



9-1-1 Outage Event Overview

Seattle Police Department

01/23/2019

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Overview


For event overview, refer to the “Summary of 9-1-1 Outage” document below



Microsoft Word
Document

Timeline


Major Incident: 9-1-1 Outage | 1st Event – Total Outage Time ~32 minutes



*All times are approximate

Timeline (continued)

Major Incident: 9-1-1 Outage | 2nd Event – Total Outage Time ~11.5 hours



12/27/2018

Midnight

12/28/2018

*All times are approximate

Q: What effect did the outage have on Seattle 9-1-1 dispatch centers?

- Seattle Police (Primary PSAP) and Seattle Fire (Secondary PSAP) were unable to field 9-1-1 calls from the public
- Operators needed to switch call-answering methods to 10-digit lines and Text-to-911
- Interoperable radio channels were utilized to communicate among PSAPs
- Emergency Communications staff needed to prioritize their work while also remaining engaged in the notification and update process

Q: Were emergency responses delayed due to the outage?

- Currently there is not enough information available to make a conclusion
- CenturyLink has 30 days from the incident date to submit a formal root cause analysis (RCA) document detailing the specifics and scope of the outage
- Requests have been made for additional information regarding missed calls
- If provided with a list of missed calls, follow up actions will occur
- Any calls for service that reached SPD via our alternate methods were fielded promptly and dispatched accordingly

Q: What are the City's protocols for responding to this kind of event?

- Normally there is a tertiary option involving plain old telephone service (POTS) lines in which either primary or secondary PSAP can switch to in the event of a system or equipment failure
- Due to the nature and magnitude of this event, this option was not technically feasible
- Additional protocols were followed in regard to notifying chain of command and escalating as necessary
- Communication to the public was paramount while working with the respective Public Information Officers

Q: What is being done to reduce system vulnerabilities?

- King County PSAPs are working toward a new architecture known as a platform model
- This model will provide additional redundancy, interoperability, security and failover features
- The use of digital phone trunks will allow for call volume scaling, portability to other centers and many other options that will enhance overall system strength and flexibility
- Network or carrier diversity should be assessed as a requirement that is fulfilled with the platform architecture

Q: Should the City's protocols be updated?

- We are always looking for ways to improve our protocols and processes within the 9-1-1 industry
- Any City and/or regional Continuity of Operations Plan should be reassessed and updated to reflect current capabilities, technologies, public outreach techniques, etc.
- The Seattle Police Department and the 9-1-1 Emergency Communications Center is open to exploring this question further. We are happy to accommodate, facilitate and/or participate in any discussions that should occur moving forward