



# CITY OF SEATTLE

## City Council

### Agenda

Tuesday, May 17, 2022

2:00 PM

Remote Meeting. Call 253-215-8782; Meeting ID: 586 416 9164; or  
Seattle Channel online.

Debora Juarez, Council President

Lisa Herbold, Member

Andrew J. Lewis, Member

Tammy J. Morales, Member

Teresa Mosqueda, Member

Sara Nelson, Member

Alex Pedersen, Member


Kshama Sawant, Member

Dan Strauss, Member

Chair Info: 206-684-8805; [Debora.Juarez@seattle.gov](mailto:Debora.Juarez@seattle.gov)

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206-684-8888 (TTY Relay 7-1-1), email [CouncilAgenda@Seattle.gov](mailto:CouncilAgenda@Seattle.gov), or visit  
<http://seattle.gov/cityclerk/accommodations>.



# CITY OF SEATTLE

## City Council Agenda

**May 17, 2022 - 2:00 PM**

### **Meeting Location:**

Remote Meeting. Call 253-215-8782; Meeting ID: 586 416 9164; or Seattle Channel online.

### **Committee Website:**

<http://www.seattle.gov/council>

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*Pursuant to Washington State Governor's Proclamation No. 20-28.15 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 8402, this public meeting will be held remotely. Meeting participation is limited to access by the telephone number provided on the meeting agenda, and the meeting is accessible via telephone and Seattle Channel online.*

Register online to speak during the Public Comment period at the 2:00 p.m. City Council meeting at <http://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment>.

Online registration to speak at the City Council meeting will begin two hours before the 2:00 p.m. meeting start time, and registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair.

Submit written comments to all Councilmembers at [Council@seattle.gov](mailto:Council@seattle.gov)  
Sign-up to provide Public Comment at the meeting at <http://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment>

Watch live streaming video of the meeting at <http://www.seattle.gov/council/watch-council-live>

Listen to the meeting by calling the Council Chamber Listen Line at 253-215-8782 Meeting ID: 586 416 9164  
One Tap Mobile No. US: +12532158782,,5864169164#

### **A. CALL TO ORDER**

### **B. ROLL CALL**

### **C. PRESENTATIONS**

**D. ADOPTION OF INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL CALENDAR:**

Introduction and referral to Council committees of Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt), and Clerk Files (CF) for committee recommendation.

[IRC 349](#)

May 17, 2022

**Attachments:** [Introduction and Referral Calendar](#)

**E. APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR**

*The Consent Calendar consists of routine items. A Councilmember may request that an item be removed from the Consent Calendar and placed on the regular agenda.*

**Journal:**

[Min 379](#)

May 10, 2022

**Attachments:** [Minutes](#)

**Bills:**

[CB 120326](#)

AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of May 2, 2022 through May 6, 2022 and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

**Resolution:****Appointments:****LAND USE COMMITTEE:**

[Appt 02196](#)

Appointment of Matt Aalfs as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02197](#) Appointment of Erica Bush as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02198](#) Appointment of Puja Shaw as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02199](#) Appointment of Vinita Sidhu as Chair, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2023.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02200](#) Reappointment of Elizabeth Conner as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)



[Appt 02201](#) Appointment of Joseph Sisneros as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2023.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02202](#) Appointment of Lia Hall as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02203](#) Appointment of Hao Liang as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02204](#) Appointment of Rebecca B. Neumann as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**

**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02205](#) Appointment of Falisha Kurji as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2025.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm as amended the Appointment (Appt).**  
**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**  
**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

[Appt 02207](#) Reappointment of Joshua N. Morris as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2025.

**The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).**  
**In Favor: 5 - Strauss, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen**  
**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Appointment Packet](#)

## F. APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA

## G. PUBLIC COMMENT

*Members of the public may sign up to address the Council for up to 2 minutes on matters on this agenda; total time allotted to public comment at this meeting is 20 minutes.*

Register online to speak during the Public Comment period at the 2:00 p.m. City Council meeting at <http://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment>.

Online registration to speak at the City Council meeting will begin two hours before the 2:00 p.m. meeting start time, and registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair.

## H. COMMITTEE REPORTS

*Discussion and vote on Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt), and Clerk Files (CF).*

## **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND CITY LIGHT COMMITTEE:**

1. [CB 120307](#) AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Audio Recording Systems.

**The Committee recommends that City Council pass as amended the Council Bill (CB).**

**In Favor: 3 - Nelson, Herbold, Strauss**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Att 1 - 2021 SIR Audio Recording Systems](#)  
[Att 2 - 2021 SIR Audio Recording Systems Executive Overview](#)

**Supporting Documents:** [Summary and Fiscal Note](#)

2. [CB 120309](#) AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of IBM i2 iBase.

**The Committee recommends that City Council pass as amended the Council Bill (CB).**

**In Favor: 3 - Nelson, Herbold, Strauss**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Att 1 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software - IBM i2 iBase](#)  
[Att 2 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: IBM i2 iBase](#)

**Supporting Documents:** [Summary and Fiscal Note](#)

**GOVERNANCE, NATIVE COMMUNITIES, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS COMMITTEE:**

3. [Res 32051](#) A RESOLUTION revising certain General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; amending Rules III and V in Attachment 1 of Resolution 32029.

**The Committee recommends that City Council adopt as amended the Resolution (Res).**

**In Favor: 5 - Juarez, Pedersen, Mosqueda, Sawant, Strauss**

**Opposed: None**

**Attachments:** [Att 1 – General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council March 2022 v3](#)

[Att 1 Appx A - List of Non-Suspendible Rules](#)

**Supporting**

**Documents:**

[Summary and Fiscal Note](#)

[SUM Att A - Ex. of resolutions per proposed change to Rule V](#)

#### I. ADOPTION OF OTHER RESOLUTIONS

#### J. OTHER BUSINESS

#### K. ADJOURNMENT



Legislation Text

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**File #: IRC 349, Version: 1**

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May 17, 2022



## Introduction and Referral Calendar

List of proposed Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt) and Clerk Files (CF) to be introduced and referred to a City Council committee

<b>Record No.</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Committee Referral</b>
<b><u>By: Juarez</u></b>		
1. <a href="#">CB 120324</a>	AN ORDINANCE amending Ordinance 126490, which adopted the 2022 Budget; changing appropriations to various departments and budget control levels, and from various funds in the 2022 Budget; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts; all by a 3/4 vote of the City Council.	City Council
<b><u>By: Mosqueda</u></b>		
2. <a href="#">CB 120326</a>	AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of May 2, 2022 through May 6, 2022 and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.	City Council
<b><u>By: Nelson, Pedersen</u></b>		
3. <a href="#">CB 120327</a>	AN ORDINANCE relating to the City Light and Seattle Public Utilities Departments; temporarily removing the charge of interest on delinquent utility consumption and utilization accounts; superseding several sections under Title 21 that authorize and require the collection of interest on delinquent utility consumption and utilization accounts; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.	City Council
<b><u>By: Nelson, Pedersen</u></b>		
4. <a href="#">CB 120328</a>	AN ORDINANCE relating to the City Light Department; amending terms and conditions pertaining to the emergency bill assistance program and temporarily expanding access to assistance to certain eligible households for a limited time in response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19") emergency; and amending Section 21.49.042 of the Seattle Municipal Code.	City Council
<b><u>By: Nelson, Pedersen</u></b>		
5. <a href="#">CB 120329</a>	AN ORDINANCE relating to Seattle Public Utilities' Emergency Assistance Program; temporarily extending increased assistance related to COVID-induced customer delinquencies; and amending Section 21.76.065 of the Seattle Municipal Code.	City Council

**By: Pedersen**

6. [CB 120325](#) AN ORDINANCE relating to housing and displacement mitigation; expanding the information required for submission under the Rental Registration Inspection Ordinance for rental housing units; requiring submission of rental housing-related information; and amending Chapter 22.214 of the Seattle Municipal Code. Sustainability and Renters' Rights Committee

**By: Sawant**

7. [Appt 02211](#) Appointment of Eunice How as member, Green New Deal Oversight Board, for a term to April 30, 2025. Sustainability and Renters' Rights Committee

**By: Sawant**

8. [Appt 02212](#) Appointment of Nina A. Olivier as member, Green New Deal Oversight Board, for a term to April 30, 2025. Sustainability and Renters' Rights Committee

**By: Sawant**

9. [Appt 02213](#) Appointment of Hibo Sahal as member, Green New Deal Oversight Board, for a term to April 30, 2023. Sustainability and Renters' Rights Committee

**By: Sawant**

10. [Appt 02214](#) Appointment of Ken Workman as member, Green New Deal Oversight Board, for a term to April 30, 2023. Sustainability and Renters' Rights Committee



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Min 379, **Version:** 1

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May 10, 2022



# SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

600 Fourth Ave. 2nd Floor  
Seattle, WA 98104



## Journal of the Proceedings of the Seattle City Council

Tuesday, May 10, 2022

2:00 PM

Remote Meeting. Call 253-215-8782; Meeting ID: 586 416 9164; or  
Seattle Channel online.

### City Council

*Debora Juarez, Council President*

*Lisa Herbold, Member*

*Andrew J. Lewis, Member*

*Tammy J. Morales, Member*

*Teresa Mosqueda, Member*

*Sara Nelson, Member*

*Alex Pedersen, Member*

*Kshama Sawant, Member*

*Dan Strauss, Member*

Chair Info: 206-684-8805; [Debora.Juarez@seattle.gov](mailto:Debora.Juarez@seattle.gov)

*Pursuant to Washington State Governor's Proclamation No. 20-28.15 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 8402, this public meeting will be held remotely. Meeting participation is limited to access by the telephone number provided on the meeting agenda, and the meeting is accessible via telephone and Seattle Channel online.*

#### **A. CALL TO ORDER**

The City Council of The City of Seattle met remotely pursuant to Washington State Governor's Proclamation 20-28.15, and guidance provided by the Attorney General's Office, on May 10, 2022, pursuant to the provisions of the City Charter. The meeting was called to order at 2:01 p.m., with Council President Pro Tem Lewis presiding.

#### **B. ROLL CALL**

**The following Councilmembers were present and participating electronically:**

**Present:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Excused:** 1 - Juarez

#### **C. PRESENTATIONS**

Councilmember Mosqueda presented a Proclamation proclaiming the week of May 8 to May 14, 2022, to be Affordable Housing Week. The Council Rules were suspended to allow Councilmember Mosqueda to present the Proclamation, and to allow Chad Vaculin, of the Housing Development Consortium, to address the Council.

#### **D. ADOPTION OF INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL CALENDAR:**

[IRC 348](#)**May 10, 2022**ACTION 1:

Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt the proposed Introduction and Referral Calendar.

ACTION 2:

Motion was made by Councilmember Pedersen, duly seconded and carried, to amend the proposed Introduction and Referral Calendar by introducing Council Bills 120322 and 120323, and Resolution 32053, and by referring them to the Transportation and Seattle Public Utilities Committee.

Council Bill 120322, AN ORDINANCE relating to Seattle Public Utilities; authorizing the General Manager/CEO of Seattle Public Utilities to accept a non-exclusive easement within the Shilshole Bay Waterway, previously known as the Salmon Bay Waterway of the Lake Washington Ship Canal, from the Washington State Department of Natural Resources for a City-owned sanitary sewer line; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

Council Bill 120323 AN ORDINANCE relating to Seattle Public Utilities; accepting two deeds for real property acquired for the purpose of installing and operating ground water wells or waterworks to provide potable water in connection with the Highline Well Field project identified in the 1985 Seattle Comprehensive Regional Water Plan and situated in Section 16, Township 23 North, Range 4 East, King County, Washington; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts. Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt the proposed Introduction and Referral Calendar as amended.

Resolution 32053, A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval to construct, maintain, and operate private communication conduit under and across Latona Avenue Northeast, north of Northeast Northlake Way; as proposed by Dunn Lumber Company, as part of the construction of a new lumber warehouse in the Wallingford neighborhood.

ACTION 3:

Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt the proposed Introduction and Referral Calendar as amended.

**The Motion carried, and the Introduction & Referral Calendar (IRC) was adopted as amended by the following vote:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

**E. APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR**

Motion was made, duly seconded and carried, to adopt the Consent Calendar.

**Journal:**

- 1. [Min 378](#) **May 3, 2022**

**The item was adopted on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Minutes:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

**Bills:**

- 2. [CB 120321](#) **AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of April 25, 2022 through April 29, 2022 and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

**The item was passed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

**F. APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA**ACTION 1:

Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt the proposed Agenda.

ACTION 2:

Motion was made by Councilmember Sawant, duly seconded and carried, to amend the proposed Agenda by adding Resolution 32054 for consideration under Adoption of Other Resolutions.

Resolution 32054, A RESOLUTION in support of abortion rights and other reproductive rights, in opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court draft majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization; and urging state and federal elected officials to codify abortion rights and other reproductive rights.

ACTION 3:

Motion was made, duly seconded and carried, to adopt the Agenda as amended.

**G. PUBLIC COMMENT**

The following individuals addressed the Council:

Howard Gale  
Barbara Phinney  
Margot Stewart  
David Haines  
Michael Vitz-Wong  
Steve Horvath  
Emily McArthur  
Sonja Ponath  
Logan Swan  
Taylor Leatrice Werner  
Ellen Anderson  
Eva Whited  
Kevin Vitz-Wong  
Chantele Machado  
Leah Rutman  
Yvette Maganya

**H. COMMITTEE REPORTS**

**CITY COUNCIL:**

1. [Appt 02111](#) **Appointment of Steve Horvath as member, Community Involvement Commission, for a term to May 31, 2022.**

Motion was made and duly seconded to postpone indefinitely Appointment 02111.

**The Motion carried, and the Appointment (Appt) was postponed indefinitely by the following vote:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

2. [Appt 02146](#) **Reappointment of Steve Horvath as member, Community Involvement Commission, for a term to May 31, 2024.**

Motion was made and duly seconded to postpone indefinitely Appointment 02146.

**The Motion carried, and the Appointment (Appt) was postponed indefinitely by the following vote:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

**I. ADOPTION OF OTHER RESOLUTIONS**

3. [Res 32054](#) **A RESOLUTION in support of abortion rights and other reproductive rights, in opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court draft majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization; and urging state and federal elected officials to codify abortion rights and other reproductive rights.**

ACTION 1:

Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt Resolution 32054.

ACTION 2:

Motion was made by Councilmember Herbold, duly seconded and carried, to amend Resolution 32054, by amending the recitals, and Section 5, as shown in Attachment 1 to the Minutes.

ACTION 3:

Motion was made and duly seconded to adopt Resolution 32054 as amended.

**The Motion carried, and Resolution 32054 was adopted as amended by the following vote:**

**In Favor:** 8 - Herbold, Lewis, Morales, Mosqueda, Nelson, Pedersen, Sawant, Strauss

**Opposed:** None

## J. OTHER BUSINESS

Motion was made, duly seconded and carried, to excuse Councilmember Morales from the June 28, 2022 City Council meeting.

Motion was made, duly seconded and carried, to excuse Councilmember Strauss from the June 14, 2022 City Council meeting.

Motion was made, duly seconded and carried, to excuse Councilmember Sawant from the June 7 and 14, 2022 City Council meetings.

## K. ADJOURNMENT

There being no further business to come before the Council, the meeting was adjourned at 3:15 p.m.

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**Jodee Schwinn, Deputy City Clerk**

**Signed by me in Open Session, upon approval of the Council, on May 17, 2022.**

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**Debora Juarez, Council President of the City Council**

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**Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk**

**Att 1 - Action 2 of RES 32054**



Att 1 – Action 2 of RES 32054

**Effect:** This amendment would clarify language in the recitals and add an additional recital related to House Bill 1851 (passed in 2022) related to protection of access to abortion care. It would also specify that the Council intends to appropriate funding for organizations that deliver programs and services in support of abortion care and access.

1. Amend the recitals of RES 32054 as follows:

WHEREAS, on May 3, 2022, thousands gathered in cities across the United States, including in Seattle, to protest a leaked draft decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, which would overturn the landmark *Roe v. Wade* decision that has protected the freedom to seek an abortion since 1973; and

WHEREAS, laws restricting access to abortion disproportionately impact poor and working-class ~~((women))~~ people and ~~((women))~~ people of color, because ~~((wealthy))~~ wealthier ~~((women))~~ people have the resources to pay a private doctor exorbitant fees or travel to where quality reproductive healthcare is available; and

WHEREAS, historian Ruth Rosen explained in *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women’s Movement Changed America* that “Advocates of abortion reform estimated that close to one million women had illegal abortions annually before the procedure became legal in 1973, and they attributed some five thousand deaths directly to illegal abortions,” showing that throughout history, laws banning abortion do not stop them from happening ~~((, instead making them humiliating, unsafe, and even fatal))~~; and

\*\*\*

WHEREAS, patients in Washington state are hampered from accessing the full range of reproductive healthcare due to hospital consolidation, leading to almost 50 percent of Washington's hospital beds being in Catholic or otherwise religiously-affiliated facilities

where reproductive healthcare is limited ~~((and limitations are not required to be disclosed to patients))~~; and

WHEREAS, by passing SB 5602 in 2019, Washington became the only state in the nation to require hospitals to publicly disclose their reproductive healthcare policies on their websites and submit publicly available forms regarding ~~((access to))~~ the reproductive healthcare ~~((available by posting such information on their websites))~~ services available at their facilities; and

WHEREAS, HB 1851, passed in 2022, protected Washingtonians from criminalization for their reproductive healthcare decisions and pregnancy outcomes, confirmed that all qualified licensed providers in Washington can offer abortion care to their patients, and ensured that Washington law protects all Washingtonians' right to abortion care, regardless of gender or gender identity; and

WHEREAS, nonetheless many patients remain unaware that their healthcare provider will not provide them with the full range of healthcare options they may require, especially those in crisis requiring emergent care, and those traveling across state lines who may be unfamiliar with local health systems; and

WHEREAS, health care entities' restrictions, including discriminatory restrictions ~~((based in religious doctrine,))~~ should not hinder patient access to reproductive care; and

WHEREAS, the ~~((ACLU of Washington is supporting the))~~ Keep Our Care Act ~~((, which))~~ would prevent health entity consolidations from moving forward if they negatively impacted communities' access to affordable quality care, including reproductive, end-of-life, and gender affirming care; and

\*\*\*

2. Amend Section 5 of RES 32054 as follows:

Section 5. The Seattle City Council intends to appropriate City funds in a 2022 supplemental budget to fund expanded access to reproductive healthcare. These funds would be allocated to organizations that deliver programs and services in support of abortion care and access, such as the Northwest Abortion Access Fund and independent abortion clinics.



Legislation Text

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File #: CB 120326, Version: 1

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CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE \_\_\_\_\_

COUNCIL BILL \_\_\_\_\_

AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of May 2, 2022 through May 6, 2022 and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

**BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

Section 1. Payment of the sum of \$14,363,922.17 on PeopleSoft 9.2 mechanical warrants numbered 4100570284 - 4100572682 plus manual or cancellation issues for claims, e-payables of \$36,890.49 on PeopleSoft 9.2 9100011657 - 9100011696, and electronic financial transactions (EFT) in the amount of \$92,895,508.73 are presented to the City Council under RCW 42.24.180 and approved consistent with remaining appropriations in the current Budget as amended.

Section 2. RCW 35.32A.090(1) states, “There shall be no orders, authorizations, allowances, contracts or payments made or attempted to be made in excess of the expenditure allowances authorized in the final budget as adopted or modified as provided in this chapter, and any such attempted excess expenditure shall be void and shall never be the foundation of a claim against the city.”

Section 3. Any act consistent with the authority of this ordinance taken prior to its effective date is ratified and confirmed.

Section 4. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force 30 days after its approval by the Mayor, but if not approved and returned by the Mayor within ten days after presentation, it shall take effect as provided by

Seattle Municipal Code Section 1.04.020.

Passed by the City Council the 17th day of May, 2022, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this 17th day of May, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk

(Seal)



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02196, **Version:** 1


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Appointment of Matt Aalfs as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> Matt Aalfs		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> Seattle Design Commission		<b>Position Title:</b> Architect
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Appointment OR <input type="checkbox"/> Reappointment		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> mm/dd/yy.	<b>Term of Position: *</b> 3/1/2022 to 2/28/2024  <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> Greenlake	<b>Zip Code:</b> 98103	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<p>Matt is the founder and principal architect of BuildingWork, an architecture and design firm based in Seattle. Matt has over two decades of professional experience, specializing in the design of civic and community facilities, adaptive reuse projects, and historic preservation. Matt founded BuildingWork in 2016 in order to focus directly on work that supports the health of cities, the environment, and culture.</p> <p>Since 2000, Matt has served as a visiting lecturer and design studio critic with the University of Washington Department of Architecture. He has recently served as a Director for the King County Library System Foundation, and on Seattle’s ACT Theater Board of Directors. Matt earned a Master of Architecture from the University of Washington, and studied architecture in Rome, Italy, and at the California College of Arts. He received his B.A. in Art from the University of California, Santa Cruz and is an alum of the Urban Land Institute’s Center for Leadership.</p>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date:</b> 3/2/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

# BUILDINGWORK

architecture design preservation



## Matt Aalfs AIA, LEED AP

Principal-In-Charge, BuildingWork

BuildingWork's Founder and Principal Architect, Matt designs innovative and carefully detailed buildings that contribute to the communities and clients they serve. Matt has over two decades of professional experience, specializing in the design of civic and community facilities, adaptive reuse projects, and historic preservation. Matt founded BuildingWork in 2016 in order to focus directly on work that supports the health of cities, the environment, and culture.

Since 2000, Matt has served as a visiting lecturer and design studio critic with the University of Washington Department of Architecture. He has recently served as a Director for the King County Library System Foundation, and on Seattle's ACT Theater Board of Directors. Matt earned a Master of Architecture from the University of Washington, and studied architecture in Rome, Italy, and at the California College of Arts. He received his B.A. in Art from the University of California, Santa Cruz and is an alum of the Urban Land Institute's Center for Leadership.

## Representative Projects

### ADAPTIVE REUSE AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION

- **Town Hall Seattle**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, renovation, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of a Landmark 1916 church into a state-of-the-art performing arts and culture venue
- **Capitol Campus Buildings Restoration**, Olympia WA | Historic preservation, façade restoration, and roof replacement of the NRHP listed Capitol Court, Cherberg, and Insurance Buildings on the historic WA State Capitol Campus
- **Metropole Building**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, renovation, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of an historic 1890's building into non-for-profit offices, child care center, and community space
- **Seattle Center Armory Exterior**, Seattle, WA | Exterior improvements of historic Landmark Armory building on the Seattle Center campus
- **760 Aloha**, Seattle, WA | Renovation, penthouse addition, and seismic retrofit of an historic 1949 warehouse into small-scale creative office spaces
- **Washington Park**, Seattle WA | Renovation, penthouse addition, and seismic retrofit of a 1896 historic building into office and commercial space
- **Good Shepherd Center**, Seattle, WA | Phased seismic retrofit and structural stabilization of a 1906 URM building and its subsequent additions housing a school, non-profit organizations, and a community center
- **Mukai Fruit Barreling Plant**, Vashon Island, WA | Structural stabilization and seismic improvements of a NRHP listed 1926 building
- **Queen Anne Exchange**, Seattle WA | Historic renovation, addition, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of a Landmark 1920 telephone exchange building into multi-family housing
- **Beverly Bridge**, Central WA | Historic Preservation Consultant for the rehabilitation and adaptive reuse of 1909 steel truss bridge listed on the NRHP into a non-motorized, recreational crossing of the Columbia River
- **J&M Hotel**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, renovation, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of an historic 1890's building into a boutique hotel



## Licenses and Certifications

- Registered Architect, WA
- LEED Accredited Professional, U.S. Green Building Council

## Professional Affiliations

- Member, American Institute of Architects, Local and National Chapters
- Board of Directors, King County Library System Foundation, 2018 – present
- Board of Directors, ACT Theater, Seattle, 2015 – 2021
- Member, Urban Land Institute Center For Leadership, 2012 – present
- Board of Directors, AIA, Seattle Chapter, 2013 – 2014
- Co-Chair, AIA Seattle Diversity Committee, 2010 – 2011
- Guest Lecturer, University of Washington Department of Architecture, 2001 – present
- Design Studio Instructor, University of Washington Architecture in Rome Program, Rome, Italy, 2001

## Education

- University of Washington, Master of Architecture, 1999
- University of California Santa Cruz, Bachelor of Arts, 1989; post-grad Certificate in Art, 1991



# BUILDINGWORK

architecture design preservation



- **Union Stables**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, renovation, penthouse addition, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of a Landmark 1909 stable into a Class A office building\*
- **The Standard**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, addition, adaptive reuse, and seismic retrofit of a Landmark 1890 building into a creative office\*
- **Ainsworth & Dunn**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, addition, and adaptive reuse of a Landmark 1910 warehouse into a Class A office building\*
- **The State Hotel**, Seattle WA | Historic preservation, renovation, addition, adaptive reuse, and seismic strengthening of a Landmark 1915 building into a boutique hotel\*
- **1200 Third Avenue**, Seattle WA | Renovation and adaptive reuse of a Landmark 1920 telephone exchange building into a data center and office\*
- **Camp Sealth, Rounds Hall**, Vashon Island WA | Historic renovation and seismic retrofit of Landmark 1942 dining hall\*

## LIBRARIES AND COMMUNITY BUILDINGS

- **La Conner Swinomish Library**, La Conner WA | New 5,000 sf public library
- **La Seattle Public Library Green Lake Branch**, Seattle WA | Renovation of the 10,000 sf Seattle Landmark public library
- **Langley Middle School Gym**, Langley WA | Seismic retrofit and structural stabilization of a 1950's gym on Whidbey Island
- **Rural Library Assessment**, Washington State | Capital needs assessment of 111 public libraries in Washington State's 21 rural, distressed counties
- **Pierce County Library System**, Pierce County WA | On-call services
- **Boulevard Park Library**, Burien WA | Renovation of 6,500 sf public library
- **Library Connection @ Southcenter**, Tukwila WA | Renovation and expansion of 4,500 sf public library
- **Bainbridge Public Library**, Bainbridge Island WA | Renovation and expansion of 12,500 sf public library
- **Skyway Library**, Renton WA | New 8,500 sf public library
- **Kenmore Library**, Kenmore WA | New 10,000 sf Public Library\*
- **Seattle Public Library Montlake Branch**, Seattle WA | New 8,500 sf library\*
- **Whitman Sherwood Athletic Center**, Walla Walla WA | 80,000 sf renovation and 10,000 sf addition of a state-of-the-art college athletic facility\*
- **Waiohuli Community Center**, Kula, Maui HI | Master plan of Waiohuli Community Center and implementation of the first phase of construction\*

## Press

- "Saving a building's soul, along with the heart of Town Hall Seattle" by Clay Eals, *Seattle Times*, August 15, 2019
- "Architect says city can keep old buildings even as construction booms" by Lynn Porter, *Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce*, February 24, 2017
- "A matter of preservation: One man bucks Seattle's new-build development spree" by Stacy Kendall, *Gray Magazine* No. 31, January 2017

## Awards

### PRESERVATION PROJECTS

- Historic Seattle Exemplary Stewardship Award, Town Hall Seattle, 2020
- Washington State Historic Preservation Office Awards, Outstanding Achievement in Historic Preservation, Union Stables, 2016\*
- Historic Seattle Best Rehabilitation Award, Union Stables, 2016\*
- NAIOP Commercial Real Estate Development Association Washington State, Redevelopment/Renovation of the Year, Union Stables, 2015\*

### LIBRARY PROJECTS

- AIA Northwest and Pacific Region Design Awards, Merit Award, Skyway Library, 2018
- AIA Washington Civic Design Awards, Citation Award, Skyway Library, 2018
- AIA Washington Civic Design Awards, Honor Award, Kenmore Library, 2012\*
- AIA Northwest and Pacific Region Awards, Citation, Kenmore Library, 2012\*
- AIA Seattle Honor Awards for Washington Architecture, Commendation, Kenmore Library, 2011\*
- AIA Seattle Honor Awards for Washington Architecture, Honor Award, Seattle Public Library Montlake Branch, 2008\*
- AIA Washington Civic Design Awards, Merit Award, Seattle Public Library Montlake Branch, 2008\*

*\*Projects completed under Matt's leadership at Weinstein AU*

# Seattle Design Commission

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- Urban planner
- Environmental or Urban Designer
- Landscape Architect
- Licensed Engineer

The commission also participates in the YMCA’s Get Engaged program. Names in bold are being appointed and names in red are being reappointed.

## Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	3	1.	Urban Planner	Adam Amrhein	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
			2.	Get Engaged	vacant				Mayor
			3.	Engineer (Civil/Transportation)	vacant				Mayor
6	M	4	4.	At Large	Jill Crary	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	5.	Architect	Matt Aalfs	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
5	F	5	6.	Landscape Architect Chair appointment – 3/1/22-2/28/23	Vinita Sidhu	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Architect	Elaine Wine	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
5	F	1	8.	Urban Designer	Erica Bush	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
6	F	6	9.	Planner (Civil/Transportation)	Amalia Leighton Cody	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	NA	10.	Fine Artist	Elizabeth Conner	3/1/22	2/28/24	2	Mayor

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Male	Female	Transgender	NB/ O/ U	Asian	Black/ African American	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	4							1	6			
Council													
Other													
Total													

## Key:

- \*D List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
  - \*\*G List *gender*, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
  - RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
- Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.*



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02197, **Version:** 1


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Appointment of Erica Bush as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> Erica Bush		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> Seattle Design Commission		<b>Position Title:</b> Urban Designer
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Appointment OR <input type="checkbox"/> Reappointment		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: Fill in appointing authority	<b>Date Appointed:</b> mm/dd/yy.	<b>Term of Position:</b> 3/1/2022 to 2/28/2024
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> Highland Park	<b>Zip Code:</b> 98106	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Background:</b> Erica Bush is an urban designer and urban planner who is the founder of Central Collective, a planning, design, and landscape architecture firm in Seattle. Erica specializes in urban planning and urban design projects that require regulatory approvals by local and regional governments. Erica also focuses her work on public art, placemaking, and landscape architecture for public and private clients. Erica's professional experience has ranged from positions with local architecture and design firms, the Downtown Seattle Association, the National Park Service, and the City of Seattle's Department of Neighborhoods.  Erica has Masters' degrees in both Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning and Design from University of Washington, and her Bachelors in Political Science from the New School University/Parsons School of Design in New York City.		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date:</b> 3/2/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell Mayor of Seattle

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not appointment date or appointee.  
August 30, 2016

Last revised



# Erica Bush

Urban Designer



## Education

M. L. A

Masters Landscape Architecture,  
University of Washington,  
Seattle, 2014

M. A

Masters Urban Design and Planning,  
University of Washington,  
Seattle, 2014

Certificate in Urban Design,  
University of Washington,  
Seattle, 2013

B.A. Political Science and Sociology  
Minor, Fine Art,  
The New School University / Parsons  
School of Design,  
New York, NY, 2007

Graduated all programs with high  
Honors

International Experience:  
China, Denmark and Japan.

## Guest Lecturer Positions

- Cornish College of The Arts
- University of Washington

## Entrepreneurship experience

- Started the artist cooperative  
Boomslang Creatives
- Co-founder of the BIPOC design  
firm Central Collective



## Work Experience

### MAKERS Architecture and Urban Design

#### Urban Designer/ Urban Planner Project Manager

MAKERS is an architecture, design and planning firm that dates back to 1972. The firm focuses heavily on community planning meeting the needs of municipalities throughout the region.

My current responsibilities include:

The management of a number of community planning and urban design projects as well as supporting the facilities planning team in their outreach and engagement efforts.

- Manage the design and approach to project deliverables
- Lead the firms philanthropic and equity based initiatives
- Overseeing projects through state and county entitlements and environmental review and implementation
- Design and facilitate cross departmental workshops and presentations
- Create project reports, and schedules, budgets and communication plans
- Review incoming analysis such as financial assessments, traffic engineering analysis, code review, and local policy regulations
- Create technical documents related to; public art plans, Urban Design project components, analysis documents, land use codes, site and activation plans and diagrams

Feb. 2019 - Present

### Mithun

#### Urban Designer/ Urban Planner Project Manager

February 2018 to April 2019

Mithun is an award winning multi-disciplinary design firm with long roots in the Seattle community.

My responsibilities included:

The management of a multi-year, multifaceted, multi-million dollar urban design and planning project for a client in Hawaii. As well as serving as urban designer on numerous placemaking and landscape master planning projects.

- Oversaw projects through state and county entitlements and environmental review
- Coordinated project deliverable across a wide team of consultants

Feb. 2018 -Feb. 2019





## Skills

- Public art administration
- Visual communication and production
- Strong group facilitation and presentation skills
- Stakeholder involvement and outreach with a specialization in youth and under-represented communities.
- Tactical urbanism approaches as they relate to schematic design, early phase implementation, and the integration of art into urban design and the pattern language of social spaces.
- Long history and experience with the unhoused community in Seattle

PC and Macintosh. Applications: Arc GIS, Auto Cad, Microsoft Office, Adobe Creative Suite, SketchUp

## Awards / Accolades

- Member of the AIA Homelessness Task Force
- Active member of The Sunny Arms Artist Cooperative
- Member of the APA WA "Great Places" Review Panel
- Cover Story of Seattle Times for Public Art Installation "Blue Sky Passage" 2016
- Nominee for the Sustainable Seattle Awards for Art and Culture category for public art installation "A view of Time" 2016
- Two-time recipient of the Washington Association of Student Landscape Architecture Award
- Three time Parking Day Award Recipient for most creative public engagement



- Scheduled client meetings to creating project graphics
- Create project reports, and schedules, budgetary analysis, and billing scopes and projections
- Reviewed incoming analysis such as traffic impact analysis, archaeological assessments, and geotechnical reports
- Designed and created land use, site plans, sections and other illustrative renderings

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## Downtown Seattle Association, Manager of Urban Design and Planning September 2014 to February 2018

The Downtown Seattle Association's (DSAs) mission is to champion a healthy, vibrant urban core. The projects I lead included tackling the redesign of small urban spaces and overseeing multiple sub contractors and projects partners. In addition to managing urban spatial design projects, I also led the program to bring art into the public spaces the DSA manages.

My responsibilities included:

- Management of the implementation of dozens of public art installations and murals almost all of which were completed by women and minority groups
- Management of a public space departmental budget of \$150,000 annually
- Oversaw and construct numerous project and maintenance contracts with design firms and public agencies
- Managed all on-site installation of art projects
- Performed public engagement meetings and workshops to identify problem spaces across Downtown Seattle, and then create work plans, concepts and project scope to improve these sites
- Created visual documents to communicate site concerns and future improvements including site analysis, site plans, precedent studies, vignettes, sections, massing models and material pallets
- Managed project time lines and phase development plans
- Grant writing and management raising over \$200,000 in the course of two years being awarded over 50 percent of applied to grant opportunities
- Developed Public Art Program to formalize artist selection and criteria for public installations across Downtown Seattle



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**National Park Service,  
Recreation Planner  
March 2012 to September 2014**

My role focused primarily on a long range-planning project for the Tule Lake Unit of WWII Valor in the Pacific National Monument. This was the creation of a new park unit designated to tell the story of Japanese American internment during WWII.

My responsibilities included:

- Organization and facilitation of over 30 public meetings across the Western United States as well as virtually in order to educate and gather information from a diverse body of participants
- Creation of public documents regarding the planning process and regulatory procedures
- Working with GIS specialists to create data files regarding the site and begin site planning and on the ground historic restoration efforts
- Complete regional analysis of the site regarding the areas ecological, social, historic and economic factors
- Assured that park site planning efforts abided by federal and local environmental regulations (SEPA, NEPA)



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**Seattle Department of Neighborhoods,  
Youth Outreach Liaison  
December 2010 to September 2015**

My position with the Department of Neighborhoods was to engage youth in the planning process for neighborhood plan updates and Urban Design Frameworks. The end result being community project outcomes that better reflected the needs of a wider variety of user groups.

My responsibilities included:

- Organized public outreach workshops and activities with Seattle youth
- Developed an arts program for youth to demonstrate their concerns and hopes for their community through artistic expression, which culminated in a public display of their work

**Public Outreach Liaison  
Department of Neighborhoods  
June 2012 to June 2015**

**Downtown Emergency Service Center,  
Intake Specialist Seattle, WA  
January 2008 to January 2009**

**Boston City Council,  
Legislative Aid,  
September 2003 to January 2006**

# Seattle Design Commission

The Seattle Design Commission is comprised of 10 members, all of which are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by City Council. Commissioners serve a two-year term and are eligible for one reappointment. Commissioners include 2 licensed architects, a fine artist, an at large member, and at least one (but not more than two) members from the following professions:

- Urban planner
- Environmental or Urban Designer
- Landscape Architect
- Licensed Engineer

The commission also participates in the YMCA's Get Engaged program. Names in bold are being appointed and names in red are being reappointed.

## Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	3	1.	Urban Planner	Adam Amrhein	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
			2.	Get Engaged	vacant				Mayor
			3.	Engineer (Civil/Transportation)	vacant				Mayor
6	M	4	4.	At Large	Jill Crary	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	5.	Architect	Matt Aalfs	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
				Landscape Architect					
5	F	5	6.	Chair appointment – 3/1/22-2/28/23	Vinita Sidhu	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Architect	Elaine Wine	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
5	F	1	8.	Urban Designer	Erica Bush	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
6	F	6	9.	Planner (Civil/Transportation)	Amalia Leighton Cody	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	NA	10.	Fine Artist	Elizabeth Conner	3/1/22	2/28/24	2	Mayor

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Male	Female	Transgender	NB/ O/ U	Asian	Black/ African American	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	4							1	6			
Council													
Other													
Total													

## Key:

- \*D List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
  - \*\*G List *gender*, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
  - RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
- Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.*





Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02198, **Version:** 1


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Appointment of Puja Shaw as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Puja Shaw</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Seattle Design Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Engineer</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Appointment <b>OR</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Reappointment	<b>City Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> City Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>3/1/2022</i> <b>to</b> <i>2/28/2024</i> <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>	
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>Wallingford</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>98103</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Background:</b> <i>Puja Shaw is a Washington State-licensed Civil Engineer with KPFF Engineers. Puja is a Principal in the firm, responsible for engineering solutions for a wide range of publicly funded projects including University of Washingtons Montlake Triangle project, a variety of educational and research facilities for University of Washington and Seattle University, a regional drainage facility for University of Washington, engineering solutions for the Pike Place Market renovation, and the King Street Station rehabilitation.</i>  <i>Puja has served on both the Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board and Seattle Public Utilities' Customer Review Panel.</i>  <i>Puja holds a Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering from University of British Columbia</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date Signed (appointed):</b> 3/22/2022	<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> <i>Bruce A. Harrell</i> <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>	

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.



## PUJA SHAW

PE

Principal, Civil Engineer

**KPFF Consulting Engineers**

### EDUCATION

BASc Civil Engineering,  
University of British Columbia

### REGISTRATION

PE: Washington (#41830)

### BOARD/REVIEW PANEL EXPERIENCE

Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board Member,  
2016-2018

Seattle Public Utilities Customer  
Review Panel Member, 2016-Present

### Add'l City of Seattle Experience:

- » Chophouse Row
- » Olive 8 Mixed-Use **LEED Silver**
- » Seattle University Center for Science and Innovation
- » Seattle University Center for Science and Innovation
- » Seattle University Vi Hilbert Hall
- » Chophouse Row
- » Olive 8
- » Seattle Kraken Lake Union Team Store

### Add'l UW Experience:

- » Hans Rosling Center for Population Health
- » Health Sciences Education Building
- » Interdisciplinary Engineering Building
- » ICA Basketball Training Facility
- » North Campus Housing
- » Lander, Terry & Maple Halls
- » Molecular Engineering Building
- » PACCAR Hall
- » Dempsey Hall

Puja Shaw is a Principal at KPFF Consulting Engineers with over two decades of experience in civil engineering for a wide variety of project types. With a rare combination of excellent technical, organizational, and people skills, Puja is an invaluable and respected leader at KPFF. She has a passion for bringing life to Seattle's urban environment while cultivating inclusive, collaborative environments in the teams she leads. Where others see challenges, Puja sees opportunities for discussion and out-of-the-box thinking to achieve creative solutions. She has played key roles in notable award-winning projects including the King Street Station Restoration and the UW Montlake Triangle.

### University of Washington (UW) Montlake Triangle and Lower Rainier Vista, Seattle, WA

Civil Project Manager for the Montlake Triangle and Lower Rainier Vista project, which serves as a new grand entrance to University of Washington Campus. The Rainier Vista was extended into the Montlake Triangle by lowering City of Seattle owned NE Pacific Place and constructing a bicycle and pedestrian landbridge over the roadway. Other elements of this complicated project included the design of a temporary bypass road for NE Pacific Place, which was used to convey traffic through the site while the new road was being constructed.

### UW San Juan Basin Regional Stormwater Facility, Seattle, WA

As Principal-in-Charge and Project Manager, Puja worked with Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) and the University of Washington (UW) to design a regional stormwater treatment facility to serve an approximately 34-acre basin. The basin is made up of both City right-of-way and University-owned land and discharges to a 42-inch, UW-owned storm outfall to Portage Bay. Efforts to permit construction of this facility involved close coordination with the UW, SPU, and SDCl in creating a new Directors' Rule specific to stormwater management in the drainage basin.

### Pike Place Market Renovation, Seattle, WA

Civil Project Manager for the renovation of Seattle's Pike Place Market. Renovations to the Market's infrastructure included the design of an electrical vault/room in the Hillclimb area, along with reconstruction of the Hillclimb. Civil design included the relocation of a heavily utilized public sewer main that runs directly through the main area of construction, along with frontage improvements along Western Avenue and utility trenching through Pike Place. Design involved extensive coordination and collaboration with Seattle Public Utilities to modify this high-profile Seattle landmark during the Market's high season.

### King Street Station Renovation and Renewal/Upgrades, Seattle, WA

#### **LEED Platinum**

Civil Project Manager for the multi-phase renovation of King Street Station in Seattle's Pioneer Square neighborhood. The goal of the project was to transform the station into a modern transit hub. Civil engineering design includes a below-grade stormwater detention facility; site paving and grading; new water, sewer and gas connections; and the layout of boreholes for a geothermal field, which is used to supplement the building's cooling system. Puja navigated the City of Seattle's permitting process so this complex civil/MEP system was easily understood by jurisdictional reviewers.

### Burke Gilman Trail Improvement Project, Seattle, WA

Civil Project Manager for replacement of a critical yet aging cornerstone of the regional trails network with a modern, world-class trail facility. The new section meets the needs of existing trail users and provides capacity for future generations of bicyclists and pedestrians through improved pedestrian and bicyclist safety and enhanced connections to the regional trails network and increased capacity for growing trail demand. The trail was improved to modern standards, which included widening and "mixing zones" at points of confluence with other pathways, bridges, and streets.

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6	F	NA	10.	Fine Artist	Elizabeth Conner	3/1/22	2/28/24	2	Mayor
			11.						
			12.						
			13.						
			14.						
			15.						

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

					(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Male	Female	Transgender	NB/ O/ U	Asian	Black/ African American	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	2	7							1	7		1	
Council													
Other													
Total													

## Key:

\*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02199, **Version:** 1

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Appointment of Vinita Sidhu as Chair, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2023.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.





# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> Vinita Sidhu		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> Seattle Design Commission		<b>Position Title:</b> Chair
<b>X Appointment OR</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> mm/dd/yy.	<b>Term of Position: *</b> 3/1/2022 to 2/28/2023  <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> Fremont	<b>Zip Code:</b> 98109	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Background:</b>  <i>Ms. Sidhu is a Principal in Site Workshop, a Seattle based Landscape Architecture firm. Vinita has a 20+ year career in landscape architecture, acting as lead designer for signature private and publicly funded projects in Seattle and the Pacific NW. Her work includes work at Children’s Hospital, Federal Detention Center, UW Medical Center, Lakeside School, as well as a broad range of hospitals, parks and other public facilities.</i>  <i>Vinita has an extensive history in public and professional service including work with the Landscape Architecture Foundation, Mary’s Place, Seattle’s Office of Arts and Culture, and as a guest lecturer at University of Washington.</i>  <i>Vinita has a Masters’ Degree in Landscape Architecture from Harvard, and Bachelor Degrees in Art History and Design of the Environment from University of Pennsylvania.</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>   <b>Date:</b> 3/2/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell Mayor of Seattle

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

# Resume

## Vinita Sidhu, PLA ASLA

Partner, Site Workshop



### Education

#### Harvard University Graduate School of Design

Master of Landscape Architecture, 1998

#### University of Pennsylvania

Bachelor of Arts, 1995

Art History and Design of the Environment

### Registration

Landscape Architect: Washington No. 949

### Professional Affiliations

American Society of Landscape Architects

## Select Project Awards

#### Helen Sommers Building

AIA Washington Civic Design Honor Award, 2018

#### WSU North Puget Sound at Everett

AIA Washington Civic Design Award, 2019

Building Design & Construction's Building Team Awards, Silver Award, 2018

#### Renton Library

AIA Seattle Award of Honor, 2017

AIA Washington Civic Design Honor Award, 2017

AIA/ALA Library Design Award, 2016

Chicago Athenaeum, American Architecture Awards, 2016

#### Seattle Children's Hospital Building Hope

Healthcare Design, Landscape Architecture Award for Health Care Communities, Silver, 2014

Major Institution Master Plan and Building Hope, ENR Northwest Best Projects, Healthcare, 2013

Major Institution Master Plan and Building Hope, Modern Healthcare Design Awards, Award of Excellence, 2013

#### Federal Center South, USACE District Headquarters

AIA COTE Top 10 Plus Award, 2015

US General Services Administration Citation Award, 2014

Design-Build Institute of America Award, 2013

AIA NW/Pacific Region Civic Design Award, 2013

National AIA COTE Top 10 Award, 2013

#### UW Medical Center Expansion

Northwest Construction Consumer Council Distinguished Project Award for Public Projects Over \$10 Million, 2012

## Professional Recognition & Boards

#### Seattle Design Commission

Landscape Architect Commissioner, 2018 - 2020

Public Art Advisory Committee, 2020

#### Landscape Architecture Foundation

Perspectives bio feature, January 2018

## Volunteer Committees, Lectures & Panels

#### Landscape Architecture Foundation

2019 Fellowship for Innovation and Leadership, Juror

2017 Olmsted Scholars Webinar, Speaker

#### WASLA Conferences

2018 "Wellness through Community Based Design", Lead Speaker

2019 "Design Build and the Landscape Architect", Speaker

2020 "Beyond Inclusive Design: Creating a welcoming, nature-based park for all", Lead Speaker

#### AIA Seattle

2019 "Learning Landscapes", Panelist

2017 "Extraordinary Playscapes", Guest Curator

#### University of Washington College of Built Environments

2018 Intro to Landscape Architecture, Guest Lecturer

2018 Women Leading in Landscape, Panelist

#### Seattle Architecture Foundation

2012 Expanding Your Horizons Conference, Teacher

#### City of Seattle Office of Planning and Community Development

2019 "Creative Parks for Healthy Communities", Speaker

#### City of Seattle Office of Arts and Culture

2015 South Transfer Station Phase II Public Art, Selection Committee

2011 Burke Gilman Trail Public Art, Selection Committee

2008 Seattle Center Skate Park Public Art, Selection Committee

#### The Block Project

2018-2019, Block Home #010, Garden Designer

#### Mary's Place

2017 Outdoor Play Space, Designer

#### B.F. Day Elementary

2017-2018 Finding Urban Nature Audubon Program, Teacher

2016-2017 Playground Committee Chair

#### Friends of Fremont Peak Park

2007-2013 Steering Committee Member

#### Phinney Neighborhood Pre-School Co-op

2010-2011 Board Member



## Select Project Experience

### Affordable Housing

**Jazz House** Seattle WA

**Africatown Plaza** Seattle WA

### Civic

**Federal Center South Building 1202** Seattle WA

**State Capitol Campus Helen Sommers Building** Olympia WA

**Fire Station 8** Seattle WA

**SPU DWW South Operations Complex** Seattle WA

**Olympia Transit Center** Olympia WA

**Auburn Library** Auburn WA

**Fife Library** Fife WA

**Kent Panther Lake Library** Kent WA

**Renton Library** Renton WA

**Sedro-Wooley Library** Sedro-Wooley WA

**Origami Theater Garden Tempe Transportation Center** Tempe AZ

### Healthcare

**Swedish Medical Center First Hill Expansion** Seattle WA

**Seattle Children's Hospital Building Hope Expansion** Seattle WA

**UW Medical Center Montlake Tower Expansion** Seattle WA

**Valley Medical Center** Covington WA

### Higher Ed

**UW Population Health Facility** Seattle WA

**UW Architecture Hall** Seattle WA

**UW Denny Hall** Seattle WA

**Everett Community College Liberty Hall** Everett WA

**WSU North Puget Sound at Everett Academic Center** Everett WA

### Historic Landscapes

**PSE Baker Club House Visitors Center** Concrete WA

**PSE Snoqualmie Restroom** Snoqualmie WA

**Cape Disappointment State Park Design Guidelines** Ilwaco WA

**Mukilteo Lighthouse Park Master Plan** Mukilteo WA

**Mosquito Fleet Trail Master Plan** Kitsap County WA

**Iron Horse State Park Master Plan** WA

### Parks & Open Space

**Garfield Super Block Legacy and Promise Promenade** Seattle WA

**The Eli's Park Project** Seattle WA

**Ernst Park** Seattle WA

**9th St Park Concept Plan** East Wenatchee WA

**Kiwanis Methow Park** Wenatchee WA

**San Antonio River Public Art Master Plan** San Antonio TX

**Island Garden at Long Key Natural Area** Broward County FL

**Old Mill Park** Silverdale WA

**Lake Oswego Open Space Plan** Lake Oswego OR

**Kitsap County Bicycle Facilities Plan** Kitsap County WA

### K-12 Schools - Private

**Seattle Country Day School** Seattle WA

**Seattle Girls School** Seattle WA

**Seattle Academy of Arts & Sciences STREAM Building** Seattle WA

**Lakeside Upper School** Seattle WA

**St. Thomas School Gymnasium** Medina WA

**Three Cedars Waldorf School** Bellevue WA

### K-12 Schools - Public

**Tacoma Green Schoolyards** Tacoma WA

**Viewlands Elementary** Seattle WA

**Rainier Beach High School** Seattle WA

**Mercer International Middle School** Seattle WA

**Van Asselt School Addition** Seattle WA

**Hazel Wolf K-8 STEM School Field** Seattle WA

**Green Lake Elementary School Active Space Master Plan** Seattle WA

**John Hay Elementary Playground Improvements** Seattle WA

**B.F. Day Elementary Playground Improvements** Seattle WA

**John Stanford International Elementary Improvements** Seattle WA

**Sacajawea Elementary Playground Improvements** Seattle WA


**Lynnwood Elementary** Lynnwood WA

**Mountlake Terrace Elementary** Mountlake Terrace WA

**Spruce Elementary** Lynnwood WA

**Liberty High School** Renton Highlands WA

**Skyline Highschool Stadium** Sammamish WA





# Seattle Design Commission

The Seattle Design Commission is comprised of 10 members, all of which are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by City Council. Commissioners serve a two-year term and are eligible for one reappointment. Commissioners include 2 licensed architects, a fine artist, an at large member, and at least one (but not more than two) members from the following professions:

- Urban planner
- Environmental or Urban Designer
- Landscape Architect
- Licensed Engineer

The commission also participates in the YMCA’s Get Engaged program. Names in bold are being appointed and names in red are being reappointed.

## Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	3	1.	Urban Planner	Adam Amrhein	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
			2.	Get Engaged	vacant				Mayor
			3.	Engineer (Civil/Transportation)	vacant				Mayor
6	M	4	4.	At Large	Jill Crary	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	5.	Architect	Matt Aalfs	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
5	F	5	6.	Landscape Architect Chair appointment – 3/1/22-2/28/23	Vinita Sidhu	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Architect	Elaine Wine	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
5	F	1	8.	Urban Designer	Erica Bush	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
6	F	6	9.	Planner (Civil/Transportation)	Amalia Leighton Cody	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	NA	10.	Fine Artist	Elizabeth Conner	3/1/22	2/28/24	2	Mayor

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Male	Female	Transgender	NB/ O/ U	Asian	Black/ African American	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	4							1	6			
Council													
Other													
Total													

## Key:

- \*D List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
  - \*\*G List *gender*, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
  - RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
- Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.*



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02200, **Version:** 1

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Reappointment of Elizabeth Conner as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to February 28, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> Elizabeth Conner		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> Seattle Design Commission		<b>Position Title:</b> Artist
<input type="checkbox"/> Appointment OR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reappointment		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: Fill in appointing authority	<b>Date Appointed:</b> mm/dd/yy.	<b>Term of Position: *</b> 3/1/2022 to 2/28/2024
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> Vashon Island, Washington**	<b>Zip Code:</b> 98070	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Background:</b>  <p>Elizabeth Conner is a public artist specializing in integration of art into building, landscape and site. Her 30-year career as an artist specializing in creation of public art extends to a variety of public projects for parks, libraries, police stations, fire stations and rights of way. Elizabeth has won commissions both locally and nationally, from the Puget Sound area to North Carolina, Arizona, California and Oregon.</p> <p>Elizabeth has served as a board member on the Washington State Arts Commission, the Vashon Allied Arts commission, and as a member of the King County Metro Public Art Commission. Elizabeth has a significant history in teaching Art in the Pacific NW and in North Carolina, most recently completing an 11-year term as an Instructor in Studio Art at UW Tacoma</p> <p>Elizabeth has a Master of Fine Arts from Vermont College in Montpelier Vermont, a Bachelor's in Fine Arts from Cornish College of the Arts, and a Bachelors in French and Russian literature from University of Rochester in New York</p>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date:</b> 3/2/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell Mayor of Seattle

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not appointment date or appointee.

\*\*\* Residency is not required for the Seattle Design Commission Last revised August 30, 2016

## RESUME:

### PUBLIC ART AND PLANNING COMMISSIONS:

- Current **Colman Dock – Seattle, WA** - ArtsWA (Washington State Arts Commission)  
Artwork for major renovation of Colman Dock: Washington State Ferries' largest multi-modal ferry terminal and transportation hub, in collaboration with NBBJ Architects. *Estimated project completion: 2023*
- 2015 **"Trio" for Lincoln Street Station – Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail** - TriMet – Portland, OR  
A grouping of three movement-related steel sculptures, with landscape, for the first station on a new light rail line.
- 2014 **"Green Flash" - Pacific Avenue Streetscape**—City of Tacoma Arts Commission/Public Works/Economic Development  
Collaborative plan/design: 10 blocks of urban streetscape; 22 sculptures relate to innovative stormwater treatment.
- 2013 **"Drawing the Land" - Jefferson Park** – Seattle Office of Arts & Culture - Seattle, WA  
Artwork integrated into a new 52-acre park and utility project includes 2,000 ft. of permanent "contour lines" to mark landforms created by filling/covering two reservoirs. With Berger Partnership, Seattle Public Utilities, Seattle Parks.
- 2012 **"Monitoring" - Tolt River Floodplain Restoration** - 4Culture / King County (WA) Parks and Dept. of Natural Resources  
12-month artist residency/blog, with staff in King County's Department of Natural Resources and Parks, Water and Land Resources Division, observing and working with ecologists studying restoration of the Tolt River floodplain.
- 2012 **"Sweet Suite." for Downtown Kent** - City of Kent Arts Commission - Kent, WA  
Collaboration on master plan, with the Portico Group, and design of integrated artwork for new urban park.
- 2012 **Master Plan for Park at Town Center** - City of Shoreline, WA  
Design team artist collaboration, with Berger Partnership, on park master plan, including concepts & infrastructure for immediate and future temporary artwork and performance, to activate a new urban civic space.
- 2010 **Downtown Cary Streetscape** – Town of Cary, NC  
Artist lead, in collaboration with Town of Cary and ARCADIS engineers and landscape architects, to incorporate art throughout the design of two miles of streets and sidewalks in a historic downtown streetscape redevelopment.
- 2010 **Civic Center West Entry Master Plan** – City of Scottsdale, AZ  
Collaborative Master Plan, with A. Dye Design, for an updated entry to Scottsdale's cultural and civic center.
- 2009 **Whatcom Creek Estuary Shoreline Restoration and Boardwalk** – City of Bellingham, WA  
Collaboration with the City of Bellingham and Anchor Environmental to design an artwork ("*Quiet Middens, Noisy Waters*") to raise awareness of the human and natural histories of a municipal landfill site.
- 2008 **Percival Landing Concept Plan and 30 percent design** - City of Olympia, WA  
Collaborative master plan for artwork-related infrastructure and redesign of a central waterfront boardwalk and park in the Capitol of Washington State, with Barker Landscape Architects, Peragine Design, and Anchor Environmental.
- 2006 **Old Town Scottsdale** – Scottsdale Public Art - Scottsdale, AZ  
"*Hidden Histories*," artwork integrated into historic commercial district streetscape design, with Dick & Fritsche Design Group, fabrication in collaboration with Benson Shaw, Duke Grenier, and Tawn Endres.
- 2005 **West Valley Branch Library** – City of San Jose, San Jose, CA  
Artwork integrated into a new library, in collaboration with library staff and Rob Wellington Quigley Architects.
- 1989 to 2004 **Urban Collaboration** - Seattle Arts Commission, WA Commission for the Humanities, 911 Media Arts, et al  
"*Small monuments*": public art for Seattle's Cascade and South Lake Union neighborhoods. Associated projects included a mixed-media window installation, 30-minute video documentary, a residency in the City of Seattle Department of Neighborhoods, and two comprehensive art plans.
- 1998 to 2003 **stART - Sound Transit Art Program** - Central Puget Sound Transit Authority – Seattle, WA  
One of three lead artists participating in the creation and implementation of an integrated art program for multi-modal regional transit system (commuter rail, light rail, express bus and transit-oriented development).
- 2003 **Police and Fire Training Academy** – Arts and Science Council, Charlotte, NC  
Artwork for a new training academy in North Carolina's Mecklenburg County, with Morris Berg Architects.
- 2003 **Thea Foss Waterway Public Esplanade** - City of Tacoma, Tacoma, WA  
Collaborative master plan and schematic design, with integrated artwork, for a major urban public space, in collaboration with Thomas Cook Reed Reinvald Architects, Zimmer Gunsul Frasca, Bruce Dees & Associates.
- 2002 **Waterfront to Market** – City of Seattle, Port of Seattle, Seattle, WA  
W/Cascade Design Collaborative open space plan under elevated highway separating downtown from waterfront.
- 2001 **Indian Creek Stormwater Facility** - City of Olympia (WA) Art in Public Places Program  
Collaborative design, w/City of Olympia, WA State DOT & others: a functional natural stormwater treatment facility.
- 1999 **West Precinct** - Seattle Arts Commission, Seattle, WA  
Design collaboration to integrate artwork throughout a new police precinct, with Weinstein-Copeland Architects, Roth-Sheppard Architects, and Murase Associates Landscape Architects.
- 1993 **Waterway 15"** - Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) - Seattle, WA  
Integrated artwork/public access on Lake Union, in collaboration with Cliff Willwerth, Landscape Architect.

**BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS:**

Current	TAG advisor	Washington State Arts Commission (ArtsWA)
2008 - 2014	Board member	Washington State Arts Commission (ArtsWA)
2005 - 2008	Services to Artists Committee	College Art Association (2013 nominee for Board membership)
2002 - 2006	President – Board of Trustees	Vashon Allied Arts - Vashon, WA
1993 - 1998	Commissioner	Public Art Commission – Metro / King County, WA

**EXHIBITIONS:**

2018	<b>big play, small mysteries</b> – Vashon Center for the Arts – 2 month evolving community performance installation
2016	<b>Fleet</b> – Vermont Studio Center - month-long mutating installation of sculptures constructed with woodshop scraps
2013	<b>McColl Center for Visual Art</b> – Charlotte, NC - “Sifting” – environmental artist residency exhibition/pilot project
2009-11	<b>VALISE Gallery</b> – curator / exhibitor / organizer - community-oriented artist collective - Vashon Island, WA
2007	<b>Site Specific – Northwest Installation Art</b> – Whatcom Museum, Bellingham, WA (curator: Kathleen Moles)
2006	<b>Personally Public</b> - Crawl Space, Seattle, WA – group show - new public projects (curator: Diana Falchuk)
2005	<b>Locus</b> - Cornish College of the Arts, Seattle, WA – an invitational solo installation and collaborative performances
2005	<b>Improvisations for Two or More, On The Boards (12 Minutes Max)</b> - Seattle, WA - performance installation
2002-05	<b>Art Outside</b> - Port Angeles (WA) Fine Arts Center –site-related installations (curator: Jake Seniuk)
1998	<b>The Spirit of Place: Art, Environment, Community</b> - Ackland Art Museum, UNC Chapel Hill (NC) Invitational exhibition – five artists (curator: Barbara Matilsky)
1996	<b>Standard Symbols</b> - Commencement Gallery, Tacoma, WA – one-person site-specific installation
1993	<b>There's No Place Like Home!</b> - Bellevue Art Museum - Bellevue, WA - invitational group show
1991	<b>Pleas and Thank You</b> - Tacoma Art Museum, Tacoma, WA - included in "Collaborators" group biennial

**HONORS & AWARDS:**

2014	<b>Pacific Avenue Streetscape</b> - 3CMA Savvy Award - innovative community engagement during construction
2002	<b>Indian Creek</b> - Award for Excellence - Environmental Enhancements - Federal Highway Administration
2001	<b>Peninsula Park</b> - Award for Work in Progress - WA Chapter: American Society of Landscape Architects
2000	<b>Waterway 15</b> - Cultural Achievement Award - WA Chapter American Society of Interior Designers (ASID)
1999	<b>West Precinct</b> - Honor Award - American Institute of Architects (AIA)
1993	<b>Waterway 15</b> - Honor Award for Design - Washington Chapter: American Society of Landscape Architects

**TEACHING AND RELATED EXPERIENCE:**

2008-2019	<b>Instructor – Studio Art</b>	UW Tacoma - School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences
2011-2013	<b>Instructor – Public Art in Depth</b>	Trainer/mentor: public art practices for studio artists - Tacoma, WA
2007	<b>Instructor – Art</b>	Puget Sound Early College (Highline), Federal Way, WA
1999, 2002	<b>Instructor - Public Art</b>	Penland School of Crafts, Penland (NC) – two summer sessions
1989 - 1997	<b>Freelance Graphics / CAD</b>	Engineering and environmental consulting firms - Seattle, WA
1980 - 1987	<b>Ship’s purser, program support</b>	Lindblad Special Expeditions natural and cultural history tours
1974 - 1980	<b>Director, U.S. Programs</b>	AFS International Exchange Programs - New York, NY
1972 - 1973	<b>English Instructor (Lectrice)</b>	Université de Haute-Bretagne - Rennes, France

**EDUCATION:**

2005	<b>M.F.A. in Visual Art</b>	Vermont College	Montpelier, VT
1987	<b>Architectural Drafting/AutoCAD</b>	Seattle Central Community College	Seattle, WA
1986	<b>B.F.A. - Sculpture</b>	Cornish College of the Arts	Seattle, WA
1972	<b>B.A., French Literature/Russian</b>	University of Rochester	Rochester, NY
1971	<b>Contemporary French Literature</b>	Université de Paris - I.P.F.E. (Sorbonne)	Paris, France

**COLLECTIONS:**

Sound Transit/Puget Sound Regional Transit System (Seattle, WA)	Chautauqua Elementary School (Vashon, WA)
Ackland Art Museum - University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC)	City of Seattle Portable Works (Seattle, WA)
University of Washington Medical Center (Seattle, WA)	David and Nancy Solomon (New York, NY)

**RESIDENCIES:**

2016	<b>Vermont Studio Center</b> – Johnson, VT	one-month residency fellowship and work-study
2013	<b>McColl Center for Visual Art</b> – Charlotte, NC	3-month fellowship - Environmental Artist in Residence
2010	<b>Jentel Artist Residency Program</b> – Banner, WY	one-month residency fellowship

**SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND PUBLICATIONS:**

*Tacoma News Tribune* – Tacoma, WA – “Artist’s orbs brighten rain gardens on Tacoma’s Pacific Avenue” – Dec. 1, 2013  
*Charlotte Magazine* (Charlotte, NC) – May 2013 – Green canvas in north Charlotte, environmental art – Adam Rhew  
*Arcade: Architecture/Design in the Northwest* – Spring 2008 – “There...Where?” (Art Matters) – Elizabeth Conner  
*C Magazine* (Cary, NC) – 2007-08 – “Streetscapes” – Alex Henderson  
*The Cary News* (Cary, NC) – May 16, 2007, p. 6A – Improving ties between city, citizens” – Emily Matchar  
*Wake Living* (Raleigh, NC) – “Downtown Cary’s Streetscape Project Blends Function with Art” (13-19) – Elizabeth Shugg  
*Art in America*, August 2004 survey of public art (“*Nest Set for Police and Fire*” - Training Academy – Charlotte, NC)  
*The Olympian* (Olympia, WA) – October 29, 2001, p. B1 - “New stormwater site a work of natural art”  
*Public Art Review* – Spring/Summer 2001 – “Touching Public Art” – contributor to article by Jean McLaughlin  
*The News Tribune* (Tacoma, WA) – June 24, 2001, p. SL4 - “Public art at transit station engages...”  
*Arcade: Architecture/Design in the Northwest* – Spring 2001 – “Indian Creek Water Weaving” - Laura Haddad  
*Arcade: Architecture/Design in the Northwest* - Fall 1999 - “Steps Towards Meaningful Places” - Cath Brunner  
*Seattle Times* - September 28, 1999, p. B4 - "In new police precinct, even the floor volunteers a statement"  
*Seattle Post-Intelligencer* - September 28, 1999, p. B4 - "Police precinct shows off its artistic side"  
*The Lake Union Review* - March 1993 - pp. 6-7. " New Lake Union public access space ..."  
*Landscape Architecture* - March 1994, pp. 72-73 “Waterway 15 - "Starting Fresh: The New Firms of the '90s"

December 2019

# Seattle Design Commission

The Seattle Design Commission is comprised of 10 members, all of which are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by City Council. Commissioners serve a two-year term and are eligible for one reappointment. Commissioners include 2 licensed architects, a fine artist, an at large member, and at least one (but not more than two) members from the following professions:

- Urban planner
- Environmental or Urban Designer
- Landscape Architect
- Licensed Engineer

The commission also participates in the YMCA’s Get Engaged program. Names in bold are being appointed and names in red are being reappointed.

## Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	3	1.	Urban Planner	Adam Amrhein	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
			2.	Get Engaged	vacant				Mayor
			3.	Engineer (Civil/Transportation)	vacant				Mayor
6	M	4	4.	At Large	Jill Crary	3/1/21	2/28/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	5.	Architect	Matt Aalfs	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
				Landscape Architect					
5	F	5	6.	Chair appointment – 3/1/22-2/28/23	Vinita Sidhu	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Architect	Elaine Wine	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
5	F	1	8.	Urban Designer	Erica Bush	3/1/22	2/28/24	1	Mayor
6	F	6	9.	Planner (Civil/Transportation)	Amalia Leighton Cody	3/1/21	2/28/23	2	Mayor
6	F	NA	10.	Fine Artist	Elizabeth Conner	3/1/22	2/28/24	2	Mayor

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Male	Female	Transgender	NB/ O/ U	Asian	Black/ African American	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
<b>Mayor</b>	3	4							1	6			
<b>Council</b>													
<b>Other</b>													
<b>Total</b>													

## Key:

- \*D List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
  - \*\*G List *gender*, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
  - RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
- Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.*



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02201, **Version:** 1

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Appointment of Joseph Sisneros as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2023.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.





# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Joseph Sisneros</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Urban Ecologist</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> <i>mm/dd/yy.</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>4/1/2020</i> <b>to</b> <i>3/31/2023</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b>
<b>Background:</b> Joe Sisneros has a Bachelor of Science degree in Environmental Science and Resource Management from the University of Washington, with a concentration in the Sustainable Forest Management option. He has field and research experience in forestry and riparian restoration.  Born on Coast Salish lands and raised in what is now Everett, WA, Joe loves to backpack, loves to read, and loves live music. With a formal education in forest ecology and oceanography, Joe has immense appreciation for the ecology of the Pacific Northwest and a deep passion for people that inhabit this incredibly special part of our Earth.  <i>Joseph is being appointed to serve the remainder of a three-year term ending March 31, 2023.</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date Signed (appointed):</b> 4/26/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> <i>Bruce A. Harrell</i> <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

# Joseph Sisneros

ISA Certified Arborist

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Joseph Sisneros  
Seattle, WA



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## Skills

- Arboriculture Practices
- Forest Inventory
- GIS Software
- Communication
- Technical Writing
- Conflict Resolution
- Research

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## Experience

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### **Ballard Tree Service/ Compliance Officer**

September 2021- PRESENT, Seattle, WA

Administered all aspects of regulatory compliance for the company, including advising clients on urban forestry ordinance, researching tree law as it pertains to 6+ unique municipalities, utilizing GIS tools for site plan development, and managing communications with municipal arborists and urban planners.

### **Washington Conservation Corps/ Riparian Restoration Crew Member**

September 2020 - September 2021, Renton, WA

Engaged in a myriad of collaboration-based restoration projects of King County's floodplains, wetlands, and riparian areas. Planted thousands of native shrubs and trees, effectively controlled hundreds of acres of invasive weeds, and aided in numerous vegetation monitoring projects. Gained proficient experience in hand and power tool operation and maintenance.

### **University of Washington/ Forestry Intern**

June 2019 - August 2019, Eatonville, WA

Internship role supporting Research Forester at the University of Washington's Pack Experimental Forest. Assisted with forest inventory, timber cruising, and seedling monitoring projects that were collectively tied to on-going climate science and forest ecology studies.

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## Education

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### **University of Washington/ Bachelor of Science in Environmental Science and Resource Management**

September 2017 - June 2020, Seattle, WA

Concentration in the Sustainable Forest Management option, a program accredited by the Society of American Foresters (SAF).

Dean's List for 8 of 9 quarters , 3.86 GPA.

### **Everett Community College/ Associate of Arts and Sciences**

September 2015 - June 2017, Everett, WA

Concentration in oceanography through the Ocean Research College Academy, a department of Everett Community College.

Graduated with High Distinction, 3.75 GPA.

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## Certifications & Additional Activities

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- ISA Certified Arborist, PN-9382A
  - Volunteer Forestry Research Assistant For Doctoral Candidate
  - Volunteer Field Biologist, The Center For Responsible Forestry
  - Avid backpacker/mountaineer

# Urban Forestry Commission

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

**Roster:**

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Wildlife Biologist	Julia Michalak	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Council
3	M	6	2.	Urban Ecologist	Joseph Sisneros	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Mayor
1	NB	3	3.	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Falisha Kurji	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	F	4	4.	Hydrologist or Similar Professional	Becca Neumann	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	4	5.	Arborist	Stuart Niven	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Council
1	M	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Hao Liang	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	3	7.	NGO Representative	Joshua N. Morris	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	M	7	8.	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Michael Moehring	4/1/22	3/31/25	2	Mayor
6	M	n/a	9.	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Blake Voorhees	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Commission
6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/21	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
9	F	2	13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Lia Hill	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council

**SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	3			1		1			4			
Council	2	3		Non-Binary	1					3			2
Other	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>			<b>8</b>			<b>2</b>

**Key:**

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02202, **Version:** 1


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Appointment of Lia Hall as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Lia Hall</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Community/Neighborhood Representative</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Council <input type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> <i>mm/dd/yy.</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>4/1/2021</i> <b>to</b> <i>3/31/2024</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>Rainier Beach</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>98118</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b>
<p><b>Background:</b></p> <p>Lia Hall was born and raised in Seattle by an ethnically and culturally mixed family. After a short stint as an adult in New York City, she returned to the Emerald City of her youth. She resides in Rainier Beach near her sanctuary, Kubota Garden. With her husband/business partner, Cedar, they have two small children and run a neon sign shop mostly producing signage for small businesses in and around Seattle. Lia also has taught yoga classes since 2006, prioritizing offering classes for BIPOC communities and pregnant folks. She has a Permaculture Landscape Design Certification through Seattle Tilth and is passionate about planting, propagating and sharing native plants.</p> <p>Lia wants to help bring our city into alignment with its sustainability goals through advocating for our tree relatives while ensuring our community members have a voice. She believes we can all have a more equitable, happier, healthier future if we plan and design for the needs of a growing city while protecting our urban forests.</p> <p><i>Lia is being appointed to serve the remainder of a three-year term ending March 31, 2024.</i></p>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b>  <i>Dan Strauss</i> <i>Seattle City Councilmember</i> <i>Chair, Land Use Committee</i>
<b>Date Signed (appointed):</b> April 28, 2022		

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

## Lia Hall

<b>Education</b>	<b>The New School University</b> ; New York, NY MFA Creative Writing: Poetry	2009
	<b>University of Washington</b> ; Seattle, WA BA Comparative Literature: Cinema Studies	2005
<b>Continuing Education</b>	<b>Seattle Tilth</b> ; Seattle, WA Permaculture Design Certification Course, 2015	
<b>Work</b>	<b>Noble Neon</b> ; Seattle, WA Co-founder, Designer, Creative Director	2012 – present
	Yoga Instruction; Brooklyn, NY & Seattle, WA Private and Group Classes	2007 – present
	<b>Mandl School, College of Allied Health</b> ; NY, NY Adjunct Faculty: English Composition Remedial Reading and Writing Interpersonal Communications	2010 – 2011
	<b>The New York Public Library</b> ; Bronx, NY Library Information Assistant	2008
	<b>The Seattle Public Library</b> ; Seattle, WA Library Associate II, Library Associate I Student Assistant	2002 – 2007
<b>Exhibits &amp; Awards</b>	Sole Repair; Seattle, WA	2015
	First Place at City Arts Spring Artwalk Awards; <i>This is About the Stories</i>	
	<b>METHOD Gallery</b> ; Seattle, WA TEXTure Show <i>This is About the Stories</i>	2014

## References

		Francois Monard    
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# Urban Forestry Commission

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

**Roster:**

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Wildlife Biologist	Julia Michalak	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Council
3	M	6	2.	Urban Ecologist	Joseph Sisneros	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Mayor
1	NB	3	3.	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Falisha Kurji	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	F	4	4.	Hydrologist or Similar Professional	Becca Neumann	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	4	5.	Arborist	Stuart Niven	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Council
1	M	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Hao Liang	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	3	7.	NGO Representative	Joshua N. Morris	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	M	7	8.	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Michael Moehring	4/1/22	3/31/25	2	Mayor
6	M	n/a	9.	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Blake Voorhees	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Commission
6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/21	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
9	F	2	13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Lia Hill	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council

**SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	3			1		1			4			
Council	2	3		Non-Binary	1					3			2
Other	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>			<b>8</b>			<b>2</b>

**Key:**

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.





Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02203, **Version:** 1

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Appointment of Hao Liang as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.


The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Hao Liang</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Landscape Architect</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> <i>mm/dd/yy.</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>4/1/2021</i> <b>to</b> <i>3/31/2024</i>  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>Haller Lake</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>98133</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b> [REDACTED]
<b>Background:</b> <i>Hao Liang is a landscape architect. He devotes his academic and professional interests to design, cultural landscape, urban forestry, and marginalized communities. As a designer, he thinks cross-disciplinarily about social and environmental issues at different scales. He has worked on a wide range of projects including public space, green infrastructure, campus planning, commercial development, and residential design. Hao enjoys the process of collaboration, learning from communities, and watching the daily changes of our built environment.</i>  <i>In the context of the Urban Forestry Commission, Hao sees identity, inclusion, and equity as situated in different layers on a given topic, which are policy, planning, design, practice, and outreach. Hao is familiar with planning studies and design implementations. He will strive to communicate his specialty to others, make the process easier when it can be, and encourage everyone to participate.</i>  <i>Hao is being appointed to serve the remainder of a three-year term ending March 31, 2024.</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <i>Bruce A. Harrell</i> <b>Date:</b> 3/1/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.



# Hao Liang

## PROFILE

a well-rounded landscape architect with professional ability in site analysis, grading, construction detailing, planting, code compliances and research studies

experience with various project types and phases

collaborator & fast learner with a wide range of interests from social to economical topics

proficiency with various softwares in design

## CREDIBILITIES

**Registered Landscape Architect**  
State of Massachusetts (#4331)

**ISA Certified Arborist**  
(PN-9067A)

## EDUCATION

2013 - 2015  
**University of Washington**  
Master of Landscape Architecture  
Thesis: "Towards a resilient landscape—  
Eco-social redevelopment in Chengdu Plain"

2006 - 2010  
**Agricultural University of Hebei**  
Bachelor of Landscape Architecture  
Capstone project: "A Marginalized Landscape—  
Rethink the Tibetan neighborhood in Chengdu"

## DESIGN AWARDS

2019  
Aim for the Sky: The Buffalo Skyway Corridor  
Competition - Finalist

2016  
Open Space Design Competition of  
Shanghai's East Bund - 2nd Place

2015  
Boston "Living with Water" Competition  
- Semi-Finalist

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

OCT. 2020 - CURRENT  
**HBB Landscape Architecture**  
Seattle, WA  
Designer

Selected Works  
**120th Ave NE - NE 16th to Northup Way, Bellevue, WA**  
roadway improvements | conceptual design, design development  
**175th Street Corridor Improvements, Shoreline, WA**  
roadway improvements | conceptual design, design development

NOV. 2015 - APR. 2020  
**Reed Hilderbrand**  
Cambridge, MA  
Senior Designer

Selected Works  
**Boston City Hall Plaza, Boston, MA**  
civic plaza | master plan, program development, conceptual design alternatives  
**Smith Residence, Wellesley, MA**  
private residence | schematic design, project management  
**House Zero of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA**  
institutional courtyard | schematic design, design development, construction documentation & administration  
**National Arboretum Penjing & Bonsai Museum, Washington, D.C.**  
museum complex | framework plan, conceptual design, strategic implementation studies  
**MIT West Campus Common, Cambridge, MA**  
university campus | master plan, conceptual design alternatives, athletic facility planning  
**Hunting Valley, Cleveland, OH**  
private residence & sculpture park | construction documentation & administration  
**Landscape Standards of Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA**  
university campus | landscape performance metrics, design guideline  
**325 Binney Street, Cambridge, MA**  
corporation campus | landscape design competition

JAN. 2015 - JUN. 2015  
**GGLO**  
Seattle, WA  
Intern

AUG. 2011 - MAR. 2013  
**China Research Center of Landscape Architectural Design and Planning**  
Beijing, China  
Designer

Selected Works  
**East Baiqi Area in Taiwanese Investment Zone, Quanzhou, Fujian**  
urban development | urban design, master plan  
**Congtai Residential District, Handan, Hebei**  
residential complex | schematic design, design development  
**Oasis Park, Jinjiang, Fujian**  
public park | construction documentation & administration

JUL. 2010 - JUN. 2011  
**Turenscape**  
Beijing, China  
Designer  
Selected Works  
**Renewal of Jiangzitou Village, Jian, Jiangxi**  
cultural restoration | master plan, schematic design  
**Garden of Jiujiang Painting Gallery, Jiujiang, Jiangxi**  
museum complex | schematic design, design development  
**Tunchang Ecological Park, Tunchang, Hainan**  
public park | preservation plan, schematic design

# Urban Forestry Commission

6-1-21

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

**Roster:**

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Wildlife Biologist	Julia Michalak	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Council
6	NB	2	2.	Urban Ecologist	Elby Jones	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	3.	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Weston Brinkley	4/1/19	3/31/22	2	Council
6	F	4	4.	Hydrologist or Similar Professional	Rebecca B. Neumann	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	4	5.	Arborist	Stuart Niven	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Council
1	M	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Hao Liang	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	3	7.	NGO Representative	Joshua N. Morris	14/1/19	3/31/22	1	Council
6	M	7	8.	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Moehring	1/19/21	3/31/22	1	Mayor
6	M	n/a	9.	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Blake Voorhees	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Commission
6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/20	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
			13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Vacant	4/1/18	3/31/24		Council

**SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
<b>Mayor</b>	2	3		Non-Binary	1					5			
<b>Council</b>	3	2								4			1
<b>Other</b>	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	6	5		1	1					10			1

**Key:**

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02204, **Version:** 1


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Appointment of Rebecca B. Neumann as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2024.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Rebecca B. Neumann</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Hydrologist</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> <i>mm/dd/yy.</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>4/1/2021</i> <b>to</b> <i>3/31/2024</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b>
<b>Background:</b> <p>Dr. Neumann leads the hydro-biogeochemistry research group in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Washington. The group investigates transport and reaction of chemicals in the environment, tackling societally relevant topics, such as food and water quality and global climate change. Dr. Neumann was the 2018 recipient of the American Geophysical Union’s Charles S. Falkenberg Award, which recognizes “an early- to middle-career scientist who has contributed to the quality of life, economic opportunities and stewardship of the planet through the use of Earth science information.” Prior to UW, Dr. Neumann worked as a NOAA Climate and Global Change postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University in the Department of Organismal and Evolutionary Biology. She received a Doctorate degree in Environmental Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and baccalaureate degrees in Civil and Environmental Engineering and Art and Art History from Rice University. Outside of work she enjoys exploring the mountains with her husband and two kids.</p> <p><i>Rebecca is being appointed to serve the remainder of a three-year term ending March 31, 2024.</i></p>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>  <b>Date:</b> 3/1/2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> Bruce A. Harrell <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

## Rebecca B. Neumann

Associate Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

**Objective.** To use my scientific and management skills in service of my community. To work toward ensuring the city of Seattle is a great place to live for all residents in all neighborhoods.

### Professional Positions

2018–pres. Associate Professor, Civil & Environmental Engineering, University of Washington

2011–2018 Assistant Professor

- Leader of University of Washington’s Hydro-biogeochemistry research program that is addressing climate change, food quality and water quality.
- Advancing knowledge of how hydrologic, chemical and biological processes interact to control the movement and form of chemicals in the environment.
- Awarded ~\$11 million in federal and state research grants.
- Received American Geophysical Union’s Charles S. Falkenberg Award for “contributions to the quality of life, economic opportunities and stewardship of the planet through the use of Earth science information” (2018)
- Conducting and overseeing fieldwork at sites around the globe (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Peru, Alaska, Washington State), laboratory and plant-growth experiments, and computer modeling.
- Presenting results in professional meetings, public seminars, public meetings and peer-reviewed manuscripts (30 peer-reviewed publications, 1388 citations, 15 h-index, see [Google Scholar](#))
- Supervising postdoctoral researchers, graduate students, laboratory and field technicians, and undergraduate students in research (35+ total people).
- Teaching undergraduate and graduate environmental engineering courses.

2021–pres. Community Scientist, Thriving Earth Exchange, American Geophysical Union

- Assisting Otsego County, NY create up-to-date greenhouse gas inventory at the municipality level
- Identifying projects that will improve community resilience while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

2017–2020 Independent Consultant

- Provided expert advice to the Port of Tacoma for remediating an arsenic-contaminated site.
- Worked with consultants to design soil and water sampling and analysis plans and to interpret data.
- Collaborated in development of a flow and transport model used to assess remediation options.
- Presented findings to site managers at the Department of Ecology.

### Notable Service Activities

- Justice, Equity, Diversity & Inclusions Committee, UW Civil & Environ. Engineering (2021 – present)
- UW Environmental Stewardship Committee (2021 – present)
- American Geophysical Union’s Sustainability Committee (2020)
- Development team for Earth Hero app for calculating carbon footprint and identifying personal actions that can reduce carbon emissions (2019 – present)
- Reviewer for California Environmental Protection Agency’s draft document titled, *Proposed Naturally Occurring Concentrations of Inorganic Arsenic in White and Brown Rice* (2017)
- UW Program on Climate Change advisory committee member (2016 – 2018)

### Professional Preparation

Rice University, Houston, TX. Civil Engineering / Art & Art History. B.S. / B.A., 2002

Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. Environmental Engineering. Ph.D., 2009

Thesis title: “The Hydrogeochemistry of Pond and Rice Field Recharge: Implications for the Arsenic Contaminated Aquifers in Bangladesh.”

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Ecology. Postdoctoral position. 2009–2011

Awarded NOAA Climate and Global Change Postdoctoral Fellowship. Project title: “The Magnitude of Hydraulic Redistribution of Water by Plants: A Laboratory and Modeling Investigation.”

# Urban Forestry Commission

6-1-21

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

## Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Wildlife Biologist	Julia Michalak	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Council
6	NB	2	2.	Urban Ecologist	Elby Jones	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Mayor
6	M	6	3.	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Weston Brinkley	4/1/19	3/31/22	2	Council
6	F	4	4.	Hydrologist or Similar Professional	Rebecca B. Neumann	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	4	5.	Arborist	Stuart Niven	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Council
1	M	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Hao Liang	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	3	7.	NGO Representative	Joshua N. Morris	14/1/19	3/31/22	1	Council
6	M	7	8.	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Moehring	1/19/21	3/31/22	1	Mayor
6	M	n/a	9.	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Blake Voorhees	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Commission
6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/20	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
			13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Vacant	4/1/18	3/31/24		Council

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	2	3		Non-Binary	1					5			
Council	3	2								4			1
Other	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>					<b>10</b>			<b>1</b>

### Key:

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.





Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02205, **Version:** 2


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Appointment of Falisha Kurji as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2025.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Falisha Kurji</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Natural Resource Agency or University Representative</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>		<b>Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Council <input type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Date Appointed:</b> <i>mm/dd/yy.</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> <i>4/1/2022</i> <b>to</b> <i>3/31/2025</i>  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>TBD</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b>
<b>Background:</b> Falisha Kurji (they/she) is a graduate of the University of Florida with majors in Sociology and Sustainability Studies. They are deeply passionate about the intersections of environmental and social justice, and seek to advocate for BIPOC, lower-income, and unhoused communities' access to green spaces. They are an alum of the Doris Duke Conservation Scholars Program at the University of Washington, where they developed a strong foundation and experience working on environmental justice issues. They are currently the Community Partnerships Coordinator at Seattle Parks Foundation, where they work with various community-led groups who are working to create safe and accessible public green spaces. In their free time, they enjoy learning about ethnobotany, connecting with their South Asian heritage, and dancing.  <i>Falisha is being appointed to serve a three-year term ending March 31, 2025.</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>    <b>Date Signed (appointed):</b> April 28, 2022		<b>Appointing Signatory:</b>  <i>Dan Strauss</i> <i>Seattle City Councilmember</i> <i>Chair, Land Use Committee</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

# Falisha Kurji

She/They | [REDACTED]

## ***Education***

University of Florida Honors Program

**Bachelor of Arts in Sustainability Studies, *Cum Laude***

**Bachelor of Arts in Sociology, *Summa Cum Laude***

*Minor in Geography*

GPA: 3.89/4.00

**May 2020**

## ***Experience***

**Community Partnerships Coordinator, *Seattle Parks Foundation***

**August 2021-Present**

- Foster partnerships with Seattle-based community led organizations to champion green spaces
- Manages grants and reporting processes in collaboration with community groups
- Attends community-led public green space events
- Advocates for increased services for priority projects in under-invested neighborhoods

**Environmental Aide, *King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks*** **October 2020-May 2021**

- Facilitated outreach and established partnerships with BIPOC community members
- Co-created the King County Swimming Beaches Survey and analyzed 1,000+ results
- Co-authored a report of survey findings
- Updated 10 King County Lakes webpages to improve accessibility and accuracy

**Undergraduate Researcher, *UF Department of Sociology***

**August 2019-May 2020**

- Conducted qualitative and quantitative content analyses of 100 American journalistic articles using Excel spreadsheets
- Synthesized a literature review of existing research about the fast fashion industry with a focus on its implications for women and environments in the Global South
- Authored an Honors Thesis in Sociology with Summa Cum Laude Distinction

**Doris Duke Intern, *Tree Kangaroo Conservation Program, Woodland Park Zoo***

**June 2019-August 2019**

- Created an informational packet for Indigenous community members to prepare for a cultural exchange of ecological knowledge
- Collected qualitative data and documented the exchange through interviews, photography, and videography during the 2019 Annual Tribal Canoe Journey
- Informed the Woodland Park Zoo's Public Relations Team on Indigenous conservation to assist with their press release

**Student Organizer and Co-Founder, *Divest UF***

**January 2018-September 2019**

- Advocated for ethical investment in multiple meetings with members of the UF Investment Corporation and the Board of Trustees
- Established partnerships with faculty, student organizations, and community groups to gain support for fossil fuel divestment
- Facilitated organizational meetings and developed detailed meeting minutes
- Coordinated logistics for direct action events

# Urban Forestry Commission

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

**Roster:**

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Wildlife Biologist	Julia Michalak	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Council
3	M	6	2.	Urban Ecologist	Joseph Sisneros	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Mayor
1	NB	3	3.	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Falisha Kurji	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	F	4	4.	Hydrologist or Similar Professional	Becca Neumann	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	4	5.	Arborist	Stuart Niven	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Council
1	M	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Hao Liang	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Mayor
6	M	3	7.	NGO Representative	Joshua N. Morris	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Council
6	M	7	8.	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Michael Moehring	4/1/22	3/31/25	2	Mayor
6	M	n/a	9.	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Blake Voorhees	4/1/20	3/31/23	1	Commission
6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/21	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
9	F	2	13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Lia Hill	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council

**SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)				
	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	3			1		1			4			
Council	2	3		Non-Binary	1					3			2
Other	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>			<b>8</b>			<b>2</b>

**Key:**

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 02207, **Version:** 1


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Reappointment of Joshua N. Morris as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to March 31, 2025.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.



# City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Joshua N. Morris</i>		
<b>Board/Commission Name:</b> <i>Urban Forestry Commission</i>		<b>Position Title:</b> <i>NGO Representative</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Appointment OR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reappointment	<b>City Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> City Council <input type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other:	<b>Term of Position: *</b> 4/1/2022 <b>to</b> 3/31/2025  <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>	
<b>Residential Neighborhood:</b> <i>Capitol Hill</i>	<b>Zip Code:</b> <i>98102</i>	<b>Contact Phone No.:</b>
<b>Background:</b> <i>Joshua is the Urban Conservation Manager at Seattle Audubon. In his role, Joshua leads engagement on local conservation issues and coordinates coalition building, advocacy and outreach to support urban conservation priorities which include our urban trees.</i>  <i>Joshua holds a Master of Arts in international environmental policy and brings over ten years of professional and volunteer experience in environmental conservation to the Urban Forestry Commission.</i>  <i>He is being appointed to a second term ending March 31, 2025.</i>		
<b>Authorizing Signature (original signature):</b>    <b>Date Signed (appointed):</b> April 28, 2022	<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> <i>Dan Strauss</i> <i>Seattle City Councilmember</i> <i>Chair, Land Use Committee</i>	

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.

# JOSHUA N. MORRIS

## CONSERVATIONIST/ENVIRONMENTALIST

I'm an environmentalist committed to protecting Earth's biodiversity through science, policy, education, and advocacy. I have over ten years of professional and volunteer experience and have successfully worked with a wide variety of people and organizations, from subsistence farmers in Cameroon to elected officials in Seattle. I am applying to represent Seattle Audubon as NGO Representative, Position 7, on Seattle's Urban Forestry Commission.

## KEY STRENGTHS

- Data analysis (Tableau, Excel, ArcGIS MS SQL Server)
- Research and report writing
- Project management
- Policy analysis
- Climate change adaptation & vulnerability analyses
- Intercultural communication
- Public speaking

## EDUCATION

**Master of Arts** 08/2017  
International Environmental Policy  
*Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California*

**Bachelor of Science** 08/2008  
Biochemistry  
*University of Washington, Seattle*

**Bachelor of Science** 08/2008  
Neurobiology  
*University of Washington, Seattle*

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

**Urban Conservation Manager** 10/2018 – Present  
*Seattle Audubon, Seattle, Washington*

- Lead Seattle Audubon's engagement on local conservation issues.
- Coordinate coalition building, advocacy, and outreach to support urban conservation priorities.
- Work cooperatively with conservation partners across the City of Seattle and the region.

**Project Scientist** 08/2017 – 09/2018  
*The Nature Conservancy  
& University of California Santa Cruz, California*

- Developed conceptual framework and geodatabase for sea level rise conservation action planning along California's 21 coastal counties. Work will guide investments in potential future habitat and non-conservation lands resilient to sea level rise.
- Compiled comprehensive reference list of policy and financing options for strategic sea level rise conservation.
- Co-authored technical report assessing the vulnerability of 40 coastal habitat types, conservation lands, and imperiled species to sea level rise in California.

**California Coastal Conservation Assessment Fellow** 12/2016 – 08/2017  
*The Nature Conservancy, Santa Cruz, California*

- Designed and executed a spatially explicit vulnerability analysis for 396 socially significant coastal access locations in California with an eye toward environmental justice.
- Co-developed a transparent process for characterizing the conservation management status of over 20,000 square kilometers of coastal California.
- Managed, mined and visualized data using ArcGIS, Tableau, MS SQL Server, and Excel to derive high-impact messages from our coastal vulnerability assessment. Generated over 30 publishable visualizations and infographics.

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (CONT.)**

- Environmental Economics Graduate Teaching Assistant** 09/2016 – 12/2016  
*Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California*
- Led economics review sessions for 46 graduate students.
  - Review topics included: Pigouvian taxation, Coase theorem, non-market ecosystem service valuation techniques, and fisheries and forestry economics.
- Research Fellow: Deep-sea Mining in the Pacific** 05/2016 – 09/2016  
*International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Suva, Fiji*
- Interviewed a wide range of stakeholders regarding the potential benefits and impacts of deep-sea mining, including former government ministers, scientists, lawyers, and economists.
  - Co-author on green paper synthesizing and simplifying the literature on deep-sea mining for use by country leaders.
- Graduate Research Assistant: Non-market Valuation of Ecosystem Services** 02/2016 – 05/2016  
*National Ocean Economics Program (NOEP)  
 Center for the Blue Economy, Monterey, California*
- Located, reviewed, and summarized 100+ studies of non-market valuation of ecosystem services for inclusion in the NOEP's data base and for use in large-scale metanalysis.
  - Reviewed and revised existing 700 records in NOEP database for quality assurance/quality control.
- Legal Assistant** 11/2014 – 12/2015  
*Johnson, Fantl & Kennifer, LLP, Monterey, California*
- Drafted initial versions of legal instruments including trusts, wills, power of attorney documents, and grant deeds.
  - Effectively worked with a variety of legal, financial, and real-estate professionals to transferred millions of dollars of assets into the trust funds of over 20 clients.
- Science Assessment Editor / Item Writer** 01/2014 – 10/2014  
*CTB/McGraw-Hill, Monterey, California*
- Critically reviewed and edited standardized science questions for content, depth of knowledge, and bias control.
  - Wrote 100+ original, high-quality, creative science questions for use on high-stakes assessment tools.
  - Managed, tracked, and manipulated meta-data for thousands of test questions.
- High School Chemistry Teacher** 06/2011– 07/2013  
*United States Peace Corps  
 Government High School, Ewoh, Republic of Cameroon*
- Taught chemistry and computer science to 120 students at a government high school, achieving one of the highest pass rates in the school.
  - Organized and presented at a workshop on HIV virology for health care professionals.
  - Integrated into small-village society, becoming conversational in West-African pidgin English and earning social rank of "quarter head" by the village chief.
- VOLUNTEER SERVICE**
- Seattle Urban Nature Guide** 08/2018-Present  
*Seattle Parks and Recreation, Seattle, Washington*
- Develop thematic, interpretive nature programming for Seattle Parks.
  - Lead public guided nature walks with up to 20 participants.
- Founding President** 09/2016 – 08/2017  
*MIIS Ocean Club, Middlebury Inst. of Int'l Studies, Monterey, California*
- Founded new campus club to promote ocean activism and recreation.
  - Planned 6 events/semester, including beach cleanups, kayak trips, film screenings, and moderated panel discussions.
- Marine Protected Areas Watch Volunteer** 2015  
*The Otter Project, Santa Cruz, California*
- Citizen scientist collecting human use data on marine protected areas and sea otter occurrences.
- Adult Literacy Tutor** 2015  
*Monterey County Free Libraries, California*
- Worked one-on-one with adult non-native English speaker to improve literacy skills.



**VOLUNTEER SERVICE (CONT.)****Ecotourism Director**

02/2010 – 11/2010

*Tia Marie's Coastal Cooperative*, San Carlos, Mexico

- Scouted routes for interpretive, guided desert hikes.
- Developed field guide to local flora.

**Orphanage Volunteer**

01/2009 – 05/2009

*OCEAN Nepal*, Kathmandu, Nepal

- Provided general care to 10 children at a privately-funded orphanage.
- Raised over \$4,000 in private donations for OCEAN Nepal.

**PUBLICATIONS**Technical Report

Heady, W. N., B. S. Cohen, M. G. Gleason, **J. N. Morris**, S. G. Newkirk, K. R. Klausmeyer, H. Walecka, E. Gagneron, M. Small. 2018. *Conserving California's Coastal Habitats: A Legacy and a Future with Sea Level Rise*. The Nature Conservancy, San Francisco, CA; California State Coastal Conservancy, Oakland, CA. 143 pages.  
[www.coastalresilience.org/project/conservation-assessment/](http://www.coastalresilience.org/project/conservation-assessment/)

Grants

Capitol Hill Connections: Reducing Pesticide Use at Cal Anderson Park and Creating a Vegetation Plan for a Habitat Corridor along 11<sup>th</sup> Avenue in Capitol Hill (Pending). National Fish and Wildlife Foundation's 5 Star and Urban Waters Restoration Program. Lead: **Joshua Morris**. \$40,000.

Conservation and Adaptation to Maintain Coastal Habitat for Future Californians. Ocean Protection Council Proposition 84 Competitive Grant Program. PIs: Walter Heady, Charles Colgan, Sarah Newkirk. \$247,000.

Non-use values of deep-sea ecosystems in Fiji. U.S. Fulbright Fellowship Program 2017 (Alternate Selection).

Other

**Morris, Joshua**. 2017. ProbleMaro [Ocean of Troubles]. *American Esperantist*. No. 2017:3 (May-Jun). Esperanto-USA, Emeryville, CA. <http://esperanto-usa.org/bulteno/arhivo/2017/03/60-scienco/>

**Morris, Joshua**. "Chapter 2 in which Josh continually wonders what could possibly go wrong." CBE Summer Fellows Internship Program. 31 July 2016. sites.miis.edu/cbefellows/2016/07/31/chapter-2-in-which-josh-continually-wonders-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/#more-1035

**Morris, Joshua**. "Lizard Replaces Queen on Coin, and Other Wonderful News." CBE Summer Fellows Internship Program. 28 June 2016 sites.miis.edu/cbefellows/2016/06/28/lizard-replaces-queen-on-coin-and-other-wonderful-news/#more-771

**Morris, Joshua**. 2011. Dankon malgrauxe [Thanks anyway]. *American Esperantist*. No. 2011:6 (Nov-Dec). Esperanto-USA, Emeryville, CA. <http://esperanto-usa.org/bulteno/arhivo/2011/06/09-djk/>

**Morris, Joshua**. 2012. Kien vi iras? [Where are you going?]. *American Esperantist*. No. 2011:5 (Sep-Oct). Esperanto-USA, Emeryville, CA. <http://esperanto-usa.org/bulteno/arhivo/2011/05/08-djk/>

**Morris, Joshua**. 2011. Blankulo [White Man]. *American Esperantist*. No. 2011:4 (Jul-Aug). Esperanto-USA, Emeryville, CA. <http://esperanto-usa.org/bulteno/arhivo/2011/04/06-djk/>

**WEB PRESENCE**

LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshuanmorris/>

iNaturalist: [https://www.inaturalist.org/observations?user\\_id=joshuamorris](https://www.inaturalist.org/observations?user_id=joshuamorris)

# Urban Forestry Commission

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.14.920, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 3-year terms:

- 6 City Council-appointed
- 6 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed

## Roster:

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6	F	7	10.	Get Engaged Member	Laura Keil	9/1/21	8/31/22	1	Mayor
9	F	4	11.	Environmental Justice Rep.	Jessica Hernandez	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council
6	F	7	12	Public Health Rep.	Jessica Jones	4/1/21	3/31/24	2	Mayor
9	F	2	13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Lia Hill	4/1/21	3/31/24	1	Council

## SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

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	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	Asian	Black/African American	Hispanic/Latino	American Indian/Alaska Native	Other	Caucasian/Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	3			1		1			4			
Council	2	3		Non-Binary	1					3			2
Other	1									1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>			<b>8</b>			<b>2</b>

### Key:

- \*D List the corresponding Diversity Chart number (1 through 9)
- \*\*G List gender, M= Male, F= Female, T= Transgender, NB= Non-Binary O= Other U= Unknown
- RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.



Legislation Text

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**File #:** CB 120307, **Version:** 2

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**CITY OF SEATTLE**

**ORDINANCE \_\_\_\_\_**

**COUNCIL BILL \_\_\_\_\_**

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Audio Recording Systems.

WHEREAS, Section 14.18.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), enacted by Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, requires City Council approval of a surveillance impact report (SIR) related to uses of surveillance technology, with existing/retroactive technology to be placed on a Master Technology List; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.020 applies to the Audio Recording Systems in use by the Seattle Police Department (SPD); and

WHEREAS, SPD conducted policy rule review and community review as part of the development of the SIR; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.080, enacted by Ordinance 125679, also requires review of the SIR by the Community Surveillance Working Group, composed of relevant stakeholders, and a statement from the Chief Technology Officer in response to the Working Group's recommendations; and

WHEREAS, development of the SIR and review by the Working Group have been completed; NOW,

THEREFORE,

**BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's Audio Recording Systems. The City Council accepts the December 17, 2021, Surveillance

Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2.

Section 2. The Council requests the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to file a report with the Clerk by August 1, 2022 that identifies the manufacturers and vendors of the Audio Recording Systems described in the 2021 Surveillance Impact Report, version 2a.

Section 3. The Council requests the Seattle Police Department to file a report with the Clerk by December 31, 2022 on the metrics provided to the Chief Technology Officer for use in the annual equity assessments of Audio Recording Systems.

Section 4. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force 30 days after its approval by the Mayor, but if not approved and returned by the Mayor within ten days after presentation, it shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Section 1.04.020.

Passed by the City Council the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

---

Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:

Attachment 1 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”)

Attachment 2 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”)

**2021 Surveillance Impact Report**

# **Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”)**

**Seattle Police Department**

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## Surveillance Impact Report (“SIR”) overview

### About the Surveillance Ordinance

Section 14.18.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), enacted by Ordinance [125376](#) and last amended by Ordinance 125679, also referred to as the “Surveillance Ordinance,” charges the City’s executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the “Surveillance Policy”.


### How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department (“Seattle IT”). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

### Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.





# Privacy Impact Assessment

## Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA") is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

## When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

## 1.0 Abstract

### 1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Seattle Police Department (SPD) utilizes audio recording systems in a handful of ways to obtain information during a criminal investigation. Pursuant to the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt.9.73 RCW](#), these technologies are applied only after obtaining appropriate consent and/or legal search warrant authority. In such a circumstance, SPD employs audio recording devices on a person's body or situated and concealed in place within an environment to capture audio conversations between individuals, wherein at least one participant is unaware of the recording.

### 1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

SPD's audio recording systems capture conversations of identifiable individuals, some of whom are unaware of the recording. Without appropriate safeguards, this raises significant privacy concerns. Recognizing these concerns, SPD only utilizes audio recording systems in a limited fashion with appropriate consent and/or court order.

## 2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview gives the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed

### 2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

Audio recording systems allow SPD to pursue resolution of criminal investigations expeditiously by recording conversations of suspects, wherein an appropriate determination that sufficient probable cause exists has been made and a warrant has been issued. Per law, probable cause is required to obtain a search warrant. Without this technology, SPD would be unable to interrupt ongoing criminal activity and collect important evidence in some criminal investigations.

### 2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

The primary benefit of audio recording systems is in the gathering of evidence used in the resolution of criminal investigations. Audio recording technologies have been utilized by law enforcement in the United States since the 1920s. "The value of employing electronic surveillance in the investigation of some forms of serious crime, in particular organized crime, is unquestionable. It allows the gathering of information unattainable through other means."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic\\_surveillance.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf)

### **2.3 Describe the technology involved.**

Audio recording devices are typically known as “wires” and can be concealed on a person or hidden in or on objects within a particular environment. Audio recording devices must be turned on by an individual and they record only portions of a conversation that occur while the device is on. The recording is stored locally on the device and must be downloaded onto a storage device (i.e., thumb drive, external hard drive) before it can be accessed and transcribed.

These devices have the ability to capture audio, video, or both. The legal and investigatory circumstances under which video is captured are different than those under which audio is captured. Video recording systems are discussed in the SIR entitled “Camera Systems”.

### **2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department’s mission.**

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD’s department priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community, and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively. Audio recording systems contribute to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of the investigation of criminal activity. These technologies are used only with proper consent and/or a warrant.

### **2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?**

All audio recording systems utilized by SPD are managed and maintained with the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). TESU receives verbal requests for the deployment of this technology from SPD detectives investigating crimes and documents the equipment requested, the case number, and saves a copy of the consent form and/or court order authorizing the equipment’s use. TESU then deploys the equipment to the requesting Officer/Detective to engage within the scope of the consent form and/or court order.

When the requesting Officer/Detective has completed recording, TESU downloads the audio on a thumb drive or external hard drive, provides this copy to the Officer/Detective for inclusion in the investigation file, and then purges all data from the audio recording device. No data is retained on the device or within TESU.

If no data was collected by the device that assists in the pursuit of the criminal investigation or falls within the scope of the consent form and/or court order, the device is purged in its entirety and no data is provided to the Officer/Detective for the investigation file.

### 3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

#### 3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

All audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). When an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment. TESU detectives then assign the audio recording device to the requesting Officer/Detective. Each deployment is logged, and all request forms (including consent form and/or court order) are maintained within TESU.

#### 3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

Audio recording devices are utilized only after legal standards of consent and/or court-issued warrant have been met, as required by the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt. 9.73 RCW](#).

#### 3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies. Audio recording devices may only be issued/deployed by TESU detectives. All TESU staff that deploy audio recording devices have received vendor training in their use. Once an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. TESU staff then train requesting Officers/Detectives in their use when they deploy the equipment. The TESU Supervisor screens all deployments, and ensures that all staff receive adequate training, specific to the technologies.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

## 4.0 Data Collection and Use

### 4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

Audio recording devices collect conversations and sounds of individuals related to a criminal investigation. The information is extracted onto a thumb drive from the device using locally stored computer application that resides on a computer in the TESU Unit. This application, accessible only to TESU staff, is used solely to extract audio data from a device and stores no data.

### 4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

Deployment of audio recording devices is constrained to the conditions stipulated by consent and/or court order, which provides the legal authority and the scope of collection. All deployments of audio recording devices are documented by TESU and subject to audit by the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor at any time.

As outlined in 2.5 above, if no data is collected by the device that assists in the pursuit of the criminal investigation or falls within the scope of the consent form and/or court order warrant (as determined by the judge), the device is purged in its entirety and no data is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective for the investigation file.

Data collected from audio recording devices is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective for the investigation and no data is retained by TESU.

### 4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

All of SPD's audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). Once an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment.

TESU detectives then assign the audio recording device to the requesting Officer/Detective.

Each deployment is logged, and all request forms (including consent form and/or court order warrant) are maintained within TESU.

### 4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

Consent and court ordered warrants determine the scope of each deployment. Audio recording devices are generally used to meet the needs of a criminal investigation, and the scope is specifically limited to the stipulations of consent and/or the court-ordered warrants providing authorization of use.

#### **4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?**

When audio recording devices are in use, they are installed temporarily within the scope of consent and/or warrant.

#### **4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?**

When audio recording devices are being utilized, they are used in a covert capacity, which necessitates authorization via consent and/or court-ordered warrant. Audio recording devices are intended to be disguised and are, thus, not visible to the public. There are no visible markings indicating when it is in use. This means that there are no markings that identify department ownership. Each device has an assigned number, however, that can be used to audit the device's deployment and use.

#### **4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?**

Only authorized SPD users can access the audio recording devices or the data while it resides in the devices. Access to the systems/technology is limited to TESU personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data removed from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including:

- [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,
- [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

#### **4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.**

SPD's audio recording devices are not operated or used by other agencies.

#### **4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?**

On probable cause, the court can issue order authorizing interception, transmission, and recording of private communications or conversations when one party to the conversation or communication has consented. Detailed requirements spelled out in RCW 9.73.090(2), (4), and (5), and RCW 9.73.120, .130, and .140

Officers/Detectives must establish probable cause, as well as a showing of necessity, and obtain consent and/or court-ordered warrant to utilize audio recording devices. Once this has been obtained, they must complete TESU's Request Form that requires an acceptable reason for deployment, case number, and copy of consent form and/or warrant, which must then be approved by the TESU Supervisor, before an audio recording device is deployed.

After TESU has extracted data and provided it to the requesting Officer/Detective, the data is included in the investigation file and treated as evidence.

#### **4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?**

Audio recording devices store audio data directly on the device. Access to the equipment and data stored on the device is accessible only to TESU staff. TESU staff extract the data, document the extraction, provide the data to the requesting Officer/Detective, and retain no copies of the data.

TESU maintains logs of requests (including copies of request forms and consent and/or warrants) and extractions that are available for audit. SPD's Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of the any system at any time. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can also access all data and audit for compliance at any time.

### **5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion**

#### **5.1 How will data be securely stored?**

Until data is extracted from an audio recording device by TESU staff, the data is temporarily stored on the device. A TESU detective extracts the data onto a SPD disc and provides the disc to the requesting Officer/Detective for inclusion in the investigation file. The audio recording device is then purged and no data is retained by TESU.

## 5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, investigational conversation recordings are retained "for 1 year after transcribed verbatim and verified OR until disposition of pertinent case file, whichever is sooner, then Destroy" (LE06-01-04 Rev. 1).

TESU maintains a log of requests (including copies of consent forms and warrants), extractions, and deployments that are available to any auditor, including the Officer of Inspector General and federal monitor.

## 5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

The scope of audio recording authorization is outlined in consent and court-ordered warrants. Any data that is collected outside the established scope is purged by the investigating detective.

All data collected within the scope of the appropriate authorization is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective and the device is purged. No data is retained by TESU.

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

## 5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

SPD's Intelligence and Analysis Section reviews the audit logs and ensures compliance with all regulations and requirements.

Audit, Policy & Research Section personnel can also conduct audits of all data collection software and systems. Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can audit for compliance at any time.



## 6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

### 6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

SPD has no data sharing partners for audio recording devices. No person, outside of SPD, has direct access to audio recording devices or the data while it resides in the device.

Data obtained from the system may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by audio recording devices may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provide by [SPD Policy 12.055](#). This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

## 6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigation, and to comply with legal requirements.

## 6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes  No

### 6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [28 CFR Part 20](#), regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260 \(auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems\)](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97 \(Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act\)](#).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

## 6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Research agreements must meet the standards reflected in [SPD Policy 12.055](#). Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [28 CFR Part 20](#). In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#).

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the audio recording devices may be used.

## 6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

Audio recording devices capture sounds as they are happening in the moment. The devices do not check for accuracy, as they are simply capturing a live exchange of sounds. They are not interpreting or otherwise, analyzing any data they collect.

## 6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

## 7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

### 7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

SPD's use of audio recording devices is governed at the state level by the [Washington Privacy Act](#). These devices are utilized only with consent and/or court-ordered warrant.

### 7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

[SPD Policy 12.050](#) mandates that all employees, including TESU personnel, receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

### 7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

Privacy risks revolve around improper collection of sounds and conversations between members of the general public. As it relates to covert audio recording, SPD mitigates this risk by deploying them consistent to the stipulations outlined in the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt. 9.73 RCW](#), and only by consent and/or with authorization of a court-ordered warrant.

[SMC 14.12](#) and [SPD Policy 6.060](#) direct all SPD personnel to "any documentation of information concerning a person's sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose."

Additionally, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

### 7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

The privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes (i.e., maintenance of all requests, copies of consent forms and warrants) that allow for any auditor, including the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor, to inspect use and deployment of audio recording devices. The potential of privacy risk is mitigated by the requirement of consent and/or court ordered warrant before the technology is utilized.

## 8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

### 8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

TESU itself does not disclose information collected by audio recording devices. This information is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective to be included in the requisite investigation file. TESU then purges all data collected. TESU maintains a log of all requests, deployments, and access.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

### 8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

Requests to utilize audio recording devices, as well as logs of deployments, are kept within TESU and are subject to audit by the TESU Supervisor, Office of the Inspector General, and the federal monitor at any time.

Audit data is available to the public via Public Records Request.

## Financial Information

### Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

### 1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

#### 1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current  potential

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source

Notes:

Initial acquisition costs are unavailable, as SPD has been using audio recording devices for decades.

#### 1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current  potential

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
\$5000.00				SPD Budget

Notes:

Periodic equipment maintenance and end of life replacement

#### 1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

Audio recording devices are used with consent and/or search warrant to resolve investigations. They provide invaluable evidence that could not be calculated in work hours.

#### 1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities

N/A

## Expertise and References

### Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report (“SIR”). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

### 1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	Karen Kramer, Senior Expert karen.kramer@unodc.org	Virtually all law enforcement agencies throughout the world rely on audio recording devices in the routine course of criminal investigations.

### 2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

### 3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any authoritative publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link
Current Practices in Electronic Surveillance	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	<a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf">https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf</a>
Personal Electronics for Law Enforcement Solid State Recorders and Body Wires	Georgia Tech Research Institute	<a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210488.pdf">https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210488.pdf</a>

## Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) and engagement for public comment worksheet

### Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

### Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments’ (“Seattle IT”) Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

### Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative (“RSJI”) is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

#### 1.0 Set Outcomes

**1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?**

- The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.
- There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
- The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
- The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.



### 1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Some personally identifiable information (PII) gathered during criminal investigations could be used to identify individuals who are associates of criminal suspects, such as their name, home address or contact information. Victims of criminal activity may also be identified during incident responses, whose identities should be protected in accordance with RCW 42.56.240 and RCW 70.02. SPD mitigates these risks by retaining as evidence only recordings within the framework established by the consent document and/or warrant obtained for each use of the technology.

### 1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. To mitigate the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias in the use of these audio recording systems, these devices are utilized only with consent and/or court-ordered warrant, having established probable cause.

### 1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

all Seattle neighborhoods

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ballard                | <input type="checkbox"/> Northwest                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Belltown               | <input type="checkbox"/> Madison Park / Madison Valley |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Beacon Hill            | <input type="checkbox"/> Magnolia                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Capitol Hill           | <input type="checkbox"/> Rainier Beach                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central District       | <input type="checkbox"/> Ravenna / Laurelhurst         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia City          | <input type="checkbox"/> South Lake Union / Eastlake   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delridge               | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> First Hill             | <input type="checkbox"/> Southwest                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Georgetown             | <input type="checkbox"/> South Park                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Greenwood / Phinney    | <input type="checkbox"/> Wallingford / Fremont         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International District | <input type="checkbox"/> West Seattle                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interbay               | <input type="checkbox"/> King county (outside Seattle) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> North                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Outside King County.          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Northeast              |  |

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use here.

### **1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?**

City of Seattle demographics: White - 69.5%; Black or African American - 7.9%; Amer. Indian & Alaska Native - 0.8%; Asian - 13.8%; Native Hawaiian & Pacific Islander - 0.4%; Other race - 2.4%; Two or more races - 5.1%; Hispanic or Latino ethnicity (of any race): 6.6%; Persons of color: 33.7%.

King County demographics: White – 70.1%; Black or African American – 6.7%; American Indian & Alaskan Native – 1.1%; Asian, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander – 17.2%; Hispanic or Latino (of any race) – 9.4%

### **1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?**

Audio recording systems are used exclusively during the investigation of crimes and only with consent and/or court-ordered warrant, having established probable cause. There is no distinction in the levels of service SPD provides to the various and diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals within the city.

All use of the audio recording systems must also comply with SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.

### **1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

The Aspen Institute on Community Change defines *structural racism* as “...public policies, institutional practices, cultural representations and other norms [which] work in various, often reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial group inequity.”<sup>1</sup> Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to structural racism and thus creating a disparate impact on historically targeted communities. Data sharing is frequently necessary during the course of a criminal investigation to follow up on leads and gather information on suspects from outside law enforcement agencies. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is an essential part of the investigative process.

In an effort to mitigate the possibility of disparate impact on historically targeted communities, SPD has established policies regarding the dissemination of data in connection with criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and other authorized researchers.

Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

**1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

Like decisions around data sharing, data storage and retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities. The information obtained by the audio recording systems is related only to criminal investigations and its users are subject to SPD’s existing policies prohibiting bias-based policing. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

**1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you / have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.**

The most important unintended possible consequence related to the continued utilization of the audio recording systems is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unlawful surveillance. SPD mitigates this risk by requiring consent and/or a court-ordered warrant, having established probable cause, prior to the utilization of these technologies.

**2.0 Public Outreach**

**2.1 Scheduled public meeting(s).**


<b>Location</b>	Virtual Event
<b>Time</b>	Thursday, June 10 <sup>th</sup> , 12 PM


<b>Location</b>	Virtual Event
<b>Time</b>	Tuesday, June 29 <sup>th</sup> , 3 PM


### **3.0 Public Comment Analysis**

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed. Please note due to the volume of comments, analysis represents a summarization of all comments received. Technology specific comments will be included in Appendix C.

#### **3.1 Summary of Response Volume**









### 3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Q2 What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

response question survey withholding information public comment open questions  
RMS Mark43 opposed informed public comment Missing information due  
hinder ability informed SPD using thus greatly hinder TESU public answered thus  
incorporates numerous questions public regarding answers questions numerous since  
dodged providing answers per year use Additionally SPD dodged  
many incidents per engagement meetings Additionally SPD specified many  
4a public engagement clarity regarding magnitude public Group 4a  
data retention period allocated questions public incident types SPD  
little time allocated CAD etc incident audio recordings defining limiting CAD  
Lack transparency Thus concerns include use Maltego concerns will Thus whether  
questions list concerns via answers open questions etc worst missing answers  
used privacy-wise assume worst **Callyo apps**  
approach security privacy-wise  
**audio recording devices** Since safest approach  
**data** survey Since safest **SPD** safest approach security **iBase**  
security privacy-wise assume **Maltego** assume worst missing  
**Lack clarity regarding** missing answers open  
**use Callyo apps** open questions list access list concerns will installed  
will Thus concerns apps policy defining limiting Maltego SIR limiting CAD etc  
regarding whether etc incident types use iBase types SPD may  
time allocated questions SPD RMS Mark43 questions public Group  
regarding magnitude use Group 4a public specified many incidents  
public engagement meetings incidents per year meetings Additionally SPD  
Surveillance always concern SPD dodged providing Security  
providing answers questions record questions numerous questions audio  
questions public answered deployment answered thus greatly write access  
greatly hinder ability One safely assume ability informed public SPD withholding information  
public comment open recording devices use SPD use Maltego question survey Since

### 3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Q3 What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Remains seen value **None**

### 3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Q4 What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

past history prior Callyo apps Require City leadership past stop funding tool tool Given City security requiring SPD recommend City leadership etc Require SPD problems fixed SPD may used fixed systemic problems version criminal system fixed considerations depend SPD support pipelines criminal TBD valid considerations community needs support update Callyo SIR tools money community per year use surveil residents SPD many incidents per use Maltego SPD disclose many record specific incident types audio recording devices Policy state specific report recent audit questions Require SPD provide date report Require SPD answer SPD publicly provide changes made Require Require SPD Policy changes superficial changes access limited cosmetic changes Require SPD update will pursue limited SPD answer public right instead will

**Require SPD disclose** suspect fundamentally right

**use** surveillance technologies suspect **data**


prior surveillance technologies **iBase** technologies suspect fundamentally

**Maltego** fundamentally right instead

**answer public questions** instead will pursue **Callyo apps** pursue limited cosmetic devices cosmetic changes superficial Require SPD publicly superficial changes made publicly provide date made Require SPD date report recent public questions Require recent audit SPD SPD Policy state systems state specific incident Ban Improve security requiring SPD surveil residents disclose many incidents need tools money incidents per year money community needs SPD update Callyo needs support pipelines apps Require SPD pipelines criminal system valid considerations depend system fixed systemic depend SPD answering systemic problems fixed audited tools recommend City audio recordings City leadership stop etc Improve security Given City leadership leadership stop funding leadership past history funding tool Given history prior surveillance

### 3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.





## 4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed.

### 4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

What program, policy and partnership strategies will you implement? What strategies address immediate impacts? Long-term impacts? What strategies address root causes of inequity listed above? How will you partner with stakeholders for long-term positive change?

## 5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

### 5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

Respond here.

## Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

### Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group (“working group”), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

“Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement.”

## Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

From: Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG)

To: Seattle City Council

Date: Oct 25, 2021

Re: Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for Audio Recording Systems

### Executive Summary

The CSWG has completed its review of the Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for the three surveillance technologies included in Group 4a of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance technology review process. These technologies are Callyo, i2 iBase, Audio Recording Systems, and Maltego. This document is the CSWG's Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for Audio Recording Systems used by Seattle Police Department (SPD) as set forth in SMC 14.18.080(B)(1), which we provide for inclusion in the final SIRs submitted to the City Councils.

This document first provides our recommendations to Council, then provides background information, key concerns, and outstanding questions regarding Audio Recording Systems.

Our assessment of Audio Recording Systems as used by Seattle Police Department (SPD) focuses on five major issues:

1. It is unclear what specific devices are used by SPD, as the SIR does not specify the manufacturer or function of devices used and it is unclear how devices are used and where they may be used.
2. It is unclear what specific data extraction software is used by SPD to extract audio data from devices.
3. It is unclear what consent procedures exist to ensure that SPD is only capturing and retaining audio that falls within the terms of an individual's consent.
4. There are inadequate policies regarding data collection, sharing, retention, deletion, storage, and protection.
5. There are inadequate policies for the issuance of recording devices and processing of recordings that limit the role of the investigating officer and ensure oversight.

### Recommendations

The Council should adopt clear and enforceable rules that ensure, at the minimum, the following:

1. The purpose and allowable uses of Audio Recording Systems must be narrowly and clearly defined, and any SPD use of Audio Recording Systems must be limited to that specific purpose and those allowable uses. There must be a requirement for SPD to state for which specific incident types Audio Recording Systems may be used.
2. There must be a requirement for SPD to publicly disclose the names of the manufacturers, vendors, model names, and model numbers of the Audio Recording Systems in use.
3. There must be a requirement for SPD to make clear the warrant and/or consent procedures authorizing the use of a recording device.

4. There must be clear rules for the issuance of recording devices and processing of all recordings that limit the role of the investigating officer and ensure oversight by a supervisor. These rules should include a data-deletion protocol that makes clear who is responsible for deleting improperly collected data, ensuring regular oversight of deletion, and providing clarity as to what data must be deleted when no warrant is used.
5. There must be clear procedures for securely sharing data with third parties, including a policy that ensures the erasure of shared data.
6. There must be a requirement for SPD to disclose how they ensure authenticity of recordings and individuals in audio recordings.
7. There must be a requirement for SPD to disclose for how many incidents per year they use Audio Recording Systems.
8. There must be a requirement for an independent audit of SPD's audio recording devices and that audit must be made publicly available.
9. There must be a prohibition on use of biometric technology on or with audio recordings.

## Key Concerns

1. **It is unclear how audio recording devices are used.** The SIR does not specify the scenarios in which officers may use recording devices, saying that "[SPD] utilizes audio recording systems in a handful of ways to obtain information during a criminal investigation." It is difficult to assess the necessity of audio recordings without clarity as to how devices are used and where they may be used. Although audio recordings are helpful in some scenarios, some audio recordings – particularly those authorized only by two-party consent – may be unjustified given the privacy concerns posed by audio recording. SPD never describes how frequently audio is recorded or how often improper recordings are captured, making it difficult to assess the current process' flaws.
2. **There is lack of clarity around warrant and consent procedures.** The SIR indicates that either a warrant or consent may authorize use of a recording device. However, neither the SIR nor the June 10<sup>th</sup> or July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meetings provided a thorough description of the consent process. It is unclear whether SPD has a clear consent script or guidelines for determining what recordings are permissible. It is important that individuals know precisely what they are consenting to and how they can opt out of being recorded. Without clear processes, SPD may be capturing and retaining audio that falls neither clearly within the terms of the party's consent nor outside of them. Retaining any such audio undermines the privacy expectations embodied in Washington's two-party consent laws. Additionally, without clear guidelines, decisions about which recordings to keep are likely to be made arbitrarily or in ways informed by bias.
3. **There are inadequate safeguards against improper data collection prevention.** The SIR specifies data deletion practices that prevent improperly collected data from being retained, pursuant to the terms of a warrant or the terms of a party's consent. However, it does not outline formal usage guidelines that would prevent improper recordings from ever being collected. The additional storage capacity and audio sensitivity of today's recording make it far more likely that an officer might turn on a device early or leave it on too long and capture third-party conversations before and after any conversation of interest. Even carefully timed recordings might capture private background conversations. Although such data might eventually be deleted, those conversations will be temporarily stored, then reviewed by a member of SPD staff. The capture, review, and temporary storage of recordings of citizens who have not consented and are not subject to a warrant constitutes a serious privacy violation, particularly given the highly personal, identifiable information which might be collected.

4. **It is unclear what devices are used.** The SIR does not specify the manufacturer or function of devices used. This is particularly concerning given that officers are using their phones to record, which may involve the use of a third-party application or software.
5. **It is unclear what specific data extraction software is used.** The SIR states that completed recordings are “...extracted onto a thumb drive from the device using a locally stored computer application.... This application... is used solely to extract audio data from a device and stores no data.” The type of application and its features are never detailed. As such, we cannot analyze the security of the software. Presumably some second software is also used to delete parts of recordings that are improperly collected. That software and its features are also not specified.
6. **There are inconsistencies in deletion policies.** The SIR states that the TESU officer is responsible for purging improperly collected data, but also that the investigating officer is responsible for the purge. If no one person is accountable for data deletion, some improperly collected data may never be purged. Additionally, if the investigating officer can complete the deletion, they necessarily may access and review improperly collected recordings. The review, use or retention of such unauthorized recordings constitutes a clear violation of 4<sup>th</sup> amendment rights and Washington consent laws.
7. **There are security risks associated with third party data sharing.** The SIR describes third-party data sharing only vaguely. It does not describe the sharing process, or how data security will be maintained. The lack of data security measures increases the likelihood that third parties will improperly expose, retain, or share private data. It is also unclear whether audio recordings shared with partner law enforcement agencies or other jurisdictions – who are not subject to the same surveillance regulations – are shared permanently, or whether any protocols are in place to ensure that shared data is later deleted.
8. **There are inconsistencies in the audio device request and management process.** The SIR is inconsistent in describing how TESU officers process requests for audio device usage. The SIR in one places states that the investigating officer completes the audio device request form but elsewhere states that TESU does so. The request form is designed to ensure that officers obtain consent or a warrant before a device is issued. Therefore, an unclear request process increases the probability of unauthorized device use and improper private data collection.

### Outstanding Questions

- What is the manufacturer and functionality of audio recording devices utilized by SPD? How much storage do they have, from what distance can they transmit, and from what distance can they pick up sound?
- How are new technologies selected when replacing devices that have reached end of life? Are there any limits on the kinds of new recording devices that can be acquired? Do new technologies include features not present in older technologies?
- What application is used to extract data from the recording devices and place the audio onto a hard drive or thumb drive? Can this software or any other alter recordings? If so, how is use of the software logged?
- Are there guidelines limiting the settings in which an audio device can be used or preventing the collection of unneeded and improper recordings?
- Are there any guidelines limiting how the audio devices can be used – for instance specifying at what point the recording may be turned on and when it must be turned off?



- What is the device request process? Who fills out the request form?
- What is the process for purging data? Who purges the data, and what oversight measures are in place to ensure data is properly and fully purged?
- What protocols ensure that consent is properly and clearly obtained before a recording is initiated?
- Where there is no warrant, how do officers decide which recordings or portions of recordings to delete and which to retain? Are there guidelines for making this determination?
- How is data shared with third parties? What security practices are observed? How is shared data monitored for deletion within the appropriate time frame?

The answers to these questions can further inform the content of any binding policy the Council chooses to include in an ordinance on this technology, as recommended above.

## CTO Response

# MEMO

**To:** Seattle City Council  
**From:** Jim Loter, Interim Chief Technology Officer  
**Subject:** CTO Response to the Surveillance Working Group Audio Recording Systems SIR Review

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### Purpose

As provided in the Surveillance Ordinance, [SMC 14.18.080](#), this memo outlines the Chief Technology Officer’s (CTO’s) response to the Surveillance Working Group assessment on the Surveillance Impact Report for Seattle Police Department’s Audio Recording Systems.

### Background

The Information Technology Department (ITD) is dedicated to the Privacy Principles and Surveillance Ordinance objectives to provide oversight and transparency about the use and acquisition of specialized technologies with potential privacy and civil liberties impacts. All City departments have a shared mission to protect lives and property while balancing technology use and data collection with negative impacts to individuals. This requires ensuring the appropriate use of privacy invasive technologies through technology limitations, policy, training and departmental oversight.

The CTO’s role in the SIR process has been to ensure that all City departments are compliant with the Surveillance Ordinance requirements. As part of the review work for surveillance technologies, ITD’s Privacy Office has facilitated the creation of the Surveillance Impact Report documentation, including collecting comments and suggestions from the Working Group and members of the public about these technologies. IT and City departments have also worked collaboratively with the Working Group to answer additional questions that came up during their review process.

### Technology Purpose

The Seattle Police Department (SPD) utilizes audio recording systems in a handful of ways to obtain information during a criminal investigation. Pursuant to the Washington Privacy Act ([Chapt.9.73 RCW](#)) these technologies are applied only after obtaining appropriate consent and/or legal search warrant authority. In such a circumstance, SPD employs audio recording devices on a person’s body or situated and concealed in place within an environment to capture audio conversations between individuals, wherein at least one participant is unaware of the recording.

## Working Group Concerns

In their review, the Working Group has raised concerns about these devices being used in a privacy impacting way, including data collection, sharing, retention, deletion, storage, and protection.

We believe that policy, training and technology limitations enacted by SPD provide adequate mitigation for the potential privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the Working Group about the use of this operational technology.

## Recommended Next Steps

I look forward to working together with Council and City departments to ensure continued transparency about the use of these technologies and finding a mutually agreeable means to use technology to improve City services while protecting the privacy and civil rights of the residents we serve. Specific concerns in the Working Group comments about cameras are addressed in the attached document.

## Response to Specific Concerns: Audio Recording Systems

**Concern: It is unclear what devices are used.**

CTO Assessment: The policies in place in the SIR and SPD manual operate regardless of the manufacturer or model of the devices. The conditions under which the devices are used are clearly outlined in the SIR and are further regulated by RCW 9.73.

SIR Response:

Section 2.3

“Audio recording devices are typically known as “wires” and can be concealed on a person or hidden in or on objects within a particular environment. Audio recording devices must be turned on by an individual and they record only portions of a conversation that occur while the device is on. The recording is stored locally on the device and must be downloaded onto a storage device (i.e., thumb drive, external hard drive) before it can be accessed and transcribed.”

**Concern: It is unclear what specific data extraction software is used.**

CTO Assessment: The policies in place in the SIR and SPD manual govern the use of data collected by audio recording devices and the circumstances under which they will be used, including in prosecutions. The conditions under which the devices are used are clearly outlined in the SIR and are further regulated by RCW 9.73. Once the audio has been collected, it is included in investigation files and treated as evidence subject to further guidelines.

**Concern: There is lack of clarity around warrant and consent procedures.**

CTO Assessment: These technologies are used surreptitiously and without consent. These technologies are operated under the authorization of a warrant from a court. Warrant and consent procedures are governed by state and federal law.

SIR Response:

Section 4.9

“On probable cause, the court can issue order authorizing interception, transmission, and recording of private communications or conversations when one party to the conversation or communication has consented. Detailed requirements spelled out in RCW 9.73.090(2), (4), and (5), and RCW 9.73.120, .130, and .140

Officers/Detectives must establish probable cause, as well as a showing of necessity, and obtain consent and/or court-ordered warrant to utilize audio recording devices. Once this has been obtained, they must complete TESU’s Request Form that requires an acceptable reason for deployment, case number, and copy of consent form and/or warrant, which must then be approved by the TESU Supervisor, before an audio recording device is deployed.

After TESU has extracted data and provided it to the requesting Officer/Detective, the data is included in the investigation file and treated as evidence.”

**Concern: Inadequate Policies on Data Collection, Sharing, Retention, Deletion, Storage, and Protection**

CTO Assessment: The SIR contains discrete sections relating to each of the concerns in addition to additional policies governing the use in the SPD manual and state law (RCW 9.73). As the data collected from these systems are primarily intended in use for criminal prosecution, there are other superseding policies and procedures that must be followed (circumstances around sharing or retention for example).

SIR Response:

## Section 4.2

"Deployment of audio recording devices is constrained to the conditions stipulated by consent and/or court order, which provides the legal authority and the scope of collection. All deployments of audio recording devices are documented by TESU and subject to audit by the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor at any time.

As outlined in 2.5 above, if no data is collected by the device that assists in the pursuit of the criminal investigation or falls within the scope of the consent form and/or court order warrant (as determined by the judge), the device is purged in its entirety and no data is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective for the investigation file.

Data collected from audio recording devices is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective for the investigation and no data is retained by TESU."

## Section 4.7

"Only authorized SPD users can access the audio recording devices or the data while it resides in the devices. Access to the systems/technology is limited to TESU personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data removed from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including:

- SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,
- SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services."

## Section 5.1

"Until data is extracted from an audio recording device by TESU staff, the data is temporarily stored on the device. A TESU detective extracts the data onto a SPD disc and provides the disc to the requesting Officer/Detective for inclusion in the investigation file. The audio recording device is then purged and no data is retained by TESU."

## Section 5.2

"Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, investigational conversation recordings are retained "for 1 year after transcribed verbatim and verified OR until disposition of pertinent case file, whichever is sooner, then Destroy" (LE06-01-04 Rev. 1). TESU maintains a log of requests (including copies of consent forms and warrants), extractions, and deployments that are available to any auditor, including the Officer of Inspector General and federal monitor."

## Section 5.3

"The scope of audio recording authorization is outlined in consent and court-ordered warrants. Any data that is collected outside the established scope is purged by the investigating detective.

All data collected within the scope of the appropriate authorization is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective and the device is purged. No data is retained by TESU.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with SPD Policy 6.060, such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002."

## Section 6.1

"SPD has no data sharing partners for audio recording devices. No person, outside of SPD, has direct access to audio recording devices or the data while it resides in the device.

Data obtained from the system may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by audio recording devices may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provide by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices."

**Concern: Inadequate Policies relating to issuance of recording devices and processing of recordings**

CTO Assessment: The SIR outlines the conditions under which recording devices are used in investigations in addition to the standards that are required by a legal entity to authorize the use of audio recording devices. Data obtained from these devices are processed in accordance with SPD's evidence handling policies as well as state and federal law.

SIR Response:  
Section 3.1



"All audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). When an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment.

TESU detectives then assign the audio recording device to the requesting Officer/Detective.

Each deployment is logged, and all request forms (including consent form and/or court order) are maintained within TESU."

### Section 3.2

"Audio recording devices are utilized only after legal standards of consent and/or court-issued warrant have been met, as required by the Washington Privacy Act, Chapt. 9.73 RCW."

## Appendix A: Glossary

**Accountable:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

**Community outcomes:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

**Contracting equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

**DON:** "department of neighborhoods."

**Immigrant and refugee access to services:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle's civic, economic and cultural life.

**Inclusive outreach and public engagement:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

**Individual racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

**Institutional racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

**OCR:** "Office of Civil Rights."

**Opportunity areas:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

**Racial equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person's race.

**Racial inequity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person’s race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

**RET:** “racial equity toolkit”

**Seattle neighborhoods:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

**Stakeholders:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

**Structural racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

**Surveillance ordinance:** Seattle City Council passed ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the “surveillance ordinance.”

**SIR:** “surveillance impact report”, a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance [125376](#).

**Workforce equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.



## **Appendix B: Meeting Notice(s)**

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## Tech Talk

Seattle Information Technology

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# Fourth Public Comment Period Opening for Technologies Subject to the City's Surveillance Ordinance

by [Seattle IT](#) on May 26, 2021



The City of Seattle has published the fourth set of draft Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for four of the 26 currently existing surveillance technologies, per the [Surveillance Ordinance](#).

The City of Seattle is looking for the public's input on the SIRs to help provide the City Council with insight into community perspective and ensure City policies responsibly govern the use of these technologies.

The public comment period is currently open and runs through June 30, 2021. The complete list of technologies in this group for review, can be found below. We have three ways to allow residents to provide input and share their concerns:

1. Residents can submit their surveillance comments on each technology online at: [City of Seattle Privacy website](#).
2. Seattle residents can also mail comments to Attn: Surveillance & Privacy Program, Seattle IT, PO Box 94709, Seattle, WA 98124
3. City Surveillance Technology Event: The City will hold virtual events to allow attendees ask questions from department technology experts and hear from City leadership. These virtual events will take place over using Webex and participants can join via online or the phone. Links and times are as follows:

**Thursday, June 10, noon to 1 p.m.**

Link to join: <https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?>

MTID=[mdfa673054e3236adb179613c69692067](#)

Phone number to call in: +1-206-207-1700

Event number (access code): 187 147 0595

**Tuesday, June 29, 3-4 p.m.**

Link to join: <https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?>

MTID=[me51f66a7150a8e16ca6e3220e25449fd](#)

Phone number to call in: +1-206-207-1700

Event number (access code): 187 172 4351

*More information on these technologies, as well as the City of Seattle's Privacy program, can be found online at the [City of Seattle's Privacy website](#).*

This public input period is a valuable part of our process. The City of Seattle is committed to being transparent and accountable. Hearing from residents is part of the process. We welcome your thoughts and comments and look forward to hearing them.

#### Seattle Police Department's Callyo

Seattle Police Department's Callyo technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. This software may be installed on an officer's cell phone to allow them to record the audio from phone communications between law enforcement and suspects. Callyo may be used with consent or search warrant.

#### Seattle Police Department's Audio Recording Devices

Seattle Police Department's Audio Recording Device technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. This technology consists of a hidden microphone to audio record individuals without their knowledge. The microphone is either not visible to the subject being recorded or is disguised as another object. Used with search warrant or signed Authorization to Intercept (RCW 9A.73.200).

#### Seattle Police Department's I2 iBase

Seattle Police Department's I2 iBase technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. The I2 iBase crime analysis tool allows for configuring, capturing, controlling, analyzing and displaying complex information and relationships in link and entity data. iBase is both a database application, as well as a modeling and analysis tool. It uses data pulled from SPD's existing systems for modeling and analysis.

#### Seattle Police Department's Maltego

Seattle Police Department's Maltego technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. Maltego is an interactive data mining tool that renders graphs for link analysis. The tool is used in online investigations for finding relationships between pieces of information from various sources located on the internet.

Filed Under: [Privacy](#)

Tagged With: [surveillance cameras](#), [surveillance ordinance](#), [Surveillance technology](#)

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## **Appendix C: All Comments Received from Members of the Public**

**ID:** 12841234860

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 7/23/2021 3:58:44 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: Audio Recording Devices

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Very little time was allocated for questions from the public at the Group 4a public engagement meetings. Additionally, SPD dodged providing answers to some of the questions. As such, numerous questions from the public have not been answered and thus greatly hinder the ability for informed public comment. My open questions on SPD's use of Audio Recording Devices are in the response to question #5 in this survey. Since the safest approach (security-/privacy-wise) is to assume the worst as the missing answers to these open questions, my list of concerns will do the same. Thus, these concerns include: (1) No SPD policy defining or limiting the (CAD/etc) incident types for which SPD may use Audio Recording Devices. (2) The potential use of voice recognition/identification technology on the audio recordings. (3) SPD is withholding information from the public about the names of the manufacturers/vendors and model names/numbers of the audio recording devices used by SPD. There are many audio recording devices on the market, each with different feature sets. SPD has not been transparent about the technology they use. One point of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance (SMC 14.18) was to bring the surveillance technologies to light so that they could have a robust public assessment. This is not possible when SPD is choosing to keep the audio recording devices they use secret. This should not be permissible. SPD must disclose the audio recording devices they use. (4) Lack of clarity regarding the magnitude of the use of audio recording devices by SPD. SPD has not specified how many incidents per year they use audio recording devices for. (5) No safeguards in place to prevent or quickly remedy the retention of audio recordings (snippets or entirety) that contain non-targeted individual(s). Privacy is not maintained/ensured for individuals not in scope for the warrant (i.e. younger brother, girlfriend, mother, strangers, etc). Nothing ensures that data collected accidentally on innocent individuals is deleted in a timely manner. (6) SPD intentionally obscuring the circumstances under which they deploy the audio recording devices. The audio recording devices SIR mentions deploying the devices within the scope of the consent form and/or court order. However, an audio recording collected via a concealed audio device will ever be used with consent. The intended use requires the target to be unaware and therefore unconsenting. Therefore, it seems SPD referring to consent being given is incorrect and intentionally obscures the true circumstances under which these devices are used. (7) No SPD Policy that addresses both reducing the inadvertent capture and the post-capture deletion of audio of individuals not targeted in an investigation. (8) Possible issues with authenticity and authentication of target individuals in audio recordings. Specifically, it is unclear how SPD accurately maps a voice in a recording to a certain person. (9) No audit (by OIG/APRS/etc) of SPD's audio recording devices. If such an audit has been performed, then SPD has not disclosed the report to the public. (10) No audit (by OIG/APRS/etc) of the TESU. If such an audit has been performed, then SPD has not disclosed the report to the public.

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

None.

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**



SPD shouldn't surveil residents. SPD doesn't need more tools, or more money. The community needs support so these pipelines to the criminal system are fixed. Those systemic problems aren't fixed by SPD having more tools. As such, I recommend that City leadership stop funding this tool. Given City leadership's past history on prior surveillance technologies, I suspect they won't do what is fundamentally right and instead will pursue limited cosmetic changes. As such, here are some superficial changes that could be made: (1) Require SPD to answer all of the public's questions. (2) Require SPD Policy to state which specific incident types for which audio recording devices may be used. (3) Ban the use of voice recognition/identification technology on audio recordings. (4) Require SPD to update the SIR to include the names of the manufacturers/vendors and model names/numbers of the audio recording devices used by SPD. Don't allow secret technologies. (5) Require SPD to disclose how many incidents per year they use audio recording devices for. (6) Ban SPD from retaining audio recordings of individuals who are not suspects nor found guilty of a crime (i.e. a suspect's younger brother, girlfriend, mother, neighbor, or a stranger like a shopkeeper, etc). (7) Require SPD to update the audio recording devices SIR to either remove or clarify if/how any of these devices would be used with consent (as opposed to only court approval). (8) Require SPD Policy be created to address both reducing the inadvertent capture and the post-capture deletion of audio of individuals not targeted in an investigation. (9) Require SPD to disclose how they ensure authenticity of recordings and authentication of target individuals in the audio recordings. Specifically, it is unclear how SPD accurately maps a voice in a recording to a certain person (and that the recording is not forged/fraudulent). (10) Require SPD to publicly provide the date and report from the most recent audit of SPD's use of audio recording devices. (11) Require SPD to publicly provide the date and report from the most recent audit of the SPD TESU.

### **Do you have any other comments or questions?**

Many questions from the public have not been answered, such as: (1) Is there any policy defining the incident types for which SPD may use these audio recording devices? (2) Does SPD use any voice recognition/identification technology on the audio recordings? (3) What are the names of the manufacturers/vendors and model names/numbers of the audio recording devices used by SPD? (4) Roughly how many incidents/investigations per year does SPD use these concealed audio recording devices for? (5) What happens to portions of the audio recordings that contain non-targeted individual(s)? How is the privacy maintained for individuals not in scope for the warrant (i.e. younger brother, girlfriend, mother, strangers, etc)? (6) The audio recording devices SIR mentions deploying the devices within the scope of the consent form and/or court order. Could you please describe an example when a concealed audio recording device will be used with consent? Wouldn't all use require the target(s) to be unaware and therefore unconsenting? (7) In regards to the audio recording devices, is there any SPD policy that addresses both reducing the inadvertent capture and the post-capture deletion of audio of individuals not targeted in an investigation? (8) How does SPD ensure that the voice in a recording is that of a specific individual? How is the voice accurately mapped to a person? (9) When was the last audit of the TESU conducted? Where is that audit report located?



**ID:** 12746763622

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 6/15/2021 7:00:21 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: Audio Recording Devices

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Surveillance is always a concern.

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

Remains to be seen if there is a value.

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**

TBD, valid considerations would depend on SPD answering the public's questions.

**Do you have any other comments or questions?**

1) Is there any policy defining the incident types for which SPD may use these audio recording devices? 2) Does SPD use any voice recognition/identification technology on the audio recordings? 3) What are the names of the manufacturers/vendors and model names/numbers of the audio recording devices used by SPD? 4) Roughly how many incidents/investigations per year does SPD use these concealed audio recording devices for? 5) What happens to portions of the audio recordings that contain non-targeted individual(s)? How is the privacy maintained for individuals not in scope for the warrant (i.e. younger brother, girlfriend, mother, strangers, etc)? 6) The audio recording devices SIR mentions deploying the devices within the scope of the consent form and/or court order. Could you please describe an example when a concealed audio recording device will be used with consent? Wouldn't all use require the target(s) to be unaware and therefore unconsenting? 7) In regards to the audio recording devices, is there any SPD policy that addresses both reducing the inadvertent capture and the post-capture deletion of audio of individuals not targeted in an investigation? 8) How does SPD ensure that the voice in a recording is that of a specific individual? How is the voice accurately mapped to a person? 9) When was the last audit of the TESU conducted? Where is that audit report located?

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**ID:** 12698219042

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 5/28/2021 2:21:42 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: Audio Recording Devices

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Privacy

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

None

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**

We don't need more surveillance

**Do you have any other comments or questions?**

We need to reduce police capabilities, not spy on our citizens.

---

## **Appendix D: Letters from Organizations or Commissions**

July 23, 2021

Seattle Information Technology  
700 5<sup>th</sup> Ave, Suite 2700  
Seattle, WA 98104

RE: ACLU of Washington Comments on Group 4a Surveillance Technologies

On behalf of the ACLU of Washington, I write to offer our comments on the surveillance technologies included in Group 4a of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance implementation process.

The four Seattle Police Department (SPD) technologies in Group 4a are covered in the following order:

1. Callyo
2. i2 iBase
3. Audio Recording Systems
4. Maltego

These comments should be considered preliminary, given that the Surveillance Impact Reports (SIR) for each technology leave a number of important questions unanswered. Specific unanswered questions for each technology are noted in the comments relating to that technology. Answers to these questions should be included in the updated SIRs provided to the Community Surveillance Working Group and to the City Council prior to their review of the technologies.

### Callyo

#### I. *Background*

Callyo is a mobile phone identification masking and recording technology. It raises privacy and civil liberties concerns because it enables law enforcement to surreptitiously record individuals' conversations, and possibly their location data, without their knowledge or consent.

Because voice is a biometric identifier, audio data can be used to surreptitiously identify and track individuals. Any audio data collected could be used with voice recognition software that may contain inaccuracies and built-in race and gender biases.<sup>1</sup> Such audio could be later input into a voice recognition or biometrics database, which may further enable both corporate and government surveillance.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Voice recognition technologies already in use, such as Voice AI, are more likely to accurately respond to white people and men. See, for instance, Joan Bajorek, "Voice Recognition Still Has Significant Race and Gender Biases," *Harvard Business Review*, May 10, 2019, <https://hbr.org/2019/05/voice-recognition-still-has-significant-race-and-gender-biases>.

<sup>2</sup> Law enforcement agencies already use such programs and the creation of vocal recognition databases is underway. See, for instance, Michael Dumiak, "Interpol's New Software Will Recognize Criminals by Their Voices," *Spectrum.IEEE.org*, May 16, 2018, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/interpol-s-new-automated-platform-will-recognize-criminals-by-their-voice>.



P.O. Box 2728  
Seattle, WA 98111-2728  
(206) 624-2184  
[aclu-wa.org](http://aclu-wa.org)

Michele Storms  
*Executive Director*



SPD's possible collection of location data with Callyo raises further concerns. While an SPD representative stated that Callyo only tracks the GPS location of SPD phones and cannot collect other location data,<sup>3</sup> the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) states that Callyo is used to GPS locate individuals.<sup>4</sup> The lack of clarity around SPD's collection of individuals' GPS data raises location-tracking concerns. Law enforcement can use geo-location data to conduct real-time surveillance of individuals without their knowledge or consent. Location data can reveal highly sensitive information about people's behaviors, social patterns, and personal life, including political activities in which they engage, with whom they associate, and what religion they practice. Digitally collected location data also may be improperly and inaccurately used in criminal investigations.<sup>5</sup> Location tracking therefore impinges upon basic privacy and due process rights and impedes individuals' abilities to enjoy their everyday lives free from fear of surveillance.

SPD's use of Callyo raises serious concerns. SPD policies described in the SIR do not include purpose limitations, adequate privacy and security protections, or clear restrictions on use. The SIR does not include a contract with the vendor, Motorola Solutions, and it is unclear whether there are contractual restrictions on data use and sharing.

Given the lack of adequate policies described by the SIR and the number of unanswered questions that remain, we have concerns that SPD's use of Callyo may infringe upon people's civil rights and civil liberties.

## II. *Specific Concerns*

- a. **Lack of Clarity Around Requirements for a Warrant:** The SIR states that Callyo's functions can only be used with a court order.<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere, the SIR states that Callyo's call recording functions may only be used with a search warrant.<sup>7</sup> However, the city's webpage states, "Callyo may be used with consent or search warrant."<sup>8</sup> Comments at the June 10<sup>th</sup> and July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting also suggested that consent might be sufficient to use Callyo. Clarity is needed as to whether current rules allow officers to use some features of Callyo based on consent alone. Such clarity is particularly important because the SIR repeatedly states that the search

<sup>3</sup> "Speaker Identification" *GoVivian.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.govivian.com/products/speaker-identification/>; "Voice Authentication," *Noware Biometrics*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.noware.com/voice-authentication/>; "Forensic Voice Analysis," *Sestek.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.sestek.com/forensic-voice-analysis/>; "Voice Inspector for Forensic Experts," *Phonecta.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.phonecta.com/en/use-case/audio-forensics-software/>.

<sup>4</sup> City of Seattle IT Department, "Group 4a Surveillance Technologies Public Meeting 1 20210610 1903 1," Accessed July 21, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10FVHt2cyv8>.

<sup>5</sup> Seattle Police Department, "2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Callyo," Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR%200-2%20Callyo.pdf>, 5-7.

<sup>6</sup> "Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. This Has to End," *Wired*, February 2, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without-warrant-end/>.

<sup>7</sup> SPD, "Callyo," 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 10, and 11.

<sup>9</sup> "Surveillance Technologies Under Review," *Seattle.gov*, Accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/surveillance-technologies>.

warrant determines what data can be properly collected via Callyo.<sup>9</sup> Uses of Callyo based on consent alone would not be subject to such parameters. The SIR fails to specify when officers can request consent and what content can be recorded based on that consent. Improper data collection is probable absent clearer guidelines.

- b. **Inadequate Policies Defining Purpose of Use.** The SIR does not fully describe the circumstances under which Callyo may be used. It is unclear when call masking may be used and whether Callyo is the only recording application that SPD uses to record calls. Without clear purpose restrictions, officers may record conversations widely, amassing unnecessary sensitive data and voice biometrics. Similarly, officers may inappropriately use call masking technologies outside of any specific criminal investigation and undermine expectations of government transparency.
- c. **Lack of Clarity on How Callyo May be Used and By Whom.** The SIR primarily addresses how a non-HRVU (High-Risk Victims Unit) officer or detective would have TESU (Technical and Electronic Support Unit) record their call. Any difference in process for recording the calls of non-officers (i.e. calls made by cooperating witnesses) is not detailed. The HRVU's Callyo use parameters are also only partially explicated,<sup>10</sup> despite HRVU's larger share of the annual Callyo budget.<sup>11</sup> Without comprehensive guidelines ensuring that appropriate usage is tracked and data is properly managed, sensitive information may be improperly shared and tools like call masking may be used improperly.
- d. **Lack of Clarity on Motorola Solutions' Data Collection and Retention.** The SIR does not describe a contract between SPD and Motorola Solutions, leaving it unclear whether Motorola collects or retains data. While the SIR indicates that no "sharing partners" have "direct access" to Callyo data "while it resides in the [mobile phone] device,"<sup>12</sup> it is unclear what access there is to data that no longer resides in the devices and may instead be stored in Callyo's cloud.<sup>13</sup> While SPD stores Callyo recordings on its own systems, the SIR does not make clear whether data initially recorded in Callyo's app is also uploaded to Amazon Web Service's GovCloud, which hosts Callyo's cloud and appears to store its data.<sup>14</sup> When asked about possible Motorola collection of Callyo data during the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative expressed uncertainty as to whether the vendor might access or store some data. If data is stored on Callyo's cloud system without contractual restrictions, Motorola Solutions may be able to review and parse private recording data, or even share or sell that data to third parties. The SIR does not mention any such

<sup>9</sup> SPD, "Callyo," 10, 11, 13, and 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-11.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>13</sup> "Investigative Solutions," *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 16, 2021,

<https://callyo.com/investigations/investigative-solutions>.

<sup>14</sup> "Callyo," *Amazon Web Services*,

<https://partners.amazonaws.com/partners/0010L0000pRHaCQA3W/Callyo>; "10-21 Video," *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://callyo.com/public-safety/10-21-video>.



cloud storage or other data collection by Motorola Solutions, leaving open the possibility that Motorola has access to highly sensitive information.

- e. **Inadequate Data Sharing Policies.** The SIR offers only an extremely general description of who might receive Callyo data and how such data would be shared.<sup>15</sup> Neither security protocols for transferring data nor for ensuring that shared data is properly deleted are explicated in the SIR. Indefinite retention of data and insecure sharing processes could lead to exposure of sensitive data, with manifold consequences for those recorded – from safety risks for witnesses to discovery of private information by employers.
- f. **Inadequate Data Retention Policies.** The SIR states that devices that collect no relevant evidence, per the terms of the court order, are purged in their entirety by TESU staff and no data is provided to the investigating officer.<sup>16</sup> However, protocols to ensure that TESU staff properly execute these determinations are not detailed fully. Additional clarity is needed as to how deletions are determined, and how frequently supervising officers review the data that is shared with investigating officers.<sup>17</sup> Indefinite and improper data storage could lead sensitive data to be shared publicly or could lead SPD officers to use improperly collected data in the course of an investigation – subjecting those investigated to an overreach of police powers.
- g. **Inadequate Oversight Policies.** Callyo advertises that the call masking on its 10-21 phone application “diverts millions of calls away from dispatch centers each year” by enabling officers to communicate with members of the public directly.<sup>18</sup> SPD does not provide data on the number of calls that might be diverted, but any such calls would no longer be subject to the systematic tracking and oversight which centralized dispatch systems provide. This arrangement makes it easier for individual officers to unilaterally control communications with members of the public and use that communication control to abuse their power.
- h. **No Policies Restricting Use of Callyo’s Additional Surveillance Features.** Callyo can be integrated with other law enforcement focused Amazon Web Services technologies in ways that makes its surveillance capabilities more forceful.<sup>19</sup> Callyo also includes numerous additional surveillance features, such as video recording and live streaming<sup>20</sup> and “10-

<sup>15</sup> SPD, “Callyo,” 14-16.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 and 10.

<sup>17</sup> See “Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies,” at SPD, “Callyo,” 9.

<sup>18</sup> “Spotlight: Callyo is Changing the Way Investigations Are Done,” *Police 1*, March 12, 2019, <https://www.police1.com/police-products/investigation/articles/spotlight-callyo-is-changing-the-way-investigations-are-done-1c5ERKAL5Mnn9y271/>.

<sup>19</sup> AWS Public Sector Blog Team, “Harnessing the Power of the Cloud: Startups Deliver Innovative Services to Public Agencies Faster,” *AWS Public Sector Blog*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/harnessing-the-power-of-cloud-startups-deliver-innovative-services-to-public-safety-agencies-faster/>.

<sup>20</sup> “Police Body Camera App,” *10-21 Video.com*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://10-21.com/10-21-Video/>, *Callyo.com*.

21 Flight," which allows officers to perform surveillance using drones.<sup>21</sup> The SIR describes no policy which would prevent SPD from using these Callyo features in the future. Videos captured by Callyo could be stored and later entered into facial recognition programs, which have been widely found to be racially biased.<sup>22</sup> Flight-based video tools can be and have been<sup>23</sup> used to track and observe protestors, improperly subjecting political organizers to targeted surveillance and chilling freedoms of speech and association.

### III. *Outstanding Questions That Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- Is location data collected via Callyo? If so, how and when is location tracked and what policies govern recording and storage of location data?
- Can Callyo be used without a warrant, based on two-party consent alone? If so, when may it be used without a warrant, how is consent obtained, and what rules set the parameters for Callyo's use?
- When Callyo is used on calls between a third party (i.e. a cooperating witness) and an unknowing participant, how does the recording process differ compared to Callyo's use for recordings of officers in phone conversations?
- How and when is call masking used and what policies govern usage of that feature?
- How does the HRVU use Callyo and what guidelines govern its use? Does the HRVU ever use Callyo functions besides call masking, such as location tracking?
- Is any data collected through HRVU usage of Callyo – such as the phone numbers called – and how is that data stored and/or shared?
- Does SPD have a contract with Motorola Solutions for its use of Callyo? If so, what are the agreement's provisions?
- Where are audio recordings initially stored? Are they ever stored anywhere besides the original recording device and the thumb drive submitted to the investigating officer, such as on the Callyo cloud?
- Who owns the data collected by Callyo? Does Motorola have access to or store the collected data at any point? If so, what are Motorola's data security practices with respect to the data collected?
- How is data shared with third parties? How is shared data monitored for deletion within the appropriate time frame?

### IV. *Recommendations for Regulation*

Pending answers to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of Callyo. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that ensure, at a minimum, the following:

<sup>21</sup> "10-21 Flight," *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://callyo.com/public-safety/10-21-flight>.

<sup>22</sup> Kade Crookford, "How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist?" *ACLU.org*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist/>.

<sup>23</sup> "U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities Using Aerial Surveillance," *The New York Times*, June 19, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html>.

- There is a specific and restricted purpose of use. The ordinance should define clear limits on Callyo's uses, including narrow parameters for Callyo's consent-based uses.
- All data collected through Callyo must follow the issuance of a search warrant, or a clearly delineated consent process that sets enforceable rules limiting the types of data that may be collected.
- Data is securely shared with third parties and properly deleted.
- Any data collected by Motorola is not owned by, used by, or retained by Motorola, and any data housed on the Callyo cloud is properly secured.
- There must be clear accountability processes for ensuring TESU officers delete improperly recorded data that falls outside the scope of a search warrant or consent statement and do not share it with investigating officers.
- There must be clear guidelines for securely storing and managing any data collected by Callyo outside of call recordings, such as location data, and provisions to ensure the deletion of any such data collected that does not fall within the scope of a search warrant or consent agreement.

## **i2 iBase**

### **I. *Background***

IBM i2 iBase is a database application that raises serious privacy and civil liberties concerns because it can operate as a surveillance dragnet and can perform automated social network analysis (SNA), which likely exacerbates disproportionate surveillance and policing of marginalized communities.

iBase is used by law enforcement to identify and analyze network connections and patterns within input data, conduct SNA or "link analysis," and share data with other agencies.<sup>24</sup> SPD uses i2 iBase in partnership with a second IBM application, i2 Analyst's Notebook,<sup>25</sup> which is "a visual analysis tool" that includes "connected network visualizations, social network analysis, and geospatial or temporal views to help... uncover hidden connections and patterns in data."<sup>26</sup> Together, these tools can search massive pools of data to find similarities and connections between entities and individuals, then produce maps and charts that represent the relationships or groups identified. The "Search 360" function in iBase allows officers to perform complex queries of stored records, expanding data search capabilities beyond those offered by existing records systems.<sup>27</sup>

iBase also allows for new ways of viewing data, and includes features not described in the SIR. It can generate heat maps and find "hidden connections" via the "Find

<sup>24</sup> "IBM Security i2 iBase: FAQs," *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-ibase>.

<sup>25</sup> Seattle Police Department, "2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software – IBM i2 iBase," Accessed June 9, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR-%20Link%20Analysis-IBM%20i2%20iBase.pdf>, 7.

<sup>26</sup> "IBM Security i2 Analyst's Notebook," *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook>.

<sup>27</sup> "IBM Security i2 iBase: Details," *IBM.com*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-ibase>.



Connected Network” tool, which identifies a network that “directly or indirectly” connects several entities of interest.<sup>28</sup>

The SIR suggests that iBase is generally employed in two contexts. First, SPD’s Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) uses iBase to rapidly provide information to officers responding to incidents.<sup>29</sup> The RTCC is a “centralized data and logistics hubs” that allows analysts to provide data to officers on the street.<sup>30</sup> Second, investigating officers use iBase to collect and organize timeline and relationship data for cases in progress.<sup>31</sup>

Although SPD describes using iBase only to assess RMS and CAD data, iBase can process larger data pools and operate as a data magnet. For instance, the Durham, NC Police Department has considered importing city utility data, recreational park logs, and daily jail visitor lists into iBase.<sup>32</sup> A law enforcement-focused Open Source Intelligence integration is now available for iBase Analyst’s notebook. The integration allows “customers to use not only the internal data available on the platform, but also to collect and analyze a wealth of further information through open sources.”<sup>33</sup> This “further information” is public, but still raises privacy concerns when collected en masse and utilized for policing; for instance, the information could include social media data and geolocation history.<sup>34</sup> The SIR does not describe any SPD policy that would prevent additional data from being added to iBase. During the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative expressed uncertainty as to whether outside information was being used in SPD’s iBase.

The data analysis and matching performed by SNA tools like iBase can often be inaccurate. Data may become outdated or be entered incorrectly or in different formats.<sup>35</sup> Such errors are difficult to catch when data is processed at this scale. The analysis process can perpetuate these inaccuracies by integrating errors into the visualizations produced and generating linkages between people who have no relationship. For instance, a one-letter typo in an address might lead someone to be inaccurately connected to a household miles away. An outdated address might generate a connection with a location or person someone has not visited for years. These inaccuracies can compound existing police bias; those who have previously interacted with the police – who are disproportionately Black, Latinx, and

<sup>28</sup> “IBM Security i2 Analyst’s Notebook: Feature Spotlights,” IBM.com, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook/details>.

<sup>29</sup> SPD, “IBM i2 iBase,” 5.

<sup>30</sup> Seattle Police Department Public Affairs, “SPD Announces Agile Policing Strategy, Unveils Real-Time Crime Center,” *spdblotter.seattle.gov*, October 7, 2015, <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2015/10/07/spd-announces-agile-policing-strategy-unveils-real-time-crime-center/>.

<sup>31</sup> SPD, “i2 iBase,” 5-6.

<sup>32</sup> “Digital Dragnet: How Data Became a Cop’s Best Weapon,” *GCM*, November 29, 2011, <https://gcm.com/Articles/2011/12/05/Predictive-policing-tech-features.aspx?Page=2>.

<sup>33</sup> “Social Links Brings the OSINT Solution to IBM’s i2 Analyst’s Notebook Platform,” *SocialLinks.io*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://blog.sociallinks.io/https://blog-sociallinks.io/social-links-brings-the-osint-solution-to-ibms-i2-analysts-notebook-platform/>.

<sup>34</sup> “SL Pro on IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook,” *SocialLinks.io*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://blog.sociallinks.io/sl-pro-on-ibm-i2-analysts-notebook-product-launch-and-practical-application/>.

<sup>35</sup> Timothy Crocker, “The Power of Social Network Analysis,” *Police Chief Magazine*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.policemagazine.com/power-social-network-analysis/>.

Indigenous<sup>36</sup> – are more likely to have data in RMS or CAD that could lead to a false “linkage” to a person of interest and subject that person to surveillance and unwarranted interactions with police.

The SIR acknowledges that i2 iBase and the Analytics notebook are used as tools within the field of social network analysis (SNA).<sup>37</sup> SNA is a problematic mode of analysis, in part because it is often used for predictive policing via “heat-mapping.” iBase advertises such features.<sup>38</sup> Any tool potentially useful for predictive policing raises well-documented civil liberties concerns, including reproducing existing biases and compounding the surveillance of neighborhoods which return higher crime data because they are over-policed.<sup>39</sup>

Utilizing relationship analysis in conjunction with other more common predictive policing tools also raises new threats. For instance, rather than identifying specific locations where gun violence is likely to occur, SNA predictive policing may aim to identify *specific individuals* likely to face gun violence<sup>40</sup> – an entirely new level of invasive surveillance and data targeting. The SIR does not describe predictive policing uses of iBase, but such uses are also not prohibited. Given RTCC’s mission, it seems entirely conceivable that iBase data could be used to predict threats and re-direct officers. Unless governed by narrowly tailored guidelines, iBase has the potential to compound issues already present in SPD’s existing predictive policing apparatus.

RTCC use of SNA technology also raises freedom of association concerns. Without proper regulation, SNA tools could be used with open source data to pull up details not only on the subject of the incident, but on all of their associations – for instance, criminal records for a brother, parent, or Facebook friend. That information may influence an officer’s response to the situation; after all, RTCC

<sup>36</sup> Factors including biased policing, discriminatory school discipline policies, and community over-policing mean that Latinx, Black, and Indigenous people are more likely to interact with police, be stopped by police, and be searched by police – leading to the creation of notes or an entry in a system like CAD or RMS. These differences are well-documented nationally and in Seattle. See, for instance, David Kroman, “Report Shows Seattle Policing Still Disparate Along Racial Lines,” *Crosscut*, May 1, 2019, <https://crosscut.com/2019/05/report-shows-seattle-police-enforcement-still-disparate-along-racial-lines/>; Elizabeth David, et al, “Contacts Between the Police and Public, 2015,” *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report*, October 2018, “Findings,” *Stanford Open Policing Project*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/>; Kim Eckart, “How a Police Contact by Middle School Leads to Different Outcomes for Black, White Youth,” *Washington.edu*, December 3, 2020, <https://www.washington.edu/news/2020/12/03/how-a-police-contact-by-middle-school-leads-to-different-outcomes-for-black-white-youth/>; <https://hsa.tsp.gov/content/guid/pdf/csp15.pdf>; Robert Crutchfield, et al, “Racial Disparity in Police Contacts,” *Race Justice* 2, no.3 (July 1, 2012): 10, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3868476/>;

<sup>37</sup> SPD “IBM i2 iBase,” 6.

<sup>38</sup> “IBM Security i2 Analyst’s Notebook: Feature Spotlights,” *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook/details>; “Durham Police Department,” *IBM.com*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/case-studies/durham-police-department>.

<sup>39</sup> Tim Lau, “Predictive Policing Explained,” *The Brennan Center for Justice*, April 1, 2020, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained>; Jared Friend, “Seattle’s New Crime Analytics Program Threatens to Perpetuate Racism in Policing,” *ACLU WA.org*, October 20, 2015, <https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/seattle-s-new-crime-analytics-program-threatens-perpetuate-racism-policing>.

<sup>40</sup> Andrew Papachristos and Michael Sierra-Arevalo, “Policing the Connected World,” *Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services*, 2018, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814315>; Reichart, et al. “Focused Deterrence: A Policing Strategy to Combat Gun Violence,” *ICJLA Research Hub*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://icjla.illinois.gov/researchhub/articles/focused-deterrence-a-policing-strategy-to-combat-gun-violence>.

pulls this data with the goal of informing officers' actions. Use of that data may prompt more aggressive policing on the basis of association alone, exacerbating existing biases in street policing. If additional data is imported into iBase, it is possible other kinds of associations and affiliations could also be identified and immediately sent to police, such as membership in Facebook groups or job history.

## II. Concerns

- a. **Bias and Inaccuracies in Computer-Automated Social Network Analysis.** As outlined above, iBase's automated relationship analyses are likely to generate data errors that compound existing biases. SPD does not indicate how often incorrect connections are identified, but they have confirmed that false connections do occur. To protect against these errors, the SIR indicates that relationship analysis will be "developed manually by analysts."<sup>41</sup> However, that claim conflicts with assertions that iBase's automated processing will "create[e] relevant intelligence from large amounts of data,"<sup>42</sup> and will create new "efficiencies" by avoiding manual data management.<sup>43</sup> Manual analysis also seems time-prohibitive in rapid-response scenarios. Even if SPD only analyzes relationships manually, the SIR never fully explains what safeguards are embedded into that manual analysis to ensure data is fully reviewed and erroneous connections deleted.
- b. **Lack of Clarity on Purpose of Use and Usage Limits.** The SIR does not fully explain use cases for iBase and does not include policies placing limits on its uses.
  - i. **Rapid Response Uses.** The SIR indicates that RTCC uses the social network analysis provided by iBase to provide "actionable information"<sup>44</sup> to officers in the field but does not thoroughly explain how that information is used by offices or why it is helpful. It is therefore difficult to assess the full extent of civil liberties concerns presented by the in-the-field uses of the technology and to assess SPD's need for the technology.
  - ii. **Need for a Criminal Investigation.** The SIR does not specify at what point someone's data is consolidated and viewed in iBase. Based on the contemplated RTCC uses of the technology, it seems that a formal criminal investigation does not need to be opened before data can be pulled and visualized in iBase. Rather, anyone who is merely the subject of a 911 call might be analyzed using iBase.
  - iii. **Visualization vs. Predictive Policing.** Without clearer usage limits, data compiled via iBase might be used for predictive policing.

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<sup>41</sup> SPD, "IBM i2 iBase," 27.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 6, 21, and 27.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.



- c. Lack of Clarity Around Types of Data Stored and Processed.** In the SIR, SPD does not specify what portion of existing data is automatically imported into iBase, and what kinds of data have been manually inputted.<sup>45</sup> The lack of information on data currently included or potentially included in iBase raises numerous concerns.
- i. Lack of Limits on Data Imported.** The SIR indicates that additional data can be “manually imported” into the system<sup>46</sup> and suggests that officers would manually input only single “piece[s] of data.”<sup>47</sup> However, it does not specify a policy limiting the kinds of data that can be manually inputted or that would prevent automatic import of outside data. The lack of such restrictions is concerning given iBase’s potential to operate as a dragnet with a disparate surveillance impact.
  - ii. Biased Data Selection.** Biases likely already exist in the data imported from RMS and CAD. Members of over-policed communities are far more likely to appear in SPD systems and are therefore more likely to appear in iBase relationships analyses and be subjected to police investigation resulting from false linkages. The SIR also states that only some portions of RMS and CAD data are automatically imported into iBase. If so, the data selection parameters used could introduce additional bias. For instance, importing data only for certain types of incidents or from certain locations could compound the racial and economic disparities already present in the data. The SIR does not indicate whether SPD has completed a disparate impact assessment of the linkages iBase generates, nor whether any policies exist which might mitigate this disparate impact. When asked what portion of data is imported into iBase, the SPD representative implied that only difficult to import data was excluded, but the inclusion parameters were not fully described.
- d. Lack of Clarity Regarding Contract with IBM.** The SIR does not indicate whether SPD has a contract with IBM and does not describe the provisions of any such contract. It is therefore difficult to assess what future uses of iBase might be possible, what kinds of data might be imported, and what data security mechanisms are in place. Although the SIR states that data is maintained on SPD servers and is entered into iBase via a one-way server transfer, the SIR does not describe enforceable provisions which could prevent future IBM use or review of data and analyses from iBase.
- e. Lack of Clarity on Data Security.** The SIR does not fully describe data security measures that would prevent third-party access to sensitive iBase relationship analyses and searches.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 6.

- i. **Data Deletion.** The SIR states that manually entered data will be automatically deleted after five years.<sup>48</sup> It is not clear why there is a lengthy five-year retention period. The SIR also does not specify what systems or oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that data is deleted. This is particularly concerning given the lack of limits on manual data inputs, as outlined above.
- ii. **Incidental Data Access.** The SIR specifies, "incidental data access may occur through delivery of technology client services."<sup>49</sup> However, it does not describe the specific scenarios in which this data access might occur, nor what kind of data would be viewed, leaving open the possibility that significant elements of analysis generated by iBase could be released to third-party entities.

### III. *Outstanding Questions that Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- Which "portion" of SPD RMS and CAD data is automatically imported into iBase? How often does the data used generate erroneous relationship linkages?
- Has an equity assessment been performed on the portion of the data transferred? What biases exist in the data, and how does SPD ensure that the biases present in the social network analyses conducted with this software do not cause disparate impact?
- Are there any limits on the kinds of data that can be manually inputted into the system? Has there been an evaluation of what kinds of data have been manually inputted thus far?
- Are there any policies that would prevent other kinds of data from being imported into iBase in the future?
- How is manual relationship analysis performed using iBase, and what specific safeguards exist within the analysis process to prevent erroneous connections? Does SPD ever use the automatically-generated relationship maps created by iBase or Analyst's notebook, without verifying the accuracy of all the many data points involved?
- Is data compiled via iBase ever used for predictive purposes, rather than mere visualization? Are there any policies that would prevent its use for predictive purposes in the future?
- How does RTCC use the social network analysis provided by iBase to provide "actionable information"<sup>50</sup> to officers in the field? What kinds of actionable information would this include, and why would such data be necessary or helpful?
- At what point can someone's data be consolidated and viewed in iBase?
- What systems ensure that manually entered data is deleted automatically?
- What circumstances might lead to "incidental" data access, and what data would be viewed? Could only ITD employees potentially obtain "incidental data access?"
- Does SPD have a contract with IBM, and if so, what are its provisions?

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 10.



#### IV. *Suggestions for Regulation*

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of IBM's i2 iBase and Analyst's Notebook. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- A regular audit to assess for biases in the data imported into iBase and in the analyses generated by iBase.
- Limits on the kinds of data that may be inputted both manually and automatically into iBase, ensuring that additional pools of public or private information are not added in the future.
- A shortened data retention period that does not exceed the time necessary to conduct a criminal investigation.
- A clear deletion oversight process to ensure that manually added data is deleted after the specified retention period.
- A manual relationships analysis process that includes clear checkpoints designed to ensure erroneous data and inaccurate linkages generated by iBase are detected and corrected before they are actively investigated.
- Limits on the usage of potentially erroneous iBase analyses and search data in rapid-response settings where manual analysis is not possible.
- Clear purpose of use limits, restricting when someone's relationship network may be assembled in iBase, such as a requirement that a criminal investigation be opened before such an analysis is begun, to prevent the widespread use of iBase analysis on all individuals encountering the police.
- A regulation banning the use of iBase for predictive policing.
- A contract with IBM that ensures IBM never possesses, uses, or accesses SPD data.

### Audio Recording Systems

#### I. *Background*

"Wires" are concealed audio recording devices, generally used to record in-person conversations pursuant to a search warrant. This type of technology poses serious privacy and civil liberties concerns. If people do not have the knowledge and assurance that private communications are, indeed, private, habits based upon fear and insecurity will gradually replace habits of freedom, chilling people's civil rights and liberties.

"Audio recording systems" include devices hidden on a person, in an object, or in a location and used to record audio, following consent or search warrant authorization.<sup>51</sup> The SIR does not specify the particular audio recording technology

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<sup>51</sup> Seattle Police Department, "2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Audio Recording Systems ("Wires")," accessed June 4, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR%20-%20Audio%20Recording%20Systems.pdf>, 4.

used by the department, outside of the Callyo call recording technology discussed above. At the June 10th public engagement meeting, an SPD representative indicated that some technologies that fall under this SIR may be able to record video, though the SIR states video devices are described in a separate SIR.<sup>52</sup> Although the SIR is unclear about the type or model of devices used, at the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, SPD representatives suggested that the devices used were mostly relatively new devices – not legacy “wires” or tape recorders – and were typically small, handheld recorders or officers’ cell phones.

Many new audio wire technologies are substantially similar in function to traditional recording devices but may be far smaller and have improved audio quality and storage capacity, making them easier to conceal and surveillance easier to perform. Improved audio filtering and increased wearer comfort mean devices can be used in a wider array of settings irrespective of noise, can pick up sound from much further away, and can be worn for longer periods of time. Transmissions from planted devices can also be streamed to remote computers so that law enforcement need not be near the conversation recorded.<sup>53</sup> Modern devices are therefore capable of widespread and complex surveillance not contemplable even 15 years ago. Increased storage capacity and ease of data deletion also make device misuse more likely; officers can now leave a device running in a public place where third-party conversations can be captured, then try to later delete excess data improperly collected.

Improved audio quality and increasingly sophisticated audio-processing software also pose new threats. Law enforcement agencies already employ software that can identify and match voices, and voice databases are being developed.<sup>54</sup> The use of this software, in conjunction with mass police storage of high-quality audio recordings, poses a risk of easy but possibly inaccurate or biased government identification and surveillance of those recorded. SPD acknowledges that audio recordings may be shared with other agencies, including other law enforcement departments.<sup>55</sup> As such, even if SPD would need to undergo a review process before acquiring voice recognition technologies, the voices of those recorded by SPD could easily become part of other agencies’ voice recording databases. SPD audio recordings could therefore become a permanent biometric record, much like a fingerprint. Given these new and developing risks, it is necessary to set narrower limits on uses of audio-processing software, sharing of audio data, and uses of recorders.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>53</sup> Wendy Ruderman, “Is Someone Recording This? It’s Harder to Find Out,” *The New York Times*, April 7, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/nyregion/secret-recording-grows-safer-as-the-wire-grows-tiner.html>; Laurie Mason Schroeder, “Wearing a Wire’ in the Digital Age: Smaller, Safer, More Comfortable,” *The Morning Call*, February 3, 2018, <https://www.mcall.com/news/police/mc-ops-allentown-city-hall-investigation-wiretaps-20180201-story.html>.

<sup>54</sup> Michael Dumiak, “Interpol’s New Software Will Recognize Criminals by Their Voices,” *Spectrum.IEEE.org*, May 16, 2018, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/interpol-new-automated-platform-will-recognize-criminals-by-their-voices>; “Speaker Identification” *GoVoice.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.govoice.com/products/speaker-identification/>; “Voice Authentication,” *Awave Biometrics*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.awave.com/voice-authentication/>; “Forensic Voice Analysis,” *Sivtek.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.sivtek.com/forensic-voice-analysis/>; “Voice Inspector for Forensic Experts,” *Phonocia.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.phonocia.com/en/use-case/an-a-forensics-software/>.

<sup>55</sup> SPD, “Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”),” 12.

## II. *Specific Concerns*

- a. **Lack of Clarity Around How Devices Are Used.** The SIR does not specify the scenarios in which officers may use recording devices, saying that “[SPD] utilizes audio recording systems in a handful of ways to obtain information during a criminal investigation.”<sup>56</sup> It is difficult to assess the necessity of audio recordings without clarity as to how devices are used and where they may be used. Although audio recordings are helpful in some scenarios, some audio recordings – particularly those authorized only by two-party consent – may be unjustified given the privacy concerns posed by audio recording. SPD never describes how frequently audio is recorded or how often improper recordings are captured, making it difficult to assess the current process’s flaws.
- b. **Lack of Clarity Around Warrant and Consent Procedures.** The SIR indicates that either a warrant or consent may authorize use of a recording device.<sup>57</sup> However, neither the SIR nor the June 10<sup>th</sup> or July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meetings provided a thorough description of the consent process. It is unclear whether SPD has a clear consent script or guidelines for determining what recordings are permissible. It is important that individuals know precisely what they are consenting to and how they can opt out of being recorded. Without clear processes, SPD may be capturing and retaining audio that falls neither clearly within the terms of the party’s consent nor outside of them. Retaining any such audio undermines the privacy expectations embodied in Washington’s two-party consent laws. Additionally, without clear guidelines, decisions about which recordings to keep are likely to be made arbitrarily or in ways informed by bias.
- c. **Lack of Adequate Safeguards Against Improper Data Collection Prevention.** The SIR specifies data deletion practices that prevent improperly collected data from being retained, pursuant to the terms of a warrant or the terms of a party’s consent. However, it does not outline formal usage guidelines that would prevent improper recordings from ever being collected. The additional storage capacity and audio sensitivity of today’s recording make it far more likely that an officer might turn on a device early or leave it on too long and capture third-party conversations before and after any conversation of interest. Even carefully timed recordings might capture private background conversations. Although such data might eventually be deleted, those conversations will be temporarily stored, then reviewed by a member of SPD staff. The capture, review, and temporary storage of recordings of citizens who have not consented and are not subject to a warrant constitutes a serious privacy violation, particularly given the highly personal, identifiable information which might be collected.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.



- d. **Lack of Clarity on Types of Devices Used.** The SIR does not specify the manufacturer or function of devices used.<sup>58</sup> This is particularly concerning given that officers are using their phones to record, which may involve the use of a third-party application or software.
- e. **Lack of Clarity on Specific Data Extraction Software.** The SIR states that completed recordings are "...extracted onto a thumb drive from the device using a locally stored computer application.... This application... is used solely to extract audio data from a device and stores no data."<sup>59</sup> The type of application and its features are never detailed. As such, we cannot analyze the security of the software. Presumably some second software is also used to delete parts of recordings that are improperly collected. That software and its features are also not specified.
- f. **Inconsistencies in Deletion Policies.** The SIR states that the TESU officer is responsible for purging improperly collected data,<sup>60</sup> but also that the investigating officer is responsible for the purge.<sup>61</sup> If no one person is accountable for data deletion, some improperly collected data may never be purged. Additionally, if the investigating officer can complete the deletion, they necessarily may access and review improperly collected recordings. The review, use or retention of such unauthorized recordings constitutes a clear violation of 4<sup>th</sup> amendment rights and Washington consent laws.
- g. **Security Risks Associated with Third Party Data Sharing.** The SIR describes third-party data sharing only vaguely.<sup>62</sup> It does not describe the sharing process, nor how data security will be maintained. The lack of data security measures increases the likelihood that third parties will improperly expose, retain, or share private data. It is also unclear whether audio recordings shared with partner law enforcement agencies or other jurisdictions – who are not subject to the same surveillance regulations – are shared permanently, or whether any protocols are in place to ensure that shared data is later deleted.
- h. **Inconsistencies in Audio Device Request and Management Process.** The SIR is inconsistent in describing how TESU officers process requests for audio device usage. The SIR in one place states that the investigating officer completes the audio device request form<sup>63</sup> but elsewhere states that TESU does so.<sup>64</sup> The request form is designed to ensure that officers obtain consent or a warrant before a device is issued. Therefore, an unclear request process increases the probability of unauthorized device use and improper private data collection.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 5 and 16.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 7.

### III. *Outstanding Questions That Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- What is the manufacture and functionality of audio recording devices utilized by SPD? How much storage do they have, from what distance can they transmit, and from what distance can they pick up sound?
- How are new technologies selected when replacing devices that have reached end of life? Are there any limits on the kinds of new recording devices that can be acquired? Do new technologies include features not present in older technologies?
- What application is used to extract data from the recording devices and place the audio onto a hard drive or thumb drive? Can this software or any other alter recordings? If so, how is use of the software logged?
- Are there guidelines limiting the settings in which an audio device can be used or preventing the collection of unneeded and improper recordings?
- Are there any guidelines limiting how the audio devices can be used – for instance specifying at what point the recording may be turned on and when it must be turned off?
- What is the device request process? Who fills out the request form?
- What is the process for purging data? Who purges the data, and what oversight measures are in place to ensure data is properly and fully purged?
- What protocols ensure that consent is properly and clearly obtained before a recording is initiated?
- Where there is no warrant, how do officers decide which recordings or portions of recordings to delete and which to retain? Are there guidelines for making this determination?
- How is data shared with third parties? What security practices are observed? How is shared data monitored for deletion within the appropriate time frame?

### IV. *Recommendations for Regulation*

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of audio/wire technology, particularly given that both the kind of technology and the scenarios where it is used are not described. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Narrowly tailored guidelines for where, how, and when recording devices may be used that help to limit the collection of unauthorized data. This might include a requirement that recording devices be turned on only once a person of interest is present, or a prohibition on using particularly powerful devices in public places where other private conversations might easily be picked up.
- Clear rules for the issuance of recording devices and processing of all recordings that limit the role of the investigating officer and ensure oversight by a supervisor. These rules should include a data-deletion protocol which makes clear who is responsible for deleting improperly collected data, ensures regular oversight of deletion, and provides clarity as to what data must be deleted where no warrant is used.

- Limits on the kinds of audio recording technology which SPD can use as end-of-life replacements for current audio devices, with consideration for the risks posed by newer and more powerful recording devices and applications.
- Limits on the software that can be used to process and extract audio recordings. For instance, this might include a prohibition on software that involves offsite cloud storage or voice biometrics recognition.
- Clear procedures for securely sharing data with third parties, including a policy that ensures shared data is erased.

## **Maltego**

### **I. Background**

Maltego is a powerful technology used by law enforcement to search, collect, and analyze billions of open-source data points and generate charts representing connections between identified entities and individuals. This technology poses serious privacy and civil liberties concerns as it enables dragnet surveillance through mass social media monitoring.

Maltego is advertised to law enforcement and cybersecurity analysts as a tool for acquiring identifying information on individuals and entities under investigation, including through analysis of email addresses and social media data, or data from the "dark web."<sup>65</sup> There are multiple versions of Maltego that include different functions and data packages.<sup>66</sup> SPD states that they use the free, community version to assess information which is already publicly available online, primarily in the course of cybercrime investigations.<sup>67</sup>

Maltego advertises having more than 35 data partners.<sup>68</sup> Their partners include Social Links,<sup>69</sup> a platform which allows for the harvesting of data from more than 50 social networks including Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.<sup>70</sup> Even the free version of Maltego can be used to access these additional data integrations. For instance, Social Links has a free plug-in, Social Links CE,<sup>71</sup> which can retrieve information from Skype and Social Links' own database,<sup>71</sup> which includes 7 billion

<sup>65</sup> "Law Enforcement," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/law-enforcement/>.

<sup>66</sup> "Pricing," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/pricing-plans/>.

<sup>67</sup> "Products," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/products/>.

<sup>68</sup> Seattle Police Department, 2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software - Maltego," Accessed June 4, 2021,

<https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR-%20Link%20Analysis-Maltego.pdf>, 5 and 11.

<sup>69</sup> "The Five Pillars of the Maltego Officer," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 4, 2021,

<https://www.maltego.com/blog/the-five-pillars-of-the-maltego-officer/>.

<sup>70</sup> "Transform Hub," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/>.

<sup>71</sup> "Social Links Pro," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/social-links-pro/>; "Police Tight Lipped on Trial of Social Media Surveillance Tools," *NewsHub*, June 14, 2021, <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2021/06/police-tight-lipped-on-trial-of-social-media-surveillance-tools.html>.

<sup>72</sup> "Social Links CE," *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/social-links-ce/>.



pieces of data.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, the free Wayback Machine integration allows users to browse “hundreds of billions of websites, going back for years or even decades...” including historical snapshots of pages and data long since deleted.<sup>73</sup> Although the SIR identifies some types of data that SPD does collect, such as web domain ownership information,<sup>74</sup> it does not fully explicate what kinds of data SPD uses within Maltego.

The validity of data collected via Maltego is questionable, given the multiple source points and huge quantities of data analyzed. Although the SIR indicates that all SPD data collected via Maltego is already publicly available,<sup>75</sup> that guarantee is misleading. Publicly available information can include private or sensitive data improperly made public via data breaches or hacking. Indeed, law enforcement agencies are known to purchase and use such “public” hacked data.<sup>76</sup> Notably, Maltego includes a free integration from “Have I Been Pwned,” which may be used to search for such “public” hacked data.<sup>77</sup> Without proper analysis and verification, outputs generated from Maltego’s open source data could further expose sensitive information.

Monitoring even accurate and properly collected public data raises serious civil liberties concerns when performed at the scale promised by Maltego. Vast pools of public data, when stored and analyzed in combination, can uncover privately held information. For instance, at a public demonstration in 2012, Maltego’s founder demonstrated that his software could uncover the identity of a likely NSA employee using “public” information flowing out of the agency’s parking lot. Maltego identified the employee’s email address, date of birth, travel history, employment and education history, and image.<sup>78</sup> Such invasive surveillance fundamentally impedes individual privacy rights, particularly when entrusted to a government agency and used without clear limitations.

Maltego also may be used for mass monitoring of social media. Law enforcement social media monitoring is not new; by 2016, 70% of more than 500 surveyed departments used social media for intelligence gathering.<sup>79</sup> Tools like Maltego, however, allow for mass analysis and complex searches of social media data, a far more potent form of surveillance than targeted investigations of specific accounts. These tools can enhance agencies’ existing social media agendas, including

<sup>72</sup> John Weber, “Social Links: The All-Round Tools for OSINT Intern Investigations – Part 2,” *Corima*, August 13, 2020, <https://corima.de/en/4-social-links-the-all-round-tool-for-osint-internet-investigations-part-2/>.

<sup>73</sup> “Wayback Machine,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/wayback-machine/>.

<sup>74</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 6.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Joseph Cox, “Police are Buying Access to Hacked Website Data,” *Vice.com*, July 8, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/3azrvy/police-buying-hacked-data-spycloud>; The Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Filed in Los Angeles and Alaska in Connection with Seizures of 15 Websites Offering DDoS-For-Hire Services,” December 20, 2018, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/criminal-charges-filed-los-angeles-and-alaska-connection-services-15-websites-offering>.

<sup>77</sup> “Have I Been Pwned,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/has-been-pwned/>.

<sup>78</sup> Jeremy Kirk, “Who Is Tweeting from the NSA’s Parking Lot,” *Computer World*, October 17, 2012, <https://www.computerworld.com/article/2492504/who-is-tweeting-from-the-nsa-s-parking-lot.html>.

<sup>79</sup> KiDeuk Kim, et. al., “2016 Law Enforcement Use of Social Media Survey,” *The Urban Institute and International Association of Chiefs of Police*, February 2017, [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey\\_5.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey_5.pdf).

monitoring of demonstrations and activists,<sup>80</sup> with tracking often particularly focused on Black Lives Matter organizers.<sup>81</sup> Such tracking chills political speech and raises safety and privacy concerns, extending decades of police surveillance and abuse of civil rights protestors.<sup>82</sup> Social media analysis has also been used as a form of predictive policing – a mode of policing rife with bias and inaccuracies<sup>83</sup> – as police surveil accounts of interest and analyze posts to anticipate future crimes.<sup>84</sup>

Law enforcement already misuses and misconstrues social media data to compound existing biases and feed mass incarceration. The NYPD, for instance, has a social media tracking unit devoted to monitoring youth “gangs.” Data is provided to probation and parole officers and can be presented in court with devastating consequences; in one case, misinterpreted social media “likes” were used to deny pre-trial bail to a misidentified, innocent Black teenager who spent two years awaiting trial on Rikers Island.<sup>85</sup> Maltego’s mass analysis of public data grants police expanded surveillance capabilities and can subject individuals to unwarranted police interaction or criminal consequences on the basis of inaccurate, hacked, or misinterpreted information.

## II. *Concerns*

- a. **Inadequate Policies Defining Purpose of Use.** The SIR suggests that Maltego is primarily used for cybercrime investigations,<sup>86</sup> but does not specify any policies designating when the technology may be used. The SIR’s language is also vague and implies that Maltego has been used in non-cyber contexts.<sup>87</sup> During the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative also commented that Maltego could be used for non-cyber crimes, although it generally is not. It is therefore unclear how widely large-scale public data analysis is currently used in SPD criminal investigations or what would prevent widespread usage of Maltego in the future.
- b. **Inadequate Policies on Data Collection and Assessment.** The SIR states that Maltego can only be used within the bounds of a specific criminal investigation or “cybersecurity incidents.”<sup>88</sup> However, it does not specify any internal guidelines restricting what public data or whose public data may be collected and analyzed using Maltego. Under existing policies, it seems entirely possible that people tenuously or erroneously associated with potential perpetrators – including people for whom there is little or no

<sup>80</sup> Rachel Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Police Challenges,” *Howard Law Journal* (61.3, 2018), [https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/images/RLW\\_Howard\\_L\\_Article.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/images/RLW_Howard_L_Article.pdf), 529.

<sup>81</sup> “Police Monitoring of Social Media Sparks Concerns in Black and Brown Communities,” *NPR – All Things Considered*, August 21, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/21/904646038/police-monitoring-of-social-media-sparks-concerns-in-black-and-brown-communities>.

<sup>82</sup> Rachel Levinson-Waldman and Angel Diaz, “How to Reform Police Monitoring of Social Media,” *Brookings Institute – Tech Stream*, July 9, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-reform-police-monitoring-of-social-media/>; Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access,” 524-525.

<sup>83</sup> Lau, “Predictive Policing Explained,” Friend, “Seattle’s New Crime Analytics Program.”

<sup>84</sup> Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access,” 530.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 523.

<sup>86</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 5.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 8 and 10.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.



evidence of criminal activity – could be subject to Maltego assessment and surveillance.

- c. Lack of Clarity Around Data Sources.** The SIR does not describe the specific data sources SPD utilizes via Maltego; it provides only limited examples of Maltego's usage and states that data is collected from "various open source websites."<sup>89</sup> Absent further clarity, it seems possible that SPD can use Maltego for social media data analysis, raising privacy issues not addressed in the SIR. Additionally, the SIR acknowledges that "some iterations of Maltego allows for collection of private data of citizens,"<sup>90</sup> but does not outline procedures to prevent accidental private data collection, including of private information improperly made public through hacking.
- d. Potential for Predictive Usages.** Paterva advertises that Maltego can "[h]elp solve future investigations by pushing insights back into [a] case management system."<sup>91</sup> The SIR indicates that SPD exports Maltego charts back into SPD's system<sup>92</sup> and suggests that data from Maltego might be used for "defensive" purposes.<sup>93</sup> If Maltego is being used to anticipate future crimes, SPD must provide clarity as to a) how they guard against existing biases often replicated by predictive policing, and b) what surveillance they perform based on these predictions.
- e. Inadequate Policies to Assess for Errors in Data Analysis.** The SIR acknowledges that erroneous linkages are one of the "most important unintended possible consequence[s]" of Maltego. However, in describing safeguards to prevent erroneous linkages, the SIR only states, "because all analysis [is] conducted in the TESU by a limited number of detectives the risk is mitigated."<sup>94</sup> This mechanism seems ineffective, as no data output review process is described. Perhaps the SIR means that TESU detectives perform only limited and reviewable amounts of manual analysis and diagramming, which indeed might limit inaccuracies. However, no policies are described which would enforce limits on diagramming techniques and levels of usage. To the contrary, any such limits contradict the core purpose of Maltego. SPD states that Maltego is useful precisely because it can "pars[e] large amounts of... information,"<sup>95</sup> and thereby "help in identifying unknown relationship[s]."<sup>96</sup>

The SIR does not describe SPD tracking of Maltego's error rate. Without error tracking or safeguards, Maltego outputs likely lead police in inaccurate directions and subject random individuals to unnecessary surveillance and police interaction. Because evidence collected via Maltego can be used for search warrants, inaccurate Maltego outputs that are presented to the court as valid could lead to particularly invasive forms of improper searches.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>90</sup> SPD, "Maltego," 20.  
<sup>91</sup> Law Enforcement, "Maltego.com."  
<sup>92</sup> SPD, "Maltego," 9.  
<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 6 and 14.  
<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>96</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

- f. **Lack of Clarity on Data Retention Policies.** The SIR states that data that is not relevant to an investigation is not retained and that "pertinent" data is exported to a spreadsheet or diagram and then handled per department policy.<sup>98</sup> However, it does not make clear how and when the originally collected, pertinent data is deleted from Maltego, leaving open the possibility that such data is retained indefinitely.
- g. **Lack of Clarity Around Relationship with Paterva.** The SIR states that SPD searches are stored by the vendor, as SPD is unable to stand up their own server using the free version of the software.<sup>99</sup> These searches contain sensitive information that indicates the contents and direction of a criminal investigation and are being exposed to a private third-party. Additionally, the SIR states that Maltego is not "used to process or collect internal data,"<sup>100</sup> but elsewhere says that private information gathered via search warrant can be input into Maltego.<sup>101</sup> The SIR does not describe measures to keep that private data secure nor outlines Paterva's or Maltego Technologies's internal data security measures. The SIR also does not describe a contract between SPD and Paterva or Maltego Technologies for the use of the free Maltego software.
- h. **Potential for Improper Use Without Auditing/Logging.** The free version of Maltego's software seems to include no auditing or logging capabilities.<sup>102</sup> Lack of auditing or logging increases the probability that the software will be misused. Given the software's potential for invasive surveillance and monitoring that could intrude upon protected speech, more careful monitoring is essential. Notably, upgrading to the paid version of the software would not resolve the problem and would likely exacerbate the overall civil liberties concerns posed by the software; the paid version includes additional privacy risks given the far wider breadth of data available.

### III. *Outstanding Questions that Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- When can Maltego be used for non-cyber investigations?
- Once an investigation is opened, are there any internal guidelines restricting what public data or whose public data may be collected and analyzed using Maltego?
- Which specific data sources does SPD analyze using Maltego? Are there any limits on the kinds of data that can be assessed?
- Are Maltego outputs ever used for any predictive or "defensive" policing?
- Are errors in the data Maltego pulls systematically tracked? Are there any safeguards against errors or processes for analyzing the data?
- How often has Maltego been used, and is there any data suggestive of its efficacy in resolving cybersecurity crimes?

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 11.

- After data is exported, how and when is pertinent data deleted from within Maltego?
- Does SPD have any kind of written agreement or contract with Paterva/Maltego Technologies for the use of the free Maltego software? If so, what are the provisions?
- Does SPD enter private information collected via search warrant into Maltego? If so, what data security protocols are in place to protect that private information?
- Does Paterva/Maltego Technologies have access to and store data that is requested and collected by SPD, beyond requests/searches made?
- What are the vendor's policies for data security, how is data stored, and who owns the data collected and analyses generated?

#### **IV. *Recommendations for Regulation***

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of Maltego. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Guidelines as to when Maltego may be used, such as a regulation that permits its use only for cybercrime investigations.
- Limits on who associated with an investigation may have their data collected using Maltego, such as a regulation requiring reasonable suspicion that an individual committed a crime before their public data can be amassed and assessed.
- Limits on the kinds of public data that may be assessed using Maltego, such as a prohibition on dragnet social media analysis.
- A regulation that prevents internal SPD data from being inputted into Maltego.
- A prohibition on use of Maltego for predictive policing.
- An analysis of the impacts of any Maltego outputs.
- A process to analyze the accuracy of data and analyses generated by Maltego.
- The deletion of originally collected, pertinent data from within Maltego after it is exported.
- A clear agreement with the vendor for the use of the free Maltego software that prohibits the vendor from storing or accessing SPD data.
- The creation of additional security measures to prevent improper access of Maltego by unauthorized officers, given the lack of auditing and logging capabilities.

Sincerely,

Jennifer Lee  
Technology and Liberty Project Manager

Farris Peale  
Policy and Advocacy Group Intern



June 8, 2021

Re: Surveillance Ordinance Group 4a Request for Clarification from CTAB Privacy & Cybersecurity

The Community Technology Advisory Board (CTAB) Privacy & Cybersecurity Committee appreciates the opportunity to provide comment on the Group 4a Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs). Volunteers from this committee have reviewed the Surveillance Impact Reports for the Group 4a technologies as a group. Our comment with requests for clarification is attached.

Our expectations for the onboarding of new technologies and the use of current technologies extend those as communicated in our 12 March 2019 memo to the Seattle City Council regarding Group 2 technologies with additions:

- Implicit bias has a material and potentially destructive impact on individuals and communities. It is important to keep in mind the ways in which bias can be streamlined and exacerbated through the use of technology.
- Interdepartmental sharing of privacy best practices: When we share what we've learned with each other, the overall health of the privacy ecosystem goes up.
- Regular external security audits: Coordinated by ITD (Seattle IT), routine third-party security audits are invaluable for both hosted-service vendors and on-premises systems.
- Mergers and acquisitions: These large, sometimes billion-dollar ownership changes introduce uncertainty. Any time a vendor, especially one with a hosted service, changes ownership, a thorough review of any privacy policy or contractual changes should be reviewed.
- Remaining a Welcoming City: As part of the [Welcoming Cities Resolution](#), no department should comply with a request for information from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without a criminal warrant. In addition, the privacy of all citizens should be protected equally and without consideration of their immigration status.

Sincerely,

**CTAB Privacy and Cybersecurity  
subcommittee members**

**Nicole Espy**, Committee co-chair  
**Camille Malonzo**, Committee co-chair  
**Eryk Waligora**, Committee volunteer

**Community Technology Advisory Board**

**Femi Adebayo**, CTAB Member  
**Nicole Espy**, CTAB Member  
**Dr. Tyrone Grandison**, CTAB Member  
**David Kirichenko**, CTAB Member  
**John Krull**, CTAB Member  
**Brandon Lindsey**, CTAB Member  
**Lassana Magassa**, CTAB Member  
**Camille Malonzo**, CTAB Vice-Chair  
**René Peters**, CTAB Chair  
**Leah Shin**, CTAB Member





### **Callyo (Police)**

1. Data from this application is stored on Amazon Web Services<sup>1</sup>. Will any SPD generated data be stored by Callyo or AWS?
2. Do other Callyo users or Callyo engineers have access to data generated by SPD?
3. How is data generated by SDP protected from Callyo or AWS?
4. Callyo was recently acquired by Motorola Systems in August 2020. Are there any changes to the terms of use as a result of the acquisition? If any data is collected by the technology provider, has its use / handling changed since acquisition?
5. Callyo is an Amazon Web Services (AWS) partner, which is a cloud services provider. Will any future usage of AWS via Callyo or any changes as a result of the acquisition by Motorola be reviewed by City Council prior to onboarding?
6. The SIR states that "Callyo is utilized in two different ways by units within SPD: Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU) and the High Risk Victims Unit (HRVU). The High Risk Victims Unit uses Callyo to mask phone numbers but does not utilize the recording features of Callyo" and goes on to describe the use of the technology by TESU officers/detectives. What is the data that HRVU keep about the call, if any, and for how long? Is that metadata used for any other purposes? Is that shared with any other department either internal to SPD or externally?
7. The SIR states "TESU maintains logs of requests (including copies of request forms and warrants) and extractions that are available for audit. SPD's Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of any system at any time. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can also access all data and audit for compliance at any time." How often do these audits occur?
8. Recordings are retained for a maximum of a year ("Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, investigational conversation recordings are retained "for 1 year after transcribed verbatim and verified OR until disposition of pertinent case file, whichever is sooner, then Destroy" (LE06-01-04 Rev. 1). TESU maintains a log of requests (including copies of warrants), extractions, and deployments that are available to any auditor, including the Officer of Inspector General and federal monitor."). What is the retention schedule for logs on calls?

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<sup>1</sup><https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/harnessing-the-power-of-cloud-startups-deliver-innovative-services-to-public-safety-agencies-faster/>



### **Audio Recording Systems (Police)**

1. The SIR states that "All audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). When an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment."
2. Is there are limit to the how long an officer/detective can use the device? What are the limits / safeguards in place for timely use? For example, is there ever a scenario where an Officer/Detective indefinitely records individuals in the scope of the court order and potentially other scenarios outside the scope of the warrant, but only the latter is ultimately transcribed for use as part of a criminal investigation. What safeguards are in place to ensure this does not happen?
3. The SIR states that "[a]udio recording devices capture sounds as they are happening in the moment. The devices do not check for accuracy, as they are simply capturing a live exchange of sounds. They are not interpreting or otherwise, analyzing any data they collect." What happens when the device records audio that is background / not part of a warrant to record but just happens to record other people? Is that data deleted? Is that transcribed?



## I2 iBase (Police)

1. The SIR states "The most important unintended possible consequence related to the continued utilization of the iBase system is the possibility that erroneous links between individuals related to criminal investigations may be considered. However, because all analysis conducted in the RTCC is developed manually by analysts the risk is mitigated by the efficiencies provided by the use of the iBase system."
2. This is deeply concerning. The implicit bias in the network analysis done by analysts themselves can have negative impacts on individuals and communities when unchecked<sup>2</sup>. The SIR states that officers/detectives undergo security training and training on the use of the technology. Is there any training around implicit bias, especially with respect to network analysis?
3. The SIR states "i2 iBase is a relational database environment for searching through investigation data imported from RMS and CAD as well as manually imported information gathered by investigators during the course of a criminal investigation." Is the scope of any search query at all limited or does an Officer/Detective have access to all of the data in the SPD system regardless of scope? For example, if an Officer/Detective searches for a given name in the database will the search return all instances of an entity attached to a given name even if that would relate to different people of the same name, individuals who may not be involved in the specific criminal investigation for which the visualisation is being created?
4. The SIR states "[t]he software logs: user sign on/off, each time a user accesses any piece of data, and any data manually added by a user. These logs are periodically reviewed to ensure proper use of the software; they may also be reviewed at any time by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor." Are any of these logs captured by the technology provider? What is the retention policy / other data handling procedures for this data?
5. Does data from Maltego (or other publicly available info) go into I2? Do analysts generate links between this external data with internal data?

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<sup>2</sup> <https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/SpencerCharbonneauGlaser.Compass.2016.pdf>





## **Maltego (Police)**

### *Governance*

1. What does it mean that "Maltego is governed by SPD Policy"? What is this policy specifically?
2. What is the 'City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance'? Is it this?:  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/03/seattle-law-limits-police-in-intelligence-gathering/916c9159-31da-4a1f-ab55-9804ba5cfa19/>
3. The governance structure also includes the 28 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 23 and Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) requirements, which are both very broad criminal justice/intelligence guidelines. Among other capabilities, Maltego is able to pull intelligence from the dark web in reconnaissance efforts. Is there any governance or training for ethical hacking?
4. The SIR states that "[a] paid version includes the ability to stand up an internal SPD server that would allow for logging, but that would involve significant costs to implement and maintain." The logging makes it easier for audits by the department and also the Office of Inspector General. Is this a requirement to ensure proper auditing? While access logs can be inspected on the workstations utilizes to use Maltego, these logs may not necessarily retain the search parameters and the actual use of the technology.

### *Use of the Technology*

1. "Maltego...allows investigators to analyze connections between individuals related to criminal investigations." Is Maltego used only for "criminal investigations"? Maltego has many more capabilities beyond criminal investigations. This is not simply a tool used for or by law enforcement. Maltego can be used for all types of data collection, analysis, and tracking. Maltego's users vary. In fact, the company has a discounted program for academics and non-profits. However, this also means Maltego can be used by anyone, not just law enforcement, academics, and nonprofits, but by anyone attempting to collect and track key information on groups or individuals.
2. "The tool is used by law enforcement partners". Who are the "partners"? Is this service contracted out? If so, to whom? Are the "partners" from the public or private sector?
3. "Maltego is used infrequently to investigate cybercrime incidents." Why infrequently? What is the average frequency of use?
4. "This software simply visualizes data collected is from publicly available information on the internet." Data visualization is just one capability, but not its primary function. Software like Tableau is primarily used for importing and visualizing big data sets. Maltego is also heavily used to pull data from APIs, collate the data, and produce intelligence based on the collected and organized data. It also has capabilities, such as operating on the dark web.
5. "Data, when pertinent, is exported as a spreadsheet and/or visual diagram, at which point it is handled per department policy regarding digital evidence as part of a criminal investigation." How is this data considered evidence? Information that is not considered "evidence" could indicate that a certain person/entity is under criminal investigation; so how is that information protected?



### *Protections*

1. "SPD utilizes Maltego to investigate cybercrimes, primarily in determining the digital origin of attacks against cyber infrastructure." And "Maltego is restricted to use for the related security incident and/or pertinent criminal investigations and subject to Department Policy regarding ongoing criminal investigations."
2. "Primarily" in determining the digital origin of attacks? What else is it used for then?
3. "Restricted to use..." by whom or what policy specifically?
4. The use of this tool for the purposes of the SPD is difficult to justify. OSINT tools like Malego are used PRIMARILY for intelligence gathering in proactive defensive security, or as some even call it, "pre-crime". Intelligence is only useful before an attack, in order to help prevent it from occurring. But as this justification for use explains, the primary purpose of this tool will be used for investigations on crimes or incidents already committed. It is likely the SPD and all other PDs already have sophisticated tools designed specifically for this very purpose. Yes, Maltego can be used for all types of investigations, which can include criminal activities or even non-malicious vulnerability audits. But what is striking is that the primary function of this tool, as justified by SPD, will not be utilized. Main point: until there is clearer policy on the limitations of the SPD's use of Maltego, it will remain a powerful tool with multiple capabilities at the hands of law enforcement.
5. "Search warrant authorization is required, and would be obtained, to further any investigation into accessing private individual information." Maltego is only authorized for use with a warrant? This includes all cyber-crime and cyber attacks?
6. "Maltego is used by two trained TESU detectives within TESU, and by no other entity." "Users of Maltego undergo training on the use of the software, which includes privacy training." Law enforcement/criminal justice training is VERY different from intelligence analysis and/or data analysis training. What type of training and background do these detectives have? Is there any implicit bias training for the TESU officers/detectives who use the technology? (Stated policy on bias-based policy does not indicate specific training or mitigation of bias before it happens: 5.140 - Bias-Free Policing - Police Manual | seattle.gov)
7. "Data collected by Maltego is stored on an encrypted workstation within TESU." What type of encryption? This this stored on an on-premises server, hybrid, or cloud?

### *Use Case Example: "The City's network is attacked with ransomware"*

1. The scenario described may not actually unfold as described. It is likely that upon a ransomware attack, the City would contract a cybersecurity consulting company it has a partnership with for incident response, which would include a team of highly trained engineers and security operation center (SOC) professionals to stop the attack and attempt to recover any lost or damaged data. It would also include attribution of the threat actor. How effective SPD's involvement would actually be in this case comparatively?

**2021 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview**

# **Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”)**

**Seattle Police Department**

## Overview

**The Operational Policy statements in this document represent the only allowable uses of the equipment and data collected by this technology.**

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered through SPD’s Audio Recording Systems. All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

### 1.0 Technology Description

Audio recording devices are typically known as “wires” and can be concealed on a person or hidden in or on objects within a particular environment. Audio recording devices must be turned on by an individual and they record only portions of a conversation that occur while the device is on. The recording is stored locally on the device and must be downloaded onto a storage device (i.e., thumb drive, external hard drive) before it can be accessed and transcribed.

These devices have the ability to capture audio, video, or both. The legal and investigatory circumstances under which video is captured are different than those under which audio is captured. Video recording systems are discussed in the SIR entitled “Camera Systems”.

### 2.0 Purpose

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services.

Audio recording systems contribute to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of the investigation of criminal activity. These technologies are used only with proper consent and/or a warrant.

Audio recording systems allow SPD to pursue resolution of criminal investigations expeditiously by recording conversations of suspects, wherein an appropriate determination that sufficient probable cause exists has been made and a warrant has been issued. Per law, probable cause is required to obtain a search warrant. Without this technology, SPD would be unable to interrupt ongoing criminal activity and collect important evidence in some criminal investigations.

### 3.0 Data Collection and Use

**Operational Policy: Audio recording devices are utilized only after legal standards of consent and/or court-issued warrant have been met, as required by the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt. 9.73 RCW](#).**



Audio recording devices collect conversations and sounds of individuals related to a criminal investigation. The information is extracted onto a thumb drive from the device using locally stored computer application that resides on a computer in the TESU Unit. This application, accessible only to TESU staff, is used solely to extract audio data from a device and stores no data.

All of SPD’s audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). Once an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU’s Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment.

TESU detectives then assign the audio recording device to the requesting Officer/Detective.

Each deployment is logged, and all request forms (including consent form and/or court order warrant) are maintained within TESU.

## 4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

**Operational Policy: Audio recording devices are utilized only after legal standards of consent and/or court-issued warrant have been met, as required by the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt. 9.73 RCW](#).**

Deployment of audio recording devices is constrained to the conditions stipulated by consent and/or court order, which provides the legal authority and the scope of collection. All deployments of audio recording devices are documented by TESU and subject to audit by the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor at any time.

As outlined in 2.5 above, if no data is collected by the device that assists in the pursuit of the criminal investigation or falls within the scope of the consent form and/or court order warrant (as determined by the judge), the device is purged in its entirety and no data is provided to the requesting Officer/Detective for the investigation file.

Per the Washington Secretary of State’s Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, investigational conversation recordings are retained “for 1 year after transcribed verbatim and verified OR until disposition of pertinent case file, whichever is sooner, then Destroy” (LE06-01-04 Rev. 1).

## 5.0 Access & Security

**Operational Policy: Regarding probable cause, detailed requirements spelled out in [RCW 9.73.090\(2\)](#), (4), and (5), and [RCW 9.73.120](#), .130, and .140.**

**All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including:**

- [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,

- [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

## Access

Only authorized SPD users can access the audio recording devices or the data while it resides in the devices. Access to the systems/technology is limited to TESU personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data removed from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD’s password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

## Security

Audio recording devices store audio data directly on the device. Access to the equipment and data stored on the device is accessible only to TESU staff. TESU staff extract the data, document the extraction, provide the data to the requesting Officer/Detective, and retain no copies of the data.

## 6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

**Operational Policy:** Research agreements must meet the standards reflected in [SPD Policy 12.055](#). Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [28 CFR Part 20](#). In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#).

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) (“PRA”). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)).

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)).

Data obtained from the system may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney’s Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests “for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies.”

Discrete pieces of data collected by audio recording devices may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor’s Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

## 7.0 Equity Concerns

**Operational Policy: All use of the audio recording systems must also comply with [SPD Policy 12.050](#) – Criminal Justice Information Systems and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.**

Audio recording systems are used exclusively during the investigation of crimes and only with consent and/or court-ordered warrant, having established probable cause. There is no distinction in the levels of service SPD provides to the various and diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals within the city.



## SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE\*

<b>Department:</b>	<b>Dept. Contact/Phone:</b>	<b>CBO Contact/Phone:</b>
SPD / ITD	Rebecca Boatwright Vinh Tang/206-684-7640	Neal Capapas/206-684-5292

*\* Note that the Summary and Fiscal Note describes the version of the bill or resolution as introduced; final legislation including amendments may not be fully described.*

### **1. BILL SUMMARY**

**Legislation Title:** AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department’s use of Audio Recording Systems.

**Summary and background of the Legislation:** Per SMC Chapter 14.18 (also known as the Surveillance Ordinance), authorizing the approval of the surveillance impact reports for Seattle Police Department’s continued use of Audio Recording Systems.

### **2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM**

**Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?**      \_\_\_ Yes X No

### **3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

**Does this legislation amend the Adopted Budget?**      \_\_\_ Yes X No

**Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle that are not reflected in the above, including direct or indirect, short-term or long-term costs?**

This technology is currently in use by the Seattle Police Department and no additional costs, either direct or indirect, will be incurred based on the continued use of the technology. However, should it be determined, that SPD should cease use of the technology, there would be costs associated with decommissioning the technologies. Additionally, there may be potential financial penalty related to breach of contract with the technology vendors.

**Is there financial cost or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation?**

Per the Surveillance Ordinance, the City department may continue use of the technology until legislation is implemented. As such, there are no financial costs or other impacts that would result from not implementing the legislation.

### **4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS**

**a. Does this legislation affect any departments besides the originating department?**

This legislation does not affect other departments. The technology under review is used exclusively by the Seattle Police Department.

**b. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?**

A public hearing is not required for this legislation.

**c. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?**

No publication of notice is required for this legislation.

**d. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?**

This legislation does not affect a piece of property.

**e. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative. Does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?**

The Surveillance Ordinance in general is designed to address civil liberties and disparate community impacts of surveillance technologies. Each Surveillance Impact Review included in the attachments, as required by the Surveillance Ordinance, include a Racial Equity Toolkit review adapted for this purpose.

**f. Climate Change Implications**

**1. Emissions: Is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way?**

No.

**2. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**

No.

**g. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)?**

There is no new initiative or programmatic expansion associated with this legislation. It approves the continuation of use for the specific technologies under review.

**List attachments/exhibits below:**



Legislation Text

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**File #:** CB 120309, **Version:** 2

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**CITY OF SEATTLE**

**ORDINANCE \_\_\_\_\_**

**COUNCIL BILL \_\_\_\_\_**

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of IBM i2 iBase.

WHEREAS, Section 14.18.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), enacted by Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, requires City Council approval of a surveillance impact report (SIR) related to uses of surveillance technology, with existing/retroactive technology to be placed on a Master Technology List; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.020 applies to the IBM i2 iBase software in use by the Seattle Police Department (SPD); and

WHEREAS, SPD conducted policy rule review and community review as part of the development of the SIR; and

WHEREAS, SMC 14.18.080, enacted by Ordinance 125679, also requires review of the SIR by the Community Surveillance Working Group, composed of relevant stakeholders, and a statement from the Chief Technology Officer in response to the Working Group's recommendations; and

WHEREAS, development of the SIR and review by the Working Group have been completed; NOW,

THEREFORE,

**BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's IBM i2 iBase software. The City Council accepts the December 17, 2021, Surveillance

Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2.

Section 2. The Council requests the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to file a report with the Clerk on data and records retention policies and/or guidelines applicable to the use and operation of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software by January 31, 2023. The report should, to the extent feasible, identify policies for retention of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software records that 1) comply with the minimum retention period allowed by state and federal law, and 2) define a clear deletion oversight process to ensure deletion of manually added data after the specified retention period.

Section 3. The Council requests the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to file a report with the Clerk on the employee access policies and/or guidelines applicable to the use and operation of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software by January 31, 2023. The report should, to the extent feasible, identify a policy and/or procedures preventing employee access to IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software records unrelated to a specific investigation to which they have been assigned.

Section 4. The Council requests the Seattle Police Department to file a report with the Clerk by December 31, 2022 on the metrics provided to the Chief Technology Officer for use in the annual equity assessments of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software.

Section 5. The Council requests the Executive to include funding in the mid-year 2022 Supplemental Budget for the Office of Inspector General for Public Safety to retain a consultant to conduct an evaluation of the civil liberties risks associated with the Seattle Police Department's use of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software, including the accuracy of the data manually input into IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software, the accuracy of linkages identified by users of IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software, and demographic information about the individuals and groups associated with each IBM i2 iBase Link Analysis Software visualization. Findings from the evaluation should be filed with the Clerk by March 31, 2023.

Section 6. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force 30 days after its approval by the Mayor, but if

not approved and returned by the Mayor within ten days after presentation, it shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Section 1.04.020.

Passed by the City Council the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:

- Attachment 1 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software - IBM i2 iBase
- Attachment 2 - 2021 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: IBM i2 iBase

**2021 Surveillance Impact Report**

# **Link Analysis Software - IBM i2 iBase**

**Seattle Police Department**

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# Surveillance Impact Report (“SIR”) overview

## About the Surveillance Ordinance

Section 14.18.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), enacted by Ordinance [125376](#) and last amended by Ordinance 125679, also referred to as the “Surveillance Ordinance,” charges the City’s executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the “Surveillance Policy”.


## How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department (“Seattle IT”). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

## Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.



# Privacy Impact Assessment

## Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment (“PIA”) is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

## When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

## 1.0 Abstract

### 1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

I2 iBase is the server backbone to the i2 Analysts Notebook application, a software system which organizes existing SPD data visually into more accessible information utilized by the SPD Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) employees. The purpose of the RTCC is to provide actionable information to units in the field to increase officer safety, efficiency, and response to incidents. It is also intended to be the information “hub” of the police department, utilizing its resources and collective knowledge to enhance the department's effectiveness at reducing crime and improving public safety. The iBase system combines data stored in SPD's Records Management System (RMS), the Community Safety and Communication Center's (CSCC) Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, and information gathered during criminal investigations and displays information related to ongoing investigations. This type of link analysis software is similar to a virtual “link board” or “pin board”, helping investigators to visualize the connections between known entities, vehicles, locations, etc. in the course of a criminal investigation.

### 1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

Prior to the implementation of the iBase software, investigators were required to re-type all criminal information from RMS onto visualization charts, which was a time-consuming and redundant process. Implementing iBase gave users direct access to that information without having to re-type it. This software is used exclusively for ongoing criminal investigations and therefore necessarily includes personal information about subjects of those investigations.

## 2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview gives the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed

### 2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

This software prevents investigators from having to re-type RMS information onto a chart. Visualizing criminal information provides investigators a more thorough understanding of complicated criminal investigations.

### 2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

Professional police departments have been utilizing manual link analysis in the form of “link boards” or “pin boards” for decades, and “connecting the dots” is a hallmark of investigative practice. In the 1990s Malcom Sparrow first introduced the concept of social network analysis to law enforcement and criminal investigations. Link analysis, a component of social network analysis, is a tool used to identify relationships in data. Though simple link analysis with a limited number of points of data can be charted manually, as the number of pieces of data, or “observations” increases, the processing power of a computer helps the analyst provide a more thorough and complete analysis of the links between the available data. Beyond just demonstrating an association, link analysis frequently is employed in an effort to highlight the relative strength of relationships<sup>1</sup>. These types of analysis techniques in criminal intelligence are used to organize data and reveal patterns in the nature and extent of relationships between data points. They also provide effective visualizations of both qualitative and quantitative data which are valuable in presenting intelligence assessments<sup>2</sup>. An important component of link analysis software is the ability for investigators to identify the significance of new information as it is added<sup>3</sup>.

Prior to the implementation of the software, users had to re-type the information associated to a criminal investigation (e.g. Names, Dates of Birth, Criminal Histories) onto a chart if they wished to visualize the case. While no formal study was done of the time wasted on these tasks, adding a single person’s criminal history to a chart could take multiple days of work. With this software, a user can see a subject’s criminal history in minutes.

<sup>1</sup> McCue, Colleen. (2015). Data Mining and Predictive Analysis (Second Edition).

<sup>2</sup> Strang, Steven. (2014). Network Analysis in Criminal Intelligence.

<sup>3</sup> Burcher, Morgan, and Chad Whelan. (2018). “Social Network Analysis as a Tool for Criminal Intelligence: Understanding Its Potential from the Perspectives of Intelligence Analysts.” Trends in Organized Crime 21 (3): 278–94

### **2.3 Describe the technology involved.**

The iBase software is a SQL server that imports a portion of the data from SPD's RMS and CAD systems, allowing users to visualize the data in a link chart (rather than the standard textual display in RMS/CAD). The iBase server is an on-premise security encrypted server housed and managed by Seattle IT meeting CJIS approved requirements. The client i2 Analyst's Notebook software is locally installed on RTCC analysts' workstations. An automated electronic data transfer allows information located within SPD's RMS and CAD systems to be imported into the iBase system via a one-way transfer of data from the source systems to iBase. i2 iBase is a relational database environment for searching through investigation data imported from RMS and CAD as well as manually imported information gathered by investigators during the course of a criminal investigation. IBM i2 Analyst's Notebook is the worldwide standard software solution for operational crime analysis and visualization, with the purpose of creating relevant intelligence from large amounts of data. Various types of structured data are compared and visualized through a variety of heatmaps, relationships, and diagrams.

### **2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.**

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's department priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community, and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively. The utilization of the IBM Security i2 iBase system increases efficiency of investigations, availability of data, awareness of situational information, and timeliness of actionable information to officers on the street.

### **2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?**

Only trained, backgrounded, and CJIS certified employees of SPD's Real Time Crime Center and supporting Seattle IT employees have access to the i2 iBase system and i2 Analyst's Notebook software.

All authorized users of CAD are Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) certified and maintain Washington State ACCESS (A Central Computerized Enforcement Service System) certification. More information on CJIS compliance may be found at the CJIS Security Policy [website](#). Additional information about ACCESS may be found on the Washington State Patrol's [website](#).

### 3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

#### 3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

IBM Security i2 iBase system is only used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center. Access for personnel into the system is predicated on state and federal law governing access to Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS). This includes pre-access background information, appropriate role-based permissions as governed by the [CJIS security Policy](#), and audit of access and transaction logs within the system. All users of i2 iBase must be CJIS certified and maintain Washington State ACCESS certification.

Each user must be directly granted an account (tied to their SPD network identity) in order to access the software. The software logs: user sign on/off, each time a user accesses any piece of data, and any data manually added by a user. These logs are periodically reviewed to ensure proper use of the software; they may also be reviewed at any time by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor.

#### 3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

IBM Security i2 iBase system is only used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center and information collected and stored in the system is related to these criminal investigations.

All use of the i2 iBase system must also comply with [SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems](#) and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.

Use of the iBase system is governed by the [City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance \(SMC 14.12\), 28 CFR Part 23](#), CJIS requirements, and any future applicable requirements.

**3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.**

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

All authorized users of CAD must be CJIS certified and must maintain Washington State ACCESS certification, and trained directly in the use of the iBase software, in addition to all standard SPD training and Directives.

[SPD Policy 12.050](#) defines the proper use of criminal justice information systems.

Outside of SPD, Seattle Information Technology Department (ITD) client services interaction with SPD systems is governed according to the terms of the 2018 Management Control Agreement (MCA) between ITD and SPD, which states that:

“Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.”



## 4.0 Data Collection and Use

### 4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

The only information pulled into iBase automatically comes from SPD's Records Management System (RMS) and CSCC's Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Users may manually add additional information that they have collected during the course of a criminal investigation,. All manually added information is deleted after five years, in accordance with 28 CFR Part 23. No data outside SPD's RMS/CAD (e.g. commercial data aggregators, publicly available data, or other city departments) is automatically collected.

### 4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

All data entered into the iBase system is directly related to criminal investigations. Individual detectives and analysts may manually enter information not imported from the existing RMS and CAD data systems. Analysts use this software to build networks of individuals associated with criminal cases.

All data changes are logged in the software's audit log, which is reviewed periodically. In addition, when manually adding information, a user must provide the source description, source reliability, and content certainty; all manually added information is purged from the system after 5 years, in compliance with 28 CFR Part 23.

### 4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

IBM i2 iBase is currently in use by the RTCC to assist with criminal investigations and to provide actionable information to units in the field. SPD employees in the RTCC and Investigations Unit utilize the i2 Analyst's Notebook software and information stored in the i2 iBase system. It may also be used in compliance with the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance.

### 4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The software itself resides on a server that is operational 24/7. Users may access the data at any time, as part of criminal investigations.

### 4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

The software is installed on a server and may be removed at any time. There is no physical installation aspect to this project.

**4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?**

No physical object is collecting any data.

**4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?**

Data stored in the i2 iBase system is accessed by SPD employees assigned to the Real Time Crime Center and Investigations Unit. Access to the application requires SPD personnel to log in with password-protected login credentials which are granted to employees with business needs to access CAD. These employees are ACCESS and CJIS certified.

According to the CJIS security policy, “The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of specified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.”.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including:

- [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,
- [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

Additionally, incidental data access may occur through delivery of technology client services. All ITD employees are required to comply with appropriate regulatory requirements regarding security and background review.

ITD client services interaction with SPD systems is governed according to the terms of the 2018 Management Control Agreement between ITD and SPD, which states that:

“Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.”

**4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.**

No outside agency has direct access to the software.

i2 iBase is operated and used exclusively by SPD personnel. Seattle IT Department personnel have administrative access to the system for support services as outlined in 4.7. Use of the iBase system will be governed by the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance, 28 CFR Part 23, CJIS requirements, and any future applicable requirements.

#### **4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?**

I2 iBase is used by the RTCC to assist in ongoing criminal investigations and to provide actionable information to units in the field to increase officer safety, efficiency, and response to incidents. Data is only accessed as part of ongoing criminal investigations or under the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance.

#### **4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?**

Only authorized SPD users can access the system, technology, or the data. Access to the application is limited to SPD personnel via password-protected login credentials. All user activity within the iBase system generates a log that is auditable.

Data is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized users.

The entire system is located on the SPD network that is protect by industry standard firewalls. ITD performs routine monitoring of the SPD network.

The CAD system is CJIS compliant. More information on CJIS compliance may be found at the CJIS Security Policy website.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems.

SPD's Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of the any system at any time. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can also access all data and audit for compliance at any time.

ITD client services interaction with SPD systems is governed by the terms of the 2017 Management Control Agreement between ITD and SPD, which states that:

“Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.”

## 5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

### 5.1 How will data be securely stored?

All of the data in the iBase system are held in SPD/ITD servers, located on City premises on SPD networks. Access to these networks is as specified in 4.1. All data that goes to mobile clients are encrypted to FIP 140-2 standards and is therefore CJIS compliant.

Per the CJIS Security Policy:

“Security - Each agency is responsible for appropriate security measures as applicable to physical security of terminals and telecommunication lines; personnel security to include background screening requirements; technical security to protect against unauthorized use; data security to include III use, dissemination, and logging; and security of criminal history 08/16/2018 CJISD-ITS-DOC-08140-5.7 D-3 records. Additionally, each CSO must ensure that all agencies establish an information security structure that provides for an ISO and complies with the CJIS Security Policy.

Network Diagrams - Network diagrams, i.e. topological drawings, are an essential part of solid network security. Through graphical illustration, a comprehensive network diagram provides the “big picture” – enabling network managers to quickly ascertain the interconnecting nodes of a network for a multitude of purposes, including troubleshooting and optimization. Network diagrams are integral to demonstrating the manner in which each agency ensures criminal justice data is afforded appropriate technical security protections and is protected during transit and at rest.”

### 5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

SPD’s Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of the any system at any time. In addition, the Office of Inspector General can access all data and audit for compliance at any time.

SPD conducts periodic reviews of audit logs and they are available for review at any time by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor under the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance. The software automatically alerts users of data that must be deleted under legal deletion requirements such as 28 CFR Part 23.

### 5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

If improperly collected data is found during an audit log review (or through other means), it will be deleted from the server (includes a soft delete and purging of deleted records). The user responsible for the improper collection will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, to include limiting their access to data or removal of their access to the system altogether.

SPD policy contains multiple provisions to avoid improperly collecting data. [SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a GO Report. [SPD Policy 7.090](#) specifically governs the collection and submission of photographic evidence. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation. And, [SPD Policy 7.110v](#) governs the collection and submission of audio recorded statements. It requires that officers state their name, the Department name, the General Offense number, date and time of recording, the name of the interviewee, and all persons present at the beginning of the recording.

Additionally, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

Per the CJIS Security Policy:

“5.8.3 Digital Media Sanitization and Disposal The agency shall sanitize, that is, overwrite at least three times or degauss digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized individuals. Inoperable digital media shall be destroyed (cut up, shredded, etc.). The agency shall maintain written documentation of the steps taken to sanitize or destroy electronic media. Agencies shall ensure the sanitization or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel.

5.8.4 Disposal of Physical Media Physical media shall be securely disposed of when no longer required, using formal procedures. Formal procedures for the secure disposal or destruction of physical media shall minimize the risk of sensitive information compromise by unauthorized individuals. Physical media shall be destroyed by shredding or incineration. Agencies shall ensure the disposal or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel.”

### 5.4 Which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

SPD's Intelligence and Analysis Section reviews the audit logs and ensures compliance with all regulations and requirements.

Audit, Policy & Research Section personnel can also conduct audits of all data collection software and systems. Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can audit for compliance at any time.

## 6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

### 6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

No person, outside of SPD and Seattle IT, has direct access to the application or the data.

As Seattle IT supports the iBase system on behalf of SPD, a Management Control Agreement exists between SPD and Seattle IT. The agreement outlines the specifications for compliance, and enforcement related to supporting the iBase system through inter-departmental partnership. The MCA can be found in the appendices of this SIR.

Because all the data used in this project relates to criminal investigations, any information shared will follow standard policing practices and CJIS compliance.

### 6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is frequently necessary during the course of a criminal investigation to follow up on leads and gather information on suspects from outside law enforcement agencies. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is an essential part of the investigative process. For example, an investigator may send out a photo or description of a homicide suspect in order to find out if another LE agency knows their identity.

Products developed using this information may be shared with other law enforcement agencies. All products created with the information used in this project will be classified as Law Enforcement Sensitive. Any bulletins will be marked with the following restrictions: LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE — DO NOT LEAVE PRINTED COPIES UNATTENDED — DISPOSE OF IN SHREDDER ONLY — NOT FOR PUBLIC DISPLAY OR DISTRIBUTION — DO NOT FORWARD OR COPY.

### 6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes  No

#### 6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

All users with direct access to the data must have a Seattle Police Department network account. The software is not set up to allow any other agency to access the data.

### 6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

No additional data sharing agreements have been established regarding the iBase system or the data it contains.

### 6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

This software simply visualizes the data already available to investigators as part of their criminal investigations. The data collected in this database mirrors that in SPD's RMS/CAD, so no additional accuracy check is required for that data. All manually added information must include the source description, source reliability, and content certainty.

### 6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

As per RCW 10.97, individuals who are subject to a criminal investigation will not be party to the information collection process and thus will not have an opportunity to correct their information. Detectives or other sworn officers may interview such subjects or conduct additional investigation to determine inaccuracies in the information, on a case by case, basis.



## 7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

### 7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

IBM Security i2 iBase system is used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center and information collected and stored in the system is related to these criminal investigations.

All use of the i2 iBase system must also comply with SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.

Use of the iBase system will be governed by the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance, 28 CFR Part 23, CJIS requirements, and any future applicable requirements.

### 7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

Users of the iBase system and i2 Analyst's Notebook undergo training on the use of the software, which includes privacy training.

All authorized users of the iBase system must be CJIS certified and must maintain Washington State ACCESS certification.

SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training. All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), many of which contain specific privacy requirements. Any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

The CJIS training requirements can be found in the appendices of this document, as well as in question 3.3, above.

**7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.**

The nature of the Department’s mission will inevitably lead it to collect and maintain information many may believe to be private and potentially embarrassing. Minimizing privacy risks revolve around disclosure of personally identifiable information.

The primary privacy risk with this system pertains to Personally Identifiable Information (PII) being added on individuals not directly associated with criminal activity. To mitigate this risk, users only add PII on individuals associated with a criminal investigation and/or collected in accordance with the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance. In addition, SPD conducts regular reviews of audit logs to ensure proper use and retention of the data.

SMC 14.12 and SPD Policy 6.060 direct all SPD personnel that “any documentation of information concerning a person’s sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Additionally, officers must take care “when photographing demonstrations or other lawful political activities. If demonstrators are not acting unlawfully, police can’t photograph them.” iBase is not used to track demonstration participants and no demonstration-related images have been input into the iBase system.

Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

**7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?**

The public may express concern over the consolidation of so much information about individuals, but all of the data that is included in the iBase system is already available to investigators in RMS/CAD and other legally accessible information repositories; this project simply works to make accessing and analyzing that information more efficient. Every individual in the database is related to a criminal investigation or part of an investigation under the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance. Under no circumstances will this project involve the collection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) on people with no connection to criminal investigations or related to a Seattle Police response to an incident.

## 8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

### 8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

The information used in iBase system relates to ongoing criminal investigations. Information will be released in response to public disclosure requests as applicable under the Public Records Act and the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance, just as they are applicable to any other SPD investigative records.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Legal Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently in response to subpoenas is then tracked through a log maintained by the Legal Unit. Public disclosure requests are tracked through the City's GovQA Public Records Response System, and responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

This software is not directly accessed by outside agencies. Information may be shared with outside agencies as it would with any criminal investigation and release is governed by the same rules. Any bulletins or other notifications created with information or analysis resulting from this project are kept in the SPD network file system as well as recorded in the established SPD bulletin system. In addition, the software's audit log keeps a record of all data accessed by each user.

### 8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

The software's audit log tracks all log-ins/offers, data views, and data modifications. SPD periodically reviews these logs to ensure proper use of the software. In addition, the logs are available at any time for review by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor.

SPD's Audit, Policy and Research Section is authorized to conduct audits of all investigative data collection software and systems. In addition, the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can conduct audits of the software, and its use, at any time. Audit data is available to the public via Public Records Request.

## Financial Information

### Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

### 1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

#### 1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current  potential

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
06/06/17	01/04/18	\$67,860	\$113,615	\$17,314	Federal Grant

Notes:

SPD has received a Department of Justice grant in order to build out the technology available to the RTCC.

#### 1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current  potential

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
\$12,325	0	0	\$4,713.97	SPD Budget

Notes:

The primary ongoing cost of this project is the annual iBase licenses. Maintenance of the software and servers is handled by SPD and Seattle IT.

### **1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology**

Quantifying the cost savings through this technology is difficult as the primary purpose is to improve the department's effectiveness at reducing crime and improving public safety. While no formal study was done of the time previously wasted on manually re-entering information onto a chart, adding a single person's criminal history to a chart could take multiple days of work. With this software, a user can see a subject's criminal history in minutes. The man-hours saved on such tasks saves the department money, while also enhancing the department's overall understanding of crime within the City of Seattle.

### **1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities**

Additional federal grants could be acquired to pay the continued licensing fees of the software.

## Expertise and References

### Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report (“SIR”). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

### 1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

### 2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

### 3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any authoritative publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link
Application of Link Analysis to Police Intelligence	<i>HUMAN FACTORS</i> Volume:17 Issue :2 Dated:(APRIL 1975) Pages:157-164	<a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=45467">https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=45467</a>
Police Information Systems and Intelligence Systems	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	<a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/4_Police_Information_Intelligence_Systems.pdf">https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/4_Police_Information_Intelligence_Systems.pdf</a>
Investigative Analysis in Law Enforcement	IBM Solution Brief	<a href="https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/OW3KJN1Y">https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/OW3KJN1Y</a>



# Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) and engagement for public comment worksheet

## Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

## Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments’ (“Seattle IT”) Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

## Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative (“RSJI”) is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

### 1.0 Set Outcomes

**1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?**

- The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.
- There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
- The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
- The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

### 1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Some personally identifiable information (PII) gathered during criminal investigations could be used to identify individuals who are associates of criminal suspects, such as their name, home address or contact information. Victims of criminal activity may also be identified during incident responses, whose identities should be protected in accordance with RCW 42.56.240 and RCW 70.02. SPD mitigates these risks by entering information into the iBase system only when it is related to the investigation of a crime and/or collected in accordance with the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance. In addition, SPD conducts regular reviews of audit logs to ensure proper use and retention of the data.

### 1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. To mitigate against any potential algorithmic bias or ethnic bias to emerge in the use of link analysis software such as the iBase system, SPD employees are responsible for gathering, creating, and disseminating information (internally or externally as defined above) and are bound by SPD Policy 5.140 which forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

### 1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

all Seattle neighborhoods

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ballard                | <input type="checkbox"/> Northwest                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Belltown               | <input type="checkbox"/> Madison Park / Madison Valley |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Beacon Hill            | <input type="checkbox"/> Magnolia                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Capitol Hill           | <input type="checkbox"/> Rainier Beach                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central District       | <input type="checkbox"/> Ravenna / Laurelhurst         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia City          | <input type="checkbox"/> South Lake Union / Eastlake   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delridge               | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> First Hill             | <input type="checkbox"/> Southwest                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Georgetown             | <input type="checkbox"/> South Park                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Greenwood / Phinney    | <input type="checkbox"/> Wallingford / Fremont         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International District | <input type="checkbox"/> West Seattle                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interbay               | <input type="checkbox"/> King county (outside Seattle) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> North                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Outside King County.          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Northeast              |  |

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

n/a

**1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?**

City of Seattle demographics: White - 69.5%; Black or African American - 7.9%; Amer. Indian & Alaska Native - 0.8%; Asian - 13.8%; Native Hawaiian & Pacific Islander - 0.4%; Other race - 2.4%; Two or more races - 5.1%; Hispanic or Latino ethnicity (of any race): 6.6%; Persons of color: 33.7%.

King County demographics: White – 70.1%; Black or African American – 6.7%; American Indian & Alaskan Native – 1.1%; Asian, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander – 17.2%; Hispanic or Latino (of any race) – 9.4%

**1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?**

IBM Security i2 iBase system is used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center and information collected and stored in the system is related to these criminal investigations. There is no distinction in the levels of service this system provides to the various and diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals within the city.

All use of the i2 iBase system must also comply with SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.

Use of the iBase system is be governed by the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance, 28 CFR Part 23, CJIS requirements, and any future applicable requirements.

**1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

The Aspen Institute on Community Change defines *structural racism* as “...public policies, institutional practices, cultural representations and other norms [which] work in various, often reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial group inequity.”<sup>1</sup> Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to structural racism and thus creating a disparate impact on historically targeted communities. Data sharing is frequently necessary during the course of a criminal investigation to follow up on leads and gather information on suspects from outside law enforcement agencies. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is an essential part of the investigative process.

In an effort to mitigate the possibility of disparate impact on historically targeted communities, SPD has established policies regarding the dissemination of data in connection with criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and other authorized researchers.

Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

**1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

Like decisions around data sharing, data storage and retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities. The information stored within the iBase system is related only to criminal investigations and its users are subject to SPD’s existing policies prohibiting bias-based policing. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

**1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you can / have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.**

The most important unintended possible consequence related to the continued utilization of the iBase system is the possibility that erroneous links between individuals related to criminal investigations may be considered. However, because all analysis conducted in the RTCC is developed manually by analysts the risk is mitigated by the efficiencies provided by the use of the iBase system.

## 2.0 Public Outreach

### 2.1 Scheduled public meeting(s).


<b>Location</b>	Virtual Event
<b>Time</b>	Thursday, June 10 <sup>th</sup> , 12 PM

<b>Location</b>	Virtual Event
<b>Time</b>	Tuesday, June 29 <sup>th</sup> , 3 PM


### **3.0 Public Comment Analysis**


This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed. Please note due to the volume of comments, analysis represents a summarization of all comments received. Technology specific comments will be included in Appendix C.

#### **3.1 Summary of Response Volume**









### 3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Q2 What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

response question survey withholding information public comment open questions  
 RMS Mark43 opposed informed public comment Missing information due  
 hinder ability informed SPD using thus greatly hinder TESU public answered thus  
 incorporates numerous questions public regarding answers questions numerous since  
 dodged providing answers per year use Additionally SPD dodged  
 many incidents per engagement meetings Additionally SPD specified many  
 4a public engagement clarity regarding magnitude public Group 4a  
 data retention period allocated questions public incident types SPD  
 little time allocated CAD etc incident audio recordings defining limiting CAD  
 Lack transparency Thus concerns include use Maltego concerns will Thus whether  
 questions list concerns via answers open questions etc worst missing answers  
 used privacy-wise assume worst **Callyo apps**  
 approach security privacy-wise  
**audio recording devices** Since safest approach  
**data** survey Since safest **SPD** safest approach security **iBase**  
 security privacy-wise assume **Maltego** assume worst missing  
**Lack clarity regarding** missing answers open  
**use Callyo apps** open questions list access list concerns will installed  
 will Thus concerns apps policy defining limiting Maltego SIR limiting CAD etc  
 regarding whether etc incident types use iBase types SPD may  
 time allocated questions SPD RMS Mark43 questions public Group  
 regarding magnitude use Group 4a public specified many incidents  
 public engagement meetings incidents per year meetings Additionally SPD  
 Surveillance always concern SPD dodged providing Security  
 providing answers questions record questions numerous questions audio  
 questions public answered deployment answered thus greatly write access  
 greatly hinder ability One safely assume ability informed public SPD withholding information  
 public comment open recording devices use SPD use Maltego question survey Since

### 3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Q3 What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Remains seen value **None**

### 3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Q4 What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?

past history prior Callyo apps Require City leadership past stop funding tool tool Given City security requiring SPD recommend City leadership etc Require SPD problems fixed SPD may used fixed systemic problems version criminal system fixed considerations depend SPD support pipelines criminal TBD valid considerations community needs support update Callyo SIR tools money community per year use surveil residents SPD many incidents per use Maltego SPD disclose many record specific incident types audio recording devices Policy state specific report recent audit questions Require SPD provide date report Require SPD answer SPD publicly provide changes made Require Require SPD Policy changes superficial changes access limited cosmetic changes Require SPD update will pursue limited SPD answer public right instead will

**Require SPD disclose** suspect fundamentally right

**use** surveillance technologies suspect **data**

prior surveillance technologies **iBase** technologies suspect fundamentally

**Maltego** fundamentally right instead

**answer public questions** instead will pursue **Callyo apps** pursue limited cosmetic devices cosmetic changes superficial Require SPD publicly superficial changes made publicly provide date made Require SPD date report recent public questions Require recent audit SPD SPD Policy state systems state specific incident Ban Improve security requiring SPD surveil residents disclose many incidents need tools money incidents per year money community needs SPD update Callyo needs support pipelines apps Require SPD pipelines criminal system valid considerations depend system fixed systemic depend SPD answering systemic problems fixed audited tools recommend City audio recordings City leadership stop etc Improve security Given City leadership leadership stop funding leadership past history funding tool Given history prior surveillance



### 3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Q5 Do you have any other comments or questions?

legal representative someone conducted audit report always disclosed legal  
answered policy defining SPD RMS Roughly iBase SIR 6.1 Mark43 instead SPD  
IBM s Security SPD use Maltego SPD licenses IBM SIR updated include  
accurately mapped person questions public answered  
individual voice accurately Callyo apps SPD  
recording specific individual many incidents per  
ensure voice recording SPD s brother girlfriend mother  
year SPD use concealed audio recording  
Roughly many incidents voice recognition identification  
types SPD may SPD use voice  
defining incident types someone facing charges  
audio recording devices  
representative someone facing iBase SPD s investigation  
policy defining incident use voice recognition  
incident types SPD recognition identification technology  
SPD may use younger brother girlfriend per year SPD  
SPD ensure voice used voice recording specific Will SIR updated  
specific individual voice incidents per year voice accurately mapped  
Many questions public SPD using information community version Maltego  
licenses IBM s also use Maltego s Security i2 RMS Mark43 instead  
public answered policy officer manually add Maltego Transform Hub  
RMS Roughly many audit report found disclosed legal representative

## 4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed.

### 4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

What program, policy and partnership strategies will you implement? What strategies address immediate impacts? Long-term impacts? What strategies address root causes of inequity listed above? How will you partner with stakeholders for long-term positive change?

## 5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

### 5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

Respond here.

# Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

## Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group (“working group”), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

“Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement.”



## Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

From: Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG)

To: Seattle City Council

Date: Oct 25, 2021

Re: Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for i2 iBase

### Executive Summary

The CSWG has completed its review of the Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for the three surveillance technologies included in Group 4a of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance technology review process. These technologies are Callyo, i2 iBase, Audio Recording Systems, and Maltego. This document is the CSWG's Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for i2 iBase used by Seattle Police Department (SPD) as set forth in SMC 14.18.080(B)(1), which we provide for inclusion in the final SIRs submitted to the City Councils.

This document first provides our recommendations to Council, then provides background information, key concerns, and outstanding questions regarding i2 iBase technology.

Our assessment of i2 iBase technology as used by Seattle Police Department (SPD) focuses on four major issues:

1. A regular audit is necessary to assess for biases, as i2 iBase's automated relationship analyses are likely to generate data errors that compound existing biases.
2. There must be a policy defining a specific and restricted purpose of use.
3. There must be clear and strong policies regarding data collection, retention, storage, and protection.
4. A prohibition on use of i2 iBase for predictive policing is necessary.

### Recommendations

The Council should adopt clear and enforceable rules that ensure, at the minimum, the following:

1. The purpose and allowable uses of i2 iBase must be clearly defined, and any SPD use of i2 iBase must be limited to that specific purpose and those allowable uses. The specific incident types for which i2 iBase may be used must be clearly stated. The use limits must restrict when someone's relationship network may be assembled in i2 iBase, such as a requirement that a criminal investigation is opened before an analysis is begun, to prevent the widespread use of i2 iBase analysis on all individuals encountering the police.
2. There must be a requirement that SPD make publicly available the contract that governs SPD's use of i2 iBase if a contract or agreement exists.
3. SPD must publicly disclose all of its data sources, such as data brokers (e.g., LexisNexis, CoreLogic) and any use of non-public details from social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter).
4. SPD must not be permitted to share i2 iBase data with third parties.

5. There must be a regular audit to assess for biases in the data imported into i2 iBase and in the analyses generated by i2 iBase. There must be technical mechanisms in place to enable robust auditing to occur (e.g. detailed logs).
6. There must be limits on the kinds of data that may be inputted both manually and automatically into i2 iBase, ensuring that additional pools of public or private information are not added in the future.
7. There must be a shortened data retention period that does not exceed the time necessary to conduct a criminal investigation.
8. There must be a clear deletion oversight process to ensure that manually added data are deleted after the specified retention period.
9. There must be a requirement that limits employee access to i2 iBase records. For example, requiring that employee access is assigned per record in i2 iBase so that employees do not have access to records unrelated to a specific investigation to which they have been assigned.
10. There must be a manual relationships analysis process that includes clear checkpoints designed to ensure erroneous data and inaccurate linkages generated by i2 iBase are detected and corrected before they are actively investigated.
11. There must be limits on usage of potentially erroneous i2 iBase analyses and search data in rapid-response settings where manual analysis is not possible.
12. There must be a requirement for SPD to disclose for how many incidents per year they use i2 iBase.
13. There must be a requirement that the use of i2 iBase is always disclosed to the individual or the legal representative of an individual facing charges for which i2 iBase was used in an SPD investigation.
14. There must be a regulation prohibiting the use of i2 iBase for predictive policing.
15. There must be a contract with IBM that ensures IBM never possesses, uses, or accesses SPD data.

## Key Concerns

1. **i2 iBase's automated relationship analyses are likely to generate data errors that compound existing biases.** SPD does not indicate how often incorrect connections are identified, but they have confirmed that false connections do occur. To protect against these errors, the SIR indicates that relationship analysis will be "developed manually by analysts." However, that claim conflicts with assertions that iBase's automated processing will "create[e] relevant intelligence from large amounts of data," and will create new "efficiencies" by avoiding manual data management. Manual analysis also seems time-prohibitive in rapid-response scenarios. Even if SPD only analyzes relationships manually, the SIR never fully explains what

safeguards are embedded into that manual analysis to ensure data is fully reviewed and erroneous connections deleted.

2. **There are inadequate policies defining purpose of use and use limitations.**
  - a. **Rapid Response Uses.** The SIR indicates that RTCC uses the social network analysis provided by i2 iBase to provide “actionable information” to officers in the field but does not thoroughly explain how that information is used by offices or why it is helpful. It is therefore difficult to assess the full extent of civil liberties concerns presented by the in-the-field uses of the technology and to assess SPD’s need for the technology.
  - b. **Need for a Criminal Investigation.** The SIR does not specify at what point someone’s data is consolidated and viewed in i2 iBase. Based on the contemplated RTCC uses of the technology, it seems that a formal criminal investigation does not need to be opened before data can be pulled and visualized in i2 iBase. Rather, anyone who is merely the subject of a 911 call might be analyzed using i2 iBase.
  - c. **Predictive Policing.** Without clearer usage limits, data compiled via i2 iBase might be used for predictive policing, which is often referred to as “crime forecasting.” Predictive policing uses computer systems to analyze large sets of data, such as historical crime data, to predict or forecast where and when the next crime or series of crimes will take place. This is a mode of policing rife with bias and inaccuracies that reproduces and compounds existing discrimination.
3. **It is unclear how data are stored and processed.** In the SIR, SPD does not specify what portion of existing data is automatically imported into i2 iBase, and what kinds of data have been manually inputted. The lack of information on data currently included or potentially included in i2 iBase raises numerous concerns.
  - a. **There are no limits on the types of data that may be imported.** The SIR indicates that additional data can be “manually imported” into the system and suggests that officers would manually input only single “piece[s] of data.” However, it does not specify a policy limiting the kinds of data that can be manually inputted or that would prevent automatic import of outside data. The lack of such restrictions is concerning given i2 iBase’s potential to operate as a dragnet with a disparate surveillance impact.
  - b. **There is likely to be biased data selection.** Biases likely already exist in the data imported from RMS and CAD. Members of over-policed communities are far more likely to appear in SPD systems and are therefore more likely to appear in i2 iBase relationships analyses and be subjected to police investigation resulting from false linkages. The SIR also states that only some portions of RMS and CAD data are automatically imported into i2 iBase. If so, the data selection parameters used could introduce additional bias. For instance, importing data only for certain types of incidents or from certain locations could compound the racial and economic disparities already present in the data. The SIR does not indicate whether SPD has completed a disparate impact assessment of the linkages i2 iBase generates, nor whether any policies exist which might mitigate this disparate impact.
4. **It is unclear whether SPD has a contract with IBM.** It is therefore difficult to assess what future uses of i2 iBase might be possible, what kinds of data might be imported, and what data security mechanisms are in place. Although the SIR states that data is maintained on SPD servers and is

entered into i2 iBase via a one-way server transfer, the SIR does not describe enforceable provisions that could prevent future IBM use or review of data and analyses from i2 iBase.

**5. It is unclear what data security measures that would prevent third-party access to sensitive i2 iBase relationship analyses and searches.**

- a. **Data Deletion.** The SIR states that manually entered data will be automatically deleted after five years. It is not clear why there is a lengthy five-year retention period. The SIR also does not specify what systems or oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that data is deleted. This is particularly concerning given the lack of limits on manual data inputs, as outlined above.
- b. **Incidental Data Access.** The SIR specifies, “incidental data access may occur through delivery of technology client services.” However, it does not describe the specific scenarios in which this data access might occur, nor what kind of data would be viewed, leaving open the possibility that significant elements of analysis generated by i2 iBase could be released to third-party entities.

### Outstanding Questions

- Which “portion” of SPD RMS and CAD data is automatically imported into i2 iBase? How often does the data use generate erroneous relationship linkages?
- Has an equity assessment been performed on the portion of the data transferred? What biases exist in the data, and how does SPD ensure that the biases present in the social network analyses conducted with this software do not cause disparate impact?
- Are there any limits on the kinds of data that can be manually inputted into the system? Has there been an evaluation of what kinds of data have been manually inputted thus far?
- Are there any policies that would prevent other kinds of data from being imported into i2 iBase in the future?
- How is manual relationship analysis performed using i2 iBase, and what specific safeguards exist within the analysis process to prevent erroneous connections? Does SPD ever use the automatically-generated relationship maps created by i2 iBase or Analyst’s notebook, without verifying the accuracy of all the many data points involved?
- Is data compiled via i2 iBase ever used for predictive purposes, rather than mere visualization? Are there any policies that would prevent its use for predictive purposes in the future?
- How does RTCC use the social network analysis provided by i2 iBase to provide “actionable information” to officers in the field? What kinds of actionable information would this include, and why would such data be necessary or helpful?
- At what point can someone’s data be consolidated and viewed in i2 iBase?
- What systems ensure that manually entered data is deleted automatically?
- What circumstances might lead to “incidental” data access, and what data would be viewed? Could only ITD employees potentially obtain “incidental data access?”
- Does SPD have a contract with IBM, and if so, what are its provisions?
- What protections are in place to protect the privacy of individuals who are not part of an investigation but whose data may be captured?
- What are all of the i2 iBase suite products that SPD uses and does SPD use the premium version of any of those products?
- When was the last audit of i2 iBase?
- What specific security features of i2 iBase has SPD enabled or configured?
- How many or what percentage of SPD employees have access to i2 iBase?

The answers to these questions can further inform the content of any binding policy the Council chooses to include in an ordinance on this technology, as recommended above.

## CTO Response

# MEMO

**To:** Seattle City Council  
**From:** Jim Loter, Interim Chief Technology Officer  
**Subject:** CTO Response to the Surveillance Working Group i2 iBase SIR Review

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### Purpose

As provided in the Surveillance Ordinance, [SMC 14.18.080](#), this memo outlines the Chief Technology Officer's (CTO's) response to the Surveillance Working Group assessment on the Surveillance Impact Report for Seattle Police Department's i2 iBase.

### Background

The Information Technology Department (ITD) is dedicated to the Privacy Principles and Surveillance Ordinance objectives to provide oversight and transparency about the use and acquisition of specialized technologies with potential privacy and civil liberties impacts. All City departments have a shared mission to protect lives and property while balancing technology use and data collection with negative impacts to individuals. This requires ensuring the appropriate use of privacy invasive technologies through technology limitations, policy, training and departmental oversight.

The CTO's role in the SIR process has been to ensure that all City departments are compliant with the Surveillance Ordinance requirements. As part of the review work for surveillance technologies, ITD's Privacy Office has facilitated the creation of the Surveillance Impact Report documentation, including collecting comments and suggestions from the Working Group and members of the public about these technologies. IT and City departments have also worked collaboratively with the Working Group to answer additional questions that came up during their review process.

## Technology Purpose

I2 iBase is the server backbone to the i2 Analysts Notebook application, a software system which organizes existing SPD data visually into more accessible information utilized by the SPD Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) employees. The purpose of the RTCC is to provide actionable information to units in the field to increase officer safety, efficiency, and response to incidents. It is also intended to be the information “hub” of the police department, utilizing its resources and collective knowledge to enhance the department's effectiveness at reducing crime and improving public safety. The iBase system combines data stored in SPD’s Records Management System (RMS), CSCC’s Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, and information gathered during criminal investigations and displays information related to ongoing investigations. This type of link analysis software is similar to a virtual “link board” or “pin board”, helping investigators to visualize the connections between known entities, vehicles, locations, etc. in the course of a criminal investigation.

## Working Group Concerns

In their review, the Working Group has raised concerns about these devices being used in a privacy impacting way, including data errors, collection, processing, and security. We believe that policy, training and technology limitations enacted by SPD provide adequate mitigation for the potential privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the Working Group about the use of this operational technology.

## Recommended Next Steps

I look forward to working together with Council and City departments to ensure continued transparency about the use of these technologies and finding a mutually agreeable means to use technology to improve City services while protecting the privacy and civil rights of the residents we serve. Specific concerns in the Working Group comments about i2 iBase are addressed in the attached document.



## Response to Specific Concerns: i2 iBase

**Concern: i2 iBase’s automated relationship analyses are likely to generate data errors that compound existing biases**

SIR Response:

## Section 4.2

“All data entered into the iBase system is directly related to criminal investigations. Individual detectives and analysts may manually enter information not imported from the existing RMS and CAD data systems. Analysts use this software to build networks of individuals associated with criminal cases. All data changes are logged in the software’s audit log, which is reviewed periodically. In addition, when manually adding information, a user must provide the source description, source reliability, and content certainty; all manually added information is purged from the system after 5 years, in compliance with 28 CFR Part 23”

## Section 5.3

“If improperly collected data is found during an audit log review (or through other means), it will be deleted from the server (includes a soft delete and purging of deleted records). The user responsible for the improper collection will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, to include limiting their access to data or removal of their access to the system altogether.

SPD policy contains multiple provisions to avoid improperly collecting data. SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a GO Report. SPD Policy 7.090 specifically governs the collection and submission of photographic evidence. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation. And, SPD Policy 7.110v governs the collection and submission of audio recorded statements. It requires that officers state their name, the Department name, the General Offense number, date and time of recording, the name of the interviewee, and all persons present at the beginning of the recording.

Additionally, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

Per the CJIS Security Policy: “5.8.3 Digital Media Sanitization and Disposal The agency shall sanitize, that is, overwrite at least three times or degauss digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized individuals. Inoperable digital media shall be destroyed (cut up, shredded, etc.). The agency shall maintain written documentation of the steps taken to sanitize or destroy electronic media. Agencies shall ensure the sanitization or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel.

5.8.4 Disposal of Physical Media Physical media shall be securely disposed of when no longer required, using formal procedures. Formal procedures for the secure disposal or destruction of physical media shall minimize the risk of sensitive information compromise by unauthorized individuals. Physical media shall be destroyed by shredding or incineration. Agencies shall ensure the disposal or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel.”

**Concern: There are inadequate policies defining purpose of use and use limitations**

SIR Response:

### Section 3.1

“IBM Security i2 iBase system is only used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center. Access for personnel into the system is predicated on state and federal law governing access to Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS). This includes pre-access background information, appropriate role-based permissions as governed by the CJIS security policy, and audit of access and transaction logs within the system. All users of CAD must be CJIS certified and maintain Washington State ACCESS certification.

Each user must be directly granted an account (tied to their SPD network identity) in order to access the software. The software logs: user sign on/off, each time a user accesses any piece of data, and any data manually added by a user. These logs are periodically reviewed to ensure proper use of the software; they may also be reviewed at any time by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor.”

### Section 4.3

“IBM i2 iBase is currently in use by the RTCC to assist with criminal investigations and to provide actionable information to units in the field. SPD employees in the RTCC and Investigations Unit utilize the i2 Analyst’s Notebook software and information stored in the i2 iBase system. It may also be used in compliance with the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance”

**Concern: It is unclear how data are stored and processed.**

SIR Response:

### Section 4.1

“The only information pulled into iBase automatically comes from SPD’s Records Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Users may manually add additional information that they have collected during the course of a criminal investigation. All manually added information is deleted after five years, in accordance with 28 CFR Part 23. No data outside SPD’s RMS/CAD (e.g. commercial data aggregators, publicly available data, or other city departments) is automatically collected.”

### Section 4.7

“Data stored in the i2 iBase system is accessed by SPD employees assigned to the Real Time Crime Center and Investigations Unit. Access to the application requires SPD personnel to log in with password-protected login credentials which are granted to employees with business needs to access CAD. These employees are ACCESS and CJIS certified.

According to the CJIS security policy, “The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of specified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.”.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including:

- SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,
- SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

Additionally, incidental data access may occur through delivery of technology client services. All ITD employees are required to comply with appropriate regulatory requirements regarding security and background review.

ITD client services interaction with SPD systems is governed according to the terms of the 2018 Management Control Agreement between ITD and SPD, which states that: “Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.””

#### Section 5.1

“All of the data in the iBase system are held in SPD/ITD servers, located on City premises on SPD networks. Access to these networks is as specified in 4.1. All data that goes to mobile clients are encrypted to FIP 140-2 standards and is therefore CJIS compliant.

Per the CJIS Security Policy:

“Security - Each agency is responsible for appropriate security measures as applicable to physical security of terminals and telecommunication lines; personnel security to include background screening requirements; technical security to protect against unauthorized use; data security to include III use, dissemination, and logging; and security of criminal history 08/16/2018 CJISD-ITS-DOC-08140-5.7 D-3 records. Additionally, each CSO must ensure that all agencies establish an information security structure that provides for an ISO and complies with the CJIS Security Policy.

Network Diagrams - Network diagrams, i.e. topological drawings, are an essential part of solid network security. Through graphical illustration, a comprehensive network diagram provides the “big picture” – enabling network managers to quickly ascertain the interconnecting nodes of a network for a multitude of purposes, including troubleshooting and optimization. Network diagrams are integral to demonstrating the manner in which each agency ensures criminal justice data is afforded appropriate technical security protections and is protected during transit and at rest.”

#### **Concern: It is unclear whether SPD has a contract with IBM**

This concern is not addressed in the SIR.

#### **Concern: It is unclear what data security measures that would prevent third-party access to sensitive i2 iBase relationship analyses and searches.**

CTO Assessment: The information contained within the system are held to security best practices and are CJIS compliant.

SIR Response:  
Section 4.10

“Only authorized SPD users can access the system, technology, or the data. Access to the application is limited to SPD personnel via password-protected login credentials. All user activity within the iBase system generates a log that is auditable.

Data is securely input and used on SPD’s password-protected network with access limited to authorized users.

The entire system is located on the SPD network that is protect by industry standard firewalls. ITD performs routine monitoring of the SPD network.

The CAD system is CJIS compliant. More information on CJIS compliance may be found at the CJIS Security Policy website.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems.

SPD’s Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of the any system at any time. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can also access all data and audit for compliance at any time.

ITD client services interaction with SPD systems is governed by the terms of the 2017 Management Control Agreement between ITD and SPD, which states that: “Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.”

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### Section 5.3



If improperly collected data is found during an audit log review (or through other means), it will be deleted from the server (includes a soft delete and purging of deleted records). The user responsible for the improper collection will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, to include limiting their access to data or removal of their access to the system altogether. SPD policy contains multiple provisions to avoid improperly collecting data. SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a GO Report. SPD Policy 7.090 specifically governs the collection and submission of photographic evidence. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation. And, SPD Policy 7.110 governs the collection and submission of audio recorded statements. It requires that officers state their name, the Department name, the General Offense number, date and time of recording, the name of the interviewee, and all persons present at the beginning of the recording. Additionally, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures. All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002. Per the CJIS Security Policy: “5.8.3 Digital Media Sanitization and Disposal The agency shall sanitize, that is, overwrite at least three times or degauss digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized individuals. Inoperable digital media shall be destroyed (cut up, shredded, etc.). The agency shall maintain written documentation of the steps taken to sanitize or destroy electronic media. Agencies shall ensure the sanitization or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel. 5.8.4 Disposal of Physical Media Physical media shall be securely disposed of when no longer required, using formal procedures. Formal procedures for the secure disposal or destruction of physical media shall minimize the risk of sensitive information compromise by unauthorized individuals. Physical media shall be destroyed by shredding or incineration. Agencies shall ensure the disposal or destruction is witnessed or carried out by authorized personnel.”

## Section 6.1

“No person, outside of SPD and Seattle IT, has direct access to the application or the data.

As Seattle IT supports the iBase system on behalf of SPD, a Management Control Agreement exists between SPD and Seattle IT. The agreement outlines the specifications for compliance, and enforcement related to supporting the iBase system through inter-departmental partnership. The MCA can be found in the appendices of this SIR.

Because all the data used in this project relates to criminal investigations, any information shared will follow standard policing practices and CJIS compliance.”

## Appendix A: Glossary

**Accountable:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

**Community outcomes:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

**Contracting equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

**DON:** “department of neighborhoods.”

**Immigrant and refugee access to services:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle’s civic, economic and cultural life.

**Inclusive outreach and public engagement:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

**Individual racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

**Institutional racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

**OCR:** “Office of Civil Rights.”

**Opportunity areas:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

**Racial equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person’s race.

**Racial inequity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person’s race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

**RET:** “racial equity toolkit”

**Seattle neighborhoods:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

**Stakeholders:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

**Structural racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

**Surveillance ordinance:** Seattle City Council passed ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the “surveillance ordinance.”

**SIR:** “surveillance impact report”, a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance [125376](#).

**Workforce equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.




## ***Appendix B: Meeting Notice(s)***

Seattle English ▼  
Google Translate Disclaimer

## Tech Talk

Seattle Information Technology


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# Fourth Public Comment Period Opening for Technologies Subject to the City's Surveillance Ordinance

by [Seattle IT](#) on May 26, 2021



The City of Seattle has published the fourth set of draft Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for four of the 26 currently existing surveillance technologies, per the [Surveillance Ordinance](#).

The City of Seattle is looking for the public's input on the SIRs to help provide the City Council with insight into community perspective and ensure City policies responsibly govern the use of these technologies.

The public comment period is currently open and runs through June 30, 2021. The complete list of technologies in this group for review, can be found below. We have three ways to allow residents to provide input and share their concerns:

1. Residents can submit their surveillance comments on each technology online at: [City of Seattle Privacy website](#).
2. Seattle residents can also mail comments to Attn: Surveillance & Privacy Program, Seattle IT, PO Box 94709, Seattle, WA 98124
3. City Surveillance Technology Event: The City will hold virtual events to allow attendees ask questions from department technology experts and hear from City leadership. These virtual events will take place over using Webex and participants can join via online or the phone. Links and times are as follows:



**Thursday, June 10, noon to 1 p.m.**

Link to join: <https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?>

MTID=[mdfa673054e3236adb179613c69692067](#)

Phone number to call in: +1-206-207-1700

Event number (access code): 187 147 0595

**Tuesday, June 29, 3-4 p.m.**

Link to join: <https://seattle.webex.com/seattle/j.php?>

MTID=[me51f66a7150a8e16ca6e3220e25449fd](#)

Phone number to call in: +1-206-207-1700

Event number (access code): 187 172 4351

*More information on these technologies, as well as the City of Seattle's Privacy program, can be found online at the [City of Seattle's Privacy website](#).*

This public input period is a valuable part of our process. The City of Seattle is committed to being transparent and accountable. Hearing from residents is part of the process. We welcome your thoughts and comments and look forward to hearing them.

#### [Seattle Police Department's Callyo](#)

Seattle Police Department's Callyo technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. This software may be installed on an officer's cell phone to allow them to record the audio from phone communications between law enforcement and suspects. Callyo may be used with consent or search warrant.

#### [Seattle Police Department's Audio Recording Devices](#)

Seattle Police Department's Audio Recording Device technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. This technology consists of a hidden microphone to audio record individuals without their knowledge. The microphone is either not visible to the subject being recorded or is disguised as another object. Used with search warrant or signed Authorization to Intercept (RCW 9A.73.200).

#### [Seattle Police Department's I2 iBase](#)

Seattle Police Department's I2 iBase technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. The I2 iBase crime analysis tool allows for configuring, capturing, controlling, analyzing and displaying complex information and relationships in link and entity data. iBase is both a database application, as well as a modeling and analysis tool. It uses data pulled from SPD's existing systems for modeling and analysis.

#### [Seattle Police Department's Maltego](#)

Seattle Police Department's Maltego technology is under review for public comment as a retroactive surveillance technology. Maltego is an interactive data mining tool that renders graphs for link analysis. The tool is used in online investigations for finding relationships between pieces of information from various sources located on the internet.

Filed Under: [Privacy](#)

Tagged With: [surveillance cameras](#), [surveillance ordinance](#), [surveillance technology](#)

20 items

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## **Appendix C: All Comments Received from Members of the Public**

**ID:** 12841230225

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 7/23/2021 3:55:46 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: i2 iBase

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**



Very little time was allocated for questions from the public at the Group 4a public engagement meetings. Additionally, SPD dodged providing answers to some of the questions. As such, numerous questions from the public have not been answered and thus greatly hinder the ability for informed public comment. My open questions on SPD's use of iBase are in the response to question #5 in this survey. Since the safest approach (security-/privacy-wise) is to assume the worst as the missing answers to these open questions, my list of concerns will do the same. Thus, these concerns include: (1) No policy defining or limiting the (CAD/etc) incident types for which SPD may enter data into or in general use i2 iBase. (2) SPD has not been transparent with the public regarding the data sources to SPD's iBase system. (3) The potential incorporation of information from data brokers (i.e. Corelogic, LexisNexis, Experian, etc) into SPD's iBase system. (4) The potential incorporation of information gleaned via SPD officer's using their own "sock puppet" accounts on social media platforms (Facebook, etc). (5) Excessive SPD RMS data pulled into SPD'S iBase (such as the entirety/majority of the SPD RMS (Mark43) as opposed to only "surgically" pulling in case-by-case data from the RMS about specific incidents). (6) SPD is likely using iBase to conduct dragnet surveillance of Seattle residents by analyzing their geolocation history/patterns via incorporating SPD's Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) data into iBase. (7) Weaken security by the likely lack of Security Classification Codes (SCC) per each item in a record in iBase. (8) Unvalidated and excessive external data incorporated into SPD's iBase via IBM Security i2 Connect, IBM i2 Enterprise Insight Analysis, and/or the Premium version of IBM i2 Analyst's Notebook. (9) Inaccurate/incomplete iBase SIR since SPD did not provide complete information regarding their data sharing partners. In iBase SIR item 6.1, SPD did not answer regarding who they indirectly share data with. Given SPD provided an answer as to why data sharing is justified (SIR item 6.2), it can only be safely assumed that SPD has withheld information from the public regarding who they indirectly share iBase data with. (10) Missing information due to SPD not specifying in the SIR the data retention period for data inside iBase. One can again only safely assume that the data retention period is excessive, otherwise why hide it. (11) No safeguards in place to prevent or quickly remedy the retention of data in iBase of individuals who are not suspects nor found guilty of a crime (i.e. a suspect's younger brother, or girlfriend, or mother). Nothing prevents SPD from using iBase on innocent members of the public. Nothing ensures that data collected accidentally on innocent individuals is deleted in a timely manner. (12) Potential security weakness due to iBase having write access to the SPD RMS. Thus if SPD's iBase system is compromised, an attacker could leverage this inappropriate scoping in the access control to modify, create, or delete arbitrary records in the SPD RMS (Mark43). (13) Too many employees with access to the system. There may also be an additional security weakness via rotting of the access control list, if employees who change teams are not promptly revoked access and/or if terminated employee accounts continue to persist post-termination. (14) Lack of transparency by SPD to the public regarding what contract language governs SPD's use of iBase. (15) Nothing prevents an SPD employee from accessing the data of an investigation they are not involved in. That is, it assumes that the access granted to iBase is all-or-nothing (not granular access control). Thus, nothing would prevent an SPD employee who is assisting in investigation A from seeing the details of unrelated investigation B in iBase (i.e. arson vs kidnapping vs stolen car, etc)? (16) Potential lack of a sufficient audit trail due to too low of an audit log level setting. (17) Lack of clarity from SPD in the iBase SIR items 5.2 &

8.2 regarding who fills the role of the "Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor". This is especially unclear given multiple rolls/teams inside Seattle and federally can conduct audits of certain aspects of SPD (and in some cases overlapping role powers regarding who can audit what). (18) SPD did not disclose to the public when the last audit of iBase was conducted or where such an audit report might be found. (19) Lack of clarity regarding the magnitude of the use of iBase by SPD. SPD has not specified how many incidents per year they use iBase for. (20) Lack of clarity regarding if the use of iBase is always disclosed to the legal representative of someone facing charges for which iBase was used in SPD's investigation. (21) Finally (and most importantly) it's concerning that SPD has yet another tool to surveil residents. SPD doesn't need more tools, or more money. The community needs support so these pipelines to the criminal system are fixed. Those systemic problems aren't fixed by SPD having more tools.

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

None.

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**

SPD shouldn't surveil residents. SPD doesn't need more tools, or more money. The community needs support so these pipelines to the criminal system are fixed. Those systemic problems aren't fixed by SPD having more tools. As such, I recommend that City leadership stop funding this tool. Given City leadership's past history on prior surveillance technologies, I suspect they won't do what is fundamentally right and instead will pursue limited cosmetic changes. As such, here are some superficial changes that could be made: (1) Require SPD to answer all of the public's questions. (2) Require SPD Policy to state which specific incident types for which iBase may be used. (3) Require SPD to disclose all of their data sources to iBase (such as, any data brokers: Corelogic, LexisNexis, Experian, etc.; use of any non-public details from social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter, etc). (4) Require SPD to disclose if any data they add to iBase has been attained via deception (such as via the use of sock puppet accounts). (5) Require SPD to only "surgically" pull in data to iBase from their RMS (Mark43) on a case-by-case basis about specific incidents. (6) Ban the incorporation of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) data into iBase (such as via IBM's iBase Plate Analysis). (7) Require SPD use Security Classification Codes (SCC) per each item in a record in iBase. (8) Due to the unvalidated and excessive external data potentially incorporated into SPD's iBase via these 3 tools, City Leadership should disallow SPD use of: IBM Security i2 Connect, IBM i2 Enterprise Insight Analysis, and/or the Premium version of IBM's i2 Analyst's Notebook. (9) Disallow SPD from indirectly sharing data from iBase. (10) Require that data that is part of an investigation be retained in iBase for at most until the investigation is closed (if not deleted sooner). (11) Ban SPD from retaining in iBase the data of individuals who are not suspects nor found guilty of a crime (i.e. a suspect's younger brother, girlfriend, mother, neighbor, or a stranger like a shopkeeper, etc). (12) Improve security by requiring that SPD's iBase system only has read access (no write access - cannot create/delete/modify records) to the SPD RMS (Mark43). (13) Reduce the number of employees with access to iBase. (14) Improve security by requiring that access to iBase is promptly revoked for employees that change teams or when they no longer work for the City. (15) Require that SPD post publicly the contract that governs their use of IBM i2 iBase. (16) Require that employee access is assigned per record in iBase (that is, prevent an SPD employee who is assisting in investigation A from seeing the details of unrelated investigation B in SPD's iBase, i.e. arson vs kidnapping vs stolen car, etc). (17) Require that the audit log level of SPD's iBase system is set to level '5' (and that sufficient disk space is allocated for the records). This would allow those auditing the system to review all access to the system and look for anomalies [see: <https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/i2-ibase/9.0.3?topic=database-controlling-what-is-audited> ] (18) Require SPD to update iBase SIR items 5.2 & 8.2 to clarify who can/does fill the roll of the "Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor" (19) Require SPD to publicly provide the date and report from the most recent audit of SPD's iBase. (20) Require SPD to disclose how many incidents per year they use iBase for. (21) Require that the use of iBase is always disclosed to the legal representative of someone facing charges for which iBase was used in SPD's investigation.

**Do you have any other comments or questions?**

Many questions from the public have not been answered, such as: (1) Is there any policy defining the incident types for which SPD may use iBase? (2) What are all of SPD's data sources to iBase - specifically what are the data sources meant by the wording in the SIR "information gathered during criminal investigation"? (3) Is SPD using information from data brokers (i.e. Corelogic, LexisNexis, Experian, etc)? (4) Is SPD using information found via officers' Facebook (or other social media) profiles? (5) Does all data in the SPD RMS get automatically imported into iBase? If not, what segments of RMS data are auto-imported to iBase? (6) Does SPD have licenses for iBase Plate Analysis? (7) Does SPD use Security Classification Codes (SCC) per each item in a record in iBase? (8) Is SPD's licenses for i2 Analyst's Notebook the basic version or the Premium version, which includes "i2 Analyze"? (9) Does SPD have licenses for IBM's "Security i2 Connect"? (10) Does SPD have licenses for IBM's "Security i2 Enterprise Insight Analysis"? (11) The iBase SIR 6.1 asks which entities are data sharing partners. SPD only answered regarding who has direct access. Which entities (if any) does SPD share iBase data with indirectly? If there are entities that SPD indirectly shares iBase data with, then will iBase SIR 6.1 and 6.3.1 be updated to accurately reflect that? If there is no indirect iBase data sharing, then why did SPD provide a supposed data sharing justification in iBase SIR 6.2? (12) How long is data retained in iBase? (13) What (if anything) prevents the retention of data in iBase of individuals who are not suspects nor found guilty of a crime (i.e. a suspect's younger brother, or girlfriend, or mother)? What ensures their information is deleted from iBase in a timely manner? (14) Does iBase have write access to the SPD RMS (i.e. can it create/delete/edit records in the RMS)? (15) How many employees are in the RTCC? How many employees are in the Investigations Unit? How many employees from IT have access to iBase? (16) Is SPD directly contracted with IBM or is there a third-party contracted company involved in provisioning/managing iBase? (17) Say an SPD employee is assisting in investigation A. What (if anything) prevents them from seeing the details of unrelated investigation B in iBase (i.e. arson vs kidnapping vs stolen car, etc)? (18) What is SPD's iBase audit log level set to? [Levels 1-5: <https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/i2-ibase/9.0.3?topic=database-controlling-what-is-audited>] (19) Who fills the role of "Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor" (from items 5.2 & 8.2 in the iBase SIR)?...OIG? (20) When was the last audit of iBase conducted? (21) Roughly how many incidents per year does SPD use iBase for? (22) Is the use of iBase always disclosed to the legal representative of someone facing charges for which iBase was used in SPD's investigation?

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**ID:** 12746737080

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 6/15/2021 6:44:20 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: i2 iBase

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Surveillance is always a concern.

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

Remains to be seen if there is a value.

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**

TBD, valid considerations would depend on SPD answering the public's questions.

**Do you have any other comments or questions?**

1) Is there any policy defining the incident types for which SPD may use iBase? 2) What are all of SPD's data sources to iBase - specifically what are the data sources meant by the wording in the SIR "information gathered during criminal investigation"? 3) Is SPD using information from data brokers (i.e. Corelogic, LexisNexis, Experian, etc)? 4) Is SPD using information found via officers' Facebook (or other social media) profiles? 5) Does all data in the SPD RMS get automatically imported into iBase? If not, what segments of RMS data are auto-imported to iBase? 6) Does SPD have licenses for iBase Plate Analysis? 7) Does SPD use Security Classification Codes (SCC) per each item in a record in iBase? 8) Is SPD's licenses for i2 Analyst's Notebook the basic version or the Premium version, which includes "i2 Analyze"? 9) Does SPD have licenses for IBM's "Security i2 Connect"? 10) Does SPD have licenses for IBM's "Security i2 Enterprise Insight Analysis"? 11) The iBase SIR 6.1 asks which entities are data sharing partners. SPD only answered regarding who has direct access. Which entities (if any) does SPD share iBase data with indirectly? If there are entities that SPD indirectly shares iBase data with, then will iBase SIR 6.1 and 6.3.1 be updated to accurately reflect that? If there is no indirect iBase data sharing, then why did SPD provide a supposed data sharing justification in iBase SIR 6.2? 12) How long is data retained in iBase? 13) What (if anything) prevents the retention of data in iBase of individuals who are not suspects nor found guilty of a crime (i.e. a suspect's younger brother, or girlfriend, or mother)? What ensures their information is deleted from iBase in a timely manner? 14) Does iBase have write access to the SPD RMS (i.e. can it create/delete/edit records in the RMS)? 15) How many employees are in the RTCC? How many employees are in the Investigations Unit? How many employees from IT have access to iBase? 16) Is SPD directly contracted with IBM or is there a third-party contracted company involved in provisioning/managing iBase? 17) Say an SPD employee is assisting in investigation A. What (if anything) prevents them from seeing the details of unrelated investigation B in iBase (i.e. arson vs kidnapping vs stolen car, etc)? 18) What is SPD's iBase audit log level set to? [Levels 1-5: <https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/i2-ibase/9.0.3?topic=database-controlling-what-is-audited>] 19) Who fills the roll of "Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor" (from 3.1 in the iBase SIR)?...OIG? 20) When was the last audit of iBase conducted? Where can that audit report be found? 21) Roughly how many incidents per year does SPD use iBase for? 22) Is the use of iBase always disclosed to the legal representative of someone facing charges for which iBase was used in SPD's investigation?

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**ID:** 12698224918

**Submitted Through:** Online Comment

**Date:** 5/28/2021 2:24:35 PM

**Which surveillance technology that is currently open for public comment, do you wish to comment on?**

SPD: i2 iBase

**What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Bias. AI may seem unbiased, but it is not. The training sets are based on historically biased data furthering the bias

**What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

None

**What do you want City leadership to consider about the use of this technology?**

There is way too much bias in the police. Let's not aggravate it even more under the guise of impartial data.

**Do you have any other comments or questions?**

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## **Appendix D: Letters from Organizations or Commissions**

July 23, 2021

Seattle Information Technology  
700 5<sup>th</sup> Ave, Suite 2700  
Seattle, WA 98104

RE: ACLU of Washington Comments on Group 4a Surveillance Technologies

On behalf of the ACLU of Washington, I write to offer our comments on the surveillance technologies included in Group 4a of the Seattle Surveillance Ordinance implementation process.

The four Seattle Police Department (SPD) technologies in Group 4a are covered in the following order:

1. Callyo
2. i2 iBase
3. Audio Recording Systems
4. Maltego

These comments should be considered preliminary, given that the Surveillance Impact Reports (SIR) for each technology leave a number of important questions unanswered. Specific unanswered questions for each technology are noted in the comments relating to that technology. Answers to these questions should be included in the updated SIRs provided to the Community Surveillance Working Group and to the City Council prior to their review of the technologies.

### Callyo

#### I. *Background*

Callyo is a mobile phone identification masking and recording technology. It raises privacy and civil liberties concerns because it enables law enforcement to surreptitiously record individuals' conversations, and possibly their location data, without their knowledge or consent.

Because voice is a biometric identifier, audio data can be used to surreptitiously identify and track individuals. Any audio data collected could be used with voice recognition software that may contain inaccuracies and built-in race and gender biases.<sup>1</sup> Such audio could be later input into a voice recognition or biometrics database, which may further enable both corporate and government surveillance.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Voice recognition technologies already in use, such as Voice AI, are more likely to accurately respond to white people and men. See, for instance, Joan Bajorek, "Voice Recognition Still Has Significant Race and Gender Biases," *Harvard Business Review*, May 10, 2019, <https://hbr.org/2019/05/voice-recognition-still-has-significant-race-and-gender-biases>.

<sup>2</sup> Law enforcement agencies already use such programs and the creation of vocal recognition databases is underway. See, for instance, Michael Dumiak, "Interpol's New Software Will Recognize Criminals by Their Voices," *Spectrum.IEEE.org*, May 16, 2018, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/interpol-s-new-automated-platform-will-recognize-criminals-by-their-voice>.



P.O. Box 2728  
Seattle, WA 98111-2728  
(206) 624-2184  
[aclu-wa.org](http://aclu-wa.org)

Michele Storms  
*Executive Director*

SPD's possible collection of location data with Callyo raises further concerns. While an SPD representative stated that Callyo only tracks the GPS location of SPD phones and cannot collect other location data,<sup>3</sup> the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) states that Callyo is used to GPS locate individuals.<sup>4</sup> The lack of clarity around SPD's collection of individuals' GPS data raises location-tracking concerns. Law enforcement can use geo location data to conduct real-time surveillance of individuals without their knowledge or consent. Location data can reveal highly sensitive information about people's behaviors, social patterns, and personal life, including political activities in which they engage, with whom they associate, and what religion they practice. Digitally collected location data also may be improperly and inaccurately used in criminal investigations.<sup>5</sup> Location tracking therefore impinges upon basic privacy and due process rights and impedes individuals' abilities to enjoy their everyday lives free from fear of surveillance.

SPD's use of Callyo raises serious concerns. SPD policies described in the SIR do not include purpose limitations, adequate privacy and security protections, or clear restrictions on use. The SIR does not include a contract with the vendor, Motorola Solutions, and it is unclear whether there are contractual restrictions on data use and sharing.

Given the lack of adequate policies described by the SIR and the number of unanswered questions that remain, we have concerns that SPD's use of Callyo may infringe upon people's civil rights and civil liberties.

## II. *Specific Concerns*

- a. **Lack of Clarity Around Requirements for a Warrant:** The SIR states that Callyo's functions can only be used with a court order.<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere, the SIR states that Callyo's call recording functions may only be used with a search warrant.<sup>7</sup> However, the city's webpage states, "Callyo may be used with consent or search warrant."<sup>8</sup> Comments at the June 10<sup>th</sup> and July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting also suggested that consent might be sufficient to use Callyo. Clarity is needed as to whether current rules allow officers to use some features of Callyo based on consent alone. Such clarity is particularly important because the SIR repeatedly states that the search

<sup>3</sup> "Speaker Identification" *GoViva.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.goviva.com/products/speaker-identification/>; "Voice Authentication," *Awars Biometrics*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.awars.com/voice-authentication/>; "Forensic Voice Analysis," *Sestek.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.sestek.com/forensic-voice-analysis/>; "Voice Inspector for Forensic Experts," *Phonocia.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.phonocia.com/en/use-case/au/fo-forensic-software/>.

<sup>4</sup> City of Seattle IT Department, "Group 4a Surveillance Technologies Public Meeting 1 20210610 1903 1," Accessed July 21, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10FVHt2oyv8>.

<sup>5</sup> Seattle Police Department, "2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Callyo," Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR%200%20Callyo.pdf>, 5-7.

<sup>6</sup> "Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. This Has to End," *Wired*, February 2, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without-warrant-end/>.

<sup>7</sup> SPD, "Callyo," 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 10, and 11.

<sup>9</sup> "Surveillance Technologies Under Review," *Seattle.gov*, Accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/surveillance-technologies>.

warrant determines what data can be properly collected via Callyo.<sup>9</sup> Uses of Callyo based on consent alone would not be subject to such parameters. The SIR fails to specify when officers can request consent and what content can be recorded based on that consent. Improper data collection is probable absent clearer guidelines.

- b. **Inadequate Policies Defining Purpose of Use.** The SIR does not fully describe the circumstances under which Callyo may be used. It is unclear when call-masking may be used and whether Callyo is the only recording application that SPD uses to record calls. Without clear purpose restrictions, officers may record conversations widely, amassing unnecessary sensitive data and voice biometrics. Similarly, officers may inappropriately use call-masking technologies outside of any specific criminal investigation and undermine expectations of government transparency.
- c. **Lack of Clarity on How Callyo May be Used and By Whom.** The SIR primarily addresses how a non-HRVU (High-Risk Victims Unit) officer or detective would have TESU (Technical and Electronic Support Unit) record their call. Any difference in process for recording the calls of non-officers (i.e. calls made by cooperating witnesses) is not detailed. The HRVU's Callyo use parameters are also only partially explicated,<sup>10</sup> despite HRVU's larger share of the annual Callyo budget.<sup>11</sup> Without comprehensive guidelines ensuring that appropriate usage is tracked and data is properly managed, sensitive information may be improperly shared and tools like call masking may be used improperly.
- d. **Lack of Clarity on Motorola Solutions' Data Collection and Retention.** The SIR does not describe a contract between SPD and Motorola Solutions, leaving it unclear whether Motorola collects or retains data. While the SIR indicates that no "sharing partners" have "direct access" to Callyo data "while it resides in the [mobile phone] device,"<sup>12</sup> it is unclear what access there is to data that no longer resides in the devices and may instead be stored in Callyo's cloud.<sup>13</sup> While SPD stores Callyo recordings on its own systems, the SIR does not make clear whether data initially recorded in Callyo's app is also uploaded to Amazon Web Service's GovCloud, which hosts Callyo's cloud and appears to store its data.<sup>14</sup> When asked about possible Motorola collection of Callyo data during the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative expressed uncertainty as to whether the vendor might access or store some data. If data is stored on Callyo's cloud system without contractual restrictions, Motorola Solutions may be able to review and parse private recording data, or even share or sell that data to third parties. The SIR does not mention any such

<sup>9</sup> SPD, "Callyo," 10, 11, 13, and 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-11.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>13</sup> "Investigative Solutions," *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://callyo.com/investigations/investigative-solutions>.

<sup>14</sup> "Callyo," *Amazon Web Services*,

<https://partners.amazonaws.com/partners/0010f00001pBHaCQA0W/Callyo>; "10-21 Video" *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://callyo.com/public-safety/10-21-video>.



cloud storage or other data collection by Motorola Solutions, leaving open the possibility that Motorola has access to highly sensitive information.

- c. **Inadequate Data Sharing Policies.** The SIR offers only an extremely general description of who might receive Callyo data and how such data would be shared.<sup>15</sup> Neither security protocols for transferring data nor for ensuring that shared data is properly deleted are explicated in the SIR. Indefinite retention of data and insecure sharing processes could lead to exposure of sensitive data, with manifold consequences for those recorded – from safety risks for witnesses to discovery of private information by employers.
- f. **Inadequate Data Retention Policies.** The SIR states that devices that collect no relevant evidence, per the terms of the court order, are purged in their entirety by TESU staff and no data is provided to the investigating officer.<sup>16</sup> However, protocols to ensure that TESU staff properly execute these determinations are not detailed fully. Additional clarity is needed as to how deletions are determined, and how frequently supervising officers review the data that is shared with investigating officers.<sup>17</sup> Indefinite and improper data storage could lead sensitive data to be shared publicly or could lead SPD officers to use improperly collected data in the course of an investigation – subjecting those investigated to an overreach of police powers.
- g. **Inadequate Oversight Policies.** Callyo advertises that the call masking on its 10-21 phone application “diverts millions of calls away from dispatch centers each year” by enabling officers to communicate with members of the public directly.<sup>18</sup> SPD does not provide data on the number of calls that might be diverted, but any such calls would no longer be subject to the systematic tracking and oversight which centralized dispatch systems provide. This arrangement makes it easier for individual officers to unilaterally control communications with members of the public and use that communication control to abuse their power.
- h. **No Policies Restricting Use of Callyo’s Additional Surveillance Features.** Callyo can be integrated with other law enforcement-focused Amazon Web Services technologies in ways that makes its surveillance capabilities more forceful.<sup>19</sup> Callyo also includes numerous additional surveillance features, such as video recording and live-streaming<sup>20</sup> and “10-

<sup>15</sup> SPD, “Callyo,” 14-16.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 and 10.

<sup>17</sup> See “Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies,” at SPD, “Callyo,” 9.

<sup>18</sup> “Spotlight: Callyo is Changing the Way Investigations Are Done,” *Police 1*, March 12, 2019, <https://www.police1.com/police-products/investigation/articles/spotlight-callyo-is-changing-the-way-investigations-are-done-1p2PRKAl5Mnn0y37/>.

<sup>19</sup> AWS Public Sector Blog Team, “Harnessing the Power of the Cloud: Startups Deliver Innovative Services to Public Agencies Faster,” *AWS Public Sector Blog*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/harnessing-the-power-of-cloud-startups-deliver-innovative-services-to-public-safety-agencies-faster/>.

<sup>20</sup> “Police Body Camera App,” *10-21 Video.com*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://10-21.com/>; “10-21 Video,” *Callyo.com*.

21 Flight,<sup>21</sup> which allows officers to perform surveillance using drones.<sup>21</sup> The SIR describes no policy which would prevent SPD from using these Callyo features in the future. Videos captured by Callyo could be stored and later entered into facial recognition programs, which have been widely found to be racially biased.<sup>22</sup> Flight-based video tools can be and have been<sup>23</sup> used to track and observe protestors, improperly subjecting political organizers to targeted surveillance and chilling freedoms of speech and association.

### III. *Outstanding Questions That Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- Is location data collected via Callyo? If so, how and when is location tracked and what policies govern recording and storage of location data?
- Can Callyo be used without a warrant, based on two-party consent alone? If so, when may it be used without a warrant, how is consent obtained, and what rules set the parameters for Callyo's use?
- When Callyo is used on calls between a third party (i.e. a cooperating witness) and an unknowing participant, how does the recording process differ compared to Callyo's use for recordings of officers in phone conversations?
- How and when is call masking used and what policies govern usage of that feature?
- How does the HRVU use Callyo and what guidelines govern its use? Does the HRVU ever use Callyo functions besides call masking, such as location tracking?
- Is any data collected through HRVU usage of Callyo – such as the phone numbers called – and how is that data stored and/or shared?
- Does SPD have a contract with Motorola Solutions for its use of Callyo? If so, what are the agreement's provisions?
- Where are audio recordings initially stored? Are they ever stored anywhere besides the original recording device and the thumb drive submitted to the investigating officer, such as on the Callyo cloud?
- Who owns the data collected by Callyo? Does Motorola have access to or store the collected data at any point? If so, what are Motorola's data security practices with respect to the data collected?
- How is data shared with third parties? How is shared data monitored for deletion within the appropriate time frame?

### IV. *Recommendations for Regulation*

Pending answers to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of Callyo. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that ensure, at a minimum, the following:

<sup>21</sup> "10-21 Flight," *Callyo.com*, Accessed June 7, 2021, <https://callyo.com/public-safety/10-21-flight>.

<sup>22</sup> Kade Crockford, "How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist?" *ACLU.org*, Accessed June 16, 2021, <https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist/>.

<sup>23</sup> "U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities Using Aerial Surveillance," *The New York Times*, June 19, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html>.

- There is a specific and restricted purpose of use. The ordinance should define clear limits on Callyo's uses, including narrow parameters for Callyo's consent-based uses.
- All data collected through Callyo must follow the issuance of a search warrant, or a clearly delineated consent process that sets enforceable rules limiting the types of data that may be collected.
- Data is securely shared with third parties and properly deleted.
- Any data collected by Motorola is not owned by, used by, or retained by Motorola, and any data housed on the Callyo cloud is properly secured.
- There must be clear accountability processes for ensuring TESU officers delete improperly recorded data that falls outside the scope of a search warrant or consent statement and do not share it with investigating officers.
- There must be clear guidelines for securely storing and managing any data collected by Callyo outside of call recordings, such as location data, and provisions to ensure the deletion of any such data collected that does not fall within the scope of a search warrant or consent agreement.

## **i2 iBase**

### **I. *Background***

IBM i2 iBase is a database application that raises serious privacy and civil liberties concerns because it can operate as a surveillance dragnet and can perform automated social network analysis (SNA), which likely exacerbates disproportionate surveillance and policing of marginalized communities.

iBase is used by law enforcement to identify and analyze network connections and patterns within input data, conduct SNA or "link analysis," and share data with other agencies.<sup>24</sup> SPD uses i2 iBase in partnership with a second IBM application, i2 Analyst's Notebook,<sup>25</sup> which is "a visual analysis tool" that includes "connected network visualizations, social network analysis, and geospatial or temporal views to help... uncover hidden connections and patterns in data."<sup>26</sup> Together, these tools can search massive pools of data to find similarities and connections between entities and individuals, then produce maps and charts that represent the relationships or groups identified. The "Search 360" function in iBase allows officers to perform complex queries of stored records, expanding data search capabilities beyond those offered by existing records systems.<sup>27</sup>

iBase also allows for new ways of viewing data, and includes features not described in the SIR. It can generate heat maps and find "hidden connections" via the "Find

<sup>24</sup> "IBM Security i2 iBase: FAQs," *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-ibase>.

<sup>25</sup> Seattle Police Department, "2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software - IBM i2 iBase," Accessed June 9, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public%20Engagement%20SIR-%20i2%20iBase-IBM%20%20i2%20iBase.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> "IBM Security i2 Analyst's Notebook," *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook>.

<sup>27</sup> "IBM Security i2 iBase: Details," *IBM.com*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-ibase>.



Connected Network<sup>27</sup> tool, which identifies a network that “directly or indirectly” connects several entities of interest.<sup>28</sup>

The SIR suggests that iBase is generally employed in two contexts. First, SPD’s Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) uses iBase to rapidly provide information to officers responding to incidents.<sup>29</sup> The RTCC is a “centralized data and logistics hubs” that allows analysts to provide data to officers on the street.<sup>30</sup> Second, investigating officers use iBase to collect and organize timeline and relationship data for cases in progress.<sup>31</sup>

Although SPD describes using iBase only to assess RMS and CAD data, iBase can process larger data pools and operate as a data dragnet. For instance, the Durham, NC Police Department has considered importing city utility data, recreational park logs, and daily jail visitor lists into iBase.<sup>32</sup> A law enforcement-focused Open Source Intelligence integration is now available for iBase Analyst’s notebook. The integration allows “customers to use not only the internal data available on the platform, but also to collect and analyze a wealth of further information through open sources.”<sup>33</sup> This “further information” is public, but still raises privacy concerns when collected en masse and utilized for policing; for instance, the information could include social media data and geolocation history.<sup>34</sup> The SIR does not describe any SPD policy that would prevent additional data from being added to iBase. During the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative expressed uncertainty as to whether outside information was being used in SPD’s iBase.

The data analysis and matching performed by SNA tools like iBase can often be inaccurate. Data may become outdated or be entered incorrectly or in different formats.<sup>35</sup> Such errors are difficult to catch when data is processed at this scale. The analysis process can perpetuate these inaccuracies by integrating errors into the visualizations produced and generating linkages between people who have no relationship. For instance, a one-letter typo in an address might lead someone to be inaccurately connected to a household miles away. An outdated address might generate a connection with a location or person someone has not visited for years. These inaccuracies can compound existing police bias; those who have previously interacted with the police – who are disproportionately Black, Latinx, and

<sup>28</sup> “IBM Security i2 Analyst’s Notebook: Feature Spotlights,” IBM.com, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook/details>.

<sup>29</sup> SPD, “IBM i2 iBase,” 5.

<sup>30</sup> Seattle Police Department Public Affairs, “SPD Announces Agile Policing Strategy, Unveils Real-Time Crime Center,” *spdblogger.seattle.gov*, October 7, 2015, <https://spdblogger.seattle.gov/2015/10/07/spd-announces-agile-policing-strategy-unveils-real-time-crime-center/>.

<sup>31</sup> SPD, “i2 iBase,” 5-6.

<sup>32</sup> “Digital Dragnet: How Data Became a Cop’s Best Weapon,” *GCM*, November 29, 2011, <https://gcn.com/Articles/2011/12/05/Predictive-policing-tech-feature.aspx?Page=2>.

<sup>33</sup> “Social Links Brings the OSINT Solution to IBM’s i2 Analyst’s Notebook Platform,” *SocialLinks.io*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://blog.sociallinks.io/https://blog-sociallinks.io/social-links-brings-the-osint-solution-to-ibms-i2-analysts-notebook-platform/>.

<sup>34</sup> “SL Pro on IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook,” *SocialLinks.io*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://blog.sociallinks.io/sl-pro-on-ibm-i2-analysts-notebook-product-launch-and-practical-application/>.

<sup>35</sup> Timothy Crocker, “The Power of Social Network Analysis,” *Police Chief Magazine*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/power-social-network-analysis/>.

Indigenous<sup>36</sup> – are more likely to have data in RMS or CAD that could lead to a false “linkage” to a person of interest and subject that person to surveillance and unwarranted interactions with police.

The SIR acknowledges that i2 iBase and the Analytics notebook are used as tools within the field of social network analysis (SNA).<sup>37</sup> SNA is a problematic mode of analysis, in part because it is often used for predictive policing via “heat-mapping.” iBase advertises such features.<sup>38</sup> Any tool potentially useful for predictive policing raises well-documented civil liberties concerns, including reproducing existing biases and compounding the surveillance of neighborhoods which return higher crime data because they are over-policed.<sup>39</sup>

Utilizing relationship analysis in conjunction with other more common predictive policing tools also raises new threats. For instance, rather than identifying specific locations where gun violence is likely to occur, SNA predictive policing may aim to identify *specific individuals* likely to face gun violence<sup>40</sup> – an entirely new level of invasive surveillance and data targeting. The SIR does not describe predictive policing uses of iBase, but such uses are also not prohibited. Given RTCC’s mission, it seems entirely conceivable that iBase data could be used to predict threats and re-direct officers. Unless governed by narrowly tailored guidelines, iBase has the potential to compound issues already present in SPD’s existing predictive policing apparatus.

RTCC use of SNA technology also raises freedom of association concerns. Without proper regulation, SNA tools could be used with open source data to pull up details not only on the subject of the incident, but on all of their associations – for instance, criminal records for a brother, parent, or Facebook friend. That information may influence an officer’s response to the situation; after all, RTCC

<sup>36</sup> Factors including biased policing, discriminatory school discipline policies, and community over-policing mean that Latinx, Black, and Indigenous people are more likely to interact with police, be stopped by police, and be searched by police – leading to the creation of notes or an entry in a system like CAD or RMS. These differences are well-documented nationally and in Seattle. See, for instance, David Kroman, “Report Shows Seattle Policing Still Disparate Along Racial Lines,” *Crosscut*, May 1, 2019, <https://crosscut.com/2019/05/report-shows-seattle-police-enforcement-still-disparate-along-racial-lines>; Elizabeth David, et al, “Contacts Between the Police and Public, 2015,” *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report*, October 2018, “Findings,” *Stanford Open Policing Project*, Accessed June 11, 2021, <https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/>; Kim Eckart, “How a Police Contact by Middle School Leads to Different Outcomes for Black, White Youth,” *Washington.edu*, December 3, 2020, <https://www.washington.edu/news/2020/12/03/how-a-police-contact-by-middle-school-leads-to-different-outcomes-for-black-white-youth/>; <https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf>; Robert Crutchfield, et al, “Racial Disparity in Police Contacts,” *Race Justice* 2, no.3 (July 1, 2012): 10, <https://www.ocla.nlm.nih.gov/gmrc/articles/FMC3868476/>;

<sup>37</sup> SPD “IBM i2 iBase,” 6.

<sup>38</sup> “IBM Security i2 Analyst’s Notebook: Feature Spotlights,” *IBM.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook/details>; “Durham Police Department,” *IBM.com*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://www.ibm.com/case-studies/durham-police-department>.

<sup>39</sup> Tim Lau, “Predictive Policing Explained,” *The Brennan Center for Justice*, April 1, 2020, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained>; Jared Friend, “Seattle’s New Crime Analytics Program Threatens to Perpetuate Racism in Policing,” *ACLU WA.org*, October 20, 2015, <https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/seattle-a-new-crime-analytics-program-threatens-perpetuate-racism-policing>.

<sup>40</sup> Andrew Papachristos and Michael Sierra-Arevalo, “Policing the Connected World,” *Department of Justice: Community Oriented Policing Services*, 2018, <https://www.hsdj.org/view?docid=674313>; Reichart, et al. “Focused Deterrence: A Policing Strategy to Combat Gun Violence,” *ICJLA Research Hub*, Accessed July 23, 2021, <https://icjla.illinois.gov/researchhub/articles/focused-deterrence-a-policing-strategy-to-combat-gun-violence>.

pulls this data with the goal of informing officers' actions. Use of that data may prompt more aggressive policing on the basis of association alone, exacerbating existing biases in street policing. If additional data is imported into iBase, it is possible other kinds of associations and affiliations could also be identified and immediately sent to police, such as membership in Facebook groups or job history.

## II. Concerns

- a. **Bias and Inaccuracies in Computer-Automated Social Network Analysis.** As outlined above, iBase's automated relationship analyses are likely to generate data errors that compound existing biases. SPD does not indicate how often incorrect connections are identified, but they have confirmed that false connections do occur. To protect against these errors, the SIR indicates that relationship analysis will be "developed manually by analysts."<sup>41</sup> However, that claim conflicts with assertions that iBase's automated processing will "create[e] relevant intelligence from large amounts of data,"<sup>42</sup> and will create new "efficiencies" by avoiding manual data management.<sup>43</sup> Manual analysis also seems time-prohibitive in rapid-response scenarios. Even if SPD only analyzes relationships manually, the SIR never fully explains what safeguards are embedded into that manual analysis to ensure data is fully reviewed and erroneous connections deleted.
- b. **Lack of Clarity on Purpose of Use and Usage Limits.** The SIR does not fully explain use cases for iBase and does not include policies placing limits on its uses.
  - i. **Rapid Response Uses.** The SIR indicates that RTCC uses the social network analysis provided by iBase to provide "actionable information"<sup>44</sup> to officers in the field but does not thoroughly explain how that information is used by offices or why it is helpful. It is therefore difficult to assess the full extent of civil liberties concerns presented by the in-the-field uses of the technology and to assess SPD's need for the technology.
  - ii. **Need for a Criminal Investigation.** The SIR does not specify at what point someone's data is consolidated and viewed in iBase. Based on the contemplated RTCC uses of the technology, it seems that a formal criminal investigation does not need to be opened before data can be pulled and visualized in iBase. Rather, anyone who is merely the subject of a 911 call might be analyzed using iBase.
  - iii. **Visualization vs. Predictive Policing.** Without clearer usage limits, data compiled via iBase might be used for predictive policing.

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<sup>41</sup> SPD, "IBM i2 iBase," 27.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 6, 21, and 27.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.



- c. **Lack of Clarity Around Types of Data Stored and Processed.** In the SIR, SPD does not specify what portion of existing data is automatically imported into iBase, and what kinds of data have been manually inputted.<sup>45</sup> The lack of information on data currently included or potentially included in iBase raises numerous concerns.
- i. **Lack of Limits on Data Imported.** The SIR indicates that additional data can be “manually imported” into the system<sup>46</sup> and suggests that officers would manually input only single “piece[s] of data.”<sup>47</sup> However, it does not specify a policy limiting the kinds of data that can be manually inputted or that would prevent automatic import of outside data. The lack of such restrictions is concerning given iBase’s potential to operate as a dragnet with a disparate surveillance impact.
  - ii. **Biased Data Selection.** Biases likely already exist in the data imported from RMS and CAD. Members of over-policed communities are far more likely to appear in SPD systems and are therefore more likely to appear in iBase relationships analyses and be subjected to police investigation resulting from false linkages. The SIR also states that only some portions of RMS and CAD data are automatically imported into iBase. If so, the data selection parameters used could introduce additional bias. For instance, importing data only for certain types of incidents or from certain locations could compound the racial and economic disparities already present in the data. The SIR does not indicate whether SPD has completed a disparate impact assessment of the linkages iBase generates, nor whether any policies exist which might mitigate this disparate impact. When asked what portion of data is imported into iBase, the SPD representative implied that only difficult to import data was excluded, but the inclusion parameters were not fully described.
- d. **Lack of Clarity Regarding Contract with IBM.** The SIR does not indicate whether SPD has a contract with IBM and does not describe the provisions of any such contract. It is therefore difficult to assess what future uses of iBase might be possible, what kinds of data might be imported, and what data security mechanisms are in place. Although the SIR states that data is maintained on SPD servers and is entered into iBase via a one-way server transfer, the SIR does not describe enforceable provisions which could prevent future IBM use or review of data and analyses from iBase.
- e. **Lack of Clarity on Data Security.** The SIR does not fully describe data security measures that would prevent third-party access to sensitive iBase relationship analyses and searches.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 6.

- i. **Data Deletion.** The SIR states that manually entered data will be automatically deleted after five years.<sup>48</sup> It is not clear why there is a lengthy five-year retention period. The SIR also does not specify what systems or oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that data is deleted. This is particularly concerning given the lack of limits on manual data inputs, as outlined above.
- ii. **Incidental Data Access.** The SIR specifies, “incidental data access may occur through delivery of technology client services.”<sup>49</sup> However, it does not describe the specific scenarios in which this data access might occur, nor what kind of data would be viewed, leaving open the possibility that significant elements of analysis generated by iBase could be released to third-party entities.

### III. *Outstanding Questions that Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- Which “portion” of SPD RMS and CAD data is automatically imported into iBase? How often does the data used generate erroneous relationship linkages?
- Has an equity assessment been performed on the portion of the data transferred? What biases exist in the data, and how does SPD ensure that the biases present in the social network analyses conducted with this software do not cause disparate impact?
- Are there any limits on the kinds of data that can be manually inputted into the system? Has there been an evaluation of what kinds of data have been manually inputted thus far?
- Are there any policies that would prevent other kinds of data from being imported into iBase in the future?
- How is manual relationship analysis performed using iBase, and what specific safeguards exist within the analysis process to prevent erroneous connections? Does SPD ever use the automatically-generated relationship maps created by iBase or Analyst’s notebook, without verifying the accuracy of all the many data points involved?
- Is data compiled via iBase ever used for predictive purposes, rather than mere visualization? Are there any policies that would prevent its use for predictive purposes in the future?
- How does RTCC use the social network analysis provided by iBase to provide “actionable information”<sup>50</sup> to officers in the field? What kinds of actionable information would this include, and why would such data be necessary or helpful?
- At what point can someone’s data be consolidated and viewed in iBase?
- What systems ensure that manually entered data is deleted automatically?
- What circumstances might lead to “incidental” data access, and what data would be viewed? Could only ITD employees potentially obtain “incidental data access?”
- Does SPD have a contract with IBM, and if so, what are its provisions?

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 10.

#### IV. *Suggestions for Regulation*

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of IBM's i2 iBase and Analyst's Notebook. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- A regular audit to assess for biases in the data imported into iBase and in the analyses generated by iBase.
- Limits on the kinds of data that may be inputted both manually and automatically into iBase, ensuring that additional pools of public or private information are not added in the future.
- A shortened data retention period that does not exceed the time necessary to conduct a criminal investigation.
- A clear deletion oversight process to ensure that manually added data is deleted after the specified retention period.
- A manual relationships analysis process that includes clear checkpoints designed to ensure erroneous data and inaccurate linkages generated by iBase are detected and corrected before they are actively investigated.
- Limits on the usage of potentially erroneous iBase analyses and search data in rapid-response settings where manual analysis is not possible.
- Clear purpose of use limits, restricting when someone's relationship network may be assembled in iBase, such as a requirement that a criminal investigation be opened before such an analysis is begun, to prevent the widespread use of iBase analysis on all individuals encountering the police.
- A regulation banning the use of iBase for predictive policing.
- A contract with IBM that ensures IBM never possesses, uses, or accesses SPD data.

#### Audio Recording Systems

##### I. *Background*

“Wires” are concealed audio recording devices, generally used to record in-person conversations pursuant to a search warrant. This type of technology poses serious privacy and civil liberties concerns. If people do not have the knowledge and assurance that private communications are, indeed, private, habits based upon fear and insecurity will gradually replace habits of freedom, chilling people’s civil rights and liberties.

“Audio recording systems” include devices hidden on a person, in an object, or in a location and used to record audio, following consent or search warrant authorization.<sup>51</sup> The SIR does not specify the particular audio recording technology

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<sup>51</sup> Seattle Police Department, “2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”),” accessed June 4, 2021, <https://www.seattle.gov/Departments/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Transparency/2021Engagement/2021SIR/01%30%30Audio%20Recording%20Systems.pdf>, 4.



used by the department, outside of the Callyo call recording technology discussed above. At the June 10th public engagement meeting, an SPD representative indicated that some technologies that fall under this SIR may be able to record video, though the SIR states video devices are described in a separate SIR.<sup>32</sup> Although the SIR is unclear about the type or model of devices used, at the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, SPD representatives suggested that the devices used were mostly relatively new devices – not legacy “wires” or tape recorders – and were typically small, handheld recorders or officers’ cell phones.

Many new audio wire technologies are substantially similar in function to traditional recording devices but may be far smaller and have improved audio quality and storage capacity, making them easier to conceal and surveillance easier to perform. Improved audio filtering and increased wearer comfort mean devices can be used in a wider array of settings irrespective of noise, can pick up sound from much further away, and can be worn for longer periods of time. Transmissions from planted devices can also be streamed to remote computers so that law enforcement need not be near the conversation recorded.<sup>33</sup> Modern devices are therefore capable of widespread and complex surveillance not contemplable even 15 years ago. Increased storage capacity and ease of data deletion also make device misuse more likely; officers can now leave a device running in a public place where third-party conversations can be captured, then try to later delete excess data improperly collected.

Improved audio quality and increasingly sophisticated audio processing software also pose new threats. Law enforcement agencies already employ software that can identify and match voices, and voice databases are being developed.<sup>34</sup> The use of this software, in conjunction with mass police storage of high-quality audio recordings, poses a risk of easy but possibly inaccurate or biased government identification and surveillance of those recorded. SPD acknowledges that audio recordings may be shared with other agencies, including other law enforcement departments.<sup>35</sup> As such, even if SPD would need to undergo a review process before acquiring voice recognition technologies, the voices of those recorded by SPD could easily become part of other agencies’ voice recording databases. SPD audio recordings could therefore become a permanent biometric record, much like a fingerprint. Given these new and developing risks, it is necessary to set narrower limits on uses of audio-processing software, sharing of audio data, and uses of recorders.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>33</sup> Wendy Ridenman, “Is Someone Recording This? It’s Harder to Find Out,” *The New York Times*, April 7, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/nyregion/secret-recording-grows-safer-as-the-privacy-protection.html>; Laurie Mason Schroeder, “Wearing a Wire in the Digital Age: Smaller, Safer, More Comfortable,” *The Morning Call*, February 3, 2018, <https://www.mcall.com/news/police/mc-nws-allentown-city-hall-investigation-wiretaps-20180201-story.html>.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Dumiak, “Interpol’s New Software Will Recognize Criminals by Their Voices,” *Spectrum* IEEE.org, May 16, 2018, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/interpol-new-automated-platform-will-recognize-criminals-by-their-voice>; “Speaker Identification,” *GoVoice.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.govoice.com/products/speaker-identification/>; “Voice Authentication,” *Awave Biometrics*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.awave.com/voice-authentication/>; “Forensic Voice Analysis,” *Sivtek.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.sivtek.com/forensic-voice-analysis/>; “Voice Inspector for Forensic Experts,” *Phonoxia.com*, Accessed June 10, 2021, <https://www.phonoxia.com/en/use-cases/audio-forensics-software/>.

<sup>35</sup> SPD, “Audio Recording Systems (“Wires”),”<sup>12</sup>.



## II. *Specific Concerns*

- a. **Lack of Clarity Around How Devices Are Used.** The SIR does not specify the scenarios in which officers may use recording devices, saying that “[SPD] utilizes audio recording systems in a handful of ways to obtain information during a criminal investigation.”<sup>56</sup> It is difficult to assess the necessity of audio recordings without clarity as to how devices are used and where they may be used. Although audio recordings are helpful in some scenarios, some audio recordings – particularly those authorized only by two-party consent – may be unjustified given the privacy concerns posed by audio recording. SPD never describes how frequently audio is recorded or how often improper recordings are captured, making it difficult to assess the current process’s flaws.
- b. **Lack of Clarity Around Warrant and Consent Procedures.** The SIR indicates that either a warrant or consent may authorize use of a recording device.<sup>57</sup> However, neither the SIR nor the June 10<sup>th</sup> or July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meetings provided a thorough description of the consent process. It is unclear whether SPD has a clear consent script or guidelines for determining what recordings are permissible. It is important that individuals know precisely what they are consenting to and how they can opt out of being recorded. Without clear processes, SPD may be capturing and retaining audio that falls neither clearly within the terms of the party’s consent nor outside of them. Retaining any such audio undermines the privacy expectations embodied in Washington’s two-party consent laws. Additionally, without clear guidelines, decisions about which recordings to keep are likely to be made arbitrarily or in ways informed by bias.
- c. **Lack of Adequate Safeguards Against Improper Data Collection Prevention.** The SIR specifies data deletion practices that prevent improperly collected data from being retained, pursuant to the terms of a warrant or the terms of a party’s consent. However, it does not outline formal usage guidelines that would prevent improper recordings from ever being collected. The additional storage capacity and audio sensitivity of today’s recording make it far more likely that an officer might turn on a device early or leave it on too long and capture third-party conversations before and after any conversation of interest. Even carefully timed recordings might capture private background conversations. Although such data might eventually be deleted, those conversations will be temporarily stored, then reviewed by a member of SPD staff. The capture, review, and temporary storage of recordings of citizens who have not consented and are not subject to a warrant constitutes a serious privacy violation, particularly given the highly personal, identifiable information which might be collected.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

- d. **Lack of Clarity on Types of Devices Used.** The SIR does not specify the manufacturer or function of devices used.<sup>58</sup> This is particularly concerning given that officers are using their phones to record, which may involve the use of a third-party application or software.
- e. **Lack of Clarity on Specific Data Extraction Software.** The SIR states that completed recordings are "...extracted onto a thumb drive from the device using a locally stored computer application.... This application... is used solely to extract audio data from a device and stores no data."<sup>59</sup> The type of application and its features are never detailed. As such, we cannot analyze the security of the software. Presumably some second software is also used to delete parts of recordings that are improperly collected. That software and its features are also not specified.
- f. **Inconsistencies in Deletion Policies.** The SIR states that the TESU officer is responsible for purging improperly collected data,<sup>60</sup> but also that the investigating officer is responsible for the purge.<sup>61</sup> If no one person is accountable for data deletion, some improperly collected data may never be purged. Additionally, if the investigating officer can complete the deletion, they necessarily may access and review improperly collected recordings. The review, use or retention of such unauthorized recordings constitutes a clear violation of 4<sup>th</sup> amendment rights and Washington consent laws.
- g. **Security Risks Associated with Third Party Data Sharing.** The SIR describes third-party data sharing only vaguely.<sup>62</sup> It does not describe the sharing process, nor how data security will be maintained. The lack of data security measures increases the likelihood that third parties will improperly expose, retain, or share private data. It is also unclear whether audio recordings shared with partner law enforcement agencies or other jurisdictions – who are not subject to the same surveillance regulations – are shared permanently, or whether any protocols are in place to ensure that shared data is later deleted.
- h. **Inconsistencies in Audio Device Request and Management Process.** The SIR is inconsistent in describing how TESU officers process requests for audio device usage. The SIR in one place states that the investigating officer completes the audio device request form<sup>63</sup> but elsewhere states that TESU does so.<sup>64</sup> The request form is designed to ensure that officers obtain consent or a warrant before a device is issued. Therefore, an unclear request process increases the probability of unauthorized device use and improper private data collection.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 5 and 16.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 7.

### III. *Outstanding Questions That Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- What is the manufacture and functionality of audio recording devices utilized by SPD? How much storage do they have, from what distance can they transmit, and from what distance can they pick up sound?
- How are new technologies selected when replacing devices that have reached end of life? Are there any limits on the kinds of new recording devices that can be acquired? Do new technologies include features not present in older technologies?
- What application is used to extract data from the recording devices and place the audio onto a hard drive or thumb drive? Can this software or any other alter recordings? If so, how is use of the software logged?
- Are there guidelines limiting the settings in which an audio device can be used or preventing the collection of unneeded and improper recordings?
- Are there any guidelines limiting how the audio devices can be used – for instance specifying at what point the recording may be turned on and when it must be turned off?
- What is the device request process? Who fills out the request form?
- What is the process for purging data? Who purges the data, and what oversight measures are in place to ensure data is properly and fully purged?
- What protocols ensure that consent is properly and clearly obtained before a recording is initiated?
- Where there is no warrant, how do officers decide which recordings or portions of recordings to delete and which to retain? Are there guidelines for making this determination?
- How is data shared with third parties? What security practices are observed? How is shared data monitored for deletion within the appropriate time frame?

### IV. *Recommendations for Regulation*

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of audio/wire technology, particularly given that both the kind of technology and the scenarios where it is used are not described. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Narrowly tailored guidelines for where, how, and when recording devices may be used that help to limit the collection of unauthorized data. This might include a requirement that recording devices be turned on only once a person of interest is present, or a prohibition on using particularly powerful devices in public places where other private conversations might easily be picked up.
- Clear rules for the issuance of recording devices and processing of all recordings that limit the role of the investigating officer and ensure oversight by a supervisor. These rules should include a data-deletion protocol which makes clear who is responsible for deleting improperly collected data, ensures regular oversight of deletion, and provides clarity as to what data must be deleted where no warrant is used.

- Limits on the kinds of audio recording technology which SPD can use as end-of-life replacements for current audio devices, with consideration for the risks posed by newer and more powerful recording devices and applications.
- Limits on the software that can be used to process and extract audio recordings. For instance, this might include a prohibition on software that involves offsite cloud storage or voice biometrics recognition.
- Clear procedures for securely sharing data with third parties, including a policy that ensures shared data is erased.

## **Maltego**

### **I. Background**

Maltego is a powerful technology used by law enforcement to search, collect, and analyze billions of open-source data points and generate charts representing connections between identified entities and individuals. This technology poses serious privacy and civil liberties concerns as it enables dragnet surveillance through mass social media monitoring.

Maltego is advertised to law enforcement and cybersecurity analysts as a tool for acquiring identifying information on individuals and entities under investigation, including through analysis of email addresses and social media data, or data from the “dark web.”<sup>65</sup> There are multiple versions of Maltego that include different functions and data packages.<sup>66</sup> SPD states that they use the free, community version to assess information which is already publicly available online, primarily in the course of cybercrime investigations.<sup>67</sup>

Maltego advertises having more than 35 data partners.<sup>68</sup> Their partners include Social Links,<sup>69</sup> a platform which allows for the harvesting of data from more than 50 social networks including Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.<sup>70</sup> Even the free version of Maltego can be used to access these additional data integrations. For instance, Social Links has a free plug-in, Social Links CE,<sup>71</sup> which can retrieve information from Skype and Social Links’ own database,<sup>71</sup> which includes 7 billion

<sup>65</sup> “Law Enforcement,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/law-enforcement/>.

<sup>66</sup> “Pricing,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/pricing-plans/>.

<sup>67</sup> “Products,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/products/>.

<sup>68</sup> Seattle Police Department, 2021 Surveillance Impact Report: Link Analysis Software - Maltego,” Accessed June 4, 2021,

<https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/Privacy/Public/620Engagement%20SIF-%20in%20Analysis-Maltego.pdf>, 5 and 11.

<sup>69</sup> “The Five Pillars of the Maltego Officer,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 4, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/blog/the-five-pillars-of-the-maltego-officer/>.

<sup>70</sup> “Transform Hub,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/>.

<sup>71</sup> “Social Links Pro,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/social-links-pro/>; “Police Tight Lipped on Trial of Social Media Surveillance Tools,” *NewsHub*, June 14, 2021, <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2021/06/police-tight-lipped-on-trial-of-social-media-surveillance-tools.html>.

<sup>72</sup> “Social Links CE,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/social-links-ce/>.



pieces of data.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, the free Wayback Machine integration allows users to browse “hundreds of billions of websites, going back for years or even decades...” including historical snapshots of pages and data long-since deleted.<sup>73</sup> Although the SIR identifies some types of data that SPD does collect, such as web domain ownership information,<sup>74</sup> it does not fully explicate what kinds of data SPD uses within Maltego.

The validity of data collected via Maltego is questionable, given the multiple source points and huge quantities of data analyzed. Although the SIR indicates that all SPD data collected via Maltego is already publicly available,<sup>75</sup> that guarantee is misleading. Publicly available information can include private or sensitive data improperly made public via data breaches or hacking. Indeed, law enforcement agencies are known to purchase and use such “public” hacked data.<sup>76</sup> Notably, Maltego includes a free integration from “Have I Been Pwned,” which may be used to search for such “public” hacked data.<sup>77</sup> Without proper analysis and verification, outputs generated from Maltego’s open source data could further expose sensitive information.

Monitoring even accurate and properly collected public data raises serious civil liberties concerns when performed at the scale promised by Maltego. Vast pools of public data, when stored and analyzed in combination, can uncover privately held information. For instance, at a public demonstration in 2012, Maltego’s founder demonstrated that his software could uncover the identity of a likely NSA employee using “public” information flowing out of the agency’s parking lot. Maltego identified the employee’s email address, date of birth, travel history, employment and education history, and image.<sup>78</sup> Such invasive surveillance fundamentally impedes individual privacy rights, particularly when entrusted to a government agency and used without clear limitations.

Maltego also may be used for mass monitoring of social media. Law enforcement social media monitoring is not new; by 2016, 70% of more than 500 surveyed departments used social media for intelligence gathering.<sup>79</sup> Tools like Maltego, however, allow for mass analysis and complex searches of social media data, a far more potent form of surveillance than targeted investigations of specific accounts. These tools can enhance agencies’ existing social media agendas, including

<sup>72</sup> Jorn Weber, “Social Links: The All-Round Tools for OSINT Intern Investigations – Part 2,” *Corma*, August 13, 2020, <https://corma.de/en/4-social-links-the-all-round-tool-for-osint-internet-investigations-part-2/>.

<sup>73</sup> “Wayback Machine,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/wayback-machine/>.

<sup>74</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 6.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Joseph Cox, “Police are Buying Access to Hacked Website Data,” *Vice.com*, July 8, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/3atvey/police-buying-hacked-data-spycloud>; The Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Filed in Los Angeles and Alaska in Connection with Seizures of 15 Websites Offering DDoS-For-Hire Services,” December 20, 2018, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/criminal-charges-filed-los-angeles-and-alaska-connection-services-15-websites-offering>.

<sup>77</sup> “Have I Been Pwned,” *Maltego.com*, Accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.maltego.com/transform-hub/has-been-pwned/>.

<sup>78</sup> Jeremy Kirk, “Who Is Tweeting from the NSA’s Parking Lot?” *Computer World*, October 17, 2012, <https://www.computerworld.com/article/2402504/who-is-tweeting-from-the-nsa-s-parking-lot.html>.

<sup>79</sup> KiDeuk Kim, et. al., “2016 Law Enforcement Use of Social Media Survey,” *The Urban Institute and International Association of Chiefs of Police*, February 2017, [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88651/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey\\_5.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88651/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey_5.pdf).

monitoring of demonstrations and activists,<sup>80</sup> with tracking often particularly focused on Black Lives Matter organizers.<sup>81</sup> Such tracking chills political speech and raises safety and privacy concerns, extending decades of police surveillance and abuse of civil rights protestors.<sup>82</sup> Social media analysis has also been used as a form of predictive policing – a mode of policing rife with bias and inaccuracies<sup>83</sup> – as police surveil accounts of interest and analyze posts to anticipate future crimes.<sup>84</sup>

Law enforcement already misuses and misconstrues social media data to compound existing biases and feed mass incarceration. The NYPD, for instance, has a social media tracking unit devoted to monitoring youth “gangs.” Data is provided to probation and parole officers and can be presented in court with devastating consequences; in one case, misinterpreted social media “likes” were used to deny pre-trial bail to a misidentified, innocent Black teenager who spent two years awaiting trial on Rikers Island.<sup>85</sup> Maltego’s mass analysis of public data grants police expanded surveillance capabilities and can subject individuals to unwarranted police interaction or criminal consequences on the basis of inaccurate, hacked, or misinterpreted information.

## II. *Concerns*

- a. **Inadequate Policies Defining Purpose of Use.** The SIR suggests that Maltego is primarily used for cybercrime investigations,<sup>86</sup> but does not specify any policies designating when the technology may be used. The SIR’s language is also vague and implies that Maltego has been used in non-cyber contexts.<sup>87</sup> During the July 20<sup>th</sup> public engagement meeting, the SPD representative also commented that Maltego could be used for non-cyber crimes, although it generally is not. It is therefore unclear how widely large-scale public data analysis is currently used in SPD criminal investigations or what would prevent widespread usage of Maltego in the future.
- b. **Inadequate Policies on Data Collection and Assessment.** The SIR states that Maltego can only be used within the bounds of a specific criminal investigation or “cybersecurity incidents.”<sup>88</sup> However, it does not specify any internal guidelines restricting what public data or whose public data may be collected and analyzed using Maltego. Under existing policies, it seems entirely possible that people tenuously or erroneously associated with potential perpetrators – including people for whom there is little or no

<sup>80</sup> Rachel Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Police Challenges,” *Howard Law Journal* (61.3, 2018), [https://www.humanrightscenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/images/RJ\\_Waldman\\_HLJ\\_Article.pdf](https://www.humanrightscenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/images/RJ_Waldman_HLJ_Article.pdf), 529.

<sup>81</sup> “Police Monitoring of Social Media Sparks Concerns in Black and Brown Communities,” *NPR – All Things Considered*, August 21, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/21/904646038/police-monitoring-of-social-media-sparks-concerns-in-black-and-brown-communities>.

<sup>82</sup> Rachel Levinson-Waldman and Angel Diaz, “How to Reform Police Monitoring of Social Media,” *Brookings Institute – Tech Stream*, July 9, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-reform-police-monitoring-of-social-media/>; Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access,” 524-525.

<sup>83</sup> Lau, “Predictive Policing Explained,” Friend, “Seattle’s New Crime Analytics Program.”

<sup>84</sup> Levinson-Waldman, “Government Access,” 530.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 528.

<sup>86</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 5.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 8 and 10.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

evidence of criminal activity – could be subject to Maltego assessment and surveillance.

- c. **Lack of Clarity Around Data Sources.** The SIR does not describe the specific data sources SPD utilizes via Maltego; it provides only limited examples of Maltego’s usage and states that data is collected from “various open source websites.”<sup>89</sup> Absent further clarity, it seems possible that SPD can use Maltego for social media data analysis, raising privacy issues not addressed in the SIR. Additionally, the SIR acknowledges that “some iterations of Maltego allows for collection of private data of citizens,”<sup>90</sup> but does not outline procedures to prevent accidental private data collection, including of private information improperly made public through hacking.
- d. **Potential for Predictive Usages.** Paterva advertises that Maltego can “[h]elp solve future investigations by pushing insights back into [a] case management system.”<sup>91</sup> The SIR indicates that SPD exports Maltego charts back into SPD’s system<sup>92</sup> and suggests that data from Maltego might be used for “defensive” purposes.<sup>93</sup> If Maltego is being used to anticipate future crimes, SPD must provide clarity as to a) how they guard against existing biases often replicated by predictive policing, and b) what surveillance they perform based on these predictions.
- c. **Inadequate Policies to Assess for Errors in Data Analysis.** The SIR acknowledges that erroneous linkages are one of the “most important unintended possible consequence[s]” of Maltego. However, in describing safeguards to prevent erroneous linkages, the SIR only states, “because all analysis [is] conducted in the TESU by a limited number of detectives the risk is mitigated.”<sup>94</sup> This mechanism seems ineffective, as no data output review process is described. Perhaps the SIR means that TESU detectives perform only limited and reviewable amounts of manual analysis and diagramming, which indeed might limit inaccuracies. However, no policies are described which would enforce limits on diagramming techniques and levels of usage. To the contrary, any such limits contradict the core purpose of Maltego. SPD states that Maltego is useful precisely because it can “pars[e] large amounts of... information,”<sup>95</sup> and thereby “help in identifying unknown relationship[s].”<sup>96</sup>

The SIR does not describe SPD tracking of Maltego’s error rate. Without error tracking or safeguards, Maltego outputs likely lead police in inaccurate directions and subject random individuals to unnecessary surveillance and police interaction. Because evidence collected via Maltego can be used for search warrants, inaccurate Maltego outputs that are presented to the court as valid could lead to particularly invasive forms of improper searches.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>90</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 20.  
<sup>91</sup> Law Enforcement,” *Maltego.com*.  
<sup>92</sup> SPD, “Maltego,” 9.  
<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 6 and 14.  
<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 6.  
<sup>96</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>97</sup> Ibid.



- f. **Lack of Clarity on Data Retention Policies.** The SIR states that data that is not relevant to an investigation is not retained and that “pertinent” data is exported to a spreadsheet or diagram and then handled per department policy.<sup>98</sup> However, it does not make clear how and when the originally collected, pertinent data is deleted from Maltego, leaving open the possibility that such data is retained indefinitely.
- g. **Lack of Clarity Around Relationship with Paterva.** The SIR states that SPD searches are stored by the vendor, as SPD is unable to stand up their own server using the free version of the software.<sup>99</sup> These searches contain sensitive information that indicates the contents and direction of a criminal investigation and are being exposed to a private third-party. Additionally, the SIR states that Maltego is not “used to process or collect internal data,”<sup>100</sup> but elsewhere says that private information gathered via search warrant can be input into Maltego.<sup>101</sup> The SIR does not describe measures to keep that private data secure nor outlines Paterva’s or Maltego Technologies’s internal data security measures. The SIR also does not describe a contract between SPD and Paterva or Maltego Technologies for the use of the free Maltego software.
- h. **Potential for Improper Use Without Auditing/Logging.** The free version of Maltego’s software seems to include no auditing or logging capabilities.<sup>102</sup> Lack of auditing or logging increases the probability that the software will be misused. Given the software’s potential for invasive surveillance and monitoring that could intrude upon protected speech, more careful monitoring is essential. Notably, upgrading to the paid version of the software would not resolve the problem and would likely exacerbate the overall civil liberties concerns posed by the software; the paid version includes additional privacy risks given the far wider breadth of data available.

### III. *Outstanding Questions that Must be Addressed in the Final SIR*

- When can Maltego be used for non-cyber investigations?
- Once an investigation is opened, are there any internal guidelines restricting what public data or whose public data may be collected and analyzed using Maltego?
- Which specific data sources does SPD analyze using Maltego? Are there any limits on the kinds of data that can be assessed?
- Are Maltego outputs ever used for any predictive or “defensive” policing?
- Are errors in the data Maltego pulls systematically tracked? Are there any safeguards against errors or processes for analyzing the data?
- How often has Maltego been used, and is there any data suggestive of its efficacy in resolving cybersecurity crimes?

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 11.

- After data is exported, how and when is pertinent data deleted from within Maltego?
- Does SPD have any kind of written agreement or contract with Paterva/Maltego Technologies for the use of the free Maltego software? If so, what are the provisions?
- Does SPD enter private information collected via search warrant into Maltego? If so, what data security protocols are in place to protect that private information?
- Does Paterva/Maltego Technologies have access to and store data that is requested and collected by SPD, beyond requests/searches made?
- What are the vendor's policies for data security, how is data stored, and who owns the data collected and analyses generated?

#### **IV. *Recommendations for Regulation***

Pending answers to the to the questions above, we can make only preliminary recommendations for regulation of Maltego. SPD should adopt clearer and enforceable policies that include, at a minimum, the following:

- Guidelines as to when Maltego may be used, such as a regulation that permits its use only for cybercrime investigations.
- Limits on who associated with an investigation may have their data collected using Maltego, such as a regulation requiring reasonable suspicion that an individual committed a crime before their public data can be amassed and assessed.
- Limits on the kinds of public data that may be assessed using Maltego, such as a prohibition on dragnet social media analysis.
- A regulation that prevents internal SPD data from being inputted into Maltego.
- A prohibition on use of Maltego for predictive policing.
- An analysis of the impacts of any Maltego outputs.
- A process to analyze the accuracy of data and analyses generated by Maltego.
- The deletion of originally collected, pertinent data from within Maltego after it is exported.
- A clear agreement with the vendor for the use of the free Maltego software that prohibits the vendor from storing or accessing SPD data.
- The creation of additional security measures to prevent improper access of Maltego by unauthorized officers, given the lack of auditing and logging capabilities.

Sincerely,

Jennifer Lee  
Technology and Liberty Project Manager

Farris Peale  
Policy and Advocacy Group Intern



June 8, 2021

Re: Surveillance Ordinance Group 4a Request for Clarification from CTAB Privacy & Cybersecurity

The Community Technology Advisory Board (CTAB) Privacy & Cybersecurity Committee appreciates the opportunity to provide comment on the Group 4a Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs). Volunteers from this committee have reviewed the Surveillance Impact Reports for the Group 4a technologies as a group. Our comment with requests for clarification is attached.

Our expectations for the onboarding of new technologies and the use of current technologies extend those as communicated in our 12 March 2019 memo to the Seattle City Council regarding Group 2 technologies with additions:

- Implicit bias has a material and potentially destructive impact on individuals and communities. It is important to keep in mind the ways in which bias can be streamlined and exacerbated through the use of technology.
- Interdepartmental sharing of privacy best practices: When we share what we've learned with each other, the overall health of the privacy ecosystem goes up.
- Regular external security audits: Coordinated by ITD (Seattle IT), routine third-party security audits are invaluable for both hosted-service vendors and on-premises systems.
- Mergers and acquisitions: These large, sometimes billion-dollar ownership changes introduce uncertainty. Any time a vendor, especially one with a hosted service, changes ownership, a thorough review of any privacy policy or contractual changes should be reviewed.
- Remaining a Welcoming City: As part of the [Welcoming Cities Resolution](#), no department should comply with a request for information from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without a criminal warrant. In addition, the privacy of all citizens should be protected equally and without consideration of their immigration status.

Sincerely,

**CTAB Privacy and Cybersecurity  
subcommittee members**

**Nicole Espy**, Committee co-chair  
**Camille Malonzo**, Committee co-chair  
**Eryk Waligora**, Committee volunteer

**Community Technology Advisory Board**

**Femi Adebayo**, CTAB Member  
**Nicole Espy**, CTAB Member  
**Dr. Tyrone Grandison**, CTAB Member  
**David Kirichenko**, CTAB Member  
**John Krull**, CTAB Member  
**Brandon Lindsey**, CTAB Member  
**Lassana Magassa**, CTAB Member  
**Camille Malonzo**, CTAB Vice-Chair  
**René Peters**, CTAB Chair  
**Leah Shin**, CTAB Member



### **Callyo (Police)**

1. Data from this application is stored on Amazon Web Services<sup>1</sup>. Will any SPD generated data be stored by Callyo or AWS?
2. Do other Callyo users or Callyo engineers have access to data generated by SPD?
3. How is data generated by SDP protected from Callyo or AWS?
4. Callyo was recently acquired by Motorola Systems in August 2020. Are there any changes to the terms of use as a result of the acquisition? If any data is collected by the technology provider, has its use / handling changed since acquisition?
5. Callyo is an Amazon Web Services (AWS) partner, which is a cloud services provider. Will any future usage of AWS via Callyo or any changes as a result of the acquisition by Motorola be reviewed by City Council prior to onboarding?
6. The SIR states that "Callyo is utilized in two different ways by units within SPD: Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU) and the High Risk Victims Unit (HRVU). The High Risk Victims Unit uses Callyo to mask phone numbers but does not utilize the recording features of Callyo" and goes on to describe the use of the technology by TESU officers/detectives. What is the data that HRVU keep about the call, if any, and for how long? Is that metadata used for any other purposes? Is that shared with any other department either internal to SPD or externally?
7. The SIR states "TESU maintains logs of requests (including copies of request forms and warrants) and extractions that are available for audit. SPD's Audit, Policy and Research Section (APRS) can conduct an audit of any system at any time. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can also access all data and audit for compliance at any time." How often do these audits occur?
8. Recordings are retained for a maximum of a year ("Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, investigational conversation recordings are retained "for 1 year after transcribed verbatim and verified OR until disposition of pertinent case file, whichever is sooner, then Destroy" (LE06-01-04 Rev. 1). TESU maintains a log of requests (including copies of warrants), extractions, and deployments that are available to any auditor, including the Officer of Inspector General and federal monitor."). What is the retention schedule for logs on calls?

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<sup>1</sup><https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/harnessing-the-power-of-cloud-startups-deliver-innovative-services-to-public-safety-agencies-faster/>





### **Audio Recording Systems (Police)**

1. The SIR states that "All audio recording devices are managed and maintained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU). When an Officer/Detective has obtained consent and/or a court order, having established probable cause, to utilize an audio recording device, s/he makes a verbal request to the TESU. TESU staff completes TESU's Request Form that requires a reason for the request, a case number associated with the investigation, and a copy of the consent form and/or court order. Each request is screened by the TESU Supervisor prior to deployment."
2. Is there are limit to the how long an officer/detective can use the device? What are the limits / safeguards in place for timely use? For example, is there ever a scenario where an Officer/Detective indefinitely records individuals in the scope of the court order and potentially other scenarios outside the scope of the warrant, but only the latter is ultimately transcribed for use as part of a criminal investigation. What safeguards are in place to ensure this does not happen?
3. The SIR states that "[a]udio recording devices capture sounds as they are happening in the moment. The devices do not check for accuracy, as they are simply capturing a live exchange of sounds. They are not interpreting or otherwise, analyzing any data they collect." What happens when the device records audio that is background / not part of a warrant to record but just happens to record other people? Is that data deleted? Is that transcribed?



## I2 iBase (Police)

1. The SIR states "The most important unintended possible consequence related to the continued utilization of the iBase system is the possibility that erroneous links between individuals related to criminal investigations may be considered. However, because all analysis conducted in the RTCC is developed manually by analysts the risk is mitigated by the efficiencies provided by the use of the iBase system."
2. This is deeply concerning. The implicit bias in the network analysis done by analysts themselves can have negative impacts on individuals and communities when unchecked<sup>2</sup>. The SIR states that officers/detectives undergo security training and training on the use of the technology. Is there any training around implicit bias, especially with respect to network analysis?
3. The SIR states "i2 iBase is a relational database environment for searching through investigation data imported from RMS and CAD as well as manually imported information gathered by investigators during the course of a criminal investigation." Is the scope of any search query at all limited or does an Officer/Detective have access to all of the data in the SPD system regardless of scope? For example, if an Officer/Detective searches for a given name in the database will the search return all instances of an entity attached to a given name even if that would relate to different people of the same name, individuals who may not be involved in the specific criminal investigation for which the visualisation is being created?
4. The SIR states "[t]he software logs: user sign on/off, each time a user accesses any piece of data, and any data manually added by a user. These logs are periodically reviewed to ensure proper use of the software; they may also be reviewed at any time by the Seattle Intelligence Ordinance Auditor." Are any of these logs captured by the technology provider? What is the retention policy / other data handling procedures for this data?
5. Does data from Maltego (or other publicly available info) go into I2? Do analysts generate links between this external data with internal data?

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<sup>2</sup> <https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/SpencerCharbonneauGlaser.Compass.2016.pdf>



## **Maltego (Police)**

### *Governance*

1. What does it mean that “Maltego is governed by SPD Policy”? What is this policy specifically?
2. What is the ‘City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance’? Is it this?:  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/03/seattle-law-limits-police-in-intelligence-gathering/916c9159-31da-4a1f-ab55-9804ba5cfa19/>
3. The governance structure also includes the 28 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 23 and Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) requirements, which are both very broad criminal justice/intelligence guidelines. Among other capabilities, Maltego is able to pull intelligence from the dark web in reconnaissance efforts. Is there any governance or training for ethical hacking?
4. The SIR states that “[a] paid version includes the ability to stand up an internal SPD server that would allow for logging, but that would involve significant costs to implement and maintain.” The logging makes it easier for audits by the department and also the Office of Inspector General. Is this a requirement to ensure proper auditing? While access logs can be inspected on the workstations utilizes to use Maltego, these logs may not necessarily retain the search parameters and the actual use of the technology.

### *Use of the Technology*

1. “Maltego... allows investigators to analyze connections between individuals related to criminal investigations.” Is Maltego used only for “criminal investigations”? Maltego has many more capabilities beyond criminal investigations. This is not simply a tool used for or by law enforcement. Maltego can be used for all types of data collection, analysis, and tracking. Maltego’s users vary. In fact, the company has a discounted program for academics and non-profits. However, this also means Maltego can be used by anyone, not just law enforcement, academics, and non-profits, but by anyone attempting to collect and track key information on groups or individuals.
2. “The tool is used by law enforcement partners”. Who are the “partners”? Is this service contracted out? If so, to whom? Are the “partners” from the public or private sector?
3. “Maltego is used infrequently to investigate cybercrime incidents.” Why infrequently? What is the average frequency of use?
4. “This software simply visualizes data collected is from publicly available information on the internet.” Data visualization is just one capability, but not its primary function. Software like Tableau is primarily used for importing and visualizing big data sets. Maltego is also heavily used to pull data from APIs, collate the data, and produce intelligence based on the collected and organized data. It also has capabilities, such as operating on the dark web.
5. “Data, when pertinent, is exported as a spreadsheet and/or visual diagram, at which point it is handled per department policy regarding digital evidence as part of a criminal investigation.” How is this data considered evidence? Information that is not considered “evidence” could indicate that a certain person/entity is under criminal investigation; so how is that information protected?





### *Protections*

1. "SPD utilizes Maltego to investigate cybercrimes, primarily in determining the digital origin of attacks against cyber infrastructure." And "Maltego is restricted to use for the related security incident and/or pertinent criminal investigations and subject to Department Policy regarding ongoing criminal investigations."
2. "Primarily" in determining the digital origin of attacks? What else is it used for then?
3. "Restricted to use..." by whom or what policy specifically?
4. The use of this tool for the purposes of the SPD is difficult to justify. OSINT tools like Maltego are used PRIMARILY for intelligence gathering in proactive defensive security, or as some even call it, "pre-crime". Intelligence is only useful before an attack, in order to help prevent it from occurring. But as this justification for use explains, the primary purpose of this tool will be used for investigations on crimes or incidents already committed. It is likely the SPD and all other PDs already have sophisticated tools designed specifically for this very purpose. Yes, Maltego can be used for all types of investigations, which can include criminal activities or even non-malicious vulnerability audits. But what is striking is that the primary function of this tool, as justified by SPD, will not be utilized. Main point: until there is clearer policy on the limitations of the SPD's use of Maltego, it will remain a powerful tool with multiple capabilities at the hands of law enforcement.
5. "Search warrant authorization is required, and would be obtained, to further any investigation into accessing private individual information." Maltego is only authorized for use with a warrant? This includes all cyber-crime and cyber attacks?
6. "Maltego is used by two trained TESU detectives within TESU, and by no other entity." "Users of Maltego undergo training on the use of the software, which includes privacy training." Law enforcement/criminal justice training is VERY different from intelligence analysis and/or data analysis training. What type of training and background do these detectives have? Is there any implicit bias training for the TESU officers/detectives who use the technology? (Stated policy on bias-based policy does not indicate specific training or mitigation of bias before it happens: 5.140 - Bias-Free Policing - Police Manual | seattle.gov)
7. "Data collected by Maltego is stored on an encrypted workstation within TESU." What type of encryption? This this stored on an on-premises server, hybrid, or cloud?

### *Use Case Example: "The City's network is attacked with ransomware"*

1. The scenario described may not actually unfold as described. It is likely that upon a ransomware attack, the City would contract a cybersecurity consulting company it has a partnership with for incident response, which would include a team of highly trained engineers and security operation center (SOC) professionals to stop the attack and attempt to recover any lost or damaged data. It would also include attribution of the threat actor. How effective SPD's involvement would actually be in this case comparatively?

## 2021 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

# IBM i2 iBase

## Seattle Police Department

## Overview

**The Operational Policy statements in this document represent the only allowable uses of the equipment and data collected by this technology.**

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered through SPD's I2 iBase. All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

### 1.0 Technology Description

The iBase software is a SQL server that imports a portion of the data from SPD's Records Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, allowing users to visualize the data in a link chart (rather than the standard textual display in RMS/CAD). The iBase server is an on-premise security encrypted server housed and managed by Seattle IT meeting CJIS approved requirements. The client i2 Analyst's Notebook software is locally installed on Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) analysts' workstations. An automated electronic data transfer allows information located within SPD's RMS and CAD systems to be imported into the iBase system via a one-way transfer of data from the source systems to iBase. i2 iBase is a relational database environment for searching through investigation data imported from RMS and CAD as well as manually imported information gathered by investigators during the course of a criminal investigation. IBM i2 Analyst's Notebook is the worldwide standard software solution for operational crime analysis and visualization, with the purpose of creating relevant intelligence from large amounts of data. Various types of structured data are compared and visualized through a variety of heatmaps, relationships, and diagrams.

### 2.0 Purpose

Prior to the implementation of the iBase software, investigators were required to re-type all criminal information from RMS onto visualization charts, which was a time-consuming and redundant process. Implementing iBase gave users direct access to that information without having to re-type it. This software is used exclusively for ongoing criminal investigations and therefore necessarily includes personal information about subjects of those investigations.

The utilization of the IBM Security i2 iBase system increases efficiency of investigations, availability of data, awareness of situational information, and timeliness of actionable information to officers on the street.

### 3.0 Data Collection and Use

**Operational Policy: All use of the i2 iBase system must also comply with [SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems](#) and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.**

**Use of the iBase system is governed by the [City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance \(SMC 14.12\), 28 CFR Part 23](#), CJIS requirements, and any future applicable requirements.**

The only information pulled into iBase automatically comes from SPD's Records Management System (RMS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. Users may manually add additional information that they have collected during the course of a criminal investigation. All manually added information is deleted after five years, in accordance with 28 CFR Part 23. No data outside SPD's RMS/CAD (e.g. commercial data aggregators, publicly available data, or other city departments) is automatically collected.

IBM i2 iBase is currently in use by the RTCC to assist with criminal investigations and to provide actionable information to units in the field. SPD employees in the RTCC and Investigations Unit utilize the i2 Analyst's Notebook software and information stored in the i2 iBase system. It may also be used in compliance with the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance.

## 4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

**Operational Policy:** All manually added information is deleted after five years, in accordance with [28 CFR Part 23](#).

All data changes are logged in the software's audit log, which is reviewed periodically. In addition, when manually adding information, a user must provide the source description, source reliability, and content certainty.

No data outside SPD's RMS/CAD (e.g. commercial data aggregators, publicly available data, or other city departments) is automatically collected.

The software automatically alerts users of data that must be deleted under legal deletion requirements such as 28 CFR Part 23.

## 5.0 Access & Security

**Operational Policy:** All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions:

- [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software,
- [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems,
- [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination,
- [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and
- [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

### Access

Data stored in the i2 iBase system is accessed by SPD employees assigned to the Real Time Crime Center and Investigations Unit. Access to the application requires SPD personnel to log in with password-protected login credentials which are granted to employees with business needs to access CAD. These employees are ACCESS and CJIS certified.

According to the CJIS security policy, “The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of specified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.”

ITD client services interaction with SPD systems is governed by the terms of the 2017 Management Control Agreement between ITD and SPD, which states that: “Pursuant to Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.23, ITD provides information technology systems, services and support to SPD and is therefore required to support, enable, enforce and comply with SPD policy requirements, including the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services, (CJIS) Security Policy.”

## Security

Only authorized SPD users can access the system, technology, or the data. Access to the application is limited to SPD personnel via password-protected login credentials. All user activity within the iBase system generates a log that is auditable.

Data is securely input and used on SPD’s password-protected network with access limited to authorized users.

The entire system is located on the SPD network that is protect by industry standard firewalls. ITD performs routine monitoring of the SPD network.

The CAD system is CJIS compliant. More information on CJIS compliance may be found at the CJIS Security Policy website.

All data that goes to mobile clients are encrypted to FIP 140-2 standards and is therefore CJIS compliant.

## 6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

**Operational Policy: No person, outside of SPD and Seattle IT, has direct access to the application or the data.**

**Because all the data used in this project relates to criminal investigations, any information shared will follow standard policing practices and CJIS compliance.**

Data sharing is frequently necessary during the course of a criminal investigation to follow up on leads and gather information on suspects from outside law enforcement agencies.

Cooperation between law enforcement agencies is an essential part of the investigative process. For example, an investigator may send out a photo or description of a homicide suspect in order to find out if another LE agency knows their identity.

Products developed using this information may be shared with other law enforcement agencies. All products created with the information used in this project will be classified as Law Enforcement Sensitive. Any bulletins will be marked with the following restrictions: LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE — DO NOT LEAVE PRINTED COPIES UNATTENDED — DISPOSE OF IN SHREDDER ONLY – NOT FOR PUBLIC DISPLAY OR DISTRIBUTION — DO NOT FORWARD OR COPY.

## 7.0 Equity Concerns

**Operational Policy: To mitigate against any potential algorithmic bias or ethnic bias to emerge in the use of link analysis software such as the iBase system, SPD employees are responsible for gathering, creating, and disseminating information and are bound by SPD Policy 5.140 which forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.**

IBM Security i2 iBase system is used during the investigation of crimes by the SPD Real Time Crime Center and information collected and stored in the system is related to these criminal investigations. There is no distinction in the levels of service this system provides to the various and diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals within the city.

All use of the i2 iBase system must also comply with SPD Policy 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems and may only be used for legitimate criminal investigative purposes.



## SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE\*

<b>Department:</b>	<b>Dept. Contact/Phone:</b>	<b>CBO Contact/Phone:</b>
SPD / ITD	Rebecca Boatwright Vinh Tang/206-684-7640	Neal Capapas/206-684-5292

*\* Note that the Summary and Fiscal Note describes the version of the bill or resolution as introduced; final legislation including amendments may not be fully described.*

### 1. BILL SUMMARY

**Legislation Title:** AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2021 surveillance impact report and 2021 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department’s use of IBM i2 iBase.

**Summary and background of the Legislation:** Per SMC Chapter 14.18 (also known as the Surveillance Ordinance), authorizing the approval of the surveillance impact reports for Seattle Police Department’s continued use of I2 iBase.

### 2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

**Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?**      \_\_\_ Yes X No

### 3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

**Does this legislation amend the Adopted Budget?**      \_\_\_ Yes X No

**Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle that are not reflected in the above, including direct or indirect, short-term or long-term costs?**

This technology is currently in use by the Seattle Police Department and no additional costs, either direct or indirect, will be incurred based on the continued use of the technology. However, should it be determined, that SPD should cease use of the technology, there would be costs associated with decommissioning the technologies. Additionally, there may be potential financial penalty related to breach of contract with the technology vendors.

**Is there financial cost or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation?**

Per the Surveillance Ordinance, the City department may continue use of the technology until legislation is implemented. As such, there are no financial costs or other impacts that would result from not implementing the legislation.

### 4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

**a. Does this legislation affect any departments besides the originating department?**

This legislation does not affect other departments. The technology under review is used exclusively by the Seattle Police Department.

**b. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?**

A public hearing is not required for this legislation.

**c. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?**

No publication of notice is required for this legislation.

**d. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?**

This legislation does not affect a piece of property.

**e. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative. Does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?**

The Surveillance Ordinance in general is designed to address civil liberties and disparate community impacts of surveillance technologies. Each Surveillance Impact Review included in the attachments, as required by the Surveillance Ordinance, include a Racial Equity Toolkit review adapted for this purpose.

**f. Climate Change Implications**

**1. Emissions: Is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way?**

No.

**2. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**

No.

**g. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)?**

There is no new initiative or programmatic expansion associated with this legislation. It approves the continuation of use for the specific technologies under review.

**List attachments/exhibits below:**



Legislation Text

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**File #:** Res 32051, **Version:** 2

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**CITY OF SEATTLE**

**RESOLUTION \_\_\_\_\_**

A RESOLUTION revising certain General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; amending Rules III and V in Attachment 1 of Resolution 32029.

WHEREAS, by Resolution 32029, the Seattle City Council adopted "General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council" to govern both its internal management and the procedures available to the public, in conformance with the City Charter and the customary practice of legislative bodies; and

WHEREAS, the Council procedures and rules guide and facilitate Councilmember duties and meeting deliberations as well as provide the public with an understanding of Council functions; and

WHEREAS, periodic alterations to the Council's procedures are appropriate to improve the Council's operations and its interactions with the general public; NOW, THEREFORE,

**BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE THAT:**

Section 1. Rule III in Attachment 1 of Resolution 32029 is amended as follows:

**III. CITY COUNCIL BUSINESS**

\* \* \*

**B. Order of Business.**

1. The President shall announce the business of the City Council at its regular meetings, which shall ordinarily be disposed of in the following order:

- a. Call to Order
- b. Roll Call
- c. Presentations

d. ~~((Approval of the Journal))~~ Public Comment

e. Approval of the Introduction and Referral Calendar

f. Approval of Consent Calendar

g. Approval of the Agenda

~~((g. Public Comment~~

~~h. Payment of Bills, Claims, and Salaries~~

i.) h. Committee Reports (discussion and vote on Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and

Appointments)

i. Items removed from Consent Calendar

j. Adoption of Other Resolutions

k. Other Business

l. Adjournment

2. Upon the passage of each Bill, the President shall announce that the President is signing the Bill, and if so requested by any CM, that Bill shall be read at length so as to ensure its correctness before it shall become enrolled.

\* \* \*

### **E. Consent Calendar**

At the discretion of the President, the agenda for a particular Council meeting may include a consent calendar to allow the Council to act on administrative items or items for which no debate or inquiries are expected. Included on this consent calendar can be matters such as approval of minutes, payment of bills, and Committee Reports (vote on Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments) with a unanimous vote and no abstentions. Upon request by any CM, an item shall be removed from the consent calendar and placed on the regular agenda for a separate vote, according to Rule III.B. Multiple removed items shall be considered in the same order as they had been presented on the consent calendar.

Section 2. Rule V in Attachment 1 of Resolution 32029 is amended as follows:

**V. CITY COUNCIL VOTING**

**A. Voting Required; Disqualification Process.**

1. Every CM in attendance shall vote on all actions before the City Council, except when CMs must disqualify themselves from voting as required by either the City’s Code of Ethics or the Washington State Appearance of Fairness Doctrine. CMs may also disqualify themselves from voting to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, unless a majority of those present vote that there is no conflict. (See Rule V.D.2 Announcing and Recording Votes.)

2. Abstentions are not allowed on actions, other than Resolutions. ~~((that, in the sole discretion of the Council President, are not materially related to City government.))~~ CMs not having abstained or disqualified themselves pursuant to Rule V.A.1 shall vote “Aye” or “No.”

3. All votes shall be recorded by the City Clerk in the Journal of the Proceedings.

**B. Roll Call Voting.**

A roll call vote shall be taken when voting on final passage of Bills, the consent calendar, and on other business when requested by a CM. A roll call vote is called in alphabetical order of last name, except for the President, whose name is always called last. At each regular Council meeting, the first name on the roll, in a systematic rotation, is moved to the name immediately preceding the President’s name.

\* \* \*

Section 3. The amendments as stated in Sections 1 and 2 of this resolution are incorporated, including updating the table of contents and formatting, into the “General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council,” attached to this resolution as Attachment 1.

Adopted by the City Council the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2022.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:

Attachment 1 - General Rules and Procedures of the City Council (as amended May 2022)





**City of Seattle**

**Legislative Department**

**General Rules and Procedures  
of the  
Seattle City Council**

**(As adopted by Resolution 32029, and amended by  
Resolution 32051, May 17, 2022)**

**GENERAL RULES AND PROCEDURES  
OF THE SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL**

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## GENERAL RULES AND PROCEDURES OF THE SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

### I. COUNCIL COMPOSITION, POWERS, AND DUTIES

#### A. Council – General Authority; Annual Report; Legislation Retirement.

1. The City Council shall establish rules for its proceedings.\*
2. As the Legislative branch of City government, the City Council shall establish policy for the City.
3. The City Council has the authority to create and use committees of its members to facilitate its legislative functions; provided that no committee of the Council and no individual member of the Council shall have or exercise executive or administrative power, except as provided in the Charter.†
4. The Council has authority to punish its members and others for disorderly or otherwise contemptuous behavior in its presence, and to expel for such behavior in its presence any members by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of its members, specifying in the order of expulsion the cause thereof.‡
5. The Council shall produce an Annual Legislative Report, as designated by the President. The report shall identify accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year and objectives of the Council for the coming calendar year, in a report format determined by the President.
6. Council Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments in committee or before the City Council for at least one year prior to March 1st of each year shall be considered for retirement.
7. Throughout these Rules, “City Council” is used when referring only to the body that meets at regular meetings as described in Rule II.A and actions taken by that body, regardless of meeting type. “Council” is used when referring to the City Council or any subdivision of it, as the context requires.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

‡ Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

**B. Members – Abbreviated as CMs; General Duties; Protest of Actions.**

1. Members of the City Council, or Councilmembers, are abbreviated as CMs throughout these Rules.
2. CMs shall
  - a. Uphold the public trust and demonstrate integrity, honesty, and fairness;
  - b. Exercise budget and fiduciary responsibility
  - c. Be responsive to citizens; and
  - d. Disqualify themselves from acting on City business when disqualification is required by the City’s Code of Ethics\*, by common law, or by the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine.  
(See “Council Rules for Quasi-Judicial Proceedings Before the City Council” as adopted by Resolution 31602.)  
(See Rule V.A.1 Voting Required.)
3. Any CM may protest against the action of the City Council upon any question and have the oral objection entered upon the Journal of the Proceedings. If the protesting CM wishes the Journal of the Proceedings to contain a written objection, the objection shall be filed with the Office of the City Clerk within 48 business hours following the action being objected.

**C. President – Appointment; Duties.**

1. Biennially, and also whenever the position of President becomes vacant, the City Council shall elect from its members a President who shall perform the usual functions of a presiding officer.†
2. The President may be removed by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of all CMs.‡
3. The President shall:
  - a. Preside over City Council meetings.
    - i. Call the City Council to order at the hour appointed for City Council meetings, or at the hour to which the City Council shall have adjourned at the preceding session.
    - ii. Proceed with the order of business if a quorum is in attendance.
  - b. Sign all Bills in authentication of their passage in open session§ and sign all Resolutions in authentication of their adoption.

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\* SMC Chapter 4.16.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

‡ Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

§ Charter, Art. IV, § 11.

- c. Promote efficient operation of the Council, including setting the City Council agenda and expediting parliamentary debate, or if there is no objection from any other CM, expediting the passage of routine motions.
  - d. Preserve order and decorum within the Council Chamber when acting as a presiding officer.
  - e. Assign legislation to committees.
  - f. Monitor committee agendas to ensure issues are appropriate to respective committees, and within the scope or work program of said committee, or as otherwise assigned.
  - g. Act as Mayor in the Mayor's absence from the City or incapacitation.\*
    - i. The President may simultaneously serve as President and act as Mayor; however, when the President, acting as Mayor, is confronted on a particular matter with a conflict of duties and responsibilities so fundamental that the public interest requires it, the President shall act as Mayor only.
    - ii. If, under Charter Art. XIX, § 6.B, the President declines to become Mayor upon a Mayoral vacancy, the Council's duty to select one of its members to become Mayor shall be performed within five days of the President's declination.
  - h. Head the Legislative Department<sup>†</sup>, including providing for the orientation of new CMs.
4. The President may speak to points of order, inquiry, or information in preference to other CMs. The President shall, with respect to a question of order: decide the question (which decision is appealable to the City Council by any CM); or submit the question to CMs to decide by a majority of CMs present and voting.  
(See Rule IV.G Point of Order.)
  5. While speaking upon any question before the City Council, the President shall have the right to turn the Chair over to the President Pro Tem.
  6. The President may create select or other non-standing committees as provided in Rule VII.A.
  7. As provided by Rule VI.B, the President shall not serve as the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Finance Committee.

**D. President Pro Tem – Designation; Duties.**

1. Biennially, the City Council shall designate by Resolution a list of Presidents Pro Tem. The list shall start with the most senior CM other than the President and continue in descending order of seniority, with alphabetical order of last name used to break ties, and the position shall rotate monthly. In the case of a City Council vacancy

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\* Charter, Art. V, § 9.

† Charter, Art. III, § 3.



- and subsequent appointment, the appointee shall fill the position of the departed CM in the rotation.
2. In the absence of the President Pro Tem, the CM designated for the next month shall act as President Pro Tem.
  3. The President Pro Tem shall:<sup>\*</sup>
    - a. Act as President in the case of incapacitation or absence of the President.
    - b. Act as President when the President, acting as Mayor, is confronted with a conflict of duties and responsibilities so fundamental that the public interest requires it.  
(See Rule I.C.3.h President.)

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<sup>\*</sup> Charter, Art. V, § 9.

## II. CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS

### A. Regular Meetings – Time; Location; Quorum; Preliminary Agenda.\*

1. The City Council shall meet each Tuesday except as listed below. Regular meetings shall convene at 2 p.m., and the City Clerk shall enter the time of adjournment in the Journal of the Proceedings.
  - a. If a Tuesday is a legal holiday, then the regular meeting shall be held on the next day that is not a legal holiday.
  - b. Regular meetings are not held on the Tuesdays following the last two Mondays in the months of August and December.
  - c. Any regular meeting may be canceled by the President or a majority vote of CMs.
2. Regular meetings are held at Seattle City Hall in the Council Chamber. The City Council may meet at another location in the event of an emergency or disaster.†
3. A quorum consists of a majority of all nine CMs except as listed below.‡
  - a. During a declared emergency under Article V, § 2 of the Charter, a quorum shall for all purposes consist of a majority of all CMs who are available to participate in City Council meetings and are capable of performing the duties of the office; and in such a declared emergency for all purposes, the City Council shall consist of a majority of such CMs available to participate in regular City Council meetings.
  - b. Except when Rule II.A.3.a applies, in order to select a person to fill a vacancy on the City Council, a quorum shall consist of a majority of those CMs currently holding office.
4. Less than a quorum of CMs may adjourn from day to day, or until the next regular meeting, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such a manner and under such penalties as the City Council prescribes.§(See Rule II.D.3 Attendance.
5. Preliminary agendas of upcoming regular meetings shall list items on which action is expected to be taken and shall be made available to the public. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
6. The Council prefers to conduct its business in person when practicable. Recognizing that CMs may not be able to attend every meeting in person due to unavoidable and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances, any CM may at their sole discretion participate and vote by any electronic means (e.g., multi-party telephone or video conferencing) utilized by the Council for such purpose provided that the Office of the

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 6.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 6.

‡ Charter, Art. IV, § 3.

§ Charter, Art. IV, § 3.

City Clerk is able to accommodate such participation. A CM shall endeavor to provide the Council President with notice of their intent to participate and vote electronically at least 48 hours whenever possible.

**B. Special Meetings – Calling; Notice; Limitations; Location.**

A special meeting is a meeting held at a time, date, or location that differs from a regular meeting.

1. The Mayor, the President of the City Council, or any three CMs may call a special meeting.\*
2. Notices of special meetings shall be in accordance with RCW 42.30.080.
  - a. The only items of business for which final action may be taken at a special meeting are those items listed on the written notice.
  - b. Special meetings are held in the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall unless: a specific alternate location is established by the party calling the meeting, whether the Mayor, the President, or three CMs; and notice as required under RCW 42.30.080 is given.
3. The Council prefers to conduct its business in person when practicable. Recognizing that CMs may not be able to attend every meeting in person due to unavoidable and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances, any CM may at their sole discretion participate and vote by any electronic means (e.g., multi-party telephone or video conferencing) utilized by the Council for such purpose provided that the Office of the City Clerk is able to accommodate such participation. A CM shall endeavor to provide the Council President with notice of their intent to participate and vote electronically at least 48 hours whenever possible.

**C. Emergency Meetings – Calling; CMs’ Electronic Attendance.**

1. Emergency City Council meetings may be called by the Mayor, President, or any two CMs, consistent with the provisions of chapter 42.30 RCW and RCW 42.14.075.†
2. Meeting time, location, and notice requirements do not apply to emergency meetings called for emergency matters as permitted by RCW 42.30.070, RCW 42.30.080, and RCW 42.14.075.
3. Emergency meetings are open to the public unless exempt under chapter 42.30 RCW.
4. If a natural disaster, fire, flood, earthquake, enemy attack, imminent enemy attack, or other catastrophic emergency that renders a CM’s physical attendance at a meeting impracticable, or if approved by a majority of CMs present and voting at an emergency meeting, the CM may participate and vote by any electronic means (e.g.,

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 6.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 6.

multi-party telephone or video conferencing) utilized by the Council for such purpose.

5. The Council prefers to conduct its business in person when practicable. Recognizing that CMs may not be able to attend every meeting in person due to unavoidable and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances, any CM may at their sole discretion participate and vote by any electronic means (e.g., multi-party telephone or video conferencing) utilized by the Council for such purpose provided that the Office of the City Clerk is able to accommodate such participation. A CM shall endeavor to provide the Council President with notice of their intent to participate and vote electronically at least 48 hours whenever possible.

**D. Attendance – Requirements; Excuses.**

1. CMs shall attend all regular City Council meetings, unless excused by the City Council.
2. A CM may obtain a leave of absence or be excused from a particular meeting by vote of the City Council before or during the meeting to which the leave of absence or excuse would apply.
3. Three CMs, including the President or President Pro Tem acting in the capacity of the President, or four CMs otherwise, may compel the attendance of absent unexcused CMs at the City Council meeting, and may adjourn from day to day if necessary until a quorum can be convened.\*
4. A CM shall be granted a leave of absence by submitting written notice to the President as soon as practical of a personal situation that would entitle a City employee to family and medical leave, paid parental leave, or paid family care leave under Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) Sections 4.26.010, 4.27.020, or 4.29.020. The notice shall give a reasonable estimate of dates to which the leave of absence shall apply.
5. No more than four CMs may be excused from any one City Council meeting, except during November budget deliberations, when no more than two CMs may be excused from any one City Council meeting.
6. If the maximum number of CMs has been excused for any one particular meeting, the last CM so excused shall be considered on-call. An on-call CM may make arrangements with any other excused CM to switch on-call status. Any such switch must be communicated with the President and the City Clerk.
7. The City Clerk shall record the attendance and requests for excused absence(s) from City Council meetings in the Journal of the Proceedings.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 3.

### III. CITY COUNCIL BUSINESS

#### A. Legislation – Introduction; Referral; Requirements.

1. Introduction of Legislation.
  - a. All submitted legislation shall be reviewed by the City Clerk before it is sent to the Council President.
  - b. All Council Bills and Resolutions shall include a Summary and Fiscal Note.
  - c. The President shall assign the appropriate committee or City Council to receive the legislation and determines when to send the legislation to the committee chair. If a primary sponsor of legislation requests that the Council President place legislation onto the Council’s Introduction and Referral Calendar without the support of the Chair of the committee with subject matter jurisdiction for doing so, then the Council President will confer with the Chair of the standing or select committee with subject matter jurisdiction prior to placing the legislation on the Introduction and Referral Calendar regardless of whether the legislation in question is routine or time sensitive.
  - d. The committee chair determines whether and when to place the legislation onto the Council’s Introduction and Referral Calendar. Any CM may be the primary sponsor of legislation, but the Council President may choose to include selected legislation on the Council’s Introduction and Referral Calendar as “Executive Requested” or “[Department] Requested Legislation” (i.e., naming the department who generated the legislation) rather than including a CM as sponsor. Prior to introduction by the Council, additional sponsors of the legislation may be added with consent of the primary sponsor, except that sponsors added outside an open session shall not cause the total number of sponsors to meet or exceed a quorum of its assigned committee (or City Council if there is no assigned committee).
  - e. When adoption of the Introduction and Referral Calendar is being considered during each City Council meeting, it may be modified by a majority vote of CMs present and voting. Modifications include amendment to titles, committee referral, sponsorship, and removing or adding legislation.
  - f. After the Introduction and Referral Calendar is adopted, legislation is in the control of the referred committee or City Council.
  - g. Before final passage by the Council, additional sponsors of the legislation may be added in open session with consent of the primary sponsor.
2. Relieving a Committee of Legislation.
 

The City Council may relieve a committee of legislation in one of two ways:

  - a. With consent from the current committee chair, the proposed committee chair, and the President, legislation may be re-referred to the proposed committee on the Introduction and Referral Calendar; or

- b. A motion to relieve the committee may be considered at the City Council meeting during consideration of the adoption of the Introduction and Referral Calendar and requires a majority vote of CMs present and voting.
3. A Resolution shall not be adopted at the same meeting at which it is introduced except by passage of at least two-thirds vote of CMs present and voting, except that resolutions pursuant to SMC Chapter 10.02 to terminate civil emergencies require at least two-thirds vote of all CMs.
4. Resolutions not on the City Council Introduction and Referral Calendar or City Council agenda shall not be added for introduction and adoption at the same City Council meeting unless previously reviewed by the Law Department and circulated via email to all CMs, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk by 5:00 p.m. on the preceding business day.
5. Council Bills not on the City Council Introduction and Referral Calendar shall not be added to the Introduction and Referral Calendar for introduction at the same City Council meeting such action is requested unless previously reviewed by the Law Department and circulated via email to all CMs, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk by 5:00 p.m. on the preceding business day.
6. A Bill shall not be introduced and passed at the same meeting, except for the weekly Bill for payment of bills, salaries, and claims.\*
7. No Bill shall become an Ordinance unless on its final passage at least a majority of all nine CMs vote in its favor.† In some cases, passage requires more than a majority vote.
8. Amendments to Bills and Resolutions shall not be presented at a City Council meeting unless previously reviewed by the Law Department and circulated via email to all CMs, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk at least two hours before the meeting. In cases, including but not limited to, amendments to development regulations subject to the Growth Management Act, a statute may require additional public notice and opportunity for public comment before an amended Bill may be passed.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 8.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 8.

**B. Order of Business.**

1. The President shall announce the business of the City Council at its regular meetings, which shall ordinarily be disposed of in the following order:
  - a. Call to Order
  - b. Roll Call
  - c. Presentations
  - d. Public Comment
  - e. Approval of the Introduction and Referral Calendar
  - f. Approval of Consent Calendar
  - g. Approval of the Agenda
  - h. Committee Reports (discussion and vote on Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments)
  - i. Items removed from Consent Calendar
  - j. Adoption of Other Resolutions
  - k. Other Business
  - l. Adjournment
2. Upon the passage of each Bill, the President shall announce that the President is signing the Bill, and if so requested by any CM, that Bill shall be read at length so as to ensure its correctness before it shall become enrolled.\*

**C. Reconsideration of Vetoed Bills.†**

1. The City Council shall reconsider and vote again on the passage of any Bill that is vetoed by the Mayor, in accordance with the Charter.
2. Reconsideration shall occur not less than five days after the Mayor's written objection of the Bill is published, and not more than 30 days after the return of the Bill by the Mayor.
3. Passage of a Bill during reconsideration shall be by two-thirds vote of all the CMs.
4. Any Bill presented to the City Council for reconsideration that does not pass during the first vote of reconsideration shall be deemed finally lost.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 11.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 12.



**D. Journal of the Proceedings.**

1. The City Clerk shall record into the Journal of the Proceedings of the Seattle City Council the proceedings of the City Council at its regular and special meetings, and recommendations to the City Council by committees.
2. The Journal of the Proceedings shall be presented to the City Council for approval at a regular City Council meeting.
3. The Journal of the Proceedings is a public document.

**E. Consent Calendar**

At the discretion of the President, the agenda for a particular Council meeting may include a consent calendar to allow the Council to act on administrative items or items for which no debate or inquiries are expected. Included on this consent calendar can be matters such as approval of minutes, payment of bills, and Committee Reports (vote on Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments) with a unanimous vote and no abstentions. Upon request by any CM, an item shall be removed from the consent calendar and placed on the regular agenda for a separate vote, according to Rule III.B. Multiple removed items shall be considered in the same order as they had been presented on the consent calendar.

## IV. PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES

If these General Rules and Procedures are silent on a matter of parliamentary procedure, the 12th Edition of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised shall govern the Council in all cases to which it is applicable.

### A. Rules of Debate.

When any CM wishes to speak, the CM shall address the Chair.

1. When recognized, the CM shall, in a courteous manner, confine comments to the question under debate.
2. The CM who sponsors a Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, Appointment, or motion has the privilege of speaking first and last upon it.
3. No CM shall impugn the motives of any other CM, or speak more than twice except for explanation during the consideration of any one question.
4. No CM, having obtained the floor while a debatable motion is immediately pending at a meeting of the Council, shall speak for longer than ten minutes unless all CMs present agree by unanimous consent to extend the limits of debate or two-thirds of CMs present and voting pass a motion to extend the limits of debate.

### B. Consideration of Motions.

1. No motion shall be entertained or debated until duly seconded and announced by the Chair.
2. The motion shall be recorded and, if requested by any CM, it shall be read by the City Clerk before it is debated.
3. Until the Chair states the question, the maker of the motion has the right to modify or withdraw it. If the motion is modified by the maker before the Chair states the question, the CM who seconded the motion may withdraw the second.
4. Motions shall be entertained in the order of precedence outlined in the 12th Edition of Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised.

MOTION TO:	Debatable?	Amendable?	Vote?	May be reconsidered?
Adjourn	No	No	Maj	No
Recess	No	Yes	Maj	No
Reconsideration (Rule V.G)	Yes	No	Maj	No
Lay on the Table (Rule IV.J)	No	No	Maj	Yes
Take from the Table (Rule IV.K)	No	No	Maj	No
Call the Question (Rule IV.H)	No	No	2/3	Yes
Postpone to a Certain Time (Rule IV.I)	Yes	Yes	Maj	Yes
Commit or Refer to a Committee	Yes	Yes	Maj	Yes
Amend or Substitute	Yes	Yes	Maj	Yes
Postpone Indefinitely (Rule IV.L)	Yes	No	Maj	Affirmative vote may be reconsidered
All motions must be seconded to be entertained or debated. See Rule IV.B.1.				

### C. Amendment Form.

1. CMs may offer for consideration amendments to proposed legislation to the body considering that legislation, whether at a City Council, select, or standing committee meeting. An amendment is a pending motion until it is voted on. Amendments to legislation must be written in accordance with City Clerk amendment standards. Motions to amend legislation must be seconded, are debatable, and require a majority vote of CMs present and voting to be adopted. Proposed amendments should take the form of either:
  - a. To insert, or to add language;
  - b. To delete language;
  - c. A combination of a and b having the following forms:

- i. To delete and insert (which applies to words);
  - ii. To substitute; that is, to delete a paragraph or the parts or the entire text of a legislation or main motion, and insert another in its place.
2. Added language shall be underlined and deleted language shall be shown with strikethrough format.
3. To promote efficiency, the Chair may accept consideration of an oral amendment that can be clearly stated in a suitable form. The Chair may also request the oral amendment be reread or presented in writing before the question is stated.

#### **D. Parliamentary Inquiry.**

A CM may direct a Parliamentary Inquiry to the presiding officer to obtain information on a matter of parliamentary law or the rules of the organization bearing on the business at hand. Inquiries may relate to e.g., making an appropriate motion, raising a proper point of order, or clarifying the parliamentary situation or the effect of a motion.

#### **E. Recognition by the Chair.**

If two or more CMs seek recognition at the same time, the Chair shall decide the one who shall speak first.

#### **F. Division of a Question.**

Any CM may call for a division of a question, which shall be divided if it embraces subjects so distinct that, if one is taken away, a substantive proposition shall remain for the decision of the Council.

#### **G. Point of Order.**

1. The Chair has the right to decide all points of order, in which case Rules IV.G.2 through IV.G.5. apply. The Chair may instead submit the question on a point of order to CMs to decide by a majority vote of the CMs present and voting.
2. If dissatisfied with the decision of the Chair, any CM may appeal the decision.
3. In all cases of appeal, the question shall be: “Shall the decision of the Chair be sustained?”
4. No CM may speak more than once on an appeal without the consent of a majority of CMs in attendance.
5. The decision in response to the appeal shall be by a majority vote of the CMs in attendance. In case of a tie vote, the decision of the Chair shall stand.

**H. Call the Question.**

A CM may make a motion to Call the Question (also known as Previous Question) to end debate on an immediate pending motion. This motion requires a two-thirds vote in favor and may be considered at committee meetings.

**I. Postpone to a Certain Time.**

To postpone a question to a certain time, the motion shall state a definite date, meeting, or hour, or until after a certain event.

**J. Lay on the Table.**

A majority of CMs present and voting may decide to temporarily halt consideration of a question immediately and without debate during a meeting. The maker of a motion to Lay on the Table must state the reason for the motion. A motion that has been laid on the table may, in either the current or subsequent meeting, be brought back by a motion to Take from the Table.

**K. Take from the Table.**

Once a question has been laid on the table, it may be taken from the table by a majority vote of CMs present and voting, as soon as the interrupting business has been disposed of or whenever no other question is pending. A motion that has been laid on the table may, in either the current or subsequent meeting, be brought back by a motion to Take from the Table.

**L. Postpone Indefinitely.**

A majority of CMs present and voting may decide not to take a direct vote or position on a main question by disposing of it with a motion to Postpone Indefinitely. The question shall not be brought back again for at least 60 days.

## V. CITY COUNCIL VOTING

### A. Voting Required; Disqualification Process.

1. Every CM in attendance shall vote on all actions before the City Council, except when CMs must disqualify themselves from voting as required by either the City's Code of Ethics\* or the Washington State Appearance of Fairness Doctrine. CMs may also disqualify themselves from voting to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, unless a majority of those present vote that there is no conflict. (See Rule V.D.2 Announcing and Recording Votes.)
2. Abstentions are not allowed on actions, other than Resolutions. CMs not having abstained or disqualified themselves pursuant to Rule V.A.1 shall vote "Aye" or "No."
3. All votes shall be recorded by the City Clerk in the Journal of the Proceedings.†

### B. Roll Call Voting.

A roll call vote shall be taken when voting on final passage of Bills, the consent calendar, and on other business when requested by a CM. A roll call vote is called in alphabetical order of last name, except for the President, whose name is always called last. At each regular Council meeting, the first name on the roll, in a systematic rotation, is moved to the name immediately preceding the President's name.

### C. Voice Vote.

A voice vote may be taken on any matter of business before the City Council, unless a roll call vote has been requested as provided in Rule V.B.

### D. Announcing and Recording Votes.

1. After a roll call vote, the City Clerk shall announce the "ayes" and "nos" in addition to "abstentions" and "disqualifications" for all votes and enter them into the Journal of the Proceedings. The announcement of the result of any vote shall not be postponed.
2. When a CM is in attendance and has been disqualified from voting under Rule I.B.2.d, the City Clerk shall record and announce "in attendance, but disqualified from voting." (See Rule V.A.1 Voting Required.)

### E. Proxy Votes.

There are no proxy votes.

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\* SMC Chapter 4.16.

† Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

**F. Tie Vote.**

In the event of a tie vote, a motion does not pass.

**G. Motion to Reconsider.**

1. After the final vote on any motion, Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment, and before the adjournment of that City Council meeting, any CM who voted with the prevailing side may move for reconsideration of the original motion. Seconds to motions for reconsideration may be from either side.
  - a. If the result of the final vote is to pass any motion, Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment, any reconsideration vote must take place before adjournment of that meeting, or else there shall be no reconsideration vote.
  - b. If a Bill is moved for final passage and fails to pass, and a motion to reconsider is made, the motion to reconsider shall not be voted on before the next meeting of the City Council.\*
2. A motion to reconsider takes precedence over every other motion, except a motion to adjourn.
3. Motions to reconsider a vote upon amendments to any pending question shall be made and decided immediately.
4. A motion to amend that does not pass in a committee meeting shall not be reconsidered, but the motion to amend may be offered to the City Council.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 10.



## VI. STANDING COMMITTEES\*

### A. Formation.

1. Standing committees are formed after the biennial election of a President.
2. Formation of standing committees, i.e., the identification of committees' scopes of work, regular meeting schedules, and Chair and membership assignments, shall be adopted by Resolution.

### B. Membership.

1. A standing committee consists of at least four members and, if the committee has fewer members than the Council has CMs, may include an alternate. A committee has a Chair and may have a Vice-Chair.
2. If the vacancy of a City Council position requires the appointment and/or election of a replacement CM, the replacement CM shall assume the replaced CM's committee duties and responsibilities, unless stated otherwise by Resolution.
3. Only CMs who are designated members of the standing committee (or the alternate if serving as a member) may sponsor amendments before the committee, or vote at its meetings. Voting rights of members include the power to make, second, amend, or vote on all motions, including proposed amendments.
  - a. If invited by the Chair or Vice-Chair, a CM other than the designated members (or the alternate if serving as a member) may participate as a non-committee member without voting rights in a standing committee meeting.
  - b. Participation of non-committee members is limited to taking part in debate, upon recognition by the Chair, and the authorship of amendments, to be submitted in accordance with Rule IV.C.1.
4. The quorum requirement for standing committee meetings is three CMs unless a greater number is stated by Resolution.
5. The President shall not serve as the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Finance Committee.

### C. Meetings.

1. Meetings are held in the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall unless a specific alternate location is established by the Chair with the concurrence of a majority of the regular members of the committee, and appropriate public notice and access are provided.

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 4.

2. The Council sets regular meeting dates and times by Resolution. The committee Chair may cancel a meeting at any time.
3. A regularly scheduled meeting will be moved to the following Friday if:
  - a. The regular schedule places that meeting on a legal holiday; or
  - b. A legal holiday moves a City Council meeting to a day on which that meeting is regularly scheduled.
4. Regular meetings are not held in weeks when the Council does not hold a regular City Council or Council Briefing meeting under Rule II.A.1.b or IX.B.2.
5. Meetings shall be noticed both as committee meetings and as City Council meetings, with the agenda limited to committee business and only rules and procedures applicable to committees in effect.
6. Preliminary agendas for upcoming regular meetings shall list items for which discussion, amendments, and/or recommendation is expected. Items where only amendments will be considered shall be listed as possible amendments, and items where amendments and/or a final recommendation is expected shall be listed as possible vote for proper notification, except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule.
7. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
8. All reasonable effort shall be made to make materials that are to be presented in a regular meeting available online at least 24 hours in advance of the meeting.
9. In accordance with 42.30.035 RCW, meeting minutes shall be promptly produced after each meeting and made available for public review.

**D. Special Meetings.**

A special meeting is a meeting held at a time, date, or location that differs from a regular meeting.

1. Special meetings may be scheduled by the committee Chair.
2. Notices of special meetings shall be in accordance with RCW 42.30.080. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
3. The only items of business for which final action may be taken at a special meeting are those items listed on the written notice.

**E. Attendance – Requirements; Excused Absences.**

1. It is the duty of each member of a committee to attend its meetings.
2. Committee Member Notification Duties.
  - a. For a committee with an alternate, if, at least three business days before a committee meeting, a committee member can notify the Chair and alternate of an expected absence from the entire meeting, the committee member shall do so, after which the alternate shall inform the Chair of the alternate's availability. Otherwise, the committee member shall notify the Chair, the Chair shall contact the alternate, and the alternate shall inform the Chair of the alternate's availability, all as soon as practical. Once these conditions are met, the alternate assumes the rights of the absent committee member for the actual duration of the absence.
  - b. For a committee without an alternate, if, at least three business days before a committee meeting, a committee member can notify the Chair of an expected absence from the entire meeting, the committee member shall do so. Otherwise, the committee member shall notify the Chair as soon as practical.
3. A committee member may be excused with the consent of the Chair.

**F. Duties of the Chair.**

The committee Chair shall:

1. Provide at each meeting a public comment period pursuant to Rule XI.C.3.a.
2. Act as presiding officer and call the meetings to order at the appointed times.
3. State the amount of time allowed for speakers and announce instructions to the speakers at the start of each meeting. The Chair may allow additional time for the submission of written comment from the public.
4. Announce CMs in attendance at the call to order and as they join the meeting.
5. Recognize CMs and, in accordance with these General Rules and Procedures, others who wish to speak.
6. Set the committee's agenda consistent with the committee's assigned scope of work and the City Council Work Program, and publish such agenda in accordance with Rule VI.C.6, VI.C.7, and VI.C.8.
7. Run meetings expeditiously.
8. Preserve order and decorum.

**G. Duties and Responsibilities of Members.**

Committee members shall acquaint themselves with the interests of the City specifically represented by that committee, and shall make recommendations to the City Council on Council Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments, and such other reports as in their judgment(s) shall advance the interests and promote the welfare of the people of the City.

**H. Voting, Referral, and Reporting.**

1. Only members of a standing committee (or the alternate if serving as a member) may vote, or abstain from voting, on issues before the committee.
2. Committee action on any Council Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment shall be limited to recommendations for the City Council to consider when voting on final action for that item.
3. Committees shall not vote on a final recommendation on any Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment on the same day that a public hearing was held on that item, except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule.
4. Starting at noon on the Thursday immediately preceding a regular City Council meeting, committees shall not refer legislation to that meeting for final action except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule and the concurrence of the President.
5. Committee Reports.  
Committees shall report their final recommendations on legislation to the City Council. Reports shall include the committee recommendation, the names of CMs in attendance and the decision of each CM on the final recommendation whether voting in favor, voting opposed, or abstaining from voting. Reports of standing committees shall be entered in the Journal of the Proceedings
  - a. If a committee recommendation is not unanimous:
    - i. Unless otherwise authorized by the President and the committee Chair, the committee report shall be reported to the second regular City Council meeting after the date of the recommendation; and
    - ii. Immediately after the meeting at which the recommendation is voted on, the Clerk of the committee shall provide the committee report on such legislation to all CMs.
  - b. A CM abstaining from voting does not make the vote non-unanimous.
6. Divided Votes.  
A report may accompany any non-unanimous committee recommendation, including an indication of how each CM voted and a statement describing the rationale for each voting CM's position.

- a. Such reports shall only be presented to the City Council if a CM who voted against the committee recommendation submits a request to the President, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk at least four calendar days before presentation of the recommendation to the City Council. If a report is made, it shall be distributed to all CMs by noon the day presentation of the recommendation is scheduled to be made to the City Council.
- b. When the City Council receives such report, the first position considered shall be the majority position (or the Chair's position if there is no majority).

**I. Finance Committee.**

The City Council shall have a Finance Committee of not less than three members.\*

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 5.

## VII. SELECT COMMITTEES

### A. Formation.

The President may create, amend, or abolish select committees and shall appoint the Chair and membership to select or other non-standing committees as required, or as deemed necessary to efficiently conduct the business of the Council. When creating the committee, the President shall specify at least three CMs as a quorum. Any committee created under this Rule may be of limited duration or focus.

### B. Meetings.

1. Meetings are held in the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall unless a specific alternate location is established by the Chair with the concurrence of a majority of the regular members of the committee, and appropriate public notice and access are provided.
2. Regular meeting dates, times, and locations may be determined in advance and filed in a Clerk File by the President upon creation of the select committee. The committee Chair may cancel a meeting at any time.
3. Meetings shall be noticed both as committee meetings and as City Council meetings, with the agenda limited to committee business and only rules and procedures applicable to committees in effect.
4. Preliminary agendas for upcoming regular meetings shall list items for which discussion, amendments, and/or recommendation is expected. Items where only amendments will be considered shall be listed as possible amendments, and items where amendments and/or a final recommendation is expected shall be listed as possible vote for public notification, except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule.
5. All reasonable effort shall be made to provide the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting, with the exception of the Budget Committee, which shall publish agendas pursuant to Rule VII.H.5.
6. All reasonable effort shall be made to make materials that are to be presented in the meeting available online at least 24 hours in advance of the meeting, with the exception of the Budget Committee, which shall publish agendas pursuant to Rule VII.H.5.
7. In accordance with 42.30.035 RCW, meeting minutes shall be promptly produced after each meeting and made available for public review.

**C. Special Meetings.**

A special meeting is a meeting held at a time, date, or location that differs from a regular meeting.

1. Special meetings may be scheduled by the committee Chair.
2. Notices of special meetings shall be in accordance with RCW 42.30.080. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
3. The only items of business for which final action may be taken at a special meeting are those items listed on the written notice.

**D. Attendance – Requirements; Excused Absences.**

1. Each committee member shall attend its meetings.
2. Committee Member Notification Duties.
  - a. For a committee with an alternate, if, at least three business days before a committee meeting, a committee member can notify the Chair and alternate of an expected absence from the entire meeting, the committee member shall do so, after which the alternate shall inform the Chair of the alternate's availability. Otherwise, the committee member shall notify the Chair, the Chair shall contact the alternate, and the alternate shall inform the Chair of the alternate's availability, all as soon as practical. Once these conditions are met, the alternate assumes the rights of the absent committee member for the actual duration of the absence.
  - b. For a committee without an alternate, if, at least three business days before a committee meeting, a committee member can notify the Chair of an expected absence from the entire meeting, the committee member shall do so. Otherwise, the committee member shall notify the Chair as soon as practical.
3. A committee member may be excused with the consent of the Chair.

**E. Duties of the Chair.**

The committee Chair shall:

1. Provide at each meeting a public comment period pursuant to Rule XI.C.3.a.
2. Act as presiding officer and call the meetings to order at the appointed times.
3. State the amount of time allowed for speakers and announce instructions to the speakers at the start of each meeting. The Chair may allow additional time for the submission of written comment from the public.



4. Announce CMs in attendance at the call to order and as they join the meeting.
5. Recognize CMs and, in accordance with these General Rules and Procedures, others who wish to speak.
6. Set the committee's agenda consistent with the committee's assigned scope of work and publish such agenda in accordance with Rule VII.B.4, VII.B.5, and VII.B.6.
7. Run meetings expeditiously.
8. Preserve order and decorum.

**F. Duties and Responsibilities of Members.**

Committee members shall acquaint themselves with the interests of the City specifically represented by that committee, and shall make recommendations to the City Council on Council Bills, Resolutions, and Clerk Files, and such other reports as in their judgment(s) shall advance the interests and promote the welfare of the people of the City.

**G. Voting, Referral, and Reporting.**

1. Only members of a select committee meeting may vote, or abstain from voting, on issues before the committee.
2. Committee action on any Council Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment, is limited to recommendations for the City Council to consider when voting on final action for that item.
3. Committees shall not vote on a final recommendation on any Bill, Resolution, Clerk File, or Appointment on the same day that a public hearing was held on that item, except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule.
4. Starting at noon on the Thursday immediately preceding a regular City Council meeting, committees shall not refer legislation to that meeting for final action except upon passage of a motion by the Chair to suspend this Rule and the concurrence of the President.
5. Committee Reports:  
Committees shall report their final recommendations on legislation reported to the City Council. Reports shall include committee recommendation, the names of CMs in attendance and the decision of each CMs on the final recommendation whether voting in favor, voting opposed, or abstaining from voting. Reports of select committees shall be entered in the Journal of the Proceedings.

- a. If a committee recommendation is not unanimous:
    - i. Unless otherwise authorized by the President and the committee Chair, the committee report shall be reported to the second regular City Council meeting after the date of the recommendation; and
    - ii. Immediately after the meeting at which the recommendation is voted on, the Clerk of the committee shall provide the committee report on such legislation to all CMs.
  - b. A CM abstaining from voting does not make the vote non-unanimous.
6. Divided Votes.
- A report may accompany any non-unanimous committee recommendation, including an indication of how each CM voted and a statement describing the rationale for each voting CM's position.
- a. Such reports shall only be presented to the City Council if a CM who voted against the committee recommendation submits a request to the President, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk at least four calendar days before presentation of the recommendation to the City Council. If a report is made, it shall be distributed to all CMs by noon the day presentation of the recommendation is scheduled to be made to the City Council.
  - b. When the City Council receives such report, the first position considered shall be the majority position (or the Chair's position if there is no majority).

#### **H. Budget Committee.**

1. The Budget Committee is a select committee comprised of all CMs, chaired by the Chair of the Finance Committee.
2. The Vice-Chair of the Finance Committee shall serve as Vice-Chair of the Budget Committee.
3. The primary purpose of the Budget Committee is to review the Mayor's proposed budget and proposed capital improvement program (CIP), amend as appropriate, and adopt a budget and CIP. The Budget Committee shall review and take action on other budget issues during the year as may be assigned.
4. From the time the Budget Committee receives the Mayor's proposed budget (typically the end of September) to the time the Council adopts a budget (typically the third week of November), regular standing and select committee meetings shall be suspended. Special standing and select committee meetings may be called:
  - a. If legislative action is required within a set time (e.g., quasi-judicial actions with 90-day deadlines for Council review); or
  - b. Upon the approval of the President and the Chair of the Budget Committee, after consultation with the Central Staff Director.

5. Preliminary agendas of Budget Committee meetings are required to list only general topics for discussion and/or recommendation. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish preliminary agendas online at least two business days before the meeting. Final agendas of Budget Committee meetings shall be issued no later than the morning of the scheduled meeting and shall include all items to be discussed.
6. A budget Amendment is a proposed change to the Mayor's proposed budget and accompanying legislation. Budget Amendments are developed in accordance with these Rules and include: amendments to budget legislation; development of new Council Bills or Resolutions; Council Budget Actions (CBAs); and Statements of Legislative Intent (SLIs).
  - a. Budget Amendments that meet established deadlines on the Budget Committee schedule may be published on the appropriate meeting agenda.
  - b. Budget Amendments that are not included on a final published agenda shall not be presented at a Budget Committee meeting unless circulated via email to all CMs, the Central Staff Director, and the City Clerk by 5:00 p.m. on the preceding business day. This rule may only be suspended by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of CMs present and voting at a Budget Committee meeting.
7. In accordance with 42.30.035 RCW, meeting minutes shall be promptly produced after each meeting and made available for public review.
8. The quorum for the Budget Committee is at least three CMs.
9. Adoption of a Balanced Budget Package:
  - a. The Chair shall prepare a group of budget revisions (Chair's Initial Proposed Balancing Package) that if adopted would amend the Mayor's proposed budget to produce a budget in which expenditures do not exceed revenues.
  - b. Following Committee discussion of the Chair's Initial Balancing Package, the Chair may prepare a Revised Balancing Package, subject to the same requirements under Rule VII.H.9.a. The Chair shall endeavor to inform CMs of any changes made to the Chair's Initial Balancing Package prior to the scheduled vote on the Revised Balancing Package in the Budget Committee.
  - c. If a CM wants to propose one or more amendments or substitute actions to the Proposed Balancing Package, the CM must make an appropriate motion at the Budget Committee, requiring a second and a majority of CMs present and voting.
10. Other rules and procedures for the Budget Committee, and the meeting dates and times for regular meetings, shall be established by the President in consultation with the Budget Committee Chair. Any rules and procedures regarding meeting times, dates, locations, attendance, and quorum supersede provisions in this Rule VII on those topics, except that a quorum may not be fewer than three CMs.

**I. Labor Committee.**

1. The Labor Committee is a select committee comprised of the President, the Chair of the Council Budget Committee, and three CMs selected by the President.
2. The primary purpose of the Labor Committee is to serve on the Labor Relations Policy Committee and perform the functions established by SMC Section 4.04.120.

## VIII. EXTERNAL COMMITTEES

### A. Appointment.

1. CM participation on an external committee (a governing or advisory body on which CMs serve that is not a Council committee) is typically established by Resolution.
2. If the vacancy of a City Council position requires the appointment and/or election of a replacement CM, the replacement CM shall assume the replaced CM's external committee duties and responsibilities unless stated otherwise, whether by Resolution or appropriate action of another body responsible for appointments to the committee.

### B. Attendance.

CMs serving on an external committee shall attend its meetings unless the CM is unavailable.

### C. Notification If Unable to Attend.

If a CM is unable to attend an external committee meeting, the CM's office shall inform the committee alternate(s) as soon as practical. When an alternate is notified of the absence, the alternate shall attend the meeting unless the alternate is also unavailable. If the alternate is unable to attend, the alternate's office shall notify other members or alternates (if there are any).

## IX. COUNCIL BRIEFING MEETINGS

### A. Purpose, Procedure, and Scope.

The Council may, at the discretion of the Council President, hold Council Briefing meetings, chaired by the President, to discuss and receive briefings on issues of general interest. The President shall be Chair of the meetings. A quorum of three CMs is required at any Council Briefing meeting. The Council shall take no vote or other final action at any Council Briefing meeting, other than approving Council Briefing minutes or collectively signing documents.

### B. Location and Frequency.

1. Council Briefing meetings shall be held in the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall, unless a specific alternate location is established by the President and appropriate public notice and access are provided.
2. Regular Council Briefing meetings shall be held at 2:00 p.m. each Monday, provided however that there shall be no regular Council Briefing meetings if Monday is a holiday. Regular meetings shall not be held on the last two Mondays in August nor on the last two Mondays in December. Council Briefing meetings may be canceled by the President at any time.
3. A special meeting is a meeting held at a time, date, or location that differs from a regular meeting. Special meetings may be scheduled by the committee Chair. Notices of special meetings shall be in accordance with RCW 42.30.080.

### C. Preliminary Agendas.

1. Preliminary agendas of upcoming regular Council Briefing meetings shall list items for which discussion is expected and shall be made available to the public. All reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
2. For special Council Briefing meetings, all reasonable effort shall be made to publish the preliminary agenda online at least two business days prior to the meeting.
3. In accordance with 42.30.035 RCW, meeting minutes shall be promptly produced after each meeting and made available for public review.

## **X. EXECUTIVE SESSIONS**

### **A. When Sessions May Be Held.**

Executive sessions may be held during City Council meetings, Council Briefing meetings, standing or select committee meetings, whether regular or special meetings, and at other times as allowed by RCW 42.30.110 and 42.30.140 and SMC 5.24.020 and 5.24.030.

### **B. How Sessions May Be Convened.**

The presiding officer or a majority of those CMs in attendance may decide to convene an executive session during a particular meeting. An executive session may be ended by the presiding officer or by a majority vote of those CMs in attendance.

### **C. Purpose of Session.**

Before convening an executive session, the presiding officer shall announce the purpose of the executive session, and the time when the executive session is expected to conclude.

### **D. Attorney to be Present.**

1. An attorney from the Law Department, or outside counsel if appropriate, shall be present during all executive sessions to advise CMs on compliance with RCW 42.30.
2. The Council may choose to waive the attorney-client privilege regarding legal matters discussed with counsel at an executive session only if all nine CMs are in attendance and unanimously agree to waive the privilege. Legislative Department staff shall not waive the privilege. Executive session is the only forum in which the Council may waive attorney-client privilege for any attorney-client privileged documents presented to the Council in or out of executive session.

### **E. Attendees.**

Attendance at an executive session is limited to:

1. CMs;
2. Assistants to CMs representing their CM in absentia (and this attendance is limited to presence, not participation);
3. The City Clerk or designee;
4. Legal counsel assigned to the matter at issue;
5. The City Council's Central Staff Director and/or designee; and



6. Designated city staff members and others representing the City (e.g., consultants) who are directly involved in the issue and who have been invited by the presiding officer to attend.

**F. Confidentiality.**

Executive session attendees shall not disclose the contents of discussions held within the session.

**G. Issues.**

Issues that may be considered in executive session include, but are not limited to:

1. Consideration of the selection of a site or the acquisition of real estate by lease or purchase when public knowledge regarding such consideration would cause a likelihood of increased price;
2. Consideration of the minimum price at which real estate will be offered for sale or lease when public knowledge regarding such consideration would cause a likelihood of decreased price;
3. Evaluation of complaints against a public officer or employee;
4. Evaluation of qualifications of candidate for appointment to elective office;
5. Evaluation of qualifications of an applicant for public employment or to review the performance of a public employee;
6. Discussion with legal counsel regarding litigation or potential litigation to which the City or a CM acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a party when public knowledge regarding the discussion is likely to result in an adverse legal or financial consequence; and
7. Planning or adopting the strategy or position to be taken during the course of collective bargaining or reviewing the proposals made in labor negotiations while in progress.

## **XI. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS**

### **A. Public Sessions – Open to Public; Location.**

1. All meetings of the Council, and all meetings of standing and select committees (except executive sessions or as otherwise permitted by law), shall be open to the public and shall be conducted in a manner that provides the opportunity for attendees to hear and see the proceedings of those Members physically present and to hear any CMs attending by electronic means.  
(See Rule XI.J Inclusive Access and Participation – Requests for Reasonable Accommodation.)
2. The Council shall not adjourn its regular City Council meetings to any place other than its regular meeting place, which is the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall, except as provided by law.\*  
(See Rule II.A.2 City Council Meetings; and Rule XI.D.3 Disruptions of Council Meetings and Committee Meetings.)
3. Meetings of standing committees shall not convene in or adjourn to any place other than that committee’s regular meeting place, which is the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall, unless a specific alternate location is established by the Chair with the concurrence of a majority of the committee’s regular CMs and appropriate public notice and access are provided.
4. Meetings of select committees may be held in the Council Chamber in Seattle City Hall, or an alternate location as established by the committee Chair so long as appropriate public notice and access are provided.

### **B. Public Hearings – Purpose; Duties of Chair.**

Public Hearings are opportunities for members of the public to speak on a particular proposed Ordinance, Resolution, Clerk File, Appointment, or other legislative action. If a Public Hearing is scheduled for a particular meeting, the agenda for the meeting shall specify the proposed Ordinance, Resolution, Clerk File, other legislative action, or other subject to be discussed at the public hearing.

(See Rule VI.F Duties of the Chair.)

1. Public hearings may be held as part of a scheduled City Council, select, or standing committee meeting, but the public hearing shall be conducted as a separate agenda item.
2. The Chair of the body conducting the public hearing shall:
  - a. Announce at the beginning of the public hearing the rules, guidelines, and time limits for individual speakers; and

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\* Charter, Art. IV, § 6.

- b. Require all speakers to sign in on registers, when provided by Legislative Department staff.
3. Members of the public who wish to speak at public hearings shall comply with Rule XI.D and XI.E.

**C. Public Comment at City Council Meetings and Committee Meetings.**

Public comment periods are opportunities for members of the public to comment on items on the meeting's agenda or, in the case of a committee meeting, on matters within the purview of the committee. The agenda for a particular Council meeting may specify the total time allotted for the public comment period and for time limits for individual comments.

(See Rule XI.B Public Hearings.)

1. The Council shall not accept public comment at special City Council meetings.
2. The Council shall accept public comment at regular City Council meetings.
  - a. Public comment at City Council meetings shall be limited to matters on the Introduction and Referral Calendar, Committee Reports on that day's regular City Council meeting agenda, and other matters directly related to the City Council Work Program; and
  - b. The President shall ensure that all public comment is in accordance with Rule XI.C.2.a.
3. Council committees shall accept public comment at standing and select committee meetings.
  - a. Public comment at a committee meeting shall be limited to matters within the purview of the specific committee or an item listed on that day's agenda.
  - b. The presiding officer at a committee meeting shall ensure that all public comment is in accordance with Rule XI.C.3.a.
4. Total public comment periods shall not exceed 20 minutes unless extended at the discretion of the presiding officer.
5. Individual speakers shall be provided up to two minutes total speaking time. Individuals who wish to speak shall sign up for public comment on registers, when provided by Legislative Department staff.  
(See Rule XI.J Inclusive Access and Participation – Requests for Reasonable Accommodation.)
6. When recognized by the presiding officer, the individual shall address the members in the form prescribed, state the individual's name for the record, and identify the item to which the individual shall speak. At the presiding officer's discretion, this Rule may be waived in the interest of personal safety of the person speaking.

7. Council and committee proceedings are electronically recorded; therefore, speakers wishing to address the Council or committee during the established public comment period shall speak only from the audio source prescribed.
8. If no speakers sign up to address the Council or the committee, or if the public comments conclude before the 20-minute time period has elapsed, the comment period shall be closed, and the Council or committee shall resume its business, with no further opportunity for public comment at that meeting.
9. The Council is not required to allow public comment at Council Briefing meetings.
10. No public comments addressing the merits of a quasi-judicial action shall be permitted at any Council or committee meeting.

**D. Disruptions of City Council Meetings and Committee Meetings.**

1. Disruptions of City Council and committee meetings are prohibited. Disruptions include but are not limited to the following:
  - a. Failure of a speaker to comply with the allotted time established for the individual speaker's public comment;
  - b. Outbursts from members of the public who have not been recognized by the presiding officer for public comment;
  - c. Comments that are not in compliance with Rule XI.C.2.a or XI.C.3.a, or that are unrelated to the particular proposed Ordinance, Resolution, Appointment, Clerk File, or other legislative action on which a public hearing is being held;
  - d. Delaying the orderly conduct or progress of the public comment period, including a failure to respect the process of accommodating individuals who wish to provide public comment;
  - e. Use of an allotted individual comment period for purposeful delay, including remaining silent or engaging in other activity without conveying a discernible message;
  - f. Standing in the center aisle or front row of the audience unless speaking as recognized by the presiding officer, waiting to speak during the public comment period, or gathering meeting materials distributed by Legislative Department staff;
  - g. Holding or placement of a banner or sign in the Council Chamber in a way that endangers others or obstructs the free flow of pedestrians or the view of others attending a Council or Committee meeting;
  - h. Behavior that intentionally disrupts, disturbs, or otherwise impedes attendance or participation at a Council or Committee meeting; or
  - i. Failure to follow the direction of a Presiding Officer or security official related to disruptions described in Rule XI.D.1(a) through (h).

2. Signs may be displayed during Council and committee meetings in a manner consistent with these Rules. Any written communication intended for a CM may be submitted to the City Clerk for distribution to the intended recipient.
3. The presiding officer shall preserve the order and decorum of a Council or committee meeting at all times. If an individual fails to comply with Rule XI.D.1, any CM may issue an oral or written warning to the individual that the individual's behavior is out of order. An oral or written warning may be issued based on an individual's prior conduct at a Council or committee meeting. If the individual continues to engage in activity that violates Rule XI.D.1, any CM may:
  - a. Terminate the individual's comment period;
  - b. Direct security staff of the prescribed forum to assist an individual to the individual's seat; or
  - c. Direct security staff of the prescribed forum to remove the individual from the meeting.
4. Any individual ordered to be removed from a meeting pursuant to Rule XI.D.3.c shall be excluded from returning to that same meeting from which the individual was removed.
5. If an individual fails to comply with the requirements of Rule XI.D.1 over the course of multiple meetings, any CM may exclude the individual from participation in future public comment periods before the Council and/or committee meetings, or exclude the individual from attendance at future Council and/or committee meetings.
  - a. The CM imposing the exclusion shall inform the individual of the specific reason for, and the specific terms of, the exclusion.
  - b. An initial and any subsequent exclusion of an individual from future participation in public comment periods or future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings may be issued for up to 28 calendar days.
  - c. If an individual is subject to an exclusion from future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings for a period of 28 calendar days, and further engages in activity that violates Rule XI.D.1, other than subsection c, within 60 days after the termination of the exclusion period, an additional exclusion from future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings may be issued for up to 90 calendar days.
  - d. If an individual is subject to an exclusion from future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings for a period of 90 or more calendar days, and further engages in activity that violates Rule XI.D.1, other than subsection c, within 60 days after the termination of the exclusion period, an additional exclusion from future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings may be issued for up to 180 calendar days.
  - e. The length of the period of any exclusion may depend upon the seriousness of the disruption, the number of disruptions, and the individual's prior record with conduct at Council or committee meetings.

- f. When issuing an exclusion from future public comment periods, or from future attendance at Council or committee meetings, the CM shall include specific notification that the individual may submit written comments to the City Clerk for distribution to the Council at future public comment periods.

**E. Abusive and Harassing Behavior During City Council Meetings and Committee Meetings.**

1. Engaging in abusive or harassing behavior may subject an individual to immediate removal from a meeting and an exclusion from future attendance at Council and/or committee meetings for a period of up to one year.
2. Abusive and harassing behavior means actions that purposefully or recklessly alarm other individuals and serve no legitimate advocacy purpose. Abusive and harassing behavior includes but is not limited to the following:
  - a. The use of obscene language and gestures;
  - b. Assaults or threatening behavior; or
  - c. Sexual misconduct, such as indecent exposure, offensive touching, or sexual harassment, including threats of such behavior.
3. Engaging in abusive or harassing behavior may subject an individual to criminal sanctions in addition to enforcement of the Council Rules.

**F. Appeals of Meeting Exclusions; Other Authority.**

1. The decision of any CM to impose a sanction or exclusion for disruptive activity may be overruled by a majority vote of those CMs in attendance either at the meeting where the disruption took place or at the next regularly scheduled City Council meeting.
2. Any individual excluded from participation in future public comment periods or from attendance at future Council or committee meetings for a period of more than two calendar days may appeal the exclusion by submitting a written appeal to the City Council within five business days after receiving notice of the exclusion. Upon receipt of a written appeal, the City Council shall consider the appeal at its next regularly scheduled open public meeting. The individual's exclusion from public comment periods or from attendance at Council or committee meetings shall remain in effect during the Council's consideration of the appeal.
3. The enforcement provisions of these rules are in addition to the authority of the Department of Finance and Administrative Services to enforce Rules of Conduct in City Hall pursuant to Rule 05-02, and Rules regarding City Buildings and Premises pursuant to Rule 06-03. Disruptions of a Council or committee meeting, including interference with City officials or City staff's preparation for a meeting, may be addressed under Rule 05-02 or Rule 06-03.

**G. Interruption(s) to City Council Meetings and Committee Meetings.**

1. It is the responsibility of the presiding officer to maintain order and adjourn any meeting as the presiding officer deems necessary.
2. If a meeting is interrupted by any person or by a group or groups of persons so as to render the orderly conduct of the meeting not feasible, and order cannot be restored by the removal of individuals who are interrupting the meeting, the members of the Council or the committee conducting the meeting may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session, or may adjourn the meeting and re-convene at another location selected by a majority vote of CMs present and voting. In such a session, final disposition may be taken only on matters appearing on the agenda. Representatives of the press or other news media, except those participating in the disturbance, shall be allowed to attend any session held pursuant to this Rule XI.G.
3. The Council or the committees may establish procedures for re-admitting an individual or individuals not responsible for disturbing the orderly conduct of the meeting.
4. If a meeting is adjourned due to an interruption, CMs and staff may leave the meeting room until the meeting is reconvened.  
(See RCW 42.30.050 Interruptions – Procedures.)

**H. Public Access to CMs and Offices.**

1. No individual other than the Legislative Department staff may approach the CMs or the Clerks while the Council or a committee is in session, unless permitted to do so by the President or Chair.
2. During committee meetings and Council Briefing meetings, no persons other than Legislative Department staff shall join the prescribed forum, unless specifically invited by the committee Chair to provide information necessary to committee business.
3. Physical access to CM office areas is limited and provided only in accordance with established policies and procedures of the Legislative Department.
4. Individuals desiring to electronically tape (audio, video, etc.) or photograph a CM or CMs within the CM office area(s) may only do so with the permission of the respective CM(s) or their respective staff members, when so delegated.
5. Access by media shall be in accordance with Legislative Department policy.
6. The presiding officer or designee may temporarily suspend or modify this Rule XI.H to protect the safe and responsible functioning of the Council.



**I. Digital Recording of Meetings.**

1. Public meetings of the Council shall be electronically recorded whenever feasible. The presiding officer or designee may temporarily suspend or modify this Rule XI.I.1 to protect the safe and responsible functioning of the Council.
2. Executive sessions and those meetings exempted from chapter 42.30 RCW shall not be recorded.
3. The City Clerk shall maintain custody of recordings made pursuant to Rule XI.I.1.

**J. Inclusive Access and Participation – Requests for Reasonable Accommodation.**

1. Assistive listening devices shall be available in the Council Chamber during all meetings of the Council and its committees, and in other rooms or places where the Council meets and where Council proceedings are broadcast.
2. Upon request, reasonable efforts to provide accommodations shall be made to enable persons with disabilities to attend and participate in all public Council meetings.
3. Upon request, reasonable efforts to provide translation or interpretation services shall be made for individuals attending Council meetings.
4. Because a request for an accommodation, translation, or interpretation services may require sufficient lead time to respond, the request should be made at the earliest possible opportunity to the Office of the City Clerk at 206-684-8888 or TYY Relay 7-1-1.
5. The Office of the City Clerk shall evaluate all requests and provide reasonable accommodations and translation and interpretation services.

**K. Use of the Council Chamber.**

1. Council business shall have priority over other uses of the Council Chamber.
2. Other uses of the Council Chamber shall be in accordance with Legislative Department policy.

## **XII. ALTERATION OF GENERAL RULES AND PROCEDURES**

### **A. Suspension.**

1. A rule or procedure not listed in Rule XII.A.2 may be temporarily suspended:
  - a. If a CM requests suspension and no objection is offered; or
  - b. In open session upon a two-thirds vote.

Any rule or procedure so suspended shall be announced by the presiding officer, after which the Council or committee shall proceed accordingly.

2. The following rules or procedures established by this document shall not be suspended:
  - a. This Rule XII.A;
  - b. Rule XII.B;
  - c. Rule V.G.1.b;
  - d. Rule X.F;
  - e. Those required by the Charter, the Seattle Municipal Code, or state law; and
  - f. Any part of a Rule that establishes a quorum.
3. The City Clerk shall provide a guide for compliance with this Rule XII.A, which guide is attached as Appendix A to these Rules.

### **B. Biennial Review.**

The President and City Clerk shall conduct and coordinate biennial reviews of the General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council.

### **C. Amendment.**

Amendments of these General Rules and Procedures shall be by a majority vote of CMs and, if applicable, pursuant to SMC 3.02.030.

Appendix A

**LIST OF NON-SUSPENDIBLE RULES**

*(These Rules and Procedures are based on Charter, RCW, or SMC provisions and should not be suspended without consulting applicable provisions)*

<b>CITY CHARTER PROVISIONS</b>	<b>RULE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>	<b>CHARTER REF.</b>
CMs establish the rules for their proceedings	I.A.1	5	Art. IV, § 4
Individual CMs shall not have or execute executive or administrative power	I.A.3	5	Art. IV, § 4, Fifth
Council has authority to punish CMs	I.A.4	5	Art. IV, § 4
Council chooses President from among members	I.C.1	6	Art. IV, § 4, First
President performs usual functions of presiding officer	I.C.1	6	Art. IV, § 4, First
Removal of president	I.C.2	6	Art. IV, § 4, First
Council Bills are signed in open session by the President	I.C.3.b	7	Art. IV, § 11
The President acting as Mayor	I.C.3.g	7	Art. V, § 9
The President heads the Legislative Department	I.C.3.h	7	Art. III, § 3
President Pro Tem acts as President	I.D.3	8	Art. V, § 9
Regular City Council meeting dates and times	II.A.1	9	Art. IV, § 6
Quorum for City Council (majority of all members)	II.A.3	9	Art. IV, § 3
Provisions for City Council special meetings	II.B	10	Art. IV, § 6 (also RCW 42.30.080)
CMs must attend all regular City Council meetings unless excused	II.D.1	12	Art. IV, § 3
Attendance at City Council meeting can be compelled	II.D.3	12	Art. IV, § 3
Council Bills cannot be introduced and passed at the same meeting	III.A.6	14	Art. IV, § 8
Council Bills require at least a majority of all CMs' votes to pass	III.A.7	14	Art. IV, § 8
President announces signature of Council Bills when they are passed	III.B.2	15	Art. IV, § 11
Council Bills to be read upon passage if requested by a CM	III.B.2	15	Art. IV, § 11
Council Bills vetoed by the Mayor are voted on again by Council	III.C.1	15	Art. IV, § 12
Reconsideration of vetoed bills must occur within 5 days of veto	III.C.2	15	Art. IV, § 12
2/3 vote is required to pass a reconsidered bill that was vetoed	III.C.3	15	Art. IV, § 12
Vetoed bills may not be reconsidered again if lost on reconsideration vote	III.C.4	15	Art. IV, § 12
A roll call vote may be demanded by a CM	V.B	20	Art. IV, § 4, Third

Att 1 Appx A – List of Non-Suspendible Rules

V1

<b>CITY CHARTER PROVISIONS</b>	<b>RULE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>	<b>CHARTER REF.</b>
When passage of a bill fails in City Council by vote, it may not be reconsidered before the next regular City Council meeting	V.G.1.b	21	Art. IV, § 10
Establishing a Finance Committee	VI.I	26	Art. IV, § 5
Meeting location for City Council regular meetings	XI.A.2	36	Art. IV, § 6

<b>RCW PROVISIONS</b>	<b>RULE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>	<b>RCW REF.</b>
Who can call a special meeting and how it shall be noticed	II.B.1	10	42.30.080 (also Charter Art. IV, § 6)
Notice of Full Council special meetings	II.B.2	10	42.30.080
Calling special emergency meetings; meeting notice requirements	II.C	11	42.30.070; 42.30.080; 42.14.075
When an executive session may be held	X.A	35	42.30.140
How an executive session is conducted	X.A	35	42.30.110
Disrupted meetings may be adjourned and reconvened elsewhere	XI.G.2	42	42.30.050

<b>SMC PROVISIONS</b>	<b>RULE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>	<b>SMC REF.</b>
Appearance of Fairness disqualifications	I.B.2.d	6	4.16
CMs must disqualify themselves from acting on certain City business	V.A.1	20	4.16
Amendment of Rules and Procedures	XII.A	45	3.02.030

**SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE\***

<b>Department:</b>	<b>Dept. Contact/Phone:</b>	<b>CBO Contact/Phone:</b>
LEG	Aly Pennucci / 48148	n/a

\* Note that the Summary and Fiscal Note describes the version of the bill or resolution as introduced; final legislation including amendments may not be fully described.

**1. BILL SUMMARY**

**Legislation Title:** A RESOLUTION revising certain General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; amending Rules III and V in Attachment 1 of Resolution 32029

**Summary and Background of the Legislation:** Resolution 32029 adopted the Seattle City Council "General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council" ("Council Rules") in December 2021 to govern both its internal management and the procedures available to the public, in conformance with the City Charter and the customary practice of legislative bodies. The proposed resolution would amend the Council Rules to:

- (1) add guidance for the use of a consent calendar at regular city council meetings;
- (2) clarify the rule allowing councilmembers to abstain from certain resolutions; and
- (3) update the formatting, numbering, and table of contents.

*Consent Calendar:* In 2022, the Council President began using a consent calendar on city council agendas. This allows for the Council to efficiently move through Council business at regularly scheduled council meetings. As proposed, the changes to Rule III.B and the addition of Rule III.E provides guidance on use of a consent calendar at any particular Council meeting; items on the consent calendar are considered as a group and only require a single vote on all items included. The consent calendar could include administrative items, or items where there is no debate or questions expected from councilmembers. The proposed rule would allow any items proposed for inclusion on the consent calendar to be removed and added to the regular agenda at the request of any councilmember.

*Abstentions:* In December of 2021, the Council amended the Council Rules to allow abstentions on resolutions that, in the sole discretion of the Council President, are not materially related to City government. The proposed resolution with amend this rule to provide more clarity on resolutions that councilmembers can abstain from. Attachment A to this Summary and Fiscal Note includes 245 resolutions considered by the council since 2019 and indicates if, based on the proposed rule, a councilmember could abstain. Based on this review, councilmembers could have abstained from approximately 19 percent of resolutions considered by the Council during that time period.

**2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM**

**Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?**       Yes  No

If yes, please fill out the table below and attach a new (if creating a project) or marked-up (if amending) CIP Page to the Council Bill. Please include the spending plan as part of the attached CIP Page. If no, please delete the table.

**3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

**Does this legislation amend the Adopted Budget?**

Yes  No

If there are no changes to appropriations, revenues, or positions, please delete the table below.

**Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle that are not reflected in the above, including direct or indirect, short-term or long-term costs?**

If so, describe the nature of the impacts. This could include increased operating and maintenance costs, for example.

No

**Are there financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation?**

Estimate the costs to the City of not implementing the legislation, including estimated costs to maintain or expand an existing facility or the cost avoidance due to replacement of an existing facility, potential conflicts with regulatory requirements, or other potential costs or consequences.

No

**3.c. Positions**

**This legislation adds, changes, or deletes positions.**

If this box is checked, please complete this section. If this box is not checked, please proceed to Other Implications.

**Total Regular Positions Created, Modified, or Abrogated through This Legislation, Including FTE Impact:**

Position # for Existing Positions	Position Title & Department*	Fund Name & #	Program & BCL	PT/FT	2022 Positions	2022 FTE	Does it sunset? (If yes, explain below in Position Notes)
<b>TOTAL</b>							

\* List each position separately.

This table should only reflect the actual number of positions created by this legislation. In the event that positions have been, or will be, created as a result of previous or future legislation or budget actions, please provide details in the Notes section below.

**Position Notes:**

**4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS**

**a. Does this legislation affect any departments besides the originating department?**

If so, please list the affected department(s) and the nature of the impact (financial, operational, etc.).

No

**b. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?**

If yes, what public hearings have been held to date, and/or what public hearings are planned/required in the future?

No

**c. Is publication of notice with *The Daily Journal of Commerce* and/or *The Seattle Times* required for this legislation?**

For example, legislation related to sale of surplus property, condemnation, or certain capital projects with private partners may require publication of notice. If you aren't sure, please check with your lawyer. If publication of notice is required, describe any steps taken to comply with that requirement.

No

**d. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?**

If yes, and if a map or other visual representation of the property is not already included as an exhibit or attachment to the legislation itself, then you must include a map and/or other visual representation of the property and its location as an attachment to the fiscal note. Place a note on the map attached to the fiscal note that indicates the map is intended for illustrative or informational purposes only and is not intended to modify anything in the legislation.

No

**e. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative. Does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?**

If yes, please explain how this legislation may impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities. Using the racial equity toolkit is one way to help determine the legislation's impact on certain communities. If any aspect of the legislation involves communication or outreach to the public, please describe the plan for communicating with non-English speakers.

**f. Climate Change Implications**

**1. Emissions: Is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way?**

Please provide a qualitative response, considering net impacts. Are there potential carbon emissions impacts of not implementing the proposed legislation? Discuss any potential intersections of carbon emissions impacts and race and social justice impacts, if not previously described in Section 4.e.

**2. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**

Describe the potential climate resiliency impacts of implementing or not implementing the proposed legislation. Discuss any potential intersections of climate resiliency and race and social justice impacts, if not previously described in Section 4e.

**g. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)?**

This answer should highlight measurable outputs and outcomes.

No

**Summary Attachments:**

- A. Examples of resolutions a councilmember could abstain from per the proposed change to Rule V



Attachment A: Examples of resolutions a councilmember could abstain from per the proposed change to Rule V			
Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2022	Res 32044	A RESOLUTION modifying Resolution 31938 and the March 14, 2020 emergency order relating to residential evictions.	N
2022	Res 32043	A RESOLUTION declaring the intention of the City Council to hold a public hearing relating to changing the assessment rate for the Seattle Tourism Improvement Area.	N
2022	Res 32042	A RESOLUTION calling for a special election to fill a vacancy in the City employee-elected position on the Civil Service Commission and directing the City Clerk to administer the election.	N
2022	Res 32041	A RESOLUTION expressing the Seattle City Council's support for workers at Starbucks in Seattle who are attempting to form a union, and urging Starbucks to accept card check neutrality.	Y
2022	Res 32040	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; affirming the City Light Department's Clean Energy Implementation Plan as required under Washington State's Clean Energy Transformation Act.	N
2022	Res 32039	A RESOLUTION supporting Seattle School District No. 1's Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 and urging Seattle voters to vote "Yes" on Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 on the February 8, 2022, special election ballot.	Y
2022	Res 32038	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle City Councilmember participation, for 2022 and 2023, on King County Committees, Regional Committees, State Committees, and City of Seattle Committees; and superseding Resolution 31927.	N
2022	Res 32037	A RESOLUTION relating to committee structure, membership, meeting times, and duties of the standing committees of the Seattle City Council for 2022 and 2023; and superseding Resolution 31947.	N
2022	Res 32036	A RESOLUTION designating the monthly President Pro Tem of the City Council of The City of Seattle for 2022-2023; superseding Resolution 31924.	N
2021	Res 32035	A RESOLUTION recognizing the efforts of the Crown Hill community to prepare an action plan for their community; and identifying strategies and actions to implement the Crown Hill Urban Village Action Plan.	N
2021	Res 32034	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle Parks and Recreation; authorizing the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to act as the authorized representative/agent on behalf of The City of Seattle and to legally bind The City of Seattle with respect to certain projects for which the City seeks grant funding assistance managed through the State Recreation and Conservation Office (RCO).	N
2021	Res 32033	A RESOLUTION declaring the City Council's and the Mayor's intent to consider strategies to ensure that all unreinforced masonry buildings in Seattle are seismically retrofitted.	N
2021	Res 32032	A RESOLUTION setting forth The City of Seattle's 2022 State Legislative Agenda.	N
2021	Res 32031	A RESOLUTION ratifying the 2021 Update to the Green/Duwamish and Central Puget Sound Watershed or Water Resource Inventory Area (WRIA 9) Salmon Habitat Plan, Making Our Watershed Fit for a King.	N
2021	Res 32030	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; acknowledging and approving the City Light Department's adoption of a biennial energy conservation target for 2022-2023 and ten-year conservation potential.	N
2021	Res 32029	A RESOLUTION adopting General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; superseding Resolution 31920.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2021	Res 32028	A RESOLUTION concerning the health, well-being, and safety of domestic workers; expressing Council's intent to establish a right to portable Paid Time Off (PTO) for domestic workers in Seattle; and requesting the Office of Labor Standards to work with community stakeholders to draft legislation creating a portable PTO policy for domestic workers.	N
2021	Res 32027	A RESOLUTION modifying the Mayoral Civil Emergency Order of October 29, 2021, related to hiring incentives for public safety emergency response.	N
2021	Res 32026	A RESOLUTION requesting King County and the State of Washington to increase services to address behavioral health conditions.	Y
2021	Res 32025	A RESOLUTION modifying the Mayoral Civil Emergency Order of October 29, 2021, related to hiring incentives for public safety emergency response.	N
2021	Res 32024	A RESOLUTION adopting revised financial policies for the Emergency Fund.	N
2021	Res 32023	A RESOLUTION amending Resolution 31334; establishing the City Council's intent to fund the Seattle City Employees' Retirement System (SCERS) as informed by the January 1, 2021. Actuarial Study.	N
2021	Res 32022	A RESOLUTION approving interest rates set by the Seattle City Employees' Retirement System (SCERS) Board of Administration for 2022.	N
2021	Res 32021	A RESOLUTION declaring that the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of anyone engaging in entheogen-related activities should be among The City of Seattle's lowest law enforcement priorities and stating the Council's support for full decriminalization of these activities.	N
2021	Res 32020	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of Grand Street Commons LLC for the vacation of the alley in Block 14, Jos C. Kinnear's Addition to The City of Seattle in the block bounded by 23rd Avenue South, South Grand Street, 22nd Avenue South, and South Holgate Street in the North Rainier/Mt. Baker Hub Urban Village area of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 15.62 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and Clerk File 314459.	N
2021	Res 32019	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of Thomas St between 1st Ave N and 2nd Ave N as "Lenny Wilkens Way."	N
2021	Res 32018	A RESOLUTION supporting the creation of a United States Truth and Healing Commission on Indian Boarding Schools and other actions to address the lasting harm of Indian boarding schools.	Y
2021	Res 32017	A RESOLUTION calling for research, engagement and presentation of information to the Mayor and City Council on the Multifamily Tax Exemption (MFTE) program prior to considering renewal of the program in 2023.	N
2021	Res 32016	A RESOLUTION relating to the University of Washington Husky Stadium Transportation Management Plan; approving a revised framework document that includes performance standards and access management strategies to be included and detailed within in an annual operating plan for certain events at the stadium; and superseding Resolution 27435.	N
2021	Res 32015	A RESOLUTION regarding the impact of Seattle's Urban Renewal program in displacing Black community members from the Central Area; supporting community demands to fund quality affordable social housing to prevent and reverse displacement; and urging the Office of Housing to fund the affordable housing project proposed by New Hope Community Development Institute.	N
2021	Res 32014	A RESOLUTION of intention to establish a 15th Avenue East Business Improvement Area and fix a date and place for a hearing thereon.	N
2021	Res 32013	A RESOLUTION to initiate a 15th Avenue East Business Improvement Area.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2021	Res 32012	A RESOLUTION regarding the voter-proposed City Charter Amendment 29 (Clerk File 321942); authorizing the City Clerk and the Executive Director of the Ethics and Elections Commission to take those actions necessary to enable the proposed amendment to appear on the November 2, 2021 ballot and in the local voters' pamphlet; requesting the King County Elections Director to place the proposed City Charter amendment on the November 2, 2021 ballot; and providing for publication of the amendment.	N
2021	Res 32011	A RESOLUTION approving the 2021-2026 revision to the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan.	N
2021	Res 32010	A RESOLUTION identifying proposed Comprehensive Plan amendments to be considered for possible adoption in 2022 and requesting that the Office of Planning and Community Development and the Seattle Planning Commission review and make recommendations about proposed amendments.	N
2021	Res 32009	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of S Hill Street between 21st and 22nd Avenues S as "Clarence Acox Jr. Way."	N
2021	Res 32008	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of Seattle City Light for the vacation of a portion of Diagonal Way South, west of 4th Avenue South in the Greater Duwamish Manufacturing/Industrial Center of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 15.62 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and Clerk File 314451.	N
2021	Res 32007	A RESOLUTION related to the City Light Department, adopting a 2022-2026 Strategic Plan for the City Light Department and endorsing the associated five-year rate path.	N
2021	Res 32006	A RESOLUTION requesting the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to transfer excess property around the Air Route Surveillance Radar facility at Discovery Park to The City of Seattle for Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) purposes.	N
2021	Res 32005	A RESOLUTION urging the United States Congress to enact legislation creating a roadmap to citizenship and other legislative priorities to support immigrants and refugees.	Y
2021	Res 32004	A RESOLUTION prioritizing people over the profits of pharmaceutical companies; supporting the production of COVID-19 vaccine around the world; urging President Biden to end U.S. opposition to the Waiver from Certain Provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19 at the World Trade Organization (WTO).	Y
2021	Res 32003	A RESOLUTION retiring introduced and referred Council Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments that have received no further action.	N
2021	Res 32002	A RESOLUTION supporting renewal of King County's Best Starts for Kids Levy.	Y
2021	Res 32001	A RESOLUTION supporting the Uptown neighborhood and requesting that City departments and other parties use the correct name for Uptown.	N
2021	Res 32000	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle Public Utilities; adopting a 2021-2026 Strategic Business Plan for Seattle Public Utilities; and endorsing a three-year rate path and a subsequent, three-year rate forecast to support the Strategic Business Plan Update.	N
2021	Res 31999	A RESOLUTION identifying the City Council's priorities to maximize local use of future federal funding to support COVID-19 relief and recovery efforts.	N
2021	Res 31998	A RESOLUTION urging Mayor Durkan and Governor Inslee to extend the City and State emergency moratoriums on evictions through no earlier than the end of 2021.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2021	Res 31997	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for a hearing on the appeal of Rick Bohrer, Hearing Examiner Case Number CWF-0295, and from the final findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751.	N
2021	Res 31996	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for hearings on the appeals of certain appellants, Hearing Examiner Case Numbers CWF-0089, CWF-0176, CWF-0215, CWF-0318, CWF-0375, CWF-0392, CWF-0410, CWF-0411, CWF-0412, CWF-0413, CWF-0414, CWF-0416, CWF-0418, CWF-0420, CWF-0422, CWF-0423, CWF-0425, CWF-0426, CWF-0427, CWF-0429, CWF-0430, CWF-0431, CWF-0432, CWF-0433, CWF-0434, CWF-0435, CWF-0436, CWF-0437, CWF-0438, CWF-0439, CWF-0440, and CWF-0441, and from the final findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751.	N
2021	Res 31995	A RESOLUTION adopting the Statements of Legislative Intent for the 2021 Adopted Budget and 2021-2026 Adopted Capital Improvement Program.	N
2021	Res 31994	A RESOLUTION adopting the Seattle City Council 2021 Work Program.	N
2021	Res 31993	A RESOLUTION endorsing the creation by the State of Washington of the Rainier Valley Creative District.	Y
2021	Res 31992	A RESOLUTION identifying the principles and activities characterizing equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.	N
2021	Res 31991	A RESOLUTION establishing a Watch List of large, complex, discrete capital projects that will require enhanced quarterly monitoring reports for the 2021 calendar year.	N
2021	Res 31990	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for hearings on the appeals of certain appellants, Hearing Examiner Case Numbers CWF-0067, CWF-0015, and CWF-0231, from the final findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751.	N
2021	Res 31989	A RESOLUTION affirming support for progressive big business taxes to fund essential community needs; urging the Washington State Legislature to enact statewide taxes on big business and the rich without any “preemption” or other ban, limitation, or phasing out of Seattle’s ability to raise revenue through local big business taxes or other progressive revenue sources, and requesting the Office of Intergovernmental Relations communicate this resolution to Washington State Lawmakers.	N
2021	Res 31988	A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval to construct, maintain, and operate a private parking area on East Howe Street, east of Fairview Avenue East; as proposed by BSOP 1, LLC, as part of developing a public plaza in unopened right-of-way in the Eastlake neighborhood.	N
2021	Res 31987	A RESOLUTION sponsoring the King County Regional Homelessness Authority’s application for membership to the Association of Washington Cities Risk Management Service Agency.	N
2021	Res 31986	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; acknowledging and approving the 2020 Integrated Resource Plan Progress Report as conforming with the public policy objectives of The City of Seattle and the requirements of the State of Washington; and approving the Progress Report for the biennium September 2018 through August 2020.	N
2021	Res 31985	A RESOLUTION calling on federal government officials to immediately remove U.S. President Donald J. Trump from office by any means permitted by the U.S. Constitution, including impeachment, for violating his oath of office on January 6, 2021 or for committing any other high crimes and misdemeanors.	Y

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2021	Res 31984	A RESOLUTION calling for U.S.-Cuban collaboration to save lives in the fight against COVID-19.	Y
2020	Res 31983	A RESOLUTION expressing the Seattle City Council's solidarity with farmers protesting the passage of farming bills in India and in support of affected members of Seattle's South Asian community.	Y
2020	Res 31982	A RESOLUTION setting forth The City of Seattle's 2021 State Legislative Agenda.	N
2020	Res 31981	A RESOLUTION relating to the Seattle Department of Transportation; authorizing the Director to act as the authorized representative/agent on behalf of The City of Seattle and to legally bind The City of Seattle with respect to certain projects for which the City seeks grant funding assistance managed through the Recreation and Conservation Office	N
2020	Res 31980	A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval to construct, install, maintain, and operate below-grade private utility lines under and across Roy Street, west of 8th Avenue N; Dexter Avenue N, north of Mercer Street; Roy Street, west of Dexter Avenue N; and the alley north of Mercer Street, west of Dexter Avenue N, south of Roy Street, and east of Aurora Avenue N, as proposed by McKinstry Company LLC.	N
2020	Res 31979	A RESOLUTION relating to the Findings and Recommendation of the Hearing Examiner for The City of Seattle on the Final Assessment Roll for the Waterfront Local Improvement District (LID #6751); remanding certain properties to the City Appraiser for further analysis concerning the valuation of the properties consistent with recommendations of the Initial Report; returning jurisdiction to the Hearing Examiner for final recommendations on the remanded properties; directing the Hearing Examiner to file final findings, recommendations, or decisions on the Final Assessment Roll for the Waterfront LID	N
2020	Res 31978	A RESOLUTION amending Resolution 31334; establishing the City Council's intent to fund the Seattle City Employees' Retirement System (SCERS) in accordance with the January 1, 2020 Actuarial Study.	N
2020	Res 31977	A RESOLUTION approving interest rates set by the Seattle City Employees' Retirement System (SCERS) Board of Administration for 2021.	N
2020	Res 31976	A RESOLUTION modifying financial policies for the Arts and Culture Fund and superseding Resolution 31507.	N
2020	Res 31975	A RESOLUTION authorizing an exception to the level of General Fund support to Seattle Parks and Recreation by a 3/4 vote of the City Council.	N
2020	Res 31974	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for a hearing on the appeal of Robert Wexler, Hearing Examiner Case Number CWF-0149, from the findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751, and directing that the City Clerk provide any required notice of the hearing in the manner required by law	N
2020	Res 31973	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for hearings on the appeals of certain appellants, Hearing Examiner Case Numbers CWF-0228, CWF-0063, CWF-0078, CWF-0137, CWF-0154, CWF-0189, CWF-0230, CWF-0338, CWF-0204, CWF-0259, CWF-0301, CWF-0270, CWF-0206, CWF-0094, CWF-0236, CWF-0375, CWF-0314, CWF-0280, CWF-0265, CWF-0243, CWF-0227, CWF-0427, CWF-0426, CWF-0215, CWF-0439, CWF-0438, CWF-0437, CWF-0436, CWF-0435, CWF-0434, CWF-0433, CWF-0432, CWF-0422, CWF-0431, CWF-0430, CWF-0171, CWF-0421, CWF-0429, CWF-0423, CWF-0420, CWF-0412, CWF-0418, CWF-0097, CWF-0417, CWF-0416, CWF-0415, CWF-0414, CWF-0413,	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2020	Res 31972	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for a hearing on the appeal of Eugene and Leah Burrus, Hearing Examiner Case Number CWF-0022, from the findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751, and directing that the City Clerk provide any required notice of the hearing in the manner required by law.	N
2020	Res 31971	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; adopting a Transportation Electrification Strategic Investment Plan for the City Light Department that will guide the development of the utility's infrastructure strategy and investment priorities related to the electrification of transportation.	N
2020	Res 31970	A RESOLUTION identifying proposed Comprehensive Plan amendments to be considered for possible adoption in 2021 and requesting that the Office of Planning and Community Development and the Seattle Planning Commission review and make recommendations about proposed amendments.	N
2020	Res 31969	A RESOLUTION setting the time and place for a hearing on the appeal of Lou Bond from the findings and recommendation report of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751, and directing that the City Clerk provide any required notice of the hearing in the manner required by law.	N
2020	Res 31968	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of E Union Street between 34th Avenue and 35th Avenue as "Douglas Q. Barnett Street."	N
2020	Res 31967	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of 28th Avenue Northeast from Northeast 125th Street to Northeast 127th Street as "Hayashi Avenue."	N
2020	Res 31966	A RESOLUTION modifying the City Council's adoption by Resolution 31945 of a modified civil emergency order issued by the Mayor on April 24, 2020, relating to capping restaurant delivery and pick-up commission fees.	N
2020	Res 31965	A RESOLUTION delegating temporary authority to the City Clerk to set the time and place for a hearing on any appeals from the report, findings, recommendation, and decision of the Hearing Examiner on the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751, and directing that the City Clerk provide any required notice of the hearing in the manner required by law.	N
2020	Res 31964	A RESOLUTION sponsoring and requesting the entrance of the King County Regional Homelessness Authority into the Association of Washington Cities Employee Benefit Trust.	N
2020	Res 31963	A RESOLUTION supporting The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020 (H.R. 7120).	Y
2020	Res 31962	A RESOLUTION relating to policing and public safety; establishing the Council's intent to create a civilian-led Department of Community Safety & Violence Prevention; identifying actions in 2020 to remove certain functions from the Seattle Police Department and provide funding for a community-led process to inform the structure and function of the new department; requesting modifications to policing practices; requesting reporting to the Council; providing guidance on layoff decisions; and establishing a work program and timeline for creating a new department.	N
2020	Res 31961	A RESOLUTION affirming the rights of members of the press, legal observers, and medical personnel covering the protests against police brutality.	Y

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2020	Res 31960	A RESOLUTION relating to transit funding; declaring The City of Seattle's resolve to work with King County on a future countywide transit measure, pursue progressive revenue options to replace the sales and use tax, and focus on equity and sustainability concerns.	N
2020	Res 31959	A RESOLUTION approving a Memorandum of Agreement with Seattle Central College regarding the establishment, composition, and rules for a Citizens Advisory Committee for preparation of a Major Institution Master Plan for Seattle Central College.	N
2020	Res 31958	A RESOLUTION approving a Memorandum of Agreement with Seattle Pacific University regarding the establishment, composition, and rules for a Citizens Advisory Committee for preparation of a Major Institution Master Plan for Seattle Pacific University.	N
2020	Res 31957	A RESOLUTION establishing spending details by year and program area for the spending plan adopted by the ordinance introduced as Council Bill 119811 that established the authorized uses of the proceeds generated from the payroll expense tax authorized by the ordinance introduced as Council Bill 119810.	N
2020	Res 31956	A RESOLUTION establishing the City Council's goal to implement Internet for All Seattle, a vision of enabling all Seattle residents to access and adopt broadband internet service that is reliable and affordable.	N
2020	Res 31955	A RESOLUTION reaffirming The City of Seattle's support of unbanked money transfer operators and the immigrant communities they serve.	Y
2020	Res 31954	A RESOLUTION relating to the City's annual budget process; stating intent that the City will consider a one-year budget proposal for 2021 only; and superseding Resolution 28885 to the extent inconsistent.	N
2020	Res 31953	A RESOLUTION adopting revised financial policies for the Emergency Fund.	N
2020	Res 31952	A RESOLUTION adopting revised financial policies for the Cumulative Reserve Subfund of the General Fund; and superseding Attachment B to Resolution 31848.	N
2020	Res 31951	A RESOLUTION authorizing an exception to the level of General Fund support to Seattle Parks and Recreation due to exigent economic circumstances, by a 3/4 vote of the City Council.	N
2020	Res 31950	A RESOLUTION relating to the Department of Parks and Recreation; authorizing the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to act as the authorized representative/agent on behalf of The City of Seattle and to legally bind The City of Seattle with respect to certain projects for which the City seeks grant funding assistance managed through the Recreation and Conservation Office.	N
2020	Res 31949	A RESOLUTION in support of fair, direct, and federal emergency support to reopen and rebuild local American economies; and stating that a fully funded Seattle is essential to economic recovery.	Y
2020	Res 31948	A RESOLUTION condemning the use of military force in jurisdictions such as The City of Seattle that have not requested and do not intend to request federal interventions.	Y
2020	Res 31947	A RESOLUTION relating to committee structure, membership, meeting times, and duties of the standing committees of the Seattle City Council for 2020 and 2021; allowing for suspension of standing committee meetings for consideration of a Revised 2020 Budget due to the COVID-19 Emergency declared March 3, 2020; and superseding Resolution 31922	N



Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2020	Res 31946	A RESOLUTION related to the response to the Covid-19 public health emergency; requesting that Governor Inslee create a "Washington Worker Relief Fund" to provide economic assistance to undocumented Washingtonians during the Covid-19 pandemic.	Y
2020	Res 31945	A RESOLUTION modifying the April 24, 2020, emergency order relating to capping restaurant delivery and pick-up commission fees.	N
2020	Res 31944	A RESOLUTION of intention to establish a University District Parking and Business Improvement Area and fix a date and place for a hearing thereon.	N
2020	Res 31943	A RESOLUTION to initiate a University District Business Improvement Area.	N
2020	Res 31942	A RESOLUTION adding the West Seattle Bridge emergency closure and repairs to the Watch List of capital projects for enhanced quarterly monitoring established in Resolution 31931.	N
2020	Res 31941	A RESOLUTION establishing a committee to develop recommendations to enhance the capacity of the Office of City Auditor to conduct performance audits.	N
2020	Res 31940	A RESOLUTION calling on Governor Inslee to impose an immediate moratorium on rent payments and urging the Governor to call on federal legislators and the Trump administration to impose an immediate moratorium on rent and mortgage payments; and calling on federal legislators and the Trump administration to impose an immediate moratorium on rent and mortgage payments.	Y
2020	Res 31939	A RESOLUTION in support of the bid by The City of Seattle to host the National League of Cities 2025 City Summit conference.	N
2020	Res 31938	A RESOLUTION modifying the March 14, 2020 emergency order relating to residential evictions.	N
2020	Res 31937	A RESOLUTION modifying the March 3, 2020 Mayoral Proclamation of Civil Emergency related to the spread of COVID-19, novel coronavirus.	N
2020	Res 31936	A RESOLUTION adopting the Statements of Legislative Intent for the 2020 Adopted Budget and 2020-2025 Adopted Capital Improvement Program.	N
2020	Res 31935	A RESOLUTION adopting the Seattle City Council 2020 Work Program.	N
2020	Res 31934	A RESOLUTION supporting the taxation of big businesses in Seattle to fund housing and essential services, urging the Washington State Legislature to oppose any "preemption" or other ban on Seattle's ability to raise revenue through big business taxes or other progressive revenue sources, and requesting the Office of Intergovernmental Relations communicate this resolution to Washington State lawmakers.	N
2020	Res 31933	A RESOLUTION expanding the requirements for the Summary and Fiscal Note that accompanies new legislation so that it also considers impacts of climate change.	N
2020	Res 31932	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; acknowledging and approving City Light's adoption of a biennial energy conservation target for 2020-2021 and ten-year conservation potential.	N
2020	Res 31931	A RESOLUTION establishing a Watch List of large, complex, discrete capital projects that will require enhanced quarterly monitoring reports for the 2020 calendar year.	N
2020	Res 31930	A RESOLUTION affirming the City's good faith intent to consider raising in the collective bargaining process for the Seattle Police Officer's Guild (SPOG) 2021 contract renewal police accountability proposals that have been identified by the public and the City's police oversight agencies.	N
2020	Res 31928	A RESOLUTION reaffirming Seattle as a welcoming city and condemning all forms of oppression throughout the world.	Y

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2020	Res 31927	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle City Councilmember participation, for 2020 and 2021, on King County Committees, Regional Committees, State Committees, and City of Seattle Committees; and superseding Resolution 31923.	N
2020	Res 31926	A RESOLUTION reaffirming Seattle as a welcoming city, expressing the Seattle City Council's solidarity with Seattle's South Asian community regardless of religion and caste, and opposing India's National Register of Citizens and Citizenship Amendment Act.	Y
2020	Res 31925	A RESOLUTION affirming The City of Seattle's support for its local Iranian-American and Iranian-immigrant communities, recognizing the importance of people-to-people diplomacy at the local level, calling for a de-escalation in the conflict and damaging rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran and an end to the attacks on the democratic rights of people with Iranian heritage in Washington State and requesting the Office of Intergovernmental Relations communicate these positions to the Washington State congressional delegation.	Y
2020	Res 31924	A RESOLUTION designating the monthly President Pro Tem of the City Council of The City of Seattle for 2020-2021 and superseding Resolution 31884.	N
2020	Res 31923	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle City Councilmember participation, for 2020 and 2021, on King County Committees, Regional Committees, State Committees, and City of Seattle Committees; and superseding Resolution 31885.	N
2020	Res 31922	A RESOLUTION relating to committee structure, membership, meeting times, and duties of the standing committees of the Seattle City Council for 2020 and 2021; and superseding Resolution 31883.	N
2019	Res 31921	A RESOLUTION stating the City Council's intent to consider legislation in 2020 that would expand Chapter 14.30 of the Seattle Municipal Code to require employers to provide employees with transit subsidies, and to consult with City of Seattle departments and relevant stakeholders in the development of such legislation and related policies.	N
2019	Res 31920	A RESOLUTION adopting General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; superseding Resolutions 31806 and 31886.	N
2019	Res 31919	A RESOLUTION relating to the Technology Matching Fund program; requesting the Chief Technology Officer to set the program's guidelines, goals, project eligibility and selection criteria, and maximum grant awards, and to execute contracts and encumber funds in support of the program; approving the membership requirements of a review committee to recommend project selection under the program; and requesting the Chief Technology Officer to approve projects under the program after receiving recommendations from the review committee.	N
2019	Res 31918	A RESOLUTION setting forth The City of Seattle's 2020 State Legislative Agenda.	N
2019	Res 31917	A RESOLUTION recognizing the importance of our healthcare workers; supporting the unionized workers of SEIU Healthcare 1199 NW exercising their right to strike and withhold their labor.	Y

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31916	A RESOLUTION acknowledging the inherent responsibility of the City to reduce unnecessary justice system involvement; acknowledging that pre-arrest diversion programs, such as the Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program, represent a harm reduction, evidence-based approach to reduce recidivism and provide for the public safety; and declaring that the City is committed to ensuring that evidence-based, law enforcement-engaged, pre-booking diversion programs, such as LEAD, receive the funding necessary to accept all priority qualifying referrals.	N
2019	Res 31915	A RESOLUTION fixing the date for hearing the final assessment roll for Local Improvement District No. 6751 ("Waterfront LID") to design and construct the Central Waterfront Improvement Program and directing that notice of the hearing be given in the manner required by law.	N
2019	Res 31914	A RESOLUTION adopting a spending plan for the proceeds of the Seattle Transportation Network Company tax to provide support to affordable housing near frequent transit, transportation, and a driver conflict resolution center.	N
2019	Res 31913	A RESOLUTION concerning Washington Referendum Measure No. 88 ("Referendum 88"), proposing voter approval of Initiative Measure No. 1000, and urging Seattle voters to vote "Approved" on Referendum 88 on the November 5, 2019, general election ballot.	Y
2019	Res 31912	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of Willow Crossing, LLLP for the vacation of a portion of 39th Avenue South, south of South Willow Street in the Othello Residential Urban Village neighborhood area of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 15.62 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and Clerk File 314422.	N
2019	Res 31911	A RESOLUTION opposing Washington Initiative Measure 976 ("I-976") and urging Seattle voters to vote "No" on I-976 on the November 5, 2019, general election ballot.	Y
2019	Res 31910	A RESOLUTION requesting a plan to develop an "Infants at Work" pilot program for eligible City of Seattle employees and their infants.	N
2019	Res 31909	A RESOLUTION requesting the Seattle Department of Transportation develop a traffic signals policy.	N
2019	Res 31908	A RESOLUTION requesting the Seattle Department of Transportation develop policy options for the maintenance of existing sidewalks, create a public education program on snow and ice removal responsibilities, and develop a program to enforce snow and ice removal requirements by private property owners.	N
2019	Res 31907	A RESOLUTION in support of the youth-led September 20, 2019 Global Climate Strike; urging Seattle Public Schools to support its students' right to assemble and participate in the Global Climate Strike; and affirming that City employees may request unpaid leave for a day of conscience on September 20, 2019.	N
2019	Res 31906	A RESOLUTION declaring the premises located at 213 South Main Street, Seattle, Washington, commonly known as the Old Cannery Building, to be a neighborhood blight requiring acquisition by the City of Seattle in accordance with RCW 35.80A.010.	N
2019	Res 31905	A RESOLUTION amending the Physical Development Management Plan for Sand Point, as adopted by Resolution 29429 and amended by Resolution 30063, Resolution 31223. and Resolution 31412.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31904	A RESOLUTION relating to the State Route 520, Interstate 5 to Medina Bridge Replacement and High Occupancy Vehicle Project; superseding Resolution 31411 and Section 2 and Section 3 of Resolution 31611; and making recommendations for the future configuration of a second Montlake bascule bridge.	N
2019	Res 31903	A RESOLUTION relating to procurement and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; affirming The City of Seattle's commitment to avoid procuring goods and services from corporations that purchase leases or develop oil fields in the Arctic Refuge Coastal Plain.	N
2019	Res 31902	A RESOLUTION declaring the City Council's and the Mayor's intent to consider strategies to protect trees and increase Seattle's tree canopy cover.	N
2019	Res 31900	A RESOLUTION reclaiming the inherent responsibility of the City to protect its most vulnerable populations; acknowledging the disproportionately high rate of violence against women of Indigenous communities; urging City departments to deliver sustainable investments that address the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) crisis, and establish a new, racially appropriate framework of understanding an approach to ending violence against Indigenous women and girls; and calling on the Mayor of Seattle to drive systemic reform that requests and empowers and holds accountable related	N
2019	Res 31899	A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval to construct, maintain, and operate a below-grade private thermal energy exchange system under and across John Street, east of Boren Avenue North and west of Fairview Avenue North; as proposed by Onni DEU (John Street) LLC.	N
2019	Res 31898	A RESOLUTION requesting that the Seattle Department of Transportation develop a budget proposal for creating on-street bike and e-scooter parking.	N
2019	Res 31897	A RESOLUTION calling for an end to the U.S. government's economic, commercial, and financial embargo against Cuba.	Y
2019	Res 31896	A RESOLUTION identifying proposed Comprehensive Plan amendments to be considered for possible adoption in 2020 and requesting that the Office of Planning and Community Development and the Seattle Planning Commission review and make recommendations about the proposed amendments.	N
2019	Res 31895	A RESOLUTION relating to a Green New Deal for Seattle; establishing goals, identifying actions necessary to meet these goals, affirming the federal Green New Deal resolution, and calling for the federal government to enact policies to advance a Green New Deal.	N
2019	Res 31894	A RESOLUTION relating to the funding of priority projects in the 2019-2024 Bicycle Master Plan Implementation Plan; requesting that the Mayor commit to building out the Bicycle Master Plan and identify funding for priority Bicycle Master Plan projects in the Mayor's 2020 Proposed Budget.	N
2019	Res 31893	A RESOLUTION relating to taxation; stating an intent to adopt legislation imposing a local sales and use tax at the maximum rate authorized to fund investments in affordable and supportive housing.	N
2019	Res 31892	A RESOLUTION expressing concern with the Northwest testing and training proposal of the United States Department of the Navy for Puget Sound, coastal waters from northern California through Washington State, and for Alaska.	Y
2019	Res 31891	A RESOLUTION approving the design for improvements to Victor Steinbrueck Park funded through the 2008 Parks and Green Spaces Levy.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31890	A RESOLUTION affirming The City of Seattle’s commitment to fostering a welcoming community that protects all its residents and declaring its support for providing permanent protection and a path to citizenship for immigrant youth and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) recipients for whom the United States is home.	Y
2019	Res 31889	A RESOLUTION in support of the right to bodily autonomy and the right to access a safe and legal abortion; and affirming The City of Seattle’s commitment to act consistently and proactively in support of those rights.	Y
2019	Res 31888	A RESOLUTION amending Resolution 31857 providing conceptual approval of a Significant Structure Term Permit to Seattle Arena Company, LLC to include the construction of permanent tensioned tie-backs in portions of Thomas Street, east of 1st Avenue North and west of 2nd Avenue North, and the long-term occupation of these permanent tensioned tie-backs in the right-of-way to enable the renovation of KeyArena at the Seattle Center.	N
2019	Res 31887	A RESOLUTION adopting and approving an application for surplus federal property at Fort Lawton, including a redevelopment plan, and authorizing the City of Seattle Office of Housing to forward an application to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development in response to the closure of the Fort Lawton Army Reserve Center.	N
2019	Res 31886	A RESOLUTION revising certain General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; amending Attachment 1 of Resolution 31806, Chapter XI.	N
2019	Res 31885	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle City Councilmember participation, for 2018 and 2019, on King County Committees, Regional Committees, State Committees, and City of Seattle Committees; and superseding Resolution 31792.	N
2019	Res 31884	A RESOLUTION designating the monthly President Pro Tem of the City Council of The City of Seattle for 2018-2019 and superseding Resolution 31790.	N
2019	Res 31883	A RESOLUTION relating to committee structure, membership, meeting times, and duties of the standing committees of the Seattle City Council for 2018 and 2019; and superseding Resolution 31859.	N
2019	Res 31882	A RESOLUTION relating to the 2018 Families, Education, Preschool, and Promise Levy; approving a partnership agreement between The City of Seattle and Seattle School District No. 1.	N
2019	Res 31881	A RESOLUTION relating to the 2018 Families, Education, Preschool, and Promise Levy; approving a partnership agreement between The City of Seattle and the Seattle College District.	N
2019	Res 31880	A RESOLUTION recognizing the efforts of the North Delridge community to prepare an action plan for their community; identifying a work program to implement the North Delridge Action Plan; and identifying proposed amendments to the Delridge Neighborhood Plan in the Comprehensive Plan for consideration in 2020.	N
2019	Res 31879	A RESOLUTION supporting a safe and responsive workplace in The City of Seattle’s Legislative Department and providing guidance to update Legislative Department Policies, including POL-LD-100 on Workplace Expectations.	N
2019	Res 31878	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of 22nd Avenue NW between NW 56th and NW 57th Streets as “Rob Mattson Way.”	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31877	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of Trinity Trailside, LLC for the vacation of a portion of NE 48th Street between 24th Avenue NE and the Burke-Gilman Trail in the University Community Urban Center neighborhood planning area of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 15.62 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and Clerk File 314380.	N
2019	Res 31876	A RESOLUTION in support of U.S. Senate Bill 726, the Personal Care Products Safety Act.	Y
2019	Res 31875	A RESOLUTION retiring introduced and referred Council Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments that have received no further action.	N
2019	Res 31874	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of University Way NE, from NE 50th Street to NE 52nd Street, as "Chris Curtis Way."	N
2019	Res 31873	A RESOLUTION recognizing the community-led visioning process and the recommendations found in the U District Station Area Mobility Plan, and supporting a pedestrian-focused rebuild of NE 43rd Street.	N
2019	Res 31872	A RESOLUTION approving the proposed budget framework of the Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission for its fiscal years 2019 through 2023.	N
2019	Res 31871	A RESOLUTION endorsing the final report and recommendations of the Regional Affordable Housing Task Force.	Y
2019	Res 31870	A RESOLUTION calling for additional measures by the City and its partners that complement mandatory housing affordability (MHA) implementation to promote livability and equitable development, mitigate displacement, and address challenges and opportunities raised by community members during the MHA public engagement process.	N
2019	Res 31869	A RESOLUTION revising Resolution 31849, which endorsed a budget for The City of Seattle for 2020, by substituting a new Attachment A that corrects technical omissions and errors.	N
2019	Res 31868	A RESOLUTION relating to City Council confirmation and reconfirmation of City department heads; describing the steps that the City Council intends to follow; outlining materials that should be submitted to the City Council prior to and as part of a nomination; describing general criteria that the Council intends to consider when evaluating the search process for an appointment and department head candidates; and superseding Resolution 30962.	N
2019	Res 31867	A RESOLUTION supporting the passage of the Medicare for All Act of 2019.	Y
2019	Res 31866	A RESOLUTION establishing a Watch List of large, complex, discrete capital projects that will require enhanced quarterly monitoring reports for the 2019 calendar year.	N
2019	Res 31865	A RESOLUTION adopting Statements of Legislative Intent for the 2019 Adopted Budget, 2020 Endorsed Budget, and 2019-2024 Adopted Capital Improvement Program.	N
2019	Res 31864	A RESOLUTION adopting the Seattle City Council 2019 Work Program.	N
2019	Res 31863	A RESOLUTION relating to misclassifications of workers as independent contractors when they should be designated as employees; requesting semi-annual updates to the Council starting at the end of the 3rd quarter of 2019 on the work the Office of Labor Standards and Labor Standards Advisory Commission is doing to investigate and correct misclassifications.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31862	A RESOLUTION to delay consideration of the Mayor’s nomination of Jason Johnson to be Director of the Human Services Department until a formal search process can be completed; and to convene a search committee representing all Human Services Department stakeholders to define qualifications, skills, and attributes for an appointee and recommend finalists for appointment.	N
2019	Res 31861	A RESOLUTION recognizing the harms that evictions from housing have on tenants and marginalized communities and describing the City Council’s plan to help avoid and mitigate those harms.	N
2019	Res 31860	A RESOLUTION supporting the Seattle Public Schools’ Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 and urging Seattle voters to vote “Yes” on Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 on the February 12, 2019, special election ballot.	Y
2019	Res 31859	A RESOLUTION relating to committee structure, membership, meeting times, and duties of the standing committees of the Seattle City Council for 2018 and 2019; allowing for temporarily changing the committee meeting times; and superseding Resolution 31789.	N
2019	Res 31858	A RESOLUTION affirming and commending the validity and application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to peace and human dignity everywhere.	Y
2019	Res 31857	A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval of a Significant Structure Term Permit to Seattle Arena Company, LLC to construct, maintain, and operate a tunnel under and across Thomas Street, east of 1st Avenue North and west of Warren Avenue North, to enable the renovation of KeyArena at the Seattle Center.	N
2019	Res 31856	A RESOLUTION committing to collaborate with the Executive on the transfer of properties that have a mutual and offsetting benefit lease to the organizations currently residing in those facilities no later than March 2019 in circumstances where those organizations have expressed interest in taking ownership of those properties and a commitment to continue to provide services to the community, and have demonstrated the financial capability of maintaining the facility.	N
2019	Res 31855	A RESOLUTION recognizing the service and dedication of the Seattle Police Department’s police officers, detectives, and sergeants; and requesting the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington conduct a judicial review of the Collective Bargaining Agreement reached between The City of Seattle and the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild.	N
2019	Res 31854	A RESOLUTION rejecting the Federal Administration’s proposed public charge rule change as applied to legal permanent residency applications by immigrants because of the harm to, negative impact on, and chilling effect on immigrant communities’ access to vital services and cost-saving initiatives that keep families healthy and on the path towards economic self-sufficiency and success.	Y
2019	Res 31853	A RESOLUTION establishing enhanced reporting requirements for the City’s Capital Improvement Program projects and establishing the City’s intent to use a stage-gate appropriation process for selected projects.	N
2019	Res 31852	A RESOLUTION setting forth The City of Seattle’s 2019 State Legislative Agenda.	N
2019	Res 31851	A RESOLUTION addressing the proposed Pebble Mine in Alaska’s Bristol Bay, and urging the Trump administration to undergo the appropriate environmental review, economic assessment, and consultation with the public to protect the wide-ranging interests in the region, including that of Seattle’s business community.	Y



Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31850	A RESOLUTION supporting Washington Initiative Measure 940 and urging Seattle voters to vote "Yes" on Initiative 940 on the November 6, 2018, general election ballot.	Y
2019	Res 31849	A RESOLUTION endorsing a budget and position modifications for The City of Seattle for 2020.	N
2019	Res 31848	A RESOLUTION adopting revised financial policies for the Cumulative Reserve Subfund of the General Fund by amending Exhibit A of Resolution 31083.	N
2019	Res 31847	A RESOLUTION relating to financial policies for the Judgment/Claims Fund; revising certain policies, establishing a new policy, and requesting a ten-year policy review cycle.	N
2019	Res 31846	A RESOLUTION supporting Washington Initiative Measure 1639 and urging Seattle voters to vote "Yes" on Initiative 1639 on the November 6, 2018, general election ballot.	Y
2019	Res 31845	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of Seattle City Light for the vacation of a portion of Broad Street between Harrison Street and Taylor Avenue North adjacent to Block 66, D.T. Denny's Park Addition to North Seattle, which is the block bounded by Harrison Street, 6th Avenue North, Thomas Street, Taylor Avenue North, and Broad Street in the Uptown Urban Center neighborhood area of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 15.62 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and Clerk File 314387.	N
2019	Res 31844	A RESOLUTION proclaiming that Seattle affirms the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in the wake of increased targeting of local activists.	Y
2019	Res 31843	A RESOLUTION endorsing "Clean Air Clean Energy" Initiative 1631, a statewide initiative to the people that would charge pollution fees on the largest corporate polluters and use the revenue to invest in healthy communities, clean our air and water, promote clean energy, and slow down the impacts of climate change - all under oversight of a public board.	Y
2019	Res 31842	A RESOLUTION relating to the Department of Parks and Recreation; authorizing the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to act as the authorized representative/agent on behalf of the City of Seattle and to legally bind the City of Seattle with respect to the Project(s) below for which the City seeks grant funding assistance managed through the Recreation and Conservation Office.	N
2019	Res 31841	A RESOLUTION requesting reports from the Seattle Department of Transportation, the Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections, and Seattle Center identifying transportation projects in the vicinity of the Seattle Center Arena and describing the process for administering the Arena Access Management Plan.	N
2019	Res 31840	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of 2nd Avenue North from Harrison Street to Thomas Street as "Seattle Storm Way."	N
2019	Res 31839	A RESOLUTION making a preliminary decision on the University of Washington 2018 Seattle Campus Master Plan.	N
2019	Res 31838	A RESOLUTION reaffirming City Council's commitment to workers and supporting dairy workers and their Fast for Reconciliation.	Y

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31837	A RESOLUTION amending and adopting the Policies and Procedures that govern the Reuse and Disposal of real property owned by The City of Seattle not subject to the City Light Department jurisdiction; updating certain portions of the procedures related to property reuse and disposal for affordable housing; and adding provisions regarding the use of proceeds from surplus property disposal.	N
2019	Res 31836	A RESOLUTION designating the Grand Street Commons Redevelopment Opportunity Zone pursuant to RCW 70.105D.150(1) and making findings in support of such designation.	N
2019	Res 31835	A RESOLUTION granting conceptual approval to construct, maintain, and operate below-grade private utility lines under and across South Holgate Street, east of Occidental Avenue South and west of 3rd Avenue South; as proposed by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak").	N
2019	Res 31834	A RESOLUTION expressing The City of Seattle's opposition to offshore oil and gas drilling and exploration activities, including seismic airgun blasting.	Y
2019	Res 31833	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; acknowledging the 2018 Integrated Resource Plan Progress Report as conforming with the public policy objectives of The City of Seattle and the requirements of the State of Washington; and approving the Progress Report for the biennium September 2018 through August 2020.	N
2019	Res 31832	A RESOLUTION denouncing the enormous backlog of citizenship applications before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services that is currently preventing over 18,000 immigrants in Seattle from becoming U.S. citizens and voters; and affirming The City of Seattle's recognition of immigrants as New Americans who: are an integral part of Seattle's communities; supports them as they integrate into Seattle and the nation; upholds their right and opportunity to receive fair and equal treatment in their journey to obtain legal status, including citizenship, under the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and regu	Y
2019	Res 31831	A RESOLUTION requesting that the Department of Finance and Administrative Services, the Seattle Fire Department, and the City Budget Office include in the City's contract for Basic Life Support Emergency Services provisions that provide to emergency medical technicians (EMTs) a prevailing wage and benefits comparable to other emergency workers employed in comparable cities and similar sectors in the City of Seattle; and requesting the departments to provide additional analysis, data, and information.	N
2019	Res 31830	A RESOLUTION related to the Move Seattle Levy; establishing principles for developing a revised workplan for Move Seattle Levy projects to ensure transparency, accountability, and thoughtful community outreach.	N
2019	Res 31829	A RESOLUTION related to the City Light Department ("City Light"); adopting revised procedures for the disposition of surplus properties under the jurisdiction of City Light.	N
2019	Res 31828	A RESOLUTION in support of the Seventy-first World Health Assembly resolution on infant and young child feeding, affirming The City of Seattle's recognition of breastfeeding as critical to infant and maternal health.	Y
2019	Res 31827	A RESOLUTION providing an honorary designation of 15th Avenue South from South Nevada Street to South Columbian Way as "Alan Sugiyama Way."	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31826	A RESOLUTION relating to the Seattle Center City Bike Network; establishing an implementation schedule for Seattle Department of Transportation delivery of capital projects that are elements of the Center City Bike Network; and requesting quarterly status updates to the Chair of the Sustainability and Transportation Committee through 2019.	N
2019	Res 31825	A RESOLUTION relating to Seattle Public Utilities (SPU); amending Resolution 31800; updating the ongoing Customer Review Panel to maintain continuous stakeholder engagement as SPU implements the six-year Strategic Business Plan (Plan) and conducts future Plan updates.	N
2019	RES 31824	A RESOLUTION of intention to establish a SODO Parking and Business Improvement Area and fix a date and place for a hearing thereon.	N
2019	RES 31823	A RESOLUTION to initiate a SODO Parking and Business Improvement Area.	N
2019	Res 31822	A RESOLUTION affirming the human right to family unity and expressing opposition to the Trump Administration's practices separating and/or detaining migrant families seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border, and strong concern about the Trump Administration's lack of family reunification plans for over 2,300 children and their parents or guardians and ongoing detention camps at the U.S.-Mexico border in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the applicable international human rights framework.	Y
2019	Res 31821	A RESOLUTION relating to education services; accompanying an ordinance requesting the 2018 Families, Education, Preschool and Promise Levy to replace two expiring levies to fund early learning and preschool, college and K-12 education support, and job readiness, and providing further direction regarding implementation of the programs funded by such levy.	N
2019	Res 31820	A RESOLUTION relating to the 2018 Special Olympics USA Games; and sponsoring the Games.	N
2019	Res 31819	A RESOLUTION relating to the City Light Department; adopting a 2019-2024 Strategic Plan for the City Light Department and endorsing a six-year rate path required to support the Strategic Plan.	N
2019	Res 31818	A RESOLUTION retiring introduced and referred Council Bills, Resolutions, Clerk Files, and Appointments that have received no further action.	N
2019	Res 31817	A RESOLUTION superseding and replacing the language in Statement of Legislative Intent, 281-1-B-2, adopted in Resolution 31795.	N
2019	Res 31816	A RESOLUTION related to The City of Seattle's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP); adopting the CEMP Introduction, Emergency Operations Plan, Continuity of Government Plan, and Emergency Support Function #14 - Transition to Recovery, including 2017 revisions.	N
2019	Res 31815	A RESOLUTION urging the University of Washington to swiftly arrive at a fair and equitable contract with its academic student employees.	Y
2019	Res 31814	A RESOLUTION requesting the Seattle Department of Transportation provide quarterly reporting to City Council on implementation of the One Center City program.	N
2019	Res 31813	A RESOLUTION in support of the bid by The City of Seattle to host the National League of Cities 2024 or 2025 City Summit conference.	N

Year	Record No	Title	Could abstain with proposed change to Council Rules?
2019	Res 31812	A RESOLUTION declaring the intention of the City Council of The City of Seattle to order the construction of the Seattle Central Waterfront Improvement Program, and to create a local improvement district to assess a part of the cost and expense of both carrying out certain of those improvements against the properties specially benefited thereby; notifying all persons who desire to object to such improvements to appear and present their objections; and establishing July 13, 2018, as the date the Council's consideration of the Waterfront Local Improvement District becomes a pending quasi-judicia	N
2019	Res 31811	A RESOLUTION recognizing the value of Equitable Development Agreements and outlining how the agreements may be considered when evaluating the required community engagement processes and public benefit packages associated with street vacations and large development projects that are subject to review by the City Council	N
2019	Res 31810	A RESOLUTION establishing a spending plan for the proceeds generated from a new Progressive Tax on Business to address homelessness and housing affordability authorized by the ordinance introduced as Council Bill 119250.	N
2019	Res 31809	A RESOLUTION adopting revised Street Vacation Policies for the City of Seattle and repealing previous versions of the policies adopted by Resolutions 27527, 28605, 30297, 30702, and 31142.	N
2019	Res 31808	A RESOLUTION relating to the for-hire transportation industry; establishing a work program for the City Council to review the administrative rules and regulations to improve customer service and lower costs to participants, and to explore ways to ensure equal market access to all participants.	N
2019	Res 31807	A RESOLUTION relating to the Seattle Comprehensive Plan; revising the procedures and the criteria for consideration of proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan as part of the annual "docket," and repealing Resolutions 31402 and 31117.	N
2019	Res 31806	A RESOLUTION adopting General Rules and Procedures of the Seattle City Council; superseding Resolutions 31639 and 31659.	N
2019	Res 31805	A RESOLUTION opposing concealed carry reciprocity.	Y
2019	Res 31804	A RESOLUTION setting the public hearing on the petition of the Washington State Convention Center for the vacation of the alley in Block 33, Heirs of Sarah A. Bell's 2nd Addition; the alley in Block 43, Heirs of Sarah A. Bell's 2nd Addition; the alley in Block 44, Heirs of Sarah A. Bell's 2nd Addition; a subterranean portion of Terry Avenue between Howell Street and Olive Way; and a subterranean portion of Olive Way between 9th Avenue and Boren Avenue, in the Denny Triangle Neighborhood of the Downtown Urban Center area of Seattle, according to Chapter 35.79 of the Revised Code of Washington,	N
2019	Res 31803	A RESOLUTION affirming The City of Seattle's support of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School students' demand for gun reform in the wake of the February 14, 2018, Parkland, Florida, massacre that resulted in the death of 17 children and teachers.	Y