymou s	Excessive and intrusive surveillance that is not evidenced supported and will harm trust and human lives.
		I am deeply concerned that we are spending public dollar on technology known to be both ineffective and to increase racial bias in policing.
416	anonymou s	You are proposing adopting this technology at a time that many other municipalities are ceasing to use it.
417	anonymou s	No concerns
418	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
		Like shotspotter (GCLS) and CCTV installation, RTCC is costly, ineffective, an invasion of privacy, and puts the people who live in Seattle at greater risk, instead of making us actually safe. I say this last point, specifically, because these technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC allows for data to be shared across law enforcement agencies, and Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state, which is something i am staunchly against. In addition, ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
419	anonymou s	One of the reasons I love Seattle is that it stands as a beacon of hope in an increasingly maddening country that restricts people's rights. I think using RTCC is a step towards restricting people's rights, and jeopardizes our position as a sanctuary city.
420	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
421	anonymou s	This technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
422	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
423	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 4 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 5 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 6 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 7 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 8 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 9 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
43	anonymou 0 s	Waste of money.
43	anonymou 1 s	The fact that most of these technologies are privately owned and incorporate private cameras poses a great threat to privacy of Seattle citizens. This very likely would violate Seattle's surveillance ordinance.
43	anonymou 2 s	investing in surveillance does not equate taking care of Seattle. We need to be investing in social services, not the police, who have NOT been proving they are trustworthy.
43	anonymou 3 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil

		liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
43 4	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."
43 5	anonymou s	It does not work, please see Chicago and the fact that they are not renewing their contract for this technology because it is extremely expensive and doesn't work.
43 6	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
43 7	anonymou s	Improper, irresponsible, and inefficient use of public funds...that would demonstrably increase disparities. Y'all, really..? This will dig an even deeper hole. Another tool that is not only 89% inaccurate in identifying gunshots, has demonstrably generated false positives for gunshots, wasting in many cases unnecessarily escalating situations putting civilians, including children, at first of being shot by police. The sales department at Shotspotter is certainly convincing, but falling for it is foolish. There are other cost-effective solutions that do not set us back in equity. It is better not to fund this than to wait for communities to be over-policed with the bias of Shotspotter, wait for stories like what has happened in Chicago, and then try to get out of the contract after it costs the city thousands and may even cost the lives of innocent people, and then try to undo the harm. Make the right choice upstream.
43 8	anonymou s	Misuse by police
43 9	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
44 0	anonymou s	I want to express extreme concern about this issue. These systems are not in the public interest, and are unwanted by many constituents.
44 1	anonymou s	That the cameras and monitoring will be used to disproportionately target people of color and be misused by SPD in general. These effects have been seen in other cities with similar systems, such as Chicago
44 2	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
44 3	anonymou s	<p>Privacy, government and policing overreach, public safety, misidentifying Innocents</p> <p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>4. RTCC software is expensive</p> <p>RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.</p>
44 4	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot</p>
44 5	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people,</p>

		including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
446	anonymou s	We need a change in our public safety strategy that reduces root causes. This is not it.
447	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
448	anonymou s	This technology smells like a fascist's wet dream. Data collection at this level risks the privacy of journalists, undocumented immigrants, and those seeking abortions.
449	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
450	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
451	anonymou s	Nothing directly related to the technology- but the city should be using funds to ensure police are properly trained to handle situations before trying to start up new technologies.
452	anonymou s	That it will NOT be used for breaking windows/storefronts vandalism and graffiti - if those are NOT felony crimes. If cameras are to be used, they should also be used to catch, deter, and prefer crimes that are hurting the business environment. The CID is still boarded up because of constant storefront window breakage/break-ins. Also it is riddled with graffiti.
453	anonymou s	none
454	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
455	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
456	anonymou s	Does big brother need to watch our every move? Too many innocent people will be watched

457	anonymou s	I strongly oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Have we not all seen enough dystopian movies to understand the risk this technology poses to privacy and civil liberties?Using this technology would greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
458	anonymou s	It's a racist technology
459	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
460	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
461	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
462	anonymou s	I oppose the implementation and use of this technology as I am concerned it will lead to a violation of privacy and undermines our democratic values. This data collection will be excessively used to hurt those most vulnerable when we should be looking at community-oriented solutions instead.
463	anonymou s	Would this technology do anything other than putting previously marginalized communities under a bigger, tighter microscope? We're very good at subjugating racial/ethnic groups, is that really the best we can do?
464	anonymou s	This technology has been shown to be ineffective when used in Seattle and other cities. This is not a good use of city resources and taxpayer money.
465	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
466	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the

		<p>company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
467	anonymou s	This technology doesn't work.
468	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
469	anonymou s	My concern is that this will lead to racist surveillance and target already vulnerable populations
470	anonymou s	Automation of policing does not reduce discrimination and does not have a track record of being effective. I am concerned this will lead to more surveillance and over policing of the marginalized.
471	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
472	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
473	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
474	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>RTCC software is expensive through subscriptions and probable rate hikes.</p>

		<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence--violence interruption programs work.</p> <p>Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?</p>
47 5	anonymou s	Data security, data privacy, algorithmic bias, data retention policies, increasing bias in policing
47 6	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
47 7	anonymou s	<p>I am writing to express my strong opposition to the establishment of a Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) in our community. While I appreciate the intent behind such initiatives to enhance public safety, I believe that the potential drawbacks and ineffectiveness of RTCCs outweigh any perceived benefits.</p> <p>Firstly, the evidence supporting the effectiveness of RTCCs in reducing crime is limited and often inconclusive. Numerous studies have shown that the implementation of RTCCs does not necessarily lead to a significant decrease in crime rates. Instead, RTCCs may contribute to the over-policing of marginalized communities, exacerbating existing social inequalities and eroding trust between law enforcement and the community.</p> <p>Furthermore, the vast financial investment required to establish and maintain an RTCC could be better utilized in addressing the root causes of crime and supporting positive community initiatives. Instead of allocating funds towards surveillance infrastructure and technology, we should prioritize investments in social services, education, affordable housing, mental health resources, and youth programs. By addressing underlying socioeconomic factors, we can create safer and more resilient communities for all residents.</p> <p>Additionally, RTCCs raise significant concerns regarding privacy rights and civil liberties. The mass collection and analysis of data, including information from surveillance cameras, social media, and other sources, pose serious risks to individual privacy and personal freedoms. Moreover, the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding RTCC operations further compounds these concerns, leaving residents vulnerable to potential abuses of power and surveillance.</p> <p>In conclusion, I urge you to reconsider the establishment of an RTCC in our community and instead focus on implementing evidence-based strategies that prioritize community engagement, trust-building, and social equity. By investing in proactive measures that address the root causes of crime, we can create a safer and more inclusive society for all.</p>
47 8	anonymou s	<p>Thank you for considering my perspective on this important issue.</p> <p>This technology will only make our city less safe, not more. This massive surveillance network goes against Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p>
47 9	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
48 0	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance</p>

		would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
48 1	anonymou s	There is no accountability process for what the information recorded will be used for. The expense is exorbitant and could be used for programs that actually protect people. Other cities that have implemented more surveillance technology do not show that it resulted in a safer city. Increased police presence and surveillance disproportionately punishes and harms black, homeless, and other marginalized communities
48 2	anonymou s	
48 3	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
48 4	anonymou s	Cost and racial bias
48 5	anonymou s	Proven to have inaccuracies and will bring harm to our community.
48 6	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
48 7	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and</p>

people seeking abortion care at risk.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

48
8
anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

48
9
anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

49
0
anonymou
s

I am adamantly opposed to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values.
Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

49
1
anonymou
s

I do not want to have to be concerned about being monitored by the police through every single camera at all times. There is a reason that police have to get permission from a camera's owner or a warrant before accessing the footage - it's called civil liberties. The government in fact, should not have the ability to watch citizens everywhere they go. Both the LAPD and the NYPD were found to have used this technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protestors. I think it's very chilling that the Seattle Municipal Tower has "Black Lives Matter" displayed in large text and would consider purchasing the same technology that police departments nationwide have used to crackdown on the very protestors who brought that phrase to this City. I can also definitely imagine a future where Seattle is getting sued for using this technology in an inappropriate, unconstitutional way. Do you all want to pay for that? In a budget deficit?

I am also deeply concerned about the use of AI in this technology, especially when it comes to image and facial recognition. AI learns from currently available data, and much of the currently available data is biased. AI facial recognition has a particularly hard time recognizing Black people correctly which has led to many false IDs and higher law enforcement contact with the Black community which is a recipe for harm and racial profiling: <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/police-facial-recognition-technology-cant-tell-black-people-apart/>

49 2	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values.
49 3	anonymou s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irresponsible use of tax dollars • Invasive and a privacy violation • Easy for this tool to be abused and hacked
49 4	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
49 5	anonymou s	RTCC facilitates usage of technologies that have no significant affect on crime and disproportionately target minorities, including CCTV and AGLS. It makes usage of these technologies and general surveillance difficult to regulate and even easier to abuse.
49 6	anonymou s	Increased surveillance, unnecessary police force, and opportunities for police profiling. This is simply not needed
49 7	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
49 8	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
49 9	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
50 0	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
50 1	anonymou s	Why is technology deciding crime? What happened to police?
50 2	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people,

		including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
503	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
504	anonymou s	None. The technology will only improve over time, especially with advances in AI. It is important that the city of Seattle start using this technology now in combatting crime in the city.
505	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
		<p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. The vast majority of scans that occur on the license plate readers that coordinate with RTCC software are never associated with crime and are just about accumulating and storing personal information for LPR companies. Only 0.2%-1% of plates scanned by LPRs are recorded on a "hot list" related to crime. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. Because RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies, third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. And third-party anti-trans organizations could do the same to those seeking gender-affirming care in the state. ICE also has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>Fusus is interested in consolidating the surveillance market and different data streams. An example of this desire is Axon, the company which SPD uses for body cameras. Axon was recently acquired by Fusus this year in order to consolidate and increased the integrability of data across different surveillance technologies. This activity within the surveillance industry means that the City of Seattle and Seattle residents alike are totally in the dark about what other applications might be added to RTCC software in the future after it is installed. RTCCs like Fusus also want to integrate large numbers of municipal cameras in order to enable access to live camera feeds, obscuring policies around who is accessing what data. In other cities that have adopted Fusus, it is unclear how RTCC data is stored and used. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. Fusus has also demonstrated an interest in pushing the debunked and dangerous method of predictive policing. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p>
506	anonymou s	
507	anonymou s	This technology has the potential to violate civil rights and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used for their neighborhoods. What happened to "listen to the community"? This tech threatens undocumented people and those seeking abortion care. It will not actually help reduce, stop,

		or solve crime. It is expensive and the money could be better spent elsewhere, like violence interruption programs.
508	anonymou s	none
		<p>1) RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>2) These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>3) Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>4) RTCC is expensive, is not yet in the budget for 2024, and the city is facing a \$250 million shortfall. This should not be used on ineffective technology.</p>
509	anonymou s	See this document for evidence behind all of these statements: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14EhNiDMb7M8Z7TafyZsbxGOfdelDOGzRYxZNd3biwIE/edit
510	anonymou s	Please do not do this. Given the events of the past few years, we can no longer assume that we will be living in a democracy for the long term. We have a likely presidential candidate who has stated he wants to be a dictator and behaved in a way consistent with that desire, and a major political party and a substantial minority of the American people who support him. While the last coup attempt failed, the next one might not. We can safely assume that any authoritarian government, or aspiring authoritarian government, will use any surveillance available to further their ends. Now that the weaknesses in our democratic processes have been revealed we cannot risk providing any more information than necessary to the government (which makes me very sad as I have always appreciated all of the positive functions of government).
511	anonymou s	Please do not do this. Given the events of the past few years, we can no longer assume that we will be living in a democracy for the long term. We have a likely presidential candidate who has stated he wants to be a dictator and behaved in a way consistent with that desire, and a major political party and a substantial minority of the American people who support him. While the last coup attempt failed, the next one might not. We can safely assume that any authoritarian government, or aspiring authoritarian government, will use any surveillance available to further their ends. Now that the weaknesses in our democratic processes have been revealed we cannot risk providing any more information than necessary to the government (which makes me very sad as I have always appreciated all of the positive functions of government).
512	anonymou s	I have ENORMOUS concerns about RTCC's potential to violate civil liberties and to increase the scope of police surveillance without warrants or ongoing consent from the owners of sources of surveillance. This is a violation of not only the public's privacy, but also of individual private owners of technologies such as IoT doorbells and cameras, as technology like RTCC allows police departments to access footage without regard for user privacy. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. These technologies also undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.
513	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
514	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

515	anonymou s	Problems with privacy and over policing of vulnerable populations and increasing existing biases.
516	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
517	anonymou s	
518	anonymou s	None
519	anonymou s	I am concerned about being monitored by the police through every single camera at all times. There is a reason that police have to get permission from a camera's owner or a warrant before accessing the footage - it's called civil liberties. The government in fact, should not have the ability to watch citizens everywhere they go. Both the LAPD and the NYPD were found to have used this technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protestors. I think it's very chilling that the Seattle Municipal Tower has "Black Lives Matter" displayed in large text and would consider purchasing the same technology that police departments nationwide have used to crackdown on the very protestors who brought that phrase to this City. I can also definitely imagine a future where Seattle is getting sued for using this technology in an inappropriate, unconstitutional way. Do you all want to pay for that? In a budget deficit?
520	anonymou s	Cost; effectiveness of the underlying technology RTCC will compile.
521	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
522	anonymou s	Fusus, a company that could be used for RTCC has explicitly said they want to work with Amazon Ring cameras. I've heard so many security concerns about ring cameras. The Federal Trade Commission even published an article on it: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users RTCC aims to have an interface connecting private and public cameras. Is this not concerning? RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. I think all those things mean the system could be easily abused or used in the wrong way.
523	anonymou s	I'm not familiar with RTCC but the description sounds like its needed to help SPD be more efficient and centralized.
524	anonymou s	Asian Counseling and Referral Service is concerned about RTCC. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. Additionally, as an agency serving immigrants we are especially worried about the impact on undocumented immigrants. RTCC software can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

52 5 anonymou s	<p>I'm concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. I am strong opposed to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle.</p> <p>Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
52 6 anonymou s	<p>RTCC would be a frightening increase in surveillance for SPD, which has repeatedly demonstrated bias against racial minorities, the poor, and activists and is not trusted by a large portion of the population as a result.</p>
52 7 anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.</p>
52 8 anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. As a university student studying technology and social justice, I am deeply opposed to the use of this software. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Surveillance software like this further entrenches systemic inequality, and directly places the most vulnerable communities at risk. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
52 9 anonymou s	<p>Has the potential to violate civil rights ans liberties and blocks communities from determining what surviellance is used in their neighborhoods</p>
53 0 anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
53 1 anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p>

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

53
2

anonymou
s
This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

		<p>ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>4. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot</p>
533	anonymou s	<p>If it disproportionately targets people/communities of color.</p>
534	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
535	anonymou s	<p>I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. This continued attempt to create less privacy instead of focusing on ways to help the community comes across as just another way for police to abuse the citizens of the city.</p>
536	anonymou s	<p>Concern about infringing on civil liberties. Control of law enforcement on public.</p>
537	anonymou s	<p>violation of privacy; equity; transparency of use; a clear and specific plan for what will happen to the data</p>
538	anonymou s	<p>This is a poor investment of money and will not increase safety. Please make investments into actual things that will create economic stability for Seattle residents, which will increase community safety. The safest communities are not ones that have crime centers, CCTV cameras, or gunshot detection technology. The safest ones have economic stability, housing, education, food, green areas, park, public amenities, and other things that are linked with community safety. This a shiny tool for the Seattle Police Department who do not prevent crime, and at best only react it..</p>
539	anonymou s	<p>First of all, this technology violates civil liberties!! Hidden cameras and drones are completely unnecessary and unacceptable. These will not improve safety.</p>
540	anonymou s	<p>My concerns are personal privacy & the continued lack of police force to punish crime. With hackers online video & security can be manipulated. There is no substitute for the physical presence of police officers & law enforcement. I vote against this implementation of technology that again is looking to replace hard working law enforcement personnel.</p>
541	anonymou s	<p>While crime prevention has value, I do not believe that this is the appropriate way to approach reducing crime. Having a "real-time" crime center wherein all of the data created by these proposed technologies is a hyper militaristic approach to reducing crime. This would also means more surveillance in neighborhoods that have historically been underserved, under resourced. This would also be an accessory a major violation of privacy. Additionally, the funding that would be required to build such a center would be massive--and better used elsewhere.</p>
542	anonymou s	<p>I strongly oppose investing in a "real time crime center" in Seattle and urge the city council to prevent the erosion of resident's civil liberties by surveillance technology. As a lecturer at University of Washington's Information School and someone with a long career in civic technology I know that these technologies will 1) not make us safer 2) waste taxpayer money and 3) have a high possibility of abuse</p>

		by the Seattle Police Department. Do not purchase or deploy this technology. We need to invest in supports that actually work to reduce crime - affordable housing, stable employment, and drug rehabilitation support. Do not turn out city into a surveillance state.
543	anonymou s	Increasing surveillance only decreases civil liberty. Politicians always reference George Orwell's 1984 regarding policy they don't like, and then turn around and implement this kind of actual, real, orwellian, dystopian technology.
544	anonymou s	This is yet another ineffective yet incredibly invasive addition of surveillance technology that disregards privacy and civil rights in the public sphere. This will not contribute positively to the health, safety, and ability to thrive for our communities throughout the city. It will no doubt lead to increased policing and harm to communities that already experience disproportionate punitive interventions. Our city resources would be better invested in community-based prevention.
545	anonymou s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
546	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.
547	anonymou s	It will help with the safety of the community.
548	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. There are many other proven ways to increase true public safety that serve communities and not a few for-profit enterprises.
549	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
550	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.
551	anonymou s	Individual citizens have no way to find out what data the system has about them and no way to correct it when it is wrong.
552	anonymou s	This technology can let the police surveil anyone in the city, for any reason. That is very dystopian as the tech can potentially access cameras located inside private residences and spy inside peoples home. I know there is a class action lawsuit against Ring for people from the company using camera inside homes to watch women change. Given the high rates of sexual assaults of people in custody, I don't want police officers to be able to spy into homes as well. Outside of that specific scenario, there has been a number of studies that prove that this tech does not help reduce crime or improve anything about response times or anything like that.
553	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned about the proposed use of this technology. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

55
4
anonymou
s

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better

55
5
anonymou
s

1) There is little to no empirical evidence this method mitigates crime or helps solve open cases. 2) This technology uses privately owned cameras and other electronic devices to increase surveillance of communities, by passing consent - an issue SPD continues to struggle with and/or outright ignore. 3) There are alternatives that have proven more effective and involve civilian personnel to keep their own communities safe. 4) Our most marginalized community members - particularly undocumented folks

		are put at risk by use of these technologies. 5) This is an ongoing, subscription based service. Locking ourselves into something when budgets are tight is negligent at best.
556	anonymou s	I am concerned that spending large amounts of money on a technology without proven benefit does not make sense when there are other interventions which have much better evidence for reducing gun violence.
557	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk RTCC software is expensive
558	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.
559	anonymou s	RTCC destroys Seattle's ability to act as a sanctuary city for anything. RTCC technologies (like FUSUS who was specifically mentioned in the Q4 report) are designed to make data sharing between different agencies as frictionless as possible cutting down on the need for warrants and oversight.
560	anonymou s	RTCC's rollout additional algorithms/features on a regular basis. These new features would not go through the SIR process robbing the community of any oversight or even information about these.
560	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
561	anonymou s	I strongly oppose purchasing and deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. This technology will violate the privacy of and civil liberties of any residents and visitors to Seattle. The government (city, county, state and federal) should not be using a technology that can capture extensive personal information about residents, including where they live, their activities, where they work, what religious or non-religious groups they belong too, etc. Extensive data collection by government will put people at risk. Technology companies already have too much data about individuals, the government does not need to keep detailed records of individuals activities. Seattle should not be a surveillance state. I urge you not to purchase or use this technology. Thank you for your consideration. Government works for us, we do not need to be tracked.

56 2	anonymou s	I have significant concerns, namely this is not a surveillance state and this is a slippery slope towards one.
		<p>I am concerned about the ability of Seattle to control the data as well as the use of private cameras including those of business owners and individual residents. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary laws. And although our sanctuary laws prohibit SPD from sharing with ICE - Fusus is a cloud-based data system. We cannot maintain control over the data. Moreover, ICE could attempt to get the data directly from the vendor. In fact, they have a history of doing just that.</p> <p>We also have to take into context national trends where states are not only making abortion illegal but attempting to limit travel to seek care, and many states including neighboring Idaho have recently adopted Texas-style bounty hunter laws. Again, while we may be able to prohibit SPD from sharing data with LE in anti-abortion states, that does little to protect those seeking abortion in Washington state because the third parties can seek the data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>I am also concerned about the safety of those seeking gender-affirming care in Washington state. Children's Hospital recently sued the Texas AG over their attempt to obtain healthcare data of those receiving gender-affirming care. Trans people, trans children and their parents (who could potentially lose custody in states like Florida or Texas if a parent were to seek gender affirming care in Washington State) are under attack. RTCC software would open the door to aggressive over-reach from states like Texas that has already demonstrated they will go to great lengths to obtain data.</p> <p>This technology advertises the continual "upgrading" of its system. This could mean the inclusion of AI. AI is trained on the data we give it and amplifies racial bias. Tech companies have never been able to eliminate this bias from the tech. This also seems to be in violation of the surveillance ordinance - and I worry that further surveillance tech will be rolled in without any opportunity or notice to the public and no review or consideration of potential violations of the civil liberties of Seattle residents.</p>
56 3	anonymou s	<p>1 RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. • RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. • The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. • RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. • RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. • Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. • In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters. <p>2 These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.
56 4	anonymou s	

- Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
- We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.
- This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
- The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

1 RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

- RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.
- RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
- The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
- RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.
- RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
- Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.
- In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

2 These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

- RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.
- Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
- We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.
- This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
- The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and

		with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
		I have concerns about how this technology could be used to prosecute those traveling from other states to seek abortion or gender affirming care.
		If we implement RTCC software - we can no longer control the data. Not only because it is uploaded to the cloud, which is inherently unsecure, but also because third party's can potentially access the data directly from the vendor. So even if SPD does not share with law enforcement agencies in states where abortion or gender affirming care are illegal - we still cannot protect this population.
		We cannot ignore that we are living at a time when many states, including neighboring Idaho are adopting Texas-style bounty hunter laws. While the constitution protects citizens from actions of the state - It does not protect citizens from each other. Again, we cannot protect those seeking sanctuary and access to health care in Washington state when we cannot control whose hands the data can fall into. Anti-abortion groups have a history of seeking license plate data. This is especially disturbing knowing that RTCC software has the potential to turn any camera into a license plate reader.
		It is difficult to know whether there are any benefits to this technology - the companies that market it do so amidst a shroud of secrecy. There are relatively few independent studies that take a look at these products and whether are not they provide the benefits that they claim to. What is known however, is that surveillance technology is incredibly ineffective at preventing violent crime and poor at facilitating evidence-gathering for law enforcement.
		In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."
		In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
56 6	anonymou s	While there is little research on RTCC software specifically, The draft SIR reports fail to cite or acknowledge the robust independent peer-reviewed research that does exist for CCTV, AGLS, or APLR. The one study cited in the draft SIR - a 40 year systemic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concluded "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop" It seems that if SPD had actually bothered to read the study they cited, they may not have included in the SIR. And as for leaving out the robust research that exists - it is likely SPD left this out because they were unable to find any independent research that supports their claims that the tech will either reduce crime or facilitate evidence gathering.
56 7	anonymou s	This is something that is creating overreach of government and is against the entire reason of the United States being created. The U.S was created as a place of freedoms and to get away from the systems that the English had, which is where the ultra rich run everything. Why are we turning into the place we had originally left?
56 8	anonymou s	RTCC technology such as Fusus poses giant harm civil liberties and has the potential to violate rights and blocks communities from determining what kind of surveillance we want. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
56 9	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

570	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
571	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
572	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
573	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
574	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
575	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or</p>

not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

57 6 anonymous I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

57 7 anonymous I strongly oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

57 8 anonymous I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

57 9 anonymous I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
580	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
581	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
582	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
583	anonymou s	Dehumanizing of societies. If there is a extreme use of technology in an effort to protect people, that lack of humanity in the said protecting will create more separation. The people processing this footage and data have the perspective of technology. Not humanity. And they will judge accordingly. Similar to how guards treat prisoners (often unfairly) based on their roles altering their perspective.
584	anonymou s	I oppose deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
585	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
586	anonymou s	The people of Seattle do not want this. Extensive surveillance like this is an invasion of our privacy and dangerous to BIPOC communities. I strongly oppose the use of this technology and believe this will cause overpolicing of the Seattle people.
587	anonymou s	I'm deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties, and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put at risk the very communities that Seattle has sought to protect, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
588	anonymou s	That it will be abused by police and governments and will violate civil liberties.

589	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
590	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
591	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
592	anonymou s	I don't want SPD to get any more funding or new toys, especially ones that allow them to act further outside due process. Increasing surveillance doesn't stop crime. If funding the police stopped crime, we wouldn't have crime. They already have the second largest chunk of the city budget and don't do the job we ask them to do. That money should be reallocated towards services that help people with their needs. The city is suffering because it's not taking care of its vulnerable population. We need rent control, not police surveillance.
593	anonymou s	Potential to violate civil rights and liberties Network/corruption of privately owned cameras, managed by a profit-driven corporation, for public safety is unethical and doesn't make sense Network vulnerable to hacking/tampering
594	anonymou s	I want to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology will violate our privacy and civil liberties, and undermine our democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle. This technology could be easily abused to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants, and people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
595	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
596	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Seattle should not become a surveillance state. This technology would greatly expand the city's surveillance infrastructure, surveilling everyone, violating the privacy of everyday people going about their daily lives, under the auspices of *possibly* reducing crime. I am deeply concerned about this technology's potential to violate the privacy and civil liberties of all people in Seattle. This technology can be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities, with no protection for their privacy. Widespread data collection and extensive

		community surveillance puts many vulnerable people and communities at increased risk of harm — including people that the city of Seattle has sought to protect— including BIPOC communities, immigrants, and people seeking abortions. I implore the city to not purchase or use this technology.
59 7	anonymou s	I am extremely opposed to the implementation of these new surveillance technologies (CCTV cameras, Acoustic Gun Location System, and Real Time Crime Center software) and I urge the Advisory Working Group to recommend *against* purchasing and implementing these systems, and I urge the City Council Technology Committee to *not* approve these proposals. We already live in a highly surveilled city with cameras everywhere and with the police having access to loads of surveillance apparatuses and data (including many people's private cameras!). What's more, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) already receives the vast majority of Seattle's budget; just weeks ago, a hiring freeze was announced for *every other department* except SPD. And, these technologies have all been heavily documented to *not be effective* and in fact often *lead to worse outcomes*! Why is Mayor Harrell so keen on pushing through these technologies when our city has so many other pressing needs? When decades of research shows that the best way to reduce "crime" is to actually give people resources such as housing, food and health care? We can do better and the legislation pushing for these technologies is both disrespectful to the residents of our city and actively makes it a more violently surveilled and harassed place to live. I have called Seattle home since 2015 and the prospect of these technologies being implemented makes me want to move.
59 8	anonymou s	It's super villain-y and also won't work the way the mayor thinks it will
		RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.
59 9	anonymou s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including

		<p>neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p>
		<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
		<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p>
60	anonymou	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with
0	s	RTCC software Seattle can
60	anonymou	
1	s	It's ineffective, overpriced, immoral and dangerous. I don't want to live in a police state.
60	anonymou	Keep to the constitution, no warrantless searches!
2	s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the

		company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
603	anonymou s	It has horrifying implications for surveillance of citizens. Dystopian stories uses technologies like this to satirize extreme criminalization of societies. These technologies make ordinary people feel less safe, not more. When every move is scrutinized, the police WILL find things to criminalize. They always do.
604	anonymou s	Chronic, ongoing surveillance changes the functionality of a city and its residents. It offers the opportunity for doxxing and misuse of info in ways that are absolutely unacceptable.
605	anonymou s	It's Wack.
606	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
607	anonymou s	The harm done when the technology is hacked and information is leaked will be astronomical. I know the intention is positive, but this is not what I want for my city.
608	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV (video surveillance) concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime." This is NOT an evidence-based move; it just appeals to citizens' fears ("People are afraid and we want to LOOK like we're doing something about it") without actually improving our safety.
609	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. All this will do is hurt people if allowed to pass.
610	anonymou s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was

requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle can

61
1
anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

61
2
anonymou
s

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to

surveillance Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle can

61
3

anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

61
4

anonymou
s

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

61
5

anonymou
s

None

61
6

anonymou
s

none

61
7

anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance

		would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
61	anonymou 8 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
61	anonymou 9 s	This technology will invade my and my families' privacy and violate my and my families' rights and safety. I say NO to this technology use in Seattle.
62	anonymou 0 s	Has there been proof this is worth the money spent?
62	anonymou 1 s	I don't have any concerns, this program should continue.
62	anonymou 2 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
62	anonymou 3 s	This is like throwing a giant fish net on a community HOPING you'll catch crime. RTCCs only encourage mass surveillance of communities. It does NOT help to reduce crime by spying on citizens of the city.
62	anonymou 4 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
62	anonymou 5 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
62	anonymou 6 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

		<p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p>
627	anonymou s	<p>I think this oversteps a lot of our civil liberties. Especially at a time when internet surveillance laws are dropping like flies we need to keep as much of our privacy in tact as possible. This is an asylum city, a bastion of bodily autonomy and progressive ideas, technology like this endangers the very soul of our city. I do not believe these kinds of tactics will do much to stop crime from happening and will only make many of us feel watched, violated, and anxious. I would rather our resources went to solving the root causes of crime than hunting people down after they've fallen victim to them.</p>
628	anonymou s	<p>Software / infrastructure security standards for this system are not clearly stated. I'm in favor of the intent of the tech but concerned on lack of clarity in how the systems are kept secure from malicious hackers having access and controlling the system. What security trainings and constant mechanisms and accountability to report any intrusions to the system are present?</p>
629	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
630	anonymou s	<p>I am very concerned how RTCC can violate civil rights and liberties as the software allows companies to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police including viewing camera footage without a warrant or an owner's consent. The extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
631	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people,</p>

including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

AGLS increases biased policing.

Technology like AGLS with high false positives leads to false arrests and creates many unnecessary contacts between police and innocent civilians. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is asking the Department of Justice to review if AGLS is being selectively deployed to justify the over-policing of mainly Black neighborhoods. This is a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle as Black, Indigenous, and people of color are already subject to disproportionate rates of violence by SPD, even after over a decade under a consent decree.

Nearly 70% of people who live in a neighborhood with at least one AGLS sensor SoundThinking identified as Black or Latino.

Chicago found that not only did AGLS increase the number of pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions when officers were responding to AGLS, but some officers used the presence of AGLS in a neighborhood even without a AGLS alert as reason in and of itself as to conduct "protective pat downs." AGLS increases biased policing. This is why the MacArthur Justice Center has filed a class action lawsuit against ShotSpotter.

AGLS causes harm.

There are many anecdotal stories of the harms acoustic gun technology has inflicted on other communities. In Chicago, Danny Ortiz was arbitrarily arrested and jailed by police who were responding to a AGLS alert and 13 year old Adam Toledo was chased, shot, and killed by a Chicago police officer in response to a AGLS alert.

Michael Williams spent about 11 months in Cook County Jail - contracting COVID twice - after CPD asked ShotSpotter to change the location of an alert in order to charge him with murder.

In Rochester, the police colluded with ShotSpotter to change evidence to frame Silvon Simmons for attempting to kill a police officer, after Mr. Simmons was chased and shot three times by a Rochester police officer.

In January 2024, Chicago police opened fire on an unarmed kid because they heard a loud noise while responding to an AGLS alert.

Police have hit gunshot victims with their cars when responding to AGLS alerts.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

63
2
anonymou
s

63
3
anonymou
s

		In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
63 4	anonymou s	Doesn't work we don't need it
63 5	anonymou s	
63 6	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
63 7	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
63 8	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
63 9	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
64 0	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and</p>

unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle can

Dear Mayor Harrell,

Thank you for your time, firstly. I am contacting you today because myself and thousands of fellow Americans across the city of Seattle have expressed a strong moral and constitutional disagreement to the newly forged and misguided plan to deploy powerful surveillance equipment throughout our city.

Time and time again, history has shown that tools seemingly intended to prevent threats to our safety and national security, both physical and cyber, ultimately become abused by those in power, and end up in the hands of criminal profiteers, which includes but is not limited to-- domestic private contractors, rogue law enforcement, and state-sponsored cybercriminal organizations run by geopolitical opponents such as China, Russia, and North Korea.

When these tools end up in the wrong hands, particularly when abused by law enforcement, abuse which has unfortunately shown itself to be a pattern in recent times, invades the privacy of the citizens of this country to a degree which is undoubtedly unconstitutional and tears away at our Fourth Amendment right to freedom of speech as well as our right to no unlawful search or seizure, a breach which will without a doubt will set a precedent to make our city, our country, and our government parallel to the aforementioned authoritarian regimes, more than it will protect our citizens from harms way or prevent crime. Absolute power tends to corrupt, and that is a proven fact, as shown in the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiments.

Unrestricted and unaudited insight into the daily lives of the American people is not what I believe it will take for us to move forward as a country, and will almost certainly be abused to target journalists, political opponents, and most importantly everyday citizens, particularly those which go against the grain of the ruling party's agenda, regardless of whether the target's actions are legal or morally correct. These tools are not for our safety, they are for control. And the contractors developing this technology are preying upon your fear for profit. Is this what the American Dream is? Or is this the American Nightmare?

64 anonymou
1 s

I urge you to take a stand on behalf of the American people and put a stop to this threat facing our

		<p>democracy. It truly is a matter of life and death for us all.</p> <p>"If a law is unjust, a man is not only right to disobey it, he is obligated to do so." -Thomas Jefferson</p> <p>Thank you again for your time.</p>
64 2	anonymou s	
64 3	anonymou s	<p>RTCC presents many security and safety issues, especially with its unconsented use of private cameras (e.g., Ring doorbells, drones, home security cameras) in other cities. These technologies also compromise Seattle's status as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p>
64 4	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
64 5	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
64 6	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. I do not want more surveillance in my neighborhood. I want the city to invest in community based solutions and not waste money on this kind of technology. It is irresponsible given the city's budget deficit.</p>
64 7	anonymou s	<p>This technology poses significant risk to community privacy and would bypass laws which require a warrant or consent from those being filmed, this especially poses risk to marginalized communities.</p>
64 8	anonymou s	<p>The money spent on this can be used for real community care and proven crime reduction methods... and it is always investment into community in real ways. Not this</p>
64 9	anonymou s	<p>I have to say of all the crappy tech being considered right now, this RTCC is the scariest to me. The idea of a centralized surveillance center that is gathering all this info into one place, and running it through software licensed by a for-profit company, and very likely stored on servers outside of WA state is</p>

SCARY. Especially considering the problems this out of state storage would cause to our city's proud status as a sanctuary city, where we have pledged by law to take care of immigrants and people coming here seeking abortions and gender-affirming care – and the very real possibility that other states or the federal government could access our surveillance info to try to prosecute people travel here for reasons we value and have pledged to protect.

I'm also really concerned about the potential abuse of this tech by police officers and others who have legitimate access to these data streams, and decide to use them for unethical or unlawful reasons (such as stalking a former girlfriends). This is not hypothetical – these things have happened and do happen on a regular basis and I don't believe any potential benefit of this tech is worth giving up the civil liberties and protections that put firm limits on powers of police and other government officials to do harm.

65
0

anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

65
1

anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

RTCC combines data from multiple surveillance technologies including automated license plate readers (ALPRs), Acoustic Gun Location Systems (AGLS), and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). I have concerns about each of these surveillance technologies, and the harms that they will cause our community. I also have serious concerns about the threats to privacy and civil liberties that emerge when all of this surveillance data is combined.

A report from the UW Center for Human Rights called "Who's Watching Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to Immigrant and Reproductive Rights in Washington State" explains "ALPRs are only one in a series of technologies used by ICE and CBP to subject ever larger swaths of the U.S. public to digital surveillance in recent years; other tools include facial recognition software, app-based location data, and even utility data to which ICE has purchased access through the CLEAR database produced by data brokers Thomson Reuters or LexisNexis' Risk Solutions. The availability of these private databases poses severe civil liberties concerns. While law enforcement would need to present a warrant or subpoena to gather such information themselves in the context of a criminal investigation, purchasing the data from private data brokers like Thomson Reuters or LexisNexis allows the sidestepping of long standing due process protections." By consolidating the data from various surveillance technologies, RTCC would make the data even more readily available to law enforcement. This should raise concerns for everyone, and especially puts undocumented folks and people seeking gender-affirming or reproductive care at risk. Though Seattle is a sanctuary city and thus there is a limit on collaboration between local police and ICE/CBP, "research has shown that by tapping into vast reservoirs of personal data offered up by private data brokers, ICE is able to effectively bypass such limitations...By contracting out to unregulated private companies to perform key elements of its investigative work, ICE sidesteps the need for search warrants or other forms of collaboration by local governments in the jurisdictions in which it operates. This not only streamlines their process, but essentially removes their activities from the oversight of courts in our communities." (UW Center for Human Rights). The lack of oversight and accountability in the type of surveillance technologies and data collected by RTCC is deeply concerning.

65
2

anonymou
s

Additionally, the report explains "Even in states where abortion remains legal, those seeking reproductive health services face what the Electronic Freedom Foundation warns is "unprecedented

digital surveillance"; ALPR systems are only one dimension of this problem. If, as some predict, abortion-banning states begin directing their criminal justice apparatus to investigate and prosecute abortion across state lines, there is little reason to expect they would not tap into the many public and private databases that include location data gathered by ALPRs in Washington state to monitor potential targets. Indeed, they're doing this already: as the MIT Technology Review warns, activists from Operation Rescue and other groups have been recording the license plates of vehicles arriving at clinics for years." Surveillance technologies and data amassed in RTCC do not keep us safe, rather they put our privacy and civil liberties at risk and can undo key protections related to immigration/citizenship status and access to reproductive and gender-affirming care.

Furthermore, surveillance technology such as RTCC has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights, political activity, and protests. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

65 3 anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

65 4 anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

65 5 anonymou
s

This would be an expansion of the surveillance state. It undermines democratic values and civil liberties. Any potential benefits would be outweighed by the risks and negative impact on our communities. Please do not purchase or deploy this technology.

65 6 anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

FUSUS, the RTCC software named in the Q4 surveillance determination report, and other RTCC software violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

65 7 anonymou
s

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices

		<p>and women’s health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
65	anonymou 8 s	No concerns. Use technology to improve our safety and give our city the latest and best technology to improve citizen safety.
65	anonymou 9 s	no concerns
66	anonymou 0 s	It is not empirically shown to reduce crime but it does violate our liberties while primarily affecting marginalized demographics.
66	anonymou 1 s	This real time crime center will be used to reinforce existing racial and cultural biases. It is yet another creeping surveillance tool of the police state. We do not need to be surveilled. We need housing and decent jobs.
66	anonymou 2 s	As a Seattle homeowner with a camera doorbell I do not consent to the use of images obtained on my private property. This concerns me greatly!!! Vote no on this technology!!
66	anonymou 3 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.
66	anonymou 4 s	I OPPOSE - I am concerned that this system not only shows historical data of inaccurately triggering enforcement to sites, but also that the increase of police to neighborhoods caused by this system also INCREASES criminalization of our marginalized community. This RTCC system does not contribute to the root needs of our Seattle community which include public health, housing, transitional programs and other social services.
		<p>These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p>
66	anonymou 5 s	In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

666	anonymou s	It invades people's privacy, is shown to be ineffective (in a 40-year systematic review), and there is very little transparency about when and why the video is accessed and what it is used for, meaning that it violates Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
667	anonymou s	RTCC violates civil rights to privacy by making use of technology unknown to civilians. These technologies put several of Seattle's demographics at risk, including undocumented people, people seeking abortion care, people seeking gender-affirming care, and more. Surveillance technology DOES NOT help solve crime, as has been proven time and time again. Don't waste funding on RTCC, instead invest in systemic solution. Violence interruption programs WORK!
668	anonymou s	This strategy of hyper-surveillance is very Stepford Wives, to put it nicely. Our government is failing us and, rather than work with communities to address these concerns and provide needed resources, you want to spend absurd amounts of money to "disappear" the people who are identifying the difficulties. So many people in this city willing to invest in creative solutions and, instead, you are inviting in technology that does nothing to prevent crime, only to criminalize free speech.
669	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p> <p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
670	anonymou s	I am strongly opposed to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
671	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p>

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

67 2	anonymou s	This technology will not accomplish it's stated goals. It will create criminals where there are none, and this will disproportionately impact people of color.
67 3	anonymou s	This surveillance will not make us safer and puts citizens at risk of harm.
67 4	anonymou s	I am a researcher on technology and public health, and I am deeply concerned, given my expertise in this field, about the safety and equity implications of this technology. It is first and foremost a violation of citizen privacy and is likely to be disproportionately used to surveil marginalized communities, as it has been elsewhere. It increases public distrust and exposes the city to potential lawsuits and expensive litigation. Research shows that technology like this leads to high rates of false positive identification and targeting of people of color. This technology is also not reflective of our communal values, but also is not effective in achieving our stated aims.
67 5	anonymou s	As a healthcare provider, I am concerned that such surveillance will deter people from getting the healthcare they need, including reproductive healthcare, given that anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data to harass and track both patients accessing care and providers/staff accessing care. The same applies to transphobia and gender affirming care, particularly for patient seeking care from other states.
67 6	anonymou s	1) Reactive, not preventative: SPD is misleading the public by calling this a "Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot". The RTCC contains data from on-going and historical crime incidents, so by it's very nature will be reactive (911 calls, etc). SPD even says in item 1.1 of the RTCC SIR that the "purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to ... reactively investigate incidents." The RTCC is not a crime prevention tool and mislabeling it as such diverts consideration away from truly preventative measures, which are not technology driven - and that is true for both community-oriented measures (like after-school programs, rehabilitation, workforce training, etc) and police/policy-driven

measures (such as gun lock boxes, gun buy-back programs, requiring reporting of lost/stolen guns, trigger locks, etc).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - effort should instead be placed on actual crime prevention measures.

2) Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

(a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145>], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]

(b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].

(c) Overall, the results from studies assessing the use of technology on crime clearances has been mixed; whereas other (non-technological) aspects have been shown to have a greater impact on case clearances. For example, the 2021 paper by Heather Prince (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the research" [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-04-2021-0054>] states "newer research findings suggest that investigations-specific organizational policies focused on strengthening the capacity and accountability of investigative work, applying targeted resources to investigations, and increasing investigative effort in developing witnesses, evidence and responding to crime scenes could improve an agency's ability to affect clearance rates" [Prince pdf page 15] So it would be a better use of SPD's time and taxpayer's money to pursue these non-technological improvements that have shown measurable improvements in crime clearances.

1) Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

(a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145>], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]

(b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].

(c) Overall, the results from studies assessing the use of technology on crime clearances has been mixed; whereas other (non-technological) aspects have been shown to have a greater impact on case clearances. For example, the 2021 paper by Heather Prince (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the research" [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-04-2021-0054>] states "newer research findings suggest that investigations-specific organizational policies focused on strengthening the capacity and accountability of investigative work, applying targeted resources to investigations, and increasing investigative effort in developing witnesses, evidence and responding to crime scenes could improve an agency's ability to

affect clearance rates" [Prince pdf page 15] So it would be a better use of SPD's time and taxpayer's money to pursue these non-technological improvements that have shown measurable improvements in crime clearances.

1) Reactive, not preventative: SPD is misleading the public by calling this a "Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot". The RTCC contains data from on-going and historical crime incidents, so by its very nature will be reactive (911 calls, etc). SPD even says in item 1.1 of the RTCC SIR that the "purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to ... reactively investigate incidents." The RTCC is not a crime prevention tool and mislabeling it as such diverts consideration away from truly preventative measures, which are not technology driven - and that is true for both community-oriented measures (like after-school programs, rehabilitation, workforce training, etc) and police/policy-driven measures (such as gun lock boxes, gun buy-back programs, requiring reporting of lost/stolen guns, trigger locks, etc).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - effort should instead be placed on actual crime prevention measures.

2) Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

(a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145>], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]

Racially-biased deployment: There are many issues with the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the CCTV SIR:

(a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.

(b) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.

(c) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public - you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled - that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.

67
8
anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

67
9
anonymou
s

I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

68
0
anonymou
s

BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

68 1 anonymou
s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot

Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

(a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145>], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area."

68 2 anonymou
s This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti

page 6]

(b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].

Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws: Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed RTCC:

(a) For background, WA HB 1469 was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.

(b) And WA SB 5497 was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).

(c) In item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications..."

(d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Utah could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Since neither of such requests would go to SPD and because Fusus isn't a WA-based company, both of these requests would circumvent those state laws specifically meant to protect WA residents. In fact, if the judge also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Fusus might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD.

(e) SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create these risks to residents.

68
3
anonymou
s

Huge violation of civil rights !

1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

68
4
anonymou
s

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and

unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

2. These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.

68	anonymou	Please do NOT deploy real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. There are very valid concerns about this invading privacy and civil liberties. Seattle should NOT become a surveillance state.
----	----------	--

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women’s health clinics. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

68	anonymou	These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.
----	----------	--

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

These technologies also undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

68
7
anonymou
s

This is a major invasion of my privacy and I am opposed to this imposition on my civil liberties. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

I am in tech by trade and I know that surveillance technology is very expensive and will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. Instead, we will see the people who are most vulnerable be further put at risk. We have seen how these types of technologies are misused by bad actors like ICE or anti-abortion nuts. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

68
8
anonymou
s

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and

undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

I am very opposed to this expensive and intrusive technology being implemented in the city.

68 9 s anonymous The SIR is riddled with inconsistencies. First of all, the "Single pane of glass" feature mentioned in section 2.3 is misleading because the example in section 2.1 shows how all of these supposed features of this technology are not accessible in one place, and the user will have to navigate between windows just as they have to do currently. Section 2.3 also mentions the option of RTCC hardware, but section 4.6 claims that all physical technology is already owned and operated by SPD. Section 4.2 implies that this software does not need to minimize the risk of improper data collection because the this data is already being collected by SPD. This is an extremely dangerous assumption, considering they are requesting to add a 3rd party into the mix. Going off these concerns of improper collection and storage, section 4.7 states that only SPD will have access to this system, however section 2.5 admits that planning is still underway for who receives access AND that civilians staff will be needed for the real time crime center.

69 0 s anonymous This tech violates civil liberties and undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. It doesn't help prevent crime, and we shouldn't fund it.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

69 1 s anonymous Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

		<p>Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p>
		<p>I am a tech worker in security against the SPD's proposals to increase surveillance in Seattle, and I am deeply concerned about the measures related to RTCC. I specifically stand against the over-policing of the target areas of deployment, the violations of privacy that come from the increased monitoring, the human error that will manifest in the use of (and trust in) software, and the lack of evidence of this technology's merits.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintaining a record of incident locations, even if personal data is purged, poses the risk of explicitly or implicitly flagging certain areas as crime hotspots. Even though keeping a history is not an uncommon practice, by putting it into software that exists for the sole purpose of surveillance, it can create a bias against that population and a pressure to increase law enforcement. 2. I do not believe that any amount of regulation is enough to secure the privacy of individuals when the very nature of the product is to prosecute. The constant collection of data restricts the freedoms of assembly and expression by positing some hypothetical crime and preparing for police intervention from the start. 3. It is a human tendency to project beliefs and feelings into the world we consume. I imagine situations where officers react, escalate, and arrest or abuse in accordance with what they *think* they saw in the software, even if it is not in line with reality. I especially worry about this possibility because people will often naturally put trust in an authority (i.e. an official software). Training is not enough to combat these behaviors. 4. I am not convinced that real-time cameras are useful. Section 2.2 (Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits) in the City of Seattle's report does not provide sufficient evidence that RTCC will mitigate any existing issues.
69 2	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying Real Time Crime Center software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermine demographic values. This technology would greatly expand Seattle surveillance infrastructure which can be used to capture extensive personal information, including where they live, work, and do other activities. The extensive collection of personal data can put communities that Seattle sought to protect at risk such as undocumented immigrants, people seeking abortion, as well as the over policed BIPOC communities. I strongly urge city of Seattle to not purchase or deploy such technology.</p>
69 3	anonymou s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
69 4	anonymou s	<p>That it be properly staffed 24/7 and that all staff, police and civilian, be well trained about the uses and limitations of the technologies.</p>
69 5	anonymou s	<p>I think this has the potential to violate Seattleites' right to privacy and will just further expand the power of SPD. SPD picks and chooses what laws to enforce and who to police more strongly. This technology just gives them more tools to pick and choose more selectively. I don't think this technology will reduce crime, so it doesn't seem worth the cost.</p>
69 6	anonymou s	

69 7	anonymou s	
69 8	anonymou s	This will give police and potentially other dangerous groups access to surveil marginalized groups. Being cloud-based, hacking will be inevitable.
69 9	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. And on top of this, RTCC software is expensive.</p> <p>If the city is interested in reducing crime, why not invest in strategies that have been proven to work and that center the needs and wellbeing of community? Strategies like violence interruption programs or investments in mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment facilities, affordable housing, and direct income support. Reducing poverty and income inequality are far better strategies for preventing violence. They also help to strengthen families and communities, not punish them.</p>
70 0	anonymou s	<p>1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021, LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City, there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveill Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
70 1	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
70 2	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		<p>BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
		<p>The stated goals here are to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * aid victims * locate and preserve evidence * hold accountable those responsible for gun violence * alert real-time crime center staff to a serious criminal event <p>These are all fine of course, but what we are missing are clear plans to measure and report on the success of these technologies.</p>
703	anonymou s	<p>We need metrics and assessments, ideally *not collected* by the SPD, so that we the taxpayers and you the elected officials can genuinely tell whether it was worth spending money on this stuff.</p>
		<p>As business district organizations working in Southeast Seattle (Beacon Hill to Brighton), we recognize the staffing and resource constraints facing the SPD and the resulting adverse impacts on safety and security in our communities. However, as the City's Surveillance Impact Report acknowledges, the evidence that RTCC technologies help understaffed police departments manage resources more efficiently is "limited" given the relatively recent adoption of these technologies in analogous jurisdictions. In large cities like Detroit, studies of RTCCs suggest that they "did nothing to prevent violent and other crimes."</p> <p>The literature suggests that RTCC technologies are rooted in post-9/11 counterterrorism "fusion center" models through which data from multiple sources is aggregated and analyzed to facilitate a faster and smarter response to a diffuse threat environment. While the risks posed by these models to civil liberties and privacy rights are widely understood, a concern that is often unaddressed in analysis of these models is whether the data being fed into an RTCC platform is actually reliable enough to produce an improved response. The City anticipates using an RTCC platform to aggregate data from unproven sources, including new CCTV systems and problematic AGLS technology. The adoption of a new tool whose efficacy depends on the efficacy of other new tools is a risky and questionable approach when public resources are limited and the most basic and fundamental investment in our public safety - solving the SPD staffing crisis and activating dual-dispatch / alternative response teams citywide - still has not been addressed.</p> <p>Our Southeast Seattle communities also continue to suffer significantly from a gap in information technology literacy and accessibility. This "digital divide" affects everything from the continued viability of longstanding small businesses to citizens' ability to effectively petition their public officials. If, for example, opting into a video call with a dispatcher would be required to act upon information fed to law enforcement through an RTCC, the adoption of this technology may further exacerbate the digital divide and skew how the SPD responds to victims who have limited access to technology.</p> <p>Sources: https://www.wired.com/story/real-time-crime-centers-rtcc-us-police/ https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/ending-fusion-center-abuses</p>
705	anonymou s	<p>Stop wasting our money on useless mass surveillance bullshit</p>
706	anonymou s	<p>I do not think we need this level of surveillance. Continuing to invest in this level of surveillance technology is concerning. It is an investment disproportionate with the low amount of violent crime in Seattle, and the city should be focusing on more social services instead of surveillance.</p>
707	anonymou s	<p>This is a waste of precious city resources. We should be focused on addressing the root causes of crime such as poverty, inadequate education, and lack of affordable housing.</p>
708	anonymou s	<p>RTCC is an expensive technology of dubious effectiveness that only serves to combine the inputs of other expensive technologies of dubious effectiveness. Besides being a second-order boondoggle built on top of other boondoggles, it also adds vulnerabilities to the systems it interlinks, primarily hacking but also algorithmic bias. It takes questionable policing tools and makes them weaker at a time when our police system is already overburdened, and it costs a fortune to boot. Our city's budget is already expected to fall short by around \$250 million next year; we cannot afford expensive, unreliable tech.</p>
709	anonymou s	<p>It's a waste of money and the wrong priorities. We keep tossing good money after bad policing and expect different results. It's insanity.</p>

71 0 s	<p>I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.</p>
71 1 s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p>
71 2 s	<p>In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.</p>
71 3 s	<p>Do not invest in this project that would not be an effective use of fund that could go towards ACTUALLY helping the community.</p>
71 3 s	<p>It would be an illegal violation of consumer privacy. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. Warrantless arrests have already led to numerous wrongful murders and deaths of residents, like Breonna Taylor. We don't need warrantless surveillance too. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>Furthermore, Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics.</p>
71 4 s	<p>I do not support the use of taxpayer funds to pay for this technology. There is no evidence that could be externally corroborated that demonstrates this technology improves safety outcome for citizens. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Importantly, these technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. Ultimately the use of this</p>

		technology will result in the encroachment on private citizen's freedoms while wasting taxpayer dollars on an ineffective and wasteful tool.
71	anonymou	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
5	s	
71	anonymou	I don't have any technology and also what is concerned but I know terrorists are using for stealing privacy of the people which will hurts to our Democracy and to our country.
6	s	
		<p>Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks</p> <p>Even SPD acknowledges this by saying in item 2.2 of the AGLS SIR, "While the current literature on AGLS does not support its efficacy as a means to improve the speed and quality of police response, nor a means of enhanced reporting..."</p> <p>In item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145</p> <p>The 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. https://www.dailynews.com/2023/06/16/police-surveillance-using-private-security-cameras-in-real-time-stirs-big-brother-fears/</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-09/hackers-expose-tesla-jails-in-breach-of-150-000-security-cams</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. https://www.404media.co/fusus-ai-cameras-took-over-town-america/</p>
71	anonymou	RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and
7	s	

		<p>unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. https://www.fusus.com/blog/how-artificial-intelligence-at-the-edge-is-transforming-video-surveillance</p>
718	anonymou s	<p>It's really worrying to me what this tech would do to Seattle's status as a sanctuary city, surveilling undocumented folks and people seeking abortions as well as people getting gender affirming healthcare. In addition, any expansion of surveillance networks is troubling and dangerous because it's always those who are already most marginalized who feel the harmful effects of these technologies.</p>
719	anonymou s	<p>This technology infringes on civil liberties and undercuts the city's sanctuary city status. It is too easily hacked and can be used for nefarious means. Our cops do not need another way to racially profile people. They have too much power and control already and do not actually ever prevent crime.</p>
720	anonymou s	<p>No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas</p>
721	anonymou s	<p>Na</p>
		<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women’s health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents. The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveille those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including</p>
722	anonymou s	

neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

72 3 anonymou
s In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

- RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

- The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

- These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

- The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates.

- In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

- In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

- Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

- SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside

72 4 anonymou
s Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

My communities have multiple concerns about this technology.

Firstly, RTCC software, like Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and prohibits communities from determining for themselves what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. This software is a vast network of cameras, including doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, etc. This allows the private company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner (Lipton, 2023). This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance (Asher-Shapiro, 2023).

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network (Saavedra, 2023) undermines our democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. This is unacceptable.

- Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices, and women's health clinics (ACLU, 2021).

- In addition, RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would violate Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Second, these technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs; Metro Nashville Community Review Board, 2024) which gathers enough data (Center for Human Rights, 2022) to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation (ACLU, 2018). This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

- We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws (Coulehan, 2022). We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

- The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal (Seattle Times, 2023). With RTCC software, any third party could access data directly from the vendor to violate the sanctuary status of both Seattle and Washington State as a whole.

- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws (Mackenzie, 2022) and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly (UW Center for Human Rights, 2022).

Thirdly, surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. Arietti (2024), the same study that SPD cites, states that this kind of technology "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," and other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. Research on CCTV efficacy (Piza et al., 2019), ShotSpotter efficacy (Doucette et al., 2021), and ALPR efficacy (Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, 2020) have shown multiple times that these technologies are not effective use of time and money in efforts to increase community safety.

72 5 anonymou s Finally, RTCC software is expensive. They subscription products and operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off...

72 6 anonymou s No concerns.

72 7 anonymou s RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The software is expensive. There is no guarantee that there will be no data breaches nor is the software immune to ransomware. Too much information is at risk.

72 8 anonymou s Have you considered the civil liberties that would be infringed upon with this technology?

		<p>In a world where technology is becoming another attack vector for bad actors, how will you ensure that this is secured? Also knowing that it is typically a matter of time before technology is compromised, especially if the bad actors are funded well enough.</p> <p>How will this technology be held accountable and adhere to laws that police currently have to stick to? This city already historically and currently struggles with policing - privatizing this is not the path forward. What forms of accountability are embedded and built in as part of this technology? Logs, telemetry, documentation, etc?</p> <p>Could this violate Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance?</p> <p>In a sanctuary city, it seems odd to want to increase surveillance that could put those we are committed to protecting at higher risk.</p> <p>SPD has not consulted with anyone other than sales people about this technology.</p>
729	anonymou s	<p>Only concern is around using any facial recognition software, storing that kind of data, and sharing it with other private companies. I attended a meeting about this technology and it seems it will only be camera footage that will be used and saved so no worries there. And I believe it will only be saved for 30 days unless there is evidence of a crime.</p>
730	anonymou s	<p>None</p>
731	anonymou s	
732	anonymou s	<p>No concern , appreciate if this system will be used.</p>
733	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods; these technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk; surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime; RTCC software is expensive; there are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p>
734	anonymou s	<p>none, i think it's good</p>
735	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software is expensive, unnecessary, and ineffective. Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD is in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.</p> <p>SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, houseless residents, and immigrant residents.</p> <p>The data on RTCC's efficacy to improve clearance rates is mixed and meager at best. The 2024 paper that SPD cites in the Surveillance Impact Report states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235223001162?via%3Dihub</p> <p>other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf</p> <p>WA HB 1469 was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.</p>

SB 5497 was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act. The Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).

But with RTCC software (like Fusus) outside agencies could access data directly from the vendor, allowing them to circumvent Washington State Law.

RTCC software puts multiple vulnerable populations at risk

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Individuals or homeowner associations that have opted into their camera's being a part of RTCC, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Law Enforcement agencies including those in Texas, Idaho, Florida, and others that have anti-abortion and/or bounty hunter laws could access data directly from the vendor.

There are a number of vulnerable populations at risk with cloud-based RTCC software program.

Those seeking abortion care in Washington State

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

<https://www.teenvogue.com/story/abortion-bounty-laws>

Those seeking gender affirming care in Washington State

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. There is nothing to prevent states like Texas or Florida from seeking data from RTCC software like Fusus

<https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/seattle-childrens-sues-texas-ag-after-request-for-gender-care-data/>

73
6 anonymous

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

73
7 anonymous

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with

third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents. The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters. Atlanta police looked into using their FUSUS system to put people on pre-trial release under CONSTANT AUDIO, VIDEO, & GPS SURVEILLANCE every-where they go.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents. The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters. Atlanta police looked into using their FUSUS system to put people on pre-trial release under CONSTANT AUDIO, VIDEO, & GPS SURVEILLANCE every-where they go.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works,

and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Atlanta police looked into using their FUSUS system to put people on pre-trial release under CONSTANT AUDIO, VIDEO, & GPS SURVEILLANCE every-where they go.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state w this tech.

73
9
s

74
0
s

RTCC including FUSUS (the RTCC named in the Q4 surveillance report) is a way to massively violate civil rights. RTCC/FUSUS is designed to make information sharing between law enforcement agencies as automatic as possible and remove local control over any such sharing by giving the data to the 3rd

		party RTCC/FUSUS (https://apnews.com/article/abortion-states-surveillance-apps-ads-wyden-87b5d36620c85ca9f6da4409755358f0 & https://statescoop.com/cook-county-illinois-data-brokers-ice/). This destroys Seattle's ability to act as a sanctuary city for anyone since it allows ICE to access information without going through the city and it allows police departments in states with abortion bounty hunting laws like Idaho & Texas (or laws banning transgender healthcare) to access information without going through the city of Seattle. Enables anyone to turn their private camera into a live feed for the police (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time , https://www.context.news/digital-rights/privacy-or-safety-us-brings-surveillance-city-to-the-suburbs) including cameras maliciously pointed at sensitive locations like gay beaches, gay clubs, healthcare providers, and places immigrant communities gather.
74	anonymou 1 s	Hell no to this and all these tech programs for over policing. NO to surveillance state. This puts people are risk. BIPOC and other marginalized communities will be targeted
74	anonymou 2 s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
74	anonymou 3 s	I'm concerned about the lack of evidence that RTCC software actually leads to meaningful (or any...) reductions in crime, but has the very real potential to baseline increase surveillance of citizens in Seattle. Cloud software can be hacked which happened in 2021, there's little to no oversight on how the data collected can be used, it aids facial recognition which can be used to target homeless neighbors and undocumented neighbors, and more. I'm concerned that RTCC is a key step in turning Seattle into a surveillance city rather than a sanctuary city, which will only serve to create fear and isolation, rather than trust and community in our city. No one is excited about the thought of being watched all the time... That's a terrible feeling, especially when there is literally no statistical backing to the idea that RTCC aids police in solving crime or preventing crime.
74	anonymou 4 s	This technology infringes on our privacy and is an ineffective way of increasing public safety. I am concerned about this technology being used for increased wrongful criminalization of community members, especially those who are BIPOC and low income.
74	anonymou 5 s	The over excessive surveillance of the people doesn't prevent crime at all. It completely removes our right to privacy and has great potential to violate many other of our rights and freedoms. THIS WILL NOT KEEP PEOPLE SAFE
74	anonymou 6 s	This technology is a direct infringement on our civil liberties. This allows private companies to bypass laws that law enforcement need to adhere to, WITHOUT A PERSON'S CONSENT OR KNOWLEDGE. Law enforcement has used this technology to suppress civil liberties in other cities, and we have no reason to think SPD will use the technology differently in our city. Furthermore, this technology is then at risk of being hacked and used for nefarious purposes. And, it's EXPENSIVE. Spending tons of money on tools that make us safer might make sense if it actually worked, but it DOES NOT.
74	anonymou 7 s	1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. 2. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. 3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. 4. RTCC expensive and fiscally irresponsible
74	anonymou 8 s	If we have a lack of police how will we have a real time crime center staffed? What is the response time to Real Time Events?
74	anonymou 9 s	None
75	anonymou 0 s	This is a surveillance overreach that spends money on something the city doesn't need. This will be used to continue repressing speech and serving vendettas of conservative politicians, homeowners, and business groups that the police serve. This technology is racist and awful.
75	anonymou 1 s	1. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Atlanta police looked into using their FUSUS system to put people on pre-trial release under CONSTANT AUDIO, VIDEO, & GPS SURVEILLANCE every-where they go.

75
2
anonymou
s

Funding technology that has repeatedly show across cities to reduce crime or support repair in communities particularly when there are evidenced based solutions that should be implemented to prevent crime

Misuse of data, police violence, further inflating SPD spending for incompetence and violence when departments that have proven to support communities have repeatedly shown to support communities long term and short term well being are losing funding

75
3
anonymou
s

This technology is ineffective for the purposes of reducing gun violence and improving public safety. Purchasing this technology would only lead to unnecessary surveillance on specific communities and would spend part of the public budget that could be used on our libraries and other services!

75
4
anonymou
s

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices

and women’s health clinics

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.

Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveil those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Atlanta police looked into using their FUSUS system to put people on pre-trial release under CONSTANT AUDIO, VIDEO, & GPS SURVEILLANCE every-where they go.

ID	Email	Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of space in section one)
1	anonymou s	How will it be decided where to place the technology?
2	anonymou s	Waste of money
3	anonymou s	
4	anonymou s	
5	anonymou s	
6	anonymou s	Probably will be misused.
7	anonymou s	
8	anonymou s	
9	anonymou s	
10	anonymou s	
11	anonymou s	
12	anonymou s	
13	anonymou s	
		The city is currently facing a \$229 million dollar shortfall and funding this technology would be fiscally irresponsible.
14	anonymou s	RTCC WILL NOT PREVENT CRIME. The city must invest in its people, neighborhoods and social infrastructure to start addressing the root of crime including zoning, affordable housing, living wages ,

		dignified work, non-violent professional development and sustainable non-industrial localized food systems
15	anonymou s	
16	anonymou s	
17	anonymou s	This also seems to bypass any need for warrants or other mechanisms to protect citizens from over policing.
18	anonymou s	This technology is expensive!! And if Seattle were to sign a contract with any company providing RTCC software we will only see the expense grow - companies have every profit incentive to increase the cost of providing.
19	anonymou s	
20	anonymou s	
21	anonymou s	
22	anonymou s	
23	anonymou s	
24	anonymou s	
25	anonymou s	Privacy is a huge concern. This data is susceptible to misuse and hacking. Having more ways to monitor people inherently opens up more risk than value.
26	anonymou s	
27	anonymou s	
28	anonymou s	
29	anonymou s	Privatization of law enforcement creates incentives for the contracted companies to worsen social conditions in order to increase demand for their services.
30	anonymou s	
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence
33	anonymou s	Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
34	anonymou s	
35	anonymou s	Feeling watched means feeling controlled, feeling surveilled. No one wants to live in a dystopian surveillance state, and it goes against all our American values. The city does not have money to waste on surveillance technologies. They will not make us safer.
36	anonymou s	
37	anonymou s	
38	anonymou s	how much does this cost?
39	anonymou s	The above issues are magnified by the negative public perception of the program, as well as the complete lack of procedures for transparency and accountability for the frequent software updates.

		There is no way for the public or for the City to fully understand and keep abreast of the operation and implications of this technology, so it has no business being used when lives are at stake.
40	anonymou s	Do not sell my image and right to freedom to private companies!
41	anonymou s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
42	anonymou s	This technology is likely to be over-used to police people of color and those in less wealthy parts of town. This tool is focused on correlating crime (or possible crime) that has already occurred, not preventing it.
43	anonymou s	
44	anonymou s	CCTV, RTCC, AGLS, and other surveillance technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
45	anonymou s	
46	anonymou s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
47	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence.
48	anonymou s	I don't see how capturing license place will lead to a large reduction in crime. The root causes of crime and other public safety issues are largely poverty, lack of access to housing, and weak community ties. We need to strengthen those to see a reduction in crime in our city.
49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	
51	anonymou s	
52	anonymou s	Maybe letting cops - the same cops who laughed about killing a student and that being cheap compared to say maybe a white student - shouldn't have access to surveillance systems without consent and/or a warrant
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	
55	anonymou s	The city is trying to rush through the procurement of surveillance technology and hoping no one will notice. The section in the reports on agencies, experts, and peer-reviewed study are for the most part left blank. The only study SPD cites - a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

56	anonymou s	Despite claims by SPD that they will use these surveillance technologies responsibly and within the bounds of the law they have a long history of flouting rules and acting in violent and racist ways; why not support the actual residents and citizens of Seattle rather than put even more funding into this unaccountable and punitive agency?
57	anonymou s	CCTV is proven to not be impactful, so there is no logical reason to pursue this means to increasing CCTV.
58	anonymou s	
59	anonymou s	No, only that it should be accessible to the public.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	Yes. The disingenuous seattle city council has given the city to criminal marauders. Residents need the city back. The city attorney better prosecute offenders.
62	anonymou s	none
63	anonymou s	
64	anonymou s	
65	anonymou s	
66	anonymou s	
67	anonymou s	
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	No. As a criminal defense attorney there's no reasonable expectation of privacy against using the technology proposed.
70	anonymou s	
71	anonymou s	CCTV, RTCC, AGLS, and other surveillance technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
72	anonymou s	No
73	anonymou s	No
74	anonymou s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC? Answer: no one
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	
77	anonymou s	
78	anonymou s	
79	anonymou s	No

80	anonymou s	
81	anonymou s	
82	anonymou s	
83	anonymou s	
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	
86	anonymou s	None
87	anonymou s	
88	anonymou s	
89	anonymou s	No
90	anonymou s	
91	anonymou s	It is violent.
92	anonymou s	
93	anonymou s	
94	anonymou s	
95	anonymou s	This tech will reinforce existing racial biases in our society and especially in policing.
96	anonymou s	
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	No
99	anonymou s	
100	anonymou s	
101	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered</p>

approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?

10
2 s

This carries huge privacy concerns.

10
3 s

10
4 s

10
5 s

I do not trust the SPD to implement this responsibly.

10
6 s

10
7 s

10
8 s

10
9 s

11
0 s

11
1 s

11
2 s

Stop this attack on the civil liberties of the people of Seattle!

11
3 s

11
4 s

11
5 s

11
6 s

11
7 s

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

11
8 s

Infringement on civil liberties; increased surveillance only leads to more violent resistance and an even further oppression of already oppressed communities. Increased police bias, with potentially deadly and/or life-threatening consequences with more impunity for racist police. Tangible support of Black, Brown, and Poor communities increases safety, not further surveillance and restriction by racist SPD.

11
9 s

12
0 s

12
1 s

12
2 s

12
3 s

12
4 s

If the City creates a crime center, the City needs to ensure that it is properly equipped, staffed, maintained to current standards of operation.

12 5	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence: Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
12 6	anonymou s	
12 7	anonymou s	<p>RTCC software has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p>
12 8	anonymou s	
12 9	anonymou s	
13 0	anonymou s	
13 1	anonymou s	
13 2	anonymou s	
13 3	anonymou s	<p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p>
13 4	anonymou s	No corporate surveillance tech
13 5	anonymou s	
13 6	anonymou s	No
13 7	anonymou s	
13 8	anonymou s	

13	anonymou 9 s	
14	anonymou 0 s	
14	anonymou 1 s	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. Such a violation is not warranted by the outcomes that research shows as no increase in arrests and no reduction in crime. Other methods are more effective and less invasive.
14	anonymou 2 s	
14	anonymou 3 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
14	anonymou 4 s	see above
14	anonymou 5 s	
14	anonymou 6 s	
14	anonymou 7 s	
14	anonymou 8 s	
14	anonymou 9 s	I am concerned by the possibility of large databases without proper audit and oversight mechanisms. Law enforcement officials and individuals can use them for their own purposes. Regulations around the storage and usage of this data are patchy at best. The integration of privately owned cameras into this mix of is troubling as well.
15	anonymou 0 s	Seattle recently lost a wrongful death lawsuit for telling medical responders the address was dangerous and required a police escort. While waiting an unreasonable time for police to respond the victim died. What role did the existing RTCC system play in that death? It really sounds like that is the sort of thing RTCC will do. It would be criminally negligent to not ensure the updated system is not subject to the same risk.
15	anonymou 1 s	
15	anonymou 2 s	
15	anonymou 3 s	
15	anonymou 4 s	
15	anonymou 5 s	
15	anonymou 6 s	
15	anonymou 7 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
15	anonymou 8 s	

15	anonymou 9 s	
16	anonymou 0 s	
16	anonymou 1 s	
16	anonymou 2 s	
16	anonymou 3 s	
16	anonymou 4 s	
16	anonymou 5 s	Violating privacy of law abiding citizens, enables stalking
16	anonymou 6 s	
16	anonymou 7 s	This technology with all the false alarms is just going to thin out the already tight resources of SPD officers what a waste
16	anonymou 8 s	
16	anonymou 9 s	
17	anonymou 0 s	
17	anonymou 1 s	
17	anonymou 2 s	
17	anonymou 3 s	
17	anonymou 4 s	
17	anonymou 5 s	
17	anonymou 6 s	Algorithmic and data centric software solutions often introduce bias into data, which exacerbates the harm done by policing on houseless people, and people of color
17	anonymou 7 s	
17	anonymou 8 s	
17	anonymou 9 s	
18	anonymou 0 s	
18	anonymou 1 s	
18	anonymou 2 s	
18	anonymou 3 s	
18	anonymou 4 s	
18	anonymou 5 s	
18	anonymou 6 s	

187	anonymou s	
188	anonymou s	
189	anonymou s	no
190	anonymou s	
191	anonymou s	none
192	anonymou s	
193	anonymou s	
194	anonymou s	Do not fund this technology.
195	anonymou s	
196	anonymou s	
197	anonymou s	
198	anonymou s	
199	anonymou s	
200	anonymou s	
201	anonymou s	
202	anonymou s	
203	anonymou s	
204	anonymou s	
205	anonymou s	
206	anonymou s	The city does not appear to have conducted any research on case studies and outcome effects of this technology.
207	anonymou s	
208	anonymou s	
209	anonymou s	
210	anonymou s	The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
211	anonymou s	
212	anonymou s	The issue is crime.
213	anonymou s	
214	anonymou s	

21	anonymou 5 s	
21	anonymou 6 s	
21	anonymou 7 s	
21	anonymou 8 s	
21	anonymou 9 s	
22	anonymou 0 s	
22	anonymou 1 s	
22	anonymou 2 s	
22	anonymou 3 s	No.
22	anonymou 4 s	
22	anonymou 5 s	I am a bit concerned about surveillance of individuals who are caught on camera who don't want their privacy invaded.
22	anonymou 6 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
22	anonymou 7 s	
22	anonymou 8 s	Facial recognition algorithms are a violation of Seattle's surveillance ordinance. Seems bad.
22	anonymou 9 s	
23	anonymou 0 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. This technology could put many vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. Seattle should live its values and not endanger the safety of its residents.
23	anonymou 1 s	
23	anonymou 2 s	RTCC is a subscription based service, which means the city will have to continue to pay for it year after year. It has not been shown to be effective at either stopping or solving crimes. I would prefer the city put the money toward social programs and other more cost effective interventions.
23	anonymou 3 s	I feel concerned that money is being spent on this when it could be spent on things that actually keep people safe, like housing.
23	anonymou 4 s	The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
23	anonymou 5 s	
23	anonymou 6 s	

237	anonymou s	If we know that the below factors, listed in the 2024 Surveillance Report, contribute to poor impacts in policing then I want the City to focus funding these efforts rather than surveillance "many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes."
238	anonymou s	N/A
239	anonymou s	no
240	anonymou s	
241	anonymou s	
242	anonymou s	
243	anonymou s	
244	anonymou s	
245	anonymou s	
246	anonymou s	
247	anonymou s	
248	anonymou s	
249	anonymou s	
250	anonymou s	We were founded upon assumption of sovereignty for each individual, the sanctity of our own homes, the right to be free. This intrusive surveillance threatens that.
251	anonymou s	
252	anonymou s	
253	anonymou s	
254	anonymou s	More waste of money.
255	anonymou s	YES!! It will be abused by the City of Seattle & the Police!
256	anonymou s	"make like we are doing something so we don't have to examine the root causes
257	anonymou s	
258	anonymou s	No
259	anonymou s	The use of this and all predictive policing isn't accurate and is found to be racist as most crimes are random.
260	anonymou s	
261	anonymou s	
262	anonymou s	It is an unsound, counterproductive expenditure. It is akin to banging a small nail with a sledge hammer.

263	anonymou s	It appears to me that RTCC systems are still in the development stage, and that they could particularly subject to mistakes and misuse. I would not like to see them implemented until their capabilities are refined and limited to their safest and most effective uses.
264	anonymou s	
265	anonymou s	
266	anonymou s	No
267	anonymou s	
268	anonymou s	
269	anonymou s	Throwing good money away
270	anonymou s	
271	anonymou s	
272	anonymou s	
273	anonymou s	
274	anonymou s	
275	anonymou s	
276	anonymou s	Better ways to improve policing—eg, follow settlement in DOJ oversight
277	anonymou s	
278	anonymou s	Seattle claims it wants to keep people safe. I don't think the use of this technology furthers this aim.
279	anonymou s	
280	anonymou s	Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle! Potentially it might be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state.
281	anonymou s	
282	anonymou s	
283	anonymou s	
284	anonymou s	
285	anonymou s	
286	anonymou s	
287	anonymou s	
288	anonymou s	

28	anonymou 9 s	No
		<p>. RTCC software is expensive</p> <p>-RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.</p> <p>-RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>-The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p> <p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>-Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>-Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>-Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>-Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>-Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>-Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
29	anonymou 1 s	
29	anonymou 2 s	
29	anonymou 3 s	
29	anonymou 4 s	
29	anonymou 5 s	
29	anonymou 6 s	
29	anonymou 7 s	
29	anonymou 8 s	
29	anonymou 9 s	
30	anonymou 0 s	
30	anonymou 1 s	
30	anonymou 2 s	

303	anonymou s	
304	anonymou s	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p>
305	anonymou s	
306	anonymou s	
307	anonymou s	Do not buy or deploy this technology.
308	anonymou s	
309	anonymou s	Seattle does not need to further develop a culture of surveillance. That further erodes public trust, and wastes precious resources. In addition to serious direct privacy concerns, there are the indirect concerns with data harvesting; data broker usage; unauthorized capture and sale of biometric data, etc.
310	anonymou s	
311	anonymou s	funding affordable housing and community programs would reduce crime in many areas
312	anonymou s	
313	anonymou s	
314	anonymou s	
315	anonymou s	Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities.
316	anonymou s	
317	anonymou s	The violation of privacy rights and the collection of extensive personal information on our residents of Seattle
318	anonymou s	I strongly oppose the installation of mass surveillance in Seattle.
319	anonymou s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
320	anonymou s	
321	anonymou s	
322	anonymou s	
323	anonymou s	
324	anonymou s	

32	anonymou 5 s	you will discourage visitors from neighboring cities, who can seek various services on the eastside and elsewhere. you will lose business and related taxes.
32	anonymou 6 s	
32	anonymou 7 s	
32	anonymou 8 s	
32	anonymou 9 s	
33	anonymou 0 s	
33	anonymou 1 s	
33	anonymou 2 s	It is a violation of privacy, and likely to be used in a discriminatory way.
33	anonymou 3 s	
33	anonymou 4 s	Think about what it is that you are actually trying to solve with this. How are you going to staff this? Are you going to use the very unaccurate AI? How are you going to keep this funded? Is this a short term appeasment to people being afraid? Think about where your money is going. It should not be here
33	anonymou 5 s	
33	anonymou 6 s	
33	anonymou 7 s	
33	anonymou 8 s	
33	anonymou 9 s	
34	anonymou 0 s	
34	anonymou 1 s	These can put undocumented people and people seeking abortion at risk. Someone's identity needs to be protected if they're running away from other states to seek abortion or for refuge. It's important not to have footage of residents for many reasons. Residents have a right to privacy.
34	anonymou 2 s	Seattle should focus on hiring more police officers, having more police on the streets *walking the neighborhoods*, investing in drug addiction and mental healthcare resources, and more.
34	anonymou 3 s	Cost for unproven results.
34	anonymou 4 s	
34	anonymou 5 s	
34	anonymou 6 s	
34	anonymou 7 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain

oversight over the data collected.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

34 8
anonymou
s

34 9
anonymou
s

35 0
anonymou
s

35 1
anonymou
s

35 2
anonymou
s

35 3
anonymou
s

More information I came across in my research that makes me concerned about the use of this technology:

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.

RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

35 4
anonymou
s

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions,

35
5
s

35
6
s

35
7
s

35
8
s

35
9
s

36
0
s

36
1
s

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

36
2
s

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

36
3
s

36
4
s

36	anonymou	
5	s	
36	anonymou	
6	s	Real-time cloud data would probably be hosted on AWS, servers, i.e. controlled by Amazon.
36	anonymou	
7	s	
36	anonymou	RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
8	s	
36	anonymou	Using THIS TECHNOLOGY WILL GREATLY EXPAND THE SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE IN SEATTLE AND COULD BE USED TO CAPTURE EXTENSIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT PEOPLE, INCLUDING WHERE THEY LIVE OR WORK AND THEIR ACTIVITIES — that includes you, me, our friends, our families.
9	s	
37	anonymou	
0	s	
37	anonymou	
1	s	
37	anonymou	
2	s	
37	anonymou	I'm concerned about the infringement on my right and the rights of community members to free speech and to protest: - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/lapd-requested-ring-footage-black-lives-matter-protests - https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/13/amazon-gave-ring-videos-to-police-without-owners-permission-00045513 - https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users
37	anonymou	RTCC software has no place in a sanctuary city. This software will make Seattle unsafe for undocumented people and people seeking legal abortions. I'm concerned about how ICE will use this software (https://statescoop.com/cook-county-illinois-data-brokers-ice/) and how anti-abortion activists will use it (https://www.wired.com/story/license-plate-reader-alpr-surveillance-abortion/).
37	anonymou	Studies show this software does not make a dent in solving crime: - https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs - https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33929640/ - https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations - https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf
37	anonymou	
4	s	
37	anonymou	Same denouncements, worth repeating: violates freedom & privacy, enables autocracy, and fascism, wastes much needed funds.
5	s	
37	anonymou	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
37	anonymou	ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
6	s	
37	anonymou	There is a trend in all modern cultures to rush headlong into every new technology without adequate study of the potential negative consequences--one of which is to make our communities more impersonal. Nowhere is this tendency, and outcome, more apparent than in the relationship of citizens
37	anonymou	
7	s	

		and their public safety officials. Besides the problems listed above, this technology makes is ever easier for the police to avoid personal contact with the citizen.
37	anonymou 8 s	
37	anonymou 9 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.
38	anonymou 0 s	
		<p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>4. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p>
38	anonymou 1 s	
38	anonymou 2 s	It seems that SPD hasn't consulted with any stakeholders other than RTCC sales people. SPD and the City of Seattle are for sure not meaningfully engaging the public on the use of this technology, rushing through this process, and providing a less than 30 day comment period.
38	anonymou 3 s	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.
38	anonymou 4 s	
38	anonymou 5 s	
38	anonymou 6 s	
38	anonymou 7 s	
38	anonymou 8 s	
		<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p> <p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p>
38	anonymou 9 s	

		<p>RTCC software is expensive.</p> <p>RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.</p> <p>RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p>
39	anonymou 0 s	
39	anonymou 1 s	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p>
39	anonymou 2 s	
39	anonymou 3 s	N/A
39	anonymou 4 s	
39	anonymou 5 s	
39	anonymou 6 s	
39	anonymou 7 s	
39	anonymou 8 s	
39	anonymou 9 s	Specifically with Shotspotter, it seems that this is being purchased solely to reward Shotspotter for their contribution to Bruce Harrell's campaign.
40	anonymou 0 s	
40	anonymou 1 s	
40	anonymou 2 s	
40	anonymou 3 s	
40	anonymou 4 s	
40	anonymou 5 s	This is an egregious waste of dollars on an already-bloated police department. Serve human needs.
40	anonymou 6 s	
40	anonymou 7 s	Negative usage of this technology by police. Trust in police is low due to events like this https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/20/us/jaahnavi-kandula-killed-seattle-police/index.html
40	anonymou 8 s	

40	anonymou 9 s	Do not consider violating my privacy!
41	anonymou 0 s	
41	anonymou 1 s	
41	anonymou 2 s	
41	anonymou 3 s	
41	anonymou 4 s	
41	anonymou 5 s	See above. Will further the wedge between SPD and community
41	anonymou 6 s	
41	anonymou 7 s	This could be a really effective tool to zero in on criminal activity ASAP and record the criminals and get aid to victims
41	anonymou 8 s	
41	anonymou 9 s	Increased surveillance doesn't actually help people. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
42	anonymou 0 s	
42	anonymou 1 s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
42	anonymou 2 s	
42	anonymou 3 s	
42	anonymou 4 s	
42	anonymou 5 s	
42	anonymou 6 s	
42	anonymou 7 s	
42	anonymou 8 s	
42	anonymou 9 s	
43	anonymou 0 s	Privacy and will be used by racist, right-wing police.
43	anonymou 1 s	
43	anonymou 2 s	
43	anonymou 3 s	
43	anonymou 4 s	This is also wildly expensive and is on a subscription model so we have to keep paying it. And there is no money allocated for it. I want Seattle's money to go toward actually helping communities be safer -- which means BASIC NEEDS MET--not ineffective tools for biased policing.

43	anonymou 5 s	
43	anonymou 6 s	
43	anonymou 7 s	This proposal is unscientific, inhumane, and embarrassing. The city has enough lawsuits as it is. Seattle communities have lost too many loved ones. There are better solutions and this is certainly not one of them.
43	anonymou 8 s	N/a
43	anonymou 9 s	
44	anonymou 0 s	
44	anonymou 1 s	
44	anonymou 2 s	
44	anonymou 3 s	
		<p>in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p> <p>5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
44	anonymou 4 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
44	anonymou 5 s	Seeing as the SPD has had some serious issues with how it has policed and their use of force, it would seem SPD should get their act together and gain the public's trust before deploying data collection and spying on citizens in the name of "safety."
44	anonymou 6 s	
44	anonymou 7 s	
44	anonymou 8 s	This technology could also help a jealous detective stalk and harass their ex-girlfriend or ex-boyfriend.

44	anonymou	
9	s	
45	anonymou	
0	s	
45	anonymou	
1	s	
45	anonymou	
2	s	
45	anonymou	
3	s	
45	anonymou	
4	s	
45	anonymou	
5	s	
45	anonymou	
6	s	
45	anonymou	
7	s	
45	anonymou	
8	s	Police will weaponize it to harm minorities
45	anonymou	
9	s	
46	anonymou	
0	s	
46	anonymou	
1	s	
46	anonymou	
2	s	
46	anonymou	
3	s	
46	anonymou	
4	s	
46	anonymou	
5	s	
46	anonymou	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
6	s	ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
46	anonymou	
7	s	
46	anonymou	This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
8	s	
46	anonymou	
9	s	
47	anonymou	
0	s	
47	anonymou	
1	s	

47	anonymou	
2	s	No.
47	anonymou	
3	s	
47	anonymou	
4	s	It is an infringement on our autonomy and privacy.
47	anonymou	
5	s	
47	anonymou	
6	s	
47	anonymou	
7	s	
47	anonymou	
8	s	
47	anonymou	
9	s	
48	anonymou	
0	s	
48	anonymou	There are so many community led programs that are proven to prevent violence! This technology is proven not to prevent violence. The choice is obvious to put resources toward supporting people instead of surveilling and harassing them.
1	s	
48	anonymou	
2	s	
48	anonymou	
3	s	
48	anonymou	
4	s	
48	anonymou	
5	s	
48	anonymou	
6	s	
48	anonymou	
7	s	
48	anonymou	
8	s	
48	anonymou	
9	s	
49	anonymou	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
0	s	
49	anonymou	
1	s	
49	anonymou	Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities.
2	s	
49	anonymou	
3	s	-
49	anonymou	
4	s	
49	anonymou	
5	s	
49	anonymou	
6	s	
49	anonymou	
7	s	
49	anonymou	
8	s	

49	anonymou 9 s	
50	anonymou 0 s	
50	anonymou 1 s	
50	anonymou 2 s	
50	anonymou 3 s	Technologies like this are trained to enforce already-existing biases in policing because that's what has been defined as a system being successful. There is no way this system can exist in a neutral way that only "punishes wrongdoers". Instead, you are going to expand how much the police already infiltrate every moment of our lives. We do not need more cops, we need affordable housing, we need assistance to pay our own bills, we need services that are well staffed and funded. There is no reason to increase the scope and scale of policing in this city, it does not actually solve any of the problems it claims it does. If more cops and more sophisticated surveillance solved anything there would be no crime today and no one on the streets.
50	anonymou 4 s	No
50	anonymou 5 s	
50	anonymou 6 s	RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. This unregulated use of surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters. SPD's own documented history of violent force against protestors exercising their First Amendment right to freedom of expression in 2020 recently forced the city to pay out a settlement of \$10 million to 50 demonstrators. Documents obtained through public records requests showed that SPD used regional police to deploy obscure weapons that are not explicitly included within Seattle's Title 8 Use of Force policies in order to get around their police manual that only explicitly applies only to "employees" of SPD. This level of contravention proves that SPD is prone to abusing loopholes and unregulated technology in order to suppress free speech and freedom of expression. The introduction of RTCC software would only expand this concern.
50	anonymou 7 s	
50	anonymou 8 s	
50	anonymou 9 s	As a grad student, I worked on this report about Automated License Plate Readers for the UW Center for Human Rights so I know a lot about the civil liberty dangers of surveillance technologies: https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/ They are ineffective and costly.
51	anonymou 0 s	
51	anonymou 1 s	
51	anonymou 2 s	
51	anonymou 3 s	
51	anonymou 4 s	This is the one that I believe can be used to curtail people's freedoms.
51	anonymou 5 s	
51	anonymou 6 s	

51	anonymou 7 s	
51	anonymou 8 s	
51	anonymou 9 s	I am also deeply concerned about the use of AI in this technology, especially when it comes to image and facial recognition. AI learns from currently available data, and much of the currently available data is biased. AI facial recognition has a particularly hard time recognizing Black people correctly which has led to many false IDs and higher law enforcement contact with the Black community which is a recipe for harm and racial profiling: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/police-facial-recognition-technology-cant-tell-black-people-apart/
52	anonymou 0 s	No
52	anonymou 1 s	
52	anonymou 2 s	-RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. -Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. -This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. -ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.
52	anonymou 3 s	NA not enough information on how exactly the Center would work. I do not favor the Acoustic Gunshots technology since it doesn't have a high success rate.
52	anonymou 4 s	
52	anonymou 5 s	
52	anonymou 6 s	
52	anonymou 7 s	
52	anonymou 8 s	
52	anonymou 9 s	Undercuts seattle being a "sanctuary city" and will not aid law enforcement in solving crime
53	anonymou 0 s	
53	anonymou 1 s	
53	anonymou 2 s	SPD consulted no one about this technology
53	anonymou 3 s	
53	anonymou 4 s	
53	anonymou 5 s	
53	anonymou 6 s	
53	anonymou 7 s	A data privacy problem already exists in Seattle due to the recent "dramatic expansion of vehicle surveillance" last fall, when council members approved the purchase of many more license plate readers. Preventing this data from being shared once collected is very difficult, if not impossible. RTCC software has the potential to exponentially worsen this problem due to the large amounts of data it collates.

53	anonymou 8 s	
53	anonymou 9 s	
54	anonymou 0 s	Video cameras don't have the same impact of the physical presence of officers. The city couldn't even afford enough staff to review speed cameras & traffic intersection violators caught on video. Is this any different?
54	anonymou 1 s	Until the city addresses true causes of criminal activity (e.g. homelessness, behavioral health crises, lack of resources) solutions in this vein are treating symptoms of failed symptoms after damage has been done to all parties.
54	anonymou 2 s	
54	anonymou 3 s	How would you feel if *I* took the footage from *your* doorbell and and emailed it to my friends? That's what you're allowing with these kinds of technologies!
54	anonymou 4 s	Too many to fully outline, not this technology/data collection puts our most vulnerable populations further at risk of harm. And provides a police force that has already proven itself to be discriminatory and prone to excessive force yet another tool to target members of the community.
54	anonymou 5 s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
54	anonymou 6 s	
54	anonymou 7 s	No
54	anonymou 8 s	The only study SPD cites - a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs
54	anonymou 9 s	
55	anonymou 0 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.
55	anonymou 1 s	
55	anonymou 2 s	
55	anonymou 3 s	
55	anonymou 4 s	
55	anonymou 5 s	N/A
55	anonymou 6 s	I am also concerned about the potential impacts on privacy and civil liberties. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.
55	anonymou 7 s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

55 8 s	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected.</p>
55 9 s	
56 0 s	
56 1 s	<p>The individuals who come to Seattle to escape persecution in other locations may be put at risk if tracked and activities recorded. Individuals who come here for medical procedures, to be protected from mass deportation, etc. could have their activities recorded and then future administrations may use this information against them if the political environment changes. There is too much risk to personal freedoms.</p>
56 2 s	
56 3 s	<p>I am concerned that there has been insufficient community input. There were only two 1 hour sessions given for public comment. And while the time was extended somewhat - not everyone got a chance to speak. There has been no attempt at community engagement in the communities where this tech is being proposed or to engage with communities most likely to be affected. This tech, if adopted, will have dramatic effects on immigrant community and on trans and queer community - but no attempts have been made at community engagement.</p>
56 4 s	<p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." • In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. • Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. <p>4. RTCC software is expensive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. • RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. • The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025 <p>5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. • Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

- Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
- Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
- Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
- Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

- In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”
- In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.
- Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

- RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.
- RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
- The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

- Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
- Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.
- Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
- Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
- Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
- Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

56
5
s

56
6
s

56
7
s

No.

56
8
s

56
9
s

57	anonymou	
0	s	
57	anonymou	
1	s	
57	anonymou	
2	s	
57	anonymou	
3	s	
57	anonymou	
4	s	
		<p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>RTCC software is expensive</p> <p>RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025</p>
57	anonymou	
5	s	
57	anonymou	
6	s	
57	anonymou	
7	s	
57	anonymou	
8	s	
57	anonymou	
9	s	
58	anonymou	
0	s	
58	anonymou	
1	s	
58	anonymou	
2	s	
58	anonymou	
3	s	
58	anonymou	
4	s	
58	anonymou	
5	s	
58	anonymou	
6	s	
58	anonymou	
7	s	
58	anonymou	
8	s	
58	anonymou	
9	s	
59	anonymou	
0	s	

59 1	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
59 2	anonymou s	
59 3	anonymou s	
59 4	anonymou s	
59 5	anonymou s	
59 6	anonymou s	
59 7	anonymou s	
59 8	anonymou s	
59 9	anonymou s	<p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p>
60 0	anonymou s	
60 1	anonymou s	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p>
60 2	anonymou s	No independent research shows this improves safety. Makes it more dangerous for those we claim to provide sanctuary to.

60	anonymou	
3	s	
60	anonymou	
4	s	
60	anonymou	
5	s	Stop being nerds.
60	anonymou	
6	s	
60	anonymou	
7	s	
60	anonymou	
8	s	
60	anonymou	
9	s	
61	anonymou	
0	s	
61	anonymou	
1	s	
61	anonymou	
2	s	
61	anonymou	
3	s	
61	anonymou	Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.
4	s	In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.
61	anonymou	
5	s	No
61	anonymou	
6	s	
61	anonymou	
7	s	This is an invasion of people's privacy.
61	anonymou	
8	s	
61	anonymou	
9	s	I do not want my tax money spent this way, period.
62	anonymou	Privacy is eroding, gov't doesn't seem to care to put more police in place and in the community mixing with the people. Community policing is the answer not more tech.
0	s	
62	anonymou	
1	s	
62	anonymou	
2	s	
62	anonymou	
3	s	
62	anonymou	
4	s	
62	anonymou	
5	s	
62	anonymou	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
6	s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there

were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

62
7
s

62
8
s

I support our police officers, and am in favor of tech that helps them keep us safe and protects them as well. Don't forget about cyber security. Question protocols and mechanisms for frequent inspections.

62
9
s

63
0
s

It is expensive and dangerous, and it would be irresponsible to spend funds on this when the \$\$ could be spent on investing in communities on things that reduce poverty and income inequality.

63
1
s

AGLS increases biased policing.

Technology like AGLS with high false positives leads to false arrests and creates many unnecessary contacts between police and innocent civilians. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is asking the Department of Justice to review if AGLS is being selectively deployed to justify the over-policing of mainly Black neighborhoods. This is a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle as Black, Indigenous, and people of color are already subject to disproportionate rates of violence by SPD, even after over a decade under a consent decree.

63
2
s

Nearly 70% of people who live in a neighborhood with at least one AGLS sensor SoundThinking identified as Black or Latino.

Chicago found that not only did AGLS increase the number of pat downs, searches, and enforcement

actions when officers were responding to AGLS, but some officers used the presence of AGLS in a neighborhood even without a AGLS alert as reason in and of itself as to conduct “protective pat downs.” AGLS increases biased policing. This is why the MacArthur Justice Center has filed a class action lawsuit against ShotSpotter.

AGLS causes harm.

There are many anecdotal stories of the harms acoustic gun technology has inflicted on other communities. In Chicago, Danny Ortiz was arbitrarily arrested and jailed by police who were responding to a AGLS alert and 13 year old Adam Toledo was chased, shot, and killed by a Chicago police officer in response to a AGLS alert.

Michael Williams spent about 11 months in Cook County Jail - contracting COVID twice - after CPD asked ShotSpotter to change the location of an alert in order to charge him with murder.

In Rochester, the police colluded with ShotSpotter to change evidence to frame Silvon Simmons for attempting to kill a police officer, after Mr. Simmons was chased and shot three times by a Rochester police officer.

In January 2024, Chicago police opened fire on an unarmed kid because they heard a loud noise while responding to an AGLS alert.

Police have hit gunshot victims with their cars when responding to AGLS alerts.

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

63 3 anonymou In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

63 4 anonymou s

63 5 anonymou s

63 6 anonymou s

63 7 anonymou s

63 8 anonymou s

63 9 anonymou s

64	anonymou 0 s	
64	anonymou 1 s	See above letter.
64	anonymou 2 s	
64	anonymou 3 s	
64	anonymou 4 s	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p>
64	anonymou 5 s	
64	anonymou 6 s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.
64	anonymou 7 s	
64	anonymou 8 s	
64	anonymou 9 s	That some of these RTCC companies (like Fusus) have devices that let any private security camera be plugged into the system seems draconian and completely freaky to me. My neighbor's ring doorbell is bad enough -- but to think it could be sending all it's footage to the police? Yikes! Isn't this like a big step towards a police state? Is this really what we want for Seattle.
65	anonymou 0 s	
65	anonymou 1 s	
65	anonymou 2 s	
65	anonymou 3 s	
65	anonymou 4 s	
65	anonymou 5 s	
65	anonymou 6 s	
65	anonymou 7 s	<p>FUSUS (& other RTCC) destroys Seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city for anyone.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p>

		<p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p>
65	anonymou	
8	s	No
65	anonymou	
9	s	
66	anonymou	
0	s	
66	anonymou	
1	s	
66	anonymou	
2	s	
66	anonymou	
3	s	
66	anonymou	<p>yes, i am concerned with how this RTCC system is utilizing city funding to SPD rather than to the NEEDS of our residents - housing, food, public health, transportation, etc. I am also concerned with how this will change Seattle from a sanctuary city to our marginalized community members to a surveillance city. Again, these systems have historically contributed to more criminalization and incarceration rates. This is incredibly concerning especially combined with the abusive history of SPD and SPD Officers who have harmed, injured and murdered civilians - members of our communities. the forms of abuse include killing pedestrians (Jaahnavi Kandula), murdering civilians with mental disorders (Charleena Lyles), and countless other victims of harrasment and stalking done by SPD officers without any justice and accountability brought to the Officer AND SPD. Just within this past 6 months, officers have also contributed to misguidance and miscommunication that has lead to destruction of vehicles of folks in demonstrations and increasing injuries and detainment of participants in these spaces. There is no trust or reason for COS to prioritize more technology to a field of abusers, but especially when utilizing funding and programming can be better aligned to our civilian needs towards HOUSING, PUBLIC HEALTH, EDUCATION, and more.</p>
66	anonymou	
4	s	
66	anonymou	
5	s	
66	anonymou	
6	s	
66	anonymou	
7	s	
66	anonymou	
8	s	
66	anonymou	<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p>
66	anonymou	<p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking</p>
9	s	

healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

67 anonymou
0 s

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

67 anonymou
1 s

67 anonymou
2 s

67 anonymou
3 s

67 anonymou
4 s

67 anonymou
5 s In general, the data shows that it doesn't work to prevent crime or violence, and it's an expensive investment when the money could be used elsewhere!

(d) SPD already has had a RTCC (iBase) since 2015. If RTCCs were effective at helping clear cases, then that should already be evident in SPD's existing data (such as, mean time to suspect identification before vs after 2015, mean length of time to case clearance before vs after 2015, etc). Since SPD didn't provide such data, the public can only assume that the data SPD does have doesn't look promising regarding the use of a RTCC. Additionally, in item 1.1 of the RTCC, SPD said that a RTCC "helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions." So how many unnecessary stops did SPD conduct before vs after 2015? Moreover, how does the RTCC change the accuracy of suspect descriptions and how is that shown in SPD's data before vs after 2015?

67 anonymou
6 s (e) SPD doesn't appear to be taking the Surveillance Ordinance seriously, since they left most of the Expertise and References sections blank in the SIR.

Expensive: This is a poor use of taxpayer money and even of the SPD budget itself. It's also highly likely to be a ballooning amount of money year-over-year, beyond what the proposed pilot implies:

(a) Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs and for which their cost information is publicly accessible, the average cost is \$7.16 per person (that is, per person based on the population data from each city's 2020 Census). With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.

(b) Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million ... This does not include the costs of ongoing maintenance, technology, and personnel" [Arietti page 1]. The paper later goes on to list the costs specific to Chicago's RTCC as "about \$10.6 million, plus an additional \$600,000 annually" [Arietti page 4].

(c) The Fiscal Impact section of the RTCC SIR is lacking any data regarding the expected year-over-year costs for powering the RTCC equipment, staffing the RTCC room, bandwidth & data storage costs, the on-going subscription to the vendor's software & support package, and projected maintenance costs. Given the budget deficit the City is facing, it is unwise for the City to spend \$1.8 million dollars to surveil residents instead of providing social services and funding community-driven, proven solutions to reducing gun violence.

(d) This seems like a foot in the door for SPD to have an always ever increasing budget allocated to them to expand and deepen their surveillance. It will be a contract that is an investment in exceptionally costly, ineffective, reactive measures that are hard to remove and do nothing to actually help residents or reduce violence.

(e) SPD says that this will replace their existing RTCC (iBase). However, SPD also uses iBase for other functionality (link analysis, which was the only approved use of iBase under the Surveillance Ordinance). This means that there will continue to be on-going costs for both iBase and the RTCC (Fusus). This is yet another way that SPD's expenditures will continue to balloon.

67 anonymou
7 s

6) Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws: Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed RTCC:

(a) For background, WA HB 1469 was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.

(b) And WA SB 5497 was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).

(c) In item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications..."

(d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Utah could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Since neither of such requests would go to SPD

67 anonymou
8 s

and because Fusus isn't a WA-based company, both of these requests would circumvent those state laws specifically meant to protect WA residents. In fact, if the judge also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Fusus might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD.

(e) SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create these risks to residents.

67 9
anonymou
s

68 0
anonymou
s

* Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

* In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

* In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

* Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

* RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

* RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

* The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

* Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

* Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

* Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

* Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

* Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

* Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

68 1
anonymou
s

Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?

68 2
anonymou
s

Surveillance expansion: RTCC SIR item 2.3 states that "Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies." There are multiple concerns about this:

(a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during

investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.

(b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further invasion of privacy beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.

(c) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have on-the-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Hidden/unknowable surveillance features: In item 1.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says, "some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies" and in item 2.3, SPD says that they "will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends." However, face recognition and predictive policing aren't the only concerns:

(a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the data.

(b) SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use an RTCC that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual using the RTCC not clicking the wrong buttons - meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. OPA Case 2020OPA-0305 and OPA Case 2020OPA-0731).

(c) The vendor that SPD plans to use for the RTCC (Fusus) advertises that their system is "continuously evolving along with its database of profiles for search and analysis" and that Fusus is continuously updating the AI capabilities of the RTCC via weekly updates to the system. SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use. Not only that but SPD won't even know beforehand what are all the capabilities this system will have even after it's live and in-use (for possibly years). New features can and will be added to the RTCC both without SPD's awareness and without any public oversight or control - thus (again) elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

(d) In item 6.5 of the RTCC SIR, SPD didn't mention any accuracy checks they were planning to perform of the AI capabilities of the RTCC. So it seems SPD expects both the City and the public to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-and-balances on that.

68 anonymou
3 s

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

68 anonymou
4 s

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

68 anonymou
5 s

Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

68 anonymou
6 s

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like

Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

68
7
s

68
8
s

68
9
s

How is this SIR acceptable to city council? It makes no sense if it's read all the way through...

69
0
s

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

69
1
s

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

69 anonymou
2 s

69 anonymou
3 s

69 anonymou
4 s

69 anonymou
5 s

69 anonymou
6 s

69 anonymou
7 s

69 anonymou
8 s

69 anonymou
9 s

2. These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs), which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software, third parties could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws, and with RTCC software, Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40-year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV, the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

4. RTCC software is expensive
As a subscription product, the city will have to pay for RTCC software every single year. In addition, RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door, then increases the amount the city is buying every year. In other words, a for-profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025. I do not want my tax dollars to go to RTCC software.

70 anonymou
0 s

70 anonymou
1 s

70	anonymou	
2	s	
70	anonymou	You are going to get the results that you are measuring and assessing. If you are measuring and requiring nothing, well, you are going to get nothing.
3	s	
70	anonymou	
4	s	
70	anonymou	Cops already wait hours because they're lazy overpaid shitheads, this won't do anything
5	s	
70	anonymou	
6	s	
70	anonymou	
7	s	
70	anonymou	
8	s	
70	anonymou	It'll inevitably be used to further white supremacy
9	s	
71	anonymou	
0	s	These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
71	anonymou	
1	s	
71	anonymou	Put money towards violence interruption programs instead. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
71	anonymou	
2	s	
71	anonymou	Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
71	anonymou	
3	s	
71	anonymou	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.
71	anonymou	
4	s	
71	anonymou	
5	s	
71	anonymou	I don't have any additional concerns about any technology but I havre only computer and cell phone to communicate with our Democratic Party.
71	anonymou	
6	s	
71	anonymou	Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from
71	anonymou	
7	s	

Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/lapd-requested-ring-footage-black-lives-matter-protests&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1711947341760189&usg=AOvVaw3KTFUkJPb34K3D_NC3e1Eo
<https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/13/amazon-gave-ring-videos-to-police-without-owners-permission-00045513>
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users>

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.
<https://gijn.org/stories/how-thousands-of-volunteers-amnesty-international-mapped-new-yorks-15000-police-surveillance-cameras/>

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.
https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/MNCO-FUSUS_2024_Informational_Report-ADA.pdf?ct=1705616491
<https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/>
<https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/virginia-supreme-court-sees-through-police-claim-license>

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
<https://www.wired.com/story/license-plate-reader-alpr-surveillance-abortion/>

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
<https://statescoop.com/cook-county-illinois-data-brokers-ice/>

<https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/>

71	anonymou	
8	s	
71	anonymou	
9	s	
72	anonymou	
0	s	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas
72	anonymou	
1	s	Na
72	anonymou	This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.
2	s	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with

RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025

Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.

Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-

		affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
72 4	anonymou s	- SPD hasn't even consulted any other experts or agencies about this technology
72 5	anonymou s	...small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is paying to the companies every year. In other words, a for-profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. To my knowledge, the city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software, so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially because Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025. Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion. If you consider the additional time and money that will be spent chasing false alarms and dead-ends, the cost is astronomical.
72 6	anonymou s	n/a
72 7	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence!
72 8	anonymou s	
72 9	anonymou s	
73 0	anonymou s	
73 1	anonymou s	
73 2	anonymou s	None
73 3	anonymou s	
73 4	anonymou s	Additional vulnerable populations at risk with cloud-based RTCC software program Immigrant Residents Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws https://statescoop.com/cook-county-illinois-data-brokers-ice/ and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly. https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/ Any population that is already subject to mass incarceration. Black, Indigenous, and Latinx individuals are subject to disproportionate rates of pre-trial detention, incarceration, and sentencing. https://healthandjusticejournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40352-022-00203-8 https://www.sentencingproject.org/app/uploads/2022/08/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf https://www.ncsl.org/civil-and-criminal-justice/racial-and-ethnic-disparities-in-the-criminal-justice-system The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveille those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA. RTCC software creates opportunities for targeted mass surveillance. https://atlprescollective.com/2024/04/01/atlanta-police-foundation-pushed-unprecedented-surveillance-plan/
73 5	anonymou s	

Homeless Residents

Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents. RTCC software and AI capabilities will multiply SPDs ability to criminalize being unhoused.

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/25/san-jose-homelessness-ai-detection>

Those exercising their right to free speech and peaceful protest

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights.

In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters.

<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/lapd-requested-ring-footage-black-lives-matter-protests>

The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

<https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/13/amazon-gave-ring-videos-to-police-without-owners-permission-00045513>

<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users>

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.

<https://gijn.org/stories/how-thousands-of-volunteers-amnesty-international-mapped-new-yorks-15000-police-surveillance-cameras/>

73 anonymou
6 s

These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

73 anonymou
7 s

.....protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

73 anonymou
8 s

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025

Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.

Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a.....

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

4. RTCC software is expensive

RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025

Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.

Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.

5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-tre

RTCC/FUSUS's data collection/coordination is an integral part of invasive surveillance ideas like placing people on pre-trial release (or really anyone) under 24/7 audio, video, and GPS monitoring (<https://atlprescollective.com/2024/04/01/atlanta-police-foundation-pushed-unprecedented-surveillance-plan/>). Such programs don't just surveil the nominal target, they also surveil everyone that person interacts with or comes near. This inevitably has ripple effects where someone gets placed in a gang database or considered high-risk due to them being seen near one of the targets. RTCC/FUSUS constantly rolls out new algorithms as part of the subscription it provides which would violate Seattle's surveillance ordinance, examples include attempts to identify the homeless

(<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/25/san-jose-homelessness-ai-detection>) and so called gait analysis to determine if someone is walking suspiciously.

There will be misuse of this to target people SPD wants to target. It WILL be misused. It will cost the city in lawsuits at some point.. guaranteed.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

74
3 s

74
4 s

74
5 s

This tech puts our status as a sanctuary city at risk, and puts people seeking abortions or gender-affirming care at risk. In the widespread attack against women and trans people, we cannot allow this to happen.

74
6 s

74	anonymou	
7	s	
74	anonymou	
8	s	
74	anonymou	No
9	s	
75	anonymou	
0	s	
		<p>2. These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party’s could access data directly from the vendor. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.</p> <p>4. RTCC software is expensive</p> <p>RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025. Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.</p>
75	anonymou	
1	s	Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs.

75	anonymou 2 s
75	anonymou 3 s
75	anonymou 4 s

ID	Email	What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?
1	anonymou s	All the data merged into one system would be very efficient and probably cost savings due to the efficiency; but I bet it is also the most expensive.
2	anonymou s	None
3	anonymou s	None
4	anonymou s	What even is it ha ha
5	anonymou s	Padding the pockets of security contractors, and diverting public resources back into the much-maligned SPD.
6	anonymou s	None
7	anonymou s	We could be the plot of Minority Report 2
8	anonymou s	None. Seattle is not a hotbed of organized crime. There are no mysterious patterns of crime that we need to be able to analyze. People are poor, starving, and neglected by our city.
9	anonymou s	None.
10	anonymou s	I don't see value in this technology, I only can see how it can be misused and cause more problems to the community.
11	anonymou s	None
12	anonymou s	None
13	anonymou s	None.
14	anonymou s	none
15	anonymou s	I see very little value in terms of public safety, if any, when weighed against the rampant opportunities for abuse and infringements on the civil rights of vulnerable groups by law enforcement.
16	anonymou s	seeing all your info in one place may help identify trends, but that may well lead to over-policing "trouble" spots, and exacerbate biased policing, which we already have problems with.
17	anonymou s	It may help catch criminals. It could be useful in the event of a disaster to coordinate evacuation and rescue as well as manage gas leaks and fires.
18	anonymou s	I do not see a value in this technology
19	anonymou s	None, other than the ego boost the new city council gets for saying that they've "done something" to solve gun violence because "something is better than nothing." I obviously do not believe this is of any value when the community has been demanding true community safety initiatives for ages.
20	anonymou s	
21	anonymou s	Any additional new help, people, and or technology that will be added to the CID will be of great value to the CID community, as it has been destroyed by crime!!
22	anonymou s	
23	anonymou s	

24	anonymou s	
25	anonymou s	None.
26	anonymou s	
27	anonymou s	I see literally no value in the use of this technology. What a shame.
28	anonymou s	None - waste of public funds
29	anonymou s	None.
30	anonymou s	None.
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	No positive value, only negative value
33	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of this technology.
34	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of this technology and have concern on its impact on my community.
35	anonymou s	
36	anonymou s	
37	anonymou s	I acknowledge that the ability to review footage could be helpful in terms of securing evidence, but it's also been found that CCTV (and, thereby, RTCC) does not significantly impact arrest outcomes or levels of violent crime, so I fail to see how that is truly a benefit.
38	anonymou s	little if you do not jail and imprisonwell righ tnow a guy in a broken down car is sittinng parked 12 days backwards with electric cord pirating electricity from utility box- old elec. cord-- how can this stuff be stopped
39	anonymou s	None
40	anonymou s	None
41	anonymou s	Little to no value whatsoever. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
42	anonymou s	While combining information seems good, given how the city procures and pays for technology this seems likely to be overpriced. We should spend money on programs that prevent and reduce severity of crime.
43	anonymou s	
44	anonymou s	None whatsoever.
45	anonymou s	If used to coordinate help for people who need it, a tool like this could be useful. But naturally the guys with guns are the ones who have the clout to get such a thing while our unhoused neighbors are left to fend for themselves.
46	anonymou s	
47	anonymou s	None!
48	anonymou s	None

49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	What even is this? Expensive item from the wishlist
51	anonymou s	
52	anonymou s	None
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	None
55	anonymou s	None.
56	anonymou s	The only value I see is in further scaring and intimidating residents of this city, particularly Black, Brown, queer and poor people, and in further expanding the scope of SPD's power to track, surveil and punish us. Which is to say, no positive value.
57	anonymou s	There is no value to this technology. It is nearly a dystopian level of privacy violation.
58	anonymou s	None, this will be used to target non-white people, specifically black, brown, and indigenous people, and queer communities. This will only further systemic racism and homophobia.
59	anonymou s	Very valuable, murder clearance rates are at record lows so deploying such a resource would be very beneficial to all communities.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	Yes. The disingenuous seattle city council has given the city to criminal marauders. Residents need the city back. The city attorney better prosecute offenders.
62	anonymou s	Crime detection and prevention.
63	anonymou s	None.
64	anonymou s	None.
65	anonymou s	Stop the crime and lawlessness. Police do not respond to any crimes. If you want to report a crime, it can take well more than an hour before you get through to speak to anyone. Then the police still do not respond. City leadership is doing nothing to stop the crime and lawlessness. Seattle is a dump. Even the rest of the country looks down on Seattle and our inability to maintain a safe community. Our reputation in the rest of the world is that Seattle is a dangerous place to visit or live in.
66	anonymou s	More arrests and an eventual reduction in crime
67	anonymou s	None
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	"The software is used to alert real-time crime center staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey that information to officers who are responding in the field."
70	anonymou s	
71	anonymou s	
72	anonymou s	This software would tie together all the other data sources allowing officers to make better judgements and decisions on potential crimes and hopefully to catch more criminals.
73	anonymou s	Ability to respond to the situation in a more timely manner. Cameras may act as a deterrent.

74	anonymou s	The main value is feel-good. And re-election, to be frank.
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	Getting more information to officers
77	anonymou s	Using it to help police arrest criminals and drug addicts.
78	anonymou s	Reduce crime
79	anonymou s	Fighting crime; apprehending criminals; making our homes and communities safer.
80	anonymou s	
81	anonymou s	This is valuable only with the presence of more law enforcement, not cameras and other tech.
82	anonymou s	None.
83	anonymou s	
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	With a warrant, I can see this expediting and investigation and augmenting CCTV footage.
86	anonymou s	Cases can be built against criminal networks that operate with impunity in our community poisoning our youth, and sending addicts further down into irreparable drain damage.
87	anonymou s	Zero value, absolutely none whatsoever.
88	anonymou s	I could imagine that providing real time information to the police would both protect the police as well as the community from errors in police judgment.
89	anonymou s	Having the ability to correlate multiple events quickly will help to catch criminals.
90	anonymou s	None
91	anonymou s	If it is violent, there is no value.
92	anonymou s	The potential value would be one in streamlining police awareness of and responses to crimes.
93	anonymou s	Being able to coordinate appropriate people toward emergency situations in a timely manner. Monitoring police activity to document their abuses for prosecution.
94	anonymou s	None, it will cost money to use and not really solve anything
95	anonymou s	None. Y'all trying really hard to ruin our lovely city with this creepy police state tech. Please stop!
96	anonymou s	None
97	anonymou s	Highlight crimes, make it harder for the criminals, protect citizens through the use of cutting edge technology - I am all for it.
98	anonymou s	Hopefully cut down crime as it would combat criminal activity as it was happening.
99	anonymou s	None
100	anonymou s	I see no value
101	anonymou s	

102	anonymou s	None.
103	anonymou s	great value and addition to public safety
104	anonymou s	None.
105	anonymou s	I do not see value in this tech.
106	anonymou s	None
107	anonymou s	<p>This technology has no value. From the research, we know that surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>In addition, it will cause harm. These technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p>
108	anonymou s	none
109	anonymou s	None
110	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	None.
112	anonymou s	None.
113	anonymou s	None.
114	anonymou s	A system that is more open and transparent (while displaying less information) would be useful to the city generally. Maybe start there, by having someone other than the SPD build a platform for sharing emergency information including 911/crime data.
115	anonymou s	Great value in having information as quickly as possible to stop, apprehend and avert further criminal activities.
116	anonymou s	No value whatsoever.
117	anonymou s	None. Police departments have been caught manipulating and “losing” CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and “losing” footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.
118	anonymou s	Absolutely none, it will make Seattle less safe.
119	anonymou s	
120	anonymou s	
121	anonymou s	There is no value in it's intended use. It will not help law enforcement catch 'criminals' or prevent violent crime. The only benefit this technology has exists in the trade value that exists in the law enforcement's investments in new technologies produced by other private companies. It can only be used to violate people's privacy and profit off of it.

12 2	anonymou s	Distributed small scale deployment in individual stores to protect them and give them the ability to identify violent subjects after an event.
12 3	anonymou s	None
12 4	anonymou s	The goal should be to have faster and more effective response and management of situations that are crime and terrorist related. Clear procedures and processes are required. Clear understanding of laws for handling crime need to be in place.
12 5	anonymou s	Absolutely none. The only reason that the city government exists is to serve the community. This is a waste of community resources.
12 6	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of this technology.
12 7	anonymou s	None
12 8	anonymou s	
12 9	anonymou s	Reduce crime, catch criminals
		<p>I don't see any value in using this technology. The stated goal of RTCC tech is to address public safety and crime, but there are proven strategies to increase public safety that this money could be used for instead: violence interruption programs. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p>
13 0	anonymou s	Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
13 1	anonymou s	I have lived in the Seattle area for over 40 years and things have changed. It seems like people were relatively safe on the streets, now many public spaces don't feel safe anymore. Seattle used to be a tourism destination, but it doesn't seem that way anymore largely because safety concerns.
13 2	anonymou s	
13 3	anonymou s	No benefits
13 4	anonymou s	NONE
13 5	anonymou s	
13 6	anonymou s	Real time information will allow officers to respond more rapidly and hopefully reduce response times.
13 7	anonymou s	None

13	anonymou	
8	s	None, negative
13	anonymou	
9	s	None
14	anonymou	As mentioned above, if Seattle wants the maximum "value" from its taxpayer money, it would be better off investing in resources that have proven effective in reducing violent crime and inequality. The communities most often suffering from high levels of violent crime are often the same communities already experiencing high levels of surveillance, high amounts of presence by law enforcement, and high economic inequality. These same communities have often shown remarkable results from investments in non-punitive, community-based resources. A recent local example is in the Rainier Beach neighborhood, where a handful of projects — namely, the Regional Peacekeepers Collective, coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention, and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project — have already reduced violence in Rainier Beach by 33%.
14	anonymou	Further investment into programs with demonstrated results such as the above are far more valuable, to all citizens, than the RTCC or related surveillance programs.
14	anonymou	None. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	Zero.
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	None.
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	
14	anonymou	Small potential to decrease property crime
15	anonymou	It's a lazy way to accomplish a goal that is better addressed through comprehensive changes to technology rather than simply adding yet another layer to the problem it purports to fix.
15	anonymou	RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk. This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and

undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced

15	anonymou	
2	s	Absolutely none. I think it's evil.
15	anonymou	
3	s	None.
15	anonymou	
4	s	None
15	anonymou	
5	s	
15	anonymou	Any value I see in the use of this technology is offset by the harm it may cause and less than the value provided by less harmful solutions.
6	s	
15	anonymou	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”
7	s	In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
15	anonymou	None - it expedites existing practices that have so far done little to help victims of violent crime and the money would be more helpfully spent elsewhere.
8	s	
15	anonymou	
9	s	
16	anonymou	None.
0	s	
16	anonymou	I think the RTCC is antithetical to the values of the city of Seattle and the U.S. Constitution.
1	s	
16	anonymou	None.
2	s	
16	anonymou	None. Other cities have seen an approximately 5% lift in case clearance, which could surely be achieved through other means that do not erode privacy.
3	s	
16	anonymou	
4	s	
16	anonymou	none.
5	s	

166	anonymou s	None.
167	anonymou s	There is no value in the use of this technology. Why are we implementing it when we already have the data on science tells us it's an effective it's racist and causes more harm than good to cities that have already tried implementing it.
168	anonymou s	This technology holds great value for those who wish to create a tightly-disciplined, fear-based society in which everyone knows that their every move could be watched at any time.
169	anonymou s	
170	anonymou s	None it is a waste of money and undermines privacy and democracy as a whole. It is a dangerous step that can easily be misused and should not be done.
171	anonymou s	None, it's something out of a bad YA novel.
172	anonymou s	none
173	anonymou s	
174	anonymou s	I don't, but I'm certain that the tech companies that produce it find these contracts highly lucrative. I am not convinced that is a type of value that benefits the city in any way.
175	anonymou s	There is no value.
176	anonymou s	None at all
177	anonymou s	None
178	anonymou s	
179	anonymou s	See value in this if all technologies are implemented to help the police in the field
180	anonymou s	NONE
181	anonymou s	None, its a waste of the city's tax dollars and resources
182	anonymou s	I want to make sure that SPD has every possible tool to do their job. Thank you for your work to keep our community safe.
183	anonymou s	None
184	anonymou s	I see the idea behind this to be able to identify and try and locate suspects but I also think this would be a fairly easy system to get around and would end up mostly gathering lots and lots of information on everyday citizens and is not worth the risk
185	anonymou s	None.
186	anonymou s	I mean, if you want to roleplay an episode of CSI, it'd probably be helpful with that.
187	anonymou s	There is no value to this technology unless Seattle wishes to be a central panopticon to a police state.
188	anonymou s	None- this is a breach of civil liberties and is shown to be racist
189	anonymou s	better data and intelligence so we can prevent and fight crime
190	anonymou s	
191	anonymou s	none
192	anonymou s	There is no value to the community by using this technology.

193	anonymou s	none
194	anonymou s	This technology has no value.
195	anonymou s	Improves offices safety and allows officers to be well-informed
196	anonymou s	I think there is too much risk of abuse of this system for it to have any value.
197	anonymou s	Absolutely none, this will cause incredible harm.
198	anonymou s	None. Absolutely none.
199	anonymou s	there is no value
200	anonymou s	none. it is invasive and unnecessary.
201	anonymou s	The area in front of our buildings has become a center for illegal activity out of parked cars. We see the same cars every night dealing drugs and with visible firearms yet we cannot get SPD to act. Our employees are terrified and a family just moved out of our apartment building
202	anonymou s	None, we do not need this technology.
203	anonymou s	None
204	anonymou s	Value in preventing crime in areas where gun violence, property crimes, human trafficking, and other felony crimes are concentrated.
205	anonymou s	None. It is so creepy.
206	anonymou s	None - It is a new-ish technology that sounds good on the surface, but in fact only flattens and automates many diverse inputs which in aggregate have no meaningful value for policing. And I say this as someone who has a degree in Policing.
207	anonymou s	None, it is a "soltuion" based on enriching tech companies to solve a problem that is inherently about the lack of trust the community rightly has for local law enforcement. This wont make their abysmal homicide clearance rates any better. Those rates reflect their failure, not a lack of tools at their disposal. Lets stop making excuses for them.
208	anonymou s	If we have a crime center at the designated location, most crimes will be dealt with a more sooner. This will help prevent and slow down crimes in the area.
209	anonymou s	This seems like another smart solution to using our limited officers and resources efficiently and effectively. The government leverages technology to be more effective in every other area, why not law enforcement?
210	anonymou s	None. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
211	anonymou s	None
212	anonymou s	Hopefully, crime reduction.
213	anonymou s	No value, only harm
214	anonymou s	
215	anonymou s	

21 6	anonymou s	None, since Seattle officers aren't even paying attention to the existing dispatch tech
21 7	anonymou s	Faster SPD and SFD response time to emergencies.
21 8	anonymou s	
21 9	anonymou s	
22 0	anonymou s	none
22 1	anonymou s	None.
22 2	anonymou s	
22 3	anonymou s	
22 4	anonymou s	
22 5	anonymou s	The software could help coordinate the information about gunshots and other violence in the city. Let's get on with it.
22 6	anonymou s	none
22 7	anonymou s	None
22 8	anonymou s	None.
22 9	anonymou s	
23 0	anonymou s	Absolutely none.
23 1	anonymou s	None.
23 2	anonymou s	
23 3	anonymou s	No value. This would be a terrible decision.
23 4	anonymou s	ZERO VALUE
23 5	anonymou s	The CCTV and AGLS are largely useless without the RTCC.
23 6	anonymou s	I see no value to me as a resident from this technology
23 7	anonymou s	None, I don't think it's preventative it's reactionary and the city should invest in truly preventative methods.
23 8	anonymou s	It will help identify criminals.
23 9	anonymou s	I don't see the value at all. I think the money would be better spent on expanding beat cops along with expanded and improved training.
24 0	anonymou s	There is no value. It is expensive. The companies have no financial incentive for true public safety and they profit off crime and reproducing fears of crime. There is no value in this technology.
24 1	anonymou s	Absolutely none.
24 2	anonymou s	None.
24 3	anonymou s	None.

244	anonymou s	For surveiling the people who are supposed to be enforcing the laws and making certain they are just as subject to the law as the populace they are supposed to protect and serve. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
245	anonymou s	None
246	anonymou s	I do not see any value in RTCC technology. It is extremely harmful to communities and would violate privacy and create conditions for increased police violence.
247	anonymou s	NONE
248	anonymou s	None
249	anonymou s	
250	anonymou s	At this time it's hard to say there's a value when it still makes enough mistakes to as to put innocent people behind bars
251	anonymou s	
252	anonymou s	None, waste of public funds.
253	anonymou s	None. It will make us less safe while wasting taxpayer money.
254	anonymou s	
255	anonymou s	NONE
256	anonymou s	does it scrub toilet bowls?
257	anonymou s	None. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities.
258	anonymou s	None. It is a waste of taxpayer money.
259	anonymou s	
260	anonymou s	
261	anonymou s	
262	anonymou s	None. I just see it costing taxpayers a hefty fee and then generating a ton of litigation about its use and inevitable misuse.
263	anonymou s	
264	anonymou s	
265	anonymou s	None
266	anonymou s	Not enough to justify it's purchase, especially since we have budget deficits
267	anonymou s	None
268	anonymou s	None
269	anonymou s	none
270	anonymou s	

27	anonymou	
1	s	
27	anonymou	
2	s	None
27	anonymou	
3	s	None
27	anonymou	
4	s	
27	anonymou	
5	s	None
27	anonymou	
6	s	
27	anonymou	
7	s	None
27	anonymou	
8	s	
27	anonymou	
9	s	
28	anonymou	
0	s	In Seattle? None. Therefore I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
28	anonymou	
1	s	None
28	anonymou	
2	s	Absolutely none! Seattle should not be invading the privacy of its citizens!
28	anonymou	
3	s	The potential values of efficiency and increased capability are less than the costs to freedom and democratic values.
28	anonymou	
4	s	
28	anonymou	
5	s	
28	anonymou	
6	s	
28	anonymou	
7	s	
28	anonymou	
8	s	ZERO.
28	anonymou	
9	s	None whatsoever
29	anonymou	
0	s	I see no value in the use of this technology.
29	anonymou	
1	s	Centralized information and decision made regarding policing.
29	anonymou	
2	s	Although profitable to the private companies that are promoting real-time crime center (RTCC) software it does not improve the quality of life for Seattle citizens.
29	anonymou	
3	s	None
29	anonymou	
4	s	This technology holds no value for the City of Seattle.
29	anonymou	
5	s	
29	anonymou	
6	s	
29	anonymou	
7	s	
29	anonymou	
8	s	None

29	anonymou 9 s	
30	anonymou 0 s	I see absolutely no value.
30	anonymou 1 s	None at all
30	anonymou 2 s	None
30	anonymou 3 s	
30	anonymou 4 s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
30	anonymou 5 s	
30	anonymou 6 s	I do not think this is a worthwhile investment
30	anonymou 7 s	None.
30	anonymou 8 s	None.
30	anonymou 9 s	
31	anonymou 0 s	
31	anonymou 1 s	n/a
31	anonymou 2 s	
31	anonymou 3 s	
31	anonymou 4 s	Negative, creates more harm to communities
31	anonymou 5 s	None
31	anonymou 6 s	None.
31	anonymou 7 s	None
31	anonymou 8 s	I believe this is extremely dangerous technology, and it will not make us safer. It will erode our civil liberties and cause undo harm to BIPOC communities
31	anonymou 9 s	
32	anonymou 0 s	Harm.
32	anonymou 1 s	No value. By implementing this technology you are saying that you do not actually care about the citizens of Seattle. The "evidence" is anecdotal not research based. In fact, most found that this technology does not work as intended to reduce crime. It also violates our privacy as citizens and would cause major harm by allowing sharing of information across state lines without our consent. Think of the implications for those who are attempting to access reproductive healthcare. We are supposed to be a safe haven for those individuals but you are setting them up for significant harm by implementing this technology
32	anonymou 2 s	

323	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of this technology.
324	anonymou s	None for the people of Seattle. Increased power over the citizenry for the police department.
325	anonymou s	none. The offender who might be apprehended this way, will be sent right back into the city, emboldened.
326	anonymou s	None at all. A stupid waste of money!!
327	anonymou s	I do not see any value in this surveillance technology. There is no data to prove it is effective, and it encroaches on peoples privacy and civil liberties which could be used to negatively impact marginalized communities.
328	anonymou s	
329	anonymou s	
330	anonymou s	
331	anonymou s	
332	anonymou s	None.
333	anonymou s	
334	anonymou s	this is not a good use of city funds.
335	anonymou s	This will only serve to surveil Seattle citizens without notable improvements to safety when a police officer can drive faster than any Washington speed limit on city streets endangering residents to the point of KILLING them with NO legal repercussions.
336	anonymou s	I do not see a benefit. There are better options for reducing crime and violence in our cities such as violence interruption programs and investments in our community such as restoring vacant land and creating more community spaces. Mental health treatment also reduces crime effectively and direct income support also helps reduce crime. RTCC is expensive, takes away from these actual solutions and is not effective.
337	anonymou s	None. Unless we want to use it see bring together all the resources to help improve the community. Like where is free food available. Where can folks get affordable healthcare. Where is affordable housing available.
338	anonymou s	
339	anonymou s	None
340	anonymou s	none.
341	anonymou s	none. This will do nothing to help reduce crime.
342	anonymou s	Zero, except for authoritarians who want to abuse power.
343	anonymou s	None. High school grads aren't smart enough for this.
344	anonymou s	
345	anonymou s	
346	anonymou s	None
347	anonymou s	

348	anonymou s	N/A
349	anonymou s	
350	anonymou s	
351	anonymou s	none
352	anonymou s	
353	anonymou s	None to the public.
354	anonymou s	No value, I think it is really scary and a blatant violation of privacy. I honestly think one day it might be illegal to use this technology, but the advancement of technology is faster than our regulatory power is. I would hate to see the City of Seattle get involved in the use of this technology.
355	anonymou s	
356	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of these technologies
357	anonymou s	
358	anonymou s	
359	anonymou s	None.
360	anonymou s	None. We need to invest in programs that actually work.
361	anonymou s	
362	anonymou s	None! We need evidence and community based solutions to these issues! Not more security theatre that does nothing but put our rights at risk.
363	anonymou s	If SPD can't keep rogue cops from slashing protester's tires they cannot be trusted with this technology.
364	anonymou s	
365	anonymou s	
366	anonymou s	It's only harmful
367	anonymou s	
368	anonymou s	I don't see value in this technology. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
369	anonymou s	ZIP, NADA, NIL, ZERO.
370	anonymou s	None
371	anonymou s	Absolutely none.
372	anonymou s	
373	anonymou s	Negative value. Use the funds to support programs that actually work for the community.

37 4	anonymou s	I see no value in the use of this technology it is expensive and ineffective and money for crime reduction should be funneled to community violence interruption programs and community resources.
37 5	anonymou s	none to anyone without agendas motivated primarily by greed and heartless power-hunger
37 6	anonymou s	
37 7	anonymou s	When weighed against the negative value of the outcomes cited above, plus the high monetary cost which must be paid by taxpayers--a negative value.
37 8	anonymou s	There may be value in it, but the overreach does not warrant using it.
37 9	anonymou s	There is no value. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
38 0	anonymou s	None.
38 1	anonymou s	
38 2	anonymou s	None for the community. Perhaps profit for RTCC companies and kickbacks to Seattle representatives who are pushing this technology.
38 3	anonymou s	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.
38 4	anonymou s	None
38 5	anonymou s	I see the value of the funds currently slated to go towards this technology being reinvested into those communities most affected by gun violence through human service initiatives and grass roots programs i.e. Community Safety Investments.
38 6	anonymou s	There is no value to this technology.
38 7	anonymou s	none! it is harmful and has no value!
38 8	anonymou s	None
38 9	anonymou s	None
39 0	anonymou s	None. Trash it. As a Technical Program Manager working at a top technology company I can say with expertise that this is a misuse of the people's money time and resources. Invest in community, not racist policing.
39 1	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
39 2	anonymou s	None
39 3	anonymou s	N/A
39 4	anonymou s	None.
39 5	anonymou s	None.

396	anonymou s	
397	anonymou s	
398	anonymou s	This technology is dangerous, does not work as advertised, expensive, and misappropriates the trust placed in the mayor and city council by voters. It has no value to the city other than to create the veil of security theatre for scared white people at the expense of historically marginalized communities.
399	anonymou s	None. It is a waste of money.
400	anonymou s	No value AT ALL.
401	anonymou s	None
402	anonymou s	
403	anonymou s	
404	anonymou s	None. This technology will make communities less safe by exacerbating over-policing
405	anonymou s	No, we need fewer cops and more services. You have it twisted
406	anonymou s	
407	anonymou s	None
408	anonymou s	None
409	anonymou s	
410	anonymou s	None.
411	anonymou s	None
412	anonymou s	
413	anonymou s	
414	anonymou s	None. Stop it. Pay for other things.
415	anonymou s	None
416	anonymou s	It's real good for wasting money.
417	anonymou s	Aid to victims at crime scenes and helping SPD FIND the bad actors
418	anonymou s	
419	anonymou s	
420	anonymou s	
421	anonymou s	None.
422	anonymou s	None.
423	anonymou s	

42	anonymou	
4	s	
42	anonymou	
5	s	
42	anonymou	
6	s	
42	anonymou	
7	s	ZERO VALUE
42	anonymou	
8	s	
42	anonymou	
9	s	
43	anonymou	
0	s	None
43	anonymou	
1	s	
43	anonymou	
2	s	
43	anonymou	
3	s	No value
43	anonymou	
4	s	NONE.
43	anonymou	
5	s	
43	anonymou	
6	s	
43	anonymou	
7	s	
43	anonymou	
8	s	None
43	anonymou	
9	s	
44	anonymou	
0	s	I do not see significant value to the public interest.
44	anonymou	
1	s	Very little
44	anonymou	
2	s	There is absolutely no value in the use of this technology.
44	anonymou	
3	s	Little; it seems like it might increase workflow, but that has its own risks in this field
44	anonymou	
4	s	None. It takes value from our community and devalues our actual lives and needs.
44	anonymou	
5	s	This only hampers freedom. Surveillance State is not the answer.
44	anonymou	
6	s	
44	anonymou	
7	s	
44	anonymou	
8	s	
44	anonymou	
9	s	
45	anonymou	
0	s	None.
45	anonymou	
1	s	

45	anonymou 2 s	If used to catch and deter violent criminals, arson, vandals, window breakers, and graffiti vandals the value will be great!!!
45	anonymou 3 s	more safety
45	anonymou 4 s	
45	anonymou 5 s	
45	anonymou 6 s	Will it be used for blackmail by the unethical? Maybe it will increase the city coffers? (Ha ha)
45	anonymou 7 s	
45	anonymou 8 s	
45	anonymou 9 s	
46	anonymou 0 s	
46	anonymou 1 s	none
46	anonymou 2 s	
46	anonymou 3 s	
46	anonymou 4 s	There is no value in the use of this technology.
46	anonymou 5 s	
46	anonymou 6 s	
46	anonymou 7 s	None.
46	anonymou 8 s	No, as it is a subscription service that the city renews it will only increase unnecessary spending
46	anonymou 9 s	None
47	anonymou 0 s	
47	anonymou 1 s	
47	anonymou 2 s	None.
47	anonymou 3 s	There is no value to the overpolicing of our communities whether it is through CCTV, Shotspotter, RTCC or any other kind of surveillance technology. People deserve more access to housing resources, employment opportunities that aren't with the police, and innovative progressive solutions that address the root causes of poverty.
47	anonymou 4 s	None.
47	anonymou 5 s	
47	anonymou 6 s	
47	anonymou 7 s	No value, maybe some jobs for people, and opportunities for police to feel like saviors when they are just further imposing harm on marginalized communities
47	anonymou 8 s	None

47	anonymou 9 s	
48	anonymou 0 s	None.
48	anonymou 1 s	None
48	anonymou 2 s	
48	anonymou 3 s	
48	anonymou 4 s	None
48	anonymou 5 s	None
48	anonymou 6 s	
48	anonymou 7 s	None. It is a waste of taxpayer dollars and city resources.
48	anonymou 8 s	NONE
48	anonymou 9 s	
49	anonymou 0 s	I see no positive value, and only see the dangers to our American ideals and safeguards.
49	anonymou 1 s	None
49	anonymou 2 s	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
49	anonymou 3 s	None
49	anonymou 4 s	
49	anonymou 5 s	None
49	anonymou 6 s	None at all.
49	anonymou 7 s	
49	anonymou 8 s	None
49	anonymou 9 s	
50	anonymou 0 s	
50	anonymou 1 s	None.
50	anonymou 2 s	
50	anonymou 3 s	There is no value to turning our city into a giant prison playground for cops to murder and harass people with no consequence. There are already no consequences when cops run people over or murder in cold blood. Stop giving them more tools to retroactively justify the violence that they commit! Technology does not refine police violence, it gives it more space to exist and then say, "its ok, the computer said I could brutalize this guy".
50	anonymou 4 s	RTCC is an essential component in enhancing and supporting the use and effectiveness of CCTV and AGLS

50	anonymou 5 s	
50	anonymou 6 s	I see no value in the use of this technology in Seattle, only a multitude of harms.
50	anonymou 7 s	None. Please do not throw away taxpayer dollars on this. It will only cause more harm.
50	anonymou 8 s	anything to help reduce and be more proactive about crime prevention and response will be a plus
50	anonymou 9 s	None, it is expensive and ineffective, not to mention downright dangerous.
51	anonymou 0 s	
51	anonymou 1 s	
51	anonymou 2 s	I see no value in this technology. Longitudinal independent studies of surveillance technology show no effects on violent crime when that technology is used. This technology is rife with potential risk and privacy violations and is expensive, with no proven benefit and little potential value.
51	anonymou 3 s	
51	anonymou 4 s	I think it would be excellent software, in the event of us us ever becoming a totalitarian, police state.
51	anonymou 5 s	None.
51	anonymou 6 s	No value.
51	anonymou 7 s	
51	anonymou 8 s	It is not uncommon that criminals commit multiple crimes within the space of hours. Having this information may stop the next crime, or enable the police to apprehend the criminal(s).
51	anonymou 9 s	None.
52	anonymou 0 s	None
52	anonymou 1 s	
52	anonymou 2 s	I think some could argue that it could help solve crime through cameras. Maybe, but I don't think having them all connected to one centralized area would be good. Also, it was found in a study for CCTV that it really doesn't help reduce violent crimes, so what's the point then? What really is the benefit to having everyone constantly surveilled like this? A lot of American media talks down on China and how there are so many cameras there, but is implementation of this not just what China is doing? I'm really struggling to see the value of this technology.
52	anonymou 3 s	One place where all info goes sounds like a time saver but what do the studies how on effectiveness in the cities where it is used?
52	anonymou 4 s	None unless there is a proper community engagement process assessing the risk of RTCC on marginalized communities
52	anonymou 5 s	
52	anonymou 6 s	None
52	anonymou 7 s	
52	anonymou 8 s	I see no value in the use of this technology, as it will further entrench systemic injustices and directly harm those most vulnerable. As a university student studying technology and social justice, I have studied how software like this is not only ineffective, it is directly harmful to vulnerable communities, and Seattle should not invest in this unjust, damaging technology.
52	anonymou 9 s	

530	anonymou s	N/a
531	anonymou s	none
532	anonymou s	None
533	anonymou s	I support technologies that reduce the number of police officers on the streets, and potential negative interactions with police and every day people. I support the responsible use of this technology to offset reduction of police.
534	anonymou s	
535	anonymou s	Absolutely none
536	anonymou s	
537	anonymou s	VERY LITTLE and in fact dangerous to seattle residents
538	anonymou s	None
539	anonymou s	
540	anonymou s	No
541	anonymou s	None
542	anonymou s	
543	anonymou s	None!
544	anonymou s	Literally none
545	anonymou s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
546	anonymou s	None
547	anonymou s	It will make the community safer.
548	anonymou s	There are far better uses of taxpayer dollars to create true public safety for all communities.
549	anonymou s	
550	anonymou s	
551	anonymou s	
552	anonymou s	There is no value, only room for abuse
553	anonymou s	I see no value in using this technology. I believe using this technology is harmful, violates peoples' rights, and erodes our democratic values by excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

55	anonymou 4 s	
55	anonymou 5 s	Truthfully none considering other alternatives that are cheaper and invest directly in civilians within our communities and not the corrupt SPD.
55	anonymou 6 s	
55	anonymou 7 s	
55	anonymou 8 s	No value. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
55	anonymou 9 s	None
56	anonymou 0 s	This technology puts everyday citizens at risk, potentially violating privacy and civil liberties, so I don't see it as adding any value.
56	anonymou 1 s	Absolutely none.
56	anonymou 2 s	Miss technology sounds expensive both to install maintain and monitor. I believe these fun should be better utilized to get to core issues that are causing some of the safety and crime concerns that the surveillance seeks to monitor, monitoring crime will not remove it. Lifting citizens out of poverty, homelessness and addiction will.
56	anonymou 3 s	
56	anonymou 4 s	None. This is surveillance technology. Expansion of surveillance technology anywhere is a threat to civil liberties everywhere, especially for marginalized communities.
56	anonymou 5 s	None. This is surveillance technology. Expansion of surveillance technology anywhere is a threat to civil liberties everywhere, especially for marginalized communities.
56	anonymou 6 s	
56	anonymou 7 s	None. It's not safe and creates dangerous living conditions for civilization.
56	anonymou 8 s	
56	anonymou 9 s	
57	anonymou 0 s	
57	anonymou 1 s	None
57	anonymou 2 s	
57	anonymou 3 s	
57	anonymou 4 s	
57	anonymou 5 s	
57	anonymou 6 s	None
57	anonymou 7 s	
57	anonymou 8 s	None

57	anonymou 9 s	None. Police do not keep us safe. Fund social programs.
58	anonymou 0 s	None
58	anonymou 1 s	
58	anonymou 2 s	
58	anonymou 3 s	This technology could be beneficial if those managing and processing the data where of a diversified force. Not just the police force.
58	anonymou 4 s	None
58	anonymou 5 s	There is no value in over surveillance of citizens. Trust in the government is already at an all time low and you will only make it worse by doing this. You are infringing on peoples rights to privacy and independence. This will inevitably make Seattle a worse place to live.
58	anonymou 6 s	None.
58	anonymou 7 s	none
58	anonymou 8 s	None.
58	anonymou 9 s	
59	anonymou 0 s	
59	anonymou 1 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
59	anonymou 2 s	None.
59	anonymou 3 s	
59	anonymou 4 s	
59	anonymou 5 s	None.
59	anonymou 6 s	
59	anonymou 7 s	Nothing positive, just more money for the lobbyists pushing for these ineffective techonologies and more capacity by police to surveil and harass those of us who actually live here.
59	anonymou 8 s	None
59	anonymou 9 s	None.
60	anonymou 0 s	
60	anonymou 1 s	None.
60	anonymou 2 s	Only to erode my feeling of safety in the city. If you want me to feel less safe in Seattle, this is a great choice to to that.
60	anonymou 3 s	This technology is worse than worthless, it is actively harmful. It doesn't help anything and only offers opportunities for exploitation of the people.

60	anonymou	
4	s	Violent crime and murder are quite low, so I see few to none.
60	anonymou	
5	s	None, it's for creeps.
60	anonymou	
6	s	None.
60	anonymou	
7	s	N/A
60	anonymou	
8	s	
60	anonymou	
9	s	None
61	anonymou	
0	s	None. Please fun local community organizations doing work that has proven effective instead.
61	anonymou	
1	s	
61	anonymou	
2	s	
61	anonymou	
3	s	
		<p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.</p> <p>We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.</p> <p>Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.</p>
61	anonymou	
4	s	
61	anonymou	
5	s	The RTCC software will provide a centralized hub for real-time information and analysis. By integrating data from various sources, such as dispatch, camera feeds, officer locations, and 911 calls, the software will give crime center staff a comprehensive view of developing situations. This enhanced situational awareness will increase the safety of both officers and the public, allowing for quicker aid and safer apprehension of suspects. Additionally, more accurate suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and descriptions.
61	anonymou	
6	s	rapid response to crime as it occurs
61	anonymou	
7	s	None
61	anonymou	
8	s	None, it is only harmful
61	anonymou	
9	s	Negative, below zero.
62	anonymou	
0	s	Make some tech company rich
62	anonymou	
1	s	

62	anonymou	
2	s	
62	anonymou	
3	s	None. Mass surveillance is not the godsend you think it is.
62	anonymou	
4	s	none
62	anonymou	
5	s	None.
62	anonymou	
6	s	None
62	anonymou	
7	s	None.
62	anonymou	Speed and efficiency in response. Having all data in one place allows for quicker and more confident response times.
8	s	
62	anonymou	
9	s	
63	anonymou	
0	s	
63	anonymou	
1	s	
63	anonymou	
2	s	None.
63	anonymou	
3	s	None.
63	anonymou	
4	s	We don't need it. Ineffective
63	anonymou	
5	s	
63	anonymou	
6	s	
63	anonymou	
7	s	
63	anonymou	
8	s	
63	anonymou	
9	s	
64	anonymou	
0	s	None
64	anonymou	
1	s	See above letter.
64	anonymou	This is the most important aspect of the new technology being proposed. Without RTCC, there would be limited value in implementing CCTV and AGLS.
2	s	
64	anonymou	
3	s	None. Implementing this expensive technology would be a waste and misuse of funds.
64	anonymou	
4	s	no value
64	anonymou	
5	s	None. Not worth the cost.
64	anonymou	
6	s	None.
64	anonymou	
7	s	None.
64	anonymou	
8	s	None
64	anonymou	I don't think this RTCC has any value for the citizens and visitors of Seattle. I'm sure the police would be this tech useful, but I am certain they would be using it in ways that are objectionable and harmful and not about reducing crime and harm. It looks like there are many studies demonstrating this tech doesn't
9	s	

aid in solving crime or in increasing arrest or clearance rates. So for what reason would we want to let SPD create a centralized spy system?		
65	anonymou 0 s	
65	anonymou 1 s	
65	anonymou 2 s	
65	anonymou 3 s	
65	anonymou 4 s	
65	anonymou 5 s	None
65	anonymou 6 s	
65	anonymou 7 s	Absolutely none.
65	anonymou 8 s	Gives the city the best and latest technology tools to improve and enhance citizen safety.
65	anonymou 9 s	Any technology that can centralize SPD and law enforcement efforts is in my opinion very desirable.
66	anonymou 0 s	
66	anonymou 1 s	
66	anonymou 2 s	ZERO
66	anonymou 3 s	
66	anonymou 4 s	This technology is aligning to the value of mass policing, mass criminalization, ableism, and supremacist values.
66	anonymou 5 s	None.
66	anonymou 6 s	
66	anonymou 7 s	
66	anonymou 8 s	The only purpose for wasting money like this is to increase fear and distrust among your citizens. That is not a future I want, so I don't see any positive value in this technology.
66	anonymou 9 s	
67	anonymou 0 s	There is no value in this technology, so do not use it.
67	anonymou 1 s	It's an expensive waste, don't use it.
67	anonymou 2 s	There is none. This technology can only be used to harm people.
67	anonymou 3 s	no value
67	anonymou 4 s	None
67	anonymou 5 s	
67	anonymou 6 s	

67	anonymou 7 s	
67	anonymou 8 s	
67	anonymou 9 s	
68	anonymou 0 s	I see little to no value in the use of this technology. The City should use these funds to invest BACK into the community, and support community efforts that have actually been proven to lower safety. OR use the money to provide safe housing for the growing rate of folks becoming houseless at the hands of the city. There are already solutions for the problems this technology seeks to "fix," show your residents that you listen to them and actually invest in those solutions.
68	anonymou 1 s	
68	anonymou 2 s	
68	anonymou 3 s	
68	anonymou 4 s	I do not see value in these technologies and strongly believe that the city should reject their implementation.
68	anonymou 5 s	No value
68	anonymou 6 s	
68	anonymou 7 s	
68	anonymou 8 s	None.
68	anonymou 9 s	No. It's been clearly stated that it adds no new data too our city's crime fighting tool box.
69	anonymou 0 s	
69	anonymou 1 s	no value
69	anonymou 2 s	
69	anonymou 3 s	
69	anonymou 4 s	
69	anonymou 5 s	I see this as a vital tool for SPD officers in responding to crimes, assuming there are sufficient numbers of SPD officers in the area to respond. I see these technologies as tools detectives can use to solve crimes after the fact, but this requires a sufficient number of detectives to pursue these crimes.
69	anonymou 6 s	
69	anonymou 7 s	
69	anonymou 8 s	
69	anonymou 9 s	I do not see any value in this technology, only harm.
70	anonymou 0 s	None whatsoever. I do not want Seattle to become a surveillance state.
70	anonymou 1 s	
70	anonymou 2 s	

703	anonymou s	Technology can be great but the only important thing is how it is used. I'd like to see Seattle actually measuring "public safety" in meaningful ways, and then determining how our employees (SPD) are meeting these standards.
704	anonymou s	Small business owners have shared stories with us of catastrophic losses from overnight commercial burglaries, including safecracking and the theft of entire store inventories. If the adoption of an RTCC platform allowed SPD to confirm more quickly that Priority 1 commercial burglaries were in progress and to dispatch a timely response, it could mitigate these kinds of catastrophic losses.
705	anonymou s	None
706	anonymou s	
707	anonymou s	None
708	anonymou s	
709	anonymou s	It will make trial lawyers rich!
710	anonymou s	minimal
711	anonymou s	<p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p> <p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."</p> <p>In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates.</p> <p>SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state.</p> <p>There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.</p>
712	anonymou s	None, do not put money towards this harmful project.
713	anonymou s	None. This will only take us down messier, darker paths.
714	anonymou s	None.
715	anonymou s	None whatsoever. There is no value in this technology, only harm, for Seattleites.
716	anonymou s	I don't know what is the values of that technology when I don't have any technology except my computer and cell phone.
717	anonymou s	
718	anonymou s	None. Please please please do not buy this tech.
719	anonymou s	Zero
720	anonymou s	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas
721	anonymou s	Helping decrease gun violence and apprehend suspects
722	anonymou s	
723	anonymou s	
724	anonymou s	This technology will bring harm to the community. There is no value in the use of it.

725	anonymou s	There is no value in the use of this technology.
726	anonymou s	Identifying areas of concerns or regular monitoring.
727	anonymou s	None
728	anonymou s	
729	anonymou s	Improve crime detection, response times, and collection evidence to hold criminals accountable. The Chinatown-International District has had increasing crime for the past 5-8 years. Violent crimes have risen and there is gun violence constantly. I feel I hear about new gun shooting victims every week.
730	anonymou s	Should help streamline dispatch and locating incidents
731	anonymou s	Utilizing technology to comb through labor intensive work
732	anonymou s	Catch the crime on time, protect residents.
733	anonymou s	
734	anonymou s	
735	anonymou s	
736	anonymou s	I am hoping there will be less crimes in ID
737	anonymou s	ZERO VALUE
738	anonymou s	
739	anonymou s	This will disproportionately harm our vulnerable communities here in Seattle. This technology has no value for our city.
740	anonymou s	None whatsoever
741	anonymou s	None
742	anonymou s	
743	anonymou s	None.
744	anonymou s	
745	anonymou s	Little to none. I truly believe it will only exasperate harm for most and would only be useful as a mean to oppress the general population
746	anonymou s	
747	anonymou s	No value
748	anonymou s	If we cannot staff a police force how will we staff a center and be able to react quickly?
749	anonymou s	I support anything that has a proven track record to help law enforcement. RTCC does.
750	anonymou s	None. This is a gift to private companies who make these technologies and a toy for cops to use on people they don't like. No benefit for normal people in the city
751	anonymou s	None
752	anonymou s	Absolutely none

75	anonymou	
3	s	None
75	anonymou	
4	s	No value waste of money and resources

ID	Email	Do you have additional comments/questions re what value do you see in this technology?
1	anonymou s	
2	anonymou s	
3	anonymou s	
4	anonymou s	
5	anonymou s	
6	anonymou s	None
7	anonymou s	
8	anonymou s	
9	anonymou s	
10	anonymou s	
11	anonymou s	
12	anonymou s	
13	anonymou s	
14	anonymou s	
15	anonymou s	
16	anonymou s	
17	anonymou s	
18	anonymou s	
19	anonymou s	We made it perfectly clear in the budget process that Seattle does not want surveillance technology. A new city council trying to get an easy win to look like they're doing something is callous and completely erodes trust in the community- trust they have yet to even earn.
20	anonymou s	
21	anonymou s	
22	anonymou s	

23	anonymou s	
24	anonymou s	
25	anonymou s	Why are you trying to record and monitor people instead of helping them with programs that get them financially stable or off street into homes??
26	anonymou s	
27	anonymou s	
28	anonymou s	
29	anonymou s	
30	anonymou s	
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	
33	anonymou s	
34	anonymou s	
35	anonymou s	
36	anonymou s	
37	anonymou s	
38	anonymou s	
39	anonymou s	
40	anonymou s	
41	anonymou s	
42	anonymou s	
43	anonymou s	
44	anonymou s	
45	anonymou s	
46	anonymou s	
47	anonymou s	
48	anonymou s	
49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	

51	anonymou s	
52	anonymou s	
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	
55	anonymou s	Value and safety can be gained by making people feel less precarious and more stable
56	anonymou s	
57	anonymou s	Please don't approve this .
58	anonymou s	
59	anonymou s	Only that it should be accessible to the public.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	Yes. The disingenuous seattle city council has given the city to criminal marauders. Residents need the city back. The city attorney better prosecute offenders.
62	anonymou s	no
63	anonymou s	
64	anonymou s	
65	anonymou s	
66	anonymou s	
67	anonymou s	
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	As a Seattle resident I want to enjoy the city and have tourists and others enjoy it too.
70	anonymou s	
71	anonymou s	
72	anonymou s	If the CCTV and GSLS are both approved, then this option should be as well as it uses the data from the other two.
73	anonymou s	I would like to see the information gathered held back from the public until the investigation is completed.
74	anonymou s	And more power in the hands of police, who have shown over and over their propensity to misuse their influence and their guns.
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	
77	anonymou s	

78	anonymou s	
79	anonymou s	
80	anonymou s	
81	anonymou s	
82	anonymou s	
83	anonymou s	
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	
86	anonymou s	Make sure that citizens can contribute with our own surveillance footage.
87	anonymou s	
88	anonymou s	
89	anonymou s	No
90	anonymou s	
91	anonymou s	It is violent, therefore, there is no value.
92	anonymou s	Again, I do not think the magnitude of the potential value gained is enough to justify the abuse concerns.
93	anonymou s	
94	anonymou s	
95	anonymou s	This is crazy and dystopian af. Y'all want to go down as the city leadership who finally ruined Seattle. Listen to the ACLU. Stop this police state surveillance madness. This used one of those issues that will cause me to vote against you.
96	anonymou s	It only leads to even more surveillance
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	No
99	anonymou s	
100	anonymou s	Have you looked into the various studies showing that this technology doesn't improve safety or quality of life, and merely perpetuates a cycle of antagonism between citizens and the police?
101	anonymou s	
102	anonymou s	
103	anonymou s	
104	anonymou s	

105	anonymou s	Once these cameras are integrated into a surveillance network, it's hard to imagine us being able to undo it, even if it demonstrably leads to more harm than good. It's like how we increase SPD salaries even when there's no correlation between higher salaries and reduced crime.
106	anonymou s	How to engage with communities affected by crime rather than surveilling them from afar.
107	anonymou s	Instead of investing in technology that we know won't work, we should invest in solutions we know do. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
108	anonymou s	
109	anonymou s	
110	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
117	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
118	anonymou s	
119	anonymou s	
120	anonymou s	
121	anonymou s	
122	anonymou s	Why are you investing in cracking down on the outcomes of social inequality rather than tackling the problems at their root? Crime, and uncivil behavior are the end state of problems that are not being addressed. See the signs and tackle the problems stop putting a Band-Aid on a flesh eating bacteria.
123	anonymou s	How racially biased is the technology?
124	anonymou s	
125	anonymou s	Do anything useful. Anything. Go back and read about what some of those options might be.
126	anonymou s	
127	anonymou s	
128	anonymou s	

12	anonymou 9 s	
13	anonymou 0 s	
13	anonymou 1 s	
13	anonymou 2 s	
13	anonymou 3 s	
13	anonymou 4 s	Don't implement corporate surveillance tech!
13	anonymou 5 s	
13	anonymou 6 s	
13	anonymou 7 s	
13	anonymou 8 s	
13	anonymou 9 s	
14	anonymou 0 s	
14	anonymou 1 s	No.
14	anonymou 2 s	
14	anonymou 3 s	
14	anonymou 4 s	Zero.
14	anonymou 5 s	
14	anonymou 6 s	
14	anonymou 7 s	
14	anonymou 8 s	
14	anonymou 9 s	It is not worth the tradeoff
15	anonymou 0 s	
15	anonymou 1 s	
15	anonymou 2 s	
15	anonymou 3 s	
15	anonymou 4 s	This is nothing but a way to waste taxpayer money by propping up tech companies that want to mass surveil everyone to bolster themselves.
15	anonymou 5 s	
15	anonymou 6 s	

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

15 7
anonymou
s

15 8
anonymou
s

15 9
anonymou
s

16 0
anonymou
s

16 1
anonymou
s

16 2
anonymou
s

16 3
anonymou
s

16 4
anonymou
s

16 5
anonymou
s

16 6
anonymou
s

16 7
anonymou
s

There is no value in technology like this. A false alarm is going to get someone killed

16 8
anonymou
s

16 9
anonymou
s

17 0
anonymou
s

17 1
anonymou
s

17 2
anonymou
s

17 3
anonymou
s

17 4
anonymou
s

17 5
anonymou
s

17	anonymou	
6	s	Dont do it
17	anonymou	
7	s	
17	anonymou	
8	s	
17	anonymou	
9	s	
18	anonymou	
0	s	
18	anonymou	
1	s	
18	anonymou	
2	s	
18	anonymou	
3	s	
18	anonymou	
4	s	
18	anonymou	
5	s	
18	anonymou	
6	s	
18	anonymou	
7	s	
18	anonymou	
8	s	
18	anonymou	we need this for CID
9	s	
19	anonymou	
0	s	
19	anonymou	
1	s	none
19	anonymou	
2	s	
19	anonymou	
3	s	
19	anonymou	
4	s	Do not fund this technology.
19	anonymou	
5	s	
19	anonymou	
6	s	
19	anonymou	
7	s	
19	anonymou	
8	s	
19	anonymou	there is no value
9	s	
20	anonymou	
0	s	
20	anonymou	
1	s	
20	anonymou	
2	s	
20	anonymou	
3	s	

20	anonymou	
4	s	
20	anonymou	
5	s	
20	anonymou	
6	s	
20	anonymou	
7	s	
20	anonymou	
8	s	
20	anonymou	
9	s	
21	anonymou	RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.
0	s	
21	anonymou	
1	s	
21	anonymou	
2	s	
21	anonymou	
3	s	
21	anonymou	
4	s	
21	anonymou	
5	s	
21	anonymou	
6	s	
21	anonymou	
7	s	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How has RTCC helped law enforcement since its implementation in 2017? Please provide concrete data. - What upgrades or expansions to the existing RTCC is SPD requesting specifically? Which of these upgrades or expansions are the most urgent and important? - What evidence does the SPD have for thinking that each RTCC upgrade will improve their work? - What is SPD and any other entities who use the RTCC and its data doing to protect privacy?
21	anonymou	- Like any technology that collects surveillance data, the RTCC is at risk for cybersecurity attacks. What will be done to mitigate and prevent RTCC cybersecurity breaches?
8	s	
21	anonymou	
9	s	
22	anonymou	
0	s	
22	anonymou	
1	s	
22	anonymou	
2	s	
22	anonymou	Law abiding humans aren't opposed to these technologies. Law ignoring humans are a burden to all of us.
3	s	
22	anonymou	
4	s	
22	anonymou	Many of us are tired of violence including gunshots being normalized in our communities. If RTCC will help coordinate and analyze violence in the city, if all for it. I would also like to see reports on the impact of these technologies in other cities.
5	s	
22	anonymou	
6	s	none

22	anonymou 7 s	
22	anonymou 8 s	
22	anonymou 9 s	Any benefits would seem to be balanced by over-surveillance of certain segments of the population.
23	anonymou 0 s	
23	anonymou 1 s	
23	anonymou 2 s	
23	anonymou 3 s	
23	anonymou 4 s	RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
23	anonymou 5 s	
23	anonymou 6 s	
23	anonymou 7 s	
23	anonymou 8 s	It provides evidence that can be used in court.
23	anonymou 9 s	Technically is not always the silver bullet it's made out to be (usually by those selling it).
24	anonymou 0 s	
24	anonymou 1 s	
24	anonymou 2 s	
24	anonymou 3 s	
24	anonymou 4 s	
24	anonymou 5 s	
24	anonymou 6 s	
24	anonymou 7 s	
24	anonymou 8 s	
24	anonymou 9 s	
25	anonymou 0 s	Like that series, was it called POI?, ability to identify a true threat can be helpful but not when it falsely identifies many other individuals as threats just because it can't discern clearly enough between individuals.
25	anonymou 1 s	
25	anonymou 2 s	
25	anonymou 3 s	

25	anonymou	
4	s	
25	anonymou	
5	s	
25	anonymou	
6	s	
25	anonymou	
7	s	
25	anonymou	No
8	s	
25	anonymou	
9	s	
26	anonymou	
0	s	
26	anonymou	
1	s	
26	anonymou	
2	s	
26	anonymou	
3	s	
26	anonymou	No advantage for the public.
4	s	
26	anonymou	Consider the loss of control as we add AI to everything.
5	s	
26	anonymou	No
6	s	
26	anonymou	
7	s	
26	anonymou	
8	s	
26	anonymou	don't buy it
9	s	
27	anonymou	
0	s	
27	anonymou	
1	s	
27	anonymou	
2	s	
27	anonymou	
3	s	
27	anonymou	
4	s	
27	anonymou	
5	s	
27	anonymou	
6	s	
27	anonymou	
7	s	
27	anonymou	
8	s	
27	anonymou	
9	s	
28	anonymou	
0	s	
28	anonymou	
1	s	

28	anonymou 2 s	
28	anonymou 3 s	
28	anonymou 4 s	
28	anonymou 5 s	
28	anonymou 6 s	
28	anonymou 7 s	
28	anonymou 8 s	
28	anonymou 9 s	No
29	anonymou 0 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
29	anonymou 1 s	
29	anonymou 2 s	
29	anonymou 3 s	
29	anonymou 4 s	
29	anonymou 5 s	
29	anonymou 6 s	
29	anonymou 7 s	
29	anonymou 8 s	This is not the direction we as a society should be headed. Random mass surveillance is a tool used by totalitarian governments.
29	anonymou 9 s	
30	anonymou 0 s	
30	anonymou 1 s	
30	anonymou 2 s	
30	anonymou 3 s	
30	anonymou 4 s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to</p>

reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

30	anonymou	
5	s	
30	anonymou	
6	s	
30	anonymou	This is unnecessary and police state technology. Do not invest in it.
7	s	
30	anonymou	
8	s	
30	anonymou	
9	s	
31	anonymou	
0	s	
31	anonymou	Why are we funding police technology when the community's lives are at stake?
1	s	
31	anonymou	
2	s	
31	anonymou	
3	s	
31	anonymou	
4	s	
31	anonymou	N/A
5	s	
31	anonymou	
6	s	
31	anonymou	
7	s	
31	anonymou	
8	s	
31	anonymou	
9	s	
32	anonymou	
0	s	
32	anonymou	
1	s	
32	anonymou	
2	s	
32	anonymou	
3	s	
32	anonymou	
4	s	
32	anonymou	add the mental health aid, drug rehab, and stop drugs from entering the state, offer job training, and affordable housing not surveying people going about their day!
5	s	
32	anonymou	
6	s	
32	anonymou	
7	s	
32	anonymou	
8	s	

32	anonymou 9 s	
33	anonymou 0 s	
33	anonymou 1 s	
33	anonymou 2 s	
33	anonymou 3 s	
33	anonymou 4 s	this is not a good use of city funds.
33	anonymou 5 s	
33	anonymou 6 s	
33	anonymou 7 s	this is a waste of taxpayer funds.
33	anonymou 8 s	
33	anonymou 9 s	
34	anonymou 0 s	
34	anonymou 1 s	
34	anonymou 2 s	
34	anonymou 3 s	No.
34	anonymou 4 s	
34	anonymou 5 s	
34	anonymou 6 s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
34	anonymou 7 s	

Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?		
348	anonymou s	
349	anonymou s	
350	anonymou s	We need more and improved response to crime happening daily in our neighborhood.
351	anonymou s	
352	anonymou s	
353	anonymou s	
354	anonymou s	
355	anonymou s	
356	anonymou s	
357	anonymou s	
358	anonymou s	
359	anonymou s	
360	anonymou s	
361	anonymou s	
362	anonymou s	There are tools that WORK to decrease violence. None of these are them Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
363	anonymou s	
364	anonymou s	
365	anonymou s	
366	anonymou s	
367	anonymou s	
368	anonymou s	We know this will be very expensive, and the funding could be much better spent on providing much-needed social services which have been proven to actually reduce violence and increase community safety. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025.
369	anonymou s	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. SEATTLE SHOULD NOT BECOME A SURVEILLANCE STATE, and I implore the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
370	anonymou s	
371	anonymou s	
372	anonymou s	

37	anonymou	
3	s	
37	anonymou	
4	s	
37	anonymou	None additional.
5	s	
37	anonymou	
6	s	
37	anonymou	Negative values
7	s	
37	anonymou	
8	s	
		Again, there is no value. We will WASTE money using this technology. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
37	anonymou	The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025.
9	s	
38	anonymou	
0	s	
38	anonymou	
1	s	
38	anonymou	We don't want surveillance. We want actual community safety. Listen to the numerous community led solutions proposed. City of Seattle's efforts to force RTCC into our city is shameful.
2	s	
38	anonymou	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.
3	s	
38	anonymou	
4	s	
38	anonymou	
5	s	
38	anonymou	
6	s	
38	anonymou	
7	s	
38	anonymou	
8	s	
38	anonymou	
9	s	
39	anonymou	We have a right to privacy.
0	s	
		RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
39	anonymou	
1	s	
39	anonymou	
2	s	
39	anonymou	N/A
3	s	

39	anonymou	
4	s	
39	anonymou	
5	s	
39	anonymou	
6	s	
39	anonymou	
7	s	
39	anonymou	
8	s	
39	anonymou	No
9	s	
40	anonymou	
0	s	
40	anonymou	
1	s	
40	anonymou	
2	s	
40	anonymou	
3	s	
40	anonymou	
4	s	
40	anonymou	
5	s	
40	anonymou	
6	s	
40	anonymou	Wait to implement until the pros and cons are demonstrated first by another city
7	s	
40	anonymou	
8	s	
40	anonymou	
9	s	
41	anonymou	
0	s	
41	anonymou	During such a drastic budget gap, SPD should focus on recruiting and training officers instead of buying fancy new toys
1	s	
41	anonymou	
2	s	
41	anonymou	
3	s	
41	anonymou	Why is this what we are choosing to spend taxpayer money on?
4	s	
41	anonymou	
5	s	
41	anonymou	
6	s	
41	anonymou	NO
7	s	
41	anonymou	
8	s	
41	anonymou	
9	s	
42	anonymou	
0	s	
42	anonymou	No.
1	s	

42	anonymou	
2	s	
42	anonymou	
3	s	
42	anonymou	
4	s	
42	anonymou	
5	s	
42	anonymou	
6	s	
42	anonymou	
7	s	
42	anonymou	
8	s	
42	anonymou	
9	s	
43	anonymou	
0	s	
43	anonymou	
1	s	
43	anonymou	
2	s	
43	anonymou	
3	s	
43	anonymou	
4	s	
43	anonymou	
5	s	
43	anonymou	
6	s	
43	anonymou	
7	s	
43	anonymou	
8	s	N/a
43	anonymou	
9	s	
44	anonymou	
0	s	
44	anonymou	
1	s	
44	anonymou	
2	s	
44	anonymou	
3	s	
44	anonymou	
4	s	
44	anonymou	
5	s	
44	anonymou	
6	s	
44	anonymou	
7	s	
44	anonymou	
8	s	
44	anonymou	
9	s	

45	anonymou	
0	s	
45	anonymou	
1	s	
45	anonymou	
2	s	
45	anonymou	
3	s	
45	anonymou	
4	s	
45	anonymou	
5	s	
45	anonymou	
6	s	
45	anonymou	
7	s	
45	anonymou	
8	s	
45	anonymou	
9	s	
46	anonymou	
0	s	
46	anonymou	
1	s	
46	anonymou	
2	s	
46	anonymou	
3	s	
46	anonymou	
4	s	
46	anonymou	
5	s	
46	anonymou	
6	s	
46	anonymou	
7	s	
46	anonymou	
8	s	No
46	anonymou	
9	s	
47	anonymou	
0	s	
47	anonymou	
1	s	
47	anonymou	
2	s	No.
47	anonymou	
3	s	
47	anonymou	
4	s	
47	anonymou	
5	s	
47	anonymou	
6	s	
47	anonymou	
7	s	

47	anonymou	
8	s	
47	anonymou	
9	s	
48	anonymou	
0	s	
48	anonymou	
1	s	
48	anonymou	
2	s	
48	anonymou	
3	s	
48	anonymou	
4	s	
48	anonymou	
5	s	
48	anonymou	
6	s	
48	anonymou	
7	s	
48	anonymou	
8	s	
48	anonymou	
9	s	
49	anonymou	
0	s	
49	anonymou	The amount of time and money it would cost to properly audit this technology to make sure that law enforcement is not abusing this power is more than the tech is worth in terms of community good.
1	s	
49	anonymou	
2	s	
49	anonymou	
3	s	-
49	anonymou	
4	s	
49	anonymou	
5	s	
49	anonymou	
6	s	
49	anonymou	
7	s	
49	anonymou	This technology exists to control and intimidate people and to make a huge amount of money for a few who own it. This trend has increased along with a concurrent decrease in social services and badly needed access to resources for the vulnerable. This needs to end.
8	s	
49	anonymou	
9	s	
50	anonymou	
0	s	
50	anonymou	
1	s	
50	anonymou	
2	s	
50	anonymou	
3	s	
50	anonymou	
4	s	An absolute must
50	anonymou	
5	s	

50	anonymou	
6	s	No.
50	anonymou	
7	s	
50	anonymou	
8	s	
50	anonymou	
9	s	
51	anonymou	
0	s	
51	anonymou	
1	s	
51	anonymou	
2	s	
51	anonymou	
3	s	
51	anonymou	
4	s	
51	anonymou	
5	s	
51	anonymou	
6	s	
51	anonymou	
7	s	
51	anonymou	
8	s	
51	anonymou	None
9	s	
52	anonymou	No
0	s	
52	anonymou	
1	s	
52	anonymou	
2	s	
52	anonymou	Again what's the data that shows it is effective?
3	s	
52	anonymou	
4	s	
52	anonymou	
5	s	
52	anonymou	
6	s	
52	anonymou	
7	s	
52	anonymou	
8	s	
52	anonymou	
9	s	
53	anonymou	
0	s	
53	anonymou	no
1	s	
53	anonymou	
2	s	
53	anonymou	
3	s	

53	anonymou 4 s	
53	anonymou 5 s	N/a
53	anonymou 6 s	
53	anonymou 7 s	
53	anonymou 8 s	
53	anonymou 9 s	
54	anonymou 0 s	Use funds for more police officers
54	anonymou 1 s	no
54	anonymou 2 s	
54	anonymou 3 s	No.
54	anonymou 4 s	I'd want to see significantly more efficacy data, peer reviewed studies, and comprehensive mitigations for how misuse will be prevented before I would even consider this. Even then, I don't think it solves what we are trying to solve.
54	anonymou 5 s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
54	anonymou 6 s	
54	anonymou 7 s	No
54	anonymou 8 s	Where is the data-driven decision making in this City Council?
54	anonymou 9 s	
55	anonymou 0 s	
55	anonymou 1 s	
55	anonymou 2 s	No value, don't do this
55	anonymou 3 s	
55	anonymou 4 s	
55	anonymou 5 s	N/A
55	anonymou 6 s	
55	anonymou 7 s	
55	anonymou 8 s	No value. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.

RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025

559	anonymou s	
560	anonymou s	
561	anonymou s	There is too much risk of government abuse with this information.
562	anonymou s	
563	anonymou s	
564	anonymou s	This technology is going to disproportionately harm minority communities that are already suffering from over-policing. Shame on you. Do not adopt this technology.
565	anonymou s	This technology is going to disproportionately harm minority communities that are already suffering from over-policing. Shame on you. Do not adopt this technology.
566	anonymou s	
567	anonymou s	No.
568	anonymou s	
569	anonymou s	
570	anonymou s	
571	anonymou s	
572	anonymou s	Profit for the vendor.
573	anonymou s	
574	anonymou s	
575	anonymou s	
576	anonymou s	
577	anonymou s	
578	anonymou s	
579	anonymou s	
580	anonymou s	
581	anonymou s	
582	anonymou s	
583	anonymou s	

58	anonymou	
4	s	
58	anonymou	
5	s	
58	anonymou	
6	s	
58	anonymou	
7	s	
58	anonymou	
8	s	
58	anonymou	
9	s	
59	anonymou	
0	s	
59	anonymou	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
1	s	
59	anonymou	
2	s	
59	anonymou	
3	s	
59	anonymou	
4	s	
59	anonymou	
5	s	
59	anonymou	
6	s	
59	anonymou	I invite you (whoever is reading this, yes you, you are in a position of power and influence!) to dream bigger and reflect on what actually brings joy and meaning to your life; I imagine it's feeling connected and in community with others; wouldn't it feel good to push for helping people instead of punishing them? Wouldn't it feel nice to live in a city where we helped and supported each other rather than where we feared and alienated each other?
7	s	
59	anonymou	
8	s	Why would you do this?
59	anonymou	
9	s	
60	anonymou	
0	s	
60	anonymou	I am paying attention to who votes for this and will NEVER support that person or anyone they endorse EVER AGAIN.
1	s	
60	anonymou	
2	s	
60	anonymou	
3	s	
60	anonymou	
4	s	
60	anonymou	
5	s	Why are you guys Being creeps.
60	anonymou	
6	s	None.
60	anonymou	
7	s	

60	anonymou 8 s	
60	anonymou 9 s	
61	anonymou 0 s	
61	anonymou 1 s	
61	anonymou 2 s	
61	anonymou 3 s	
61	anonymou 4 s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
61	anonymou 5 s	It is important to note that the Crime Prevention Technology pilot is just one component of a holistic crime-prevention strategy. The city will continue to invest in other crucial initiatives, such as increased police patrols, community-based public safety programs, enhanced lighting, and more frequent street and sidewalk cleaning. By combining these efforts with the proposed technologies, we can take a multi-faceted approach to addressing the root causes of crime and creating a safer Seattle for everyone.
61	anonymou 6 s	
61	anonymou 7 s	No
61	anonymou 8 s	
61	anonymou 9 s	
62	anonymou 0 s	
62	anonymou 1 s	
62	anonymou 2 s	
62	anonymou 3 s	
62	anonymou 4 s	
62	anonymou 5 s	
62	anonymou 6 s	
62	anonymou 7 s	
62	anonymou 8 s	I don't want a private company to manage this - I would like the City of Seattle fully fund and own this system with regulation to make this data public as well.
62	anonymou 9 s	
63	anonymou 0 s	
63	anonymou 1 s	
63	anonymou 2 s	Back away from our civil liberties.

63	anonymou	
3	s	Nope. Get stay from our civil liberties.
63	anonymou	
4	s	
63	anonymou	
5	s	
63	anonymou	
6	s	
63	anonymou	
7	s	
63	anonymou	
8	s	
63	anonymou	
9	s	
64	anonymou	Again, this will increase violent interactions with police and violations of the civil rights of minority groups.
0	s	
64	anonymou	See above letter.
1	s	
64	anonymou	
2	s	
64	anonymou	
3	s	
64	anonymou	RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
4	s	
64	anonymou	
5	s	
64	anonymou	
6	s	
64	anonymou	
7	s	
64	anonymou	
8	s	
64	anonymou	
9	s	
65	anonymou	
0	s	
65	anonymou	
1	s	
65	anonymou	
2	s	
65	anonymou	
3	s	
65	anonymou	
4	s	
65	anonymou	
5	s	
65	anonymou	
6	s	
65	anonymou	
7	s	

65	anonymou	
8	s	Do it.
65	anonymou	
9	s	
66	anonymou	
0	s	
66	anonymou	
1	s	
66	anonymou	
2	s	
66	anonymou	
3	s	
66	anonymou	How is this system going to help or even engage in consent or alerts to our community members with language barriers, hearing disabilities, sight disabilities, etc? How does this technology protect civilians from harrassment or escalation of officers with implicit and explicit biases?
4	s	
66	anonymou	
5	s	
66	anonymou	
6	s	
66	anonymou	
7	s	
66	anonymou	
8	s	
66	anonymou	
9	s	
67	anonymou	
0	s	
67	anonymou	
1	s	
67	anonymou	
2	s	
67	anonymou	
3	s	
67	anonymou	
4	s	
67	anonymou	None
5	s	
67	anonymou	
6	s	
67	anonymou	
7	s	
67	anonymou	
8	s	
67	anonymou	
9	s	
68	anonymou	
0	s	
68	anonymou	
1	s	
68	anonymou	
2	s	
68	anonymou	
3	s	
68	anonymou	
4	s	
68	anonymou	Please do NOT deploy real-time crime center (RTCC) software
5	s	

68	anonymou 6 s	
68	anonymou 7 s	
68	anonymou 8 s	
68	anonymou 9 s	Has no one on city council read the SIR?
69	anonymou 0 s	
69	anonymou 1 s	more info / attached links: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14EhNiDMb7M8Z7TafyZsbxGOfdelDOGzRYxZNd3biwIE/edit
69	anonymou 2 s	
69	anonymou 3 s	
69	anonymou 4 s	
69	anonymou 5 s	
69	anonymou 6 s	
69	anonymou 7 s	
69	anonymou 8 s	
69	anonymou 9 s	
70	anonymou 0 s	The City should consider the needs of communities already most impacted by police violence, rather than sweeping the concerns of low-income folks under the rug in favor of wealthy coalitions of business owners.
70	anonymou 1 s	
70	anonymou 2 s	
70	anonymou 3 s	
70	anonymou 4 s	
70	anonymou 5 s	
70	anonymou 6 s	
70	anonymou 7 s	
70	anonymou 8 s	
70	anonymou 9 s	
71	anonymou 0 s	
71	anonymou 1 s	RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.

		<p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025</p> <p>Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.</p> <p>Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.</p>
71	anonymou 2 s	NONE.
71	anonymou 3 s	
71	anonymou 4 s	
71	anonymou 5 s	
71	anonymou 6 s	Suppliers must know who they are supply to terrorists what is the value or who they are buying and don't know about any technology and what is value of that technology.
71	anonymou 7 s	
71	anonymou 8 s	
71	anonymou 9 s	
72	anonymou 0 s	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas
72	anonymou 1 s	Na
72	anonymou 2 s	
72	anonymou 3 s	
72	anonymou 4 s	
72	anonymou 5 s	
72	anonymou 6 s	No
72	anonymou 7 s	no
72	anonymou 8 s	I implore you to push to consult with researchers and other cities that are pulling away from this costly and ineffective technology. This is not something we should be rushing towards and I am extremely concerned about the lack of consult from researchers or others in this field that do not directly profit from the use of the technology.
72	anonymou 9 s	It could help with other local issues or crime. For example, kidnapping of children and things like that. Violence or other crimes that may not be felonies like break-ins into local businesses. That is a constant crime in the C-ID neighborhood.
73	anonymou 0 s	
73	anonymou 1 s	
73	anonymou 2 s	None
73	anonymou 3 s	

73	anonymou	
4	s	
73	anonymou	
5	s	
73	anonymou	
6	s	
73	anonymou	
7	s	
73	anonymou	
8	s	
73	anonymou	
9	s	
74	anonymou	
0	s	
74	anonymou	NO to Surveillance tech. Invest in community organizations. Listen to the people. Not just those with power or proximity to power
1	s	
74	anonymou	
2	s	
74	anonymou	None.
3	s	
74	anonymou	
4	s	
74	anonymou	
5	s	
74	anonymou	
6	s	
74	anonymou	
7	s	
74	anonymou	
8	s	
74	anonymou	No
9	s	
75	anonymou	
0	s	
75	anonymou	
1	s	
75	anonymou	
2	s	
75	anonymou	None, please do not purchase these technologies.
3	s	
75	anonymou	
4	s	

ID	Email	What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?
	anonymou	
1	s	initial cost vs long term savings (cost over time due to the efficiency of the network).
	anonymou	
2	s	
	anonymou	It inherently violates the surveillance ordinance. This technology constantly adds additional algorithms & other items. These additions would not be going through the surveillance impact review process.
3	s	It has not been proven to reduce crime or increase clearance rates

		It is dependent on the existence of other invasive surveillance technologies (most notably CCTV) It eliminates public knowledge & approval of other surveillance technologies & their expansion Endangers anyone traveling to Seattle to access abortion or trans healthcare Money for this could be spent on community investments that actually reduce violence
4	anonymou s	Provide/post/disseminate public information. I really want to support you but won't do it blindly. :)
5	anonymou s	If you want to have a Real Time Crime Center, I'd suggest looking at wage theft. It *vastly* outpaces the financial impact of larceny + burglary + auto-theft put together.
6	anonymou s	Please stop letting the police waste money on toys.
7	anonymou s	Why are we trying to do things that don't work versus cops doing they job they're paid a lot for?
8	anonymou s	Do you really think your neighbors are all coordinating violent criminal acts? If so, why do you still live here?
9	anonymou s	
10	anonymou s	Consider it's citizens privacy and make better use of funds by investing in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs.
11	anonymou s	Please consider how much money you will be spending on ineffective technology to be given to SPD with little to no oversight. We already have a serious lack of accountability in the SPD and we do not need to hand them more technology to surveil us, especially technology that is proven useless in creating actual public safety. Please instead invest in the root causes of violence and support housing, mental health support, substance abuse treatment, education and after school programs, community centers, and community lead initiatives to reduce neighborhood violence.
12	anonymou s	Consider talking to equity minded researchers at UW (e.g., college of education or social work), community organizations, mental health/social workers etc. Your plan sounds like it came from people who don't actually know about the community they're trying to make decisions for or the research on such policies. It sounds like people outside of the actual communities trying to feel safe or do something quickly and irresponsibly.
13	anonymou s	AI bias is well documented, and outsourcing an already biased field of policing to AI technologies will increase these biases even more.
		There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
14	anonymou s	
15	anonymou s	There are MANY more effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence, which do not create a surveillance state that infringes on the civil rights of the most vulnerable in our community. a. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their

		<p>Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>b. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>c. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>d. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>e. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
16	anonymou s	Why are you focused on funding upgrading technology to "fight" crime, rather than actually addressing the problems causing the crime?
17	anonymou s	Are there better ways to prevent crimes? Do these leaders feel comfortable knowing their movements may be tracked? How about the movements of their children? Yes, it can be used to track down a lost child, but it can also be used to target a child for criminal purposes.
18	anonymou s	The city has not consulted anyone (except maybe sales reps) about this technology - the fields in the SIR report regarding experts, outside agencies consulted are left blank.
19	anonymou s	
20	anonymou s	
21	anonymou s	That it is needed in the CID now, as the public safety and business environment has been destroyed in the CID since the "defund-the-police" movement has destroyed the police force.
22	anonymou s	<p>Please consider the fact that there are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. These include violence interruption programs. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. These are the kinds of solutions we should truly be considering.</p>
23	anonymou s	This is a toolkit for mass surveillance of Seattle residents and visitors. It violates our civil rights, enrolls many private entities in government surveillance, and is a waste of our money. It is especially dangerous for communities of color, for a variety of reasons related to ingrained racism.
24	anonymou s	How over surveillance negatively impacts vulnerable communities
25	anonymou s	Invest in growth programs rather than technology to monitor people and violate privacy rights.
26	anonymou s	
27	anonymou s	Please consider the cost, efficacy, and what you are showing as a city if you were to choose to implement this technology. This would only increase distrust and is extremely harmful and violates neighborhood and community and individual civil liberties.

28	anonymou s	Be more responsible with spending the public's money, don't waste it on gimmicks and gadgets like this. It's just pumping money into the companies that sell the tech instead of more efficiently going to the root of our crime problems and addressing basic needs.
29	anonymou s	Spending this money on social support systems would be much more cost effective at reducing crime.
30	anonymou s	
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	Waste of taxpayer money, degradation of our communities as livable
33	anonymou s	Consider how this money could be better spent on the people of Seattle.
34	anonymou s	Consider the impact on marginalized people and the use of the data gathered by these technologies. I restate: The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and eat up scarce public money, preventing programs that actually reduce violence from getting funded and continuing disinvestment in communities
35	anonymou s	We need safety in our city but surveillance will not make us safer
36	anonymou s	Read 1 sci-fi book about this type of surveillance system. It always goes badly. We have a budget shortfall.
37	anonymou s	Surveillance and AI recognition technology disproportionately impact already over-policed groups, especially BIPOC, queer, disabled, and low-income communities. I'd urge SPD to consider how the addition of more surveillance and AI recognition technology would impact these groups.
38	anonymou s	cost & use
39	anonymou s	Making use of solutions to violence that actually work (https://www.vera.org/community-violence-intervention-programs-explained) The implications of handing the reins of ethical concerns to complex technology that is changing and which comes with many liabilities and problems for which there are currently absolutely not satisfactory solutions.
40	anonymou s	Consider how voters will feel about this betrayal when your seat is up for reelection
41	anonymou s	What community-based alternatives are being discussed?
42	anonymou s	Is this worth the money? Are we spending more money on expensive technology that just tells us after the fact that something maybe bad maybe happened somewhere when we could be spending it on programs that give people the resources and support they need to not commit crime in the first place?
43	anonymou s	That implementing this technology is a violation of privacy and human rights. More surveillance is not a solution for poverty.
44	anonymou s	I urge you to stay true to Seattle's values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Investing in these programs would also put money into the actual communities most impacted by gun violence instead of giving that money to a company located in a different state.
45	anonymou s	How much money do you have to throw away and for how long before you can admit to yourself and us that policing does not solve what it purports to? Police do not prevent crime. Police officers commit domestic crime at a higher rate than the population. Police are more likely to die by friendly fire than by the hand of a "bad guy". Let's get out of the 80s and into the new year folks. A few bad apples do not account for the years of misconduct by the SPD. Find some guts and make the decisions to actually address problems so we can all be safer, healthier, and happier.
46	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

47	anonymou s	Stop putting money towards expensive and ineffective technology and use that to better our community and third spaces.
48	anonymou s	Racial equity and how our resources can be best used to promote public safety. Also think about the implications of having RTCC potentially sharing data with private companies.
49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	Are you just going to rubber stamp this? It's just more surveillance tools to spy on innocent citizens.
51	anonymou s	
52	anonymou s	How to help offset poverty - the real drive of crime
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	
55	anonymou s	Engage in good-faith discussions with the community, take their time, provide ample and responsibly-sourced meta-studies and invest in proven solutions
56	anonymou s	
57	anonymou s	Please consider the safety of undocumented people, the privacy of citizens, the safety of everyone.
58	anonymou s	Don't. This will amplify racism in our already awfully racist police system. There is no benefit to targeting communities and taking away people's right TO THEIR OWN PRIVACY
59	anonymou s	A user friendly web GUI for the public to review and volunteer critical data.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	Yes. The disingenuous seattle city council has given the city to criminal marauders. Residents need the city back. The city attorney better prosecute offenders.
62	anonymou s	Always keep privacy concerns top of mind.

63	anonymou s	The research shows that this technology does not reduce crime.
64	anonymou s	Who has access and oversight? How to ensure it can't be weaponized? How effective is it without all features/systems to coordinate?
65	anonymou s	Stop the crime and lawlessness. Police do not respond to any crimes. If you want to report a crime, it can take well more than an hour before you get through to speak to anyone. Then the police still do not respond. City leadership is doing nothing to stop the crime and lawlessness. Seattle is a dump. Even the rest of the country looks down on Seattle and our inability to maintain a safe community. Our reputation in the rest of the world is that Seattle is a dangerous place to visit or live in.
66	anonymou s	
67	anonymou s	This will not make our city safer or more equitable. It will, however, lead to more racial profiling.
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	Use it
70	anonymou s	<p>Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
71	anonymou s	Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences. Whose Streets Our Streets (WSOS), a local BIPOC organization who has been conducting community based and participatory research has identified that the current level of surveillance has "a psychological effect on the people being surveilled." We expect this negative psychological impact will vastly increase should the City of Seattle expand its surveillance technology programs. Instead, substantially increase investment in equitable and evidence-based strategies for gun violence prevention while also offering meaningful support to victims and survivors.
72	anonymou s	This software would be beneficial if you approve the CCTV and GSLS and should be approved if one of both of the others are approved.
73	anonymou s	The safety of the public rather than the voices of the people who loudly oppose everything. Tune out the ACLU for a change and consider the majority who want to be heard.
74	anonymou s	Whom are you actually serving or responding to? And whom else should you be responding to and serving?
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	Please lock up violent and repeat offenders to keep us safe.
77	anonymou s	Getting this approved and doing their job to keep the peace at our communities.
78	anonymou s	Prosecute criminals
79	anonymou s	How quickly this can be installed

80	anonymou s	Consider the privacy and security threat of this technology without the proper vetting put in place. Consider that this program may be getting rushed without full transparency to the people it would be affecting the most. Consider that most people do not know this is happening, and if they did they would most likely voice their opinions against this program.
81	anonymou s	Hire more cops first.
82	anonymou s	We have many other asks and services that are not being addressed, such as rent control, affordable housing, and COVID safety protocol, and police brutality.
83	anonymou s	
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	City leaders need to make clear to law enforcement, this is not a replacement for good policing. This is another tool when a horrific crime occurs. Warrants should be required for this information. This is not a replacement for good policing. This should not be abused and over utilized.
86	anonymou s	
87	anonymou s	Is freedom really so unimportant?
88	anonymou s	I have a friend who has worked for many years as a Seattle police officer. We have laws to protect the rights of citizens, but my understanding is that, in some cases, these laws may hold police to very high standards of proof that result in less effective policing. I don't know if this would be the case, but I wonder if such a command center would enable police to have access to the high standards of proof needed to lead to effective enforcement.
89	anonymou s	The number of times that folks have stopped reporting crimes because the police don't have the time to investigate and catch the criminals.
90	anonymou s	
91	anonymou s	No one wants this but violent people.
92	anonymou s	Mainly the dangers of implicit bias among operators of this technology potentially causing significant injustice due to differing amounts of police attention to different communities.
93	anonymou s	Consider all the ways this system could be misused before thinking about any benefits.
94	anonymou s	
95	anonymou s	These systems violate people's rights. You shouldn't need any more information than that.
96	anonymou s	Put it in your neighborhood first.
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	That it combats criminal activity as it happening.
99	anonymou s	Consider the right for citizens to be free of police surveillance in their private lives
100	anonymou s	Please consider every test program showing that actually investing into communities (direct financial aid, putting the homeless into real housing, etc) does actual good as opposed to increased surveillance and use this money to do that instead.
101	anonymou s	
102	anonymou s	This money would be better invested in social services with more gains for community building and crime deterrence.
103	anonymou s	the public safety and well-being of citizens, rather than those who choose to commit crimes and hurt others
104	anonymou s	I want them to ask themselves if this is the world they want for themselves and our children. To be constantly monitored. To sacrifice our freedoms to technology and the illusion of safety.

105	anonymou s	Again, let's think ahead to the inevitable cases of mis-identification, and how much damage this will do to citizens who already have ample reasons to distrust the SPD and Big Tech surveillance.
106	anonymou s	
107	anonymou s	City leadership should look at the research and examine what actually works. City leadership should understand that in a tight budget, we need to double down on investments that we know work. Our city leadership needs to approach this extremely complex and nuanced issue of gun violence and community safety not from a fear-based mindset but from one rooted in research and understanding of what our communities need to be safe and what community members need to feel safer.
108	anonymou s	I do not support any further funding of surveillance technologies and do not want the SPD to have any further surveillance resources supplied to them.
109	anonymou s	We're already over-surveilled. More surveillance isn't the answer. This will impact communities very disproportionately. We shouldn't be living in a panopticon.
110	anonymou s	Yes, they take work, but invest in real solutions that take time and work, not this lazy way out. This is a step on the way to replacing police with AI. Perhaps we should replace the mayor and council with AI too. By real solutions: increased gun control, enabling lower and middle income people to comfortably live and work in Seattle, training police not weaponizing them.
111	anonymou s	Impact on marginalized communities. How could this money be spent on housing, healthcare, education instead of policing?
112	anonymou s	City leadership must consider the multitude of negative impacts these technologies have been proven to have along with the potential for abuse.
113	anonymou s	If you support the use of this technology, I will vote for your opponents and donate to their campaigns.
114	anonymou s	The privacy afforded to me by the 4th amendment of the constitution and the unconstitutionality of effectively searching individuals without cause.
115	anonymou s	That having this technology, if used correctly, can only help this city with crime prevention.
116	anonymou s	I want the city to consider using taxpayer money responsibly. We are in the midst of a housing and drug crisis. We need housing and treatment, not wasteful tech gadgets for cops to play with. The police have plenty of technology.
117	anonymou s	Cost and alternatives that help people in Seattle become stable, get mental health and recovery program access.
118	anonymou s	Consider that there is no scientific or statistical evidence that such surveillance technology will increase safety in Seattle. Everything goes against what Fusus salespeople purport. This widens the power gap between the city and it's citizens, who are the true power center of Seattle. Increased surveillance and restriction will only increase violent resistance, costing more money and more violence in an already unequal city.
119	anonymou s	
120	anonymou s	
121	anonymou s	Consider alternative strategies for community support that do not involve more violence. Broadband surveillance like this is an act of violence against the community. It has been proven to us time and again that SPD has no obligation in their oath or organization to protect and serve their community, their entire job is to protect assets and secure 'undesirable' neighborhoods to make way for further gentrification and wealth acquisition, but increasing surveillance used by police is a direct offensive act against all citizens of Seattle. Harm reduction does not start with increasing reactionary measures against harm, it starts with working with the community to understand the sources of harm that are working through people. It starts with understanding that it takes a lot of intersectional pressure in society to make a person commit violent crime, and in some sense it is usually self defense on some level.
122	anonymou s	Consider the science and sociology that show how to tackle the issues that our city is facing. Do not resort to authoritarian means of coercion.
123	anonymou s	The expansion of surveillance and the police state is a threat to community safety. Police have a history of extrajudicial killings, especially of Black and Indigenous community members.
124	anonymou s	Cost and the ability to establish, operate, maintain and update systems, policies and procedures are critical. Strong command structure is critical, but leadership needs to ensure that there is also collaboration between all parties involved in decision making and leadership during operations.

125	anonymou s	Consider all that life has to offer and how short it can be. Consider that you have a job to do, and you're failing at it every day.
126	anonymou s	
127	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
128	anonymou s	
129	anonymou s	
130	anonymou s	I want the City to consider the facts about this technology, which is that it's expensive and ineffective. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. And the investments that are being proposed to purchase and maintain this technology should be used for programs and solutions that come from the community, and don't increase the potential for police abuse and overreach.
131	anonymou s	Training those who monitor the system need to be well trained.
132	anonymou s	Policing is a band-aid solution and we should focus on long-term solutions!
133	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
134	anonymou s	Don't implement corporate surveillance tech!
135	anonymou s	Less resources towards crime suppression, more towards removing the causes of crime.
136	anonymou s	
137	anonymou s	Public comment. Y'all collect it, but you don't actually care.
138	anonymou s	Stop ignoring the people who live here. This technology is not wanted by the majority. You wouldn't dare put this on a ballot because you already know it would be overwhelmingly rejected.
139	anonymou s	
140	anonymou s	I want City leadership to consider the wealth of evidence in support of local, community-based solutions to the problems of crime that the RTCC is purportedly aiming to solve. I also want City leadership to

		consider the decades of evidence pointing out the failure of surveillance technologies to accomplish the goals that community-based solutions have been making strides in just in the last several years. If there is a "new" technology that should attract the interest of community members who want a safe and vibrant city to live in, it is not surveillance, or AI; it is strengthening the community itself, bringing citizens closer to one another, alleviating poverty and encouraging the growth and development of all of the neighborhoods in our city, particularly those which have been most neglected and thus most susceptible to violence.
14	anonymou 1 s	
14	anonymou 2 s	Listen to community members who are most impacted.
14	anonymou 3 s	
14	anonymou 4 s	This is a fault of their making, the citizens already pay enough through our day to day lives in this city they have decimated.
14	anonymou 5 s	Is this going re-direct public funds to private enterprise that already has an outside influence on public policy? Is this going to protect wealthy property owners and businesses while leaving marginalized and low-income people as targets of the system? Why do we need this technology instead of a human driven non-law enforcement approach?
14	anonymou 6 s	
14	anonymou 7 s	Restructuring the police since the current crop are sexist and incompetent.
14	anonymou 8 s	
14	anonymou 9 s	The lack of studies into how effective RTCCs really are. That there would be nothing to stop someone from pointing their own privately owned camera where they liked, the data of which would then still be integrated into the RTCC software.
15	anonymou 0 s	SPD is saying their existing systems are too cumbersome because they aren't integrated. In an attempt to solve that problem, SPD is proposing creating yet another database. It should be obvious that the solution to too many un integrated data systems is NOT another data system. Fix the ones you already have or create portals to integrate them rather than compounding the existing problem.
15	anonymou 1 s	<p>RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights</p> <p>These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.</p> <p>This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.</p> <p>3. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.</p>

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced

15	anonymou 2 s	
15	anonymou 3 s	
15	anonymou 4 s	That there are so many other effective ways to directly help people in need and offer outreach to would-be criminals to improve their lives. Abusing technology is an aggressive, dangerous approach that will not make the city a better place to live.
15	anonymou 5 s	
15	anonymou 6 s	I would want them to consider underlying causes of the problems they identify rather than bending their knee to the lobbying of those who seek to take advantage of public fear.
15	anonymou 7 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
15	anonymou 8 s	How many people we could feed, clothe and shelter for the cost of this program.
15	anonymou 9 s	Whether any independent third-party research into the use of RTCC like Fusus has consistently demonstrated a improvement in crime-related outcomes, whether the adoption of RTCC is consistent with Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, whether the adoption of RTCC will contribute a chilling effect to freedom of movement and speech, particularly in public spaces, and whether the adoption of RTCC is consistent with the positions of civil liberties organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation which opposes such efforts: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time
16	anonymou 0 s	The negative effects it would have on already marginalized communities!
16	anonymou 1 s	The City should stop throwing money at contractors and technology and instead build real community relationships to increase safety. An adversarial police force becomes only more hostile to the people as its reach increases.
16	anonymou 2 s	This is a waste of taxpayer money and a violation of privacy. This money would be more effective at preventing crime if it were spent funding schools, parks, or lawyers working to dismantle the SPOG. Please find effective ways to hold the SPD accountable and professional instead of suppressing protests and free speech.
16	anonymou 3 s	The fact that is has been documented to be almost completely ineffective.
16	anonymou 4 s	

165	anonymou s	
166	anonymou s	I want City leadership to consider that instead of using this technology, you could invest in community-led solutions to violence such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
167	anonymou s	I want city leadership to consider facts, data and knowledge, Not just ignore all the data about this program that we already have
168	anonymou s	Can someone truly be free if they are being constantly watched
169	anonymou s	Privacy, risk of litigation, racial disparity in enforcement and the consequences thereof, fiscal irresponsibility of doing this when the city is facing a budget shortfall and cuts to needed programs, dangers to citizens from responses targeting locations with "known associates" etc
170	anonymou s	I have lived in authoritarian police state type countries, the crime rate is much lower but it comes at a cost to the citizenry. If a centralized surveillance state is your desire there are plenty to choose from: Russia, China, Syria, N. Korea the list is long. Choose one and move.
171	anonymou s	Please consider the laws that we have in place regarding limitations on police reach. Such as warrants or consent to access private property, including camera feeds. These exist for a reason. Please also consider any external research about the effectiveness of surveillance in general. It simply doesn't work to reduce crime and instead endangers already vulnerable communities. Do not waste funds on untested technology that violates civil liberties, instead fund community led efforts that are more effective and respect the privacy and autonomy of Seattle residents.
172	anonymou s	How will the city be sure these technologies don't violate civil liberties, or are used to target BIPOC citizens?
173	anonymou s	I would prefer that you invest in prevention and our community rather than spend money on big tech companies that we can't trust and that don't work.
174	anonymou s	I understand that you likely believe automation to be a natural result of the high costs of policing in Seattle and the high rate of churn among officers. Have you considered that the current state of the SPD is fundamentally broken instead of attempting to bolster it with technological solutions? Have you considered that less, not more, punitive and invasive policing is the way to fix this trajectory?
175	anonymou s	I'm deeply concerned that this technology might include information from privately owned cameras. I would not trust city leaders who choose to back this technology.
176	anonymou s	Assist and invest in more community oriented solutions for protecting our communities. Go to the communities and support them in the way they wish to be supported. People who actually live in impacted communities know best what these solutions look like
177	anonymou s	Don't vote for it!!!! Invest in jobs, housing & healthcare
178	anonymou s	
179	anonymou s	
180	anonymou s	Listen to your constituents and do your research
181	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered

		<p>approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
18 2	anonymou s	
		RTCC is an expensive annual subscription and the city is facing a massive budget deficit.
18 3	anonymou s	RTCC has not been shown to reduce crime or improve clearance rates. While a lot of community investments have been shown to reduce crime (ex. affordable housing, food access, number of parks, lighting, programs for youth, and youth employment)
18 4	anonymou s	I want the City to think about the effects of this on everyday citizens and people in the community at large the how much city surveillance is ethical and we are willing to tolerate in the supposed name of justice. Is this actually going to prevent crimes? What does the data say about the practical effectiveness of this technology? Does it decrease crime rate? Or does it increase the number of arrests?
18 5	anonymou s	What evidence is there that this would reduce harm? That it would not exacerbate existing harms?
18 6	anonymou s	I want the councilmembers to really think about how they would feel staring down a city block full of cameras, not knowing which ones are watching and what they're recording about you, what they're deciding about you at all times (which we of course wouldn't know, given that a private company is in charge here). If some algorithm decides you're undesirable for any reason, that's really it for you, and there's nothing you can do about it. That's horrifying.
18 7	anonymou s	I would want City leadership to consider its ethical and moral responsibilities to the many people who live in Seattle because it is a Sanctuary City, because it is a liberal city, and because it is one of the few cities in the United States where people of all backgrounds can safely reside. Please do not make Seattle yet another place to flee.
18 8	anonymou s	To consider the communities that call Seattle home, and how this will only hurt them, not prevent crime. Investing in mental health, housing, or education would all be better ways to prevent crime
18 9	anonymou s	no
19 0	anonymou s	
19 1	anonymou s	none
19 2	anonymou s	Consult with experts and others aside from salespeople for RTCC technologies. Consider the use of other more effective crime prevention techniques like violence interruption models, affordable housing, and mental healthcare.
19 3	anonymou s	not use this technology
19 4	anonymou s	It's invasive It's expensive It won't keep people safe I don't trust cops with this power
19 5	anonymou s	Continue it
19 6	anonymou s	How this violates our constitutional rights and creates an environment ripe for abuse.
19 7	anonymou s	Consider the rights of your constituents to live lives as they choose, to be free, to be in community in public without backlash, to have FULL and complete ownership over their bodies and who has information about their bodies.
19 8	anonymou s	This a creepy, truly apocalyptic overreach by the city. Seattle is a sanctuary city. People come here seeking refuge, from anti-LGBT legislation, from misogynistic healthcare policies, from domestic violence, for the chance at a better life. And we would undermine that all for a useless and expensive piece of technology?
19 9	anonymou s	this is not the way to make our city more safe

20 0	anonymou s	not go forward with this, and stick up for our community's needs and rights.
20 1	anonymou s	This is extremely urgent. I'm not sure city leadership understands how badly things are deteriorating in spite of their statements that things are getting better.
20 2	anonymou s	Meeting people's basic needs (food, shelter, clothing, healthcare) are what reduces crime - not excessive technology or bloated police budgets. We need to be putting funds towards housing, shelter, healthcare, food access programs, and harm reduction to help our communities be safer.
20 3	anonymou s	The city should use resources to support communities and work to shelter the unhoused, not give more unnecessary funds to police who will misuse it.
20 4	anonymou s	That videos are not used for purposes other than the intended, to monitor illegal activity in high-crime areas where gun violence, property crimes, human trafficking, and other felony crimes are concentrated.
20 5	anonymou s	If the City adopts this technology, they will not be standing true to the values of the sanctuary city Seattle says it is.
20 6	anonymou s	Don't just jump on the bandwagon whenever new tech comes along and expect it to solve our crime problem. It's tedious and wasteful. Take your time to do proper research, consult independent experts, etc. Measure twice, cut once. The taxpayers of Seattle will (finally) thank you.
20 7	anonymou s	The reason police dont solve crime is because of a lack of community trust. This will only undermine what little trust exists and people will automatically assume the worst of law enforcement and think that any question is an attempt to entrap them or catch them in a lie because the police will have secret access to who knows how many cameras in the area.This only makes the problem it is trying to address worse. We deserve better from the people we give 40% OF OUR MUNICIPAL BUDGET TOO
20 8	anonymou s	Just have a few crime center around the district.
20 9	anonymou s	Use cost-effective technology to supplement increased investments in law enforcement and care team officers.
21 0	anonymou s	Do not use this. Instead, please invest in one of the many effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
21 1	anonymou s	The city needs to listen to lots of people and not just law enforcement or corporations shilling their products to law enforcement. The city needs to look at the research around RTCC. The city needs to consider the civil liberties and rights of people living in and moving around the city of Seattle. The city also needs to realize that this money can be better spent. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
21 2	anonymou s	Hello, My name is Dr. Wilda Heard and am a long-time resident of Belltown. Belltown is trying to recover from the Pandemic, Open Air Drug Dealing, loitering, petty crime, burglary, and the wrong definition of Compassion. Compassion is not allowing people to commit suicide on the street because the Neiman Marxist Class feels guilty. Law and Order is not Racist, allowing Blacks to suffer because predatory criminals are allowed to roam free is. All neighborhoods must have law and order and there must be deterrence to predatory criminal behavior, no matter who the perp is. This comment is in support of implementation of Seattle's new crime prevention technology pilot program. This program will target high-crime areas where gun violence, property crimes, human trafficking, and other felony crimes are concentrated. Last fall, Mayor Bruce Harrell and the Seattle City Council included funding in the 2024 budget for this

pilot program that combines:

- Closed circuit TV cameras
- Automated license plate readers
- Acoustic gunshot locators

With staffing of Seattle Police Department sworn officers at an all-time low (only 937 available for deployment) the police department needs more tools in their toolbox to adequately address crime in our region. Other cities across the country, like Detroit, that have deployed this technology package have seen a reduction in crime by nearly 20%.

In order for small businesses to thrive, crime must reduce, the streets must be cleaned up and hopefully you will clean up Seattle before the Soccer games in 2026 and not wait until a President Xi arrives as San Francisco did.

Another suggestion to strengthen Seattle is a revolving credit fund to help small businesses with temporary cash flow problems. At present, all government wants to do in feed and grow the Homeless Industrial Complex.

Thanks for the opportunity to present my opinions.

Drwildasays

Recommended Cite:

<https://www.simplypsychology.org/broken-windows-theory.html>

Theories » Criminology

Broken Windows Theory Of Criminology

By

Charlotte Ruhl

Updated on February 8, 2023

Reviewed by

Saul Mcleod, PhD

21	anonymou	Based on the voluminous evidence of harm with this technology, I would want city leadership to refuse it and instead invest our resources in prevention and investing in community.
3	s	
21	anonymou	
4	s	
21	anonymou	civil liberties, socioeconomic oppression
5	s	
21	anonymou	Why they're looking to fix non-problems instead of the actual blatant problem
6	s	
21	anonymou	What are other cities finding when the same system was implemented. Is it meeting the goal of faster response time? Has it targeted populations unfairly? And has it benefited certain neighborhoods more than others? (Eg. Do people in QA get faster SPD responses than Rainier Beach?)
7	s	
		Seattle has an existing RTCC program, what upgrades are actually necessary and most likely to improve law enforcement work and/or reduce gun violence? I am concerned about whether updates and expansions to our system are needed to REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE. I would like to see concrete data related to the current RTCC system, including its effects on law enforcement response since its implementation in 2017.
		I am also concerned about SPD working with private entities to accomplish RTCC upgrades. I want to know what is being done to protect the cybersecurity of RTCC currently.
21	anonymou	I am also highly concerned about integrating useless and potentially harmful add-ons to RTCC including the proposed AGLS technology. AGLS is likely to overwhelm the RTCC with false positives, which I worry will reduce its effectiveness for law enforcement.
8	s	
21	anonymou	
9	s	
22	anonymou	Prevention - what is the efficacy of the technology at preventing violence and how does that compare with the efficacy of community investments in reducing violent crime? I understand there are other considerations such as evidence gathering, clearance rates. However, the top priority of the city should be preventing violence from happening in the first place.
0	s	

		Cost - I'm sure I don't have to remind this city council that we are facing a \$250 million budget shortfall in 2025. RTCC software is a subscription service which means that the city is likely to see a ballooning cost. We need to consider a cost/benefit analysis. Many council members ran campaigns on platforms of fiscal responsibility - that they intended to comb through the budget and examine what programs work. I hope the City leadership is taking that charge seriously because this technology is both expensive and ineffective.
22	anonymou 1 s	Evidence. Get out of SPD's echo chamber of failed ideas.
22	anonymou 2 s	Consider spending money on improving the quality of life through public services and affordable housing. Not flashy "crime-fighting" tech.
22	anonymou 3 s	Seattle deserves to be safe. This will help.
22	anonymou 4 s	Who most benefits from this technology and who is most harmed by this technology?
22	anonymou 5 s	Make sure innocent bystanders do not get falsely accused by limitations of this technology.
22	anonymou 6 s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."
22	anonymou 7 s	I wish the voices of voters would be considered in their actions
22	anonymou 8 s	There's no money for this and will erode everyone's civil liberties. There's no evidence that this will reduce crime, only make it easier for police to target marginalized people.
22	anonymou 9 s	
23	anonymou 0 s	I think you are rushing this process in order to pass this legislation without given appropriate time and opportunity for public input.
23	anonymou 1 s	
23	anonymou 2 s	
23	anonymou 3 s	Please consider the root causes of violence - lack of housing, lack of resources, systemic racism. Please consider what actually reduces violence - housing, community building organizations, education, and access to food.
23	anonymou 4 s	What does the data show: Does this technology reduce crime or increase public safety? Does it make us safer or place us under unnecessary and illegal surveillance?
23	anonymou 5 s	
23	anonymou 6 s	I want leadership to consider that this is not the way to decrease crime or a way to make anyone be safer in Seattle
23	anonymou 7 s	Direct funds to scientifically proven public safety methods. If not this, then slow down this process and provide more public education and feedback opportunities.
23	anonymou 8 s	I want them to actually use the footage to arrest criminals instead of letting them off the hook like they usually do.
23	anonymou 9 s	Is it necessary? If so, how will you measure its success and will it be reevaluated periodically to make sure its value remains consistent with the defined expectations?
24	anonymou 0 s	Listen to community voices, particularly those who are already targeted and surveilled by police including Black, Latina, Indigenous communities, unhoused people, people practicing their first amendment rights
24	anonymou 1 s	This technology destroys Seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city for immigrants, women, and the LGBTQIA+ community because once this data is collected by a 3rd party that uses cloud storage there's no keeping it from being access by other entities. This technology's main purpose is to make data sharing as easy & frictionless as possible
24	anonymou 1 s	This technology violates the surveillance ordinance by rolling out new features. These new features are incompatible with the surveillance ordinance since each one would need to go through a SIR.

		Removes public control from police surveillance by allowing private individuals to setup cameras & then give the police a live video feed.
		Cost of this technology given the budget deficit and community investments that are proven to reduce violence & improve community safety.
24	anonymou 2 s	Why would you want people to be able to watch and surveil you and your families more than they already can?
24	anonymou 3 s	It's a waste of money. It's all show and won't prevent crime. Teach the cops to not beat up poor people. Have some compassion
24	anonymou 4 s	Whether this is actually desired in the communities where the technology would be placed or if it would be better served in the whiter, wealthier areas of our fair city.
24	anonymou 5 s	These technologies will only perpetuate racialized harm and harm against those experiencing homelessness. Please redirect these resources towards community-led safety initiatives.
24	anonymou 6 s	Please consider the harms this would cause the most marginalized among us as well as the harms to us all, all while not reducing gun violence or other violent crime. Please consider instead using this funding to support community based violence interruption programs. We need you to fund solutions to gun violence, but we need them to be the evidence based community solutions our communities need not surveillance technology that makes everyone more unsafe.
24	anonymou 7 s	
24	anonymou 8 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
24	anonymou 9 s	
25	anonymou 0 s	Consider the budget and money and priorities and see if this is truly in the best interests of everyone concerned, and I don't think it is
25	anonymou 1 s	
25	anonymou 2 s	Proactive crime reduction that looks like improving the lives of folks who end up in desperate situations that end up committing crimes.
25	anonymou 3 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and would be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities.
25	anonymou 4 s	
25	anonymou 5 s	Don't buy it! We can use that money to help
25	anonymou 6 s	
25	anonymou 7 s	
25	anonymou 8 s	Same response as Q1.
25	anonymou 9 s	
26	anonymou 0 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed

		BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
261	anonymou s	
262	anonymou s	Cost, race equity, the right to privacy, how this technology could be misused to target specific groups such a BIPOC, women seeking abortion, immigrants and political activists. This technology promises an encroachment on our expectations of and right to privacy and is a tacit blow to our democracy and the right to be left alone.
263	anonymou s	
264	anonymou s	
265	anonymou s	How does real a time control center improve response times and presence?
266	anonymou s	Solicit from ALL communities, especially those who are currently experiencing more contact with the legal system
267	anonymou s	Its impact on communities that are already over policed and over surveillanced. Consider using this funding for social programs that are actually proven to increase safety; affordable housing, food, schools and investing in youth.
268	anonymou s	Respect for privacy.
269	anonymou s	human rights
270	anonymou s	
271	anonymou s	
272	anonymou s	Don't do it. It's costly, potentially biased, anti democratic, and unlikely to be sufficient help to justify the risks and shortcomings.
273	anonymou s	No not use this technology. It has not proven effective at reducing crime.
274	anonymou s	Please do not invest in this harmful technology. Instead, invest in public safety solutions that truly work and do not violate the rights of your constituents.
275	anonymou s	
276	anonymou s	
277	anonymou s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
278	anonymou s	Use of this software will increase the number of public safety officials working behind desks and reduce the number getting out into the community.
279	anonymou s	
280	anonymou s	THE PUBLIC GOOD. If Human Beings who are the constituency of Seattle feel threatened by the possible misuse of the technology then it is inappropriate.
281	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
282	anonymou s	

28	anonymou 3 s	
28	anonymou 4 s	
28	anonymou 5 s	
28	anonymou 6 s	
28	anonymou 7 s	
28	anonymou 8 s	
28	anonymou 9 s	There are places where personal privacy is not accorded significant consideration. Don't let Seattle become one of those places.
29	anonymou 0 s	Consider how this technology would impact Seattle as a Sanctuary City.
29	anonymou 1 s	
29	anonymou 2 s	Please do not purchase or deploy real-time crime center (RTCC) software technology.
29	anonymou 3 s	Please stop looking into mass surveillance technologies as a way to demonstrate that you are actually doing something to address the increase (or perceived increase) in crime. Increased crime has to do with the extreme disproportionate distribution of wealth in this city
29	anonymou 4 s	Is this investment helping feed and house the hungry and homeless? Is this investment lifting up the people and making for a better safer city? Is this investment criminalizing more people and leading to more incarceration and displaced people with irrevocably damaged names and lives?
29	anonymou 5 s	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
29	anonymou 6 s	
29	anonymou 7 s	
29	anonymou 8 s	The SPD does not have a record of using their tools wisely and legitimately. I would be very concerned of the potential for imaginative misuse of this software.
29	anonymou 9 s	
30	anonymou 0 s	
30	anonymou 1 s	Our country's legal system operates on a principle of innocent until proven guilty by an appointed jury of peers. This form of surveillance is firmly counter to this principle.
30	anonymou 2 s	RTCC increases surveillance of communities that will make things worse, rather than better.
30	anonymou 3 s	
30	anonymou 4 s	
30	anonymou 5 s	
30	anonymou 6 s	I'd like you to consider the felt safety of community members, the possible dis-incentivization of community engagement (the possibility that the more people are being surveilled the less they may want to leave their homes), how else money could be spent in order to support a safer city that is separate from policing, such as supporting access to basic needs of housing, food, and community.
30	anonymou 7 s	Do not buy or invest this technology.

308	anonymou s	Please consider how the people of Seattle may resist this technology.
309	anonymou s	
310	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center software in Seattle.
311	anonymou s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
311	anonymou s	It's an easy lean-on to increase incarceration, not reduce crime.
312	anonymou s	No! Do not buy!
313	anonymou s	What side of history they want to be on
314	anonymou s	Will this actually help the communities more at risk? No it will not
315	anonymou s	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
316	anonymou s	I urge you to consider the overpolicing of BIPOC communities and the fact that this technology is a alarming invasion of privacy. I do not want to live in a surveillance state. It undermines my right to liberty. The money being spent on these new technologies could be used on community-based gun violence prevention or funding affordable housing.
317	anonymou s	
318	anonymou s	Again, to be clear, I believe this is extremely dangerous technology, and it will not make us safer. It will erode our civil liberties and cause undo harm to BIPOC communities
319	anonymou s	
320	anonymou s	This are our tax dollars and I am not in support.
321	anonymou s	Consider the research. Consider the harm
322	anonymou s	
323	anonymou s	This would be a huge infringement on our freedoms as citizens of the US. I find it very upsetting that the city wants to turn itself into a surveillance state.
		The money that would be spent on this technology should be spent on community-based violence prevention programs instead.
324	anonymou s	Seattle Police Department has long demonstrated that it is unaccountable for the abuses it inflicts on our population. Why would you supercharge that?
325	anonymou s	this is a waste of resources. finding out who the bad apples are will solve nothing with the current support or legal system. They'll be right back there. Fix everything else first.
326	anonymou s	They should consider that this does not address root causes of crime.
327	anonymou s	I want city leadership to reject mass surveillance in Seattle and redirect funds towards solutions that work such as community based programs. This will not keep people safe and will cause me to feel more unsafe within my own city. I have lived all over Seattle, including areas with higher crime rate and gun violence, and this would not make me feel safer or prevent any crimes. This is not the solution. During a time where the city is on a hiring freeze with a large budget deficit, this is not how funds should be allocated within our city.
328	anonymou s	
329	anonymou s	The potential privacy violations are huge with this proposal and we know that technology is imperfect and has the potential to mis-identify and damage the community as well as reducing community privacy. Please do not support this proposal.

33	anonymou 0 s	
33	anonymou 1 s	Privacy as a value .
33	anonymou 2 s	
33	anonymou 3 s	
33	anonymou 4 s	this is not a good use of city funds.
33	anonymou 5 s	
33	anonymou 6 s	Consider whether the evidence supports this technology, and consider whether sticking with your corporate backers is what the people who are your constituents deserve. This is NOT evidence based and is wasting our precious tax dollars.
33	anonymou 7 s	We don't need to spend additional funds surveilling folks, we need to provide good paying jobs that actually help make our society better.
		This is dangerous. It's a dystopian sci fi future for the government to record everything the public is doing without a warrant and than use that information to find/prosecute/punish people.
		Get it together.
33	anonymou 8 s	Specifically: we are a sanctuary city. This WILL be used to deport people.
33	anonymou 9 s	This is a waste of money and actively harmful to communities. There are much better options to fund, such as community violence intervention programs.
34	anonymou 0 s	I know you want to keep up safer, but this tech doesn't do it. And even if it did, as a country we have long felt that it was against our interest to sacrifice civil liberties to make us "safer." That's why it's innocent until proven guilty. That's why we have search warrants. This tech is one step closer to a 'show your papers' country, not a safer one. We need real, on the ground solutions to the root causes of crime. We need investments in our city's people, not in tech.
34	anonymou 1 s	Please focus more on local solutions and groups that are doing things to reduce crime like Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project.
34	anonymou 2 s	Center your decision on the impact of marginalized communities. Ask yourself if you would like to be watched 24/7 by the government. I certainly don't.
34	anonymou 3 s	COST v. BENEFIT
34	anonymou 4 s	I would like leadership to better consider methods of reducing violent crime before it happens through SERVICES and EDUCATION -- rather than surveilling, policing, and punishing after the fact.
34	anonymou 5 s	
		1. Where could the money be better spent? 2. Does it work? Is any evidence suggesting it works reliable and robust? 3. What will we do when it doesn't work? Will we have the courage to pull back or will we invest in additional surveillance and more expensive technology? 4. In what ways can this technology be abused? 5. Does use of this technology fit our values? Even if it does work, does it create the sort of community we want?
34	anonymou 6 s	
34	anonymou 7 s	
34	anonymou 8 s	Rather than purchasing technology that will continue to cause harm in our communities, we can redistribute resources to programs & services that actually increase safety-- like housing, healthcare, child care, and much more.
34	anonymou 9 s	
35	anonymou 0 s	

35	anonymou 1 s	Protect our privacy!!!!
35	anonymou 2 s	
35	anonymou 3 s	These technologies waste police resources and public funds on unproven promises of crime reduction, all while increasing the chances of police violating people's civil liberties, particularly those all ready marginalized in our communities.
35	anonymou 4 s	Please do your due diligence with the City of Seattle's Racial Equity Toolkit and Surveillance Impact Report. This technology has the potential to have serious negative consequences, so it is so critical that if City leadership does want to invest in this technology that they feel 100% confident in their heart and gut and could swear that they believe this technology will improve the lives of their constituents. If you cannot do this, you are failing to fulfill your duty as a public servant.
35	anonymou 5 s	
35	anonymou 6 s	Consider the immense harm that over surveillance causes BIPOC communities
35	anonymou 7 s	I do not support increased police surveillance.
35	anonymou 8 s	
35	anonymou 9 s	What is the cost of this technology? What are the potential violations of civil liberties that can incur? Will such surveillance undermine public trust? What other (better) solutions can we fund with the same resources?
36	anonymou 0 s	This technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities.
36	anonymou 1 s	
		<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work.</p> <p>Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers</p> <p>Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
36	anonymou 2 s	
36	anonymou 3 s	

36 4	anonymou s	
36 5	anonymou s	Our privacy
36 6	anonymou s	I want them to think about how they've let Amazon destroy local jobs, communities, and institutions, and how this is another step in that direction.
36 7	anonymou s	No to more police tech!
36 8	anonymou s	Consider that this funding could be much much better spent in the budget elsewhere.
36 9	anonymou s	Common sense — which is so uncommon these days. Don't let Seattle become a surveillance state. Don't let Seattle become China!
37 0	anonymou s	City leadership should focus on increasing initiatives that are actually proven globally to reduce crime, such as funding affordable housing programs and improving the standard of living for the poor.
37 1	anonymou s	Pulling their heads out and finding a moral compass
37 2	anonymou s	Heinous proposals. You all should be ashamed of the direction you're taking this city. Stop militarizing our police force and start addressing the root causes of crime.
		Invest in solutions that empower the people -- community programs, affordable housing, rehab, education, mental health, etc.
		Here are some great ideas: - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.20544 - https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22610/w22610.pdf - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094119011000301?via%3Dihub - https://www.brookings.edu/articles/want-to-reduce-violence-invest-in-place/ - https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1718503115 - https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122417736289 - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091743522001827
		Community violence intervention programs work: - https://www.vera.org/community-violence-intervention-programs-explained - https://nnscommunities.org/impact/impact/ - https://cls.gmu.edu/defenses/1067 - https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/justinphillips/article/richmond-crime-homicides-progressive-reform-18626585.php - https://blackvoicenews.com/2023/10/19/community-centered-public-safety-investment/
37 3	anonymou s	Please consider the cost of these systems and how there are better alternative that have long lasting effects and actually reduce violent crimes and gun crimes. Like programs to combat poverty and income inequality and programs like community violence interruption. And support and learn from organizations like Rainer Beach Action Coalition who have reduced violence in Rainer Beach by 33%
37 4	anonymou s	
37 5	anonymou s	None additional.
		Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
		4. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
37 6	anonymou s	The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money

		would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
377	anonymou s	There is a growing body of research on these technologies--use it. Be wary of salesmen, lobbyists, political opportunists. Keep all your discussions and decisions public. Keep asking for citizen input as you have here.
378	anonymou s	Taking a community first approach rather than a technology first approach
		There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence.
		Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
		Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.
		Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
		Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
379	anonymou s	Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
380	anonymou s	
		There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
		- Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
		- Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.
		- Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
		Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
		- Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
		- Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
381	anonymou s	
382	anonymou s	Listen to community and serve the community. Not your pockets and not technology companies.

383	anonymou s	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.
384	anonymou s	<p>Reviewing data comparing models of investment in community (ex. Richmond, CA) to models of increased surveillance (ex. SF, CA) and comparing crime rates.</p> <p>Consulting people who are experts and are not invested in the product, nor invested in the continuation of violence (SPD).</p>
385	anonymou s	Redirect these funds into the communities.
386	anonymou s	<p>Do not spend limited City funds on programs that will harm the more under-resourced communities in our city.</p> <p>Look at the actual data on these technologies, and you will see that they don't actually work.</p> <p>What is the goal of these programs? What is considered a success of these programs? How are these program 'successes' going to be monitored? How will the City divest from these programs should they fail? (Chicago voted to divest this month from using ShotSpotter because it had negative outcomes.) Do you want to live in a surveillance state?</p>
387	anonymou s	
388	anonymou s	Please do not use this technology
389	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
390	anonymou s	Do you want to build an unsafe world for your children? Because this is a further step in that.
391	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments</p>

		<p>restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
39	anonymou 2 s	
39	anonymou 3 s	Tax the billionaires and give us social safety nets - how many times do studies show that giving people their basic needs improves everything for everyone. Make clean safe accessible bathrooms in public spaces, improve transit. Do literally anything else besides this. Starting to feel like a real dystopian nightmare out here.
39	anonymou 4 s	George Orwell's novel titled '1984'
39	anonymou 5 s	Use tax money on things that efficiently help people, not police state boondoggles.
39	anonymou 6 s	
39	anonymou 7 s	
39	anonymou 8 s	Don't do this. Find a different avenue that doesn't rely on harming marginalized communities further.
39	anonymou 9 s	SPD needs to take steps to professionalize and remove officers committing grave misconduct and crimes before moving forward.
40	anonymou 0 s	What Seattle needs for safe neighborhoods is a real police presence and real consequences for crime. Surveillance will do none of that.
40	anonymou 1 s	We don't need more surveillance. Our communities are in crisis - we need housing and financial support, not wasting money on this
40	anonymou 2 s	
40	anonymou 3 s	
40	anonymou 4 s	Do not waste our hard earned money on this frivolous project.
40	anonymou 5 s	My tax dollars - literally ANY human services would be a better investment than this shit. Who tf do you think you are, CSI: Miami?? People are living in tents. Get your head on right.
40	anonymou 6 s	
40	anonymou 7 s	Consider using the money and resources on homeless issues
40	anonymou 8 s	
40	anonymou 9 s	If you were voted in you can be voted out.
41	anonymou 0 s	
41	anonymou 1 s	Is this a fiscally responsible decision, during a budget crisis? How will this technology be used, and will it actually decrease response times or just increase arrests in overpoliced neighborhoods?
41	anonymou 2 s	
41	anonymou 3 s	
41	anonymou 4 s	I would like them to consider the possibility of not doing it

41 5	anonymou s	Reject this and reinvest in evidence proven community safety and support programs
41 6	anonymou s	
41 7	anonymou s	YES-give officers who are scare some support to record neferious criminal activity so they can arrest the perps
41 8	anonymou s	
41 9	anonymou s	How much will this cost, not just to install, but to maintain and monitor? Is this costly technology even effective? What else could the city do with these funds?
42 0	anonymou s	
42 1	anonymou s	See above responses.
42 2	anonymou s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state.
42 3	anonymou s	
42 4	anonymou s	
42 5	anonymou s	
42 6	anonymou s	
42 7	anonymou s	Consider spending the money on things we actually need instead of failed technology
42 8	anonymou s	
42 9	anonymou s	
43 0	anonymou s	Stop wasting your time with money sinks and address the homeless crisis with adult solutions by focusing on root causes.
43 1	anonymou s	
43 2	anonymou s	
43 3	anonymou s	
43 4	anonymou s	Where is the money coming from? And where is this push for tech coming from? How will you answer for all of the concerns re: safety, civil liberties, and more?
43 5	anonymou s	Do not buy this, get more busses and trains instead.
43 6	anonymou s	These surveillance devices should not be installed in neighborhoods without the explicit consent of its citizens. At best, these kinds of decisions should be put to a vote. Though I do not believe this is the solution for decreasing crime.
43 7	anonymou s	
43 8	anonymou s	What civil liberties they are willing to give up and how much of a police state they want to create in the name of "public safety"
43 9	anonymou s	
44 0	anonymou s	Do not invest tax dollars in a system of unnecessary surveillance. Especially when so many reported crimes seemingly go unaddressed.
44 1	anonymou s	Don't do it
44 2	anonymou s	

44	anonymou 3 s	It seems like a simple asset of upgrades, but it's once again not really addressing any of the issues the public has with how this city handles policing, on either side of the isle. It's more equipment when we're told we need bodies; it's more spending when we're told we need cuts
44	anonymou 4 s	Crime is a social and economic problem; the solutions are giving people the resources they need to live their lives in peace, not racheting up surveillance and turning our city into a dystopian nightmare.
44	anonymou 5 s	Consider the law abiding citizens and their privacy. Consider how marginalized communities are already over policed and many arrests are for petty infractions, though of course you need to funnel humans into the prison industrial complex (aka modern slavery).
44	anonymou 6 s	Please stop spending money on ineffective non-solutions.
44	anonymou 7 s	
44	anonymou 8 s	Do not make Seattle a surveillance state.
44	anonymou 9 s	
45	anonymou 0 s	This violates the rights of Seattle residents. Use the money to provide AFFORDABLE HOUSING and wraparound care for at risk Seattleites. Public safety should not entail stalking and guns.
45	anonymou 1 s	
45	anonymou 2 s	
45	anonymou 3 s	Less homeless people out on the streets
45	anonymou 4 s	
45	anonymou 5 s	
45	anonymou 6 s	Will it be watching your every move? Is this a George Orwell story?
45	anonymou 7 s	When considering such decisions, it's important to think about the kind of city we want to live in. I want to live in a city that is safe not because people fear Big Brother is watching but because we have a society of mutual respect, abundant opportunity, compassion, and care. Let's invest in the things that strengthen community, not the things that imperil it.
45	anonymou 8 s	
45	anonymou 9 s	
46	anonymou 0 s	
46	anonymou 1 s	
46	anonymou 2 s	
46	anonymou 3 s	Tackle the tough problems of homelessness, despair, drug use, and weapons proliferation. Not an easy or flashy thing to attempt but not attempting it won't help. From the Pirke Avot: "You are not required to finish your work, yet neither are you permitted to desist from it."
46	anonymou 4 s	This technology has proven ineffective and Seattle should be looking at better ways to spend it's resources and taxpayer money.
46	anonymou 5 s	
46	anonymou 6 s	
46	anonymou 7 s	Look at the data and the science about these technologies - they don't work, and, in fact, they often identify the wrong person. This further criminalizes marginalized communities and does not reduce gun violence, period. I am very opposed to guns and am shocked and frightened by the increase in gun

		violence in this city. And. These technologies are going to be a costly purchase of political points that will do nothing to reduce gun violence.
46	anonymou 8 s	Consider supporting our citizens in poverty and how this can be used to reduce crime
46	anonymou 9 s	The real needs of every day individuals across Seattle
47	anonymou 0 s	
47	anonymou 1 s	
47	anonymou 2 s	Don't make seattle a surveillance State.
47	anonymou 3 s	VOTE NO! Listen to the constituents and community members that are most effected or most at risk of poverty and homelessness.
47	anonymou 4 s	Divert the money and resources to community programs and social services to help the unhoused, mentally ill, disabled, drug recovery assistance, and youth.
		Privacy, equity, civil liberties
47	anonymou 5 s	The city needs to do more to engage the community in this issue
47	anonymou 6 s	
		<p>I write to you today with a heavy heart, burdened by the weight of injustices that continue to plague our beloved city of Seattle. It is with a profound sense of urgency and determination that I implore you to reconsider the allocation of funds, redirecting resources away from an overly militarized police force and towards nurturing positive community services.</p> <p>Every dollar funneled into law enforcement coffers feels like another brick laid in the wall of division that separates us from true social progress. Our communities are crying out for support, yet instead of investing in their well-being, we perpetuate a cycle of violence and marginalization. Families struggle to make ends meet, children lack access to quality education, and our homeless population grows ever larger, yet our response remains rooted in outdated notions of punitive justice.</p> <p>Seattle needs a transformational shift in priorities. We must divest from systems of oppression and invest in initiatives that uplift and empower our most vulnerable residents. Imagine the impact of redirecting funds towards affordable housing programs, mental health services, addiction treatment facilities, and youth mentorship programs. These are the cornerstones of a society built on compassion and solidarity, where every individual is valued and supported on their journey towards a brighter future.</p> <p>Let us not be swayed by the false allure of security through force. True safety is cultivated through community resilience, mutual aid, and the equitable distribution of resources. It is time to break free from the shackles of the status quo and forge a new path forward, one guided by empathy, justice, and collective action.</p> <p>I urge you to heed the voices of the people, to listen to their stories of struggle and resilience, and to act with courage and conviction in service of a more just and equitable Seattle. Together, we can build a city where all residents thrive, not in spite of their differences, but because of them.</p>
47	anonymou 7 s	
47	anonymou 8 s	
47	anonymou 9 s	This is a waste of money and city resourcss. Seattle is going to look even more foolish and even if we had these, what will happen? This will barely solve any symptoms and does not at all solve the root cause.
48	anonymou 0 s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state.
48	anonymou 1 s	Consider the terror of not having privacy. That is what you would be inflicting on these neighborhoods. Consider putting money towards solutions that work, like adequate housing and universal income programs.
48	anonymou 2 s	I have no concerns about software that puts all the information you have available in one dashboard. I'm surprised you don't already have something like this. This is the only one of the three proposed

		technologies to which I am not opposed. It seems convenient. But if you do not implement the other two technologies, what is this really integrating? How is this different than just opening a bunch of different programs on your computer and resizing the windows? How much money are we going to spend to make a bunch of widgets that could probably be coded by an advanced high school student?
483	anonymou s	
484	anonymou s	reject it
485	anonymou s	This is not what the people who elected these officials want. Listen to the people. Seattle should not become so militarized and surveillanced.
486	anonymou s	The more data that is collected on people, the greater the likelihood of abuse and misuse. We don't need bandaids, we need structural change.
487	anonymou s	<p>5. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
488	anonymou s	I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
489	anonymou s	
490	anonymou s	
491	anonymou s	<p>That it would be a violation of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance to use this tool that continually implements new and unvetted image recognition algorithms.</p> <p>Moreover, this technology is incredibly expensive and subscription based. The City will be paying for it forever if it starts now, despite the fact that it only dubiously "works". There are many other things that do actually work to prevent violence that do not include violating the rights of your residents like making sure that residents have their basic needs met rather than trying to arrest our way out of crimes of poverty and disenfranchisement.</p>
492	anonymou s	
493	anonymou s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost • Public comments and concerns are addressed • Putting into practice the alternative suggestions presented by commenters about how funds can be better used

49 4	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
49 5	anonymou s	We need to address the root causes of crime and make meaningful investments in people and community. More technology is not the answer, especially ineffective and expensive technology. We need to look into other solutions such as violence interruption programs.
49 6	anonymou s	RTCCs have not been shown to be meaningfully effective, and sap trust in the city from its residents. I am much less likely to trust my city and be proud of living here if we increase surveillance in this way.
49 7	anonymou s	
49 8	anonymou s	Consider actually caring for the people of this City rather than solely the wealthy people of this city. It is painful to see how much money the City is willing to spend on doing harm to communities of color and unhoused neighbors.
49 9	anonymou s	
50 0	anonymou s	
50 1	anonymou s	What's the point of the SPD if they can't handle their current workload?
50 2	anonymou s	
50 3	anonymou s	Does this investment actually reduce the material conditions that cause people to commit crimes, be on the streets, and have no support? Is there any other option that we could possibly imagine that might make our city a more supportive place to live? Would you want the cops to be surveilling your every move? City time and money are zero-sum, choosing this technology comes at the cost of not being able to choose some other way we could organize our city.
50 4	anonymou s	When considering RTCC, CCTV and AGLS leadership should prioritize the three technologies in terms of their potential effectiveness in crime prevention . I would rate RTCC and CCTV as being more important and effective than AGLS.
50 5	anonymou s	
50 6	anonymou s	Instead of wasting city money on this technology, the city could invest in effective violence interruption programs. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
50 7	anonymou s	How this will impact communities of color. How this will impact crime (it has no positive impact). How this can be used to protect police who abuse their power. That the money spent on this technology would be much better spent on alternative programs and investments directly in our communities.
50 8	anonymou s	implementation as soon as possible
50 9	anonymou s	Impact on communities of color, undocumented people, women.
51 0	anonymou s	Please do not do this. Given the events of the past few years, we can no longer assume that we will be living in a democracy for the long term. We have a likely presidential candidate who has stated he wants to be a dictator and behaved in a way consistent with that desire, and a major political party and a substantial minority of the American people who support him. While the last coup attempt failed, the next one might not. We can safely assume that any authoritarian government, or aspiring authoritarian government, will use any surveillance available to further their ends. Now that the weaknesses in our democratic processes have been revealed we cannot risk providing any more information than necessary to the government (which makes me very sad as I have always appreciated all of the positive functions of government).

51 1	anonymou s	Please do not do this. Given the events of the past few years, we can no longer assume that we will be living in a democracy for the long term. We have a likely presidential candidate who has stated he wants to be a dictator and behaved in a way consistent with that desire, and a major political party and a substantial minority of the American people who support him. While the last coup attempt failed, the next one might not. We can safely assume that any authoritarian government, or aspiring authoritarian government, will use any surveillance available to further their ends. Now that the weaknesses in our democratic processes have been revealed we cannot risk providing any more information than necessary to the government (which makes me very sad as I have always appreciated all of the positive functions of government).
51 2	anonymou s	I am strongly opposed to the increase of surveillance in this city in general. I am strongly opposed to RTCC in particular because it forces private consumers of technology like Ring doorbells and security cameras to participate in the state security apparatus without real ongoing consent. This technology is dangerous to the general public and to consumers of this technology, it is undemocratic, and it is a waste of taxpayer money. I would rather city budget go toward community investment like community-led violence interruption programs and affordable housing.
51 3	anonymou s	
51 4	anonymou s	Racial and ethnic profiling. The danger of fascism--the reputation of Seattle police.
51 5	anonymou s	Spent the money on real solutions like alternatives to police for public safety & social services.
51 6	anonymou s	
51 7	anonymou s	
51 8	anonymou s	Many of my neighbors are strongly in favor of this.
51 9	anonymou s	I want city leadership to consider the voices of our community that in the INCREDIBLY SHORT time you gave us for public comment gathered 1,200 signatures against this technology and showed up in numbers to the first public comment session to say NO to this technology. As well this technology would be a violation of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance to use this tool that continually implements new and unvetted image recognition algorithms. Also this technology is incredibly expensive and subscription-based. The City will be paying for it forever if it starts now, despite the fact that it only dubiously "works". There are many other things that do actually work to prevent violence that do not include violating the rights of your residents like making sure that residents have their basic needs met rather than trying to arrest our way out of crimes of poverty and disenfranchisement.
52 0	anonymou s	Cost, how this technology differs from info 911 dispatch already has, effectiveness of the underlying technology RTCC will compile.
52 1	anonymou s	
52 2	anonymou s	-RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. -RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. -The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
52 3	anonymou s	Cost, success rate and what studies from other cities show.
52 4	anonymou s	Consider the funds used on this technology and instead invest in violence intervention programs
52 5	anonymou s	
52 6	anonymou s	The time is long past for trying surveillance tool snake oil to improve public safety. Invest in proven non-carceral, non-law enforcement solutions that address the root causes of crime!

527	anonymou s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
528	anonymou s	
529	anonymou s	Consider programs that actually work like Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intevention model
530	anonymou s	Surveillance will not actually do anything to target the root causes of crime, but rather continues to deteriorate the trust that the targeted communities have in City leadership. This technology can be co-opted by those who want to police even protected rights (like the right to an abortion in WA) and poses a real risk to people where this technology is implemented.
531	anonymou s	COST. Sara Nelson said on the radio today it is state money. So what? IT COSTS TIME. SPD is short-handed, so why waste their time on something that doesn't work?
532	anonymou s	Build better street infrastructure so people stop dying on the streets and fund low / middle income housing.
533	anonymou s	
534	anonymou s	
535	anonymou s	To stop attempting to over police the citizens and using that tax money to promote programs that work to uplift and assist people.
536	anonymou s	
537	anonymou s	Please do NOT allow RTCC into seattle
538	anonymou s	Please invest in other things. This an inappropriate use of city dollars. It is performative and will not actually increase safety. Invest in building more economic stability for people who live here, which will do much better at increasing safety then crime tech hubs, CCTV cameras, and gun detection technology. These shiny tech products simply do not work.
539	anonymou s	There are reasons cops need to get warrants!! Skirting that process puts people in danger of police violence. This technology does not improve safety, rather in expects unsafe behavior and attempts to find it, thus creating it. Real safety measures are things like community support, harm reduction, treatment centers,friendliness, and compassion.
540	anonymou s	Physical law enforcement officers can react, assist, thwart & prevent crime cameras & video cannot.
541	anonymou s	I emphatically implore you to consider putting any and all funding that would go towards such a project to actual resources in "high-crime" neighborhoods. Resources are crime prevention; healthcare access is crime prevention; outreach programs and access to behavioral health care is crime prevention. And the money should go to organizations run by and for people in those neighborhoods, and for expansion of resources.
542	anonymou s	
543	anonymou s	Listen to your substituents! Do not spy on us like batman! You are not batman!
544	anonymou s	This money could be so much better invested in community based public safety initiatives. There are proven models we can follow. This is an expensive bandaid that will do more harm than good.
545	anonymou s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
546	anonymou s	Investing in building the health of our community and people in it is shown to be the best way to reduce crime, urgent care/ER visits, and other expensive services. Moving forward with these technologies is

		providing further evidence that the City of Seattle doesn't want to help those most vulnerable, instead the focus is on supporting businesses and the wealthy, as a Seattle native that breaks my heart.
54	anonymou 7 s	No comment
54	anonymou 8 s	Data, results, and impact that truly improves public safety. Violence interruptions programs work: https://www.vera.org/community-violence-intervention-programs-explained
54	anonymou 9 s	
55	anonymou 0 s	
55	anonymou 1 s	
55	anonymou 2 s	That this is expensive, will not help anything, and can only be abused.
55	anonymou 3 s	The city should not adopt this harmful technology. Instead, the city should use its precious funds to invest in evidence-based violence prevention programs. For example, neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
55	anonymou 4 s	
55	anonymou 5 s	Budget considerations, empirical and anecdotal evidence (all of it, not just cherry-picked studies that support your agenda. Even conflicting reporting with split evidence means we should search for alternatives, the wishes of your most marginalized community members.
55	anonymou 6 s	
55	anonymou 7 s	How this in fact only contributes to the over policing of marginalized folks but also the further collecting of personal information without any ounce of agency in deciding for ourselves.
55	anonymou 8 s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
55	anonymou 9 s	There's no data showing RTCC's work for reducing violent crime or improving clearance rates. Why would the city purchase an unproven technology and use the people of Seattle as beta-testers? Especially when facing a budget deficit and when there are proven items that work.
55	anonymou 9 s	RTCCs destroy Seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city because data in RTCC's are designed to make it easy for other law enforcement agencies to access what is going on in Seattle.

560	anonymou s	This technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
561	anonymou s	You must provide residents valid reasons for us to give up our civil liberties. I can guarantee there are none that I will find reasonable. Also, you must provide costs, what information is being stored, how long it will be saved, how it will be used, who will have access, how it will be safeguarded from theft or mis-use, what transparency measures there will be, how we can request our own personal files to see what is there, options to opt-out, grievance procedures, etc.
562	anonymou s	If this is the example that they want to set as Seattle is viewed as a progressive city, I believe this surveillance technology is a huge step backwards for our politics and our vision as a humane society.
		<p>Transparency - the companies that sell the software are very secretive about the tech. It is difficult to know whether or not it is actually affective at what it claims when there is an utter lack of transparency.</p> <p>Cost - these technologies are a subscription service. They advertise a relatively cheep "buy in" but the \$ for the service goes up after purchased. I'm sure I don't need to remind city leadership that we are facing a \$250 million shortfall in 2025. Is this really the best use of our scarce resources?</p> <p>Civil Liberties - SPD claims they will be responsible with the data. But the whole point of RTCC software is seamless data sharing. The whole point of the software is that local jurisdictions do not maintain control of the data.</p> <p>The makeup of the CSWG does not include members who represent community voice (as required by the ordinance) nor does it include those who have the expertise to address civil liberty concerns. The CSWG was down to 1 member and the mayor rushed appointment of 4 additional members in order for the CSWG to be able to make quorum. This is clearly an attempt to rush through these technologies without consideration of the risks to civil liberties that this surveillance tech poses and an attempt to rush things through while hoping to avoid any public engagement and avoid transparency.</p>
563	anonymou s	Entire portions of the SIR draft reports are left blank - these are the sections of the reports related to relevant research consulted and relevant agencies consulted. I understand why this is the case. It would be difficult for SPD to find relevant research that supports the procurement of this tools - and it is further evidence that the city is not taking seriously protecting the rights of Seattle residents.
564	anonymou s	Listen to your constituents. At least 1,300 people have signed the Stop Surveillance City Sign-On Letter, demanding a halt in investment in policing technologies. Your attempts to adopt harmful technology anyway shows signals authoritarian governance.
565	anonymou s	Listen to your constituents. At least 1,300 people have signed the Stop Surveillance City Sign-On Letter, demanding a halt in investment in policing technologies. Your attempts to adopt harmful technology anyway shows signals authoritarian governance.
		<p>Efficacy - Do we have significant data in independent peer-reviewed research that these surveillance technologies do what they claim?</p> <p>Civil Liberties and maintaining our status as a sanctuary city - Do we have the ability to control the data? OIG oversees SPD's use of the data. But we have no control over third parties - whether they are other LE agencies from states where abortion and/or gender affirming care are illegal, Customs and Border Control, ICE, or anti-abortion or anti-trans vigilante groups seek information directly from vendors</p> <p>Prevention of violent crime? Gun violence is a serious threat that communities face and deserves a urgent response. Preventing harm in the first place should be top priority. And there are several evidenced-based solutions. Violence interruption programs, direct income support, environmental design, and providing after school and late night activities for youth to engage in are all proven strategies that would invest in our Seattle residents and prevent harm from happening in the first place.</p>
566	anonymou s	Community Engagement and Equity? There have been no attempts to reach out to the communities where this technology is being proposed.

567	anonymou s	Consider that this is creating a severe disconnect from your community and that the people are now seeing the government as something they should not and do not trust. That's not a good place to be in as a country.
568	anonymou s	Stop funding surveillance tech in Seattle that is ineffective at reducing crime and instead harms our communities, increasing police violence and racial discrimination. We need to be funding violence interruption programs, mental health programs, and housing for people instead.
569	anonymou s	
570	anonymou s	
571	anonymou s	Please listen to your constituents. Community care works. Policing does not. Let's spend resources on making safe, well resourced communities, not militarizing the police.
572	anonymou s	
573	anonymou s	
574	anonymou s	
575	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
576	anonymou s	
577	anonymou s	Installing surveillance technology goes against the wishes and best interests of your constituents.
578	anonymou s	Do not turn our city into a surveillance state
579	anonymou s	
580	anonymou s	Blatant violation of privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values
581	anonymou s	
582	anonymou s	
583	anonymou s	
584	anonymou s	Invest in community based programs that research has proven creates safer communities.

58 5	anonymou s	I hope the city considers the consequences of their actions on how their local, national, and international communities view them. Again, this is an obvious infringement on our freedoms and a scary progression towards a fully policed state. This is not the answer.
58 6	anonymou s	Please consider the people of Seattle when making a decision. This is an extreme invasion of our right to privacy. There is already high distrust in the police and this will continue to raise tension in the city between the people and the police/government. Any decision that is for the implementation of this technology is a decision against the Seattle people.
58 7	anonymou s	I don't want my tax dollars to be wasted on this unnecessary and invasive software. Please prioritize this obviously extraneous money for housing and community services.
58 8	anonymou s	
58 9	anonymou s	
59 0	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
59 1	anonymou s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
59 2	anonymou s	Invest in services that help with basic needs. That'll stop more crime than any number of police, especially since police don't prevent crime, the respond to it. If you want to prevent crime, you have to understand why people do crime. And the answer to that is that they can't afford to live in this city because you let landlords and companies price them out without offering sufficient support. We need rent control, public services, drug rehab, housing support. We don't need more cops, the cops we have are already a waste of money.
59 3	anonymou s	
59 4	anonymou s	
59 5	anonymou s	
59 6	anonymou s	
59 7	anonymou s	The actual opinions of the people who live here aka the many folks pushing against this technology and for better supports, as well as the actual evidence from research showing both that these technologies are consistently ineffective and harmful, and that the best way to reduce "crime" is to improve people's lives.
59 8	anonymou s	This is a waste of money
59 9	anonymou s	4. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money

		would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025.
60	anonymou 0 s	
60	anonymou 1 s	I am paying attention to who votes for this and will NEVER support that person or anyone they endorse EVER AGAIN.
60	anonymou 2 s	Seems like a sucker's bet. Don't fall for the scam. No research supports this. Don't be a homeopathy in the face of COVID person. This is about the same level of responsible to your communities.
60	anonymou 3 s	Consider not turning Seattle into George Orwell's idea of a PARODY of an authoritarian state. This would be a joke if it were funny, but it's not. It's scary. You are scaring us, not protecting us.
60	anonymou 4 s	People often justify surveillance with the idea that "if you do nothing wrong, it'll be fine." This is a huge error. With context and appropriate aggression, anything can be interpreted as wrong. It's foolish to imagine that this will be benignly interpreted, especially with the lack of ethical guidelines around it. This will increase racism, discrimination, hate crimes, and marginalization of the already marginalized. Let's spend our money on something that can address the true problems facing this area: addiction, homelessness, poverty, etc.
60	anonymou 5 s	A Vote.
60	anonymou 6 s	Consider the abundant alternatives to protecting communities that don't require 24hr surveillance and the infringement of civil liberties
60	anonymou 7 s	Only create infrastructure for a new technology if you want it to be weaponized against good people. Hacking happens despite our best intentions.
60	anonymou 8 s	This money should be used on interventions that PREVENT crime: education, health care, social services, housing, etc. City leadership should be using evidence-based methods like the above, to prevent crime, not spending on projects like this that respond to citizens' fears by making it LOOK like we're "doing something about crime" in the short term, without actually improving public safety. I honestly don't understand why you continue to look for pro-surveillance, pro-aggression alternatives, when EVIDENCE-BASED community violence prevention methods WORK and people in your city are begging for them to be funded. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
60	anonymou 9 s	Please don't give the police access to more tools with which to hurt the citizens of Seattle.
61	anonymou 0 s	
61	anonymou 1 s	
61	anonymou 2 s	
61	anonymou 3 s	
61	anonymou 4 s	RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
61	anonymou 5 s	There are several key factors that City leadership should carefully evaluate: Effectiveness: City leaders should examine the potential effectiveness of the proposed technologies in reducing crime and improving public safety. This can be done by reviewing case studies, research, and data from other cities that have implemented similar programs.

Privacy concerns: The use of surveillance technologies like CCTV and AGLS raises valid privacy concerns among citizens. City leadership must ensure that the program includes strict guidelines and safeguards to protect individuals' privacy rights, such as limited data retention periods, secure data storage, and clear policies governing access to the collected data.

Community engagement and transparency: It is crucial to engage the community in open discussions about the proposed technologies, their benefits, and potential drawbacks. City leaders should prioritize transparency by clearly communicating the program's objectives, scope, and the measures in place to address privacy concerns. This will help build trust and support within the community.

Oversight and accountability: City leadership must establish a robust oversight and accountability framework to ensure that the technologies are used responsibly and in accordance with established guidelines. This may include regular audits, public reporting, and the creation of an independent oversight committee to monitor the program's implementation and effectiveness.

Equitable deployment: The deployment of these technologies should be equitable across the city, focusing on areas with the highest concentrations of crime while avoiding the over-surveillance of marginalized communities. City leaders should work closely with community stakeholders to ensure that the program does not perpetuate existing biases or disproportionately impact certain neighborhoods.

Integration with other crime-prevention efforts: As mentioned in the original letter, the Crime Prevention Technology pilot should be viewed as one component of a comprehensive crime-prevention strategy. City leadership must ensure that the program is well-integrated with other initiatives, such as community policing, social services, and youth programs, to address the root causes of crime effectively.

Cost-benefit analysis: Implementing and maintaining these technologies will require a significant investment of public funds. City leaders should conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the expected benefits in terms of reduced crime and improved public safety justify the costs associated with the program.

61	anonymou	
6	s	existing policies address all my concerns
61	anonymou	
7	s	That this is an infringement of our rights.
61	anonymou	
8	s	Evidence based solutions only
61	anonymou	
9	s	Serve us the people, not your special interest groups!
62	anonymou	
0	s	Might it not be better to use human interactions to cut down on crime?
62	anonymou	
1	s	
62	anonymou	
2	s	
62	anonymou	Focus on fixing the on-the-ground issues with poverty and homelessness in the city to reduce crime in the county. If we stopped destroying homeless peoples homes, maybe they wouldn't have to steal things to get it back. If people weren't left to sit on the streets, maybe there wouldn't be as much fentanyl and drug use in the area because they could have a life.
62	anonymou	
4	s	
62	anonymou	
5	s	Consider that civil liberties will be violated and we won't be safe according to research.
62	anonymou	
6	s	SPD has not consulted with any agency or experts beyond RTCC salespeople
62	anonymou	Consider how this kind of thing betrays the very essence of Seattle. If we have a crime problem then it's because of soaring rent, debt, deeply unequal school systems, lack of quality afterschool activities in poor neighborhoods, and an immensely high cost of living. Please invest these resources into improving conditions in our city not surveilling its inhabitants.
62	anonymou	
7	s	

628	anonymou s	Ensure you understand the technical details very well - tech sounds cool but ensure you trust and inspect the tech - power point slides sound good but question and be curious to learning about the details. Ensure you are being advised by strong technical experts. Ask for what could go wrong and what mechanisms are in place to mitigate. You need the ability to inspect and observe details of the system.
629	anonymou s	
630	anonymou s	
631	anonymou s	
632	anonymou s	Privacy.
633	anonymou s	
634	anonymou s	That they look reckless and foolish with tax payer money
635	anonymou s	
636	anonymou s	
637	anonymou s	I am uncomfortable with scale of surveillance and information being collected.
638	anonymou s	
639	anonymou s	
640	anonymou s	Why are you only wanting to implement these tools in poor, Black and Brown communities?
641	anonymou s	See above letter.
642	anonymou s	Please implement as soon as possible, maintaining a learn-as-we-go attitude, and make adjustments as needed to ensure judicious use. Maintain a zero-tolerance policy towards the misuse of this system. Oversight of its use should be formalized in advance of its deployment, and tweaked over time as issues arrive. Oversight should be conducted both from within and without the SPD.
643	anonymou s	Please consider how expensive this technology is, especially given its ineffectiveness. This technology is not worth the financial costs along with the communal harms it will exacerbate and/or introduce unnecessarily. Seattle residents WILL negatively respond and cease support of City leadership if this technology is implemented.
644	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
645	anonymou s	
646	anonymou s	It is expense and we should be looking at proven approaches to reducing crime. This kind of technology isn't the solution and is prime for abuse and targeting of the most marginalized in our city
647	anonymou s	Do not make Seattle a surveillance city, there are countless innocent people under threat for their identities alone who rely on leadership to make the ethical choice to protect our rights.
648	anonymou s	Seattle leadership doesn't listen to anyone who they should listen. They are all bought by money. And too far right to listen
649	anonymou s	We are entering into several years of budget crisis, and RTCC is EXPENSIVE. These are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.
650	anonymou s	

65 1	anonymou s	
65 2	anonymou s	I want City leadership to consider the harms caused by surveillance technologies. Surveillance is not safety. I also want City leadership to consider the immense cost of technologies such as RTCC and to think about how those funds could be better used to keep our communities safe and healthy - anything from affordable housing to healthcare to UBI to investing in community-based violence prevention and healing programs.
65 3	anonymou s	
65 4	anonymou s	
65 5	anonymou s	Use public funds for programs or technology that will support historically marginalized communities, not harm them. Use an equity lens. Consider civil liberties and privacy rights for people who live in Seattle.
65 6	anonymou s	<p>FUSUS, the RTCC software named in the Q4 surveillance determination report, and other RTCC software violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods</p> <p>RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.</p> <p>The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.</p> <p>Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics</p> <p>RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.</p> <p>RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.</p> <p>Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.</p>
65 7	anonymou s	In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.
65 8	anonymou s	Use the latest technology that is available to improve citizen security and safety.
65 9	anonymou s	
66 0	anonymou s	Do not support the implementation of this tech.
66 1	anonymou s	Consider that we are giving whoever runs this center a ridiculous amount of control over our community. That in the past SPD has proven resistant to civilian control over the police force.
66 2	anonymou s	Personal property, basic civil rights etc
66 3	anonymou s	
66 4	anonymou s	Emphasizing that I OPPOSE for this technology. I urge for COS to use this funding to programs for affordable housing, public health, education and transportation!

665	anonymous	Crime is a social problem that can be solved by making sure peoples needs are met. Property theft makes up the vast majority of crimes in the U.S. That can be prevented if the reasons for those property crimes are removed, specifically not having basic necessities of food and water met. Surveillance technologies are not effective and is just a waste of taxpayer money that can go somewhere else. They also just escalate peoples circumstances rather than resolve the underlying issue, making future crimes more likely.
666	anonymous	
667	anonymous	Less funding for policing, more funding for systemic solutions!!
668	anonymous	The data says this is ineffective. That anyone would consider using this expensive technology anyway suggests to me that you aren't good with numbers or logic. The alternative being that such a person doesn't care that this technology doesn't help stop crime and is really just interested in being an arm of white supremacy and fascism. Either way, I cannot vote for such a person.
669	anonymous	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
670	anonymous	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
671	anonymous	This extensive data collection and surveillance would put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions.
671	anonymous	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p>

		Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
67 2	anonymou s	Instead of wasting money on ineffective technology, we should invest in proven, community-driven solutions that lift people out of poverty, the true danger to public safety.
67 3	anonymou s	it's very racist
67 4	anonymou s	
67 5	anonymou s	If the goal is to increase public safety, please instead consider investing in violence interruption programs, community nonprofits working on violence and crime reduction, mental health and substance use treatment, and affordable housing!
67 6	anonymou s	SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology
		<p>Racially-biased deployment: There are many issues with the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the CCTV SIR:</p> <p>(a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.</p> <p>(b) RET item 1.4.1 in the SIR shows disparate impact in the locations chosen to be surveilled. Specifically, there is disproportionate impact on Native American residents in 4 out of 4 of the pilot locations, Black residents in 3 of the pilot locations, Asian & Latinx residents in 2 of the pilot locations, and Mixed folks in 1 of the pilot locations. Additionally, while the majority of Seattle residents are white, all of the pilot locations have an under-proportionate amount of white residents - thus meaning the pilot locations selected appear on paper to be racially motivated. I don't see how the impact won't be biased-based policing because if you are only looking for crime in non-white neighborhoods, then you're primarily going to find non-white suspects (and victims); whereas criminals in white neighborhoods (who are therefore likely white themselves) will fly under the radar of the police.</p> <p>(c) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.</p> <p>(d) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public - you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled - that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.</p> <p>(e) Only 1 of the 2 public engagement meetings on these surveillance technologies was held near a pilot location and the 1 location that was also happened to be the location with the highest amount of white residents out of the 4 pilot locations. Why can SPD find the time to talk to surveillance technology vendors and the City can find the money to surveil residents, but somehow doesn't have the time nor the money to even have host a community event in all of the pilot locations?</p> <p>Lack of outreach: Item 2.1 in the RET in the SIR asks "Please include a list of all organizations specifically invited to provide feedback on this technology." and SPD answered, "The list of organizations will be listed in the final SIR." However, this is unlikely to occur in practice considering in the most recent 12 SPD SIRs having completed the Ordinance process have had the outreach requirement of the RET deleted in each of those finalized SIRs. So the City has a history of not conducting the required outreach about surveillance technologies.</p>
67 7	anonymou s	
67 8	anonymou s	<p>Surveillance expansion: RTCC SIR item 2.3 states that "Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies." There are multiple concerns about this:</p> <p>(a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.</p> <p>(b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further invasion of privacy</p>

beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.

(c) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have on-the-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Hidden/unknowable surveillance features: In item 1.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says, "some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies" and in item 2.3, SPD says that they "will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends." However, face recognition and predictive policing aren't the only concerns:

(a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the data.

(b) SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use an RTCC that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual using the RTCC not clicking the wrong buttons - meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. OPA Case 2020OPA-0305 and OPA Case 2020OPA-0731).

(c) The vendor that SPD plans to use for the RTCC (Fusus) advertises that their system is "continuously evolving along with its database of profiles for search and analysis" and that Fusus is continuously updating the AI capabilities of the RTCC via weekly updates to the system. SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use. Not only that but SPD won't even know beforehand what are all the capabilities this system will have even after it's live and in-use (for possibly years). New features can and will be added to the RTCC both without SPD's awareness and without any public oversight or control - thus (again) elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

(d) In item 6.5 of the RTCC SIR, SPD didn't mention any accuracy checks they were planning to perform of the AI capabilities of the RTCC. So it seems SPD expects both the City and the public to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-and-balances on that.

67
9
s

68
0
s

The actual safety and concerns of their residents. There is so much evidence that this technology does NOT make communities safer, and your residents have been gracious enough to provide it for you. Furthermore, as a city that touts itself on listening to its community and supporting community efforts, actually stand by what you say and INVEST in those community members doing the work. Show them that you value them, not just with your words but with your actions.

68
1
s

No limitations on use: Item 5.1 of the RET in the RTCC SIR says the number one goal for the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the RTCC to only "felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc).

Unidentified data sources: In item 4.1 of the RTCC SIR, SPD lists the data sources to the RTCC and closes with "and other information systems." This wording leaves open the door for future data integrations to the RTCC to be configured but never go through the Surveillance Ordinance process. For example, SPD could add social media data/analysis to the RTCC and that would not generate a new or updated SIR. No department should be above the scope of the Ordinance.

68
2
s

Excessive data retention: In item 4.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy..." This has multiple issues:

(a) 30 days is too long to keep data on innocent people just going about their day.

(b) Retaining the RTCC data (which includes ALPR and CCTV data) for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for data to use against their victims.

(c) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to RTCC data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this group of pilot technologies enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.

(d) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.

(e) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.

(f) It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would be getting processed by the RTCC).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.

68 3
anonymou
s

68 4
anonymou
s

68 5
anonymou
s

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence
Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

68 6
anonymou
s

Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?

68 7
anonymou
s

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

68 8
anonymou
s

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives

		<p>and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
689	anonymou s	<p>The surveillance impact report, for starters.</p> <p>Instead of funding expensive and racist technologies, let's fund housing, social programs, and community engagement. Stop considering these ineffective and expensive tools that only result in more black and brown people being incarcerated.</p>
690	anonymou s	
691	anonymou s	
692	anonymou s	I would greatly prefer policies of harm reduction, affordable housing, and community investments and care over new technology in these spaces.
693	anonymou s	City leadership should consider the negative impact that this technology would have on the community as well as in their own personal lives. Would they want someone knowing all their personal information, where they live, work, and personal schedules of their every lives.
694	anonymou s	
695	anonymou s	
696	anonymou s	Please consider how this technology could be misused by a department that has continued to not build trust with the majority of Seattle.
697	anonymou s	Make the city safer for the community.
698	anonymou s	Consider other alternatives like violence interruption programs, and community-led programs.
699	anonymou s	I would like City leadership to consider why we should continue investing in police when increased funding for police is not associated with reductions in crime. As the city faces tough budget cuts, why should law enforcement not be held to the same evidence-based standards as other city departments? Why should funding go to programs that have proven to be ineffective?
700	anonymou s	The City should consider the needs of communities already most impacted by police violence, rather than sweeping the concerns of low-income folks under the rug in favor of wealthy coalitions of business owners.
701	anonymou s	
702	anonymou s	
703	anonymou s	I'd like to see the city manage the police force, and not the other way around.
704	anonymou s	<p>Since the COVID-19 pandemic, small business owners in Southeast Seattle who have experienced multiple commercial burglaries have been told by City officials that the SPD staffing crisis inhibits the City's ability to deter and solve crime. In many instances, the perpetrators of these burglaries are known to the victims because they have been identified on the victims' video surveillance systems. The same perpetrator burglarizes the same business multiple times, even after their recorded image has been provided by the victim to SPD. This situation has led small businesses to consider investing in private security during overnight hours when commercial burglaries most frequently occur - an exorbitantly</p>

		costly undertaking. The City is now signaling its intention to invest significant resources in unproven technologies to aggregate data when - from the perspective of the victims of repeated and financially ruinous crimes - the necessary data to identify the perpetrators is already available but the perpetrators continue to burglarize with seeming impunity.
705	anonymous	What this will cost relative to one (1) actually useful proposal
706	anonymous	
707	anonymous	Focus on the data and facts - address the root causes of crime and you will see lower crime rates and a safer, happier Seattle.
708	anonymous	The city's budget can't support, and it wouldn't be worth investing in at one-tenth the price as it is. Look to better, community-oriented options rather than cyberpunk policing.
709	anonymous	Common sense. History. Facts. Science. Humanity.
710	anonymous	Personal privacy
		<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
711	anonymous	
712	anonymous	Put money towards violence interruption programs instead, surveillance technology does NOT work and harms civilians.
713	anonymous	
714	anonymous	
715	anonymous	Consider the many other ways we could use this money to help community members in need.
716	anonymous	City leadership people are elected by people through voting so this is decision of the majority people who they are getting majority through voting.
717	anonymous	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.
718	anonymous	As with the other proposed technologies, this is another method of further surveilling and harming already heavily surveilled and policed communities. We do not need another level of institutional racism/classism to be put in place.
719	anonymous	Fund the community instead of the police. Multiple independent studies in multiple cities prove that resolving income inequality and pulling people out of poverty is what truly prevents crime.
720	anonymous	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas

72 1	anonymou s	Effective implementation
72 2	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state.
72 3	anonymou s	There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.
72 4	anonymou s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. - Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. - Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. - Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. - Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. - Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
72 5	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50% (National Network for Safe Communities, 2024). The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33% (Nazaire, 2018). Violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments, including restoring vacant land, community-led non-profits, investments in mental health treatment like providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to safe, affordable housing. My communities ask that city leadership consider these alternatives to surveillance technology that has little research to back up its efficacy and that poses such a threat to our communities. Spend money and resources on programs that actually work with people on the ground, instead of handing us over to the whims of technology controlled by for-profit corporations.
72 6	anonymou s	N/A
72 7	anonymou s	City leadership needs to consider long-term costs and risks. It appears city leadership wants to project the impression they are doing something, anything, to address crime in Seattle, regardless of efficacy, fairness, equity and cost.

728	anonymou s	Please really consider our concerns. I know there will be a lot of people pushing for this and it might seem like an easy "win" or "fix" but please really listen and consider the concerns we are voicing. Please ask your own questions and push to get answers for us as we have elected you and depend on you to uphold our city.
729	anonymou s	se bring it to the C-ID! We need more support and City investment to prevent and respond to crimes here. It's exponentially worsened since the COVID pandemic. Our business has been a victime of gun violence 4 ties in the past 18 months. Thankfully nobody has been hurt yet, but I don't want us to wait until people are getting killed in their workplaces before we start investing in crime prevention here. I fear for the safety of the elders and other marginalized and vulnerable members of the community that deal with crime constantly just walking around the C-ID.
730	anonymou s	Making sure to actually implement it and test thoroughly to see if it works.
731	anonymou s	
732	anonymou s	safety of residents
733	anonymou s	
734	anonymou s	
735	anonymou s	SPD has a clearance rate of 24% for homicides. Since it currently has a RTCC (iBase - which is on sight) this would in and of itself suggest that RTCC is not the answer to improving clearance rates. While there is little peer-reviewed research on RTCC - the available research is mixed and meager at best. SPD took many officers off investigatory units - I would suggest this, more than anything else is likely responsible for their low clearance rates.
736	anonymou s	In any case, whatever the meager benefits of RTCC are - we already have an RTCC (iBase) and so should already be benefitting from whatever benefits RTCC has to offer. The only thing a cloud-based program would change is huge threats to civil liberties and additional cost to the city.
737	anonymou s	
738	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.
739	anonymou s	We are in a budget deficit. We already have iBase, which addresses this tech need. Is this the legacy you want of your time in office? Wasting tax payers money on something we already have tech for?
740	anonymou s	This technology is expensive. Seattle is facing a massive budget deficit and is required to have a balanced budget. Funding this technology that's proven to be ineffective in preventing crime or increasing clearance rates will require cutting spending elsewhere. Those spending cuts will likely come to programs that actually reduce crimes like Rainier Beach Action Collection which reduces violence in the community by 33% (https://cls.gmu.edu/defenses/1067) or violence interruption programs which have been shown to reduce violence by up to 60% (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/06/fact-sheet-the-biden-%E2%81%A0harris-administration-advances-equity-and-opportunity-for-black-americans-and-communities-across-the-country-2/).
741	anonymou s	That this will create no more safety and it will cost money that could be spent elsewhere to really serve communities

74 2	anonymou s	
74 3	anonymou s	I want the city to consider all of the studies and meta-analysis that have been done that show a 5% or less impact on violent crime clearance, that show no significant effects on crime reduction, that this technology is expensive and that money should be spent on community-centered crime reduction that's proven to work. I want the city to consider that implementing RTCC puts undocumented, unhoused, trans, and women at risk and undercuts our status as a sanctuary city. I want the City to consider if we want to create a city that's filled with surveillance and cameras, or one that's filled with community and support networks. Surveillance creates isolation and suspicion and does not encourage community.
74 4	anonymou s	
74 5	anonymou s	That the people do not want this. This is a project furthering the police state and militarization of it. This is not Keeping people safe. This will not keep our leaders safe. This is only for the billionaires in the city.
74 6	anonymou s	Stop trying to spend money on technology that further harms our marginalized communities. Instead, fund education, community centers, infrastructure, public transit, and violence intervention programs that actually work.
74 7	anonymou s	I would like the city to use actual facts and the numerous case studies on rtcc when making a decision. I would like them to use an equity lens and understand who is harmed if the city moves forward with RTCC.
74 8	anonymou s	Please consider looking at Data which shows these do not work if not enough staffing and the technology is not there. We could better use the money to be more effective in patrol, police presence and consequences for crimes committed.
74 9	anonymou s	Implement ASAP
75 0	anonymou s	Consider that you are talking about cutting all sorts of valuable things that actually improve life in the city like social workers and housing that actually address the problems that are hurting our communities. You can't surveil and police your way out of that.
75 1	anonymou s	
75 2	anonymou s	The overwhelming evidence across the nation that shows this technology is an egregious misuse of funds given it harms communities, doesn't work
75 3	anonymou s	There are studies that show that this technology is ineffective, please do your research! Other major cities have canceled their contracts with ShotSpotter due to finding it ineffective so I do not think we should spend money on it!
75 4	anonymou s	

ID	Email	Do you have additional comments/considerations that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?
1	anonymou s	
2	anonymou s	
3	anonymou s	
4	anonymou s	
5	anonymou s	
6	anonymou s	Money could be spent better on things other than the police.
7	anonymou s	

8	anonymou s	
9	anonymou s	
10	anonymou s	
11	anonymou s	
12	anonymou s	
13	anonymou s	
14	anonymou s	do not fund it
15	anonymou s	Stop looking for shortcuts to creating equitable and safe communities in technology. Income inequality, rampant housing price increases, and a lack of resources for mental health and the homeless are the cause of violence and crime in our communities, and creating a surveillance state will not solve these issues in the slightest.
16	anonymou s	
17	anonymou s	Do they want to live in a surveillance city?
18	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence that are not only evidence-based but that are cost effective as well.</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
19	anonymou s	We are watching a genocide unfold in Palestine, where Israeli surveillance technology is perfected and exported at a profit to the West. The city of Seattle is incredibly activated right now, and its civilians will not let such draconian measures come to our town.
20	anonymou s	
21	anonymou s	Any new technology that can be used to help SPD do a better job is good, especially in the CID, as Seattle is having a terrible time hiring new officers- and it is almost at 50% of its needed man power.
22	anonymou s	
23	anonymou s	
24	anonymou s	

25	anonymou s	
26	anonymou s	
27	anonymou s	Please consider redirecting these funds into programs that actually help people in Seattle rather than increasing the creepy surveillance state that serves no one. This could look like social services, housing, drug recovery programs. There are so many options that would do so much good towards helping so many people! This program would literally only harm people. That is not what good leadership looks like you and all should be extremely ashamed for even considering these technologies.
28	anonymou s	
29	anonymou s	
30	anonymou s	Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
31	anonymou s	
32	anonymou s	
33	anonymou s	
34	anonymou s	
35	anonymou s	
36	anonymou s	
37	anonymou s	
38	anonymou s	
39	anonymou s	
40	anonymou s	
41	anonymou s	
42	anonymou s	
43	anonymou s	
44	anonymou s	
45	anonymou s	
46	anonymou s	
47	anonymou s	
48	anonymou s	
49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	
51	anonymou s	

52	anonymou s	
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	The funding for AGLS should be given to violence interruption strategies that have been proven to be effective as well as to investing in historically underfunding communities in order to address the root causes of violence, including poverty and income inequality.
55	anonymou s	
56	anonymou s	
57	anonymou s	Cast a wider net on looking into the efficacy. There is no justifiable reason to pursue the use of this technology!
58	anonymou s	
59	anonymou s	Disregard the activist courts, enforce the current laws and keep communities safe, do no apologize for prosecuting criminals.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	
62	anonymou s	No
63	anonymou s	
64	anonymou s	I can see the potential value to assist officers in their duty, but there is too much potential for abuse or misuse
65	anonymou s	Stop the crime and lawlessness. Police do not respond to any crimes. If you want to report a crime, it can take well more than an hour before you get through to speak to anyone. Then the police still do not respond. City leadership is doing nothing to stop the crime and lawlessness. Seattle is a dump. Even the rest of the country looks down on Seattle and our inability to maintain a safe community. Our reputation in the rest of the world is that Seattle is a dangerous place to visit or live in.
66	anonymou s	
67	anonymou s	
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	
70	anonymou s	
71	anonymou s	RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
72	anonymou s	Do not fall for the far left narrative that this would be a waste of money, or violation of privacy. It is a tool to fight crime which is up in Seattle.
73	anonymou s	The area you use these in should be those with ongoing problems. Do not let people claim this is targeted minorities. The good law abiding people in those neighborhoods deserve safety too.
74	anonymou s	
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	
77	anonymou s	

78	anonymou s	
79	anonymou s	
80	anonymou s	
81	anonymou s	
82	anonymou s	
83	anonymou s	Please redirect funds to support communities.
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	
86	anonymou s	
87	anonymou s	
88	anonymou s	Police have been leaving in droves. I had a conversation with a woman who was interviewing candidates for law enforcement in Pierce County. She told me that they had a very large number of Seattle police interviewing for positions because they were so unhappy with their jobs. That does not make Seattle progressive. It makes Seattle dysfunctional. I do not know how effective this kind of real-time command center would be. But if it is a step towards supporting police, I would be in favor.
89	anonymou s	
90	anonymou s	
91	anonymou s	You are a violent person if you approve of this.
92	anonymou s	
93	anonymou s	
94	anonymou s	
95	anonymou s	Consider you may end up increasing unnecessary and hurtful policing of communities of color. Consider that these tech are completely unnecessary and dystopian. Consider that these tech have been proven inaccurate. Consider that we need money to address homelessness and should not be buying creepy police state tech for our lovely city.
96	anonymou s	
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	No
99	anonymou s	
100	anonymou s	
101	anonymou s	
102	anonymou s	
103	anonymou s	

10 4	anonymou s	
10 5	anonymou s	Please consider investing in affordable housing and health services instead. We are still recovering from the pandemic. Punitive measures and hyper-surveillance are not going to strengthen our communities.
10 6	anonymou s	
10 7	anonymou s	
10 8	anonymou s	
10 9	anonymou s	
11 0	anonymou s	
11 1	anonymou s	
11 2	anonymou s	If Seattle is the progressive city it claims to be, where all are welcome, we should not even be considering adapting these oppressive technologies.
11 3	anonymou s	
11 4	anonymou s	
11 5	anonymou s	
11 6	anonymou s	
11 7	anonymou s	Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
11 8	anonymou s	
11 9	anonymou s	PLEASE don't do this. Ridiculous waste of taxpayer money. Weren't you all elected on the promise of fiscal responsibility?
12 0	anonymou s	
12 1	anonymou s	My roommate was killed by the SPD over a very small bumper scrape. They refused to have compassion for the fact that he was in a hurry to get to a job interview, and they thought it would be funny to lie to him about a fictional woman he had crushed with his car until he committed suicide to avoid going to prison for what he saw as the remainder of his life. He was tall and funny, a glass blower, he had a terrible sweet tooth, liked flowers and enjoyed repairing bicycles. He left us behind, his friends, a community of musicians and artists that loved him, and his mother. The officers who continuously harassed and stalked him were punished with a 2-week paid suspension period after they, the precinct and court admitted to the fiction they had crafted. There was no woman, there was simply a small scrape that he did not stop to exchange insurance information about. They used their current level of surveillance technology to track him down from where he had lived previously, find his car, and eventually find our home. They showed up several times while he was out and left him threatening voicemails describing a woman in critical condition who he had allegedly hit with his car. He had no memory of this but was so terrified he felt he had no other option to comply with these accusations or face death. He could not live with even the thought he might have hurt someone, and he could not live with being wrongfully tried for manslaughter. The night before his court hearing, he killed himself in his bedroom, 10 feet below my bed. His death is not the first to happen in this city under these same circumstances, his death will not be the last. But for those of us who have lost loved ones to the SPD by use of any of their covert or surveilling operations will never, ever back giving law enforcement more tools to track, watch, or wrongfully harass us. I would hope that the City Council would be on our side.
12 2	anonymou s	Stop spending my and others money (tax dollars) on things that don't work.
12 3	anonymou s	Do not fund this technology.

12 4	anonymou s	Don't try to implement a system if the proper tools, staff, laws, policies and procedures are not in place. Too many times, the City has forged ahead and not been able to make programs and systems work effectively and efficiently. City officials then end up with egg on their faces and all that happens is loss of confidence by voters and residents, along with the commitment of huge costs with very little return and very little change in dealing with problems.
12 5	anonymou s	How embarrassing that I and so many others have to put forth this amount of efforts in our free time in order to tell you how to do your job. You should be embarrassed.
12 6	anonymou s	Listen to community! The community has wisdom, experience, thoughtfulness to promote a solution that brings about more public safety, health, and connection. We don't need more technology or surveillance -- we need solutions developed by and for the community that keep everyone safe, particularly Black and Brown folks in our community.
12 7	anonymou s	
12 8	anonymou s	
12 9	anonymou s	
13 0	anonymou s	Cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPRs), gunshot detection technology, among other police surveillance tools will only make the budget crisis worse, without actually addressing the root causes of the issues we're trying to solve. As someone who is part of the communities who will be most negatively impacted by this technology, I want the City to take into consideration that there are other options that don't increase the likelihood of harm against the very communities that we are trying to support.
13 1	anonymou s	
13 2	anonymou s	
13 3	anonymou s	SPD has not consulted with any experts outside of the Fusus salespeople. It is irresponsible to not complete due diligence.
13 4	anonymou s	Don't implement corporate surveillance tech!
13 5	anonymou s	
13 6	anonymou s	
13 7	anonymou s	I don't think we should give SPD any new technology until they embrace complete and total accountability in upcoming contract negotiations.
13 8	anonymou s	Stop ignoring the people who live here. This technology is not wanted by the majority. You wouldn't dare put this on a ballot because you already know it would be overwhelmingly rejected.
13 9	anonymou s	
14 0	anonymou s	
14 1	anonymou s	Instead of investing money into surveillance they should put it towards methods that actually work like violence interruption programs and community-led safety initiatives. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
14 2	anonymou s	
14 3	anonymou s	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

14 4	anonymou s	This will open the city and countless others to lawsuits, stop wasting our taxpayer dollars on these things and address the actual issues.
14 5	anonymou s	
14 6	anonymou s	
14 7	anonymou s	
14 8	anonymou s	
14 9	anonymou s	
15 0	anonymou s	I would like to see a competing proposal to fix the problem without adding yet another database.
15 1	anonymou s	
15 2	anonymou s	
15 3	anonymou s	This is a waste of money, and we are facing epic budget shortfalls. Please be responsible stewards of public funds.
15 4	anonymou s	Trusting AI and tech companies and police officers with mass surveillance technology is ridiculously stupid, and is guaranteed to result in unsafe situations for many people, including false arrests and deaths.
15 5	anonymou s	
15 6	anonymou s	
15 7	anonymou s	I do not support this technology.
15 8	anonymou s	
15 9	anonymou s	
16 0	anonymou s	
16 1	anonymou s	These systems are an enormous giveaway to corporations with no responsibility to the taxpayers of Seattle forced to fund them.
16 2	anonymou s	
16 3	anonymou s	This is an ineffective, expensive, and privacy-eroding idea that will serve no purpose other than to waste a lot of money. Worse, it could set up further erosions of privacy in the future when more automation is needed, or more tracking is needed, or any other number of surveillance state type features are enabled through technological development. Consider the possibility of Seattle starting to look like London or Shanghai with cameras everywhere and nowhere to hide from Big Brother.
16 4	anonymou s	
16 5	anonymou s	
16 6	anonymou s	
16 7	anonymou s	Stop implementing technology like this -And get SPD drones out of our parks
16 8	anonymou s	
16 9	anonymou s	

170	anonymous	Stop wasting our tax money! If you are truly interested in addressing crime start by addressing the core problems that contribute to crime: poverty, substance abuse, lack of education funding (for teachers NOT fancy buildings), lack of mental health resources. If you are unwilling to spend money on helping to develop a healthy community (no prison is NOT the answer to social problems) then lower our taxes. It is shameful the level of "services" that have to be provided by non-profits because the government does not, given the high level of taxes we pay.
171	anonymous	
172	anonymous	
173	anonymous	
174	anonymous	
175	anonymous	Surveillance is the worst strategy for decreasing crime. It doesn't help people, it hurts people.
176	anonymous	
177	anonymous	
178	anonymous	
179	anonymous	
180	anonymous	
181	anonymous	
182	anonymous	
183	anonymous	
184	anonymous	
185	anonymous	
186	anonymous	
187	anonymous	
188	anonymous	no
190	anonymous	
191	anonymous	none
192	anonymous	
193	anonymous	
194	anonymous	Do not fund this technology.
195	anonymous	

19	anonymou 6 s	
19	anonymou 7 s	
19	anonymou 8 s	
19	anonymou 9 s	
20	anonymou 0 s	
20	anonymou 1 s	The sense of lawlessness in the city is encouraging criminal actors.
20	anonymou 2 s	Meeting people's basic needs (food, shelter, clothing, healthcare) are what reduces crime - not excessive technology or bloated police budgets. We need to be putting funds towards housing, shelter, healthcare, food access programs, and harm reduction to help our communities be safer.
20	anonymou 3 s	
20	anonymou 4 s	
20	anonymou 5 s	
20	anonymou 6 s	
20	anonymou 7 s	
20	anonymou 8 s	
20	anonymou 9 s	
21	anonymou 0 s	Far more effective investments in public safety would make our city more liveable and great place to live. I urge you to consider programs that have worked elsewhere to make communities safer. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
21	anonymou 1 s	
21	anonymou 2 s	
21	anonymou 3 s	
21	anonymou 4 s	
21	anonymou 5 s	privacy and liberty of citizens
21	anonymou 6 s	
21	anonymou 7 s	With all three technologies, there should be a specified time to use them and after a trial period, revisit to determine if they are meeting the stated goals.
21	anonymou 8 s	
21	anonymou 9 s	do not do this.
22	anonymou 0 s	Gun violence is a serious problem that needs an urgent and effective response. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions

such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. I don't understand why when our city is seeing a record death rate from fentanyl overdose that we are not investing in overdose prevention centers. And why we are not scaling up treatment. Making substance use treatment available and affordable would help with the public health crisis we are dealing with and also decrease rates of violent crime.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. A guaranteed basic income pilot may be the city's most effective strategy to reducing community violence.

22
1 s

22
2 s

22
3 s

22
4 s

22
5 s

Let's do the pilot and then analyze the results and see if it helps.

22
6 s

22
7 s

22
8 s

When there's a budget shortfall, there is no reason to spend money on this.

22
9 s

23
0 s

I do not want my tax dollars spent on this technology. Please fund solutions that work like housing, mental health supports, anti-poverty programs, and violence interruption programs. We know those work in deterring crime. Unlike these ineffective and invasive tech solutions.

23
1 s

Please consider the history of policing and how it inevitably leads to harm caused disproportionately to communities of color. It does not address root causes of crime like poverty and housing/mental instability. Please do better with our resources.

23
2 s

23
3 s

Increased surveillance is not the answer to increasing public safety. Housing, community building organizations, education, and access to food help keep people safe.

23
4 s

Spend the money on housing our citizens instead.

23
5 s

23
6 s

23
7 s

23 8	anonymou s	Only use tax payers' money on the technology if you will actually prosecute criminals.
23 9	anonymou s	
24 0	anonymou s	
24 1	anonymou s	
24 2	anonymou s	
24 3	anonymou s	
24 4	anonymou s	
		<p>We urge you to stay true to Seattle's values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Investing in these programs would also put money into the actual communities most impacted by gun violence instead of giving that money to a company located in a different state. Seattle should heed the lessons learned from the many other cities that have already discontinued their contracts for AGLS based on its ineffectiveness and the several concerns laid out above and follow their lead by not implementing these technologies.</p> <p>As laid out in Council Budget Action SPD-900-A in the 2024 budget, the RET must be conducted in concert among the Executive's Office, the Office of Civil Rights, and the Office of the Inspector General. Given the documented impacts of acoustic gunshot detection technology and CCTV in increasing biased policing and over-policing of marginalized communities and the chilling effect of RTCC software on civil liberties, we want there to be a robust process that involves ALL THREE bodies in an active partnership as required by law. This process should include in-depth review of independent peer-reviewed studies and consultation with other municipalities that have discontinued use of AGLS to understand potential pitfalls and unintended outcomes. Additionally, if the AGLS and CCTV will be moved from their initial proposed locations, each move must include a robust and deliberate public process.</p> <p>Importantly, impacted communities must be engaged in a proactive way that works well for us. We are concerned by a tendency to choose just a few token representatives to speak for an entire group. Likewise, we are concerned that only two very short public forums on these SIRs are being planned, at times that might be difficult for people to attend, and that require attendees to sit through sales pitches by the companies profiting from these technologies that are branded as "education."</p> <p>Further, we have no information about how much outreach has been or will be done or feedback collected from affected communities as part of the RET process. As always when deploying new surveillance technology, we must consider the potential negative impacts on the most marginalized and vulnerable. This includes but is not limited to special outreach needed to BIPOC communities, our neighbors who are unhoused, sex workers, disabled people, queer and trans people, undocumented people, and people who are impoverished.</p> <p>Our primary demand is to halt investment in these policing technologies, but if the city moves forward with its current objectives, then it is imperative that the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and the associated Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) be conducted in a thorough, equitable, transparent, and accessible manner. These decisions are too large and too long-lasting to be rushed or to be made by the few.</p>
24 5	anonymou s	
24 6	anonymou s	
24 7	anonymou s	
24 8	anonymou s	

24	anonymou 9 s	
25	anonymou 0 s	If you could maintain a long-range plan of talking with people in each neighborhood and seeing what they really wanted and what they thought was needed that would be good. I don't think the current structure allows the capacity for that type of long range gathering of information and taking action.
25	anonymou 1 s	
25	anonymou 2 s	
25	anonymou 3 s	This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
25	anonymou 4 s	
25	anonymou 5 s	Seattle deserves public safety solutions that work. Unfortunately, extensive research shows that such surveillance technologies are ineffective at reducing crime. Instead, they violate people's civil liberties, harm the communities they're deployed in, and waste police resources.
25	anonymou 6 s	
25	anonymou 7 s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
25	anonymou 8 s	No.
25	anonymou 9 s	
26	anonymou 0 s	
26	anonymou 1 s	
26	anonymou 2 s	
26	anonymou 3 s	
26	anonymou 4 s	
26	anonymou 5 s	
26	anonymou 6 s	A better use of funds would be to hire more PUBLIC DEFENDERS see Seattle Times front page story Feb 25,2024
26	anonymou 7 s	
26	anonymou 8 s	
26	anonymou 9 s	
27	anonymou 0 s	
27	anonymou 1 s	
27	anonymou 2 s	
27	anonymou 3 s	
27	anonymou 4 s	

27	anonymou	
5	s	
27	anonymou	
6	s	
27	anonymou	
7	s	
27	anonymou	
8	s	
27	anonymou	
9	s	
28	anonymou	
0	s	
28	anonymou	
1	s	
28	anonymou	
2	s	
28	anonymou	
3	s	
28	anonymou	
4	s	
28	anonymou	
5	s	
28	anonymou	
6	s	
28	anonymou	
7	s	
28	anonymou	
8	s	
28	anonymou	
9	s	No
29	anonymou	
0	s	No
29	anonymou	
1	s	
29	anonymou	
2	s	
29	anonymou	
3	s	
29	anonymou	
4	s	
29	anonymou	
5	s	
29	anonymou	
6	s	
29	anonymou	
7	s	
29	anonymou	
8	s	
29	anonymou	Feelings and rights of innocents being monitored
9	s	
30	anonymou	
0	s	
30	anonymou	It is also unnecessarily expensive and unreliable.
1	s	
30	anonymou	
2	s	

30	anonymou	
3	s	
30	anonymou	
4	s	
30	anonymou	
5	s	
30	anonymou	<p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. It does not happen overnight, continuing to fund these types of services is the best way forward.</p>
30	anonymou	
6	s	
30	anonymou	
7	s	This is not an appropriate use of tax payer funds.
30	anonymou	
8	s	
30	anonymou	
9	s	
31	anonymou	
0	s	
31	anonymou	
1	s	Leadership helps communities, not idly stand by and “surveil.” It’s not preventive, it’s reactionary.
31	anonymou	
2	s	
31	anonymou	
3	s	
31	anonymou	
4	s	
31	anonymou	
5	s	Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
31	anonymou	
6	s	
31	anonymou	
7	s	
31	anonymou	
8	s	
31	anonymou	
9	s	
32	anonymou	
0	s	
32	anonymou	
1	s	
32	anonymou	
2	s	
32	anonymou	
3	s	
32	anonymou	
4	s	
32	anonymou	
5	s	democracy and surveillance do not go together!
32	anonymou	
6	s	

32	anonymou 7 s	
32	anonymou 8 s	
32	anonymou 9 s	
33	anonymou 0 s	
33	anonymou 1 s	
33	anonymou 2 s	
33	anonymou 3 s	
33	anonymou 4 s	this is not a good use of city funds.
33	anonymou 5 s	
33	anonymou 6 s	
33	anonymou 7 s	We need to focus our taxpayer dollars on projects that actually make our communities better and bring us together.
33	anonymou 8 s	
33	anonymou 9 s	
34	anonymou 0 s	
34	anonymou 1 s	
34	anonymou 2 s	
34	anonymou 3 s	No.
34	anonymou 4 s	
34	anonymou 5 s	
34	anonymou 6 s	
34	anonymou 7 s	
34	anonymou 8 s	
34	anonymou 9 s	
35	anonymou 0 s	
35	anonymou 1 s	
35	anonymou 2 s	
35	anonymou 3 s	
35	anonymou 4 s	Community based violence reduction and interruption works! Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. Please look into this as a viable option! The city could scale effective community-led solutions such

		as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. (The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.)
35	anonymou 5 s	
35	anonymou 6 s	
35	anonymou 7 s	
35	anonymou 8 s	
35	anonymou 9 s	
36	anonymou 0 s	
36	anonymou 1 s	
36	anonymou 2 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
36	anonymou 3 s	
36	anonymou 4 s	
36	anonymou 5 s	
36	anonymou 6 s	
36	anonymou 7 s	
36	anonymou 8 s	
36	anonymou 9 s	
37	anonymou 0 s	
37	anonymou 1 s	
37	anonymou 2 s	
37	anonymou 3 s	
37	anonymou 4 s	
37	anonymou 5 s	None additional.
		There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
37	anonymou 6 s	Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like

		<p>Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
377	anonymou s	Pretty complete--thank you!
378	anonymou s	This technology is expensive. We already have budget concerns in this city, there is no reason to add to the budget, especially since it has not been allocated in the current budget
379	anonymou s	
380	anonymou s	
381	anonymou s	
382	anonymou s	Listen to community. Leadership's irresponsibility in pushing this technology at the expense of community will be a stain on their legacy.
383	anonymou s	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.
384	anonymou s	
385	anonymou s	
386	anonymou s	
387	anonymou s	
388	anonymou s	
389	anonymou s	
390	anonymou s	
391	anonymou s	
392	anonymou s	
393	anonymou s	N/A
394	anonymou s	
395	anonymou s	
396	anonymou s	
397	anonymou s	
398	anonymou s	

39	anonymou 9 s	
40	anonymou 0 s	
40	anonymou 1 s	
40	anonymou 2 s	
40	anonymou 3 s	
40	anonymou 4 s	
40	anonymou 5 s	
40	anonymou 6 s	
40	anonymou 7 s	
40	anonymou 8 s	
40	anonymou 9 s	
41	anonymou 0 s	
41	anonymou 1 s	
41	anonymou 2 s	Expensive and ineffective. The foundations of a police state.
41	anonymou 3 s	
41	anonymou 4 s	
41	anonymou 5 s	If SPD is understaffed it is because of its racist and sexist practices toward its own staff. You cannot tech your way out of a hostile culture.
41	anonymou 6 s	
41	anonymou 7 s	NO
41	anonymou 8 s	
41	anonymou 9 s	
42	anonymou 0 s	
42	anonymou 1 s	I am appalled that the City would consider this technology.
42	anonymou 2 s	
42	anonymou 3 s	
42	anonymou 4 s	
42	anonymou 5 s	
42	anonymou 6 s	

42	anonymou 7 s	
42	anonymou 8 s	
42	anonymou 9 s	
43	anonymou 0 s	Stop wasting our money.
43	anonymou 1 s	
43	anonymou 2 s	
43	anonymou 3 s	
43	anonymou 4 s	
43	anonymou 5 s	
43	anonymou 6 s	
43	anonymou 7 s	
43	anonymou 8 s	N/a
43	anonymou 9 s	
44	anonymou 0 s	
44	anonymou 1 s	
44	anonymou 2 s	
44	anonymou 3 s	
44	anonymou 4 s	Don't trust salespeople. They're paid to lie to you.
44	anonymou 5 s	
44	anonymou 6 s	
44	anonymou 7 s	
44	anonymou 8 s	
44	anonymou 9 s	
45	anonymou 0 s	
45	anonymou 1 s	
45	anonymou 2 s	To not pay attention to the loud (but small) group of protesters who are protesting about "Policing" in general. Otherwise Seattle will continue to wallow in the crime infestation that the previous "Summer of Love" City Council and Mayor (Durkin, Sawant, Morales, etc.) allowed and encouraged with the "defunding of police" sentiments and actions.
45	anonymou 3 s	

45	anonymou 4 s	
45	anonymou 5 s	
45	anonymou 6 s	
45	anonymou 7 s	
45	anonymou 8 s	
45	anonymou 9 s	
46	anonymou 0 s	
46	anonymou 1 s	
46	anonymou 2 s	
46	anonymou 3 s	Please think about just what would be learned and what the "unintended consequences" of such data collection might be. And, would you want it in your neighborhood? If the technology has positive benefits that outweigh the negative aspects, then we should have it in all neighborhoods, not just the ones that are currently "high crime" areas. The other neighborhoods are moving in that direction too.
46	anonymou 4 s	This technology is a waste of taxpayer money and city resources. If adopted, the inevitable failures of this technology to improve the city of Seattle will not look good for you during the next election.
46	anonymou 5 s	
46	anonymou 6 s	
46	anonymou 7 s	
46	anonymou 8 s	No
46	anonymou 9 s	Why are we spending our money on this when there are SO many other needs in the city?
47	anonymou 0 s	
47	anonymou 1 s	
47	anonymou 2 s	No.
47	anonymou 3 s	
47	anonymou 4 s	Consider the dangerous precedent this sets towards an authoritarian environment in our city.
47	anonymou 5 s	
47	anonymou 6 s	
47	anonymou 7 s	While I understand the importance of ensuring public safety, I urge you to prioritize the needs of our homeless population, school children, and marginalized communities before committing additional resources to surveillance initiatives. Seattle is facing a humanitarian crisis with its homeless population, many of whom are struggling to survive without access to stable housing, healthcare, and basic necessities. Instead of investing in surveillance technology, I implore you to redirect these funds towards housing-first initiatives, mental health services, substance abuse treatment programs, and support services that can provide immediate relief and long-term solutions to those experiencing homelessness.

Additionally, our school children are in urgent need of support, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many students lack access to adequate resources, including technology for remote learning, nutritious meals, and mental health support services. Rather than channeling funds into surveillance infrastructure, we should prioritize investments in education, afterschool programs, tutoring services, and initiatives that address the digital divide to ensure that every child has the opportunity to succeed.

Furthermore, marginalized communities in Seattle continue to face systemic barriers to equity and justice, including racial discrimination, economic inequality, and lack of access to essential services. Instead of perpetuating systems of surveillance and control, we must invest in community-led initiatives that promote social cohesion, economic empowerment, and civic engagement. This includes funding for grassroots organizations, cultural programs, restorative justice practices, and community centers that serve as safe spaces for all residents.

In conclusion, I urge you to consider the needs of our most vulnerable populations before allocating additional funds to the establishment of an RTCC. Let us prioritize compassion, equity, and human dignity in our decision-making processes, and work together to build a Seattle that is truly inclusive, resilient, and just for all.

47
8 anonymous

47
9 anonymous

48
0 anonymous

48
1 anonymous

48
2 anonymous

48
3 anonymous

48
4 anonymous

48
5 anonymous

48
6 anonymous

48
7 anonymous

48
8 anonymous This is a massive waste of city money. There's are so many better uses for this money. This will NOT help citizens of Seattle and will instead hurt.

48
9 anonymous

49
0 anonymous

49
1 anonymous

49
2 anonymous

49
3 anonymous -

49
4 anonymous

49
5 anonymous

49
6 anonymous

497	anonymou s	
498	anonymou s	Seattle needs to change course from this austerity and these draconian control technologies and practices and fund desperately needed resources.
499	anonymou s	
500	anonymou s	
501	anonymou s	
502	anonymou s	
503	anonymou s	
504	anonymou s	No
505	anonymou s	
506	anonymou s	<p>Mayor Harrell's administration has argued that combining CCTV with AGLS will supposedly improve the efficacy of the two independently unsuccessful technologies by overlaying their data onto a map with RTCC. At a public hearing earlier this month, the Mayor's director of public safety, Kerry Keefe, claimed that "studies show" that AGLS, commonly referred to by the brand name ShotSpotter, showed promise in preventing crime and assisting criminal investigations "when it is coupled with the CCTV." However, a partially randomized experiment on the effectiveness of combined use of AGLS and CCTV published in Springer Link in 2018 showed "no significant increase in the number of confirmed shootings" after combining this technology. The City of Chicago also rolled out AGLS and CCTV technology together, and still canceled their contract with ShotSpotter's manufacturer in February of 2024.</p> <p>Additionally, the Seattle City Council has already approved \$1.5 million for the overall pilot project, however it is important to note that RTCC software is a subscription-based product, meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. Therefore, the true long-term cost of these systems for taxpayers is uncertain. RTCC software operates on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software, so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025.</p>
507	anonymou s	It's obvious that this tech will not actually help the city. An investment in our communities will help. Please do not pursue this.
508	anonymou s	
509	anonymou s	
510	anonymou s	
511	anonymou s	
512	anonymou s	
513	anonymou s	
514	anonymou s	I think the most important things to take into account is that this is not what Seattle should be like--it is out of line for Seattle as a community, as a liberal, safe space. Work on making us more like what we should be--how we present ourselves to the rest of the world.
515	anonymou s	
516	anonymou s	Instead of reducing violent crime, they harm communities by violating civil liberties, contributing to the historic disproportionate over-policing and over-surveillance of BIPOC communities, and encouraging police overreach.

517	anonymou s	
518	anonymou s	
519	anonymou s	If your language is only money and business and not anything you actually pretend to say you care about - you should at least see this as a really stupid business decision... especially in a deficit....
520	anonymou s	No
521	anonymou s	
522	anonymou s	<p>Please consider other ways of decreasing community violence, here are just a few possible ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. -Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. -Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. -Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. -Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. -Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
523	anonymou s	Cost, effectiveness, data on success in other places where it's used. How Seattle will set up data collection and analysis of usage.
524	anonymou s	
525	anonymou s	
526	anonymou s	
527	anonymou s	
528	anonymou s	
529	anonymou s	
530	anonymou s	
531	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p>

		<p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
53	anonymou 2 s	
53	anonymou 3 s	
53	anonymou 4 s	
53	anonymou 5 s	N/a
53	anonymou 6 s	
53	anonymou 7 s	
53	anonymou 8 s	
53	anonymou 9 s	
54	anonymou 0 s	No
54	anonymou 1 s	
54	anonymou 2 s	
54	anonymou 3 s	No.
54	anonymou 4 s	Nope
54	anonymou 5 s	<p>In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p>
54	anonymou 6 s	
54	anonymou 7 s	No
54	anonymou 8 s	
54	anonymou 9 s	
55	anonymou 0 s	
55	anonymou 1 s	

55 2	anonymou s	There is no evidence of this tech helping reduce crime, community based interventions have been shown to actually have a positive effect.
55 3	anonymou s	
55 4	anonymou s	
55 5	anonymou s	N/A
55 6	anonymou s	
55 7	anonymou s	
55 8	anonymou s	These changes will not increase safety, only profits for large corporations.
55 9	anonymou s	
56 0	anonymou s	
56 1	anonymou s	If deployed, will files be kept on all residents, including those in higher social-economic groups? If low-income people are tracked, then the rich should have the same government files.
56 2	anonymou s	
56 3	anonymou s	
56 4	anonymou s	Racial equity. A decision to expand surveillance technology is antithetical to any racial equity or justice goal. Especially in light of the 2020 George Floyd protests, this is unconscionable and disgusting.
56 5	anonymou s	Racial equity. A decision to expand surveillance technology is antithetical to any racial equity or justice goal. Especially in light of the 2020 George Floyd protests, this is unconscionable and disgusting.
56 6	anonymou s	
56 7	anonymou s	No.
56 8	anonymou s	
56 9	anonymou s	
57 0	anonymou s	
57 1	anonymou s	
57 2	anonymou s	
57 3	anonymou s	
57 4	anonymou s	
57 5	anonymou s	
57 6	anonymou s	
57 7	anonymou s	
57 8	anonymou s	
57 9	anonymou s	

58	anonymou 0 s	
58	anonymou 1 s	
58	anonymou 2 s	
58	anonymou 3 s	
58	anonymou 4 s	
58	anonymou 5 s	
58	anonymou 6 s	
58	anonymou 7 s	
58	anonymou 8 s	Affordable housing, healthcare and public services create safety, not policing. Police don't prevent crime, they respond to it and they also often perpetrate it.
58	anonymou 9 s	
59	anonymou 0 s	
59	anonymou 1 s	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
59	anonymou 2 s	
59	anonymou 3 s	If the public is surveilled, we should have access to the records. Elected officials and state authorities should also be surveilled, with that information publicly accessible
59	anonymou 4 s	
59	anonymou 5 s	
59	anonymou 6 s	
59	anonymou 7 s	This is literally money that could fund: free meals for students; more therapists in schools; better teacher pay; improving side walks and bike lanes; transitioning off of fossil fuels; funding artists and cultural events; more buses and transit; public housing. Wouldn't that feel better?
59	anonymou 8 s	
59	anonymou 9 s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments

		restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
600	anonymou s	
601	anonymou s	I am paying attention to who votes for this and will NEVER support that person or anyone they endorse EVER AGAIN.
602	anonymou s	This tech isn't hack proof or even meaningfully hack resistant and all this data fed into an AI learning model is not going to produce results you want to see in the world. Please stop this before it's too late.
603	anonymou s	
604	anonymou s	People often justify surveillance with the idea that "if you do nothing wrong, it'll be fine." This is a huge error. With context and appropriate aggression, anything can be interpreted as wrong. It's foolish to imagine that this will be benignly interpreted, especially with the lack of ethical guidelines around it. This will increase racism, discrimination, hate crimes, and marginalization of the already marginalized. Let's spend our money on something that can address the true problems facing this area: addiction, homelessness, poverty, etc
605	anonymou s	The people's voice.
606	anonymou s	No
607	anonymou s	
608	anonymou s	
609	anonymou s	
610	anonymou s	
611	anonymou s	
612	anonymou s	
613	anonymou s	
614	anonymou s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence

Yes, there are a few additional considerations that City leadership should take into account when deciding whether to implement the proposed Crime Prevention Technology pilot program:

Potential for misuse or abuse: While the technologies are intended to improve public safety, there is a risk that they could be misused or abused by those with access to the system. City leaders should establish clear guidelines and consequences for any misuse of the technologies, and ensure that there are robust safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized access or abuse of power.

Impact on community trust: The introduction of surveillance technologies may strain the relationship between law enforcement and the community, particularly in neighborhoods that have historically experienced over-policing or discrimination. City leadership must be proactive in addressing these concerns and work to build trust through open communication, transparency, and community engagement.

Long-term sustainability: Implementing and maintaining these technologies will require ongoing financial investment. City leaders should consider the long-term sustainability of the program and ensure that there is a plan in place to secure the necessary funding and resources to support the program's continued operation and maintenance.

Balancing technology with human judgment: While these technologies can provide valuable information and insights, it is crucial that they are used to support, rather than replace, human judgment and decision-making. City leadership should emphasize the importance of relying on the expertise and experience of law enforcement professionals in interpreting and acting upon the data provided by these systems.

Continuous evaluation and improvement: As with any new program or technology, it is essential to continuously monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the Crime Prevention Technology pilot. City leaders should establish clear metrics for success and regularly assess the program's impact on crime reduction, community safety, and public trust. This ongoing evaluation will allow for necessary adjustments and improvements to be made over time.

Collaboration with community partners: The success of the program will depend not only on the technology itself but also on the strength of partnerships between law enforcement, community organizations, and local residents. City leadership should actively engage with these stakeholders to build collaborative relationships, share information, and work together to create a safer and more resilient community.

61
5
anonymou
s

61
6
anonymou
s

61
7
anonymou
s No

61
8
anonymou
s

61
9
anonymou
s Do better Seattle!

62
0
anonymou
s

62
1
anonymou
s

62
2
anonymou
s

62
3
anonymou
s

62
4
anonymou
s

62
5
anonymou
s

62
6
anonymou
s The will of the people

62	anonymou 7 s	
62	anonymou 8 s	
62	anonymou 9 s	
63	anonymou 0 s	
63	anonymou 1 s	You, as a board member, were born into a world where you could enter the public space freely. It would have been illegal to stalk, surveil, and retaliate against you based on facial recognition data. You have a moral obligation to not make the world worse for the current generation of Seattlites. These kids are not less deserving of privacy because of a perceived insecurity in our criminal system. There is no factor that could balance this gross overreach of power.
63	anonymou 2 s	
63	anonymou 3 s	
63	anonymou 4 s	
63	anonymou 5 s	
63	anonymou 6 s	
63	anonymou 7 s	
63	anonymou 8 s	
63	anonymou 9 s	
64	anonymou 0 s	PLEASE STOP USING OUR TAX DOLLARS TO PERPETUATE THE POLICE AND SURVEILLANCE STATE. We are experiencing a budget and housing crisis. Why is this a priority?
64	anonymou 1 s	See above letter.
64	anonymou 2 s	Consider appointing an "RTCC Ethical Deployment Overseer" outside the SPD to oversee the setup and initial deployment of all 3 technologies (CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC). The overseer's job would be to troubleshoot any ethical problems in how the systems are set up and deployed.
64	anonymou 3 s	
64	anonymou 4 s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality</p>

		predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
64	anonymou	
5	s	
64	anonymou	
6	s	
64	anonymou	
7	s	
64	anonymou	
8	s	
64	anonymou	It looks like Fusus (and other RTCC companies) boast about their frequent software updates (adding new AI recognition capabilities, for example). I'm very concerned that these software updates will not each be put through the surveillance review process – but rather just adopted as part of the RTCC subscription. If RTCC is used, any changes to the software that expand its capabilities needs to be put through the surveillance review process, with public comment and council vote. It seems like the rate at which these RTCC companies add "features", it will impossible and/or illegal.
65	anonymou	
0	s	
65	anonymou	
1	s	
65	anonymou	
2	s	
65	anonymou	
3	s	
65	anonymou	
4	s	
65	anonymou	
5	s	
65	anonymou	
6	s	
		FUSUS (& other RTCC) destroys Seattle's ability to be a sanctuary city for anyone.
		RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.
		Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.
		We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.
		This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.
		The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.
		Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.
65	anonymou	RTCC is expensive. It is an annual subscription cost at a time that the city is facing a massive budget deficit. Funding this will come directly at the expense of community investments that actually create safety. The long list of studies proving what actually reduces violence. Violence interruption programs, place making, jobs, reducing inequality, direct income supports, affordable housing, healthcare access, etc.
7	s	
65	anonymou	
8	s	No

65	anonymou 9 s	
66	anonymou 0 s	
66	anonymou 1 s	
66	anonymou 2 s	
66	anonymou 3 s	
66	anonymou 4 s	I want city leadership to consult residents of seattle directly with transparent budget proposals, appropriate timeline of public commentary and engagement before making a decision. This proposal was originally planned for public commentary during the month of February WITHOUT transparent nor finalized mapping of the technology to best engage the impacted and greater Seattle public in the concerns this brings them. I also want City leadership to DEPRIORITIZE SPD criminalization programs to fund more affordable housing, public health and mental health programs.
66	anonymou 5 s	
66	anonymou 6 s	
66	anonymou 7 s	
66	anonymou 8 s	
66	anonymou 9 s	
67	anonymou 0 s	
67	anonymou 1 s	
67	anonymou 2 s	
67	anonymou 3 s	
67	anonymou 4 s	
67	anonymou 5 s	
67	anonymou 6 s	
67	anonymou 7 s	
67	anonymou 8 s	(e) Moreover, even SPD themselves doesn't want automated assessment of their own videos, so why should residents be subjected to surveillance tools that even SPD doesn't like? https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/decision-to-halt-program-analyzing-seattle-police-bodycam-video-under-scrutiny/
67	anonymou 9 s	No limitations on use: Item 5.1 of the RET in the RTCC SIR says the number one goal for the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the RTCC to only "felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc).
68	anonymou 0 s	

68 1	anonymou s	<p>Never-ending pilot: SPD has not told the public how long this pilot is supposed to last for (3 months, 1 year, 10 years?).</p> <p>(a) By not giving duration length, SPD has opened the door to a potentially perpetual "pilot" program.</p> <p>(b) Why isn't the evaluation plan included in the SIR's appendix?</p> <p>(c) In item 1.3 of the RET in the RTCC SIR, SPD says that the pilot "will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective." It's worrisome that SPD didn't even list that the pilot would be terminated if it was found to 'inadvertently' re-enforce biases.</p> <p>(d) Without this accountability, SPD is creating a future door through which there is no way for this surveillance to be deemed ineffective.</p> <p>Security & Compliance:</p> <p>(a) Item 4.7 says, "Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials." It would be better if access wasn't just password-based, but was also using MFA/2FA (or even 2SA would be something).</p> <p>(b) SPD has also not detailed whether a person must be on the SPD network in order to access the RTCC or if remote access will be permitted.</p> <p>(c) SPD hasn't confirmed whether the RTCC will have granular access control.</p> <p>(d) Nor whether the RTCC logs the username and timestamp when a camera's pan, tilt, or zoom are changed; or when an ALPR search is conducted. For example, if the system does NOT log this and there was a news report about misuse of the RTCC, then it might be impossible for the OIG/OPA to determine which employee was at fault.</p> <p>(e) Item 5.4 in the SIR says that, "Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD"; but that doesn't make sense here. Wouldn't this mean that the unit supervisor for the homicide detectives and the supervisor for the gang unit (and so and so forth) would all each be responsible for ensuring data retention compliance of the RTCC? That responsibility should be more centralized so as to ensure consistency in application of compliance requirements for a potentially widely-used system like the RTCC.</p> <p>Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require the RTCC to support: detailed logging for all features, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and granular access control of any cameras.</p>
68 2	anonymou s	
68 3	anonymou s	
68 4	anonymou s	
68 5	anonymou s	
68 6	anonymou s	
68 7	anonymou s	
68 8	anonymou s	
68 9	anonymou s	Consider the \$200million budget deficit?
69 0	anonymou s	
69 1	anonymou s	
69 2	anonymou s	
69 3	anonymou s	
69 4	anonymou s	
69 5	anonymou s	

69	anonymou 6 s	
69	anonymou 7 s	
69	anonymou 8 s	
69	anonymou 9 s	
70	anonymou 0 s	Take all possible measures to reinvest in Seattle's communities and allow them to grow and heal from decades of targeted SPD violence.
70	anonymou 1 s	
70	anonymou 2 s	
70	anonymou 3 s	
70	anonymou 4 s	
70	anonymou 5 s	
70	anonymou 6 s	
70	anonymou 7 s	
70	anonymou 8 s	
70	anonymou 9 s	We keep giving cops more money and they just close fewer and fewer cases.
71	anonymou 0 s	
71	anonymou 1 s	
71	anonymou 2 s	Do not approve this. Please listen to community and use the funds for social services like violence interruption programs. If you truly care about community safety you would not approve this.
71	anonymou 3 s	
71	anonymou 4 s	
71	anonymou 5 s	
71	anonymou 6 s	Our leaders shouldn't listen to terrorists but they should listen to who they are good patriots and taking care about our country through paying taxes to State and to Federal also.
71	anonymou 7 s	
71	anonymou 8 s	
71	anonymou 9 s	
72	anonymou 0 s	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas
72	anonymou 1 s	Na
72	anonymou 2 s	
72	anonymou 3 s	RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy

		<p>where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025</p> <p>Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.</p> <p>Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.</p>
72	anonymou 4 s	
72	anonymou 5 s	
72	anonymou 6 s	N/A
72	anonymou 7 s	no
72	anonymou 8 s	Please do not further increase the surveillance of this city and its people in an effort to perform security. We need to strive for safety and safety happens when everyone's needs are met and no at-risk group is targeted further.
72	anonymou 9 s	
73	anonymou 0 s	
73	anonymou 1 s	
73	anonymou 2 s	None
73	anonymou 3 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
73	anonymou 4 s	
73	anonymou 5 s	
73	anonymou 6 s	
73	anonymou 7 s	<p>RTCC software is expensive</p> <p>RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.</p> <p>The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$230 million shortfall in 2025</p> <p>Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.</p> <p>Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million.</p>
73	anonymou 8 s	<p>.....a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p>

		<p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
739	anonymou s	Where are the social services? Leadership is only looking for solutions that militarize our city and communities.
740	anonymou s	<p>If the city wants to reduce crime, it should be increasing spending in these areas along with turning vacant land into parks (https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1718503115), increasing affordable housing (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094119011000301?via%3Dihub), increasing healthcare access, direct income supports (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0091743522001827), or any of the other community investments that reduce inequality (which is the biggest predictor of homicide rates https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/08/income-inequality-murder-homicide-rates) which are proven to reduce violent crime and show the community that the city actually cares about them</p> <p>How is combing failed technologies supposed to somehow produce success? How is combining technologies with documented histories of causing harm and violating civil rights going to result in anything other increasing those harms and civil rights violations?</p>
741	anonymou s	
742	anonymou s	The expansion of mass surveillance with software companies like Fusus, along with AI capabilities, is being proposed to surveille those who have not been convicted of any crime but are on pretrial release (as well as their family members and friends) under constant, targeting video surveillance in Atlanta, GA.
743	anonymou s	
744	anonymou s	
745	anonymou s	If you care about anything other than money, care about the fact that your right to privacy is GONE, if you enact this
746	anonymou s	
747	anonymou s	
748	anonymou s	
749	anonymou s	No
750	anonymou s	
751	anonymou s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p>

		Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
75	anonymou 2 s	
75	anonymou 3 s	
75	anonymou 4 s	

ID	Email	Do you have any additional comments or questions?
1	anonymou s	
2	anonymou s	
3	anonymou s	
4	anonymou s	
5	anonymou s	This is a garbage idea, and I think you all know it. But with a right-wing majority in city council and a right-wing mayor in office, with a right-wing city attorney? You're not reading these surveys. You've already written the check.
6	anonymou s	No.
7	anonymou s	Bad.
8	anonymou s	
9	anonymou s	
10	anonymou s	
11	anonymou s	
12	anonymou s	
13	anonymou s	Please read Timnit Gebru's work on the biases of AI (https://hai.stanford.edu/news/timnit-gebru-ethical-ai-requires-institutional-and-structural-change) and expand social programs and weather/housing shelters in the city to improve public safety, and instead focus on accountability for police misuse of technologies already being used!
14	anonymou s	
15	anonymou s	Time and again, throughout my life, as both a witness and the victim of crimes, I've seen how thoroughly ineffective law enforcement are at preventing crimes and violence in our communities. All they do when they show up is either nothing, or they make the problem worse, if they're not the cause themselves. And yet still, this city pours more money into a fundamentally broken institution, serving the business interests of this city first, and the people second. I'm sick of it, and this is just one more example of how you, the city council, refuse to acknowledge what you should have learned in 2020, which is that police do not keep our communities safe! Stop giving them more toys to brutalize our communities with impunity!
16	anonymou s	
17	anonymou s	This technology does not make me feel safer. I don't believe it will prevent crime.

18	anonymou s
19	anonymou s
20	anonymou s
21	anonymou s
22	anonymou s
23	anonymou s
24	anonymou s
25	anonymou s
26	anonymou s
27	anonymou s
28	anonymou s
29	anonymou s
30	anonymou s
31	anonymou s
32	anonymou s
33	anonymou s
34	anonymou s
35	anonymou s
36	anonymou s
37	anonymou s
38	anonymou s
39	anonymou s
40	anonymou s
41	anonymou s
42	anonymou s
43	anonymou s
44	anonymou s
45	anonymou s

46	anonymou s	
47	anonymou s	
48	anonymou s	
49	anonymou s	
50	anonymou s	
51	anonymou s	
52	anonymou s	I've lived here 8 years and this city has progressively gotten more and more violent. Not because of the individuals I walk by on my street, my neighbors don't harass or intimidate me, the community isn't using war fare tactics to isolate and attack individuals when they are in groups using their RIGHT to protest. It is the police who threaten our peace. STOP EMPOWERING THEM.
53	anonymou s	
54	anonymou s	
55	anonymou s	
56	anonymou s	Please do not implement this technology.
57	anonymou s	I said this already in my CCTV response, but why not pursue violence interruption programs that have a record of positive impact in many cities and neighborhoods? Invest in drug abuse treatment facilities, access to mental health treatment, access to affordable housing. These things are all proven to work hand-in-hand with violence prevention. Inequality begets violence, so address inequality rather than trying to patch together "fixes" to the violence.
58	anonymou s	To the city of leadership in charge of implementing this, shame to you for creating this or supporting this. Congratulations, you are aiding a corrupt system and you are taking away people's right to privacy. You are helping to create a government like North Korea. I don't know about you but I would prefer to keep my right to privacy and I would like my communities of color and queer communities safe. Feel the shame of the mere thought of policing walking and talking in the streets of Seattle.
59	anonymou s	Making this open source is critical.
60	anonymou s	
61	anonymou s	
62	anonymou s	No
63	anonymou s	
64	anonymou s	We need more officers that are supported by their community leaders
65	anonymou s	
66	anonymou s	
67	anonymou s	
68	anonymou s	
69	anonymou s	

70	anonymou s	
71	anonymou s	We urge you to stay true to Seattle’s values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Investing in these programs would also put money into the actual communities most impacted by gun violence instead of giving that money to a company located in a different state. Seattle should heed the lessons learned from the many other cities that have already discontinued their contracts for AGLS based on its ineffectiveness and the several concerns laid out above and follow their lead by not implementing these technologies.
72	anonymou s	Approve this option.
73	anonymou s	
74	anonymou s	
75	anonymou s	
76	anonymou s	
77	anonymou s	None. Just get this ready as soon as possible.
78	anonymou s	
79	anonymou s	
80	anonymou s	
81	anonymou s	
82	anonymou s	
83	anonymou s	
84	anonymou s	Waste of money; prosecutors will just release any caught criminals back to the street.
85	anonymou s	What about people who arrive by buses and on foot? Are we making sure CCTV footage is also accessible from transit agencies?
86	anonymou s	
87	anonymou s	
88	anonymou s	
89	anonymou s	
90	anonymou s	
91	anonymou s	This technology is violent.
92	anonymou s	
93	anonymou s	
94	anonymou s	

95	anonymou s	This is a city, not a prison. Please stop this dystopian madness immediately. I
96	anonymou s	
97	anonymou s	
98	anonymou s	Suspect downtown would be in better shape if this had been implemented a decade ago.
99	anonymou s	
100	anonymou s	
101	anonymou s	
102	anonymou s	
103	anonymou s	
104	anonymou s	
105	anonymou s	The cycle of pushing poor people in and out of our courthouses and jails is not making us safer.
106	anonymou s	
107	anonymou s	
		Defund the SPD -- they have more than enough funding.
108	anonymou s	Any money that is set aside for the SPD for newly hired officers should be given to education if the SPD is not able to use the money for newly hired officers. It should not be redistributed elsewhere in the SPD budget.
109	anonymou s	
110	anonymou s	
111	anonymou s	
112	anonymou s	The people of Seattle do not trust SPD, the leadership of Seattle should be cautious about putting so much trust in that same department.
113	anonymou s	
114	anonymou s	
115	anonymou s	
116	anonymou s	
117	anonymou s	Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.
118	anonymou s	
119	anonymou s	
120	anonymou s	
121	anonymou s	

12	anonymou	
2	s	Please be better people, our society, and your neighbors deserve it.
12	anonymou	
3	s	Do not fund this technology.
12	anonymou	
4	s	I could write a book, but I won't.
12	anonymou	
5	s	Please go touch grass.
12	anonymou	
6	s	
12	anonymou	
7	s	
12	anonymou	
8	s	
12	anonymou	
9	s	
13	anonymou	
0	s	
13	anonymou	Opponents will include people who are concerned about invasion of privacy and equity. One will argue the usual "big brother is watching" and the other will argue that it's only focused on certain demographics. However, the fact of the matter is we need to save lives and protect everyone.
13	anonymou	
2	s	
13	anonymou	
3	s	
13	anonymou	
4	s	Don't implement corporate surveillance tech!
13	anonymou	
5	s	
13	anonymou	
6	s	
13	anonymou	
7	s	
13	anonymou	Stop ignoring the people who live here. This technology is not wanted by the majority. You wouldn't dare put this on a ballot because you already know it would be overwhelmingly rejected.
13	anonymou	
9	s	
14	anonymou	
0	s	
14	anonymou	Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing that this city desperately needs.
14	anonymou	
1	s	
14	anonymou	
2	s	
14	anonymou	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in
14	anonymou	
3	s	

violent crime.
Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.
Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.
Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

14 anonymou
4 s

14 anonymou
5 s

14 anonymou
6 s

14 anonymou
7 s

14 anonymou
8 s

14 anonymou
9 s

15 anonymou
0 s

15 anonymou
1 s

15 anonymou
2 s

15 anonymou
3 s

15 anonymou
4 s I do not consent to allowing the city to spy on me.

15 anonymou
5 s

15 anonymou
6 s

15 anonymou
7 s Please do not implement this technology in Seattle.

15 anonymou
8 s

15 anonymou
9 s

16 anonymou
0 s Don't implement this!

16 anonymou
1 s

16 anonymou
2 s

16 anonymou
3 s Do not approve this ill-advised, expensive, useless, and privacy-invading proposal.

16 anonymou
4 s

16 anonymou
5 s

16	anonymou	
6	s	
16	anonymou	
7	s	
16	anonymou	
8	s	I do not consent to warrantless surveillance.
16	anonymou	
9	s	
17	anonymou	
0	s	
17	anonymou	
1	s	
17	anonymou	
2	s	
17	anonymou	
3	s	
17	anonymou	
4	s	
17	anonymou	
5	s	
17	anonymou	
6	s	
17	anonymou	
7	s	
17	anonymou	
8	s	
17	anonymou	
9	s	
18	anonymou	
0	s	
18	anonymou	
1	s	
18	anonymou	
2	s	
18	anonymou	
3	s	
18	anonymou	
4	s	
18	anonymou	
5	s	
18	anonymou	Can we just put more funding into buses already? Jeez. This is all so ridiculous. Please just treat people with care and respect.
6	s	
18	anonymou	
7	s	
18	anonymou	
8	s	
18	anonymou	
9	s	
19	anonymou	
0	s	We need this in C-ID
19	anonymou	
1	s	We need this in CID
19	anonymou	
2	s	
19	anonymou	
3	s	

19 4	anonymou s	Do not fund this technology.
19 5	anonymou s	
19 6	anonymou s	
19 7	anonymou s	
19 8	anonymou s	
19 9	anonymou s	
20 0	anonymou s	
20 1	anonymou s	
20 2	anonymou s	
20 3	anonymou s	
20 4	anonymou s	
20 5	anonymou s	
20 6	anonymou s	Seattle prides itself on being a haven of progressive values, intellect, and a leader among the nation's cities, often one of the first to do the right thing. Spending our valuable resources on something as ineffectual and undemocratic as increased mass surveillance is not the answer to our problems, and it is a step in the opposite direction, tarnishing our credibility on the national stage, as well as our soul.
20 7	anonymou s	
20 8	anonymou s	
20 9	anonymou s	
21 0	anonymou s	
21 1	anonymou s	
21 2	anonymou s	
21 3	anonymou s	
21 4	anonymou s	
21 5	anonymou s	
21 6	anonymou s	
21 7	anonymou s	
21 8	anonymou s	
21 9	anonymou s	
22 0	anonymou s	

22	anonymou	
1	s	
22	anonymou	
2	s	
22	anonymou	
3	s	
22	anonymou	
4	s	
22	anonymou	
5	s	
22	anonymou	
6	s	
22	anonymou	
7	s	
22	anonymou	
8	s	
22	anonymou	
9	s	
23	anonymou	
0	s	
23	anonymou	
1	s	
23	anonymou	
2	s	
23	anonymou	
3	s	
23	anonymou	
4	s	Tax the rich.
23	anonymou	
5	s	
23	anonymou	
6	s	
23	anonymou	
7	s	
23	anonymou	I'd like to see more people end up in jail instead of being let go or simply not prosecuted at all. The amount of criminals walking the streets in Seattle is outrageous.
8	s	
23	anonymou	
9	s	
24	anonymou	
0	s	
24	anonymou	How are there fewer public hearings than technologies being reviewed?
1	s	How are there fewer public hearings than geographic areas under consideration?
24	anonymou	How are there hearings when no one knows where this will be deployed?
2	s	
24	anonymou	
3	s	
24	anonymou	
4	s	
24	anonymou	
5	s	
24	anonymou	
6	s	
24	anonymou	I urge the city council to vote NO to any funding and implementation of RRTC and increased surveillance technology.
7	s	

I urge the city council to invest in the community, including investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Scot Sternberg 98144

24 8 s anonymou

24 9 s anonymou

25 0 s anonymou

25 1 s anonymou

25 2 s anonymou

25 3 s anonymou

25 4 s anonymou

25 5 s anonymou

25 6 s anonymou

25 7 s anonymou

25 8 s anonymou No

25 9 s anonymou

26 0 s anonymou

26 1 s anonymou

26 2 s anonymou

26 3 s anonymou

26 4 s anonymou

26 5 s anonymou We need more police not more gimmicks

26 6 s anonymou No

26 7 s anonymou

26 8 s anonymou

26 9 s anonymou

27 0 s anonymou

27 1 s anonymou

27 2 s anonymou

27 3 s anonymou

27	anonymou	
4	s	
27	anonymou	
5	s	
27	anonymou	
6	s	
27	anonymou	
7	s	
27	anonymou	
8	s	
27	anonymou	
9	s	
28	anonymou	
0	s	
28	anonymou	
1	s	
28	anonymou	
2	s	
28	anonymou	
3	s	
28	anonymou	
4	s	
28	anonymou	
5	s	
28	anonymou	
6	s	
28	anonymou	
7	s	
28	anonymou	
8	s	
28	anonymou	No
9	s	
29	anonymou	No
0	s	
29	anonymou	
1	s	
29	anonymou	
2	s	
29	anonymou	
3	s	
29	anonymou	
4	s	
29	anonymou	
5	s	
29	anonymou	
6	s	
29	anonymou	
7	s	
29	anonymou	
8	s	
29	anonymou	
9	s	
30	anonymou	
0	s	
30	anonymou	
1	s	

30	anonymou 2 s	
30	anonymou 3 s	
30	anonymou 4 s	
30	anonymou 5 s	
30	anonymou 6 s	Who other than RTCC salespeople have SPD consulted about RTCC? Only one *broken* link is included in the Expertise and References section of the City of Seattle Draft Surveillance Impact Report
30	anonymou 7 s	Do not deploy this tech. Full stop, NO.
30	anonymou 8 s	
30	anonymou 9 s	
31	anonymou 0 s	
31	anonymou 1 s	Why are millions not being invested into community gardens, food banks, affordable housing, accessible healthcare, public education, homeless shelters for the youth, etc?
31	anonymou 2 s	
31	anonymou 3 s	
31	anonymou 4 s	
31	anonymou 5 s	N/A
31	anonymou 6 s	
31	anonymou 7 s	
31	anonymou 8 s	
31	anonymou 9 s	
32	anonymou 0 s	Why? Why not invest in health, education, food access?
32	anonymou 1 s	
32	anonymou 2 s	
32	anonymou 3 s	
32	anonymou 4 s	Do not deploy real-time crime center software. Use the money for less intrusive, proven-effective, community-based programs instead.
32	anonymou 5 s	
32	anonymou 6 s	
32	anonymou 7 s	
32	anonymou 8 s	
32	anonymou 9 s	

33	anonymou 0 s	
33	anonymou 1 s	
33	anonymou 2 s	
33	anonymou 3 s	
33	anonymou 4 s	this is not a good use of city funds.
33	anonymou 5 s	
33	anonymou 6 s	
33	anonymou 7 s	This whole surveillance push is misguided.
33	anonymou 8 s	
33	anonymou 9 s	
34	anonymou 0 s	
34	anonymou 1 s	
34	anonymou 2 s	
34	anonymou 3 s	n/a
34	anonymou 4 s	
34	anonymou 5 s	
34	anonymou 6 s	I want my taxes to fund positive efforts at making a livable city: housing, social services, parks, schools, libraries, mental health and addiction treatment, public art. I don't want my tax dollars spent chasing one unproven technological "solution" to crime after another. If spending more and more money on policing and policing technology doesn't prevent or solve crime, we have to try something different, not double down endlessly.
34	anonymou 7 s	
34	anonymou 8 s	
34	anonymou 9 s	
35	anonymou 0 s	
35	anonymou 1 s	
35	anonymou 2 s	
35	anonymou 3 s	
35	anonymou 4 s	Please please do not rush to make the decision of whether or not to use this technology. This is a very very serious decision that can have grave consequences.
35	anonymou 5 s	
35	anonymou 6 s	

35	anonymou 7 s	
35	anonymou 8 s	
35	anonymou 9 s	
36	anonymou 0 s	Do not move forward with this.
36	anonymou 1 s	
36	anonymou 2 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
36	anonymou 3 s	
36	anonymou 4 s	
36	anonymou 5 s	
36	anonymou 6 s	
36	anonymou 7 s	
36	anonymou 8 s	
36	anonymou 9 s	
37	anonymou 0 s	
37	anonymou 1 s	
37	anonymou 2 s	
37	anonymou 3 s	
37	anonymou 4 s	
37	anonymou 5 s	None additional. Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
37	anonymou 6 s	Source: City of Seattle Draft Surveillance Impact Report
37	anonymou 7 s	No
37	anonymou 8 s	
37	anonymou 9 s	
38	anonymou 0 s	
38	anonymou 1 s	
38	anonymou 2 s	Surveillance is not safety. Safety comes from people's needs being met. More and more of us see through SPD and the City of Seattle's manipulation of people's real fear and concerns to further invest in our ineffective and actively dangerous police force.
38	anonymou 3 s	Not an effective use of taxpayer dollars. This doesn't address the root issue and instead slaps a bandaid on the problem. This will only result in continuing the socio-economic inequality growing in Seattle.

38	anonymou	
4	s	
38	anonymou	
5	s	
38	anonymou	
6	s	
38	anonymou	
7	s	
38	anonymou	
8	s	
38	anonymou	
9	s	
39	anonymou	
0	s	
39	anonymou	
1	s	
39	anonymou	
2	s	
39	anonymou	
3	s	N/A
39	anonymou	
4	s	
39	anonymou	
5	s	
39	anonymou	
6	s	
39	anonymou	
7	s	
39	anonymou	You can rebuild trust in community by dissolving the SPD, disbanding the SPOG, and rebuilding it from the ground up - much like the city of Camden, New Jersey did.
8	s	
39	anonymou	
9	s	
40	anonymou	
0	s	
40	anonymou	
1	s	
40	anonymou	
2	s	
40	anonymou	
3	s	
40	anonymou	
4	s	Defund the police.
40	anonymou	
5	s	Who told you this was a good idea? Fire them.
40	anonymou	
6	s	
40	anonymou	
7	s	
40	anonymou	
8	s	
40	anonymou	
9	s	
41	anonymou	
0	s	
41	anonymou	
1	s	Why was there such a short period for public comment for these issues?

41	anonymou	
2	s	
41	anonymou	
3	s	
41	anonymou	
4	s	
41	anonymou	
5	s	
41	anonymou	
6	s	
41	anonymou	NO
7	s	
41	anonymou	
8	s	
41	anonymou	I think in this case the invasion of privacy is especially egregious—a sets a precedent that being in a public space at all strips you of any right to privacy. I don't think that should be true—do you?
9	s	
42	anonymou	
0	s	
42	anonymou	
1	s	No.
42	anonymou	
2	s	
42	anonymou	
3	s	
42	anonymou	
4	s	
42	anonymou	
5	s	
42	anonymou	
6	s	
42	anonymou	
7	s	
42	anonymou	
8	s	
42	anonymou	
9	s	
43	anonymou	
0	s	
43	anonymou	
1	s	
43	anonymou	
2	s	
43	anonymou	
3	s	
43	anonymou	
4	s	
43	anonymou	
5	s	
43	anonymou	
6	s	
43	anonymou	
7	s	
43	anonymou	
8	s	N/a
43	anonymou	
9	s	

44	anonymou 0 s	
44	anonymou 1 s	
44	anonymou 2 s	
44	anonymou 3 s	
44	anonymou 4 s	
44	anonymou 5 s	
44	anonymou 6 s	
44	anonymou 7 s	
44	anonymou 8 s	
44	anonymou 9 s	
45	anonymou 0 s	
45	anonymou 1 s	
		<p>I am Gary Lee with the Chinatown Block Watch and the CID Public Safety Council. I was at the 2/27/24 meeting at the Bitter Lake Community Center and was not allowed to speak because of time. Hopefully there will a better organized meeting/hearing for an opportunity to present my support. But here it is.</p> <p>I want to say that the CID Community Supports and Appreciates the work the SPD does in our neighborhood.</p> <p>On November 13, 2023, I submitted over 745 signatures from residents, business owners, and workers in the CID to the City Council requesting that they approve the budget request for this Pilot project, and that they implement this pilot project in the CID.</p> <p>As mentioned in the presentation, earlier, the Chinatown International District is one of the high crime neighborhoods under consideration.</p> <p>This is an opportunity for the City to mitigate the harms and crime it has, and is, drawing to our neighborhood, because of the City's inadvertent, OR PURPOSEFULL OVERCENTRATION of homeless shelters and human services in, and within walking distance, of the CID.</p> <p>I am here today to invite you to, and continue to request – that this Pilot project be implement in the CID first!</p> <p>I think I heard that this technology is only going to be used for felony crimes! I think that should not be the case if breaking store front windows and graffiti are not felonies.</p> <p>We are tired of what the CID has become over the last 5 years. Look at Little Saigon!! Does that look like a normal/vibrant commercial district to you??!!! Are boarded up storefronts still "normal" outside of the CID?!!</p> <p>We are afraid of being shot at and attacked while standing at a bus stop, or walking to a bus stop, or just walking on the street.</p> <p>We are tired of our store front windows being broken, over, and over again. Insurance companies have stopped insuring business in the CID because vandalism and break-ins are so rampant. We are tired of having to repaint over graffiti - over, and over again.</p>
45	anonymou 2 s	

This Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot project should be implemented first in the Chinatown International District in order to:

Help Prevent crime, as in - reduce crime, as in - hopefully make our neighborhood safer, as in - help restore our neighborhood to be "Normal" and SAFE!!

We believe the CID is the best place for a Pilot project - to study the impacts on Crime Reduction – because there is too much crime happening there.

The mass majority of the residents, business owners, and people who work in the CID want safety and the implementation of new Technology Crime Prevention.

Use the CID for the pilot project to see how it works!!

45 anonymou
3 s

45 anonymou
4 s

45 anonymou
5 s

45 anonymou
6 s

45 anonymou
7 s

45 anonymou
8 s

45 anonymou
9 s

46 anonymou
0 s

46 anonymou
1 s

46 anonymou
2 s

46 anonymou
3 s

46 anonymou
4 s

46 anonymou
5 s

46 anonymou
6 s

46 anonymou
7 s

46 anonymou
8 s No

46 anonymou
9 s

47 anonymou
0 s

47 anonymou
1 s

47 anonymou
2 s No.

47 anonymou
3 s Police don't keep us safe. Communities do. Invest in community-led projects, not policing and surveillance.

47 anonymou
4 s

47	anonymou	
5	s	
47	anonymou	
6	s	
47	anonymou	
7	s	
47	anonymou	
8	s	
47	anonymou	
9	s	
48	anonymou	
0	s	
48	anonymou	
1	s	
48	anonymou	
2	s	
48	anonymou	
3	s	
48	anonymou	
4	s	
48	anonymou	
5	s	
48	anonymou	
6	s	
48	anonymou	
7	s	
48	anonymou	
8	s	
48	anonymou	
9	s	
49	anonymou	
0	s	
49	anonymou	You all are trying to make use of a technology that Lucius (played by Morgan Freeman) had to destroy in "The Dark Knight" because no one should have access to it. Not even Batman. Not even to find the Joker. And there is no real life Joker so you don't even have that excuse. We don't have supervillains, you don't need Batman level technology.
1	s	
49	anonymou	
2	s	
49	anonymou	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will another meeting be held to receive public comments since not all who signed up in-person and online was able to speak? • With the overwhelming community opposition to all the technologies proposed, what happens next?
3	s	
49	anonymou	
4	s	
49	anonymou	
5	s	
49	anonymou	
6	s	
49	anonymou	
7	s	
49	anonymou	
8	s	
49	anonymou	Please invest these funds into making parts, food, housing, and educational programs for children.
9	s	Invest these funds into free healthcare, free education, not surveillance.
50	anonymou	
0	s	

501	anonymou s	These technologies are frankly ridiculous. It is such a violation to record and monitor everyone in public spaces.
502	anonymou s	
503	anonymou s	Please, do not turn our city into a giant prison. Do not take away people's freedom to exist in anonymity from the state and the police. We should not all be tracked and monitored like lab rats. There are problems in this city and there are solutions if we are brave enough to try. Other cities in the country and the world have the imagination to try new ways of solving problems, rather than making the existing brutality more expansive and efficient.
504	anonymou s	Get it done!
505	anonymou s	
506	anonymou s	The city's central staff memo on the 2023/2024 biannual budget (specifically the SPD budget) stated that surveillance technologies in this pilot program may be moved after just one year. Will the city provide residents about what neighborhoods may potentially be targeted with surveillance next? Has it made any efforts to adequately consult members of those communities on their concerns? The Mayor and SPD have rushed through the Surveillance Impact Report process, giving the less than 30 days to provide public comment on this matter. This irresponsible approach has sidelined the neighborhoods that would be affected by the initial instillation of this surveillance technology, and therefore the comment period should be extended to more accurately reflect the public's input on the use of RTCC in Seattle.
507	anonymou s	
508	anonymou s	
509	anonymou s	I don't want to live in a dystopian novel. Please don't turn Seattle into 1984.
510	anonymou s	
511	anonymou s	
512	anonymou s	
513	anonymou s	
514	anonymou s	More police feet on the ground--this city is not that big--it has hotspots--find them arrest people and let them know what behaviors won't be tolerated. Be smart on crime. You know you could do it if you really wanted to make the city a lawful place.
515	anonymou s	
516	anonymou s	
517	anonymou s	
518	anonymou s	
519	anonymou s	
520	anonymou s	No
521	anonymou s	
522	anonymou s	

523	anonymou s	Technology must be used carefully and not target any particular population. Need community buy in and support. Outreach will be key. Reminder: Delete International District. It doesn't exist. You already have Chinatown International District.
524	anonymou s	
525	anonymou s	
526	anonymou s	
527	anonymou s	
528	anonymou s	
529	anonymou s	
530	anonymou s	
531	anonymou s	
532	anonymou s	
533	anonymou s	
534	anonymou s	
535	anonymou s	N/a
536	anonymou s	
537	anonymou s	
538	anonymou s	
539	anonymou s	
540	anonymou s	No
541	anonymou s	Please please do not give into fear-stoking tactics, and please focus on listening to the voices of people who LIVE in the areas where these proposed technologies would be deployed. Their voices matter the most.
542	anonymou s	
543	anonymou s	Don't implement these technologies or partner with these kinds of companies. They do not serve the people's interests.
544	anonymou s	
545	anonymou s	In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.
546	anonymou s	

547	anonymou s	No
548	anonymou s	
549	anonymou s	
550	anonymou s	
551	anonymou s	
552	anonymou s	
553	anonymou s	
554	anonymou s	
555	anonymou s	
556	anonymou s	
557	anonymou s	
558	anonymou s	
559	anonymou s	
560	anonymou s	I am strongly opposed to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
561	anonymou s	
562	anonymou s	
563	anonymou s	
564	anonymou s	The Seattle Police Department Chief of Police failed to give me a straight answer when I asked him about empirical research regarding the efficacy of the surveillance technologies the City of Seattle plans to adopt. I am concerned about the lack of transparency and "trust me" attitude shown by Seattle leadership generally regarding this plan. As a law student at the University of Washington, the City is disappointing me more and more. Shame on you.
565	anonymou s	As an immigrant and person of color, I am deeply disturbed and concerned about the City of Seattle's moves to increase surveillance technology. I condemn any effort that increases risk of harm to our minority communities.
566	anonymou s	
567	anonymou s	No.
568	anonymou s	
569	anonymou s	
570	anonymou s	
571	anonymou s	
572	anonymou s	

57	anonymou	
3	s	
57	anonymou	
4	s	
57	anonymou	
5	s	
57	anonymou	
6	s	
57	anonymou	
7	s	
57	anonymou	
8	s	
57	anonymou	
9	s	
58	anonymou	
0	s	
58	anonymou	
1	s	
58	anonymou	
2	s	
58	anonymou	
3	s	
58	anonymou	
4	s	
58	anonymou	
5	s	
58	anonymou	
6	s	
58	anonymou	
7	s	
58	anonymou	
8	s	
58	anonymou	
9	s	
59	anonymou	
0	s	
59	anonymou	I would like to express my strong opposition to deploying real-time crime center (RTCC) software in Seattle. I am deeply concerned that this technology has the potential to violate privacy and civil liberties and undermines democratic values. Using this technology will greatly expand the surveillance infrastructure in Seattle and could be used to capture extensive personal information about people, including where they live or work and their activities. This extensive data collection and surveillance would also put communities that Seattle has sought to protect at risk, such as currently over-policed BIPOC communities, undocumented immigrants or people seeking abortions. Seattle should not be a surveillance state, and I urge the city not to purchase or deploy this technology.
1	s	
59	anonymou	Your job is to make the city better. If you think this will make the city better, you are woefully under qualified to be making these decisions.
2	s	
59	anonymou	
3	s	
59	anonymou	
4	s	
59	anonymou	
5	s	
59	anonymou	
6	s	
59	anonymou	I hope you listen to us :)
7	s	

598	anonymou s	
599	anonymou s	Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
600	anonymou s	
601	anonymou s	I am paying attention to who votes for this and will NEVER support that person or anyone they endorse EVER AGAIN.
602	anonymou s	
603	anonymou s	The decisions of this city government have been foolish and counterintuitive up to this point. Break that pattern and decline the technology.
604	anonymou s	People often justify surveillance with the idea that "if you do nothing wrong, it'll be fine." This is a huge error. With context and appropriate aggression, anything can be interpreted as wrong. It's foolish to imagine that this will be benignly interpreted, especially with the lack of ethical guidelines around it. This will increase racism, discrimination, hate crimes, and marginalization of the already marginalized. Let's spend our money on something that can address the true problems facing this area: addiction, homelessness, poverty, etc
605	anonymou s	Save Earth.
606	anonymou s	No
607	anonymou s	
608	anonymou s	
609	anonymou s	
610	anonymou s	
611	anonymou s	
612	anonymou s	
613	anonymou s	
614	anonymou s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
615	anonymou s	Thank you for the opportunity to provide input on this important decision. I believe we have covered the most critical considerations that City leadership should take into account when evaluating the proposed Crime Prevention Technology pilot program. However, I would like to emphasize a few final points: Public engagement and feedback: As the City moves forward with its decision-making process, it is crucial to continue engaging with the public and soliciting feedback from a wide range of community members. This could include holding town hall meetings, conducting surveys, and establishing advisory committees that include representatives from diverse backgrounds and perspectives. By actively listening to and incorporating community input, City leadership can ensure that the program is responsive to the needs and concerns of the people it is intended to serve. Phased implementation and ongoing assessment: Given the complexity and potential impact of the proposed technologies, City leadership may want to consider a phased implementation approach. This could involve starting with a smaller-scale pilot program in a specific area of the city, allowing for a more controlled evaluation of the technologies' effectiveness and impact on the community. As the program expands, regular assessments and adjustments should be made based on data, community feedback, and lessons learned.

Transparency and public reporting: To maintain public trust and confidence in the program, City leadership must prioritize transparency throughout the implementation and operation of the Crime Prevention Technology pilot. This should include regular public reporting on the program's progress, challenges, and outcomes, as well as clear communication about any changes or adjustments made to the program over time.

By keeping these points in mind and carefully weighing all of the considerations we have discussed, I believe that City leadership will be well-positioned to make an informed and responsible decision about the use of this technology in our community. If there are any further questions or concerns, I am more than happy to continue this discussion and provide additional insights or perspectives as needed.

61 anonymou
6 s

61 anonymou
7 s No

61 anonymou
8 s

61 anonymou
9 s

62 anonymou
0 s

62 anonymou
1 s

62 anonymou
2 s

62 anonymou
3 s Criminals are people, there is a reason why they are doing crime. Mass surveillance does not fix OR IDENTIFY the problem as to why people do crime. That is something much deeper that the state needs to sort out.

62 anonymou
4 s

62 anonymou
5 s

62 anonymou
6 s

62 anonymou
7 s

62 anonymou
8 s

62 anonymou
9 s

63 anonymou
0 s

63 anonymou
1 s

63 anonymou
2 s This technology makes our city worse.

63 anonymou
3 s

63 anonymou
4 s

63 anonymou
5 s

63 anonymou
6 s

63 anonymou
7 s

63	anonymou	
8	s	
63	anonymou	
9	s	
64	anonymou	If any surveillance technologies are implemented, I and others will work together to ensure the mayor and city council members do not have any further power in politics.
0	s	
64	anonymou	
1	s	See above letter.
64	anonymou	We need to move forward as a city and embrace technology that makes us all safer while at the same time discouraging criminal activity.
2	s	
64	anonymou	
3	s	
64	anonymou	
4	s	
64	anonymou	
5	s	
64	anonymou	
6	s	
64	anonymou	
7	s	
64	anonymou	
8	s	
64	anonymou	Why in this year of a very large budget deficit is the city considering embarking on these very expensive technologies? It makes no kind of sense. I get that you are worried about the shrinking size of the SPD force, but you could take this as an opportunity to be a visionary leader in re-imagining what public safety can look like – rather than doubling-down on failed technological stop-gap measures whose only effect will be to make it look like you are doing something, rather than really address the problems and root causes. Please consider that there are MANY more evidence-proven efficacious methods to improve public safety that do not involve placing CCTV cameras in public. For example: Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models, neighborhood-led programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, investments in restoring vacant land and funding community non-profits, better and more accessible mental health treatment facilities, more social housing, direct income support – and much more.
9	s	
65	anonymou	
0	s	
65	anonymou	
1	s	
65	anonymou	
2	s	
65	anonymou	
3	s	
65	anonymou	
4	s	
65	anonymou	
5	s	
65	anonymou	
6	s	
65	anonymou	
7	s	
65	anonymou	
8	s	No
65	anonymou	
9	s	
66	anonymou	
0	s	

66	anonymou 1 s	
66	anonymou 2 s	
66	anonymou 3 s	
66	anonymou 4 s	I oppose this technology. I urge COS leadership to prioritize housing access, ethics, rehabilitation programs, education, public health, transportation, etc.
66	anonymou 5 s	
66	anonymou 6 s	
66	anonymou 7 s	
66	anonymou 8 s	
66	anonymou 9 s	
67	anonymou 0 s	
67	anonymou 1 s	
67	anonymou 2 s	Being in a public space is not justification to surveil people. No one should be treated like a criminal for simply existing.
67	anonymou 3 s	
67	anonymou 4 s	
67	anonymou 5 s	
67	anonymou 6 s	
		<p>Based on my concerns, I recommend the city not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology.</p> <p>But if the city insists on ignoring the concerns of it's citizens and moving ahead I have the following recommendations.</p> <p>Recommendation 1: Require that the RTCC to be on-premise.</p> <p>Recommendation 2: Privately-owned CCTV videos (both live and recorded) should require a warrant signed by a judge before they can be viewed, accessed, or saved by SPD.</p> <p>Recommendation 3: All edge-based analytics and/or AI capabilities in the RTCC must be disabled until SPD explicitly lists them individually in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council.</p> <p>Recommendation 4: Specify that the only allowable use of the RTCC should be for felony crimes.</p> <p>Recommendation 5: Strike "and other information systems" from item 4.1 of the SIR.</p> <p>Recommendation 6: Limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.</p> <p>Recommendation 7: Specify a maximum time duration for the pilot.</p> <p>Recommendation 8: The public alert notification feature of the RTCC must be disabled.</p>
67	anonymou 7 s	Recommendation 9: Require the RTCC to support: detailed logging for all features, Multi-Factor

Authentication (MFA), and granular access control of any cameras.

Recommendation 10: Require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the RTCC, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the system.

Unidentified data sources: In item 4.1 of the RTCC SIR, SPD lists the data sources to the RTCC and closes with "and other information systems." This wording leaves open the door for future data integrations to the RTCC to be configured but never go through the Surveillance Ordinance process. For example, SPD could add social media data/analysis to the RTCC and that would not generate a new or updated SIR. No department should be above the scope of the Ordinance.

Excessive data retention: In item 4.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy..." This has multiple issues:

(a) 30 days is too long to keep data on innocent people just going about their day.

(b) Retaining the RTCC data (which includes ALPR and CCTV data) for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for data to use against their victims.

(c) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to RTCC data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this group of pilot technologies enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.

(d) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.

(e) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.

(f) It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would be getting processed by the RTCC).

Never-ending pilot: SPD has not told the public how long this pilot is supposed to last for (3 months, 1 year, 10 years?).

(a) By not giving duration length, SPD has opened the door to a potentially perpetual "pilot" program.

(b) Why isn't the evaluation plan included in the SIR's appendix?

(c) In item 1.3 of the RET in the RTCC SIR, SPD says that the pilot "will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective." It's worrisome that SPD didn't even list that the pilot would be terminated if it was found to 'inadvertently' re-enforce biases.

(d) Without this accountability, SPD is creating a future door through which there is no way for this surveillance to be deemed ineffective.

Duplication causing confusion in an emergency: Item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, says "Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle..." Seattle already has an opt-in alert notification system (AlertSeattle - <https://alert.seattle.gov/>). Having two separate systems that perform overlapping functionality of notifying residents in the case of an emergency is a bad idea because it could result in residents believing that they are subscribed for all emergency alerts when they are only subscribed to SPD's RTCC-based alerting system. If there is a non-SPD emergency, residents won't receive the alert because they are subscribed to the wrong system. There should be only one emergency alert system used by the City of Seattle and it should be whatever system the City's Office of Emergency Management officially designates as such. All city departments should feed their alert data to the OEM-designated system (as is already the case).

67 anonymou
8 s

67 anonymou
9 s

68 anonymou
0 s

68 anonymou
1 s

Do right by the people, stand with humanity

Training: Item 3.3 of the RTCC SIR says, "Authorized personnel will receive training in the RTCC management system prior to authorization." and item 7.2 says, "SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training." SPD does not mention creating any privacy or ethics training specific to the RTCC. There should be training that:

(a) That RTCC features must never be used outside the scope of an active call or investigation; and that employees found to have used the RTCC outside that scope would be personally liable for their actions.

(b) That ALPR data especially must be treated as sensitive information never to be used for personal purposes (such as stalking an ex/significant-other/neighbor/etc).

(c) Advises that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their pan/tilt/zoom altered to look inside private residences, to stalk/harass individuals, or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons)

(d) And that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their camera's viewing angle moved away from an area of police response, while police are still present.

(e) Additionally, the RTCC SIR doesn't mention any policy that prohibits the user of the RTCC from taking screenshots, screen-recordings, or pictures/recordings using their cell phone or other mobile device. This especially impacts any victims, passerby, or anyone in the vicinity who are only partially clothed or fully naked, especially if unconscious.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the RTCC, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the system.

68 anonymou
2 s

68 anonymou
3 s

68 anonymou
4 s

68 anonymou
5 s

68 anonymou
6 s

68 anonymou
7 s

68 anonymou
8 s

68 anonymou
9 s Thank you.

69 anonymou
0 s

69 anonymou
1 s

69 anonymou
2 s

69 anonymou
3 s

69 anonymou
4 s

69 anonymou
5 s

69 anonymou
6 s

69 anonymou
7 s

69 anonymou
8 s

69 anonymou
9 s

70	anonymou	
0	s	
70	anonymou	
1	s	
70	anonymou	
2	s	
70	anonymou	
3	s	
		<p>The crimes that plague so many small business owners in our Southeast Seattle communities are not especially sophisticated. In many cases, people living in crisis are committing commercial burglaries to finance substance abuse disorders, and they do not wear masks, disable cameras, or take other measures to obscure their identities. From the standpoint of many victims, identifying and apprehending the perpetrators of commercial burglaries and storefront vandalism is not the fundamental problem that the City must solve: instead, the key challenge is sustainably addressing the underlying issues of community members' houselessness and substance abuse disorders – which requires interventions outside of the criminal justice system, since perpetrators cycle quickly in and out of incarceration when apprehended. Service providers engaged in this kind of work, including REACH and the CARE team, have limited resources: they are either operating in our southeast neighborhoods in a limited capacity, or they do not yet have the resources to expand their services to our neighborhoods. Expanding the scope and scale of Seattle's community responder and behavioral health response teams could achieve the results – reducing police caseloads and allowing SPD to focus resources on serious crime - sought by the implementation of RTCC technology.</p> <p>We know that prioritizing investment in human-centered solutions with proven results will help our communities. While we look forward to evidence that RTCC and related new technologies can reliably address the specific challenges that the small business community faces in Southeast Seattle prior to expansion to our area, we believe that it is important to prioritize evidence-based solutions and not to place unfounded hopes in unproven approaches.</p>
70	anonymou	
4	s	
70	anonymou	
5	s	
70	anonymou	
6	s	
70	anonymou	
7	s	
70	anonymou	
8	s	
70	anonymou	
9	s	
71	anonymou	
0	s	
71	anonymou	
1	s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
71	anonymou	Do not approve this project. It would make our communities more unsafe. If you truly care about public safety, you should reject this.
2	s	
71	anonymou	
3	s	
71	anonymou	
4	s	
71	anonymou	
5	s	
71	anonymou	This is bottom of from my heart until we can not finish or delete the terrorism from this country we can't move forward into right directions so we need to stop listen to terrorists and using to them against our US people or to immigrant US people.
6	s	
71	anonymou	
7	s	
71	anonymou	
8	s	

71	anonymou 9 s	
72	anonymou 0 s	No Concerns, i am supporting to install all the camera to protect Chinatown areas
72	anonymou 1 s	Na
72	anonymou 2 s	Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
72	anonymou 3 s	Who other than RTCC sales people have SPD consulted about RTCC?
72	anonymou 4 s	
72	anonymou 5 s	
72	anonymou 6 s	No
72	anonymou 7 s	no
72	anonymou 8 s	
72	anonymou 9 s	
73	anonymou 0 s	
73	anonymou 1 s	
73	anonymou 2 s	None
73	anonymou 3 s	
73	anonymou 4 s	
73	anonymou 5 s	
73	anonymou 6 s	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments
73	anonymou 7 s	

		<p>restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p> <p>Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.</p>
73	anonymou 8 s	
73	anonymou 9 s	
74	anonymou 0 s	
74	anonymou 1 s	
74	anonymou 2 s	
74	anonymou 3 s	<p>It is extremely scary to think about what Seattle might look like in 5-10 years if all of this technology is implemented. I already walk around this city and assume I'm being watched at all times, and that's truly a gross feeling. We need to interrupt crime at its source by investing in things like universal healthcare, food access, education, housing, income support, and more. Why do we focus so much on crime after it has happened, rather than true crime prevention? Surveillance technologies respond to crime, they don't stop crime. Divert all of this funding to actual long-term solutions!</p>
74	anonymou 4 s	
74	anonymou 5 s	
74	anonymou 6 s	
74	anonymou 7 s	
74	anonymou 8 s	
74	anonymou 9 s	No
75	anonymou 0 s	
75	anonymou 1 s	<p>There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence</p> <p>Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.</p> <p>Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.</p> <p>Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.</p> <p>Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.</p> <p>Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.</p>

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

75 anonymou
2 s

75 anonymou
3 s

75 anonymou
4 s

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

April 12, 2024

RE: ACLU of Washington Public Comment on CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC

Dear Mayor Harrell, Council President Nelson, Technology Committee Chair Hollingsworth, and Honorable City Councilmembers:



P.O. Box 2728
Seattle, WA 98111-2728
(206) 624-2184
aclu-wa.org

Michele Storms
Executive Director

The ACLU of Washington would like to express our concerns regarding the City’s intent to acquire and/or expand the use of three surveillance technologies: CCTV, an acoustic gunshot location system (AGLS), and real-time crime center (RTCC) software. These technologies pose grave risks to people’s civil rights and liberties and will not accomplish the goal of preventing violent crime. We are also concerned that the current review process for these technologies has not been sufficiently thorough, transparent, or equitable as per the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) and the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance (SSO).

A few of the demonstrated issues with these technologies include the following:

- **CCTV:** Extensive research, including a [40-year systematic review](#), shows that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. A [recent study](#) where police officers in Newark were assigned to actively monitor and respond to CCTV camera footage concluded that such efforts required extensive resources and were “unsustainable over time.”
- **AGLS:** AGLS systems, such as ShotSpotter, have been shown to be ineffective at preventing or investigating gun violence based on extensive peer-reviewed research, including a [study](#) of 68 metropolitan U.S. counties. Adding CCTV to AGLS [does not improve](#) its accuracy, but instead increases police workload. Further, AGLS increases the risk of [police violence](#) and [wrongful arrests](#), and disproportionately harms communities of color, sometimes with [fatal consequences](#).
- **RTCC:** RTCC software, such as Fusus, incorporates both public and privately owned cameras to provide law enforcement with expanded surveillance capabilities, including the ability to access footage that would typically [require a warrant](#) while also bypassing oversight. RTCC software also regularly incorporates new

functionalities, such as AI object recognition. The introduction of new surveillance capabilities would not only require an updated surveillance impact report as per the SSO, but would also present new and unanticipated risks and harms that would be challenging to mitigate once the technology has already been deployed.

- By greatly expanding Seattle's surveillance infrastructure, all three technologies pose significant risks to privacy and other civil liberties, and could cause significant harm to BIPOC communities that have been historically overpoliced. Surveillance at this scale would enable tracking and making inferences about people's activities in granular detail. Once this data is collected, it could be accessed or misused in unforeseen ways that could have especially serious consequences for individuals that Seattle, as a sanctuary city, has sought to protect, including undocumented immigrants and people seeking abortions or gender-affirming healthcare.

We urge the City to not invest in these three technologies given the extensive research evidence that shows that they will be ineffective at preventing violent crime, and the known risks and harms surrounding their use. Instead, we recommend that the City redirects the funds for the surveillance pilot toward data-driven solutions that reduce crime both effectively and safely. For example, community-based violence intervention programs have been shown to reduce violent crime in cities across the country, including a [63% reduction](#) in shooting victimizations in New York City and a [75% reduction](#) in homicides in Charlotte.

In addition to concerns with the technologies themselves, we are also concerned with the current review process:

- As per Council Budget Action SPD-900-A, a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis must be co-prepared by the Executive's Office, the Office for Civil Rights, and the Office of the Inspector General. The RET requires the City to conduct a comprehensive review of independent research on these technologies, as well as to engage with communities that will be most impacted. We are concerned that this process has not been sufficiently robust. We urge the City to conduct meaningful public outreach and to collect feedback from impacted communities in a transparent and equitable manner that ensures their voices are heard.

- The Seattle Surveillance Ordinance established a process that City departments must follow prior to acquiring any surveillance technology, including developing a surveillance impact report (SIR) and gaining Council approval (See Ord. 125679). The SSO also established a Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG) to advise the Executive and Council; the working group is tasked with developing a privacy and civil liberties assessment for each surveillance impact report. The City makes appointments to the CSWG, and the group is required to comprise seven members, at least five of whom must represent equity-based organizations. We are concerned that the CSWG currently only has four members, and has not been fully staffed for multiple years. Advancing the review and/or acquisition of these technologies without a fully appointed working group runs counter to the legislative intent and goals of the SSO.

Please feel free to reach out to us to discuss these issues, including ways we can work toward improving public safety in Seattle through evidence-based solutions that uplift communities rather than cause them further harm.

Sincerely,

Tee Sannon
Technology Policy Program Director
tsannon@aclu-wa.org



Seattle Community Police Commission

STATEMENT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

March 21, 2024

CPC Official Statement on SPD's Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Program

As a matter of principle, the Seattle Community Police Commission (CPC) opposes law enforcement's increasing reliance on automated cameras and microphones to surveil City residents who are simply going about their daily lives. However, a significant number of CPC Commissioners report that the communities they represent are profoundly suffering from the daily trauma of increasing gun violence in Seattle. Because of these concerns, the CPC does not oppose a time-limited and location-limited surveillance pilot with the primary aim of reducing gun violence in our City. This includes the new technologies proposed by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to "help the City's public safety response to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence."

We understand that the overriding purpose of the Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) combined with the Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) camera system is to obtain more accurate information about specific gun violence as it is occurring so that it can be more quickly conveyed through the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) to responding officers. The Surveillance Impact Reports (SIR) for each of these technologies detail numerous privacy protections and limitations including 30-day retention limits, encryption, restricted access, and data reporting. Most importantly, significant oversight authority is given to our accountability partner, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

We have a number of concerns about the use of these technologies in the four potential pilot areas (Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, Chinatown-International District, Downtown Commercial Core). To increase privacy and civil liberties protections and to prevent SPD misuse of these new technologies, we ask City leaders to consider the following additional limits as they decide whether or not to go forward with this pilot:

1. **Time limits:** A two-year time limit should be imposed on the pilot. None of the three SIRs contains an end ("sunset") date. We believe that two years is enough time for SPD and OIG to determine whether or not these technologies reduce gun violence in Seattle.

2. **Metrics measurement:** The SIRs should contain more specifics about the metrics of how success or failure will be measured, e.g., a certain percent reduction in gun violence and/or an increase in gun-related arrests or convictions.
 - a. Clarify what those metrics are, how they're being used, what success looks like, and share that information with the public; and
 - b. Determine the metrics *before* implementing any new use of these technologies and choose an implementation date that allows enough time to do so.

3. **Community engagement:** Targeted outreach to the four pilot communities beyond posted warnings should be required. Educational community meetings should be held in each of the pilot areas so that residents can learn about the technologies and ask questions about camera and microphone locations, what privacy protections they will have and how they can access the data.
 - a. Conduct more community engagement to clarify that there are three distinct technologies being proposed; and
 - b. Require continuous community engagement and feedback from the community.

4. **Program end process:** Should SPD determine at the end of the two years to expand the pilot and/or make it permanent, city leaders should require that the SIR process be repeated before the program is made permanent or expanded. At the end of the two-year pilot period, SPD should also:
 - a. Share the program findings to determine whether success metrics were met, both qualitative and quantitative; and
 - b. Note any unintended consequences of the technology implementation and share that information with the public.

Thank you for considering our ideas.

This statement was passed by vote of the Commissioners of the CPC on March 20, 2024 at its [Bi-Monthly Public Meeting](#). The CPC listens to, amplifies, and builds common ground among communities affected by policing in Seattle. We champion policing practices centered in justice and equity. The CPC is independent and led by volunteer commissioners. Learn more about the CPC at seattle.gov/community-police-commission.

##

Media Contact

Emma Shepard

Communications Advisor

Community Police Commission

Emma.Shepard@seattle.gov



907 Pine Street
Suite 500
Seattle, WA 98101

T 206-682-9552
F 206-682-9556

LegalVoice.org

April 12, 2024

Dear Mayor Harrell, Council President Nelson, and Seattle City Councilmembers,

Legal Voice, a gender equity and reproductive rights organization based in **the Pacific Northwest, is gravely concerned with the City's intent to acquire** and/or expand elements of three surveillance technologies: CCTV, an acoustic gunshot location system (AGLS) such as ShotSpotter, and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software in Seattle. There are significant privacy and data-sharing consequences with expanding surveillance in Seattle, especially in light of threats to reproductive rights and bodily autonomy following the *Dobbs* decision in 2022. It is essential that Seattle continue to respect and protect the data privacy of its residents and visitors. We urge you to reject this massive expansion of surveillance.

Abortion access and gender affirming care is under attack—right-wing extremists are targeting patients, their helpers, and healthcare providers through public records and private data sharing. This is particularly significant when:

- Washington has already seen an over 20% increase¹ in people seeking abortion care from out of state, including from our neighboring state of Idaho that has a near total abortion ban.²
- Abortion seekers, especially from restricted states, tend to be Black, lower-income, and in their 20s, and are facing increasing structural and legal barriers to care.³

¹ Alison Saldhanha, *Abortions jump 23% in WA as visiting patients reverse decade long decline*, Seattle Times (Dec. 6, 2023), <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/abortions-jump-23-in-wa-as-visiting-patients-reverse-decade-long-decline/>.

² Idaho Code, Defense of Life Act § 18-622 (*amended* 2023).

³ Rachel K. Jones & Doris W. Chiu, *Characteristics of abortion patients in protected and restricted states accessing clinic-based care 12 months prior to the elimination of the federal constitutional right to abortion in the United States*, Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health (Apr. 11, 2023), <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1363/psrh.12224>.

- People seeking gender affirming care also face incredible hurdles, including prohibitive costs for care out of state and out of network, in addition to legal and structural barriers.⁴

The Washington state **legislature recognized the need to protect patients’ location information and health data** by passing the My Health My Data Act in 2023.⁵ As a government entity, Seattle and its contractors are exempt from this Act, meaning information collected by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) is potentially available for sharing or sale by any data broker or company they contract with for surveillance **services. It is also unclear whether SPD’s surveillance data could be accessed by a future federal administration hostile to bodily autonomy and reproductive rights.**

We have ample evidence that third party data brokers use aggregate data to pinpoint individual locations, including visits to Planned Parenthood or other abortion providers.⁶ Anti-abortion centers, which are often not subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), are known to collect private health information on consumers who visit their centers, without needing to conform to any federal health information confidentiality standards.⁷ Two active prosecutions for unlawful abortions in Nebraska and Texas hinged on text and Facebook messages, underlining the need for data privacy in every aspect of our lives.⁸ Additionally, we have already seen conservative states attempt to access gender-affirming healthcare information in Seattle.⁹

State collection of people’s images, locations, and other sensitive information is a high-risk activity in a world increasingly hostile to bodily autonomy and individual privacy. These concerns about data sharing with federal agencies have also been raised by communities we work with, including representatives in Seattle’s Immigrant & Refugee Commission, Women’s Commission, and LGBTQ Commission from when

⁴ Jae Downing et al., *Spending and Out-of-Pocket Costs for Genital Gender-Affirming Surgery in the US*, JAMA Surg. (July 2022),

<https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamasurgery/article-abstract/2793977>.

⁵ RCW § 19.373, Washington My Health My Data Act (2023) (protecting patient location information and health data which is defined broadly, since location information and online activities can reveal sensitive **information about an individual’s health**)

⁶ Alfred Ng, *A company tracked visits to 600 Planned Parenthood locations for anti-abortion ads, senator says*, Politico (Feb. 13, 2024), <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/13/planned-parenthood-location-track-abortion-ads-00141172>.

⁷ Abigail Abrams & Vera Bergengruen, *Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers Are Collecting Troves of Data That Could Be Weaponized Against Women*, Time (June 22, 2022), <https://time.com/6189528/anti-abortion-pregnancy-centers-collect-data-investigation/>.

⁸ Shefali Luthra, *Could Facebook messages be used in abortion-related prosecution?*, The 19th (July 19, 2023, updated July 20, 2023), <https://19thnews.org/2023/07/abortion-laws-facebook-messages-digital-privacy/>.

⁹ William Melhaldo, *Seattle Children’s Hospital sues Texas Attorney General over trans patient records*, Texas Tribune (Dec 21, 2023).

<https://www.texastribune.org/2023/12/21/texas-attorney-general-trans-seattle-childrens/>.

the Seattle Police Department expanded their use of body cameras. Technology is evolving at a rapid pace, and it is the responsibility of our government to protect the most vulnerable among us, not expose them to further harm.

We applaud Seattle’s past commitment to reproductive rights,¹⁰ especially in the face of this national emergency, and urge you to keep that commitment front and center by rejecting this expansion of Seattle Police Department’s surveillance powers.

Please do not hesitate to contact us for further questions at abhojani@legalvoice.org.

Sincerely,

Alizeh Bhojani
WA Policy Counsel
Legal Voice

¹⁰ See e.g. CB 120374, CB 120376, CB 120375, and CB 120366 (2022).

To:

Mayor Harrell, Senior Deputy Mayor Burgess, Director Wheeler-Smith, and Director Judge:
bruce.harrell@seattle.gov; tim.burgess@seattle.gov; oig@seattle.gov; lisa.judge@seattle.gov;
civilrights@seattle.gov; Derrick.Wheeler-Smith@seattle.gov; council@seattle.gov

We are writing as a concerned coalition of community members and organizations in response to the City's intent to acquire and/or expand elements of three surveillance technologies: CCTV, an acoustic gunshot location system (AGLS) such as ShotSpotter, and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software in Seattle. Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) already uses CCTV cameras to monitor traffic and Seattle Police Department (SPD) can and has [frequently accessed them](#) according to the city.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences. Whose Streets Our Streets (WSOS), a local BIPOC organization who has been conducting community based and participatory research has identified that the current level of surveillance has "[a psychological effect on the people being surveilled](#)." We expect this negative psychological impact will vastly increase should the City of Seattle expand its surveillance technology programs. This coalition strongly urges you to instead substantially increase investment in equitable and evidence-based strategies for gun violence prevention while also offering meaningful support to victims and survivors.

We have serious objections and questions regarding both the deployment of these technologies and the review and approval process currently taking place. Below, we have outlined the several grave concerns we have about the use of these technologies in our communities.

ShotSpotter is proven to be an ineffective technology, as seen in several independent, peer-reviewed studies.

- In independent studies, ShotSpotter deployments have failed to result in any evidence of a gun crime [90%](#) to [97%](#) of the time, an abysmal rate that isn't improved [by the addition of CCTV](#).
- A large meta-analysis examined ShotSpotter in 68 cites from 1999 to 2016 and found that ShotSpotter "[has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes](#)." Other research finds that acoustic gunshot technology doesn't get [victims of gun violence to safety faster](#) and [doesn't reduce violent crime while greatly increasing demands on police resources](#).

ShotSpotter increases biased policing.

- Technology like Shotspotter with high false positives leads to false arrests and a sharp increase in policing in already over-policed neighborhoods creating many unnecessary contacts between police and residents. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is asking the Department of Justice to [review](#) if Shotspotter is being [selectively deployed to justify the over-policing of mainly Black neighborhoods](#). This is a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle as Black, Indigenous, and People of Color are already [subject to disproportionate rates of violence by SPD](#), even after over a decade under a consent decree.
- Chicago found that not only did [ShotSpotter increase the number of pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions](#) when officers were responding to ShotSpotter, but some officers used the mere presence of ShotSpotter in a neighborhood, even without a ShotSpotter alert, as enough reason to conduct “*protective pat downs*.” ShotSpotter increases biased policing. This is why the [MacArthur Justice Center](#) has filed a class action lawsuit against ShotSpotter.

ShotSpotter causes harm and increases police violence.

- There are many anecdotal stories of the harms acoustic gun technology has inflicted on other communities. In Chicago, [Danny Ortiz](#) was arbitrarily arrested and jailed by police who were responding to a ShotSpotter alert.
- 13 year old [Adam Toledo](#) was chased, shot, and killed by a Chicago police officer in response to a ShotSpotter alert.
- [Michael Williams](#) spent about 11 months in Cook County Jail - contracting COVID twice - after CPD asked ShotSpotter to change the location of an alert in order to charge him with murder.
- In Rochester, the police colluded with ShotSpotter to change evidence to frame [Silvon Simmons](#) for attempting to kill a police officer, after Mr. Simmons was chased and shot three times by a Rochester police officer.
- In [January 2024](#), Chicago police opened fire on an unarmed man because they heard a loud noise while responding to a Shotspotter alert.
- We also note the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR)’s complete dismissal of the many studies showing the harms caused by AGLS technology. Combining a harmful technology with other technologies (with their own harms) does not mitigate the overall potential of harm, and experimenting on a population that has already suffered extensively from police brutality, over policing, and police bias is irresponsible at best.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV

- In Washington, DC a [police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men](#).
- CCTV camera operators have been caught [using the cameras to spy on people](#).
- Cameras have been [caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police’s actions](#).

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

- In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “[no significant effects observed for violent crime](#)” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”
- A study of Dallas, TX found “[\[CCTV\] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances](#)” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.
- [Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK](#) found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.
- In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found [no significant impacts on arrest outcomes](#).
- Only [1%](#) to [0.2%](#) of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and undermines democratic values.

- RTCC software, like [Fusus](#), recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage [without a warrant or notification to the owner](#). There are [typically two options](#) a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to [investigate or even to manage](#) how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
- The privatization of policing represented by relying on [private consumers to expand the camera network](#) undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
- RTCC software [creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse](#), as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a [poor track record](#) on [preventing](#) their officers from abusing law enforcement data.
- RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new [AI object recognition algorithms](#) and [integrations with third-party applications](#). This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance.

CCTV, RTCC, Shotspotter, and other surveillance technologies undercut Seattle’s values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

- RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a [license plate reader](#) which gathers enough data to [reveal sensitive personal information](#), including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect -

[abortion seekers and undocumented people](#) - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

We urge you to stay true to Seattle’s values and instead invest in scaling up already existing community-based gun violence prevention programs such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already [reduced violence](#) in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Investing in these programs would also put money into the actual communities most impacted by gun violence instead of giving that money to a company located in a different state. Seattle should heed the lessons learned from the many other cities that have already **discontinued their contracts for AGLS based on its ineffectiveness and the several concerns laid out above** and follow their lead by not implementing these technologies.

As laid out in Council Budget Action SPD-900-A in the 2024 budget, the RET must be conducted in concert among the Executive’s Office, the Office of Civil Rights, and the Office of the Inspector General. Given the documented impacts of acoustic gunshot detection technology and CCTV in increasing biased policing and over-policing of marginalized communities and the chilling effect of RTCC software on civil liberties, we want there to be a robust process that involves ALL THREE bodies in an active partnership as required by law. This process should include in-depth review of independent peer-reviewed studies and consultation with other municipalities that have discontinued use of AGLS to understand potential pitfalls and unintended outcomes. Additionally, if the AGLS and CCTV will be moved from their initial proposed locations, each move must include a robust and deliberate public process.

Importantly, impacted communities must be engaged in a proactive way that works well for us. We are concerned by a tendency to choose just a few token representatives to speak for an entire group. Likewise, we are concerned that only two very short public forums on these SIRs are being planned, at times that might be difficult for people to attend, and that require attendees to sit through sales pitches by the companies profiting from these technologies that are branded as “education.”

Further, we have no information about how much outreach has been or will be done or feedback collected from affected communities as part of the RET process. As always when deploying new surveillance technology, we must consider the potential negative impacts on the most marginalized and vulnerable. This includes but is not limited to special outreach needed to BIPOC communities, our neighbors who are unhoused, sex workers, disabled people, queer and trans people, undocumented people, and people who are impoverished.

Our primary demand is to halt investment in these policing technologies, but if the city moves forward with its current objectives, then it is imperative that the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and the associated Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) be conducted in a thorough, equitable,

transparent, and accessible manner. These decisions are too large and too long-lasting to be rushed or to be made by the few.

By the Undersigned,

ORGANIZATIONS:

1. 350 Seattle
2. A Center for Restorative Solutions
3. ACLU Washington
4. Amazon Employees for Climate Justice
5. A Sacred Passing Death Midwifery and Community Education
6. Awake Church
7. Backbone Campaign
8. Ballard Mutual Aid
9. Be:Seattle
10. Black and Pink Seattle/Tacoma
11. Black Brilliance Research
12. Buddhist Peace Fellowship--Seattle
13. CARW
14. CARW West Seattle Neighborhood Cohort
15. Central Neighbors
16. Central Seattle Greenways
17. CID Coalition
18. Coalition for Rights & Safety for People in the Sex Trade
19. Coalition of Anti-Racist Whites
20. Collective Justice
21. Conspiracy of Geniuses and RAD Care
22. Creative Justice
23. Cultures Connecting
24. Defend the Defund
25. Experience Education
26. Gender Justice League
27. Got Green
28. Greenwood Mutual Aid
29. House Our Neighbors
30. Institutional Climate Action
31. International League of People's Struggle seattle
32. Kids Are Kids
33. LEAP YEAR PARTY
34. Lifewerq Project
35. Massage Parlor Outreach Project
36. No New Washington Prisons
37. Northwest Animal Rights Network (NARN)
38. Northwest Community Bail Fund
39. No Tech For Apartheid
40. People Power WA
41. QLaw Foundation of Washington
42. Real Change
43. Sacred Community Connections
44. Seattle Abolition Support
45. Seattle Bike Blog
46. Seattle Caucus of Rank and File Educators
47. Seattle Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)
48. Seattle Raging Grannies
49. Seattle Transit Riders
50. Services Not Sweeps Coalition
51. SHARE (Seattle Housing and Resource Effort)
52. Sketch House Games
53. Soapbox Project
54. Students United for Palestinian Equality & Return at UW (SUPER UW)
55. Subvert UD
56. Surge Reproductive Justice
57. Sustainable Student Action
58. Tech 4 Housing
59. The Rhapsody Project
60. Transit Riders Union
61. University Friend's Meeting
62. Urban Indians Northwest
63. Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle
64. UW Law Students for Palestinian Liberation
65. Wallingford Indivisible
66. WHEEL (Women's Housing, Equality and Enhancement League)
67. Whose Streets? Our Streets! (WSOS)
68. Wrestle Yr Friends
69. Young Women Empowered (Y-WE)
70. Zero Hour

INDIVIDUALS:

1. Aaliyah Davis
2. Aarin Wilde
3. Aaron von Reyn
4. Aaron Wheeler
5. Abigail Graber
6. Abi Santiago
7. Aby Marsh
8. Achala Devi
9. Adaline McCormick
10. Adam Peltier
11. Adi Stein
12. Adrianna hall
13. Adrienne Banks
14. Ahra Nam
15. Aidan Carroll
16. Aidan McDonald
17. Aimee Graesser
18. Aiyana Mehta

19. Aja Alabastro
20. AJ Carothers
21. AJ Setala
22. AJ Wynne
23. Akiksha Chatterji
24. Akshita Vaidyanathan
25. Alaina Kwan
26. Alaina McCallum
27. Alana Sendlakowski
28. Alan Castro
29. Alan Liu
30. Alanna Hart
31. Alan Zhang
32. Alberto Arriola
33. Alessio Tosolini
34. Alexa Evans
35. Alexander Hartanov
36. Alexandra Caamano
37. Alexandra Loessberg-Zahl
38. Alexandra Spencer
39. Alexandria Gates
40. Alexandria Smith
41. Alex Berger
42. Alex Fay
43. Alex Gomez
44. Alex H
45. Alex Huynh
46. Alexis Ashe
47. Alexis Mansanarez
48. Alexis Modula
49. Alex Lande
50. Alex Murray
51. Alex Stonehill
52. Alex Thompson
53. Alex Titus
54. Alex Webster
55. Alex Woerschling
56. Alfie Norling
57. Alice Friedman
58. Alice Gao
59. Alice Hassel
60. Alice Liu
61. Alice Mar-Abe
62. Alice Nicholson
63. Alicia
64. Alison Eisinger
65. Alison Howard
66. Allen Burgess
67. Allie Sullivan
68. Allison Jurkovich
69. Allison Kamino
70. Allison Masangkay
71. Allison Mills
72. Allister Layne
73. ally parks
74. Alora McGavin
75. Al Smith
76. Alyce
77. Amanda Agrellas
78. Amanda Heffernan
79. Amanda Hubbard
80. Amanda Locke
81. Amandalynne Paullada
82. Amanda Sorell
83. Amaryah Wolf
84. Amber Ogata
85. Amelia Ross-Gilson
86. Amelia Taylor
87. Ammar
88. Amy Elder
89. Amy Harrington
90. Amy Jiravisitcul
91. Amy Moore
92. Amy Sundberg
93. Amy Truax
94. amy vong
95. Ana-Claudia Magana
96. Ana Maria Campoy
97. Andi Ridings
98. Andrea Chin
99. Andrea Marcos
100. Andrea O'Ferrall
101. Andrea O'Ferrall
102. Andrea Paz
103. Andrea Portillo
104. Andrea Speed
105. Andrea Vargas
106. Andrew
107. Andrew Asakawa
108. Andrew Eckels
109. Andrew Garcia
110. Andrew Harrison
111. Andrew Smith
112. Andrew Thomas
113. Angela Yu
114. Angeles Barham
115. Angel McCullough
116. Anna
117. Anna Haas
118. Anna Hughes
119. Anna Ludwig
120. Anna Reed
121. Anna Schmidt
122. Ann Dorsey
123. Anne Campbell
124. Anne Dwyer
125. Annette Klapstein
126. Annie Christensen
127. Annie Doubleday
128. Annie Leiter
129. Annie Lu
130. Annie Pham
131. Anteia DeLaney
132. Anthony
133. Anya Gavrylko
134. Apurva Mishra
135. Ardina Boll
136. Ariana de Lefia
137. Ariana Marshall
138. Ariel Alon
139. Arlene Martinez
140. Arman Naderi
141. Arryn Davis
142. Artemis Lonan
143. Ash
144. ashiana stoll
145. Ash King
146. Ash King
147. Ash King
148. Ashlee Grant
149. Ashley Seni
150. Atlas Rain
151. atlas tan
152. atticus sumabat
153. Audrey Bell
154. Audrey Kelly
155. Audrey Rohwer
156. Austin Price
157. Austin Werner
158. Avery Swearer
159. Ayotunde Johnson
160. Bailee Hiatt
161. Bailey Dishar
162. Bailey Griffin
163. Bailey Pruss
164. Barbara Phinney
165. Barbara Wight
166. Barrett Leider
167. Bean Yogi
168. Beau Black
169. Beauregarde Reed
170. Beck Brunstetter
171. Beckett
172. Bee Keyser
173. Belinda
174. bemny
175. Benjamin Danielson
176. Benjamin Gillott
177. Bennett Ellis
178. Bennett Walkes
179. Bennie Gross
180. BETH BRUNTON
181. Beth Quintana
182. Betsy Foley
183. Betsy Foley
184. Bill Daniell
185. BJ Last
186. bob barnes
187. Bobby Righi
188. Bob Kutter
189. Bokang Zhu
190. Bonnie Feldberg
191. Braden Pence
192. Bradley Paul-Gorsline
193. Bradley Pooler
194. Brandi Hair
195. Brand Mace
196. Brandon Bowersox-Johnson
197. Brandon Pedro
198. Brenna Stroup
199. Brent McFarlane
200. Brent Williams
201. Brian Camero
202. Brian Mabe

203. Brian Taintor
 204. Briar Stratas
 205. Bri Castle
 206. Bridget O'Brien
 207. Bri Leslie
 208. Bri Lit
 209. Britney
 210. Britney Phan
 211. Brooke Christiansen
 212. Bruce Jackson
 213. Bruce Shherman
 214. Bryan Edenfield
 215. Bryleigh Apple
 216. Bryna Cortes
 217. Bry Osmonson
 218. Cailin Dahlin
 219. Caitlin Guenther
 220. Caitlin Molenaar
 221. Caitlyn Ngadisastra
 222. Cal Foster
 223. Cally Nicholls
 224. Calvin Read
 225. Cameron Fraser
 226. Camille Baldwin-Bonne
 227. Camille Beasley
 228. Candace Braley
 229. Candice Rose
 230. Carissa Knipe
 231. Carl A Meyer
 232. Carly Brook
 233. Carly Greyell
 234. Carly Rademacher
 235. Carmen Carrillo
 236. Caroline Bryant
 237. Caroline Cates
 238. Caroline Conley
 239. Caroline Poole
 240. Carolyn Akinbami MD
 241. Carolyn Le
 242. Carolyn Paul-Gorsline
 243. Carrie Grossman
 244. Carrie Hawthorne
 245. Carrie Lafferty
 246. Carrie Lippy
 247. Carrie Matthews
 248. Carson Boden
 249. Carter Hemion
 250. Carter Yee
 251. Casper Sparks
 252. Catherine Parker
 253. Catherine Pedigo
 254. Catherine Swedberg
 255. Cause Haun
 256. Cause Haun
 257. Cecelia Black
 258. Cecil Haskell
 259. Cecil Seferos
 260. Celie Forrester
 261. Chari Cortez
 262. Charlene Lauzon
 263. Charles Cockburn
 264. Charles Therrell
 265. Charlie Richter
 266. Charlie Shih
 267. charlotte furner
 268. Charlotte McIntosh
 269. Chava Monastersky
 270. Chelsea Chamberlain
 271. Chelsea Johnson
 272. Chelsie Porter
 273. Cherry Leung
 274. cheryl schneiderhan
 275. Cheyne Anderson
 276. Chili Judge
 277. Chloe Gaechter
 278. Chloe Huber
 279. Chris Comte
 280. Chris Lovings
 281. Chris Rivers
 282. Chris Speckhardt
 283. Christina Ellis
 284. Christina Nowak
 285. Christina Nowak
 286. Christina Ruggles
 287. Christina Twu
 288. Christopher Chan
 289. Christopher Comte
 290. Christy Hill
 291. Christy Hill
 292. Cinda Stenger
 293. CJ Risman
 294. Claire Schwartz
 295. Clara Berridge
 296. Clara Cantor
 297. Clarence Thompson
 298. Clayton M Compton
 299. Clio Erignac
 300. Coco CM Weber
 301. Colette Boilini
 302. Cole Wilder
 303. Colin Morrin
 304. Colleen Heidorn
 305. Collin Denbow
 306. Connor Stein
 307. Constance DeRooy
 308. Constance Voget
 309. Courtney Aiken
 310. Cristina Doi
 311. Crow Delavan
 312. Crystal Tam
 313. Cynthia Brothers
 314. Cynthia Roig
 315. Cynthia Spiess
 316. Dan "Workers Strike
 Back" DiLeva
 317. Daniel Brant
 318. Daniel Gilman
 319. Daniel Hernbrott
 320. Daniel McLeod
 321. Daniel Nelson
 322. Daniel Sepulveda
 323. Daniel Zizza
 324. Darcy Ruppert
 325. Daria Parodi
 326. Dave McCaul
 327. David
 328. David Berlow
 329. David Kipnis
 330. David Nixon
 331. David Shokenu
 332. David Stoesz
 333. David Westberg
 334. Davina Kerr
 335. Deanna Ren
 336. Deb Carstens
 337. Delia Ward
 338. Demiana Shenouda
 339. Demiana Shenouda
 340. Demian Godon
 341. Denise Henrikson
 342. Denise Sterchi
 343. Derek
 344. Derek Brown
 345. Derek Dexheimer
 346. Deserae Abed-Rabbo
 347. Desiree Andersen
 348. Destanie Ruhl
 349. Devoni Whitehead
 350. Devon Pimentelli
 351. Diana Robbins
 352. Diana Schooling
 353. Diane Hood
 354. Dianne Laguerta
 355. Diego Gonzalez
 356. Dina Dahbany-Miraglia
 357. Don Lane
 358. Donovan Ho
 359. Dorothy Parshall
 360. Doug Cole
 361. Douglas Indrick
 362. Dylan Bandy
 363. Dylan Flesch
 364. Dyneeca Adams
 365. E.N. West
 366. Eden Chapman
 367. Eduardo Gonzalez-Vega
 368. Eila Strand
 369. eileen mccann
 370. Eleena McRae
 371. Elena Romero
 372. Elena Rumiantseva
 373. Elena Shearer
 374. Eliana Horn
 375. Elizabeth Arias
 376. Elizabeth Carley
 377. Elizabeth
 Kiyani-Thompson
 378. Elizabeth Quintana
 379. Eliza Brumer Cohn
 380. Eliza Cohn
 381. Eliza Furmansky
 382. Eliza Grant
 383. Ella Shahn
 384. Ellen Finkelstein
 385. Ellen Kissman
 386. Elyse Gordon

387. Emaan Haseem
 388. Emerson Judd
 389. Emerson Rogers
 390. Emiko Kawakubo
 391. Emil Minakata
 392. Emily Chu
 393. Emily Chu
 394. Emily Hazelton
 395. Emily Johnson
 396. Emily Johnston
 397. Emily McRen
 398. Emily Smith
 399. Emily Stone
 400. Emily Turner
 401. Emily Whybra
 402. Emma Bateman
 403. Emma Cooper
 404. Emma Goidel
 405. Emma Seely
 406. Emma Shorr
 407. Emma Young
 408. Emmett Petsche
 409. Em Rose
 410. Erica Cannatelli
 411. Erica Cartwright
 412. Erica Hall
 413. Erica Olson
 414. Erica Richardson
 415. Erica Weiland
 416. Erika Cook
 417. Erika Jaymes
 418. Erika Straus-Bowers
 419. Erika Sweet
 420. erin alberts
 421. Erin Cadena
 422. Ethan Campbell
 423. Eugene Takahashi
 424. Eva Bhagwandin
 425. Eva Doell
 426. Evan McLain
 427. Eva Salcedo
 428. Evelyn Lemoine
 429. Evelyn Sizer
 430. Evelyn Smith
 431. Eve Sizer
 432. Eya Lazaro
 433. Ezra Zelizer
 434. Fallon "Ashen" Wilson
 435. Faolán Rolloson
 Halbhuber
 436. Fatima Elzein
 437. Feiya Wang
 438. Felix B
 439. Ferdinand Reeder
 440. Fiona O'Leary
 441. Fiona Reilly
 442. Fiona Smith
 443. Fiona Yu
 444. Forest Shomer
 445. Francesca
 Favorini-Csorba
 446. Frances Yih
 447. Franklin mabel
 448. Franky Hawk
 449. Frederick Seymour
 450. Freya Batez
 451. Gabriela salaben
 452. Gabriel Kennedy-Gibbens
 453. Gabriella Vincent
 454. Gaby Desatnik
 455. Gail Simon
 456. Garrett McCulloch
 457. G D Abbott
 458. George Samora
 459. Gillian Maxwell
 460. Gillian Rose
 461. Gillian Spangler
 462. Gina Levow
 463. Giulia pasciuto
 464. Glen Anderson
 465. Goil Joshua
 466. Gordon Philip Baldwin
 467. Grace
 468. Grace Chai
 469. Grace Flores
 470. Grace Hope
 471. Grace Huang
 472. Grace Liatti
 473. Grace Williams
 474. Gracia Heilmer
 475. Graham Golbuff
 476. Grant Wilson
 477. Greg Covel
 478. Greta Treistman
 479. Griffin Brandstetter
 480. Guillermo Zazueta
 481. Habib Loew
 482. Hailey Swearingen
 483. Hali Bellisario
 484. Halle Thompson
 485. Hallie Sykes
 486. Hannah Katz
 487. Hannah Lertola
 488. Hannah Scholes
 489. Hannah Scott
 490. Hannah Scott
 491. Hannah Wilson
 492. Hannah Yale
 493. Hans pinkham
 494. Harley Munsie
 495. Haven Barnes
 496. Hayden
 Agnew-Wieland
 497. Heather Lippert
 498. Heather Stone
 499. Heather Ward
 500. Heidi Acuña
 501. Heidi Freidman
 502. Heidi Whalley
 503. Helen Potter
 504. Hendrix Mcginty
 505. Hilary Hayes
 506. Hilary Simonetti
 507. Hoda Eldifrawy
 508. Hope Freije
 509. Howe
 510. Ian Gauntt
 511. Ian Jamison
 512. Ilona Brose
 513. Ilsa Govan
 514. Imani israel
 515. Ingria Jones
 516. Iridius Izzarne
 517. Iris Bordman
 518. Isabella Medina
 519. Isabella Palacios
 520. Isa Stewart
 521. Izzy Christman
 522. Jaci Leavitt
 523. Jack Hogan
 524. Jackie Makdah
 525. Jackson Barnes
 526. Jackson Siebert
 527. Jacky Nakamura
 528. Jacob Baca
 529. Jacob Black
 530. Jacob de Guzman
 531. Jacob Dutton
 532. Jacob Leavitt
 533. Jacob Mihalak
 534. Jacob M Janin
 535. Jacob Pohs
 536. Jacob Sarb
 537. Jacob Stuiwenga
 538. Jacob Tsyarkin
 539. Jade
 540. Jade Weise
 541. Jaeden Noll
 542. Jae Foxglove
 543. Jai Broome
 544. Jaime Hoe
 545. Jake Mutter
 546. James Baldwin
 547. James Hatten
 548. Jamie Lan
 549. Jamie Marks
 550. Jane Bullard
 551. janet maker
 552. Janet Munin
 553. Jared Moore
 554. Jasmin Eng
 555. Jasmine Zhu
 556. Jason Achurra
 557. Jason Lang
 558. Jason Walsh
 559. Jax Braun
 560. Jayden Lee
 561. Jay Moore
 562. JC Fretz
 563. Jean M Schwinberg
 564. Jeanna Stone
 565. Jeanne Ripp
 566. Jeannie Mounger
 567. Jeff Coyne
 568. Jeff Higgins
 569. Jeff McDowell

570. Jeffrey Chiu
 571. Jeffry Berner
 572. Jeff West
 573. Jen Blackwood
 574. Jeng Tcheung
 575. Jenna Lee
 576. Jennie Li
 577. Jennifer Beetem
 578. Jennifer Fingles
 579. Jennifer Managhan
 580. Jennifer Nemhauser
 581. Jennifer Primm
 582. Jennifer Valentine
 583. Jennifer Widrig
 584. Jenny Katz
 585. Jenny Le
 586. Jen Van Dijk
 587. Jesse Floyd
 588. Jesse Roth
 589. Jesse Swingle
 590. Jessica Green
 591. Jessica Mogk
 592. Jessica Trupin
 593. Jessie Jabortnik
 594. Jessie Lawton-Crane
 595. Jessie McKenna
 596. Jess Kim
 597. Jess Kim
 598. Jess Rock
 599. Jess Sarsfield
 600. Jess Wallach
 601. Jill Alles
 602. Jill Eckhart
 603. Jim Bernthal
 604. JJ L.
 605. Joanna
 606. Jocelyn Fofana
 607. Jodie Nathan
 608. Jodi Taylor
 609. Joe Beda
 610. Joel Hildebrandt
 611. Joelle Craft
 612. Joelle Pretty
 613. Joe Molloy
 614. Jo Harvey
 615. John
 616. John Bito
 617. John Duksta
 618. John Gilbert
 619. Johnny Mao
 620. Johnny McCaffrey
 621. John Stone
 622. John Tullius
 623. Joice Tang
 624. Jona Schuman
 625. Jonas Dodge
 626. Jonathan Hartman
 627. Jordan Faralan
 628. Jordan Goldwarg
 629. Jordan Sullivan
 630. Jordan Van Voast
 631. Jordyn Seni
 632. Joseph Concannon
 633. Josephine
 Alexander-Cooper
 634. Joseph Roberts
 635. Josh Diamond
 636. josh martinez
 637. Joshua Swanson
 638. Joshua Wise
 639. Josh Wiese
 640. Josiah Howard
 641. Joyous Levien
 642. Joy R
 643. Jude Watson
 644. Julene Weaver
 645. Julia Buck
 646. Julia Farmer
 647. Julian Lepke
 648. Julia Paleski
 649. Julia Prado
 650. Justice Wornum
 651. Justin Blau
 652. Justin Koiner
 653. Kaelin Mason
 654. Kae Unterseher
 655. Kai Fukutaki
 656. Kaitlin McCarthy
 657. Kaitlyn Welch
 658. Kalila Jackson-Spieker
 659. Kane Manning
 660. Karen Bichler
 661. Karen Carpenter
 662. Karen Crow
 663. Karen Engelbrecht
 664. Karen Mccaw
 665. Karina Delaine
 666. Kashina Groves
 667. Kass Wolcott
 668. Kate Balling
 669. Kate Dorwart
 670. Katelyn Mullikin
 671. Katharine Knutzen
 672. Katherynn Nguyen
 673. Katherine Bax
 Michalakakis
 674. Katherine Busz
 675. Katherine Chilson
 676. Katherine Kauffman
 677. Katherine Kirk
 678. Katherine Manbeck
 679. Katherine Solomon
 680. Katherine Woolverton
 681. Kathleen Anderson
 682. Kathleen Barnes
 683. Kathleen Boroughs
 684. Kathryn Compton
 685. Kathryn Greaser
 686. Kathy Zheng
 687. Katie Carter
 688. Katie Gower
 689. Katie Jendrey
 690. Katie McCarthy
 691. kat kranzler
 692. Kat Metrovich
 693. Katrina England
 694. Katrina Go
 695. Katrina James
 696. Katrina James
 697. Katrina James
 698. Katrina Spade
 699. Katya Schexnaydre
 700. Katya Wilson
 701. Katy dichter
 702. Katy Dichter
 703. kaye breeman
 704. Kayla Mendoza Chui
 705. Kaylie Treskin
 706. kelly bjork
 707. Kelly Hickman
 708. Kelly Johnson
 709. Kelly Martineau
 710. Kellyn Grassel
 711. Kelly Norton
 712. Kelly Oberbillig
 713. Kel Mossman
 714. Kelsea Dill
 715. Kelsey Blackstone
 716. Kelsey Funkhouser
 717. Kelsey McGrath
 718. Kelsey Peronto
 719. Kelsey Timmer
 720. Kelsi Kaczmarek
 721. Kendall Lincoln
 722. Kendra Appe
 723. Kendra Peterson
 724. Kendrick Tang
 725. Kenna Ketrick
 726. Kennedy Dresh
 727. Kenneth Tran
 728. Kenney Tran
 729. Kenny Phan
 730. Keshia Elder
 731. Kevin Gause
 732. Kevin Gallagher
 733. Kevin Xu
 734. Keyara Demers
 735. Kiana Fukuyama
 736. Kieran Wharton
 737. Kim
 738. Kimberly Chen
 739. Kim Concannon
 740. Kira Benson
 741. Kira Smith
 742. Kirsten L. Schneider
 743. Kirsten Schumacher
 744. K Norton
 745. Kolby Rowland
 746. Kristen Faiferlick
 747. Kristi Boes
 748. Kristi Krein
 749. Kristin
 750. Kristina Chu
 751. Kristi Nakata
 752. Kristine Ford
 753. Kristin Mannschreck

754. Kristin Mowery
 755. Kristopher Samaniego
 756. Kristopher Stewart
 757. Kristy Valenti
 758. Kwan Wah Lui
 759. kylie wong
 760. Kyndal arkley
 761. Lachlan Hill
 762. Lake Hernandez
 763. Lance Williams
 764. Lara Ruegg
 765. Lashanna Williams
 766. Laura Beier
 767. Laura Finkelstein
 768. Laura Gibbons
 769. Laura Lehni
 770. Laura Rapalski
 771. Laura Rodriguez
 772. Laurel Hecker
 773. Laurelle Banta
 774. Lauren Barkley
 775. Lauren Cooper
 776. Lauren Dorsch
 777. Lauren Freidenberg
 778. Lauren Golden
 779. Lauren Herber
 780. Lauren Kay
 781. Lauren McCulloch
 782. Lauren Murdock
 783. Lauren Ring
 784. Lauren Turnblom
 785. Lauren Vorona
 786. Laurie Bohm-Gibson
 787. Leah Eister
 788. Leah Eister Hargrave
 789. Lee Gingras
 790. Leena Yin
 791. Lee Riddell
 792. Lee Stetson
 793. lee swedin
 794. Leif Paris
 795. leighanne mcquarrie
 796. Leigh Riibe
 797. Lena Jones
 798. Leo Barros
 799. Leon West
 800. Leo Russell
 801. Leo Segovia
 802. Leslie Barber
 803. LeTania Severe
 804. Levi Fuller
 805. Levi Muhm
 806. Lex Van Horn
 807. Liam Niehus-Staab
 808. Liam Nold
 809. Liberty Harrington
 810. Lila Burns
 811. Lillian Donahoe
 812. Lily Haverstein
 813. Linda Bevis
 814. Linda Hendrix
 815. Linda Strout
 816. Linda Vong
 817. Lindsey Hand
 818. Lindsey Lozoskie
 819. Linnea
 820. Linnea Scott
 821. Lisa Kauffman
 822. Lisa Marcus
 823. Lisa Morrow
 824. Lisa Niemann
 825. Lisa Nikodem
 826. Lisha Mohan
 827. Lisha Mohan
 828. Liza Burell Mack
 829. Liz Campbell
 830. L Lin
 831. Loren Peterson
 832. Lorenzo Canales
 833. Lore Thomson
 834. Louie Zibelli
 835. Lucas O'Bryan
 836. lucas schmidt
 837. LUCILLE GROLEAU
 838. Lucinda Stroud
 839. Lucy Cress
 840. Lucy Fink
 841. Luke DeRoche
 842. Lydia Hswe
 843. Lydia S.
 844. Ly Huynh
 845. Lynne Hyerle
 846. Lynn Levine
 847. Lyn Smith
 848. Lyns Runyan
 849. M. Dayton
 850. M. K. Russell
 851. Mackenzie Brown
 852. Madalyn Omalley
 853. Maddie Min
 854. Maddy Goodro
 855. Maddy Kennard
 856. Madeleine Rackers
 857. Madeleine Schulz
 858. Madeline Burbage
 859. Madeline Fox
 860. Maggie Bishop
 861. Maggie karaya
 862. Magnolia Klee
 863. Mahala Howard
 864. Maia Mares
 865. Maida Kennedy Xiao
 866. Makenna Lehrer
 867. Mallory Jordan
 868. Mara Page
 869. Marcella
 870. Maren Costa
 871. Margaret Crosson
 872. Maria Abando
 873. Maria Hernandez
 874. Maria King
 875. Mariam Elbortoukaly
 876. Maria Nuccio
 877. Mariel Angulo
 878. Marina Edney
 879. Marin Plut
 880. Marisa Brunelli
 881. Marisa Manso
 882. Marisa Manso
 883. Marissa Stone
 884. Marivic Borromeo
 885. Mark Belanger
 886. Mark Dillenkofer
 887. Mark Foltz
 888. Marla Murdock
 889. Marlie Somers
 890. Marni Sorin
 891. Marshall Bender
 892. Martha Bishop
 893. Mary Dimond
 894. Maryellen Redish
 895. Mary Mullen
 896. Mary OConnor
 897. Mary OConor
 898. Mary Reeves
 899. Matthew Cloner
 900. Matthew D Horwitz
 901. Matthew Laun
 902. Matthew Offenbacher
 903. Matt Wright
 904. Maureen
 905. Maxwell Doggett
 906. Maya Esquivido
 907. Maya Hahn
 908. McCoy Patino
 909. McKane Andrus
 910. Meera Lee Sethi
 911. megan carlson
 912. Megan Swanson
 913. Megan Tully
 914. Meg Cummins
 915. Meghan Reckmeyer
 916. Mei'lani Eyre
 917. Melani Baker
 918. Melissa Kagerer
 919. Melissa Lound
 920. Melissa Miller
 921. Meredith nimz
 922. Meredith Ruff
 923. Michael
 924. Michaela Guzzetti
 925. Michael Lampi
 926. Michael Mellini
 927. Michael Moynihan
 928. Michaud Savage
 929. Michelle Fairrow
 930. Michelle Giarmarco
 931. Michelle LeSourd
 932. Michelle Molina
 933. Miguel Escobar
 934. Miguel Fernandez
 935. Mihai Eseanu
 936. Mikaela Freundlich
 937. Mikey Redding
 938. Mike Zanine
 939. Milena Matthews

940. milo charpentier	1001. Olivia Grove	1059. Reid Smith
941. Milo Kusold	1002. Olivia Grove	1060. Reilly Rosbotham
942. Mindi Tambellini	1003. Olivia Heath	1061. Renee
943. Miranda Johnson	1004. Olivia Lederman	1062. Renee Lamberjack
944. misty forest	1005. Omen Jackson	1063. Reuben Gelblum
945. Mitchell Lafaive	1006. Orin Dubrow	1064. Rev. Carter Smith
946. Miya Cohen-Sieg	1007. Orion Chen	1065. Rev. Ellie Leech
947. Miyah Rosenfeldt	1008. Orion Rose	1066. Rev. Steve Jerbi
948. Moji Igun	1009. Owen Kovarik	1067. Rey Hauser
949. Molly Mattingly	1010. Page Bates	1068. RG Tuomi
950. Molly Miller Petrie	1011. Pamela Ehrlich	1069. Rhys Hutton
951. Morgan Capps	1012. Pam Heyman	1070. Richard Figinski
952. Morgan Hoke	1013. Pam Orbach	1071. Richard Moreno
953. Moses Rifkin	1014. Pardes Lyons-Warren	1072. Richard Voget
954. Moses Rifkin	1015. Patricia Pedersen	1073. Rich Voget
955. Na'Quel Walker	1016. Patrick Brown	1074. Riley Freedman
956. Naishin. Fu	1017. Patrick McGrath	1075. Riley Rheta
957. Nancy Helm	1018. Paula Sjunneson	1076. Riley Wilmart
958. Nancyrose Houston	1019. Paulette	1077. River Talt
959. Naomi Natsuhara	1020. Paul Faucher	1078. RJ Dumo
960. Naomi Price-Lazarus	1021. Paul Feldman	1079. Roberta Garcia
961. Nastassia Barber	1022. PAUL KIM	1080. Robert Brown
962. Natalie Dupille	1023. Pennie O'Grady	1081. Robert Drucker
963. Natalie estrello	1024. Peter Condit	1082. Robert Evans
964. Natalie Wellen	1025. Peter Klett	1083. Robert Schentrup
965. Natasha Breidenbach	1026. Phillip Collins	1084. Rochelle Berg
966. Natasha Crepeau	1027. Phil Neff	1085. Rosa Palumbo
967. Nate Buck	1028. Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, United States of America	1086. Rose Anastasio
968. Nat X	1029. Piedra Manier	1087. Rose Hatfield
969. Neha Hazra	1030. PJ Phillips	1088. Rose King, PhD
970. Neil Patel	1031. Porscha Anderson	1089. Roslyn Martinez
971. Neisha bhagwandin	1032. Preston Hampton	1090. Roxy
972. Nell Gross	1033. priya dhawka	1091. Rozi Romanesco
973. Nellie Joselyn	1034. Quinn Qian	1092. Ruth Elan
974. Niamh Barlow	1035. Quinton Singer	1093. Ruthie Carroll
975. Nicholas Bailey	1036. R. Boswell	1094. Ryan Brooks
976. Nicholas Graff	1037. Rachael Ludwick	1095. Ryan Driscoll
977. Nichole Snyder	1038. Rachael Robinson	1096. Ryan McMorrow
978. Nick Wagner	1039. Rachel Andersen	1097. Sabina Rai
979. Nico Bucaro	1040. Rachel Anne Seymour	1098. Sacha Jacobson
980. Nicole Bradford	1041. Rachel Beda	1099. Sadé A. Smith
981. Nicole Engle	1042. Rachel Braunstein	1100. Sadie Scott-Hobson
982. Nicole Minkoff	1043. Rachel BRumer	1101. Sadie Scott-Hobson
983. Nicole Southwell	1044. Rachel Glass	1102. Sage Walund
984. Nicole Thomas-Kennedy	1045. Rachel Gordon	1103. Saina Hussain
985. Nicole Ulakovic	1046. Rachel McDonald	1104. Samantha Coleman
986. Nicole Zeller	1047. Rachel Spence	1105. Samantha Shafer
987. Nikhil Lonberg	1048. Rae Jing Han	1106. Samantha White
988. nikkita oliver	1049. Ranny Nguyen	1107. Samara Almonte
989. Nina Ozbek	1050. RaShawndra Doby	1108. sam bhagwandin
990. Nisma Gabobe	1051. Ray Gordon	1109. Sam Foote
991. Nivi Achanta	1052. Ray Power	1110. Samuel Rapoport
992. Noah de Leeuw, PhD	1053. Rebecca Deutsch	1111. Samuel So
993. Noé Loyola	1054. Rebecca Haberkorn	1112. Sandra VanderVen
994. Noel Rivard	1055. Rebecca Lavigne	1113. Sandy Vo
995. Nolan Price	1056. Rebecca Leisher	1114. Sara Bliss
996. Noor Alzamami	1057. Rebecca Ryser	1115. Sara Darlington
997. Nora Vralsted-Thomas	1058. Rebecca Yin	1116. Sara Elgabalawy
998. Nurhaliza Mohamath		1117. Sara Hanneman
999. O. Rose Benedict		
1000. Ocean Sky		

1118.	Sarah Bolton	1178.	Sophia Keller	1237.	Tobey Solomon-Auger
1119.	Sarah Kavage	1179.	Sophia Miyazaki	1238.	Tom Neill
1120.	Sarah Kreshtool	1180.	Spencer Rawls	1239.	Tom Sheehan
1121.	Sarah Lippek	1181.	Spencer Riddering	1240.	Tor Shimizu
1122.	Sarah Newhall	1182.	Spencer Ward	1241.	Tova Gaster
1123.	Sarah Potter	1183.	Stacey Wiese	1242.	Tracey Loyd
1124.	Sarah Rudy	1184.	Stanley Feliciano	1243.	Tracy Stewart
1125.	Sarah Vershon	1185.	Stefanie Brendler	1244.	Tracy Tran
1126.	Sara Nishikawa	1186.	Stefan Richmond	1245.	Tracy VanSlooten
1127.	Sara Pizzo	1187.	Stella Biehl	1246.	Tramy Nguyen
1128.	Sara Stogner	1188.	Stella Biehl	1247.	Tristen Wartonick
1129.	Sarra Loew	1189.	Stella Simonet	1248.	True Patterson
1130.	Savannah Martinez	1190.	Steph Hagerty	1249.	Tula Kurashige
1131.	Sayan Bhattacharjee	1191.	Steve Leigh	1250.	Tula Kurashige
1132.	Sayr Watson	1192.	Steven Hampton	1251.	Tylar Alexander
1133.	Scot Sternberg	1193.	Steven Nielsen	1252.	Tyler Kipling
1134.	Scott Funkhouser	1194.	Suad Abdelaziz	1253.	Tyler Morrison
1135.	Scott McClay	1195.	Sue Han	1254.	Valentina Warner
1136.	Scott Meyer	1196.	Sue kay	1255.	Valerie Bak
1137.	Sebastian Kimberk	1197.	Suman Grewal	1256.	Vanessa Reyes
1138.	Seema Ardakan	1198.	Summer Stevens	1257.	Vanessa Rosenberg
1139.	Sejal Soni	1199.	Sunny Davey	1258.	Vanessa Skantze
1140.	Selene Russo	1200.	Susana Simmonds	1259.	Veronica Martinez
1141.	Serena Tran	1201.	Susan	1260.	Vickie H. Woo
1142.	Sergio chavez		Blythe-Goodman	1261.	Vickie Woo
1143.	Seth Krantzler	1202.	Susan Koppelman	1262.	Vicki McMullin
1144.	Seth Taylor	1203.	Susan Moskwa	1263.	Victoria Aukland
1145.	Seth Warna	1204.	Susanna Waldrop	1264.	Victoria Franklin
1146.	Shan Contreras	1205.	Suzanne Nevins	1265.	Victoria Urias
1147.	Shanilla Morgan	1206.	Suzie Strait	1266.	Vida Behar
1148.	Shannon Pickard	1207.	Sweller Weller	1267.	Violet Lederman
1149.	Shannon Ren	1208.	Sydney Provence	1268.	Virginia Weihs
1150.	Shannon Ren	1209.	Sylvia haven	1269.	vivian hua
1151.	Shannon Stebbins	1210.	T.K. Anney	1270.	Vox Valentine
1152.	Sharon Kim	1211.	Tahni Nikitins	1271.	Vyom Raval
1153.	Sharon Lieberman	1212.	Tara Beach	1272.	Way Sum
1154.	Sharran Moynihan	1213.	Tara Peters	1273.	Way Sum
1155.	Shary B	1214.	Tasha Faber	1274.	Way Sum
1156.	Shayla Riday	1215.	Tatyana Emery	1275.	Wendy Wern
1157.	Shayne Lippard	1216.	Taylor Hilton	1276.	Wesleigh
1158.	Shelby Branam		Taylor Klekamp		Richardson
1159.	Shelby Daugherty	1218.	Taylor Quach	1277.	Whitney Kahn
1160.	Shemona Moreno	1219.	Taylor Riley	1278.	William Daniell
1161.	Sheridan Sogge	1220.	Teddy McDonald	1279.	William Siegel
1162.	Shiloh Silverberg	1221.	Tegan Von Neupert	1280.	Winne Luo
1163.	Shirley Leung	1222.	Teresa Manz	1281.	Wyatt Duclos
1164.	Shraddha Shirude	1223.	Teresa Sweeney	1282.	Yuan Tao
1165.	Shreya Sharma	1224.	Tesha Zietlow	1283.	Zachariah Brosius
1166.	Shyanne Steele	1225.	Tessa Fier	1284.	zach frimmel
1167.	Sidney Ross	1226.	Tess Mueller	1285.	Zac Russillo
1168.	sidonie wittman	1227.	Thena Seer	1286.	Zarine Kharazian
1169.	Sierra Smith	1228.	Theo Moon	1287.	Zar stackhouse
1170.	Simon Knaphus	1229.	Theo Yih	1288.	zee zelinski
1171.	Sindri Woodard	1230.	Thomas Moriarty	1289.	Zeynep Ertugay
1172.	Singgih Tan	1231.	Thomas Smith	1290.	Zoe Haverstein
1173.	Siri Rigsby	1232.	Tiffany Ha	1291.	Zoe Wahbeh
1174.	S Kessler	1233.	tika	1292.	Zolaire Arcade
1175.	skye d'aquila	1234.	Timothy Joki	1293.	
1176.	Sonia Hossain	1235.	Timothy Keeler		
1177.	Sophia Keller	1236.	Tim Taft		

April 12, 2024

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Dear Esteemed Members of the Seattle City Council,

Unreliable, misleading, and biased police procedures are among the primary contributing factors to wrongful criminal convictions, in Washington State and beyond. Many new technology-based “tools” currently under consideration or in use by law enforcement have not been properly vetted to ensure they do not pose an unacceptable risk to the public. We are therefore deeply concerned about Mayor Harrell’s proposed investment in ShotSpotter and CCTV surveillance technologies.

WashIP is an independent nonpartisan charitable organization that works throughout the state of Washington to identify, rectify, and prevent wrongful criminal convictions in Washington State.

Since 1989, a total of 56 Washingtonians have been exonerated after losing over 302 years of their lives incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.¹ Sadly, this data does not account for the years lost by the loved ones of each of those 56 men and women, or the years – and even decades – required to rebuild their lives after being released. Nor does it come close to identifying the many instances of wrongful conviction that have never been documented or cannot meet the strict criteria required to be classified as an “exoneration,” or where insurmountable procedural hurdles prevented the truth from emerging. The costs and consequences of false arrests and wrongful convictions are severe, not only for individuals directly involved but also for entire families, neighborhoods, cities, and society at large.

We urge the City to completely avoid technologies that pose significant risks of false arrests and wrongful convictions. First, innocent individuals may find themselves falsely implicated in crimes due to environmental factors and human bias. ShotSpotter technology—touted as a tool to

¹ *Nat’l Registry of Exonerations*, UNIV. OF MICH.
<https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Washington%20FINAL.pdf>
(last visited April 11, 2024).

enhance public safety— relies on acoustic sensors that are susceptible to triggering false alerts due to environmental factors such as fireworks or construction noise. The data analysis process in ShotSpotter is also prone to human error and bias, potentially leading to inaccurate pinpointing of gunshot locations and wrongful suspicion falling on innocent individuals. The integration of CCTV surveillance with ShotSpotter technology further compounds these risks. Biases in interpreting CCTV footage can result in false arrests, and reliance on technological surveillance tools may overlook contextual factors or other evidence that could clear innocent individuals of suspicion.

Second, societal pressure to solve crimes may lead law enforcement to rely too heavily on ShotSpotter and CCTV alerts while overlooking contradictory evidence. This is likely to exacerbate existing issues of racial or socioeconomic profiling within the criminal investigation process, leading to wrongful arrests and convictions based on flawed or incomplete evidence. Additionally, the public perception of increased police presence following a ShotSpotter alert may create a sense of urgency to solve a perceived crime, leading to pressure on law enforcement to make arrests regardless of the strength of the evidence. Once an arrest is made, prosecutors may then experience downstream pressure that influences their decision-making at the charging phase.

Mistaken eyewitness identification and official misconduct are already widely recognized as two of the leading contributors to wrongful convictions in the United States.² Expending limited city resources on law enforcement “tools” that operate at cross-purposes with public safety will only exacerbate an already profoundly tragic societal issue.

The consequences of false arrests and wrongful convictions are severe, both for individuals and society at large. Innocent individuals endure the loss of liberty and years of their lives, while the financial costs of incarcerating³ and, eventually, compensating those wrongfully

2

<https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx>

³ The Department of Corrections reports that it costs an astonishing \$63,368 to incarcerate one person at a major prison institution in Washington State for just one year. FY 2022 Cost Per Incarcerated Individual Per Day, WASH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, <https://www.doc.wa.gov/docs/publications/reports/200RE019.pdf>.

convicted⁴ burden our communities to an extent we can never fully capture.⁵


WashIP joins those who urge extreme caution in deploying acoustic gunshot detection and CCTV video surveillance technologies that have been shown to be biased and ineffective at reducing crime. We urge you to reject the current proposals that would misdirect significant community resources towards the adoption of counter-productive technologies. Instead, we implore you to prioritize reforms that prevent wrongful convictions and uphold the rights and liberties of all members of our community, and that strive toward true justice.

Thank you for considering our concerns, and for your commitment to true public safety.

Sincerely,



John Marlow
Litigation Director



Lara Zarowsky
Executive & Policy Director

⁴ Setting aside many 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights claims and considering only the 9 claims that have been granted under the Wrongly Convicted Persons Act, an avoidable \$2,631,946 in state funds have already been diverted from other critical public services to remedy past errors in the criminal legal system. See Gutman, Jeffrey, COMPENSATION UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: WASHINGTON, www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Washington%20FINAL.pdf (last visited 4/11/24).

⁵ Viewing only the cost of incarcerating and compensating those whose claims have been granted under the Act would be misleading. For example, that calculation does not consider several state statutory claims that are still pending. These figures also do not account for the salaries of each government attorney, agency administrative staff, and court personnel that must become involved in addressing wrongful incarceration and conviction.

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

April 12, 2024

RE: ACLU of Washington Public Comment on CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC

Dear Mayor Harrell, Council President Nelson, Technology Committee Chair Hollingsworth, and Honorable City Councilmembers:



P.O. Box 2728
Seattle, WA 98111-2728
(206) 624-2184
aclu-wa.org

Michele Storms
Executive Director

The ACLU of Washington would like to express our concerns regarding the City's intent to acquire and/or expand the use of three surveillance technologies: CCTV, an acoustic gunshot location system (AGLS), and real-time crime center (RTCC) software. These technologies pose grave risks to people's civil rights and liberties and will not accomplish the goal of preventing violent crime. We are also concerned that the current review process for these technologies has not been sufficiently thorough, transparent, or equitable as per the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) and the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance (SSO).

A few of the demonstrated issues with these technologies include the following:

- **CCTV:** Extensive research, including a [40-year systematic review](#), shows that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. A [recent study](#) where police officers in Newark were assigned to actively monitor and respond to CCTV camera footage concluded that such efforts required extensive resources and were "unsustainable over time."
- **AGLS:** AGLS systems, such as ShotSpotter, have been shown to be ineffective at preventing or investigating gun violence based on extensive peer-reviewed research, including a [study](#) of 68 metropolitan U.S. counties. Adding CCTV to AGLS [does not improve](#) its accuracy, but instead increases police workload. Further, AGLS increases the risk of [police violence](#) and [wrongful arrests](#), and disproportionately harms communities of color, sometimes with [fatal consequences](#).
- **RTCC:** RTCC software, such as Fusus, incorporates both public and privately owned cameras to provide law enforcement with expanded surveillance capabilities, including the ability to access footage that would typically [require a warrant](#) while also bypassing oversight. RTCC software also regularly incorporates new

functionalities, such as AI object recognition. The introduction of new surveillance capabilities would not only require an updated surveillance impact report as per the SSO, but would also present new and unanticipated risks and harms that would be challenging to mitigate once the technology has already been deployed.

- By greatly expanding Seattle's surveillance infrastructure, all three technologies pose significant risks to privacy and other civil liberties, and could cause significant harm to BIPOC communities that have been historically overpoliced. Surveillance at this scale would enable tracking and making inferences about people's activities in granular detail. Once this data is collected, it could be accessed or misused in unforeseen ways that could have especially serious consequences for individuals that Seattle, as a sanctuary city, has sought to protect, including undocumented immigrants and people seeking abortions or gender-affirming healthcare.

We urge the City to not invest in these three technologies given the extensive research evidence that shows that they will be ineffective at preventing violent crime, and the known risks and harms surrounding their use. Instead, we recommend that the City redirects the funds for the surveillance pilot toward data-driven solutions that reduce crime both effectively and safely. For example, community-based violence intervention programs have been shown to reduce violent crime in cities across the country, including a [63% reduction](#) in shooting victimizations in New York City and a [75% reduction](#) in homicides in Charlotte.

In addition to concerns with the technologies themselves, we are also concerned with the current review process:

- As per Council Budget Action SPD-900-A, a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis must be co-prepared by the Executive's Office, the Office for Civil Rights, and the Office of the Inspector General. The RET requires the City to conduct a comprehensive review of independent research on these technologies, as well as to engage with communities that will be most impacted. We are concerned that this process has not been sufficiently robust. We urge the City to conduct meaningful public outreach and to collect feedback from impacted communities in a transparent and equitable manner that ensures their voices are heard.

- The Seattle Surveillance Ordinance established a process that City departments must follow prior to acquiring any surveillance technology, including developing a surveillance impact report (SIR) and gaining Council approval (See Ord. 125679). The SSO also established a Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG) to advise the Executive and Council; the working group is tasked with developing a privacy and civil liberties assessment for each surveillance impact report. The City makes appointments to the CSWG, and the group is required to comprise seven members, at least five of whom must represent equity-based organizations. We are concerned that the CSWG currently only has four members, and has not been fully staffed for multiple years. Advancing the review and/or acquisition of these technologies without a fully appointed working group runs counter to the legislative intent and goals of the SSO.

Please feel free to reach out to us to discuss these issues, including ways we can work toward improving public safety in Seattle through evidence-based solutions that uplift communities rather than cause them further harm.

Sincerely,

Tee Sannon
Technology Policy Program Director
tsannon@aclu-wa.org



April 12, 2024

SENT VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Dear Esteemed Members of the Seattle City Council,

Unreliable, misleading, and biased police procedures are among the primary contributing factors to wrongful criminal convictions, in Washington State and beyond. Many new technology-based “tools” currently under consideration or in use by law enforcement have not been properly vetted to ensure they do not pose an unacceptable risk to the public. We are therefore deeply concerned about Mayor Harrell’s proposed investment in ShotSpotter and CCTV surveillance technologies.

WashIP is an independent nonpartisan charitable organization that works throughout the state of Washington to identify, rectify, and prevent wrongful criminal convictions in Washington State.

Since 1989, a total of 56 Washingtonians have been exonerated after losing over 302 years of their lives incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.¹ Sadly, this data does not account for the years lost by the loved ones of each of those 56 men and women, or the years - and even decades - required to rebuild their lives after being released. Nor does it come close to identifying the many instances of wrongful conviction that have never been documented or cannot meet the strict criteria required to be classified as an “exoneration,” or where insurmountable procedural hurdles prevented the truth from emerging. The costs and consequences of false arrests and wrongful convictions are severe, not only for individuals directly involved but also for entire families, neighborhoods, cities, and society at large.

We urge the City to completely avoid technologies that pose significant risks of false arrests and wrongful convictions. First, innocent individuals may find themselves falsely implicated in crimes due to environmental factors and human bias. ShotSpotter technology—touted as a tool to

¹ *Nat’l Registry of Exonerations*, UNIV. OF MICH.
<https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Washington%20FINAL.pdf>
(last visited April 11, 2024).

enhance public safety—relies on acoustic sensors that are susceptible to triggering false alerts due to environmental factors such as fireworks or construction noise. The data analysis process in ShotSpotter is also prone to human error and bias, potentially leading to inaccurate pinpointing of gunshot locations and wrongful suspicion falling on innocent individuals. The integration of CCTV surveillance with ShotSpotter technology further compounds these risks. Biases in interpreting CCTV footage can result in false arrests, and reliance on technological surveillance tools may overlook contextual factors or other evidence that could clear innocent individuals of suspicion.

Second, societal pressure to solve crimes may lead law enforcement to rely too heavily on ShotSpotter and CCTV alerts while overlooking contradictory evidence. This is likely to exacerbate existing issues of racial or socioeconomic profiling within the criminal investigation process, leading to wrongful arrests and convictions based on flawed or incomplete evidence. Additionally, the public perception of increased police presence following a ShotSpotter alert may create a sense of urgency to solve a perceived crime, leading to pressure on law enforcement to make arrests regardless of the strength of the evidence. Once an arrest is made, prosecutors may then experience downstream pressure that influences their decision-making at the charging phase.

Mistaken eyewitness identification and official misconduct are already widely recognized as two of the leading contributors to wrongful convictions in the United States.² Expending limited city resources on law enforcement “tools” that operate at cross-purposes with public safety will only exacerbate an already profoundly tragic societal issue.

The consequences of false arrests and wrongful convictions are severe, both for individuals and society at large. Innocent individuals endure the loss of liberty and years of their lives, while the financial costs of incarcerating³ and, eventually, compensating those wrongfully

2

<https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx>

³ The Department of Corrections reports that it costs an astonishing \$63,368 to incarcerate one person at a major prison institution in Washington State for just one year. FY 2022 Cost Per Incarcerated Individual Per Day, WASH. DEPT OF CORRECTIONS, <https://www.doc.wa.gov/docs/publications/reports/200RE019.pdf>.

convicted⁴ burden our communities to an extent we can never fully capture.⁵

WashIP joins those who urge extreme caution in deploying acoustic gunshot detection and CCTV video surveillance technologies that have been shown to be biased and ineffective at reducing crime. We urge you to reject the current proposals that would misdirect significant community resources towards the adoption of counter-productive technologies. Instead, we implore you to prioritize reforms that prevent wrongful convictions and uphold the rights and liberties of all members of our community, and that strive toward true justice.

Thank you for considering our concerns, and for your commitment to true public safety.

Sincerely,



John Marlow
Litigation Director



Lara Zarowsky
Executive & Policy Director

⁴ Setting aside many 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights claims and considering only the 9 claims that have been granted under the Wrongly Convicted Persons Act, an avoidable \$2,631,946 in state funds have already been diverted from other critical public services to remedy past errors in the criminal legal system. See Gutman, Jeffrey, COMPENSATION UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: WASHINGTON, www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Washington%20FINAL.pdf (last visited 4/11/24).

⁵ Viewing only the cost of incarcerating and compensating those whose claims have been granted under the Act would be misleading. For example, that calculation does not consider several state statutory claims that are still pending. These figures also do not account for the salaries of each government attorney, agency administrative staff, and court personnel that must become involved in addressing wrongful incarceration and conviction.

March 21st, 2024

Dear Seattle City Leadership,

Here is my public comment on the SPD Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) Surveillance Impact Report (SIR).

I've provided my concerns and recommendations below in order of severity. You will find that the negatives far exceed any possible positives and as such **my overall recommendation is that the City of Seattle not implement the proposed changes (i.e. broadening the capabilities and/or replacing the existing RTCC) of the SPD RTCC as described in the SIR (even as part of a pilot program).**

Concerns & Recommendations:

1) **Reactive, not preventative:** SPD is misleading the public by calling this a "Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot". The RTCC contains data from on-going and historical crime incidents, so by its very nature will be reactive (911 calls, etc). SPD even says in item 1.1 of the RTCC SIR that the "purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to ... reactively investigate incidents." The RTCC is not a crime prevention tool and mislabeling it as such diverts consideration away from truly preventative measures, which are not technology driven - and that is true for both community-oriented measures (like after-school programs, rehabilitation, workforce training, etc) and police/policy-driven measures (such as gun lock boxes, gun buy-back programs, requiring reporting of lost/stolen guns, trigger locks, etc).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - effort should instead be placed on actual crime prevention measures.

2) **Meager efficacy:** The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

- (a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145>], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]
- (b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [<https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019-Final-Report.pdf>] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].
- (c) Overall, the results from studies assessing the use of technology on crime clearances has been mixed; whereas other (non-technological) aspects have been shown to have a greater impact on case clearances. For example, the 2021 paper by Heather Prince (of George Mason University)

page 1 of 8

and et. al. titled "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the research" [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PJPSM-04-2021-0054>] states "newer research findings suggest that investigations-specific organizational policies focused on strengthening the capacity and accountability of investigative work, applying targeted resources to investigations, and increasing investigative effort in developing witnesses, evidence and responding to crime scenes could improve an agency's ability to affect clearance rates" [Prince pdf page 15] So it would be a better use of SPD's time and taxpayer's money to pursue these non-technological improvements that have shown measurable improvements in crime clearances.

- (d) SPD already has had a RTCC (iBase) since 2015. If RTCCs were effective at helping clear cases, then that should already be evident in SPD's existing data (such as, mean time to suspect identification before vs after 2015, mean length of time to case clearance before vs after 2015, etc). Since SPD didn't provide such data, the public can only assume that the data SPD does have doesn't look promising regarding the use of a RTCC. Additionally, in item 1.1 of the RTCC, SPD said that a RTCC "helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions." So how many unnecessary stops did SPD conduct before vs after 2015? Moreover, how does the RTCC change the accuracy of suspect descriptions and how is that shown in SPD's data before vs after 2015?
- (e) SPD doesn't appear to be taking the Surveillance Ordinance seriously, since they left most of the Expertise and References sections blank in the SIR.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology.

3) **Expensive:** This is a poor use of taxpayer money and even of the SPD budget itself. It's also highly likely to be a ballooning amount of money year-over-year, beyond what the proposed pilot implies:

- (a) Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs and for which their cost information is publicly accessible, the average cost is \$7.16 per person (that is, per person based on the population data from each city's 2020 Census). With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV, AGLS, and ALPR expansion.
- (b) Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million ... This does not include the costs of ongoing maintenance, technology, and personnel" [Arietti page 1]. The paper later goes on to list the costs specific to Chicago's RTCC as "about \$10.6 million, plus an additional \$600,000 annually" [Arietti page 4].
- (c) The Fiscal Impact section of the RTCC SIR is lacking any data regarding the expected year-over-year costs for powering the RTCC equipment, staffing the RTCC room, bandwidth & data storage costs, the on-going subscription to the vendor's software & support package, and projected maintenance costs. Given the budget deficit the City is facing, it is unwise for the City to spend \$1.8 million dollars to surveil residents instead of providing social services and funding community-driven, proven solutions to reducing gun violence.
- (d) This seems like a foot in the door for SPD to have an always ever increasing budget allocated to them to expand and deepen their surveillance. It will be a contract that is an investment in exceptionally costly, ineffective, reactive measures that are hard to remove and do nothing to actually help residents or reduce violence.
- (e) SPD says that this will replace their existing RTCC (iBase). However, SPD also uses iBase for other functionality (link analysis, which was the only approved use of iBase under the Surveillance Ordinance). This means that there will continue to be on-going costs for both

iBase and the RTCC (Fusus). This is yet another way that SPD's expenditures will continue to balloon.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - there are better uses of limited City funds.

4) Racially-biased deployment: There are many issues with the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the CCTV SIR:

- (a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.
- (b) RET item 1.4.1 in the SIR shows disparate impact in the locations chosen to be surveilled. Specifically, there is disproportionate impact on Native American residents in 4 out of 4 of the pilot locations, Black residents in 3 of the pilot locations, Asian & Latinx residents in 2 of the pilot locations, and Mixed folks in 1 of the pilot locations. Additionally, while the majority of Seattle residents are white, all of the pilot locations have an under-proportionate amount of white residents - thus meaning the pilot locations selected appear on paper to be racially motivated. I don't see how the impact won't be biased-based policing because if you are only looking for crime in non-white neighborhoods, then you're primarily going to find non-white suspects (and victims); whereas criminals in white neighborhoods (who are therefore likely white themselves) will fly under the radar of the police.
- (c) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.
- (d) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public - you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled - that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.
- (e) Only 1 of the 2 public engagement meetings on these surveillance technologies was held near a pilot location and the 1 location that was also happened to be the location with the highest amount of white residents out of the 4 pilot locations. Why can SPD find the time to talk to surveillance technology vendors and the City can find the money to surveil residents, but somehow doesn't have the time nor the money to even have host a community event in all of the pilot locations?

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - racist behavior (including with technology) has no place in Seattle.

5) Lack of outreach: Item 2.1 in the RET in the SIR asks "Please include a list of all organizations specifically invited to provide feedback on this technology." and SPD answered, "The list of organizations will be listed in the final SIR." However, this is unlikely to occur in practice considering in the most recent 12 SPD SIRs having completed the Ordinance process have had the outreach requirement of the RET deleted in each of those finalized SIRs. So the City has a history of not conducting the required outreach about surveillance technologies.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - if the City won't even notify impacted communities, then that alone should be grounds to deny the SIR.

6) Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws: Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed RTCC:

- (a) For background, [WA HB 1469](#) was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.
- (b) And [WA SB 5497](#) was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).
- (c) In item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications..."
- (d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Utah could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Since neither of such requests would go to SPD and because Fusus isn't a WA-based company, both of these requests would circumvent those state laws specifically meant to protect WA residents. In fact, if the judge also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Fusus might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD.
- (e) SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create these risks to residents.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program) - SPD must not weaken state laws nor endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. If City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require that the RTCC to be on-premise.

7) Surveillance expansion: RTCC SIR item 2.3 states that "Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies." There are multiple concerns about this:

- (a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.
- (b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further invasion of privacy beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.
- (c) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have on-the-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made

available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, privately-owned CCTV videos (both live and recorded) should require a warrant signed by a judge before they can be viewed, accessed, or saved by SPD.

8) **Hidden/unknowable surveillance features:** In item 1.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says, "some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies" and in item 2.3, SPD says that they "will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends." However, face recognition and predictive policing aren't the only concerns:

- (a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the data.
- (b) SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use an RTCC that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual using the RTCC not clicking the wrong buttons - meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. [OPA Case 2020OPA-0305](#) and [OPA Case 2020OPA-0731](#)).
- (c) The vendor that SPD plans to use for the RTCC (Fusus) advertises that their system is "continuously evolving along with its database of profiles for search and analysis" and that Fusus is continuously updating the AI capabilities of the RTCC via weekly updates to the system. SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use. Not only that but SPD won't even know beforehand what are all the capabilities this system will have even after it's live and in-use (for possibly years). New features can and will be added to the RTCC both without SPD's awareness and without any public oversight or control - thus (again) elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).
- (d) In item 6.5 of the RTCC SIR, SPD didn't mention any accuracy checks they were planning to perform of the AI capabilities of the RTCC. So it seems SPD expects both the City and the public to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-and-balances on that.
- (e) Moreover, even SPD themselves doesn't want automated assessment of their own videos, so why should residents be subjected to surveillance tools that even SPD doesn't like?
<https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/decision-to-halt-program-analyzing-seattle-police-bodycam-video-under-scrutiny/>

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, all edge-based analytics and/or AI capabilities in the RTCC must be disabled until SPD explicitly lists them individually in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council.

9) **No limitations on use:** Item 5.1 of the RET in the RTCC SIR says the number one goal for the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the RTCC to only "felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, specify that the only allowable use of the RTCC system should be for felony crimes.

10) Unidentified data sources: In item 4.1 of the RTCC SIR, SPD lists the data sources to the RTCC and closes with "and other information systems." This wording leaves open the door for future data integrations to the RTCC to be configured but never go through the Surveillance Ordinance process. For example, SPD could add social media data/analysis to the RTCC and that would not generate a new or updated SIR. No department should be above the scope of the Ordinance.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, strike "and other information systems" from item 4.1 of the SIR.

11) Excessive data retention: In item 4.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy..." This has multiple issues:

- (a) 30 days is too long to keep data on innocent people just going about their day.
- (b) Retaining the RTCC data (which includes ALPR and CCTV data) for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for data to use against their victims.
- (c) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to RTCC data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this group of pilot technologies enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.
- (d) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.
- (e) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.
- (f) It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would be getting processed by the RTCC).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.

12) Never-ending pilot: SPD has not told the public how long this pilot is supposed to last for (3 months, 1 year, 10 years?).

- (a) By not giving duration length, SPD has opened the door to a potentially perpetual "pilot" program.
- (b) Why isn't the evaluation plan included in the SIR's appendix?
- (c) In item 1.3 of the RET in the RTCC SIR, SPD says that the pilot "will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective." It's worrisome that SPD didn't even list that the pilot would be terminated if it was found to 'inadvertently' re-enforce biases.
- (d) Without this accountability, SPD is creating a future door through which there is no way for this surveillance to be deemed ineffective.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, specify a maximum time duration for the pilot.

13) Duplication causing confusion in an emergency: Item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, says "Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle..." Seattle already has an opt-in alert notification system (AlertSeattle - <https://alert.seattle.gov/>). Having two separate systems that perform overlapping functionality of notifying residents in the case of an emergency is a bad idea because it could result in residents believing that they are subscribed for all emergency alerts when they are only subscribed to SPD's RTCC-based alerting system. If there is a non-SPD emergency, residents won't receive the alert because they are subscribed to the wrong system. There should be only one emergency alert system used by the City of Seattle and it should be whatever system the City's Office of Emergency Management officially designates as such. All city departments should feed their alert data to the OEM-designated system (as is already the case).

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, the public alert notification feature of the RTCC must be disabled.

14) Security & Compliance:

- (a) Item 4.7 says, "Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials." It would be better if access wasn't just password-based, but was also using MFA/2FA (or even 2SA would be something).
- (b) SPD has also not detailed whether a person must be on the SPD network in order to access the RTCC or if remote access will be permitted.
- (c) SPD hasn't confirmed whether the RTCC will have granular access control.
- (d) Nor whether the RTCC logs the username and timestamp when a camera's pan, tilt, or zoom are changed; or when an ALPR search is conducted. For example, if the system does NOT log this and there was a news report about misuse of the RTCC, then it might be impossible for the OIG/OPA to determine which employee was at fault.
- (e) Item 5.4 in the SIR says that, "Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD"; but that doesn't make sense here. Wouldn't this mean that the unit supervisor for the homicide detectives and the supervisor for the gang unit (and so and so forth) would all each be responsible for ensuring data retention compliance of the RTCC? That responsibility should be more centralized so as to ensure consistency in application of compliance requirements for a potentially widely-used system like the RTCC.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require the RTCC to support: detailed logging for all features, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and granular access control of any cameras.

15) Training: Item 3.3 of the RTCC SIR says, "Authorized personnel will receive training in the RTCC management system prior to authorization." and item 7.2 says, "SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training." SPD does not mention creating any privacy or ethics training specific to the RTCC. There should be training that:

- (a) That RTCC features must never be used outside the scope of an active call or investigation; and that employees found to have used the RTCC outside that scope would be personally liable for their actions.
- (b) That ALPR data especially must be treated as sensitive information never to be used for personal purposes (such as stalking an ex/significant-other/neighbor/etc).
- (c) Advises that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their pan/tilt/zoom altered to look inside private residences, to stalk/harass individuals, or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons)
- (d) And that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their camera's viewing angle moved away from an area of police response, while police are still present.
- (e) Additionally, the RTCC SIR doesn't mention any policy that prohibits the user of the RTCC from taking screenshots, screen-recordings, or pictures/recordings using their cell phone or other mobile device. This especially impacts any victims, passerby, or anyone in the vicinity who are only partially clothed or fully naked, especially if unconscious.

Recommendation: SPD must not broaden or replace their RTCC (even as a pilot program); but if City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the RTCC, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the system.

Please seriously consider my public comment. Thank you.

General Comment

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Emily Menon Bender <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 2:24 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am strongly opposed to increased surveillance and therefore very concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

Surveillance does not keep us safe. Surveillance is not compatible with equity. Surveillance is not congruent with a thriving, democratic metropolis.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Emily Menon Bender
ebender@stanfordalumni.org
4228 Meridian Ave N
Seattle, Washington 98103

From: Michael Mellini <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 9:37 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Michael Mellini

michael.mellini@gmail.com

535 16th Ave. E

Seattle , Washington 98112

▪

From: Michael Mellini <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 9:37 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Michael Mellini

michael.mellini@gmail.com

535 16th Ave. E

Seattle , Washington 98112

▪

From: Carey Homan <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 8:15 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Carey Homan

careyhoman@gmail.com

12527 Densmore Ave N

SEATTLE, Washington 98133

▪

From: Emily Silver <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 8:11 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to
blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of
the police's actions.

Emily Silver
elesnick@gmail.com
4520 48th Ave S
Seattle, Washington 98118

▪
From: Denise Krownbell <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 7:20 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No to SpotShooter and surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot
technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and
urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches

of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Denise Krownbell

friscokrown@comcast.net

2936 36th Ave S

Seattle, Washington 98144

▪

From: Victoria Urias <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 6:57 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

I OPPOSE Surveillance technology ASAP!

Victoria Urias

vickiurias@comcast.net

14001 35th Avenue NE

Seattle, Washington 98125

▪

From: Melissa Petersen <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2024 6:53 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Melissa Petersen

Dritta@gmail.com

1703 N 122nd St

Seattle, Washington 98133

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2024 11:05 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Eliza Furmansky <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2024 11:24 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Eliza Furmansky
eliza.furmansky@yahoo.com
14600 9th PI NE
Shoreline , Washington 98155

▪

From: Emily Chu <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2024 12:01 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: NO TO INCREASED SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

The proposed technologies (CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC) are harm-producing surveillance methods that have been proven NOT to reduce violent crime and to actually increase harm to

community members, such as the child setting off fireworks who was recently shot in Chicago as a result of Shotspotter. These technologies are expensive and end up further marginalizing and harming already marginalized groups, particularly Black, Brown, and homeless people. Please put this money toward community-based solutions instead.

Thank you for your time,
Emily Chu (she/her, resident of Capitol Hill)

Emily Chu
emilypchu@gmail.com
1058 E. Lynn St.
Seattle, Washington 98102

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2024 1:27 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not

decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Clara Cantor <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 4:54 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease

30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Clara Cantor

cantorclara@gmail.com

5918 47th Ave S

Seattle, Washington 98118

From: Jonel Stahr <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 11:15 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Jonel Stahr

jonelstrb@mac.com

2727 Fairview Ave East

Seattle, Washington 98102

▪

From: Liz Campbell <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 7:50 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate

people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Liz Campbell

zil1000campbell@gmail.com

605 n 64th street

sea, Washington 98103

▪

From: Carolyn Akinbami <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 9:34 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Acoustic Gunshot Technology Systems

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I reject the city's rushed attempt to force acoustic gunshot technology system through the SIR process without considering the impacts on equity or reviewing the large body of evidence that already exists.

Technology like Shotspotter increases biased policing.

Chicago found that not only did ShotSpotter increase the number of pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions when officers were responding to ShotSpotter, but some officers used the mere presence of ShotSpotter in a neighborhood, even without a ShotSpotter alert, as enough reason to conduct "protective pat downs." ShotSpotter increases biased policing. This is why the MacArthur Justice Center has filed a class action lawsuit against ShotSpotter.

Carolyn Akinbami
carolyn.akinbami@gmail.com
716 17th Ave E
Seattle, Washington 98112

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2024 10:05 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2024 3:04 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▫

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, March 24, 2024 9:30 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney
camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com
10741 Dayton Ave N
Seattle, Washington 98133

▫

From: Melinda Mueller <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 3:03 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology. I was pleased when the previous council declined to include Shotspotter in the city budget, and dismayed that it is again being proposed.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Melinda Mueller

mueller.melinda@gmail.com

7704 16th AVE NW

Seattle , Washington 98117

From: Linda Strout <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 2:45 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Linda Strout

lsstrout@gmail.com

11200 Greenwood Ave N

Seattle , Washington 98133

▪

From: Siri Rigsby <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 11:44 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Siri Rigsby

siriadrienne@gmail.com

9511 Roosevelt Way Northeast, 210

Seattle, Washington 98115

▪

From: Carly Eyer <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 11:13 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Carly Eyer
carly.eyer@gmail.com
1231 SW 118th St
Burien, Washington 98146

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2024 12:01 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Carolyn Akinbami <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2024 9:28 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT ineffective surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I have lived on Capitol Hill for 30 years, am a PCO for my precinct, and I oppose the city's attempt to procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence deserves a significant and urgent response, but these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches. They don't work. What RTCC software *would* do is vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle. This should be unacceptable anywhere in the US, but I'm especially disturbed to see this proposed in my home city.

We need to use proven methods to reduce gun violence instead. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. You never see that kind of result using surveillance technology.

The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by proven community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

I implore you to explore effective alternatives to this ineffective and privacy-violating waste of tax dollars.

Carolyn Akinbami

carolyn.akinbami@gmail.com

716 17th Ave E

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Mary OConnor <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2024 5:22 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Mary OConnor

49.mary@gmail.com

1440 NW 64th St

Seattle, Washington 98107

From: Kathleen Anderson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2024 4:33 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people. Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration of this very important issue.

Kathleen Anderson

klada@comcast.net

9206 17th Ave. N.E.

Seattle, Washington 98115

▪

From: Peter Condit <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 9:25 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop surveillance tech in Seattle

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I live near Aurora and 85th Street. I am against surveillance in my neighborhood or anywhere in Seattle.

I do not want police and artificial intelligence systems to listen to or watch my family as we go about our lives. Surveillance leads to self-censoring and a loss of individuality and creativity. Surveillance is the opposite of a public good.

The harmful impacts of these technologies (and policing in general) have fallen and will continue to fall disproportionately on individuals who have already experienced violence from

white supremacy and colonialism. SPD commissioned a study in 2021 that showed that SPD stops black and native Seattlites over 7 times more often than white Seattlites. And police have a pattern of killing people they interact with. Black lives matter. Indigenous lives matter.

City council should not approve these surveillance technologies. There is ample evidence that the millions of dollars that these technologies cost would be more effectively spent on community-led public health and safety programs.

Acoustic Gunshot Location Systems (AGLS), like ShotSpotter, operate by placing microphones in neighborhoods. An algorithm reviews sounds these microphones pickup. If the algorithm thinks a loud sound is a gunshot, a recording of that loud sound goes to a person to review. If the person also thinks the loud sound is a gunshot, the police get an alert.

The city cites no independent peer-reviewed research in it's report. The section is blank.

ShotSpotter is proven to be an ineffective technology, as seen in several independent, peer-reviewed studies.

A large meta-analysis examined ShotSpotter in 68 cites from 1999 to 2016 and found that ShotSpotter “has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes.” Other research finds that acoustic gunshot technology doesn't get victims of gun violence to safety faster and doesn't reduce violent crime while greatly increasing demands on police resources.

Peter Condit

shellito@gmail.com

8251 Interlake Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98103

▪

From: Kate Frost <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 7:08 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

This is not the solution you are hoping for!

Kate

Kate Frost
kfrost0@gmail.com
11362 28th Ave NE
Seattle, Washington 98125

▪

From: Susan Moskwa <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, March 17, 2024 2:21 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology such as CCTV, ShotSpotter/AGLS, and Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) software.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Community-led violence prevention methods WORK and people in your city are begging for them to be funded. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. Seattle could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Susan Moskwa

moskwa@gmail.com

3222 45th Ave SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: Noah Hake <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 9:20 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

There were only 2 opportunities for public comment given and there has not been any community engagement with the communities where this tech would be implemented. This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Noah Hake

nhake94@gmail.com

7055 Corfu Blvd NE

Bremerton, Washington 98311

▪

From: Reuben Gelblum <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 5:30 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: We Don't Want RTCC!

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

Greetings -- My name is Reuben Gelblum; I am a Social Worker and have lived in Seattle since 2015. I am extremely opposed to the city's attempt to procure RTCC as well as other surveillance technologies (Shot Spotter and CCTV cameras).

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Reuben Gelblum

reuben.gelblum@gmail.com

2339 Fairview Ave E Slip I

Seattle, Washington 98102

▪

From: Kathleen Anderson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 4:59 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration of this issue.

Kathleen Anderson

klada@comcast.net

9206 17th Ave. N.E.

Seattle, Washington 98115

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 1:27 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Eliza Furmansky <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2024 12:25 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Eliza Furmansky

eliza.furmansky@yahoo.com

14600 9th PI NE

Shoreline , Washington 98155

From: Linda Strout <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 11:24 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Linda Strout

lsstrout@gmail.com

11200 Greenwood Ave N

Seattle , Washington 98133

From: Neiko Alvarado <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2024 12:40 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Neiko Alvarado

neiko.alvarado@gmail.com

1821 E Thomas, Apt 103

Seattle, Washington 98112

▪

From: Marla Murdock <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 3:11 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Marla Murdock

mkmfeb@gmail.com

6246 NE Radford Dr. apt 2325

Seattle, Washington WA 98115

▪

From: Siri Rigsby <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 2:51 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes. Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. Siri Rigsby

siriadrienne@gmail.com

9511 Roosevelt Way Northeast, 210

Seattle, Washington 98115

From: Jenna Riggs <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 9:46 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle-area resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

What happens in Seattle affects everyone in the area. Washington State is now a top travel state for reproductive healthcare, and we all know that Idaho and Texas (to start) require surveillance to punish their residents for traveling out of state for care, and we can't let that happen. We need to keep people's privacy safe. Please make this grave consideration high on your list as you consider new surveillance technology.

Thank you,
Jenna

Jenna Riggs
jenna@jennariggs.com
11419 Asta Lane SW
Vashon, Washington 98070

▪

From: Carolyn Akinbami <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 8:50 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Carolyn Akinbami
carolyn.akinbami@gmail.com
716 17th Ave E
Seattle, Washington 98112

▪

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, March 10, 2024 8:19 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney

camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com

10741 Dayton Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

▪

From: Diana Alvarez <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2024 10:26 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Diana Alvarez

dianalvz@gmail.com

2524 S Jackson St

Seattle, Washington 98144

From: Ashley Lindell <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 4, 2024 7:32 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: We need Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident, a family practice physician, and a mother. I oppose the city's attempt to procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle. It has touched all of our lives. My middle school daughter's volleyball coach, a high school student herself at the time, was injured in a shooting less than two years ago. Thankfully she survived. Gun violence deserves an urgent and effective response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches promise of reducing gun violence.

There are interventions which have much better evidence for reducing gun violence and we should spend our money on these. As an example, violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Gun violence is an urgent and important issue and it deserves effective responses.

Ashley Lindell

aclinde73@gmail.com

4842 50th Ave SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, March 3, 2024 1:17 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: tiffany.ha.8@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 2:13 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

tiffany.ha.8@gmail.com

113 NE 62nd St

Seattle, Washington 98115

From: Lizzy Stone <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 12:37 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Residents against surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a 10-year Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Thank you for listening to the community.

Lizzy Stone

Lizzy Stone

lizzylauriel@gmail.com

8527 16th Ave SW

Seattle, Washington 98106

From: MEGAN BRANDON <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 10:15 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV

In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

MEGAN BRANDON

megansimpsonster@gmail.com

1802 North 137th Street

Seattle, Washington 98133

From: Mallory Jordan <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 9:29 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is limiting the comment period from February 5th to February 29th, giving people fewer than 30 days to comment on all 3 technologies. The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending in just 2 weeks, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Mallory Jordan

onion.scrawny-0n@icloud.com

4511 35th Ave SW

Seattle, Washington 98126

From: John Gilbert <jgilbert98199@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 8:22 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Reject the proposed surveillance technologies

CAUTION: External Email

There are NO VALID JUSTIFICATIONS for adopting even the pilot projects for the proposed technologies.

CCTV

EFFECTIVITY: By the single white paper offered the council, CCTV monitoring is not effective and has no effect on crime rates.

-
-
- The only study SPD cites - a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy
 - of CCTV - concludes “[no significant effects observed for violent crime](#)” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”
-
-
-
- A study for the
 - [British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country](#) similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer.
-
-
-
- A study of Dallas, TX found “[\[CCTV\] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances](#)” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts.
-
-
-
- [Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK](#) found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.
-
-
-
- Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes
 - of CCTV. [Justice Department experiments have found “\[a\]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing... This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors.”](#)
-

COST. Sara Nelson said on the radio today it is state money. So what? IT COSTS TIME. SPD is short-handed, so why waste their time on something that doesn't work?

BETTER SOLUTIONS: Talk to Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already [reduced violence](#) in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%

Acoustic Gun Location System (AGLS)

EFFECTIVITY and PEER REVIEW:

- 1. AGLS is proven to be an ineffective technology, as seen in several independent, peer-reviewed studies.**
 - In independent studies, AGLS deployments have failed to result in any evidence of a gun crime anywhere from [90%](#) to [97%](#) of the time, an abysmal rate that isn't improved [by the addition of CCTV](#).
 - A large meta-analysis examined ShotSpotter in 68 cities from 1999 to 2016 and found that AGLS "[has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes](#)." Other research finds that acoustic gunshot technology doesn't get [victims of gun violence](#) to [safety faster](#) and [doesn't reduce violent crime while greatly increasing demands on police resources](#).
 - AGLS is ineffective, expensive, and harmful which is why many cities that have tried AGLS have ended use of the technology. [Chicago](#) is the most recent city to do so, joining [Atlanta](#), [Buffalo](#), [Charlotte](#), [San Antonio](#), [Fall River, MA](#), [Dayton, OH](#), and others.
 - AGLS [increases 911 response times by "nearly two-minutes"](#)
 - In 2023, the largest study on the effectiveness of AGLS concluded "[public safety benefits—in the form of the reduction and increase clearance of gun violence—*did not result*](#)" from AGLS. (emphasis added)

In an independent review, Cook County found that AGLS has a [minimal effect on prosecuting gun violence cases](#).

COST. Sara Nelson said on the radio today it is state money. So what? IT COSTS TIME. SPD is short-handed, so why waste their time on something that doesn't work? You don't need a pilot program when the evidence is overwhelming.

Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) software

- **RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.**
-
-

- RTCC
- software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell
- cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings.
-
-
-
- RTCC software like
 - [Fusus](#)
 - recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage
 - [without](#)
 - [a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner](#). This poses serious safety concerns
 - for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.
-
-
-
- The privatization of policing represented by relying on
 - [private](#)
 - [consumers to expand the camera network](#) undermines democratic values, effectively
 - excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.
-
-
-
- RTCC software
 - [creates](#)
 - [conditions that are ripe for police abuse](#), as it provides little, if any,
 - oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.
-
-
-
- RTCC software like Fusus
 - **continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations**
 - with third-party applications via the [software's](#)
 - [AI capabilities](#). This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance
 - tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.
-
-
- Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether
- criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on
- free speech rights. In 2021
 - [LAPD](#)

- [requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters](#). The data
- was requested from [Amazon](#)
- [Ring](#), a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement
- without a warrant and [blatant](#)
- [disregard for user privacy](#).

-
-
-

- In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition
- technology to [surveillance](#)
- [Black Lives Matter protesters](#).

-

- **Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.**

-
-

- In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors
- concluded there were “[no](#)
- [significant effects observed for violent crime](#)” and “a body of research on
- the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

-
-
-

- In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found

- [no](#)
- [significant impacts on arrest outcomes](#).

-
-
-

- Only

- [1%](#)
- to [0.2%](#)
- of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

-

- **RTCC software is expensive**

-

- RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every
- single year.

-
-
-

- RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand
- strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products
- every year.
-
-
- The city has not allocated any money in the budget for RTCC software so it is unclear
- where the money would come from - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025
-

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence, as noted above.

We need less military-trained and -oriented police, and more human-centered police.

COST. Sara Nelson said on the radio today it is state money. So what? IT COSTS TIME. SPD is short-handed, so why waste their time on something that doesn't work? You don't need a pilot program when the evidence is overwhelming.

Thanks

John Gilbert

From: Adrienne Banks <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 8:44 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is limiting the comment period from February 5th to February 29th, giving people fewer than 30 days to comment on all 3 technologies. The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending in just 2 weeks, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Adrienne Banks

adriennebanks21@gmail.com

3112 E Olive St

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Uli Johnson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 12:52 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Uli Johnson

ulijohnson@gmail.com

900 EAST BAY DR NE APT 406

Olympia, Washington 98506

From: Eric Dee <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 9:15 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No dangerous and ineffective surveillance tech for SPD

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Highland Park resident, and I oppose the Mayor's plan to spend millions of dollars on technology for the SPD that has already been proven to be ineffective at best, harmful and dangerous to the community at worst. When we are facing a budget crisis due to lack of willingness to tax the enormous amount of wealth in this city, we should not be showering tech corporations with money to install ineffective surveillance technology. Let's use that money to take care of people and our communities instead.

Sincerely,

Eric Dee

Eric Dee

lza206@yahoo.com

9035 12th Ave SW

Seattle, Washington 98106

From: Jade Weise <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 7:51 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Jade Weise

j.jadeweise@gmail.com

17233 15th Ave NE

Shoreline, Washington 98155

From: Briar Stratas <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 4:36 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: I am writing in opposition to the use of public resources on surveillance technologies

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I live in the Central District of Seattle and experience proximity to gun violence on a regular basis. Even just a few weeks ago my Citizen app showed that there was an active shooter just 2 blocks from my home. Gun violence affects me and my community directly.

That is why I OPPOSE the city's attempt to use public resources on these 3 new surveillance technologies. Our city needs solutions that are actually effective against violent crime, and these require financial resources that will be wasted on CCTV systems, AGLS(spotshotter), and RTCC software.

Research has shown that these technologies are ineffective and in fact even dangerous. Even recently a child was almost killed by a Chicago police officer shooting at him based on an alert from shotspotter.

CCTV monitoring does not improve the outcomes of CCTV and those paid to monitor them are shown to have reduced attention to the point of being useless....a waste of money on both the systems and the salary of the person monitoring.

These resources should be used on real solutions like preventative community centered approaches. Research has shown that investments in providing affordable housing, mental health treatment, and substance abuse treatment have a much higher impact on reducing violent crime.

I urge everyone who can impact this decision to deny funds being used for these purposes. And instead push to have them utilized for services that will actually perform the goal of reducing violent crime.

Thank you for reading,

Briar Stratas

Briar Stratas

Briarstratas@gmail.com

909 20th Ave.

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Alan Zhang <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 4:28 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology. Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Alan Zhang

a6zhang@gmail.com

1004 NE 112th St

Seattle, Washington 98125

From: Nancyrose Houston <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 3:18 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Please oppose surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Wedgwood neighborhood and I oppose Shotspotter or any AGLS, as well as CCTV and the RTCC. These technologies have largely been proven not to increase public safety. In fact, the study that the city of Seattle cited about CCTV actually says that the technology had not impact on violent crimes.

I worked on a team of researchers at the UW Center for Human Rights researching Automated License Plate Readers: <https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/>. This technology is bad for reproductive rights and immigrant rights. I worry that the same problems that we found in our report would be present with CCTV that is being proposed.

Acoustic Gunshot Location Systems (AGLS), like ShotSpotter, operate by placing microphones in neighborhoods. An algorithm reviews sounds these microphones pickup. If the algorithm thinks a loud sound is a gunshot, a recording of that loud sound goes to a person to review. If the person also thinks the loud sound is a gunshot, the police get an alert.

The city cites no independent peer-reviewed research in its report. The section is blank.

ShotSpotter is proven to be an ineffective technology, as seen in several independent, peer-reviewed studies.

A large meta-analysis examined ShotSpotter in 68 cites from 1999 to 2016 and found that ShotSpotter “has no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest outcomes.” Other research finds that acoustic gunshot technology doesn’t get victims of gun violence to safety faster and doesn’t reduce violent crime while greatly increasing demands on police resources.

Thank you, please do the right thing and DO NOT vote for these technologies.

Nancyrose Houston

nancyrosehouston@gmail.com

7525 39TH AVE NE

Seattle, Washington 98115

From: carpenter.kp@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 3:16 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

carpenter.kp@gmail.com

5020 California Ave SW

Seattle , Washington 98136

From: Clayton Compton <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 12:27 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO Surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

Please reject the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer.

A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found "[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing... This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors."

I urge the city to pursue real solutions, rather than fake promises.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Clayton Compton

claycompton@comcast.net

10925 NE 37TH PL, APT 1, Bellevue, WA 98004-7642, United States of Ame
Bellevue, WA 98004, Washington 98004-7642

From: eliana.d.horn@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 11:37 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

eliana.d.horn@gmail.com

5108 South Farrar Street

Seattle, Washington 98118

From: Nivi Achanta <nivi@soapboxproject.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 11:18 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Writing against ShotSpotter and SPD surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

I wanted to submit public comment to write against the proposed SPD surveillance tech planned for Aurora Avenue. The suite of surveillance technologies you are suggesting have been deployed in other US Cities and **have been found to be ineffective and very costly; in addition to being a privacy invasion and potentially deadly risk to those local communities** when police show up expecting gun violence to have recently occurred even when it has not (such as mis-categorization of vehicle backfire, construction sounds, helicopters, etc).

Community-based violence prevention programs are where we need to invest -- not in costly AND ineffective technologies like ShotSpotter.

You can find NUMEROUS studies and stats [linked here](#). This is not a good use of my taxpayer money and I would like to push back strongly against SPD's surveillance technology pilot of CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC.

I live in Fremont and this would directly affect me, and I am not okay with this kind of civil rights violation and invasion of privacy in the name of public safety.

Real public safety comes from the community. Thank

[Nivi Achanta](#)



Soapbox Project

www.soapboxproject.org

Join us in fighting climate change from your inbox in 3 min every week.

Let's Connect!



From: Cameron Cooper <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 10:41 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Cameron Cooper

cmcooper93@gmail.com

3010 1st Ave

Seattle , Washington 98121

From: Ashley Chilling <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 10:36 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

With all the talk of a budget crisis, these are expensive pieces of technology that are not proven to be effective. Let's not put out valuable city dollars on foolish endeavors. (Especially when our officers are not even responding quickly to called in reports of gun shots. What guarantees do we have that they will listen to the automated inaccurate machines?)

There are much higher priority causes such as housing our unhoused neighbors, fixing transit, improving bike and walking paths (to name a few) to spend our limited budget on. Let us think critically about what is actually useful and what is being sold to us at a high high price.

Thank you,

A concerned Capitol Hill citizen

Ashley Chilling

ashley@chilling.info

1713C 14th Ave

Seattle , Washington 98122

From: Lee Nadolski <lee.nadolski@gmail.com>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 9:08 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: SPD Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

To whom it may concern,

I would like SPD and those responsible for approving the use of CCTV, AGLS, and RTCC to reconsider using these technologies in Seattle.

These technologies have been proven to be ineffective in several other US cities and have the potential to cause a disproportionate amount of harm in marginalized communities.

Regards,

Lee Edwin Nadolski

From: Ana María Campoy <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 8:42 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

The city owes the community true commitment to the safety, equity, and dignity of all its residents— especially those of historically harmed by law enforcement and systemic racism. This technology is not the answer. It is an irresponsible waste of money. Our communities want and need care and services, not surveillance.

Ana María Campoy

campoy.anamaria@gmail.com

5442 Fauntleroy Way SW, Unit B

Seattle, Washington 98136

From: Flora Wright <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 7:48 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Acoustic Gunshot Technology Increases Biased policing

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of acoustic gunshot technology. ShotSpotter is proven to increase biased policing! 2024 data analysis of AGLS sensor locations revealed that nearly 70% of people who live in a neighborhood with at least one ShotSpotter sensor identified as Black or Latino. The MacArthur Justice Center just filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago claiming the AGLS system led to unfounded charges against Black and Hispanic defendants. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is currently asking the Department of Justice to review if Shotspotter is being selectively deployed to justify the over-policing of mainly Black neighborhoods.

Technology like Shotspotter with high false positives leads to false arrests and a sharp increase in policing in already over-policed neighborhoods, creating many unnecessary contacts between police and residents. AGLS technology like Shotspotter has also failed to result in any evidence of a gun crime from 90% (in Chicago) to 97% (in Atlanta) of the time. In a study of 68 cities, it was found that "[AGLS] has no significant impact on firearm-related arrest outcomes." Mayor Harrell's administration has argued that combining CCTV with AGLS will improve its effectiveness, but a partially randomized experiment on the effectiveness of AGLS and CCTV published in Springer Link in 2018 showed no significant increase in the number of confirmed shootings after combining this technology. The City of Chicago also rolled out AGLS and CCTV technology together, and still canceled their contract with ShotSpotter's manufacturer this month.

The City Council has already approved \$1.5 million for the project, however it is important to note that surveillance companies are trending towards subscription-based pricing, causing the true long-term cost of these systems to be uncertain for taxpayers. AGLS alone cost the City of Chicago \$50 million dollars over 6 years. Taxpayers in Seattle don't want our money spent on ineffective surveillance technology from companies that prey on communities struggling with violence. We don't want scarce city funds to be wasted instead of going to programs that actually are actually evidence-based and reduce violence.

Once again, this technology is a threat to equitable public safety in Seattle as Black, Indigenous, and People of Color are already subject to disproportionate rates of violence by SPD, even after over a decade under a consent decree. The Mayor and SPD have rushed through the Surveillance Impact Report process, giving the public less than 30 days to provide public comment and in the process sidelining the neighborhood

communities that would be affected by the instillation of this surveillance technology, which have disproportionately high numbers of people of color relative to other parts of the city.

Listen to your constituents and do not move forward with a pilot project that implements AGLS, CCTV cameras, or Real Time Crime Center software in Seattle!

Flora Wright

floramaywright@gmail.com

229 29TH AVE E

Seattle, WA, Washington 98112

From: Anna Reed <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 8:27 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Anna Reed

annarosereed@gmail.com

2027 23rd Ave E

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Karen Hansen <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 2:46 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences. The risk it that it would further target people of color who need to feel they are not being targeted and are able to build trust in our police protection for themselves as well as others.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. I also support promoting more gun buyback programs, let's get more education about guns and the dangers in owning them out to the people who need to feel safe in better ways.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.

Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Instead fund and train a police keeping force that is a guardian of public safety rather than a threat to some. We also need a bigger force that can implement this public safety arena for all.

Karen Hansen

karenhansenmsw@gmail.com

10231 Radford Ave NW

Seattle, Washington 98177

From: Rebecca Deutsch <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 2:13 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is limiting the comment period from February 5th to February 29th, giving people fewer than 30 days to comment on all 3 technologies. The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending in just 2 weeks, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Rebecca Deutsch

rdeutsch@gmail.com

722 12th Ave E

Seattle , Washington 98102

From: Charlie Shih <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 12:15 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Violence Reduction Solutions NOT false surveillance technology!

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Charlie Shih

charliebitmyfinger102@gmail.com

1340 44th AVE SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: Charlie Richter <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 6:49 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose AGLT, CCTV, and RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident I am concerned that the city is trying to rush the Surveillance Impact Report process.

The portion of the SIR reports that are intended for the city to site outside agencies, experts, or documents are almost completely blank.

The city is limiting the comment period from February 5th to February 29th, giving people fewer than 30 days to comment on all 3 technologies. The city is trying to rush through this massive increase in surveillance and police-spending in just 2 weeks, after announcing both a hiring freeze for everyone other than cops, and that all RFPs over \$1M will be reviewed.

This is a sham process and the public is not being given ample opportunity to weigh in.

Charlie Richter

charlierichter97@gmail.com

1020 NE 63rd St Unit 613

Seattle, Washington 98115

From: Lauren Tozzi <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 9:51 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Lauren Tozzi

lrntozzi2@gmail.com

4648 Sunnyside Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98103

From: Avery Swearer <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 4:19 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Avery Swearer

avery.swearer@gmail.com

12304 Pinehurst Way NE

Seattle, Washington 98125

From: Tula Kurashige <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 2:52 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Stop Dangerous Surveillance Tech

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the attempt of the city to procure dangerous surveillance technology

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Tula Kurashige

tulakurashige@gmail.com

12323 NE 97th St, Unit A

Kirkland, Washington 98033

From: Meilani Mandery <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 11:21 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident in the Chinatown-International District and I am very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies. The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

In the Chinatown-International District, we do not need more cameras or police. Do not let conservative voices claim they speak for my neighborhood.

Meilani Mandery

meilanimandery@gmail.com

705 S. Weller St

Seattle, Washington 98104

From: Alice Friedman <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 10:01 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support Real Solutions NOT false surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to try and procure acoustic gunshot technology, CCTV, and RTCC.

We must protect privacy.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.

Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Alice Friedman

alicef.54@gmail.com

3018 NW 58th St

Seattle, Washington 98107

From: Mary OConnor <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 9:59 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Mary OConnor

49.mary@gmail.com

1440 NW 64th St

Seattle, Washington 98107

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 6:18 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney

camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com

10741 Dayton Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

From: Carolyn Akinbami <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 8:47 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No Surveillance Tech - it's ripe for abuse

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to rush through 3 surveillance technologies. This is disturbing and indicates that the city was hoping that Seattle residents wouldn't notice.

Law enforcement agencies have a longer history of mis-using and abusing CCTV

In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Carolyn Akinbami

carolyn.akinbami@gmail.com

716 17th Ave E

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Reilly Rosbotham <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 1:51 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Surveillance Technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and very concerned that the city is trying to rush through the procurement of multiple surveillance technologies.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance, violate people's civil rights, and lead to further disinvestment in communities by eating up scarce public money.

Reilly Rosbotham

reillyrosbotham@gmail.com

7111 Linden Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98103

From: S Kessler <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 12:18 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology. Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

S Kessler

kessler124@gmail.com

9506 Ravenna Ave NE

Seattle, Washington 98115

From: Veronica Martinez <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 5:07 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Veronica Martinez

ronniemariee4@gmail.com

1729 Boylston Ave

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Alley Greymond <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 12:00 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Alley Greymond

intentionalalley@gmail.com

7 HARRISON ST APT 4

SEATTLE, Washington 98109

From: Charlie Shih <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2024 7:33 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTC- invest in community resources and evidence based equitable solutions

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Charlie Shih

charliebitmyfinger102@gmail.com

1340 44th AVE SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: mm.jaytileke@yahoo.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 9:18 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.

Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

mm.jayetileke@yahoo.com

3400 S. Main St.

Santa Ana , California 92707

From: River Talt <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2024 9:36 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

River Talt

peytontalt@gmail.com

2100S 260th St Apt C202

Des Moines, Washington 98198

From: baileydisher@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 10:59 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

baileydisher@gmail.com

8745 Hamlet Ave S

Seattle, Washington 98118

From: Lauren Kay <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2024 10:07 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - Reject massive surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC softwares, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Lauren Kay

smarn@umich.edu

5505 15th Ave NE

Seattle , Washington 98105

From: Ryan Paul <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 4:08 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: RTCC software is a threat to free speech rights

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,
RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Ryan Paul

canadian1der@msn.com

6760 Division Ave NW

SEATTLE, Washington 98117

From: Terri Cole <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, February 23, 2024 4:19 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No to RTCC!

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's plans to procure RTCC. There is NO data to show a positive return on investment. Worse, these technologies put our sanctuary city status at risk! The assault on reproductive health care, for example, is challenging enough without unintended consequences of these technologies and collection of data for people seeking abortion care at risk, especially those from other states.

And, I'm terribly concerned about sufficient data protections. Can you assure residents that no data will be captured that can then be manipulated to expose sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation?

Lastly, beyond obvious concerns about unintended impacts on vulnerable communities, what about good governance over how we spend taxpayer dollars. 1.5 million proposed is for a pilot, with no public review before scaling. Are you looking at the data? Chicago just published their very expensive 50 million dollar failed experiment with SpotShotter. Why would Seattle go down a road tried by Chicago, and after 30 million of taxpayer money invested, determined to stop using the technology due to adverse effects.

[https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/shotspotter-report-cook-county-states-attorney-kim-](https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/shotspotter-report-cook-county-states-attorney-kim-foxx/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20report%2C%20which%20the%20Cook%20County,92%25%20of%20shooting%20incidents%20are%20unrelated%20to%20ShotSpotter.)

[foxx/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20report%2C%20which%20the%20Cook%20County,92%25%20of%20shooting%20incidents%20are%20unrelated%20to%20ShotSpotter.](https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/shotspotter-report-cook-county-states-attorney-kim-foxx/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20report%2C%20which%20the%20Cook%20County,92%25%20of%20shooting%20incidents%20are%20unrelated%20to%20ShotSpotter.)

Have you reviewed data on better investments to achieve true public safety? For example, from the CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/YV-Prevention-Resource_508.pdf

I'm suspicious because of the shortened time for public engagement, education, and comment. I'm concerned because there is an absence of data being used to justify the spend. I'm concerned because the initial 1.5 million would go to software companies vs alternative community based programs that have far better outcomes.

Please get truly educated on cost vs outcomes vs unintended impacts. I know that this direction is a great "sound bite" for voters, but is it really a good use of funds? I have seen no data to support and expect my city council to make informed decisions.

Terri Cole

terrircole@outlook.com

8319 Jones Avenue Northwest
Seattle, Washington 98117

From: Jackie Makdah <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2024 11:46 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.

Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Jackie Makdah

jackiemakdah7@gmail.com

316 13th Ave E, Apt 403, Apt 403

Seattle, Washington 98102

From: Fiona Smith <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2024 2:28 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: RTCC software is a threat to free speech rights

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

My name is Fiona Smith and I am writing as a concerned citizen to implore you to reject the implementation of RTCC software in Seattle.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Fiona Smith

fiona.e.smith18@gmail.com

15250 NW Oak Hills Drive

Beaverton, Oregon 97006

From: Abigail Santiago <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 8:55 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

These technologies will NOT make our communities safer. In fact, this will only create greater tensions among our community. If you want to make the city safer, try investing this money into community solutions that have proved to increase safety, not this poorly documented technology.

Abigail Santiago

abigailsanti@gmail.com

1105 Spring St

Seattle, Washington 98104

From: jporak@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 7:31 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

jporak@gmail.com

32926 19th PI S Apt E204

Federal Way, Washington 98003

From: Susan Souders <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 9:03 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

Susan Souders

anaphasia@gmail.com

332 NE 51st St

Seattle, Washington 98105

From: Rebekah Gardea <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 10:58 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC **CAUTION: External Email**

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and representative from a statewide legal aid organization, and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance. In a climate where the public's relationship to the police is essential to restoring our City's sense of safety, we need to find solutions that bridge gaps between police and community. The at issue technology will primarily be deployed in Seattle's poorest and most ethnically diverse neighborhoods. Our members worry this implementation will contribute to the over-policing of these communities, which will only further their perceived stigmatization and ostracization from our officers. We already have data on which areas of the City are most at risk of gun violence; the next step is to work with—not against—those communities to build a solution that supports us all. Additionally, funding for surveillance technologies in the proposed budget would be fiscally irresponsible when we could better allocate that funding to addressing the root cause of crime -- which is poverty.

Rebekah Gardea
rebekah@qlawfoundation.org
400 E Pine St. Suite 225
Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Lydia Simpson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 11:46 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

These systems will continue to perpetuate racialized harm and harm against those experiencing homelessness and poverty. Our city must redirect these resources to supporting community-led initiatives that center the voices of those most harmed.

Lydia Simpson

lydiasimpson29@gmail.com

556 Prospect St.

Seattle, Washington 98109

From: Matthew Laun <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 2:03 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Matthew Laun

mwlaun4@gmail.com

1415 E John St Apt 1

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Vyom Raval <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 2:10 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: IMPORTANT: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Vyom Raval

vyomr22@gmail.com

828 NE 66TH ST, E406

SEATTLE, Washington 98115

From: Beth Quintana <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 5:58 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose increased surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a concerned citizen.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Surveillance technology does NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”

A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts and dropping quickly as the distance from cameras increased.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of license plates recorded by Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

Beth Quintana

quintanamama@gmail.com

10703 Interlake Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

From: Abigail Santiago <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 8:18 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

Abigail Santiago

abigailsanti@gmail.com

1105 Spring Street, Apt 504

Seattle, Washington 98104

From: Grace Chai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 8:43 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Surveillance is not safety - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I write with great concern about the city's attempt to procure CCTV cameras, Acoustic Gun Location System (AGLS), and Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) software.

CCTV technology is has no documented effect on violent crime and violates our civil liberties.

The only study SPD cites - a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer.

A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts.

Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved.

No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates.

CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties

The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled..."

The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone."

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

The companies selling these technologies prey on communities struggling with the very real problem of gun violence by claiming to have a solution. Their technologies, however, do not decrease gun violence or improve public safety. Instead they increase surveillance,

violate people's civil rights, and eat up scarce public money, preventing programs that actually reduce violence from getting funded and continuing disinvestment in communities. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally encourage police restraint and accountability. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Grace Chai

gchai123@gmail.com

6504 28th Avenue South

Seattle, Washington 98108

From: Shelby Branam <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 10:27 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC software is a waste of money and causes harm

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,
RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

This is a waste of resources and money, with very little evidence of benefit and much evidence of harm. Please do not let this go through.

Shelby Branam

shelby.branam@gmail.com

903 9th Ave Apt 57

Seattle, Washington 98104

From: Lisa Niemann <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 10:45 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, work and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Lisa Niemann

lisanmn@gmail.com

3208 S Hanford St

Seattle, Washington 98144

From: Blue Wright <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 10:53 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Are those in charge of Seattle corrupt, or merely incompetent?

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Bothell resident who works downtown and I oppose the use of any surveillance tech.

Police have been caught panning cameras away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. They repeatedly lie, refuse to release exculpatory evidence for defendants, and refuse to release damning evidence of their own violence.

Police use surveillance techniques routinely to manufacture excuses to increase policing in marginalized communities--especially with proven useless tech like ShotSpotter. If you see this going any other way, you're either corrupt or incompetent. So which is it? Are you corrupt? or are you merely incompetent? May God have mercy on your souls.

Blue

Blue Wright

actionnetwork@blue-industries.net

10202 185th st

bothell, Washington 98011

From: Shane Waletzko <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 11:06 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Shane Waletzko

shanew@stgpresents.org

3429 Beacon Ave S, Unit A

Seattle, Washington 98144

From: caleyshemc@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 11:52 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

caleyshemc@gmail.com

937 NW 59th St

Seattle, Washington 98107

From: jason walsh <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 12:48 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - Reject massive surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC softwares, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

The data does not support this decision, and in spite of this, your office moves forward with the recommendation to adopt as part of a suite of surveillance technologies to "improve public safety". Such action, in the face of counterfactual evidence, smacks of pure political pandering, a waste of public funds and trust, and further oppression of marginalized communities in Seattle.

No on RTCC.

Jason

jason walsh

mr_brownshoes@yahoo.com

4709 50th ave s

seattle, Washington 98118

From: Kolby Rowland <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 4:59 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Kolby Rowland

kolby.rowland@gmail.com

1833 13th Ave, APT 106

Seattle, WA, Washington 98122

From: Lee Swedin <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2024 5:47 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Lee Swedin

swdn@protonmail.com

4731 46th Ave NE

Seattle, Washington 98105

From: Jill Alles <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2024 9:10 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

From: Mason Friedman <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 1, 2024 9:11 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC. RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Mason Friedman

Mason.friedman39@gmail.com

3655 S Spokane St

Seattle, Washington 98144

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Saturday, March 2, 2024 3:47 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2024 9:45 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.

Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Jill Alles

jill_aubry@hotmail.com

622 38th Ave

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Jill Alles <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2024 9:10 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Jill Alles

jill_aubry@hotmail.com

622 38th Ave

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Michael Mellini <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2024 8:43 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: RTCC software is a threat to free speech rights

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Michael Mellini

michael.mellini@gmail.com

535 16th Ave E

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Thomas Moriarty <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 4, 2024 12:16 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - Reject massive surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC softwares, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Thomas Moriarty

Orcrist11122@yahoo.com

2124 California Ave. SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: William Bassett <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 29, 2024 10:53 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Opposing Real Time Crime Center

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident writing to oppose RTCC systems. You all say you want to "listen to the community." Well, "the community" is in overwhelming opposition to this technology.

We have seen how it is deployed in other cities, only to be canceled later. Why? Because it doesn't work and it costs millions of dollars!

The fact that the city is pursuing this when we already know that it won't help is ridiculous.

I can't stomach the thought of my taxpayer money going towards this ineffective technology. If you want to reduce crime, invest in our communities, not the police. Pursue violence reduction programs.

As you know, a huge budget shortfall is coming up. Please stop pursuing this technology which is proven to not stop, reduce, or help solve crime, and save some money.

William Bassett

bassettwc@gmail.com

1720 E Denny Way, Apt 210

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Adaline McCormick <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2024 2:02 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Adaline McCormick

adaline2000@gmail.com

10612 16th Ave Ct. S.

Tacoma, Washington 98444

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 6, 2024 10:34 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Support real solutions NOT surveillance technology

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the city's attempt to procure surveillance technology.

Gun violence is an issue of utmost seriousness in Seattle and deserves a significant and urgent response. However, these policing technologies have not lived up to their sales pitches of preventing and reducing gun violence, and RTCC software would vastly expand police surveillance in Seattle with many disturbing consequences.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 7, 2024 1:49 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Saturday, March 9, 2024 12:26 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - threatens those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care in Washington State

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney

camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com

10741 Dayton Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Saturday, March 9, 2024 2:55 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Jordyn Caven <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 4:47 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - poses risks to those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology, I am a Seattle resident and I am very concerned about the city's attempt to procure RTCC software.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Jordyn Caven

jordyncavenhealing@hotmail.com

21 Lasher st

Stevenson , Washington 98648

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2024 12:17 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney
camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com
10741 Dayton Ave N
Seattle, Washington 98133

▪

From: Camille Baldwin-Bonney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 10:06 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO RTCC software - It puts those coming to Seattle to seek abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk of criminalization

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras and automated license plate readers (ALPRs).

Fusus (the software the city is attempting to procure) recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to view camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner and turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs)

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal.

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Camille Baldwin-Bonney

camillebaldwinbonney@gmail.com

10741 Dayton Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

From: Vickie Woo <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 12:45 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems. You could rebut my opposition with the old standby of, "well, if you're innocent you've got nothing to worry about." Yet how many times have innocent people been wrongly apprehended, wrongly accused, wrongly convicted, wrongly imprisoned?

You think this will solve our crime problems? Why aren't we investing in solutions that address the actual source vs the "symptoms?" Why aren't we investing in drug treatment programs? More affordable housing? Mental health programs? The list is sadly endless.

But instead, you're considering/approving a method of simply watching us. And how often has data been compromised? And this surveillance tool hasn't even been vetted yet? Isn't that in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance? Why hasn't this been discussed with community leaders? Where's the SRI?

Thank you for reading my comments.

Vickie Woo

98121

Vickie Woo

vwoo3536@gmail.com

2440 Western Avenue, Apt 803

Seattle, Washington 98121

From: Doug Cole <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2024 12:22 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Doug Cole
dougcole@gmail.com
1103 NW 56th St
Seattle, Washington 98107

▣

From: Kathleen Anderson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2024 6:48 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration of this issue.

Kathleen Anderson
klada@comcast.net
9206 17th Ave. N.E.
Seattle, Washington 98115

From: Lauren Achee <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 15, 2024 8:01 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Lauren Achee

laurenachee2@gmail.com

315 23RD AVE E

Seattle, Washington 98112

From: Jasz Petty <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Saturday, March 16, 2024 11:22 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Jasz Petty

jazzyspazzo@gmail.com

8450 25th Ave SW, Unit A

Seattle, Washington 98106

▪

▪

From: Vickie Woo <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, March 17, 2024 8:32 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am vehemently opposed to the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

Enough already. There are many other priorities that need your attention and budget \$\$ much more than surveillance technology and hardware. We have hungry residents, homeless residents, residents with substance use disorder, a dying downtown, and on and on and on.

Thank you for reading my comments.

Vickie Woo
98121

Vickie Woo
vwoo3536@gmail.com
2440 Western Avenue, Apt 803
Seattle, Washington 98121

▪

From: Kenny Phan <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, March 17, 2024 10:24 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

Kenny Phan
ktphan0@gmail.com
3642 33rd Ave S APT #A306
Seattle, Washington 98144

▪

From: Teresa Sweeney <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, March 17, 2024 11:03 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Teresa Sweeney

teresasweeney.phd@gmail.com

2536 1st Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98109

From: Elizabeth Carley <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 11:15 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC software is a threat to free speech rights

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Please do not fund these technologies and instead focus on funding location community organizations doing important and effective work to increase resources in these communities and decrease violence. Let's invest in our communities instead of surveilling them.

Elizabeth Carley
elizabeth.carley@gmail.com
8317 54th Ave. S.
SEATTLE, Washington 98118

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 2:17 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Rachel Seligman <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2024 9:06 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Rachel Seligman

▫

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2024 10:30 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▫

From: Brian Schwartz <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 9:48 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Brian Schwartz

schwazroda@gmail.com

500 W Mercer St

Seattle, Washington 98119

▪

From: Sameen Boparai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 11:43 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Sameen Boparai

sameenboparai@gmail.com

400 NE 45th St. Apt. 208

Seattle, Washington 98105

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 12:06 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Vicki McMullin <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 12:28 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC software - poses risks to those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very concerned about the city's attempt to procure RTCC software.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Vicki McMullin
vkimcm@gmail.com
112 N 49th St
Seattle, Washington 98103

▪

From: Terri Pollock <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 1:13 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I STRONGLY oppose RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.

In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop."

In a large meta-analysis of ShotSpotter the authors found no significant impacts on arrest outcomes.

Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.

The city has much better, cost-effective, and equitable ways to reduce violence in communities.

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Terri Pollock

polterann@gmail.com

125 NE 51st Street

Seattle, Washington 98105

▪

From: Maureen Brinck-Lund <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2024 3:24 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and a naturalized citizen of USA, and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor. ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Thank you. Together we can build a trusting community. Build trust not surveillance.

Maureen Brinck-Lund

molundia@gmail.com

7009 35th Ave. NW

Seattle, Washington 98117

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2024 9:29 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Terri Cole <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2024 2:40 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: I oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a long-time Seattle resident and have been following the effectiveness of "public safety" approaches Seattle employs and the effectiveness of tax-payer dollars employed. I am concerned that we are using money in effective vs ineffective ways.

Data clearly shows that RTCC approaches are costly and ineffective and have the potential to violate civil rights. Crucially, this approach does not afford communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

I look for public servants to use data to determine how best to employ tax-payer dollars and am dismayed that when it comes to public safety, that is not done. Recruiting dollars did not return results, and I fear that the purchase, even for a pilot, of RTCC technology will align with poor results as seen elsewhere (assume you do your research, but in case not, reference Cook County IL results that have been published) and, worse, will further degrade police response time and increase harmful SPD actions in overpoliced communities.

Please use our taxpayer dollars wisely and leverage data.

Terri Cole
terrircole@outlook.com
8319 Jones Avenue Northwest
Seattle, Washington 98117

From: Vickie Woo <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2024 6:24 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident at 98121 and I am deeply concerned about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

I'm sure others have told you that RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods. Let's be clear, this will not improve public safety.

Would we not be better served to fund programs to address mental health, drug addiction, youth programs, homelessness, hunger/food insecurity, etc.? What kind of city do we want to be?

Thank you for reading my comments.

Vickie Woo
ywoo3536@gmail.com
2440 Western Avenue, Apt 803
Seattle, Washington 98121

▫

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2024 12:11 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose Dangerous Tech - Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very worried about the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC software, like Fusus, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police. When an owner chooses to share real time access, in many cases the police can access footage without a warrant or notification to the owner. There are typically two options a municipality can pursue: (1) private citizens register their cameras on the system, and (2) the cameras of private citizens can be integrated into the system. With option (1) people have sometimes been provided the means to investigate or even to manage how and when the cameras may be accessed by law enforcement. In either case, this poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Saturday, March 30, 2024 4:47 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - Reject massive surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC softwares, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

Francine Lai
francinelai.1985@gmail.com
2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl
Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Barbara Fristoe <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 7:31 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Barbara Fristoe

bfristoe@mac.com

3418 16th Ave S

Seattle , Washington 98144

▪

From: Geneva Griswold <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Monday, April 1, 2024 9:11 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC threatens Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am deeply concerned over the city's attempt to procure RTCC.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an ALPRs which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Geneva Griswold
geneva.griswold@gmail.com
5232 42nd Ave SW
Seattle, Washington 98136

▪

From: Holly Prairie <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 11:20 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: RTCC software is a threat to free speech rights

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. The data was requested from Amazon Ring, a company that has a history of turning over footage to Law Enforcement without a warrant and blatant disregard for user privacy.

In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used CCTV along with facial recognition technology to surveil Black Lives Matter protesters.

Holly Prairie
hollydance@gmail.com
825 B NE 67th St
Seattle, Washington 98115

▪

From: alexakunitsugu@hotmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 11:20 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

alexakunitsugu@hotmail.com

7710 22 Ave NE

Seattle , Washington 98115

▪

From: LeTania Severe <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2024 7:02 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - Reject massive surveillance

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC!

RTCC software, such as Fusus, has the potential to violate civil rights and liberties and blocks communities from determining what surveillance is used in their neighborhoods.

RTCC softwares, recruit a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions which normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.

This poses serious safety concerns for all community members, especially those already experiencing police violence and surveillance.

LeTania Severe
le4severe@gmail.com
449 24th Ave E
Seattle, Washington 98112

▪

From: Linda Strout <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2024 2:01 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Linda Strout

lsstrout@gmail.com

11200 Greenwood Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98133

▪

From: Kathleen Anderson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2024 4:51 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Thank you for your thoughtful consideration in opposing RTCC.

Kathleen Anderson
klada@comcast.net
9206 17th Ave. N.E.
Seattle, Washington 98115

▫

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

alandaugherty@gmail.com

2929 1st Ave

Seattle, Washington 98121

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2024 12:32 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works,

and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

▪

From: Linda Strout <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2024 6:16 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - poses risks to those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very concerned about the city's attempt to procure RTCC software.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where

someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Linda Strout

lsstrout@gmail.com

11200 Greenwood Ave N

Seattle , Washington 98133

From: Cassandra Sanderson <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 8:50 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems. Our Police Force is compromised with MAGA Q Anon nuts, how can you give them free reign into our lives?

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Cassandra Sanderson

cassevolved@gmail.com

15108 SE 141st Plalce

Renton, Washington 98059

▪

From: Mary Pat DiLeva <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 9:17 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Mary Pat DiLeva
mpd12000@hotmail.com
712 15th Ave
Seattle, Washington 98122

▪

From: Bonnie Feldberg <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2024 11:28 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: Oppose RTCC

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose Real Time Crime Center systems.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight over the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little if any oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. SPD already has a poor track record on preventing their officers from abusing law enforcement data.

RTCC software like Fusus is always adding new AI object recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance capabilities would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Bonnie Feldberg

bsf1217@gmail.com

930 Martin Luther King Jr Way

Seattle, Washington 98122

From: Thomas Moriarty <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2024 9:45 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - poses risks to those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I am very concerned about the city's attempt to procure RTCC software.

These technologies undercut Seattle's values as a sanctuary city, putting undocumented people and people seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care at risk.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

We cannot ignore the threat to reproductive rights in the context of states across the country including neighboring Idaho adopting Texas-style abortion bounty hunter laws. We cannot protect those seeking healthcare in Washington state if we are unable to protect sensitive data.

This technology puts vulnerable populations -- those seeking abortion or gender-affirming care and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

The State of Texas has sought medical records of those who have left their home state where gender-affirming care is illegal for minors to access gender-affirming care, to seek treatment in Washington, where it is legal. With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

Thomas Moriarty
orcrist11122@gmail.com
2124 California Ave. SW
Seattle, Washington 98116

From: Thomas Moriarty <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>
Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2024 9:44 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No RTCC - this puts vulnerable communities at risk

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I oppose RTCC.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into a license plate reader which gathers enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to

protect - abortion seekers and undocumented people - at a much higher threat of police surveillance and criminalization.

Thomas Moriarty

orcrist11122@gmail.com

2124 California Ave. SW

Seattle, Washington 98116

From: mcgrathjill40@gmail.com <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Monday, April 15, 2024 4:28 PM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: No RTCC software - undermines our Seattle values as a sanctuary city

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a Seattle resident and I oppose the procurement of RTCC software

With RTCC software - third party's could access data directly from the vendor.

ICE has a history of violating local sanctuary city laws and with RTCC software Seattle cannot maintain oversight over the data collected. In some cases Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly.

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. This puts communities that Seattle seeks to protect at risk.

mcgrathjill40@gmail.com

6743 Palatine Ave N

Seattle, Washington 98103

▪

From: Francine Lai <noreply@adv.actionnetwork.org>

Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2024 11:00 AM

To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO Real Time Crime Center Software - Violates Civil Liberties

CAUTION: External Email

Seattle Information Technology,

I am a resident of Seattle and I oppose RTCC. The potential for civil liberty violations are chilling.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.

Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights

Francine Lai

francinelai.1985@gmail.com

2737 Nw Pine Cone Pl

Issaquah, Washington 98027

2024 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department

Overview

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security, and access controls for data that is gathered through Seattle Police Department's (SPD) Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC). All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

1.0 Technology Description

Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one “pane of glass” (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

2.0 Purpose

The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and citizen safety, and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects – enabling quicker aide and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

3.0 Data Collection and Use

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

5.0 Access & Security

Access

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems, [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

Security

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

Retention period for data stored in RTCC software storage will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will get saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors will be allowed as needed.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by [SPD Policy 12.055](#). This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

7.0 Equity Concerns

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.