CITY OF SEATTLE

City Council

Agenda

Tuesday, September 9, 2025

2:00 PM

Council Chamber, City Hall
600 4th Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104

Sara Nelson, Council President
Joy Hollingsworth, Member
Debora Juarez, Member
Robert Kettle, Member
Alexis Mercedes Rinck, Member
Maritza Rivera, Member
Rob Saka, Member
Mark Solomon, Member
Dan Strauss, Member

Chair Info: 206-684-8809; Sara.Nelson@seattle.gov

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

CITY OF SEATTLE

City Council
Agenda

September 9, 2025 - 2:00 PM

Meeting Location:
Council Chamber, City Hall, 600 4th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104

Committee Website:
http://www.seattle.gov/council

Members of the public may register for remote or in-person Public Comment to address the Council. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair. Details on how to register for Public Comment are listed below:

Remote Public Comment - Register online to speak during the Public Comment period at https://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment. Online registration to speak will begin one hour before the meeting start time, and registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting.

In-Person Public Comment - Register to speak on the public comment sign-up sheet located inside Council Chambers at least 15 minutes prior to the meeting start time. Registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting.

Written comments must be submitted prior to 10 a.m. to ensure that they are distributed to Councilmembers prior to the start of the meeting. Comments may be submitted at Council@seattle.gov or at Seattle City Hall, Attn: Council Public Comment, 600 4th Ave., Floor 2, Seattle, WA 98104. Comments received after 10 a.m. will be distributed after the meeting to Councilmembers and included as part of the public record.

A. CALL TO ORDER

B. ROLL CALL

C. PRESENTATIONS

D. PUBLIC COMMENT

Members of the public may sign up to address the Council for up to 2 minutes on matters on this agenda; total time allotted to public comment at this meeting is 20 minutes.

E. ADOPTION OF INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL CALENDAR:

Introduction and referral to Council committees of Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt), and Clerk Files (CF) for committee recommendation.

IRC 495 September 9, 2025

Attachments: Introduction and Referral Calendar

F. APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA

G. APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR

The Consent Calendar consists of routine items. A Councilmember may request that an item be removed from the Consent Calendar and placed on the regular agenda.

Journal:

1. Min 538 September 2, 2025

Attachments: Minutes

Bills:

2. CB 121070 AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 25, 2025, through August 29, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note

Appointments:

CITY COUNCIL:

3. Appt 03248 Appointment of Agni Bhattacharya as member, Seattle Renters' Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

4. Appt 03276 Appointment of BB Denton as member, Seattle LGBTQ Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

5. Appt 03277 Appointment of Charlie Vu Nguyen as member, Seattle Disability Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

6. Appt 03278 Appointment of Hector Garcia as member, Seattle Human Rights Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

7. Appt 03279 Appointment of Sofia Brown as member, Seattle Women's Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

8. Appt 03280 Appointment of Eric Alipio as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

9. Appt 03281 Appointment of Keeanna Andres as member, Design Review Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

10. Appt 03282 Appointment of Maeve Gillis as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

11. Appt 03283 Appointment of Margaret Szeles as member, Seattle Planning Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

12. Appt 03284 Appointment of Jonathan Lopez as member, Seattle Immigrant and Refugee Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

13. Appt 03285 Appointment of Cameron Wong as member, Landmarks Preservation Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

14. Appt 03286 Appointment of Kamryn Yanchick as member, Community Involvement Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

15. Appt 03287 Reappointment of Montana Houston as member, Pioneer Square Preservation Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

16. Appt 03288 Appointment of Lauren Campbell as member, Seattle Center Advisory Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

17. Appt 03289 Appointment of Brian Bakker as member, Board of Parks and Recreation Commissioners, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

18. Appt 03290 Appointment of Jack Nash as member, Seattle Arts Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

19. Appt 03291 Appointment of Jeremy Knapp as member, Seattle Pedestrian Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

20. Appt 03292 Appointment of Naomi Cutler as member, Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

21. Appt 03293 Appointment of Sidney Orr as member, Seattle Transit Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

Attachments: Appointment Packet

H. COMMITTEE REPORTS

Discussion and vote on Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt), and Clerk Files (CF).

CITY COUNCIL:

1. CB 121065 AN ORDINANCE relating to City employment; authorizing the execution of a collective bargaining agreement between The City of Seattle and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898, effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

Attachments: Att 1 - Agreement By and Between the City and Local 2898

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note
Summary Att 1 - Bill Draft of Agreement By and Between the City and Local 2898
Central Staff Memo

PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE:

2. CB 121052 AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems.

The Committee recommends that City Council pass as amended the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 5 - Kettle, Saka, Hollingsworth, Juarez, Nelson
Opposed: None

Attachments: Att 1 - 2025 SIR Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems
Att 2 - 2025 SIR Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems Executive Overview

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note
Amendment A
Amendment B
Amendment C
Amendment D
Amendment E

3. CB 121053 AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software.

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 5 - Kettle, Saka, Hollingsworth, Juarez, Nelson
Opposed: None

Attachments: Att 1 - 2025 SIR Real-Time Crime Center
Att 2 - 2025 SIR Real-Time Crime Center Executive Overview

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note

FINANCE, NATIVE COMMUNITIES, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS COMMITTEE:

4. CB 121046 AN ORDINANCE relating to public works contracts; amending provisions of the small works roster and contractor bond processes to align with state law; and amending Sections 20.40.020 and 20.48.010 of the Seattle Municipal Code.

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 4 - Strauss, Rivera, Nelson, Saka
Opposed: None

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note

LAND USE COMMITTEE:

5. CB 121049 AN ORDINANCE relating to land use and zoning; amending Chapter 23.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) at page 8 of the Official Land Use Map to rezone land in the Lake City neighborhood.

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 5 - Solomon, Strauss, Juarez, Rinck, Rivera
Opposed: None

Attachments: Att 1 - Lake City Rezone Map

Supporting Documents: Summary and Fiscal Note
Director's Report

6. CF 314536 Council waiver or modification of development standards to allow installation of 32 netting poles at Jefferson Park Golf Course (Project No. 3039491-LU; Type V).

The Committee recommends that City Council grant as conditioned the Clerk File (CF).
In Favor: 5 - Solomon, Strauss, Juarez, Rinck, Rivera
Opposed: None

Attachments: Jefferson Park Golf Course - Site Plan
SDCI Recommendation

Supporting Documents: Unsigned Findings, Conclusions, and Decision

I. ITEMS REMOVED FROM CONSENT CALENDAR

J. ADOPTION OF OTHER RESOLUTIONS

K. OTHER BUSINESS

L. ADJOURNMENT

Legislation Text

File #: IRC 495, **Version:** 1

September 9, 2025

SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

September 09, 2025

Introduction and Referral Calendar

List of proposed Council Bills (CB), Resolutions (Res), Appointments (Appt) and Clerk Files (CF) to be introduced and referred to a City Council committee

Record No.	Title	Committee Referral
By: Strauss		
1. CB 121070	AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 25, 2025, through August 29, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.	City Council
By: Nelson		
2. Res 32182	A RESOLUTION of intention to change the assessment rate and exemptions for the SODO Parking and Business Improvement Area and fix a date and place for a hearing thereon.	City Council
By: Nelson		
3. CB 121072	AN ORDINANCE relating to updating the structure and processes of the Office of City Auditor; amending Chapter 3.40 and Sections 14.08.040 and 14.08.050 of the Seattle Municipal Code; and repealing Section 15.52.100 of the Seattle Municipal Code.	Governance, Accountability, and Economic Development Committee
By: Nelson		
4. CB 121073	AN ORDINANCE relating to the SODO Parking and Business Improvement Area; changing the assessment rate and exemptions; and amending Ordinance 125678, as previously amended by Ordinance 126191.	Governance, Accountability, and Economic Development Committee
By: Nelson		
5. CB 121076	AN ORDINANCE relating to the University District Parking and Business Improvement Area; modifying the process for selecting a program manager; modifying the requirements governing the composition of the BIA Advisory Board; and amending Ordinance 126093.	Governance, Accountability, and Economic Development Committee
By: Nelson		
6. CB 121077	AN ORDINANCE relating to City employment; adopting a 2025 Citywide Position List.	Governance, Accountability, and Economic Development Committee

By: Solomon

7.	CB 121074	AN ORDINANCE relating to land use and zoning; amending Chapter 23.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code at page 100 of the Official Land Use Map to rezone parcels located at 352 Roy Street from Seattle Mixed Uptown with a 65 foot height limit and M Mandatory Housing Affordability suffix (SM-UP 65 (M)) to Seattle Mixed Uptown with an 85 foot height limit and M Mandatory Housing Affordability suffix (SM-UP 85 (M)); and accepting a Property Use and Development Agreements as a condition of rezone approval. (Application of Kamiak Real Estate LLC, C.F. 314534, SDCI Project 3041336-LU)	Land Use Committee

By: Rivera

8.	CB 121075	AN ORDINANCE relating to historic preservation; imposing controls upon Tolliver Temple Church of God in Christ, a landmark designated by the Landmarks Preservation Board under Chapter 25.12 of the Seattle Municipal Code, and adding it to the Table of Historical Landmarks contained in Chapter 25.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code.	Libraries, Education, and Neighborhoods Committee

By: Rivera

9.	Appt 03320	Appointment of VJ Kopacki as member, Landmarks Preservation Board, for a term to August 14, 2028.	Libraries, Education, and Neighborhoods Committee

By: Rivera

10.	Appt 03321	Appointment of Erica J. Thomas as member, Landmarks Preservation Board, for a term to August 14, 2028.	Libraries, Education, and Neighborhoods Committee

By: Kettle

11.	CB 121071	AN ORDINANCE relating to the Seattle Fire Code; clarifying provisions relating to preventable alarms and securing of premises, and amending Sections 112, 202, 311, and 901 of the 2021 Seattle Fire Code as adopted by Section 22.600.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code and as regulated and allowed by the State Building Code Act, chapter 19.27 of the Revised Code of Washington.	Public Safety Committee

Legislation Text

File #: Min 538, **Version:** 1

September 2, 2025

SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

600 Fourth Ave. 2nd Floor
Seattle, WA 98104

Journal of the Proceedings of the Seattle City Council

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

2:00 PM

Council Chamber, City Hall
600 4th Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104

City Council

Sara Nelson, Council President
Joy Hollingsworth, Member
Debora Juarez, Member
Robert Kettle, Member
Alexis Mercedes Rinck, Member
Maritza Rivera, Member
Rob Saka, Member
Mark Solomon, Member
Dan Strauss, Member

Chair Info: 206-684-8809; Sara.Nelson@seattle.gov

A. CALL TO ORDER

The City Council of The City of Seattle met in the Council Chamber in City Hall in Seattle, Washington, on September 2, 2025, pursuant to the provisions of the City Charter. The meeting was called to order at 2:04 p.m., with Council President Nelson presiding.

B. ROLL CALL

Present: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Excused: 1 - Hollingsworth

C. PRESENTATIONS

Council President Nelson presented a Proclamation proclaiming September 7, 2025 to be "Seahawks 50th Season Day!"

The following Councilmembers affixed their signature to the Proclamation: 8 - Juarez, Kettle, Nelson, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

By unanimous consent, the Council Rules were suspended to allow Council President Nelson to present the Proclamation, and to allow former Seattle Seahawks Quarterback, Jim Zorn, and Seahawks Vice President of Community Outreach, Mike Flood, to address the Council.

D. PUBLIC COMMENT

The following individuals addressed the Council:
Allan Francis
Linda Soriano
Chanel Horner
George Hacker
Timm Brown
Anitra Freeman
Julia Buck
Bill Clifford
Patrick McKee
Bennett Haselton
David Haines
BJ Last
Joe Kunzler
Lawaina M. Graciidis
Alex Tsimerman
Holly Heep

E. ADOPTION OF INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL CALENDAR:

IRC 494 **September 2, 2025**

By unanimous consent, the Introduction & Referral Calendar (IRC) was adopted.

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

F. APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA

By unanimous consent, the Agenda was adopted.

G. APPROVAL OF CONSENT CALENDAR

Motion was made by Council President Nelson, duly seconded and carried, to adopt the Consent Calendar.

Journal:

1. Min 536 **August 11, 2025**

The Minutes were adopted on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Minutes (Min):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

2. Min 537 **August 12, 2025**

The Minutes were adopted on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Minutes (Min):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

Bills:

3. CB 121061 **AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 4, 2025, through August 8, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

The Council Bill (CB) was passed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

4. CB 121066 **AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 11, 2025, through August 15, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

The Council Bill (CB) was passed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

5. CB 121067 **AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 18, 2025, through August 22, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

The Council Bill (CB) was passed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

Appointments:

PARKS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE:

6. Appt 03270 **Appointment of Jeremy Febus as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

7. Appt 03271 **Reappointment of Ebony Rose Frazier as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

8. Appt 03272 **Appointment of Rita Howard as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

9. Appt 03273 **Reappointment of Raj Kumar as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

10. Appt 03274 **Reappointment of Amanda Richer as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

11. Appt 03275 **Reappointment of Robin Schwartz as member, Seattle Public Utilities Customer Review Panel, for a term to July 31, 2028.**

The Committee recommends that City Council confirm the Appointment (Appt).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Appointment (Appt) was confirmed on the Consent Calendar by the following vote:

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

H. COMMITTEE REPORTS

PARKS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE:

1. CB 121036 **AN ORDINANCE relating to Seattle Parks and Recreation; authorizing the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to execute for and on behalf of The City of Seattle a concession agreement granting The Kite Cafe LLC the right to exclusive use and occupancy of the Golden Gardens Bathhouse Concession Premises for the purpose of providing food and concessions for park patrons at Golden Gardens Park.**

The Committee recommends that City Council pass as amended the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Council Bill (CB) was passed by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

2. CB 121056 **AN ORDINANCE authorizing the Superintendent of Seattle Parks and Recreation to enter into a Concession Agreement with Magnuson Brewing, LLC, to occupy and use a portion of the North Shore Recreation Area at Warren G. Magnuson Park to provide food and beverage concessions.**

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Council Bill (CB) was passed by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

3. CB 121057 **AN ORDINANCE relating to Seattle Parks and Recreation; authorizing the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to accept, for and on behalf of the City, certain donated improvements from the Seattle Parks Foundation for Westlake Park, identified as King County parcel number 197570-0175 at 401 Pine Street; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Council Bill (CB) was passed by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

4. CB 121005 **AN ORDINANCE relating to land use and zoning; updating and clarifying requirements for solid waste storage, staging areas, and access for residential, commercial, and industrial development; adding new requirements for Neighborhood Residential and industrial zones; updating provisions for alternative arrangements to meet requirements; and amending Sections 23.49.025, 23.54.040, and 23.84A.036 of the Seattle Municipal Code.**

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Council Bill (CB) was passed by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

5. CB 121043 **AN ORDINANCE relating to the Harbor Island Superfund Site; authorizing Seattle Public Utilities and Seattle City Light to agree to orders issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency regarding remediation of contamination at the East Waterway Operable Unit of the Harbor Island Superfund Site; and authorizing Seattle Public Utilities and Seattle City Light to enter into agreements with other parties to implement and share the costs of implementing those orders, including making commitments to expend funds not contemplated in the annual budget, consistent with RCW 35.32A.070.**

The Committee recommends that City Council pass the Council Bill (CB).
In Favor: 3 - Hollingsworth, Kettle, Strauss
Opposed: None

The Council Bill (CB) was passed by the following vote, and the President signed the Council Bill (CB):

In Favor: 8 - Nelson, Juarez, Kettle, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

Opposed: None

I. ITEMS REMOVED FROM CONSENT CALENDAR

There were none.

J. ADOPTION OF OTHER RESOLUTIONS

There were none.

K. OTHER BUSINESS

Councilmember Kettle presented a proclamation for signature proclaiming September 2025 to be "Childhood Cancer Awareness Month in Seattle." The following Councilmembers affixed their signature to the Proclamation: 8 - Juarez, Kettle, Nelson, Rinck, Rivera, Saka, Solomon, Strauss

By unanimous consent, Councilmembers Juarez, Solomon, and Strauss were excused from the September 16, 2025, City Council meeting

L. ADJOURNMENT

There being no further business to come before the Council, the meeting was adjourned at 3:24 p.m.

Jodee Schwinn, Deputy City Clerk

Signed by me in Open Session, upon approval of the Council, on September 9, 2025.

Sara Nelson, Council President of the City Council

File #: CB 121070, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 25, 2025, through August 29, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Payment of the sum of $14,613,545.62 on PeopleSoft 9.2 mechanical warrants numbered 4100963982- 4100965780 plus manual or cancellation issues for claims, e-payables of $44,699.24 on PeopleSoft 9.2 9100015614- 9100015632, and electronic financial transactions (EFT) in the amount of $73,698,078.19 are presented to the City Council under RCW 42.24.180 and approved consistent with remaining appropriations in the current Budget as amended.

Section 2. Payment of the sum of $68,553,628.86 on City General Salary Fund mechanical warrants numbered 10429386 - 10429823 plus manual warrants, agencies warrants, and direct deposits numbered 0000001 - 1012257 representing Gross Payrolls for payroll ending date August 26, 2025, as detailed in the Payroll Summary Report for claims against the City that were reported to the City Council September 4, 2025, is approved consistent with remaining appropriations in the current budget as amended.

Section 3. RCW 35.32A.090(1) states, “There shall be no orders, authorizations, allowances, contracts or payments made or attempted to be made in excess of the expenditure allowances authorized in the final budget as adopted or modified as provided in this chapter, and any such attempted excess expenditure shall be void and shall never be the foundation of a claim against the city.”

Section 4. Any act consistent with the authority of this ordinance taken prior to its effective date is

ratified and confirmed.

Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the 9th of September, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this 9th of September, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Office of City Finance	Kaitlin Klaustermeier	Lorine Cheung

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title:
AN ORDINANCE appropriating money to pay certain claims for the week of August 25, 2025, through August 29, 2025, and ordering the payment thereof; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts. Claims include all financial payment obligations for bills and payroll paid out of PeopleSoft for the covered.

Summary and Background of the Legislation:
RCW 42.24.180 requires that payment of certain claims be authorized by the City Council. This bill, prepared each week by the City Treasury, authorizes the payments of funds that were previously appropriated by the City Council, so the passage of this bill does not have a direct result on the City's budget.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ☐ **Yes** ■ **No**

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City? ☐ **Yes** ■ **No**

This bill authorizes the payments of funds that were previously appropriated by the City Council, so the passage of this bill does not have a direct result on the City's budget.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.
The legislation authorizes the payment of valid claims. If the City does not pay its legal obligations it could face greater legal and financial liability.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Please describe how this legislation may affect any departments besides the originating department.
This type of legislation authorizes payment of bill and payroll expenses for all City departments.

b. Does this legislation affect a piece of property? If yes, please attach a map and explain any impacts on the property. Please attach any Environmental Impact Statements, Determinations of Non-Significance, or other reports generated for this property.
No.

c. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.

i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.
N/A

ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.
N/A

iii. What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?
N/A

d. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.
N/A

ii. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.
N/A

e. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?
N/A

5. CHECKLIST

☐ **Is a public hearing required?**

☐ **Is publication of notice with *The Daily Journal of Commerce* and/or *The Seattle Times* required?**

☐ **If this legislation changes spending and/or revenues for a fund, have you reviewed the relevant fund policies and determined that this legislation complies?**

☐ **Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?**

6. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments:
None.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03248, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Agni Bhattacharya as member, Seattle Renters' Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Agni Bhattacharya*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Renters' Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Fremont*	**Zip Code:** *98103*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Agni is a product manager at Stripe, a fintech company, in their Seattle office, and a former venture capital-backed entrepreneur. He rents in the Fremont neighborhood of Seattle, and is excited to join the Seattle Renters Commission to balance the triangle of needs between renters, landlords, and developers by leveraging quantitative and qualitative insights from all stakeholders to drive equitable and meaningful policy change for Seattle renters.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 11th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

AGNI BHATTACHARYA

EXPERIENCE

Staff Product Manager, Banking Fraud Team *Feb 2024 – present*
Stripe *| Seattle, WA*
• Built rules-based heuristics and machine learning models to combat banking fraud

Founder (Technical)/CEO *Jun 2022 – Feb 2024*
Alma Banking *(Y Combinator S22) | Palo Alto, CA & Seattle, WA*
- Launched a gamified mobile banking app where users can win prizes up to $1M every Wednesday
- Raised $2M funding from top venture capital funds (YC, Franklin Tempelton, Pioneer Fund, Xoogler, Gaingels)
- Sourced, recruited and managed cross-functional team of 25 to drive product roadmapping, strategy and GTM
- Engineered backend APIs and mobile UI that processed $1M+ monthly payment volume, growing at 80% MoM
- Executed growth strategy, onboarding 6.5K users at $20 customer acquisition cost vs $200 industry benchmark

Senior Product Manager, Meta Pay Wallet Growth *Feb 2020 – Jun 2022*
Meta *| Menlo Park, CA & Seattle, WA*
- Grew Meta Pay user base from 180K to 20M by shipping growth products and managing $XM budget
- Shipped one-click checkout, boosting ecommerce conversion rates by 20% (+$XX M revenue) within 3 months
- Collaborated cross-functionally with Ads Delivery team to drive ads delivery efficiency by 0.21% ($XX M)
- Recognized by HR as a "recruitment hero" ($5K award) for high (top 1%) volume of candidate interviews

Founder (Technical) *Feb 2020 – May 2022*
Haight Street Apps LLC *(a mobile gaming business) | San Francisco, CA*
- Launched Word Connect game, growing to 1M installs, 4.8 star rating, $0.80 CAC (vs. $5 industry benchmark)
- Hired and directed a team of 4 software engineers, 1 designer, 1 game artist, 1 project manager and 1 QA
- Sold game IP to Nomad Internet (TX-based internet company) for 6x annual revenue, resulting in $X M exit

Group Product Manager, B2B Growth *Aug 2018 – Feb 2020*
Aura *(a series D fintech company)* | *San Francisco, CA*
- Led a team of two product managers, owning a portfolio of financial products driving ~$60M annual revenue
- Reduced B2B onboarding costs by 28% by negotiating contracts and implementing CRM software
- Improved day-30 retention by 60% by shipping a Welcome Bonus feature for new customers

Product Manager, Zynga Poker Monetization *Aug 2017 – Aug 2018*
Zynga | *San Francisco, CA*
- Boosted Android in-app purchase (IAP) conversion by 23% via Google collaboration on a $0.50 starter IAP
- Increased ads revenue/user by 5% by segmenting player audiences to optimize in-game video ads delivery
- Initiated and led biweekly user experience research (UXR) call to shape roadmap via qualitative insights

EDUCATION

Johns Hopkins University *| B.A. in Applied Math and Biology, focus in Bioinformatics*
- Westgate ($200K) and Brennan ($5K) Merit Scholarships, Dean's List (4x), GPA: 3.52/4.0, SAT: 2320/2400
- Internships in software engineering at Mediaocean and technology strategy consulting at Deloitte
- Volunteer GED Instructor at Baltimore City Jail, TA (Bioinformatics), DJ Club (President), Sigma Phi Epsilon

Seattle Renters' Commission

15 Members: Pursuant to *Ordinance 125280, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *2*-year terms

Appointing Authority for SRC Member Positions

- *6* City Council-appointed (Positions 1 through 6)
- *7* Mayor-appointed (Positions 7 through 12 and Position 15)
- *2* Commission-appointed (Positions 13 and 14)

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	4	1.	Member	Liz Fite	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Council
3	F	3	2.	Member	Julissa Sanchez	3/1/25	2/28/27	2	Council
6	FT	5	3.	Member	Adora Blue	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Council
6	F	2	4.	Member	Kate Rubin	3/1/25	2/28/27	2	Council
6	F	5	5.	Member	Sally M. Kinney	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Council
6	M	4	6.	Member	Allan Francis	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Council
6	M	3	7.	Member	Sam Wolfson	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor
6	F	3	8.	Member	Lydia Felty	3/1/25	2/28/27	2	Mayor
2	F	5	9.	Member	E. Mandisa Subira	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor
		2	10.	Member	Kasey Burton	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Mayor
9	F	3	11.	Member	Angela O'Brien	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor
3	M	3	12.	Member	Daniel E. Lugo	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Mayor
2	M	2	13.	Member	Andrew Ashiofu	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Commission
6	F	2	14.	Member	Karen Taylor	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Commission
			15.	Get Engaged Member	Agni Bhattacharya	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	Male (1)	Female (2)	Transgender/ Non-Binary (3)	NB/ O/ U (4)	Asian (5)	Black/ African American (6)	Hispanic/ Latino (7)	American Indian/ Alaska Native (8)	Other (9)
Mayor	2	3				1	1		
Council	1	5	1				1		1
Other	1	1				1			
Total	4	8	1			2	2		1

	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic (6)	Pacific Islander (7)	Middle Eastern (8)	Multi-racial (9)
Mayor	1			1
Council	5			
Other	1			
Total	7			1

Please Note: Information in this table may not accurately reflect the number of commissioners and/or demographics on the commission due to missing information and multiple selections.

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03276, **Version:** 1

Appointment of BB Denton as member, Seattle LGBTQ Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *BB Denton*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle LGBTQ Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Ravenna*	**Zip Code:** *98115*	**Contact Phone No.*:*** [redacted]
Background: *BB Denton (They/Them/Theirs) is an early career professional raised in Seattle, with a background in healthcare, human rights, and community building. They live in Ravenna and are a recent graduate of the University of Washington, and Puget Sound Sage's Community Leadership Institute. Their work and studies have centered around the role of POC and QTBIPOC communities in policy and organizing. BB is especially interested in advancing access to housing, healthcare, and transit. They hope to bring a community-centered perspective to the commission, fostering deeper connections between the commission, the city, and the people they serve.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature):  **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th. 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

BB Denton

[redacted]

Education

University of Washington / Seattle, WA / March 2024 / 3.92 GPA
Bachelor of Arts in International Studies and minor in Arctic Studies.
Honors & Awards: *Diversity Leadership Development Certificate* (Samuel E. Kelly Ethnic Cultural Center) / *Annual & Quarterly Dean's List Recipient* (Autumn 2020 - Winter 2024)
Study Abroad: Rikkyo University, Tokyo (Spring Semester 2023)
Affiliated Organizations: Modality, Students for Sensible Drug Policy, Jackson School Journal of International Studies (Peer Reviewer), Real Change (volunteer)

Skills

Japanese (language)	Policy Analysis
Public Speaking	Organization
Report Writing	Administration

Experience

Community Leadership Institute Fellow / Puget Sound Sage / Seattle, WA
September 2024-Present

- Trained by community leaders on local issues including zoning, transit, and climate.
- Developed storytelling, advocacy, and strategic planning skills to support equitable policy creation.

Patient Services Specialist / UWMC Outpatient Rehab Therapies / Seattle, WA
April 2024 - Present

- Processed referrals, scheduled patients, and communicated with providers in a timely manner.
- Supported patients in accessing relevant resources and resolving outstanding issues.
- Maintained a clean and organized work station per DOH requirements.

Events and Outreach Intern / UW Sustainability / Seattle, WA
September 2023 - March 2024

- Assisted in the planning, coordination, and execution of various events including exhibitor fairs, teach-ins, and workshops.
- Collaborated on the expansion of community engagement through traditional and social media, as well as physical outreach, focusing on non-ecologically focused entities.

Co-Director / Sexual Assault and Relationship Violence Activists (SARVA) / Seattle, WA
September 2022 - April 2023

- Directed a diversity commission with thousands of constituents at UW by fulfilling roles such as personnel recruitment, social media marketing, research, and political advocacy.
- Coordinated and mentored a team of seven interns on various projects and events.
- Undertook administrative roles such as scheduling, budgeting, and recruitment.

Constituent Relations Intern / Gender Equity Commission / Seattle, WA
November 2021 - June 2022

- Created content for and helped to manage various social media accounts and newsletters.
- Identified key campus stakeholders, working to expand connections with existing organizations representing historically marginalized communities.

Seattle Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Commission
July 2025

21 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.14.920,* all members subject to City Council confirmation, *2* -year terms except for the Get Engaged member who will serve a 1-year term pursuant to SMC 3.51:

- *8*City Council-appointed
- *9*Mayor-appointed
- *4*Other Appointing Authority-appointed: Commission-appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
		4	1.	Member	Jessa Gavrielle Davis	5/1/25	4/30/27	1	City Council
			2.	Member	VACANT	5/1/25	4/30/27	1	Mayor
			3.	Member	Sinomi Adeleine Sison	5/1/25	4/30/27	1	City Council
			4.	Member	Robert Parkstone	5/1/25	4/30/27	1	Mayor
		3	5.	Member	Jeremy Erdman	5/1/25	4/30/27	2	City Council
		5	6.	Member	Carl G Harris	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Mayor
		3	7.	Member	Kody Allen	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Commission
			8.	Member	VACANT	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Mayor
		4	9.	Member	Maha Roy	5/1/24	4/30/26	1	City Council
		7	10.	Member	Jason Self	5/1/24	4/30/26	1	Mayor
		5	11.	Member	Theresa Smith	5/1/24	4/30/26	1	City Council
		2	12.	Member	Brett Pepowski	5/1/24	4/30/26	2	Mayor
		3	13.	Member	Landon Labosky	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	City Council
		3	14.	Member	Barry Fuentes	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	Mayor
		5	15.	Member	Christina Pizaña	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	City Council
		4	16.	Get Engaged	BB Denton	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor
		5	17.	Member	Ashley E. Ford	5/1/24	4/30/26	1	City Council
			18.	Member	Scott Humphreys	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Mayor
		1	19.	Member	Chris Curia	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Commission
		3	20.	Member	Andrew Ashiofu	5/1/24	4/30/26	2	Commission
		7	21.	Member	Amari Leach	5/1/24	4/30/26	1	Commission

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Transgender	(4) Unknown	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor							1	1		1			1
Council						1	3		2				
Comm							1				1		
Total													

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M** = Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03277, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Charlie Vu Nguyen as member, Seattle Disability Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Charlie Vu Nguyen*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Disability Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *First Hill*	**Zip Code:** *98104*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Charlie lives in the First Hill neighborhood and works in Downtown Seattle. He values helping out in the local community, and he hopes to further his civic engagement by serving on the Seattle Disability Commission. He is familiar with disability matters though life and professional experiences, and he aims to use his knowledge and skills to support the commission's goal of being a voice for the disability community.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Charlie Vu Nguyen

[redacted]

EDUCATION

University of Pennsylvania
August 2019 - May 2023 | Philadelphia, PA 19104

- BA in History: World History
- Cumulative GPA: 3.78/4.0 | Major GPA: 3.89/4.0 | Honor Society: Phi Alpha Theta

WORK EXPERIENCE

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), *Investigator*
September 2023 - Present | 909 First Avenue, Suite 400, Seattle, WA 98104

- Conducted over 200 interviews during Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 to investigate allegations of employment discrimination, including interviews with aggrieved individuals, attorneys, witnesses, and management officials.
- Analyzed information and evidence, including documentary and testimonial evidence, to produce investigative reports and reach resolutions for over 90 cases of alleged employment discrimination during FY 2024.
- Facilitated discussions and negotiated monetary and injunctive relief among complainants, defendants, and associated counsel. Drafted and reached final execution on settlement agreements, including obtaining over $100,000 in monetary relief to date in FY 2025 (Oct. 2024 – Sept. 2025).

Penn Hospitality Services, *Guest Services Attendant*
May - August 2022 & June - August 2023 | 3702 Spruce St, Philadelphia, PA 19104

- Provided consistent and quality customer service to inhabitants and guests of residential buildings.

Fuse Lenses, *Lab Technician*
June - August 2019 & May - August 2020 | 1686 N Belcher Road, Clearwater, FL 33765

- Operated technical equipment to manufacture replacement sunglass lenses at an efficient rate of production.

LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE

AANHPI Network (EEOC Voluntary Employee Organization), *Secretary*
February 2024 – January 2025 (Suspended in January 2025 due to Executive Order 14151) | Seattle, WA 98104

- Collaborated with board members to organize monthly networking, professional development, and social events for EEOC employees to engage in, including facilitating a panelist event with over 200 attendees during AANHPI (Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islanders) Heritage Month in May 2024.

American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), *Local Y.O.U.N.G. Coordinator*
June 2024 - Present | Seattle, WA 98104

- Serving as the Local Y.O.U.N.G. (Young Organizing Unionists for the Next Generation) Coordinator for AFGE Local 3230 to disseminate union information and recruit due-paying members. Following January 2025 administration changes, consistently relayed AFGE-approved information to employees with concerns and successfully converted employees to dues-paying membership.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Seattle Central College, *ESL Tutor*
March 2024 - Present | 1701 Broadway, Room 3122, Seattle, WA 98122

- Providing tutoring services to adult students taking courses in English as a Second Language.

Friends of the Seattle Public Library, *Book Shop (FriendShop) Volunteer*
April 2024 - Present | 1000 4th Ave, Seattle, WA 98104

- Providing customer service to promote book and gift sales that help financially support the Seattle Public Library.

St. James Cathedral, *Garden Volunteer*
April 2024 - Present | 921 Terry Ave, Seattle, WA 98104

- Performing gardening work to generate produce for the Cathedral Kitchen to use in providing meals for those in need in the local community.

UNDERGRADUATE ACTIVITIES

Penn Judo Club, *Treasurer*
April 2022 - May 2023 | Philadelphia, PA 19104

- Managed finances of the club through collecting dues, preparing budget request forms, and creating invoices. Coordinated with fellow board members to manage the operations of the club, including organizing intercollegiate tournaments.

Penn Habitat for Humanity, *Fundraising Committee Member*
November 2021 - May 2023 | Philadelphia, PA 19104

- Cooperated in a committee to organize fundraising events like profit shares and bake sales, and contributed to the operations of volunteer activities, including Thanksgiving food drives, Rake-A-Thons, and demolition programs.

Penn Vietnamese Student Association (VSA), *Culture Show Backstage Crew Member*
September 2021 - May 2023 | Philadelphia, PA 19104

- Collaborated on operations and organization of the backstage crew for two annual Penn VSA Culture Shows - conducted to recognize Vietnamese and Vietnamese-American identities.

Seattle Disability Commission
July 2025

21 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.14.920,* all members subject to City Council confirmation, *2*-year terms except for the Get Engaged member who will serve a 1-year term pursuant to SMC 3.51:

- *8*City Council-appointed
- *9*Mayor-appointed (includes 1 Get-engaged Mayor position)
- *4*Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify): Commission-appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
1	F	7	1.	Member	Samiya Nasim	5/01/25	4/30/27	1	Mayor
			2.	Member	VACANT	5/01/25	4/30/27	1	City Council
6	M	2	3.	Member	Scot Nelson	5/01/25	4/30/27	1	Mayor
			4.	Member	VACANT	5/01/25	4/30/27	1	City Council
			5.	Member	VACANT	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Mayor
			6.	Member	VACANT	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	City Council
			7.	Member	VACANT	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Mayor
			8.	Member	VACANT	11/1/23	10/31/25	1	Commission
			9.	Member	VACANT	5/01/24	4/30/26	1	City Council
			10.	Member	VACANT	5/01/24	4/30/26	1	Mayor
			11.	Member	VACANT	5/01/24	4/30/26	1	City Council
			12.	Member	VACANT	5/01/24	4/30/26	1	Mayor
3	F	7	13.	Member	Bianca Gallegos	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	City Council
			14.	Member	VACANT	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	Mayor
6	F	7	15.	Member	Jessica Jensen	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	City Council
3	M	1	16.	Get Engaged	Charlie Vu Nguyen	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor
			17.	Member	VACANT	5/01/24	4/30/26	2	City Council
			18.	Member	VACANT	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	Mayor
6	F	7	19.	Member	Shelby Dey	5/01/24	4/30/26	2	Commission
			20.	Member	VACANT	11/1/24	10/31/26	1	Commission
6	F	1	21.	Member	Kaitlin Skilton	11/1/24	10/31/26	3	Commission

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	Male (1)	Female (2)	Transgender (3)	NB/ O/ U (4)	Asian (5)	Black/ African American (6)	Hispanic / Latino (7)	American Indian/ Alaska Native (8)	Other (9)	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	2	1			2					1			
Council		2					1			1			
Other		2								2			
Total	2	5			2		1			4			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03278, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Hector Garcia as member, Seattle Human Rights Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Hector Garcia*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Human Rights Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *University District*	**Zip Code:** *98105*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Hector is a passionate advocate with a strong foundation in human rights, community empowerment, and public service. He brings firsthand experience addressing systemic issues in housing, justice, healthcare, and youth advocacy. His leadership includes roles with Planned Parenthood, advancing reproductive healthcare access, and Point One North, promoting restorative justice. Committed to uplifting youth, Hector strives to be a bridge between young people and policymakers, ensuring youth voices shape inclusive, equitable policy. He hopes to advocate for underserved communities, grow as a civic leader, and learn from seasoned commissioners using this experience to strengthen his pursuit of a legal career and deepen his lifelong commitment to justice and systemic change.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Hector Garcia

• [redacted]

Poised and dedicated Community Director with 5 years of business management experience specializing in stabilizing, fostering innovation, and maximizing revenue. Strong leader with demonstrated ability to execute vision, empathy, adaptability and resilience.

Experience

March 2024- Present- Part Time

Sales and Marketing Specialist | Palette Painting Studio| Seattle,WA

- Conducted market research to identify customer trends, competitive landscapes, and opportunities for growth.
- Acquired 43% of new accounts by performing door to door sales and creating strong relationships with property managers, owners, and developers.
- Sustained 100% client satisfaction by checking in during and after services and identifying any potential issues, promptly resolved any concerns.
- Balanced multiple projects and deadlines by implementing weekly prioritization framework improving productivity by 30%.

July 2022- March 2024

Community Director | Indigo Real Estate| Seattle,WA

- Managed all aspects of a class A 110-unit University District apartment community, catering to high net-income residential, retail, and corporate tenants.
- Processed legal documents for evictions, unit abandonment, major building mutilation, and MFTE affordable housing audits.
- Handled monthly financial reporting, expense and revenue tracking, and accounts payable/receivable, keeping a 60%-70% average renewal rate.
- Prepared and executed annual budget by analyzing prior year expenses, CapX projects, profit and loss statements and forecasting based on market trends.
- Maintained average 97% occupancy rate by Researching market trends and implemented marketing strategies such as leasing specials, website designs, social media campaigns, SEO campaigns, resident satisfaction surveys.

November 2020- July 2022

Property Manager| HubCentral| Seattle,WA

- Oversaw resident relations, maintenance, and administrative functions to ensure smooth operations for 2 properties, (82 units).

- Successfully increased rent rate by 12% while retaining 95% by conducting resident communications and negotiations effectively.
- Maintained a strong understanding of local landlord tenant and fair housing laws and served legal notices when needed to ensure harmonious living.
- Collaborated with vendors to negotiate favorable contracts and reduce expenses by 20%-30% budgeted.

August 2020- March 2022 – Part time

Operations Specialist| West Seattle Health Club| Seattle, WA

- **L**ead a team of 6 front desk staff, and 4 housekeeping staff by training, monitoring staff performance, and ensuring proper scheduling according to business needs during pandemic.
- Conducted regular financial audits, identifying and addressing discrepancies and potential revenue leaks and collecting 75% of delinquent accounts.
- Assisted with membership sales, renewals, cancellations.
- Managed risk mitigation by ensuring health code compliance in pool, cleanliness, and that gym equipment was regularly maintained.
- Daily reporting to General manager regarding sales, incidents,, structural and member feedback.
- General Support to staff and management.

Skills and Interest

✓ Skills: Proficient in Yardi, Buildium, CRM Software • Innovative • Intuitive • Adaptability • Data analysis

✓ Interest: Gastronome • Economic Empowerment • Art • Social Affair • Health and Fitness

✓ Languages: English and Spanish Proficient

Education

Renton Technical College
High school Diploma

Certified Apartment Manager (CAM) NAA 2023

Seattle Human Rights Commission

May 2025

21 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.14.920,* all members subject to City Council confirmation, *2*-year terms except for the Get Engaged member who will serve a 1-year term pursuant to SMC 3.51:

- *8* City Council-appointed
- *9* Mayor-appointed (includes 1 Get-engaged Mayor position)
- *4* Other Appointing Authority-appointed: Commission-appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
1	F		1.	Member	Bryennah Quander	7/23/23	7/22/25	1	City Council
	M		2.	Member	Trevor Duston	7/23/23	7/22/25	1	Mayor
	F		3.	Member	Amy Bailey	7/23/23	7/22/25	1	City Council
	F		4.	Member	Gwen McCullough	7/23/23	7/22/25	1	Mayor
	M		5.	Member	James Munger	7/23/23	7/22/25	1	City Council
	M		6.	Member	Kyle Tibbs	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	Mayor
	F		7.	Member	Mariam Sulayman Koss	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	City Council
	M		8.	Member	Calvin Lassiter	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	Commission
	F		9.	Member	Beverly Smith	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	Mayor
	F		10.	Member	Koumudi Phadake	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	City Council
	M		11.	Member	VACANT	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	Mayor
	F		12.	Member	Anika Khan	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	City Council
	F		13.	Member	Kristina Sawyckyj	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	Mayor
	M		14.	Member	Ali Khan	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	City Council
	F		15.	Member	Diana Ortega-Chance	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	Mayor
3	M	4	16.	Get Engaged	Hector Garcia	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor
	M		17.	Member	Phillip Lewis	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	City Council
	F		18.	Member	Katie Gonser	1/23/24	1/22/26	3	Mayor
	M		19.	Member	Goutham Putta	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	Commission
	M		20.	Member	Nicholas Leydon	1/23/24	1/22/26	1	Commission
	F		21.	Member	Miranda Catsambas	7/23/24	7/22/26	1	Commission

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	5					1			1			
Council	3	5				1	1						
Comm	3	2				1							
Total	19												

List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9) ****G** L ist *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown ****RD** Residential Council District number

Key: ***D** 1 through 7 or N/A -Diversity info is self-identified and voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03279, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Sofia Brown as member, Seattle Women's Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Sofia Brown*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Women's Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *University Heights*	**Zip Code:** *98105*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Sofia is currently a student at the University of Washington studying Political Science and Public Policy. She is passionate about equitable urban development and has a strong interest in how planning decisions impact communities. Through her academic work and volunteer experience with local advocacy groups, she has developed a commitment to amplifying underrepresented voices in decision making processes. She hopes to bring a thoughtful, research-informed perspective to the board and contribute to shaping a more inclusive, sustainable city.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Sofia Brown

[redacted]

Skills

Applications: Microsoft Word, Google Docs, Sheets, Slides, etc.
Customer service experience
Leadership and event planning experience

Education **Expected Graduation 2027**

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science,
Minor in Public Policy
University of Washington Seattle

Relevant Coursework

- CS&SS 221 A: Statistical Concepts And Methods For The Social Sciences
- PUBPOL 303 A: Methods Of Policy Inquiry
- PUBPOL 302 A: Public Service Leadership
- ENVIR/SMEA 201: Climate Governance: How Individuals, Communities, Ngos, Firms, And Governments Can Solve The Climate Crisis
- POL S 407 A: International Conflict

Relevant Projects and Research

- PUBPOL 302 Public Service Analysis Projects
    - Conducted fieldwork in the Chinatown-International District, Northgate, and Rainier Valley.
    - Participated in guided tours by local leaders, community members, and political figures.
    - Completed in-depth research on regional policy challenges and political history to propose informed service solutions.

Work and Leadership Experience

- **Coal Creek YMCA | Lifeguard 2022-Present**
    - Description: Guarding the pools, assisting with activities, problem solving for members, managing the schedule.
- **Junior State of America Co-director of Fundraising**
    - Designing merchandise and setting prices
    - Selling merchandise at conventions and events
    - Managing profits, and helping allocate money for conventions and events.

Seattle Women's Commission
May 2025

21 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.14.920, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *2*-year terms:

- *8* City Council-appointed
- *9* Mayor-appointed -plus one Get Engaged.
- *4* Other Appointing Authority-appointed: Commission-appointed

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
	F		1.	Member	Theashionna Owens	7/02/25	7/01/27	1	Mayor
			2.	Member	VACANT	7/02/24	7/01/26		Mayor
	F		3.	Member	Hannah Glover	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	Mayor
	F		4.	Member	Naseem Ghazanfari	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	Mayor
			5.	Member	VACANT	7/02/25	7/01/27		Mayor
			6.	Member	VACANT	7/02/25	7/01/27		Mayor
	F		7.	Member	Eunji Han	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	Mayor
	F		8.	Member	Krystal Guerrero	7/02/24	7/01/26	2	Commission
			9.	Member	VACANT	7/02/25	7/01/27		Mayor
	F		10.	Member	Neely Evanoff	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	City Council
	F		11.	Member	Emily Rose Barr	7/02/25	7/01/27	2	City Council
	F		12.	Member	Mariah Rivera	7/02/23	7/01/25	1	City Council
	F		13.	Member	Vinati Mamidala	7/02/24	7/01/26	3	City Council
	F		14.	Member	Talley Mills	7/02/24	7/01/26		City Council
	F		15.	Member	Jennifer Tran	7/02/23	7/01/25	1	City Council
	F		16.	Member	Kate Faoro Wright	7/02/23	7/01/25		City Council
	F		17.	Member	Nardos Tola	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	Commission
	F		18.	Member	Amanda DeFisher	7/02/24	7/01/26	1	City Council
	F		19.	Member	Whitney Nakamura	7/02/24	7/01/26	3	Commission
			20.	Member	Nadia Goforth	7/02/25	7/01/27	1	Commission
6	F	4	21.	Get Engaged	Sofia Brown	9/01/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	(1) Asian	(2) Black/ African American	(3) Hispanic/ Latino	(4) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(5) Other	(6) Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	(7) Pacific Islander	(8) Middle Eastern	(9) Multiracial
Mayor	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Council	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Comm	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	16	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Key: *Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.*

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)

****G** List *gender*, **M** = Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **U**= Unknown

RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03280, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Eric Alipio as member, Seattle Design Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Eric Alipio*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Design Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Ballard*	**Zip Code:** *98107*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Currently pursuing his Master of Landscape Architecture at the University of Washington, Eric Alipio is passionate about co-creating spaces that nurture people and place alike. Putting his studies into practice, Eric works at the Burke Museum of Natural History and Culture centering Traditional Ecological Knowledge on both land restoration and urban agriculture projects, as well as interning at Puget Sound Regional Council. Having served in a variety of advisory capacities within our local and regional government (such as within OPCD, King County Executive Department, and Seattle Parks & Rec) and alongside various Indigenous community groups and businesses, he aims to utilize his experiences to continue uplifting historically marginalized voices in the design of our rapidly expanding city.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature):  **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

ERIC ALIPIO

[redacted]

Highlights

A first-year Master of Urban Planning and Master of Landscape Architecture student with a passion for community building, Indigenous placemaking, and collaborative social change. With eight years of experience managing diverse teams, advocating for various minoritized communities, organizing impactful events, and improving organizational systems along the way, I am dedicated to fostering community elevation. Social and racial justice prove to be activators and guides of both professional and artistic pursuits. Whether publishing op-eds through city government and local newspaper, developing sustainable business practices for a Native-owned company, or reviewing county policies through an equity lens, I seek opportunities to strengthen and connect communities.

Education

University of Washington || *Master of Urban Planning* || *Master of Landscape Architecture* **||** Seattle, WA || Expected June 2028

Puget Sound Sage || *Community Leadership Institute Fellow* || Seattle, WA || Jul 2023 - May 2024

University of Washington || *Bachelor of Arts - English* || *Minor - Art History* **||** Seattle, WA || Sep 2016 - May 2020

Native People's Academy for Community Engagement (PACE) || Seattle, WA || Apr 2021 - May 2021

Experience

Native Ecosystems Lead || *Burke Museum of Natural History and Culture* || Seattle, WA || Aug 2024 - Present

- Research and employ traditional and contemporary methods of Indigenous agriculture
- Develop and plan engagement activities for students across UW Seattle's campus, specifically programs and events that center Indigenous knowledge and culture
- Collaboratively craft Native Garden crop plan and organize community plot stewardship

Community Advisory Group Member || *OPCD, City of Seattle* || Seattle, WA || Nov 2023 – Present

- Collaboratively create an Equitable Transit-Oriented Development (ETOD) Strategy and Implementation Plan
- Help identify issues that are important to affected minoritized communities, make proposals, and direct supporting staff on research tasks and evaluating potential tools and strategies

Community Design Partner || *Parks & Recreation, City of Seattle* || Seattle, WA || Nov 2022 - Janx2 2025

- Selected from competitive community applicant pool based on a curated architectural design proposal to act as the creative lead of the schematic design for Dr. José Rizal Park
- Oversee the Dr. José Rizal Park redesign project from design through to construction including culturally responsive community engagement approaches

Board Member || *Hollow Earth Radio* || Seattle, WA || Mar 2023 - Nov 2024

- Directed radio operations and logistics as a voting member on the board
- Developed the direction and tone of board committee work influencing scope of community impact
- Fostered opportunities for connection within arts & culture communities across the Seattle area

Warehouse Operations and Procurement Manager || *Eighth Generation* || Seattle, WA || Mar 2023 - May 2024

- Coordinated both domestic and international procurement of over 300 different products and supplies
- Handled all aspects of logistics and procurement from sourcing to delivery to order fulfillment
- Managed $2 million yearly purchasing budget
- Managed and guided a team of 5 employees towards department success

Equity Workgroup Member || *King County Comprehensive Plan* || King County, WA || Sep 2022 - Feb 2024

- Participated in dialogue that supports the inclusion of historically disadvantaged voices in the King County Comprehensive Plan
- Co-created public participation plan with King County to engage & empower minoritized communities
- Reviewed regional plan policies, procedures & practices as part of an equity impact analysis process
- Selected to represent Urban Native populations & serve the region by uplifting Indigenous priorities & challenging status quo within urban planning process rooted in colonial ideals

Warehouse Manager || *Eighth Generation* || Seattle, WA || Jul 2022 - Mar 2023

- Generated over $250,000 in wholesale sales
- Initiated over 50 new wholesale partnerships (domestic and international)
- Maintained and managed +$1,000,000 of inventory for all departments within the company facilitating interdepartmental collaboration and communication at any given time
- Guided the warehouse team to fulfilling 20,000 orders for our online retail business

Director || *ASUW American Indian Student Commission* || Seattle, WA || Aug 2018 - Jun 2020

- Created and coordinated over 20 successful programs and maintained a budget of $10,500, which included a powwow that was attended by 1,000 people
- Designed all marketing materials used for advertising events and programs the commission hosted
- Served as a representative for Indigenous advocacy & acted liaison between the student body, UW faculty & staff, native leaders/tribal members across WA state
- Spoke directly with regional Tribal councils in developing plans to better support Native students, their retention, and improve graduation rates through conferences such as the Tribal Leadership Summit and ATNI

Publications

"Makings of a 'Real Indian': Reflections In Anticipation of Native American History Month," Author, *Department of Neighborhoods*, *Front Porch Blog*, City of Seattle, Oct 2022

- A short opinion piece on Native American identity and modernity

"We Must Free Leonard Peltier," Author, *South Seattle Emerald*, Mar 2022

- An op-ed explaining who Leonard Peltier is and the importance of his release from political imprisonment

"Moving Forward / Backward: my oracular outlook of some future," Author/Designer, *Self Published*, Feb 2022

- Mini essays accompanied by film photographs analyzing personal and cultural connections to nature, which was fully self-designed in writing, photography, layout, and print

"The First 36," Author/Designer**,** *Self Published*, Apr 2021

- An early film photography portfolio fully self-designed from photographing to layout to print

"In Plain Sight: Fiona Connor Response," Contributor, *Henry Art Gallery, Interpretive Guide*, Apr 2019

- A mini essay reflecting on the work of Fiona Connor's exhibition at the Henry Art Gallery, which was published by the Henry Art Gallery for the exhibition opening

Seattle Design Commission

The Seattle Design Commission advises the Mayor, City Council, and City departments on the design and environmental implications of City funded projects, projects seeking long-term or permanent use of a right of way, or public projects seeking City approval. The Commission is comprised of 10 members, as established by Seattle Municipal Code Section 3.58. Members serve a two year term and are eligible for two consecutive terms. All members are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.
A Chair is also appointed on each year. The Chair is selected by Commissioners for appointment by the Mayor and confirmation by the Council for a one year term.

New appointments are **bold and underline**.

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	3	1.	Urban Planner	Ray Gastil	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Mayor
4	**M**	**6**	**2.**	**Get Engaged**	**Eric Alipio**	**9/1/25**	**8/31/26**	**1**	**Mayor**
6	M	4	3.	Engineer (Civil/Transportation)	Brian Markham	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor
8	F	3	4.	At-large	Shirin Masoudi	3/1/25	2/28/27	1	Mayor
1	M	3	5.	Architect	Zubin Rao	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor
6	F	5	6.	Landscape Architect	Phoebe Erin Bogert	3/1/25	2/28/27	2	Mayor
6	M	2	7.	Architect	Ben Gist	3/1/25	2/28/27	2	Mayor
6	NB	2	8.	Urban Designer	Molly Spetalnick	3/1/23	2/28/25	2	Mayor
6	M	6	9.	Transportation Planner/Chair (1 year appointment)	Kevin O'Neill	3/1/25 3/1/25	2/28/27 2/28/26	2	Mayor
6	F	3	10.	Fine Artist	Kate Clark	3/1/24	2/28/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	5	4		1	1			1		7		1	
Council													
Other													
Total	5	4		1	1			1		7		1	

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03281, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Keeanna Andres as member, Design Review Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Keeanna Andres*		
Board/Commission Name: *Design Review Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Magnolia*	**Zip Code:** *98199*	**Contact Phone No.*:*** [redacted]

Background:

Keeanna is an architectural designer of Native Hawaiian, Filipino, and Chinese heritage, currently working with 7 Directions Architects/Planners — a firm focused on Indigenous and community-centered design. She holds a Master of Architecture from the University of Washington and a Bachelor of Science in Architecture from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Her multicultural background informs a design philosophy grounded in cultural awareness, environmental stewardship, and community well-being.

With a strong foundation in sustainable and inclusive design, she hopes to bring an equity-focused voice to the Design Review Board — advocating for projects that reflect Seattle's diverse communities. Keeanna views this role as an opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the city in which she resides while acquiring experience she may one day share in service to her lāhui (people) in Hawai'i.

Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

KEEANNA ANDRES

RESUME

about me

As a multiracial Architectural Designer of Native Hawaiian, Filipino, and Chinese heritage, I bring a culturally rooted and community-oriented lens to my work. Currently pursuing licensure, I'm committed to design that reflects the voices and needs of diverse communities.

contact

[redacted]

EDUCATION

M.ARCH (ADV ST)
University of Washington
Seattle, WA
Summer 2023

B.S. ARCHITECTURE
University of Nevada
Las Vegas, NV
Summer 2021

SKILLS

Revit • Rhinoceros • Grasshopper
Illustrator • Photoshop • Enscape
Strong Leadership and Work Ethic
Adaptability • Collaboration
Critical Thinking • Problem Solving
Fast Learning • Decision Making
Accuracy • Attention to Detail
Organization • Prioritization
Adaptability • Flexibility
Time Management • Multi-Tasking
Handling Pressure

ACADEMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Spring 2023 / UW Recipient of the Kimo Griggs Award for Most Functional furniture design in the annual 2023 Chair Affair

Autumn 2022 / Studio project selected for UW Architecture Archives

2021-2022 / UW Recipient of the Marga Rose Hancock Award

Fall 2017-2021 / UNLV Dean's List

Spring 2019 / Projects published in UNLV's School of Architecture book: *Billboard*

relevant experience

2023 - CURRENT — ARCHITECTURAL DESIGNER / *7 Directions Architects/Planners* / *Seattle, WA*

- Support design of community-led and culturally rooted projects.
- Create drawings, renderings, and presentation materials.
- Assist in all phases from concept to construction documents.
- Conduct site research and coordinated with consultants.
- Integrate traditional knowledge into design narratives.

SUMMER 2020 — ARCHITECTURE INTERN / *Ushijima Architects, Inc. (UAI)* / *Honolulu, HI*

- Assisted in daily operations of Ushijima Architects, Inc.
- Assisted with the digital drafting of sites and various projects
- Solved on-the-job issues with effective critical thinking and decision-making skills
- Attended job site visits and all staff meetings to further understand office workflow
- Produced project renderings and preliminary programming and analysis

Seattle Design Review Boards - June 2025

42 Design Review Board Members: Pursuant to SMC 23.41.008, *all* members are subject to City Council confirmation, *two*-year terms that may be re-appointed to a second term:

- *12* City Council-appointed
- *13* Mayor-appointed
- *15* Joint Mayor and Council appointed
- *2* *Mayor appointed per SMC 3.51, one-year term (Get Engaged)*

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name († holdover, ‡ beginning mid-term)	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
1	M		1.	Local Residential, DT	Kuo, Jonas	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
6	M		2.	Local Community, NE	Lee, Todd	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor
6	M		3.	Development, SW	Schaefer, Gavin	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
6	M		4.	Business/ Landscape, W	Allwine, Stephen ‡	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
9	M		5.	Local Residential, SW	McCulloch, Rob	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor
			6.	Business/ Landscape, E	Vacant	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor/ Council
6	F		7.	Local Community, SE	Wild, Kirsten	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
6	F		8.	Development, SE	Baxter, Brenda	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
1	M		9.	Local Community, NW	Prathivadi, Keshav	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
			10.	Business/ Landscape, NW	Vacant	4/4/2025	4/3/2027	1	Mayor/ Council
6	F		11.	Design Professional, E	Gage, Gina	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	2	Mayor
6	M		12.	Development, NW	Efthimiadis, Nicholas	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
2	F		13.	Business/ Landscape, DT	Vasser, Lisa	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	2	Mayor/ Council
5	M		14.	Development, E	Arun, Akhil ‡	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Council
6	M		15.	Development, NE	Say, Dan	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
6	F		16.	Local Community, SW	McClurg, Jessie	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
3	M		17.	Design Professional, NE	Herrera-Enzuate, Stuart	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
1	F		18.	Design Professional, W	Sato, Norie	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Council
5	F		19.	Local Community, W	Maas, Sarah	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
6	M		20.	Development, DT	Bendix, Christopher	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Council
3	F		21.	Business/ Landscape, SW	Alvarez, Ana "A.B." ‡	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
9	F		22.	Design Professional, SE	De Giuli, Adriana	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Council
6	M		23.	Design Professional, NW	DiRaimo, Ryan	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor

9	M		24.	Local Community, E	Reilly, Joe ‡	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Council
6	F		25.	Local Residential, NW	Böehm, Vanessa	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor/ Council
1	F		26.	Local Community, DT	Fortaleza, Che	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	2	Mayor
6	F		27.	Development, W	Rattray, Tiffany	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	2	Mayor
9	F		28.	Local Residential, NE	Schickler, Kayleigh	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
6	M		29.	Design Professional, DT	Woll, Jacob	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
1	F		30.	Design Professional, SW	Li, Nicole ‡	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
6	M		31.	Business/ Landscape, SE	Duda, Nick	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor/ Council
2	M		32.	Local Residential, W	Ogunmola, Kinsley	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
			33.	Local Residential, E	Vacant	4/4/3025	4/3/2027	1	Mayor/ Council
1	M		34	Local Residential, SE	Zhang, Zi	4/4/2023	4/3/2025	1	Mayor/ Council
6	M		35.	Business/ Landscape, NE	Doehr, Benjamin	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor/ Council
9	F	6	36.	Get Engaged	Andres, Keeanna	9/1/2025	8/31/2026	1	Mayor (SMC 3.51)
6	F		37.	Local Residential, CA	Port, Brittany	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
6	M		38.	Local Community, CA	Karlinsey, Ethan	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
1	F		39.	Design Professional, CA	Wong, Samantha	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Council
5	M		40.	Development, CA	Hirsty, Daniel	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor
			41.	Business/ Landscape, CA	Vacant	4/4/2024	4/3/2026	1	Mayor/ Council
			42.	Get Engaged	Vacant	9/1/2025	8/31/2026	1	Mayor (SMC 3.51)

New Appointments
Re-appointments
Vacant

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) Transgender	(4) Unknown	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	8	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	9	0	0	2
Council	6	6	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	5	0	0	2
Joint	6	5	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	4	0	0	1
Total	20	17	0	0	7	2	2	0	3	18	0	0	5

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M** = Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03282, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Maeve Gillis as member, Urban Forestry Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Maeve Gillis*		
Board/Commission Name: *Urban Forestry Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Fremont*	**Zip Code:** *98103*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Maeve lives in Fremont and is passionate about equitable access to outdoor spaces. She brings experience in engineering and renewable energy, and is excited to contribute to reaching Seattle's 30% canopy coverage target. Maeve believes urban forests are critical for climate resiliency and is committed to helping ensure all communities benefit from a healthy urban forest.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Maeve Gillis

[redacted]

PROFESSIONAL SUMMARY

Results-driven management consultant with a proven track record of developing and executing strategic initiatives and optimizing operational efficiency. Expertise in delivering innovative solutions in the clean energy space with a passion for working at the intersection of forestry and carbon removal.

WORK EXPERIENCE

MCKINSEY & CO

Senior Business Analyst – Clean Hydrogen Rotation | Seattle, WA July 2024 – May 2025

- Developed a commercial go-to-market strategy for an electrolyzer manufacturer diligencing 70 renewables developers in three target regions, resulting in 200MW of electrolyzer sales in six months
- Identified 2030 global hydrogen demand segments by application and geography where the value-in-use for clean exceeds production cost; Synthesized results in a report published with Hydrogen Council
- Provided data for McKinsey teams serving Hydrogen clients on projected clean hydrogen demand, production costs by hub, impact of regulatory incentives and on hydrogen production technology

Business Analyst & Senior Business Analyst | Seattle, WA Oct 2021 – Jun 2024

- Implemented a Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) degradation tracking tool delivering 8-12M USD/yr through battery performance insights and analytics and real-time alerts to inform asset deployment strategy and plan capital allocation to meet Resource Adequacy agreement
- Identified 20M USD/yr opportunity across 1.7GW solar portfolio by reducing downtime through enhanced inventory management and predictive failure modeling, and increasing yield through drone-assisted early detection of panel degradation
- Led rigorous performance management of commercial and operations teams to ensure residential solar client remained solvent despite significant headwinds while managing Private Equity stakeholders
- Identified 3M USD/yr opportunity for a Chemicals client through improved reactor stability and reduced unplanned downtime by developing, trialing, and implementing reactor control updates
- Developed a detailed project schedule achieving a 10% reduction in schedule duration for a 12MW data center by optimizing resources and rapidly testing scenarios using generative scheduling

EXXONMOBIL

Emissions Reporting Advisor | Baton Rouge, LA Aug 2020 – Sep 2021

- Calculated emissions for Title V permitted sources at the 500,000 barrel per day refinery and compiled internal, state, and federal emissions reports (Emissions Inventory, GHG, TRI, SARA 311 and 312)
- Developed emissions projections methodology based on business utilization and integrated emissions planning into existing business planning for a site-wide air permitting strategy
- Reconciled year-on-year changes for thousands of emissions paths and communicated drivers of change to external agencies and site leadership

DOW CHEMICAL

Process Engineer Co-op | Harbor Beach, MI, Hahnville, LA, Freeport, TX May 2018– Aug 2019

- Led business review as a manufacturing representative for a personal safety project to install guard rails on top of tanks, organizing engineering resources, operations, and third-party vendors
- Debottlenecked wastewater system during rain events through a three-part solution including changes in operational discipline, updates to controls code, and a targeted pump upgrade

EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN | Ann Arbor, MI Aug 2016 – May 2020

- BSE in Chemical Engineering, Summa Cum Laude, GPA: 3.8/4.0

OTHER INTERESTS

Skills: Advanced Excel Modeling, PowerPoint, Tableau, Alteryx, AspenTech, ALICE
Interests: Backpacking (completed 1,440 mi of the Pacific Crest Trail), Backcountry Skiing, Mountaineering
Citizenship: United States, Ireland

Urban Forestry Commission

2/25/2025

13 Members: Pursuant to SMC 3.72, all members subject to City Council confirmation, *3*-year terms: Get Engaged clause added for 1-year term pursuant to SMC 3.51

- *6* City Council-appointed
- *6* Mayor-appointed
- *1* Commission-appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	4	1	Wildlife Biologist	Aaron Clark	4/1/23	3/31/26	1	Council
1	F	6	2	Urban Ecologist	Alicia Kellogg	4/1/23	3/31/26	1	Mayor
1	F	3	3	Natural Resource Agency or University Representative	Lani Chang	4/1/25	3/31/28	1	Council
			4	Hydrologist or Similar Professional		4/1/24	3/31/27	1	Mayor
6	F	6	5	Arborist	Drue Epping	4/1/24	3/31/27	1	Council
6	F	1	6	Landscape Architect	Tristan Fields	4/1/24	3/31/27	1	Mayor
			7	NGO Representative		4/1/25	3/31/28	2	Council
2	M	7	8	Development Community or Utility Representative	David Baker	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	Mayor
8	M	1	9	Economist, Financial Analyst, Realtor, or Similar Professional	Nathan Collins	4/1/23	3/31/26	1	Commission
			10	Get Engaged Member	Maeve Gillis	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor
3	F	2	11	Environmental Justice Rep.	Melanie Ocasio	4/1/24	4/1/27	1	Council
6	F	2	12	Public Health Rep.	Andrea Starbird	4/1/24	3/31/27	1	Mayor
9	F	2	13	Community/Neighborhood Rep.	Lia Hall	4/1/24	3/31/27	2	Council

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	Men	Women	Transgender	Unknown	(1) Asian	(2) Black/ African American	(3) Hispanic/ Latino	(4) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(5) Other	(6) Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	(7) Pacific Islander	(8) Middle Eastern	(9) Multiracial
Mayor	2	4			1	1	1			2			
Council	2	3			1		1			3			1
Other	1											1	
Total	5	7			2	1	2			5		1	1

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)

****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown

RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03283, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Margaret Szeles as member, Seattle Planning Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Margaret Szeles*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Planning Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Fremont*	**Zip Code:** *98107*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Margaret is currently a third-year law student at the University of Washington School of Law. Prior to law school she worked as a transportation planner in Boise, Idaho. Margaret is passionate about the intersection of land use, transportation, and environmental justice. Through her service on the Planning Commission, Margaret aims to use her knowledge and experience to help encourage accessible and community-focused land-use decisions. Margaret resides in the Fremont neighborhood and spends her free time climbing and trail running around the Seattle area.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature):  **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

MARGARET SZELES

EDUCATION

University of Washington School of Law | Seattle, Washington
Juris Doctor | anticipated June 2026

- Notes and Comments Editor, *Washington Law Review*
- Pro Bono Director, Environmental Law Society; Secretary, OUTlaws
- Relevant coursework including administrative; environmental; environmental justice; real estate; business organizations; civil procedure II; and water law amongst others.

Boise State University | Boise, Idaho
Bachelor of Science, Political Science; Bachelor of Arts, Environmental Studies, *magna cum laude*
Certificate in Environmental Education | May 2022

- 2021 Andrus Scholar, Andrus Center for Public Policy
- Blue Thunder Marching Band

EXPERIENCE

Van Ness Feldman | Seattle, Washington
Summer Associate June 2025 – August 2025

- Will do legal research and writing pertaining to energy, environment, and natural resources law and policy

Green Diamond Resource Company | Seattle, Washington
Legal Intern August 2024 – October 2024

- General corporate counsel and in-house legal research and writing relating to land use, property, environmental, and commercial transactional law

U.S. District Judge Tana Lin, Western District of Washington | Seattle, Washington
Judicial Extern June 2024 – August 2024

- Exposure to broad civil and criminal proceedings
- Conducting research and writing for Judge Lin's chambers around contract litigation

Ada County Highway District | Boise, Idaho
Senior Transportation Planner August 2022 – July 2023

- Programmed $70 million in infrastructure projects for the successful adoption of the 2024-2028 Integrated Five-Year Work Plan (IFYWP) by the Board of Commissioners

Current Planner February 2022 - August 2022

- Analyzed the impact of land-use development projects on transportation infrastructure

Conservation Voters for Idaho | Boise, Idaho
Fellow, Boards and Commissioners Fellowship January 2023 – June 2023

- Received policy training to advance conservation policy on local boards or commissions

Advocates for the West | Boise, Idaho
Legal Intern May 2021 – July 2021

- Prepared comprehensive NEPA legal research and memorandum for supervising staff attorney

Idaho Department of Environmental Quality | Boise, Idaho
Outreach Intern August 2020 – December 2020

- Assisted with outreach program for sustainable products to auto maintenance facilities

INTERESTS

- Rock climbing (outdoor sport lead, indoor bouldering, & youth climbing instructor for indoor gym); trail running; pizza making (homemade dough, of course); figure drawing and acrylic painting

Seattle Planning Commission

JULY 2025

16 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.6, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *3*-year terms (except for position 16 which serves a one-year term and is a Get Engaged member):

- *7* City Council-appointed
- *8* Mayor-appointed
- *1* Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify): Planning Commission

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	3	1.	Member	McCaela Daffern	4/16/25	4/15/28	2	City Council
3	F	3	2.	Member	Dhyana Quintanar Solares	4/16/25	4/15/28	2	Mayor
6	F	6	3.	Member	Rebecca Brunn	4/16/25	4/15/28	1	City Council
2	M	2	4.	Member	Kelabe Tewolde	4/16/25	4/15/22	2	Mayor
2	F	6	5.	Member	Julia Jannon-Shields	4/16/25	4/15/28	1	City Council
6	M	4	6.	Member	Andrew Dannenberg	4/16/23	4/15/26	1	Mayor
9	F	1	7.	Member	P Xiomara (Xio) Alvarez	4/16/23	4/15/26	1	City Council
1	F	5	8.	Member	Radhika Nair	4/16/23	4/15/26	2	Mayor
6	M	1	9.	Member	Matt Hutchins	4/16/23	4/15/26	2	City Council
9	NB	3	10.	Member	Monika Sharma	4/16/23	4/15/26	1	Mayor
6	F	4	11.	Member	Cecelia Black	4/16/24	4/15/27	1	City Council
9	F	5	12.	Member	Rose Lew Tsai-Le Whitson	4/16/24	4/15/27	2	Mayor
6	M	3	13.	Member	Dylan Glosecki	4/16/24	4/15/27	1	City Council
6	M	1	14.	Member	Nick Whipple	4/16/24	4/15/27	1	Mayor
4	M	7	15.	Member	Dylan Stevenson	4/16/24	4/15/27	1	Commission
6	F	5	16.	Get Engaged	Margaret Szeles	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/O/U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	3	4		1	1	1	1			3			2
Council	3	5				1				5			1
Other								1					
Total	6	9		1	1	2	1	1		8			3

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03284, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Jonathan Lopez as member, Seattle Immigrant and Refugee Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Jonathan Lopez*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Immigrant and Refugee Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Pioneer Square*	**Zip Code:** *98104*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Jonathan Lopez is a first-generation public servant and active community leader dedicated to advancing equity and opportunity for immigrant, refugee, and all underserved communities. He currently serves King County as a Project Control Engineer, managing large scale infrastructure projects including the transition to electric public transit buses. Previously, he supported housing affordability and homelessness initiatives as a Project Manager. Jonathan is also a board member of Year Up United, where he hosts community events and empowers young adults through education, workforce development, and mentorship. He is passionate about building partnerships and bridging knowledge gaps to help communities access resources, representation, and pathways to success.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

JONATHAN LOPEZ

[redacted]

CAREER SUMMARY

Dedicated public servant with a strong background in government operations, policy development, and community advocacy, seeking to serve as a City Commission member to drive equitable policies and community progress. I am passionate about public service, policy development, and community advocacy. Adept at collaborating with diverse teams to ensure high-quality services related to data and adherence to industry standards. My motivation stems from continuing my work within the public sector to continue supporting and making a change to our community.

SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS

Professional Skills: Government Contract Administration, Attention to Detail, Data Integrity, Project/Program Management, Problem-solving, Collaboration, Data Best Practices, Business Communication.
Technical Skills: Microsoft Office Suite, Oracle EBS, REDCap, SQL, Data Collection/Analysis, BI Insights, Oracle Cloud, Tableau, R.
Certifications: Google – Data Analytics Specialization (2023), Scrum – PSM 1 (2024), South Seattle College – Project Management (2024).

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

YEAR UP UNITED *Seattle*, WA
Board Vice Chair *October 2024 - Present*

- Lead board meetings to influence strategic decisions impacting current students within the program.
- Represent the Year Up United program in supporting the efforts of closing the opportunity divide at community events.
- Serve as a guest speaker, conducting presentations for students exploring post-secondary education pathways.
- Mentor young professionals, providing guidance on professional development and career advancement.
- Organize and lead community outreach events, including school supply drives and food distributions at homeless shelters, reinforcing community engagement and support.

KING COUNTY *Seattle*, WA
Project Control Engineer *March 2025* - Present

- Prepare contract closeout documentation, secure lien releases, and coordinate with state agencies for outstanding requirements.
- Assist in generating regular and ad hoc reports for capital projects.
- Contribute to process improvements by refining procedures.
- Manage the data put into MS Project templates to track and monitor capital project progress.
- Engage in discussions on Equity and Social Justice (ESJ) topics during team and unit meetings.
- Manage and update logs for submittals, RFIs, change orders, and amendments.

KING COUNTY *Seattle*, WA
Project/Program Manager 1 *September 2024 – March 2025*

- Support housing policy development and data-driven decision making for municipal programs.
- Manage the development and integration of a new multi-billion-dollar housing affordability database via REDCap.
- Use data best practices to accurately identify data discrepancies for the Data Engineer team.
- Manage government contract administration, ensuring compliance with municipal regulations and budget allocations.
- Test database to ensure system stability for use of other departments within King County.
- Read and understand the purpose of complex legal documents to interpret new data.
- Use Project Management best practices to communicate and fix gaps in project data.
- Ensure data quality control with new and existing databases.
- Delegate important data points with Senior Management to help them determine crucial data needed in the database.
- Host office hour and training sessions to ensure smooth integration of new database system.

KING COUNTY *Seattle*, WA

Functional Analyst - Internship *March 2024 – September 2024*

- Provide technical assistance to vendors and end users to address IT needs, leading to successful exchange of data.
- Act as a liaison between vendors, Contract Specialists, and others within County departments to resolve disputes.
- Review and analyze county-wide data collection and dissemination procedures to optimize processes.
- Process 70+ service requests weekly, including creation and editing of new vendors, ensuring adherence to King County department policies.
- Utilize Office 365: Word, Visio, SharePoint, Teams, Excel, and PowerPoint to prepare detailed reports and presentations for senior management enabling data informed decision making.
- Facilitate user training for the Functional Analyst team by updating training materials and standard work documentation with Visio by creating flowcharts.
- Assist senior management in prioritizing requests from King County vendors, ensuring prompt resolution.
- Utilize BI Insights to update dashboards in King County Procurement & Payables section of the website.
- Facilitate process rounding meetings with hundreds of participants in attendance.
- Utilize process change techniques to make data driven decisions.

CASCADIA CUSTOM FRAMING *Renton*, WA

Project Administrator *June 2019- February 2024*

- Managed core aspects of construction projects, facilitating initiatives with budgets valued at up to $250,000.
- Authored key business documents, including requests for proposals, bidding documents, invoices, and contracts.
- Trained and mentored other administrative staff.
- Collaborated with project managers to analyze and forecast material requirements for upcoming projects, successfully reducing material shortages and delays leading to a boost in company revenue by 30%.
- Led process improvement initiatives for key business documents to facilitate document development phases.

Seattle Immigrant and Refugee Commission

15 Members: Pursuant to *SMC 3.14.545, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *2*-year terms, except for the Get Engagement member, who will serve a 1-year term pursuant to SMC 3.51:

- *7* City Council-appointed
- *8* Mayor-appointed
- *#* Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify):

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
			1.	Member					City Council
			2.	Member					City Council
			3.	Member					Mayor
			4.	Member					Mayor
			5.	Member					City Council
			6.	Member					Mayor
			7.	Member					Mayor
			8.	Member					City Council
			9.	Member					City Council
			10	Member					Mayor
			11.	Member					Mayor
			12.	Member					City Council
			13.	Member					Mayor
			14.	Member					City Council
			15.	Get Engaged Member	Jonathan Lopez	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor													
Council													
Other													
Total													

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03285, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Cameron Wong as member, Landmarks Preservation Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Cameron Wong*		
Board/Commission Name: *Landmarks Preservation Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Renton*	**Zip Code:** *98059*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Cameron is the Development Specialist for Asian & Pacific Islander Americans in Historic Preservation and has served on several community nonprofit boards focused on cultural heritage and community development. He brings a passion for architecture, preservation, and urbanism as tools for building equity and opportunity in Seattle. He aims to contribute his unique perspective on preservation to the Landmarks Preservation Board and deepen his understanding of how thoughtful stewardship of our historic places can shape resilient neighborhoods and reflect the city's full cultural history. Cameron earned a bachelor's degree in Marketing and Finance from the University of Washington, plans to pursue a Masters in Architecture, and resides in Renton.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature):  **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Cameron Wong

[redacted]

SUMMARY

Skilled marketing professional with expertise in strategic decision-making, community engagement, and market research/analysis. Successfully led marketing campaigns, created digital marketing collateral, and drove awareness in support of historic preservation initiatives at organizations such as APIAHiP, Renton Downtown Partnership, and the ASUW Shell House.

SKILLS

- **Data Analysis & Market Research**
- **Strategic Decision-Making**
- **Stakeholder & Community Engagement**
- **Board Leadership**
- **Report Writing and Presentation**
- **Historic Preservation**
- **Donor/Sponsor relationships & Fundraising**
- **Project/Campaign Management and Execution**
- **Digital Marketing**
- **Financial Planning & Budgeting**

PRIMARY EXPERIENCE

Development Specialist, Asian & Pacific Islander Americans in Historic Preservation **Jan. 2024 – Present**

- APIAHiP is the only national organization dedicated to protecting historic places and cultural resources significant to Asian and Pacific Islander Americans
- Secured over $70k in sponsorship and $150k in other funding in 2024
- Maintain donor/sponsor relationships, write for relevant grant opportunities, and create digital marketing materials
- Lobbied for Historic Tax Credit and Preservation policy with Congressional representatives in Washington D.C. during Advocacy Week 2024 and 2025

Board Member, Renton Downtown Partnership – *Renton, WA*

Board President: March 2024 – Present

Board Vice President: August 2023 – March 2024

Board Member at Large: April 2022 – August 2023

- Renton Downtown Partnership is a designated Main Street Community whose mission is to cultivate a vibrant social, cultural and economic center by bringing together the community, nonprofits and city center stakeholders while celebrating the unique historic character of Renton's Downtown.
- Guide strategic decision-making, board governance, and partnerships to revitalize the city's historic downtown core
- Lead various projects including small business pitch competition, façade grant program, major public art projects, and various events geared towards engaging the community and fostering economic growth downtown
- Active in allocating organization's $250k+ annual budget and in hiring new executive director in 2024

Senior Research Analyst, Ipsos – *Seattle, WA* **Jan. 2022 – October 2023**

- Support all stages of market research study execution from questionnaire development and field monitoring to reporting and analysis writing, achieving double digit growth in tech innovation service line
- Deliver insights on quantitative and qualitative research from a range of innovation methodologies
- Create reports with written and charted elements and deliver findings in client presentations
- Instrumental in developing AI thought leadership and development of new name testing methodology
- Collaborate with internal and external teams to ensure quality data and insights are delivered

ASUW Shell House Capital Campaign – *Seattle, WA*

Advisory Board Member: Jan. 2022 – Present

- The ASUW Shell House is a historic building on UW's campus, connecting native, rowing, aviation, and military history. The campaign aims to restore the space into a space of learning and gathering for students and the community.
- As an advisory committee member, I promote the restoration capital campaign of the ASUW Shell House and its history and relevance to the greater Seattle community as well as advise the design/build and UW project teams

Campaign Analyst: Sept. 2018 – Dec. 2021

- Developed financial forecasts and budgets to prove project's financial viability, securing over $16.5 million in gifts, grants, and pledges after presenting findings to potential donors
- Collaborated with UW faculty and local industry experts to develop a business and operations plan, which influences our $19 million capital campaign to restore the building
- Researched comparable historic preservation projects in market, and executed day-to-day campaign tasks (updating website, managing social media presence, donor research, etc.)
- Designed marketing materials for fundraising, project awareness, and events, and distributed to over 2,000 supporters

OTHER EXPERIENCE

Marketing & Communications Lead, UW Recreation – *Seattle, WA* **March 2021 – Dec. 2021**

- Responsible for the creative and strategic execution of marketing and promotion of campus recreation offerings
- Developed multiple cohesive digital/print marketing campaigns to promote in-person and virtual classes and programs
- Executed marketing projects for department leads, creatives, and other UW Recreation staff among over 10 program areas. Managed UW Recreation's social media presence of over 5,000 followers

Board Member & Secretary, Renton Rowing Center – *Renton, WA* **May 2022 – Present**

- Renton Rowing Center is a nonprofit rowing organization that encourages people of all ages, abilities, and backgrounds to discover community on and off the water.
- Co-chair of fundraising committee (2022-2024), which has raised over $100k in the past two years for youth and community rowing programs
- As a board member, I direct the organization's strategy, financial planning, and programming decisions.

EDUCATION

University of Washington, Michael G. Foster School of Business – *Seattle, WA* **Dec. 2021**

- Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration
- Double-majored in Finance and Marketing (Freshman direct to major)

RELEVANT COURSEWORK & CERTIFICATIONS

The Grantsmanship Center, Project Grantsmanship: Week-long grant writing training and certification **March 2024**

Google Analytics Certification: Google analytics dashboards, reports, etc. **Sept. 2021**

Foster Microsoft Excel Credential: PivotTables, advanced chart types, mathematical functions, etc. **June 2020**

MGMT 445, Local Business Consulting Engagement – *Seattle, WA* **Jan. – March 2020**

- Led a 5-student team and local coffee shop on an expansion growth project, including marketing/financial analysis, customer survey, and recommendations for expansion, financials, and marketing.

Training the Street Excel Workshop: Excel fundamentals, financial modeling & formatting, etc. **Nov. 2019**

OTHER ACTIVITIES & AWARDS

- Eagle Scout, BSA Troop 476: April 2018
- NIRSA Creative Excellence Award 2022 – 1st place Student Publication
- Dean's List: Spring 2021, Winter 2021, Fall 2020, Fall 2019
- Agency Consultant, UW American Marketing Association – Spring 2021
- Renton Rowing Center, Spirit of Renton Award: July 2018
- Renton Rowing Center, Rowing Coach: June 2017 – August 2019
- Finance Manager, The Red Tea Room Catering**:** March 2020 – Present
- Brand Ambassador, Thursday Boot Company: 2018-21
- Foster Rome Study Abroad Program (Rome, Italy & Rotterdam, Netherlands): July – August 2019

Landmarks Preservation Board

12 Members: Pursuant to *Ordinance No. 106348, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *3-year term for 11 members, and 1-year term for Get Engaged Member*:

- *12* Mayor-appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
2	M	5	1.	At- Large	Dean E. Barnes	08-15-22	08-14-25	2nd	Mayor
2	M	3	2.	At-Large	Lawrence Norman	08-15-24	08-14-27	2nd	Mayor
1	F	2	3.	Structural Engineer	Roi Chang	08-15-22	08-14-25	2nd	Mayor
1	M	N/A	4.	Get Engaged	Cameron Wong	09-01-25	08-31-26	1st	Mayor
6	F	4	5.	Architect	Taber Caton	08-15-24	08-14-27	2nd	Mayor
6	M	2	6.	Urban Planning	Ian Macleod	08-15-24	08-14-27	2nd	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Real Estate	Katie Randall	08-15-25	08-14-28	2nd	Mayor
6	F	3	8.	At-Large	Harriet Wasserman	08-15-24	08-14-27	2nd	Mayor
2	F	N/A	9.	Historian	Lora-Ellen McKinney	08-15-24	08-14-27	2nd	Mayor
6	F	2	10.	Architect	Becca Pheasant-Reis	08-15-25	08-14-28	2nd	Mayor
			11.	Finance	vacant	08-15-22	08-14-25	1st	Mayor
1	M	6	12.	Historian	Matt Inpanbutr	08-15-22	08-14-25	2nd	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	5	6			3	3				5			
Council													
Other													
Total													

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03286, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Kamryn Yanchick as member, Community Involvement Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Kamryn Yanchick*		
Board/Commission Name: *Community Involvement Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Interbay*	**Zip Code:** *98119*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Kamryn Yanchick (she/her) is a proud citizen of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and a descendant of the Muscogee Nation originally from Oklahoma City and now living in the Interbay neighborhood in Seattle. She works as the Political Navigator with Native Action Network, where she manages leadership development and advocacy training programs for Native women. She is passionate about furthering community empowerment in the political process, especially amongst Native youth, and hopes to use her position on the Community Involvement Commission to help foster equitable and inclusive engagement across Seattle.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

KAMRYN YANCHICK

[redacted]

EDUCATION

University of Oklahoma, Norman — May 2022
B.A. in Political Science, Pre-Law
B.A. in Native American Studies, *Summa Cum Laude*

WORK EXPERIENCE

Native Action Network — **Seattle, WA**
Political Navigator — May 2024 - Present

- Managed leadership and advocacy training programs to increase Native women's representation, participation, and leadership in local, state, tribal, and national affairs.
- Engaged in collaborative policy advocacy on issues relevant to the Native community in Seattle and across Washington State, including the organization of a Native Lobby Day.
- Planned and implemented get-out-the-vote campaign serving the urban Native community.

National Congress of American Indians — **Washington, DC (Remote)**
Wilma Mankiller Fellow, Civic Engagement — June 2023 - May 2024

- Designed and implemented the national Tribal College and University voter engagement initiative. including educational resource development, partnership management, research, and outreach.
- Researched and maintained a public database on voting guidelines, resources relevant to the Native community, and contact information for all 50 states and DC.

Metriarch — **Tulsa, OK**
Data and Policy Fellow — May 2022 - May 2023

- Engaged in quantitative and qualitative research to support long-term projects and publications regarding women's health and reproductive justice policy in Oklahoma.
- Monitored and tracked state and national policies and litigation issues related to women's health.
- Disseminated public health policy information into accessible and engaging formats for public audiences through written and visual communication.

Seminole Nation of Oklahoma Election Board — **Wewoka, OK**
Absentee Voting Coordinator and Head Poll Worker — May 2021 - August 2021

- Demonstrated knowledge of and adherence to Election Code of the Seminole Nation Constitution.
- Oversaw the absentee voting process for the 2021 election with unprecedented absentee turnout.

American Civil Liberties Union, National Political Advocacy Department — **Washington DC**
Equality Division Intern — January 2021 – July 2021

- Researched federal and state legislation, advocacy efforts, and related legal and policy issues regarding Indigenous rights, immigrants' rights, environmental justice, and racial justice issues.
- Developed and successfully pitched a multi-state legislative campaign plan on Indigenous graduation regalia.

SERVICE AND LEADERSHIP

Seattle Young Nonprofit Professionals Network **Seattle, WA**
Board Member January 2025 – Present
- Facilitated professional development and community-building opportunities.

36th Legislative District Democrats **Seattle, WA**
Precinct Committee Officer January 2025 – Present
- Participated in LD meetings and engaged in voter outreach and engagement.

Free the Pill **Remote**
Native Contraceptive Access Collaborative Member June 2023 – Present
- Participated in a working group dedicated to organizing, educating, and advocating for over-the-counter birth control access within urban Native, IHS, and tribal health clinics.

Rock the Native Vote **Oklahoma**
Voter Registrar January 2020 – April 2024
- Organized voter registration, civic education, and political mobilization campaigns amongst the urban Native communities across Oklahoma City and Tulsa.

Oklahoma Department of Health, Prevention Leadership Committee **Oklahoma**
Youth Advisory Subcommittee Member May 2022 - April 2024
- Promoted sexual violence prevention awareness through health education and resource navigation for Oklahoma youth.

18by Vote **Remote**
Exploring Youth Engagement Innovative Research Mentor June 2023 – September 2023
- Provided support and mentorship to young people on the development, execution, and dissemination of a mixed-methods research project on gen z voting behavior.

Campus Vote Project **Remote**
Student Advisory Board, Native American Representative May 2021 – May 2022
- Conducted research on barriers and resources impacting voting among Native students.
- Led a new initiative on voter engagement outreach and programming for Native college students.

Gamma Delta Pi, Native Sorority Inc. **Norman, OK**
National Governance Board Member August 2022 - August 2024
Alpha Chapter President May 2021 - May 2022
- Promoted a sisterhood to create a culturally aligned support system for Native women to succeed in higher education, both as a student leader and alumni mentor.
- Organized our annual Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women Awareness Week.

Community Involvement Commission

Sixteen Members: Pursuant to Ordinance 125192, all members subject to City Council confirmation, one – and two-year terms for the initial round of appointments, two-year terms thereafter:

- *7* City Council-appointed
- *7* Mayor-appointed
- *2* Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify): Commission-selected

Roster:*Updated 7/9/25

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
	M	1	1.	City Council District 1 Member	Hunter Camfield	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	City Council
		2	2.	City Council District 2 Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	City Council
		3	3.	City Council District 3 Member	VACANT	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	City Council
		4	4.	City Council District 4 Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	City Council
		5	5.	City Council District 5 Member	VACANT	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	City Council
1		6	6.	City Council District 6 Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	City Council
3	M	7	7.	City Council District 7 Member	Julio Perez	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	City Council
2		3	8.	At-Large Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	Mayor
	F		9.	At-Large Member	Rachelle Olden	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	Mayor
1		7	10.	At-Large Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	Mayor
2	F	6	11.	At-Large Member	Ahoua Koné	6/1/24	5/31/26	2	Mayor
6		5	12.	At-Large Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	Mayor
4	F	5	13.	At-Large Member	Heidi Morisset	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	Mayor
			14.	Get Engaged Member	Kamryn Yanchick	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor
2		7	15.	Commission-Selected Member	VACANT	6/1/25	5/31/27	1	Commission
			16.	Commission-Selected Member	VACANT	6/1/24	5/31/26	1	Commission

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor		4				2	1	1					
Council	2						1			1			
Other													
Total	2	4				2	2	1		1			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03287, **Version:** 1

Reappointment of Montana Houston as member, Pioneer Square Preservation Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Montana Houston*		
Board/Commission Name: *Pioneer Square Preservation Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☐ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☒ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Rainier Beach*	**Zip Code:** *98118*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Born and raised in Seattle, Montana Houston is honored to serve on the Pioneer Square Preservation District Board. Her passion for preserving Seattle's history began during a Seattle Underground Tour and grew through her experiences as a community advocate. A graduate of the University of Southern California with a degree in Pre-Law, she brings a blend of legal expertise and leadership to her work. As a previous Seattle Renters' Commissioner and current founder of rYOUminate (an edu-tech platform for diverse 18 to 30-year-olds), she uplifts underserved communities and promotes inclusion. She is excited to help preserve Pioneer Square's rich legacy while celebrating Seattle's diverse cultures.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

MONTANA HOUSTON

[redacted]

EDUCATION

Aug. 2016 – May 2020 **University of Southern California (USC),** Los Angeles, CA GPA: 3.83 / 4.00

Bachelor of Arts, Non-Governmental Organizations and Social Change (Pre-Law) Magna Cum Laude

Minor in East Asian Languages and Cultures (Japanese)

Honors and Awards: Dean's List (Aug 2016 - May 2020), Renaissance Scholar (2020), Levan Humanities Scholar (2020), Warren Bennis Leadership Scholar (2020)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

July 2022 – Present **Dropbox,** San Francisco, CA *Senior Commercial Legal Analyst*

Aug. 2020 – July 2022 *Commercial Legal Analyst*

- Negotiates and drafts contracts, including NDAs, SOWs, and SaaS Agreements; to date, have executed 547 deals with total value of $105,099,687.00, 4.2% of its annual revenue.
- Invented time-saving process for team of 18 by creating a review guide for event and hotel contracts, reduced negotiating time by 85% and contract influx by 92%.
- Transformed new-hire training from manual discussions to on-demand videos to reduce onboarding duration, successfully created 5 videos and onboarded 4 new employees, saved 72 training hours.
- Chairs 27 cross-functional initiatives, including Software as a Service agreement playbook, Insurance terms review, and influencer agreement template, informs tasks for team of 18.

May 2019 – Aug. 2019 **Discover Financial Services,** Riverwoods, IL *Legal Department Intern*

- Conducted cross-merchandising analysis on 6 competitors' travel rewards cards by consolidating trigger disclosures against Miles Card via Excel Document and presented information to stakeholders
- Analyzed loss payee terms to discern corporate claim to abandoned property and compiled findings into 50 state survey in Excel sheet, yielding a widely used department resource

May 2017 – Aug. 2017 **Goodwill Job Training & Education Center,** Seattle, WA *Financial Literacy Consulting Intern*

- Initiated a schedule of 10+ financial programs across 3 Goodwill Job Training & Education centers to streamline service offerings to a low income, ESL community of over 17,000 people
- Assisted Senior Financial Consultant in teaching personal financial concepts to 5 classes of 40 students

LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

- May. 2025 – Present **YMCA x City of Seattle**: *Pioneer Square Preservation Board Member*, advising Mayor on historic land.
- May 2024 – Present **Access Fellows**: *Community Chair & 2025 Fellow*, leader in a highly selective pre-MBA fellowship.
- Mar 2024 – Present **rYOUminate**: *Founder & CEO*, research- and reflection-based media publication for 18 to 30 year-olds.
- Sep. 2021 – Present **Dropbox**: *Legal Diversity Co-Lead*, executed diversity survey of 16 law firms, improved growth by 80%.
- Sep. 2024 – Sep. 2025 **Leadership Tomorrow**: *Participant*, Chosen as 1 of 45 Seattle leaders to advocate for local racial equity.
- Mar 2024 – July 2025 **Treehouse**: *Treehouse Ambassador Board & Volunteer*, advocates for foster care education services.
- Jan. 2024 – Jan 2025 **Forte MBALaunch**: *Launcher*, participant in pre-MBA professional development program for women.
- Jan. 2021 – May 2024 **Dropbox**: *Internal Engagement Chair*, planned 13 events for Black History Month for 2k+ employees.
- Feb. 2018 – Mar. 2020 **USC**: *Senior Director of Programming*, directed 16 organizations, delegated $2.4m budget for events.
- Apr 2018 – May 2020 **USC**: *Cohort 3 Scholar*, chosen as 1 of 20 scholars for leadership development from 130+ applicant pool.
- Apr 2018 – May 2019 **USC**: *Executive Director*, managed $69k budget and hosted 39 events, and saw 67% rise in recruitment.

ENGAGEMENTS & INTERESTS

Engagements University of Washington's Foster School of Business Youth Executives of Color Keynote Speaker for 2016 program; two-time YEOC Case Competition winner against 30 teams of 5.

Interests Managing my book blog; practicing Japanese (adv. proficiency); crocheting blankets; practicing servant leadership; doing aerial yoga.

Pioneer Square Preservation Board

Ten Members: Pursuant to SMC 23.66.110, *all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *3*-year terms except for the Get Engaged which will be a 1-year term per SM C3.51:

- *#* City Council-appointed
- *10* Mayor-appointed
- *#* Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify):

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
		2	1.	Property Owner	Vacant	3/2/23	3/1/26		Mayor
6	F	7	2.	Historian	Maureen R. Elenga	3/2/22	3/1/25	2	Mayor
6	M		3.	Property Owner	Henry Watson	3/2/22	3/1/25	1	Mayor
2	F		4.	Get Engaged	Montana Houston	9/1/25	8/31/26	2	Mayor
			5.	At Large	vacant	3/2/22	3/1/25		Mayor
3	M		6.	Architect	Jose Lorenzo-Tores	3/2/21	3/1/24	1	Mayor
			7.	Human Services	vacant	3/2/22	3/1/25	1	Mayor
		2	8.	Attorney	vacant	3/2/23	3/1/26		Mayor
			9.	Retail	vacant	3/2/22	3/1/25	1	Mayor
1	F	N/A	10.	Architect	Sohyun Kim	3/2/22	3/1/25	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	4	3		1	1	2	1			3			
Council													
Other													
Total	4	3			1	2	1			3			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03288, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Lauren Campbell as member, Seattle Center Advisory Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Lauren Campbell*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Center Advisory Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Queen Anne*	**Zip Code:** *98109*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Lauren is a Senior Coordinator on the Gates Foundation event team. She is happy to call Queen Anne her home after obtaining her B.A. in Psychology from the University of Washington. She is passionate about fostering community & collaboration through recreation, and believes no singular place signifies this value more than our beautiful Seattle Center. On the Seattle Center Advisory Commission, she aims to blend her expertise in events & programming with a lifetime of cherished memories to guide the direction of the Seattle Center project, ensuring the decisions of today have positive impact for the inhabitants of the future.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

LAUREN CAMPBELL

[redacted]

Event Coordinator with 4+ years of experience assisting with organizational event planning and program coordination for multiple Seattle institutions, and a lifetime of experience as a patron of these institutions. A proven track record of using my excellent personal, communication, and organization skills to facilitate projects, strengthen working relationships, and improve department efficiencies. Team player with a keen eye for detail, high quality of work, driven & self-motivated, and incredibly proud of the city I come from.

ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS

- Arts & Entertainment (concerts, public & private festivals, museums, sports, Parks)
- Seattle restaurants & dining
- Civic engagement
- Music performance (vocal)
- Furry friends

KEY SKILLS

- Event management
- Process review & refinement
- Contract analysis
- Team coordination
- Calendar scheduling
- Exceptional written & verbal communication
- Friendly, courteous, & service oriented
- Poised under pressure
- Technologically proficient (Microsoft Suite, EMS, Power apps)
- Quick learner
- Positive outlook

WORK EXPERIENCE

Senior Event Coordinator
Opus Agency, on assignment at the Gates Foundation | Seattle, WA
AUGUST 2023 - PRESENT

Serves as a liaison between our operational and planning team units. Primary manager of event payments and expense reconciliation for the offsite event program, ensuring payments are completed efficiently and with due process to maintain positive working relationships. Sources venues & vendors for a multitude of domestic & international meetings and convenings, negotiating rates to ensure financial compliance. Provides further support through coordination of team agendas, training and instructional materials, and library of trusted vendors.

Events Production Assistant
Woodland Park Zoo | Seattle, WA
JULY 2020 – AUGUST 2023

Provided direct onsite support for all production elements of the zoo's private and public events, including: ZooTunes Summer Concerts, weddings, fundraisers, company picnics, and more. Ensured proper venue set-up and takedown according to client requests, maintaining communication with clients day-of event to fulfill on-demand requests as needed. Served as Will Call Lead for ZooTunes 2021& 2022: regularly troubleshooted ticketing problems and ensured an efficient and pleasant customer experience. Trained other employees on Will Call processes.

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Arts, Psychology
Minor in Education, Learning and Society
University of Washington
June 2023

Seattle Center Advisory Commission

15 Members: Pursuant to Ordinances 91885 and 108936, 3-year terms; 1 Member pursuant to Ordinance 121568, 1-year term; all members subject to City Council confirmation:

- 16 Mayor- appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
1	M	7	1.	Member	Koichi Kobayashi	9/29/22	9/28/25	2	Mayor
1	F	2	2.	Member	Joy R. Shigaki	9/29/22	9/28/25	1	Mayor
6	M	7	3.	Member	Michael George	9/29/22	9/28/25	2	Mayor
6	M	7	4.	Chair	Mark F. Dederer	9/29/22	9/28/25	5	Mayor
6	F	7	5.	Member	Sally Bagshaw	9/29/22	9/28/25	1	Mayor
6	M	7	6.	Member	John Olensky	9/29/23	9/28/26	2	Mayor
6	F	6	7.	Member	Sarah C. Rich	9/29/23	9/28/26	5	Mayor
6	F	1	8.	Member	Stacey E. Hutchison	9/29/23	9/28/26	2	Mayor
6	M	4	9.	Member	Eric Berlinberg	9/29/23	9/28/26	2	Mayor
6	F	7	10.	Vice Chair	Holly Golden	9/29/23	9/28/26	5	Mayor
2	M	4	11.	Member	Matthew Mead	9/29/24	9/28/27	2	Mayor
			12.	Member	Vacant	9/29/24	9/28/27	1	Mayor
7	F	2	13.	Member	Lara Mae D. Chollette	9/29/24	9/28/27	2	Mayor
6	M	N/A	14.	Member	Will Ludlam	9/29/24	9/28/27	5	Mayor
3	F	2	15.	Member	Gloria Alvarez Connors	9/29/24	9/28/27	5	Mayor
2	F	7	16.	Get Engaged Member	Lauren Campbell	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	7	8			2	1	1			9	1	1	
Council													
Other													
Total	7	8			2	1	1			9	1	1	

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary, **O=** Other, **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03289, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Brian Bakker as member, Board of Parks and Recreation Commissioners, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Brian Bakker*		
Board/Commission Name: *Board of Parks and Recreation Commissioners*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *West Seattle*	**Zip Code:** *98116*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Brian is the general manager of a hardware store in West Seattle. On Saturdays he walks 10-15 miles through downtown Seattle running errands and exploring its parks. On Sundays he can be found outdoors, often hiking in the Snoqualmie wilderness. He will use his management experience, knowledge of the city, and love of the outdoors to help advise the Parks and Recreation department during his tenure.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): Bruce A. Harrell **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Brian Bakker

[redacted]

Professional Summary

With nearly three years of experience managing hardware stores at Sherwin-Williams, five years experience leading and supporting teams, a track record of awards for sales, operations and the co-lead of a program for the development of assistant & store managers.

Work Experience

Store Manager — November 2023 to Present
Sherwin-Williams, Seattle, Washington

- Managing a 3.5 M, high volume and high transaction store
- For the Seattle area, 1st seller of premium products, 2x 2nd highest sales calls, top seller of equipment
- Host monthly store employee and customer product and skill workshops
- Transformed store from being on audit probation to exceeding expectations
- Train existing Store Managers and Assistant Store Managers on store operations, P&L, inventory, etc
- Minimized store turnover and created a great store culture

Assistant Store Manager — January 2023 to October 2023
Sherwin-Williams, Seattle, Washington

- Co-led team of at a 1.4 M store
- Created and ran several store events to grow sales in res repaint and property maintenance segments
- Conducted 30+ weekly sales calls to grow and maintain customer business

Assistant Store Manager in Training — November 2022 to December 2022
Sherwin-Williams, Seattle, Washington

- Completed training to prepare for ASM placement

Team Lead — June 2019 to June 2022
The Collegian, Eugene, Oregon-Apartment complex

- Led team of three people to organize and host social events, organize shifts, and look after residents
- Washed dishes, toured potential residents, cleaned, and repaired the building
- Created an auto filling Google Spreadsheets to improve shift planning and organization

Education

B.S. Philosophy, University of Oregon — September 2018 to June 2022
Minors in Rhetoric and Biology
Studied abroad in Ecuador, Summer 2019. Studied in the Andes, Amazon Rainforest and Galapagos Islands.

BOARD OF PARKS AND RECREATION COMMISSIONERS

15 Members: Pursuant to *Ordinance 126380, all* members subject to City Council confirmation, *3*-year terms:

- *7* City Council-appointed
- *8* Mayor-appointed
- *#* Other Appointing Authority-appointed (specify):

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	M	1	1.	At-Large	Ryan Baum	5/14/24	5/13/27	1	Mayor
6	*F*	*3*	*2.*	*At-Large*	*Jane C. Stonecipher*	*N/A*	*3 years from City Council confirmation*	*1*	*Mayor*
6	M	4	3.	At-Large	Steve Lerer	5/14/24	5/13/27	1	Mayor
6	*M/O*	*3*	*4.*	*At-Large*	*Kevin Werner*	*N/A*	*3 years from City Council confirmation*	*1*	*Mayor*
6	M	1	*5.*	Get Engaged	*Brian Bakker*	9/1/25	8/31/26	1	*Mayor*
2	F	4	6.	Commission Seat	Tricia Diamond	5/14/24	5/13/27	1	Mayor
1	M	7	7.	Commission Seat	Phillip Meng	9/26/23	9/25/26	1	Mayor
1	F	4	8.	Commission Seat	Whitney Nakamura	5/14/24	5/13/27	1	Mayor
			9.	City Council Dist. 1					City Council
1	*F*	*2*	*10.*	*City Council Dist. 2*	*Daya Zhang*	*N/A*	*3 years from City Council confirmation*	*1*	*City Council*
6	M	3	11.	City Council Dist. 3	John Flinn	5/14/24	5/13/27	1	City Council
6	F	4	12.	City Council Dist. 4	Elise Chisholm Clare	9/17/24	9/16/27	1	City Council
2	M	5	13.	City Council Dist. 5	Ammanuel Haile-Luel	7/16/24	7/15/27	1	City Council
			14.	City Council Dist. 6					City Council
2	M	7	15.	City Council Dist. 7	Stafford Mays	4/1/22	3/31/25	1	City Council

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	4	4	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
Council	3	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Other													
Total	7	6	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	7	0	0	0

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary **O=** Other **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03290, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Jack Nash as member, Seattle Arts Commission, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Jack Nash*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Arts Commission*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Ravenna*	**Zip Code:** *98115*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Jack is a software engineer at Microsoft living in Ravenna. While studying computer science at Cornell University, he performed in and led an improv comedy troupe. In addition to performing arts, he is passionate about public art which he sees as essential to creating a vibrant city that reflects its residents. He looks forward to applying his analytical skills to solve the unique challenges as Seattle prepares for the World Cup next summer – a great opportunity to activate our city and showcase our creativity. His goal on the commission is to advance community-driven artwork that makes city living richer and more inspiring.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

[redacted] # JACK NASH [redacted]

WORK EXPERIENCE

Microsoft, Redmond, WA *August 2022 – Present*
Software Engineer (L60; promoted from L59 in May 2023)

- Key contributor in developing a localization management tool for internal and external software and documentation handling hundreds of thousands of files a day
- Built tool to generate captions from videos via AI, translate them, then generate synthetic audio of the localized text, automating hours of manual labor and increasing accessibility of Azure training content
- Led knowledge sharing sessions to upskill coworkers and improve teamwide engineering excellence
- Participated in regular on-call rotation. Fixed multiple major bugs including a key security vulnerability

MongoDB, San Francisco, CA *June 2021 – August 2021*
Software Engineer Intern

- Designed and built a command line interface tool allowing natural text search queries to be run locally over individual files. Prior, queries were limited to cloud databases and this tool was the team's most requested feature.
- Developed infrastructure for a tool to give live feedback when defining how to split text into tokens.

ShareThis, Palo Alto, CA *June 2020 – August 2020*
Software Engineer Intern

- Improved traditional methods to create higher-quality customer segments by using machine learning to generate embeddings for websites and users.
- Built a Python program to classify site-types using previously generated website embeddings more effectively and accurately.
- Optimized performance to speed up embedding generation time by 300% as well as reduce storage size by 73%.

EDUCATION

Cornell University, College of Engineering, Ithaca, NY *May 2022*
Bachelor of Science, Computer Science
Cumulative GPA: 4.0, Dean's List Fall 2018 – Spring 2022, *Summa cum laude*

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Cornell Machine Learning Group, Ithaca, NY *August 2019 – October 2021*
Undergraduate Researcher

- Assisted in a research lab studying datacenter communication protocols. Previous work studied the optimization of large-scale machine learning systems and proving a parallelization strategy's efficiency given an optimization algorithm.

RELEVANT PERSONAL PROJECTS

QR Code Generator

- Built program in Java from scratch to encode alphanumeric messages of scalable complexity along with error correction and alignment symbols to account for scanner orientation

Fast Neural Style Transfer

- Implemented current research on training a neural network to quickly render images and GIFs in the style of different images, such as those of famous artists.

PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

- C#, Java, Python, OCaml, C++, Rust, Julia, HTML, CSS

Seattle Arts Commission Roster

16 Members: Pursuant to ordinance 121006, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 2-year terms (Get-Engaged member serves a 1-year term):

- 7 City Council-appointed
- 7 Mayor-appointed
- 1 Commission-appointed
- 1 Get-Engaged

(Roster as of 6/27/2025)

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
2	M	2	1.	At-Large	Ed King	01/01/25	12/31/26	1st	City Council
6	F	7	2.	At-Large	Megan Kiskaddon	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	City Council
3	F	1	3.	At-Large	Vanessa Villalobos	01/01/25	12/31/26	3rd	City Council
3	F	1	4.	At-Large	Linda Chavez Lowry	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	City Council
6	M	5	5.	At-Large	Ricky Graboski	01/01/24	12/31/25	2nd	City Council
3	F	6	6.	At-Large	Diana Garcia (Dhyana)	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	City Council
6	F	5	7.	At-Large	Kate Nagle-Caraluzzo	01/01/25	12/31/26	1st	City Council
4	F	N/A	8.	At-Large	Yolanda Spencer	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	Commission
3	F	5	9.	At-Large	Leslie Anne Anderson	01/01/24	12/31/25	2nd	Mayor
2 & 9	F	1	10.	At-Large	Avery Barnes	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	Mayor
6	F	3	11.	At-Large	Kayla DeMonte	01/01/24	12/31/25	3rd	Mayor
			12.	At-Large					Mayor
6	F	2	13.	At-Large	Holly Jacobson	01/01/24	12/31/25	3rd	Mayor
1	F	N/A	14.	At-Large	Yoon Kang-O'Higgins	01/01/24	12/31/25	1st	Mayor
1, 4, & 6	F&O	7	15.	At-Large	Jo Mikesell (pending confirmation)	01/01/25	12/31/26	1st	Mayor
6	M	4	16.	Get-Engaged	Jack Nash	09/01/25	08/31/26	One	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)

	Men	Women	Transgender	Other/ Unknown	Asian	Black/ African America n	Hispanic/ Latino	American Indian/ Alaska Native	Other (Specification Optional)	Caucasian / Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	1	5		1	1		3		2	3			
Council	2	5				1	1			3			
Other		**1**						1					
Total	*3*	*11*		*1*	*1*	*1*	*4*	*1*	*2*	*6*			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)

****G** List *gender*, **M** = Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **U**= Unknown, **O**= Other

RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03291, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Jeremy Knapp as member, Seattle Pedestrian Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Jeremy Knapp*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Pedestrian Advisory Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Capitol Hill*	**Zip Code:** *98102*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Jeremy is the Executive Legislative Assistant to State Senator Marko Liias. They live in the Capitol Hill neighborhood and are driven by a passion for creating people-first communities. Through their experience at the legislature, they've gained firsthand insight into the vital role of community voices in transportation planning. Jeremy is committed to collaborating on solutions that prioritize pedestrian safety, foster social connection, and enhance the overall livability of Seattle.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Jeremy Knapp

[redacted]

Education:

Pacific Lutheran University (PLU) – Tacoma, WA *2017 - 2021*
Bachelor of Arts
Majors: Politics and Government

Regent's Park College, Oxford University – Oxford, UK *Fall 2018*
Semester Study Abroad
Research Focus: Protest in Non-Democratic States and Global Development

Professional Experience:

Executive Legislative Assistant, Senator Marko Liias D-21, Olympia, WA *May 2021-Current*

- Serves as Transportation Liaison for the office by coordinating with Legislators and stakeholders regarding their budget needs; and staffing stakeholder meetings, budget negotiations, and committee planning meetings.
- Manages and tracks all policy and policy ideas by communicating with Senator, interest groups, and constituents and maintaining detailed records from meetings to guarantee the Senator can propose effective legislation in future sessions.
- Manages office schedule by checking in with Senator and regular communication with Lobbyists, advocate groups, and constituents to ensure a smooth daily operation in both in-person and virtual settings.
- Creates talking points by working with various stakeholders and interest groups to guarantee that the Senator has accurate and reliable information for testimony and speeches.

Regional Field Director, People for Derek Kilmer, Tacoma, WA *March-November 2020*

- Created a broad field strategy by analyzing past election outcomes with other field staff and Political Director, resulting in our candidate winning with 59% of the vote.
- Implemented field strategy by managing two field organizers, six interns, and multiple volunteers to reach thousands of voters each week and ensure candidate re-election.
- Recruited and trained volunteers by using different digital recruitment tools and regular volunteer contact in order to keep volunteers engaged and dedicated to the campaign.
- Coordinated with other campaigns in down-ballot races by planning eleven joint campaign events, resulting in flipping two seats and keeping Democrats in two seats.

Campaign Manager, Pinky Vargas for Mayor, Bellingham, WA *May-August 2019*

- Devised and implemented field strategy through meetings with campaign consultants and active recruitment of interns and volunteers to knock on over 7,000 doors.
- Designed and enacted a social media outreach plan utilizing programs such as ActionSprout and working with a team of volunteers to increase digital outreach.
- Organized and managed multiple campaign outreach events by communicating with community leaders, invested voters, and political organizations in order to further expand voter outreach and grassroots fundraising.

Training:

Institute for a Democratic Future, Seattle, WA *Jan 2024 - June 2024*

- Received an immersive deep-dive into the policy landscape of Washington state and a comprehensive understanding on how to advocate for people across the state.

Seattle Pedestrian Advisory Board

12 Members: Pursuant to Resolution 29532 and Ordinance 120325, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 2-year terms, Get Engaged Member, 1-year term:

- 7 Mayor- appointed
- 5 City Council - appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	6	1.	Member	Fallon Boyle	4/1/24	3/31/26	2	City Council
			2.	Member	Vacant	4/1/23	3/31/25		City Council
6	M	5	3.	Member	Wes Mills	4/1/24	3/31/26	2	City Council
6	F	7	4.	Member	Chelsea Morrison	4/1/23	3/31/25	2	City Council
3	F	3	5.	Member	Natasha Riveron	4/1/23	3/31/25	2	City Council
6	F	1	6.	Member	Kelsey Nyland	4/1/24	3/31/26	1	Mayor
3	F	4	7.	Member	Desiree Krautkramer	4/1/23	3/31/25	1	Mayor
6	F	4	8.	Member	Tracy Timmons-Gray	4/1/24	3/31/26	1	Mayor
6	O	3	9.	Member	Chris Grgich	4/1/24	3/31/26	2	Mayor
6	F	5	10.	Member	Delaney Lind	4/1/23	3/31/25	1	Mayor
3	F	3	11.	Member	Stevie Rae Brown	4/1/24	3/31/26	1	Mayor
		3	12.	Get Engaged Member	Jeremy Knapp	9/1/2025	8/31/2026	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor		5		1			2			4			
Council	1	3					1			3			
Other													
Total	1	8		1			3			7			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)

****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary, **O=** Other, **U**= Unknown

RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03292, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Naomi Cutler as member, Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Naomi Cutler*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *Queen Anne*	**Zip Code:** *98109*	**Contact Phone No.:** *N/A*
Background: *Naomi has commuted and recreated by bike in Michigan, Vermont, Montana, and Italy, before moving to Seattle in 2024. Enjoying the (relatively) mild weather in Seattle, Naomi commutes to the University of Washington where she is a research coordinator focused on climate disaster preparedness and response. She is thrilled to join the Bicycle Advisory Board in making cycling safer and more accessible to support our community's well-being and adaptation to climate change.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Naomi Cutler

SHE/HER/HERS

[redacted]

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Coordinator | **University of Washington** | 2024-Present

- Collaborate across disciplines to manage academic research projects on public health emergency preparedness and using location-based data to predict health outcomes of climate disasters
- Facilitate project and stakeholder meetings to gather expertise on public health emergency planning

Farmer/Community Engagement Coordinator | **Raven Ridge Farm** | Summer 2023

- Planted, tended, harvested, and processed a diverse range of vegetables using sustainable farming practices
- Designed community engagement content including posters for the farmstand, a recipe database for the community-supported agriculture members, and a farm tour and workshop

Arboretum Caretaker | **Matthaei Botanical Gardens and Nichol's Arboretum** | 2022-2023

- Managed and educated volunteers on ecological restoration projects including invasive species removal, gardening, and trail maintenance
- Monitored and tended to 123 acres of city and university land including maintenance of facilities, visitor engagement, invasive species removal, and snow removal

Digital Cartography Research Assistant | **Detroit River Story Lab** | Dr. David Porter | 2023

- Envisioned and spearheaded the creation of an interactive map of the Detroit River corridor on ArcGIS Online
- Provided technical support to community-based organizations using the map tool
- Designed a logo and communications material for the initiative

Environmental Communications Assistant | **Ecology Center of Ann Arbor** | 2022-2023

- Created and curated social media and communications content related to environmental health and safety research including chemicals in water, food, and other common household products
- Updated the Drupal website with articles and content

Monitoring and Outreach Specialist: ECO AmeriCorps | **Forest Ecosystem Monitoring Cooperative** | 2021-2022

- Developed an online map to lead a community-science volunteer project focused on invasive plants and insects
- Recruited, interviewed, and supervised twelve technicians for the Forest Health Monitoring summer program
- Served on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Justice (DEIJ) Committees at FEMC and ECO AmeriCorps
- Promoted the FEMC story via communication material on social media, web-tool fact sheets, and the web

Lands, Trails, and Education Coordinator: ECO AmeriCorps | **Middlebury Area Land Trust (MALT)** | 2020-2021

- Coordinated and maintained communication with education and trail volunteers
- Developed and managed a volunteer engagement database to increase MALT's capacity to stay connected with volunteers
- Redesigned a trail map on ArcGIS and Adobe InDesign and fundraised over $7,000 through grant-writing and partnership-building with local organizations to print the map
- Contributed to the 2022-2025 annual work plan by advocating for increased accessibility to educational programs
- Designed and wrote newsletters for Mailchimp and print to inform community members about MALT news and events

EDUCATION

University of Michigan School for Environment and Sustainability
Master of Science in Behavior, Education, and Communication and Geospatial Data Science | GPA: 4.0 |
Ann Arbor, Michigan | 2022-Present

Middlebury College | Bachelor of Arts in History | GPA: 3.78 | Middlebury, Vermont | 2016-2020

VOLUNTEERISM & LEADERSHIP

Behavior, Education, and Communication Track Leader | **University of Michigan** | September 2023-May 2024

- Prepared, facilitated, and executed community events for graduate students and faculty
- Built relationships with faculty members and creatively tackled challenges related to the curriculum

Refugee Resettlement Volunteer | **US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants** | 2021-2022

- Assisted with logistical preparation for the arrival of Afghan refugees in Vermont
- Tutored refugees in the English language after resettlement in Vermont

Trash Volunteer | **Shelburne Concerts on the Green** | 2020-2022

- Communicated with concert-goers about proper waste disposal
- Collaborated with other volunteers to ensure proper waste management during and after events

TECHNICAL SKILLS

- Microsoft Office Suite
- Google Suite
- ArcGIS, QGIS
- Adobe Illustrator, InDesign, Photoshop
- Python, R, JavaScript
- Zoom
- Mailchimp
- Social Media: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter
- Database Management
- Website Management

LANGUAGE SKILLS

- Italian (high oral and written proficiency)
- Spanish (novice oral and written proficiency)

AWARDS AND GRANTS

- Middlebury College Scholar, Middlebury, Vermont, 2016-2020
- Magna Cum Laude at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont, 2020
- High Honors in Middlebury College History Department, Middlebury, Vermont, 2020
- Marshall-Weinberg Endowed Fellowship, University of Michigan, 2022, 2023, $30,000
- Middlebury Rotary Club, Charitable Assessment Committee Grant, 2021, $1,000
- Sustainable Food Systems Initiative, Summer Funding Grant, 2023, $3,000

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

Conference Presenter | **Northeast Society of American Foresters** | 2021

- Tabled throughout the conference to promote the mission of the Forest Ecosystem Monitoring Cooperative to conference attendees including government officials and academics.

Conference Organizer | **Forest Ecosystem Monitoring Cooperative** | 2020

- Organized talks, workshops, and poster sessions for annual conference with 250+ attendees on Zoom Events.

Seattle Bicycle Advisory Board

12 Members: Pursuant to Resolution 30995; all members subject to City Council confirmation, 2-year terms:

- 7 Mayor- appointed
- 5 City Council- appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
6	F	4	1.	Member	Ksenia Ershova	9/1/2023	8/31/2025	1	Mayor
6	F	2	2.	Member	Kathryn Ricchiuto	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	1	City Council
9	F	3	3.	Member	Nia Ransom	9/1/2023	8/31/2025	1	Mayor
2	M	2	4.	Member	Madin Akpo-Esambe	9/1/2023	8/31/2025	1	City Council
1	M	6	5.	Member	Taylor Hom	9/1/2023	8/31/2025	1	Mayor
6	M	7	6.	Member	Douglas Migden	9/1/2023	8/31/2025	2	City Council
6	F	7	7.	Member	Donna McBain Evans	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	2	Mayor
3	M	2	8.	Member	Rafael Ronquillo	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	1	City Council
6	NB/O	3	9.	Member	Molly McNeely	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	1	Mayor
6	M	1	10.	Member	Max Baker	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	1	City Council
2	M	3	11.	Member	Joseph Roberts	9/1/2024	8/31/2026	2	Mayor
6	F	7	12.	Get Engaged Member	Naomi Cutler	9/1/2025	8/31/2026	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	2	4		1	1	1				4			1
Council	4	1				1	1			3			
Other													
Total	6	5		1	1	2	1			7			1

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary, **O=** Other, **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A
Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

Legislation Text

File #: Appt 03293, **Version:** 1

Appointment of Sidney Orr as member, Seattle Transit Advisory Board, for a term to August 31, 2026.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

City of Seattle Boards & Commissions Notice of Appointment

Appointee Name: *Sidney Orr*		
Board/Commission Name: *Seattle Transit Advisory Board*		**Position Title:** *Get Engaged Member*
☒ **Appointment** ***OR*** ☐ **Reappointment**	**City Council Confirmation required?** ☒ Yes ☐ No	
Appointing Authority: ☐ City Council ☒ Mayor ☐ Other: *Fill in appointing authority*	**Term of Position: *** 9/1/2025 **to** 8/31/2026 ☐ *Serving remaining term of a vacant position*	
Residential Neighborhood: *South Delridge*	**Zip Code:** *98126*	**Contact Phone No.:** [redacted]
Background: *Sidney is a community engagement professional with a passion for transportation, environmental justice, and building healthy communities through outreach and education. Sidney graduated from UW Seattle's College of the Environment in 2019 and currently works at PRR in Seattle as a Senior Community Engagement Specialist. Sidney is hoping to use their appointment to the Transit Advisory Board as an opportunity to deepen their commitment to bettering Seattle's integrated transit system and advocate for their community.*		
Authorizing Signature (original signature): **Date Signed (appointed):** July 18th, 2025	**Appointing Signatory:** *Bruce A. Harrell* *Mayor of Seattle*	

**Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.*

Sidney Orr, PMP

[redacted]

she/her, they/them

SENIOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATIONS CONSULTANT | PROJECT MANAGER

- **Program and project management** – Trusted communications consultant and collaborator in strategic project management and program planning.
- **Community engagement**– Over nine years of communications and public relations experience with a focus on community outreach, strategic planning, and crisis communications on public and capital projects.
- **Equity** – On a lifelong journey to advocate for marginalized groups, advance equity and inclusion, unpack my own biases, and educate myself on the lasting repercussions of racism.

EDUCATION

University of Washington, Seattle, Bachelor of Science in Environmental Science and Terrestrial Resource Management, 2019
Cornell University, Project Management Certificate, 2022
Project Management Institute, Project Management Professional Certification, 2023
FEMA, Public Information Office Basics, 2025

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

PRR, Senior Community Engagement Consultant | January 2025 – Present

Community Engagement Consultant | June 2023 – December 2024

Manages and provides strategic consultation on communications and community engagement strategies for the SR 509 Completion Project and Puget Sound Gateway Program with the Washington State Department of Transportation. Assists and coaches interdisciplinary client and consultant teams on project community outreach goals and objectives. Assesses communications and community engagement risks and opportunities and crafts appropriate responses.

- Creates and implements communications and engagement plans that effectively reach diverse audiences, including people who are Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC), people with disabilities, people with low incomes, and people who use languages other than English.
- Builds and supports effective working relationships with interdisciplinary teams across WSDOT, the Puget Sound Gateway Program, the SR 509 Completion Project, and partner organizations and agencies.
- Leads and supports teams, including onboarding team members, providing support to successfully accomplish complex tasks, delegating work effectively to team members with various levels of experience, coaching team members to accomplish goals, and identifying gaps in staffing and collaborating to fill them.
- Partners with WSDOT and client teams to provide solutions, help establish goals and objectives, maintain focus on achieving the goals, and seek opportunities to add value.

Enviroissues, Communications & Outreach Project Manager | June 2021 – June 2023

Project Coordinator | November 2020 – July 2021

Managed communications and public affairs on capital projects with clients from Seattle Public Utilities, Seattle Department of Transportation, King County Wastewater Treatment Division, Sound Transit, King County Metro, and the Washington State Department of Transportation. Managed junior staff on six different client accounts and managed contracts, budgets, and client relationships on those accounts.

- Served as a liaison between multiple teams within project ecosystems, including community-based organizations, subject matter experts, technical teams, creative teams, partner agencies, sub-consultants, department executives, internal and external stakeholders, and adjacent project teams/staff.
- Used strong written and oral communication skills to plan and employ inclusive stakeholder engagement strategies, including translating materials for non-English speaking audiences, editing communications materials so they meet access needs, producing videos, developing websites, and creating presentations.
- Led business development and contracting activities, including drafting proposals, negotiating project scopes, tracking budgets, managing relationships with sub-consultants, and drafting progress reports.

Stepherson & Associates, Project Coordinator | June 2019 – November 2020

Worked with clients and project teams to plan and implement public engagement processes, develop communications materials, and plan events to connect with people and advance transportation, water, land use, and energy projects.

- Worked with dynamic teams to write and develop on-brand communications materials for clients including listservs, websites, factsheets, infographics, online open houses, presentations, press releases, mailers, display boards, summaries, surveys, and social media campaigns. Worked with clients to develop and carry out crisis communications plans, stakeholder correspondence management, inbox management, and communications database management.
- Researched demographic and population data to inform equitable outreach practices to engage underrepresented communities
- Analyzed quantitative and qualitative data and summarized public input to create client-ready project updates and reports for internal and external audiences

UW Sustainability – Campus Sustainability Fund, Project Development Specialist | September 2018 – June 2019

Assisted prospective project teams in navigating the grant application process and supported active project teams through check-in meetings, partnership building, and resource sharing. Oversaw, tracked and mentored over 50 grant-funded sustainability projects in four sustainability categories: social, economic, cultural, and ecological.

- Conducted outreach to community-based organizations, colleges, and student communities to encourage grant applications and guided groups through the application progress.
- Strategized with stakeholders and teams to develop better pathways for community organizations, University departments, and project teams to work together towards common goals.
- Created and implemented RSJ programming and equity-focused grant funding bylaws. This included changing the department's definition of "sustainability" to specifically call out social and cultural sustainability as a requirement for all the projects we awarded grants to.
- Drafted quarterly reports for the fund's governing committees, wrote grant summaries for websites and newsletters, and provided feedback on draft grant applications.

Seattle Public Utilities, Communications Intern | June 2017 – June 2018

Assisted the Seattle Public Utilities Communication Team with community outreach activities, marketing, multimedia material development, social media planning, media engagement, and other forms of external communication Conducted research via focus groups, direct community outreach, surveys, personal interviews, and nationwide utility data to gain an understanding of, and present options for, how SPU can better serve customers.

- Planned the overall communications effort for the Sharps (syringes, needles, and lancets) Collection Pilot Program, including scheduling, planning, and hosting a media event, drafting press releases and preparing employees to staff the media event.
- Designed graphics using Adobe Creative Suite and assisted in a rebranding effort to upgrade externally facing material.
- Partnered with the Environmental Justice and Service Equity branch to create training videos that instructed SPU employees on how to employ an Equity Tool Kit better to serve historically underserved communities during the damage claims process.
- Partnered with the drainage and wastewater line of business to carry out a side-sewer maintenance outreach plan and solicit input from stakeholders through a series of compensated focus groups and surveys.

University of Washington – ASUW Office of Government Relations, Outreach Coordinator |October 2015 – January 2017

- Planned, organized, and executed a campus-wide voter registration drive and Get Out the Vote campaign which registered over 750 new voters. Trained student volunteers on best practices when engaging with community members directly, digitally, and over the phone during the voter registration drive and Get Out the Vote campaign.
- Worked with other members of the Office of Government Relations to build relationships with state, county, and city government officials on behalf of the University of Washington student body.
- Created communications pathways for students to engage directly with elected officials and have a say in policies that affect them.

Seattle Transit Advisory Board

12 Members: Pursuant to Resolution 31572, all members subject to City Council confirmation, 2-year terms:

- 7 Mayor- appointed
- 5 City Council- appointed

Roster:

*D	**G	RD	Position No.	Position Title	Name	Term Begin Date	Term End Date	Term #	Appointed By
3	M	3	1.	Member	Sandro R. Pani	8/3/24	8/2/26	3	City Council
1	F	4	2.	Member	Shirley Chu	8/3/24	8/2/26	1	City Council
6	T/NB	4	3.	Member	Deborah Barnard	8/3/24	8/2/26	1	City Council
2	M	2	4.	Member	Dexter Jenkins	8/3/23	8/2/25	1	City Council
1	F	7	5.	Member	Priyadharshini Balan	8/3/23	8/2/25	1	City Council
6	NB	6	6.	Member	Katie Freeman	8/3/24	8/2/26	1	Mayor
1	M	3	7.	Member	Ashwin Bhumbla	8/3/24	8/2/26	2	Mayor
1	M	1	8.	Member	Art Kuniyuki	8/3/24	8/2/26	3	Mayor
6	F	5	9.	Member	Carolyn Tillinger	8/3/23	8/2/25	1	Mayor
6	M/T/ NB	4	10.	Member	Dana Coppernoll-Houston	8/3/23	8/2/25	1	Mayor
6	M	7	11.	Member	Zachary Burton	8/3/23	8/2/25	1	Mayor
6	F	1	12.	Get Engaged Member	Sidney Orr	9/1/2025	8/31/2026	1	Mayor

SELF-IDENTIFIED DIVERSITY CHART

	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Transgender	(4) NB/ O/ U	(5) Asian	(6) Black/ African American	(7) Hispanic/ Latino	(8) American Indian/ Alaska Native	(9) Other	Caucasian/ Non-Hispanic	Pacific Islander	Middle Eastern	Multiracial
Mayor	4	2	1	2	2					5			
Council	2	2	1	1	2	1	1			1			
Other													
Total	6	4	2	3	4	1	1			6			

Key:

***D** List the corresponding *Diversity Chart* number (1 through 9)
****G** List *gender*, **M**= Male, **F**= Female, **T**= Transgender, **NB=** Non-Binary, **O=** Other, **U**= Unknown
RD Residential Council District number 1 through 7 or N/A

Diversity information is self-identified and is voluntary.

File #: CB 121065, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE relating to City employment; authorizing the execution of a collective bargaining agreement between The City of Seattle and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898, effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

WHEREAS, the collective bargaining agreement between The City of Seattle ("City") and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898 expired on December 31, 2021; and

WHEREAS, employees represented by the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898 continued to work on condition that their wages, hours, benefits, and other conditions of employment continue to be negotiated; and

WHEREAS, collective bargaining has led to an agreement between the City and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898; and

WHEREAS, separate, future legislation, as required, will be forwarded by the City Budget Office to provide department budget appropriation authority to cover compensation items authorized in the attached collective bargaining agreement; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. As requested by the Seattle Human Resources Director and recommended by the Mayor, the Mayor is authorized on behalf of the City to execute a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898, effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026, substantially in the form attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1 and identified as "Agreement By and Between The City of Seattle and Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898."

Section 2. Any act consistent with the authority of this ordinance taken prior to its effective date is ratified and confirmed.

Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this ____day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Agreement By and Between The City of Seattle and Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898

AGREEMENT

BY AND BETWEEN

THE CITY OF SEATTLE

AND

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION, IAFF, LOCAL 2898

AFL - CIO - CLC

Effective January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2026

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AGREEMENT

BY AND BETWEEN

THE CITY OF SEATTLE

AND

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION, IAFF, LOCAL NO. 2898

AFL - CIO - CLC

PREAMBLE

The rules contained herein constitute an Agreement between the City of Seattle, hereinafter referred to as the "City" or the "Employer" and the Seattle Fire Chiefs Association, I.A.F.F., Local Union No. 2898, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," governing wages, hours, and working conditions as described herein.

The City and the Union agree that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for fair and reasonable compensation and working conditions for employees of the City as enumerated in this Agreement and to provide for the efficient and uninterrupted performance of municipal functions. This Agreement has been reached through the process of collective bargaining with the objective of serving the aforementioned purposes and with the further objective of fostering effective cooperation between the City and its employees.

ARTICLE 1 - RECOGNITION AND BARGAINING UNIT

1.1 The City hereby recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit of all supervisory uniformed personnel of the Fire Department holding the rank of Battalion Chief and Deputy Chief.

ARTICLE 2 - UNION ENGAGEMENT

2.1 The City and the Union will administer the provisions of this Article with regard to dues deduction and membership of employees in accord with their respective obligations under the law.

2.1.1 Any disputes concerning the amount of dues or fees and/or the responsibility of the Union to the employees covered by this Agreement shall not be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in this Agreement.

2.2 Neither party shall discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of membership or non-membership in the Union. Provided however, that this clause shall not restrict the Union from providing internal Union-sponsored benefits to Union members only.

2.3 The City shall make deductions on a regular basis from an employee's pay for the regular Union dues or other obligation agreed between the employee and the Union; provided such employees shall authorize said deductions in writing on a form to be filed with the City. The City shall remit such deductions to the Union. The performance of this function is recognized as a service to the Union by the Employer.

2.4 The Union recognizes that it is the Union's exclusive responsibility to notify employees of their options regarding association and/or membership. The Union agrees to indemnify and hold the Employer harmless from all claims, demands, suits or other forms of liability that arise against the Employer for deducting dues from union members, including those that have communicated a desire to revoke a previous deduction authorization, along with all other issues related to the deduction of dues or fees.

2.5 lAFF Local 2898, the Seattle Fire Department, and the City of Seattle share a commitment to attracting and retaining a skilled workforce that reflects the diversity of our community. We believe that diversity makes us stronger and furthers the City of Seattle's commitment to Workforce Equity. We will continue to partner in recruitment and workforce development initiatives to increase the participation of historically marginalized groups in fire protection and emergency medical services.

ARTICLE 3 - SALARIES

3.1 The minimum salaries to be paid by the City to employees in the bargaining unit during the period of this Agreement are set forth in Appendix A of this Agreement.

3.2 The hourly rate of pay for employees shall be determined as follows:

A. Monthly salary X 12 ÷ (52.2 x 45.7) = Hourly rate of pay for Operations Division (24-hour shift) schedules

B. For 40-hour employees: Monthly salary X 12 = Annual salary
Annual salary ÷ 2088 = Hourly rate

3.3 Employees who work, or are otherwise entitled to pay, for all scheduled shifts in a work schedule that averages 45.7 hours per week on an annual basis shall be paid for 91.4 hours a pay period regardless of the number of hours actually worked. The bi-weekly pay of employees who are absent from scheduled work and are in a non-pay status for less than two shifts during the pay period shall be computed by subtracting the number of hours absent from 91.4 and multiplying by the hourly rate of pay. When unpaid absence equals two or more scheduled working shifts in one pay period, payment will be made only for time worked.

3.4 When an employee's number of actual hours worked is affected by Daylight Savings Time adjustments, the employee shall not be compensated for any additional time worked as a result of said adjustments, nor shall their compensation be reduced for working less time as a result of said adjustments.

3.5 In the event an employee covered by this Agreement leaves the service of the Fire Department and within a year the Fire Department rehires said employee in the same classification to which assigned at date of termination, such employee shall be placed at the step in the salary range which is closest to the salary earned at the time of the original termination.

3.6 Upon promotion to a position in the bargaining unit, an employee previously in a position classified as Captain shall be granted service credit for work in an out of class basis in the position to which promoted if the conditions below are met. Similarly, upon promotion to a Deputy Chief position in the bargaining unit, an employee previously in a Battalion Chief position shall be granted service credit for work in an out of class basis in a Deputy Chief position if the following conditions are met:

A. The higher-level position to which the employee is promoted is in the same Fire Department unit (Operations, FAC, FMO, Paramedics) in which the out of class assignment was worked.

B. The out of class assignment continued for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately prior to the promotion. (The "consecutive months" will be considered to have been interrupted if the employee was absent from duty for any reason for a total of eight or more shifts.)

ARTICLE 4 - HOURS OF DUTY

4.1 The number of hours assigned duty per week for employees under this Agreement shall be continued in accordance with provisions as set forth in this Agreement. Nothing herein shall limit the City in exercising discretion in varying the hours of duty of any employee. Employees working an average work week of 45.7 hours shall work a base schedule of a twenty-four (24) hour shift. Employees assigned to other divisions shall work forty (40) hours per /week.

4.1.1 In exigent circumstances such as earthquake, flood, pandemic, natural or manmade disaster, or danger to life or property or work so urgently necessary that its nonperformance will cause serious loss or damage to the City, the department may redeploy staff and/or adjust work schedules for up to two weeks or as mutually agreed.

4.2 Members working consecutive shifts at their request are responsible for all issues regarding proper relief including compensation for a holdover member. The Department will assume responsibility for relief compensation when members are held over for emergencies or at the direction of the Department.

4.3 Members are responsible for monitoring their state of readiness. When a member's scheduled shift falls on the consecutive shift and the member is not adequately rested to perform their duties, the member will inform their supervisor and request time off using accrued compensatory time, vacation, or sick leave.

4.4 Employees will have twenty-four (24) hours off duty before and after a change of schedule to or from Operations and Administrative schedules when participating in manipulative training or work or having travel time greater than four (4) hours. Employees will have at least twelve (12) hours off duty before and after a change of schedule when only participating in non-manipulative training or work or other deployments that mandate post-incident rehabilitation periods.

4.5 Operations Division Supervising Chiefs assigned to Deputy 1, Battalions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and the Safety Officer positions shall have their floating debit day cancelled without using a vacation day. The Fire Chief (or designee) shall name the Supervising Chiefs by the end of December of each year.

4.6 The City agrees to a Special Relief program for all employees covered by this Agreement. Early or Late Relief shall be permitted subject to approval by the Employer.

4.7 An employee shall be granted time off with pay on Volunteer Relief if a replacement from the Union is arranged to work in place of the employee, with the approval of the Fire Chief or their designee.

4.7.1 Requests and arrangements for Volunteer Relief shall be made by the Union at least one shift prior to the proposed time off whenever possible.

4.7.2 Volunteer Relief may be worked in twenty-four (24) hour and twelve (12) hour increments (0800 to 2000 shifts and 2000 to 0800 shifts).

4.8 Each employee working in the Operations Division shall be assigned a work number consisting of the employee's assigned platoon (A, B, C, D) and a number from 1 to 13. In addition to the employee's assigned platoon schedule, the employee is assigned to work on the days upon which the work number falls. These days shall be referred to as scheduled debit shifts.

4.8.1 Employees shall work, in addition to the regularly scheduled twenty-four (24) hour shifts, one (1) floating debit shift per year to result in an average 45.7-hour work week.

4.8.2 Employees in the Operations Division shall be scheduled to work 28 shifts excluding floating debit shifts per 104-day debit cycle. Usually this will be 26 days on the assigned shift and 2 debit days. If, due to a transfer, an employee is not scheduled to work 28 shifts during the cycle, the Department will assign additional shifts or provide time off so that the employee is scheduled for 28 shifts.

4.9 Employees may not accumulate more than 480 hours of compensatory time as a result of a merit trade. Employees with 480 hours or more of compensatory time who work a merit trade shall be paid straight time wages for hours worked. Employees with less than 480 hours of compensatory time who work a merit trade shall accrue compensatory time up to the 480-hour cap and shall be paid straight time wages for all hours worked above the 480-hour cap. The employee initiating the merit trade shall have the appropriate amount of compensatory time deducted from their total.

ARTICLE 5 - OVERTIME PAY

5.1 Work performed outside of the employee's regular scheduled shift(s) shall be compensated (pay or compensatory time) at the overtime rate of one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate of pay for actual hours worked. All overtime work must be approved in advance by the employee's authorizing authority.

5.1.1 All overtime compensation shall be at the rate of time and one-half (1 1/2). Such overtime compensation shall be in the form of pay or employees may receive compensatory time at the overtime rate in lieu of overtime pay upon approval of the Chief of the Department up to a maximum of 480 hours of accumulated compensatory time. All overtime hours in excess of 480 shall be in the form of pay. Any employee who has accumulated more than 480 hours of compensatory time shall not accumulate any more, including by merit trade, as set forth above in Section 4.9. Any overtime earned after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) threshold of 212 hours in a twenty-eight (28) day work period shall be in the form of pay in all cases. The FLSA period shall begin on the first day of a pay period, with the beginning on June 14, 1995. The overtime rate of pay shall be determined from the applicable straight time hourly rate. Additionally, overtime worked pursuant to reimbursable activity shall be compensated at the overtime rate in the form of pay and shall not be taken as compensatory time.

5.2 Effective January 1, 2018, any Department work which commences less than four (4) hours before or after a shift will be considered shift extension time. Such shift extension time shall be paid at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate to the next even one (1) hour time period for the first hour and for the actual time worked thereafter. When such shift extension time is taken in compensatory time instead of pay, the employee shall be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the regular straight time hourly rate to the next even one (1) hour time period for the first hour and rounded up to the nearest next half-hour for time worked thereafter.

5.2.1 Effective January 1, 2018, in the event that overtime is not an extension at the beginning or end of a normal shift, the minimum payment shall be four (4) hours at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate. Time worked in excess of the four (4) hour minimum shall be compensated for the actual time worked thereafter in accordance with Section 5.1. When time worked in excess of the four (4) hour minimum is taken in compensatory time instead of pay, the employee shall be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate rounded up to the nearest next half-hour for time worked thereafter. Except that effective upon ratification of this Agreement by both parties, employees who remotely or virtually attend required meetings off-shift shall

be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate for actual time worked, rounded up to the next half hour.

5.3 Vacancies occurring in the Battalion and Deputy Chief ranks in the Operations Division not covered by a member working a debit shift shall be filled by those Battalion/Deputy Chiefs in the bargaining unit who have volunteered for overtime assignments to ensure that there are seven chiefs assigned to each platoon consistent with the 2017 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning Battalion 2 and the 2021 Acting BC MOA.

5.3.1 Employees shall be hired for overtime from a voluntary overtime signup list. Overtime hiring procedures will be in accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated January 30, 2009. If vacancies cannot be filled in accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated January 30, 2009, the Department may fill such overtime positions as its policy and procedure may provide. Employees shall be scheduled and called for overtime work in such a manner as will, as far as practicable, rotate overtime work opportunities among employees covered by this Agreement. If more than one employee has signed up to work overtime, the member with the fewest previously worked overtime hours in the calendar year shall be hired.

5.3.2 The Department shall maintain two separate overtime hiring lists: 1) a full-shift overtime hiring list for 20 hours or more, and 2) a partial-shift overtime hiring list for fewer than 20 hours. Members hired for Deputy 1 and Safety 2 must be eligible to work in those positions when hired from the partial-shift overtime list.

5.3.2.1 Employees shall have twenty (20) hours added to their "Hours Worked" balance when initially hired from the full-shift overtime hiring list. Hours will be reconciled upon the employee's overtime submittal.

5.3.2.2 Employees shall have four (4) hours added to their "Hours Worked" balance when initially hired from any partial-shift overtime hiring list. Hours will be reconciled upon the employee's overtime submittal.

5.3.3 The employees of the bargaining unit shall be granted access to the Department's Local 2898 modified overtime program. All requests for information as a result of this access shall be directed only to the Fire Chief or designee. Local 2898 shall use the department's electronic hiring, staffing, and timekeeping program, and members shall be granted access.

5.3.4 Employees shall not sign up to work overtime, nor be assigned to work overtime during any period of time when the overtime assignment would conflict with their regularly scheduled duty assignment(s) or their "off-duty standby" status, as described in Sections 6.1.2, 6.1.2.1, and 6.1.2.2. However, an employee assigned to an Administrative schedule who is working overtime in Operations may use vacation

or compensatory time off to complete the overtime shift before reporting to their regular administrative assignment.

5.3.5 Employees who receive an out-of-city-deployment will not be eligible to work overtime until all forms for all work performed while on deployment have been submitted. The Union agrees that the City shall be held harmless and indemnified against any and all errors related to eligibility to work overtime under this Section.

5.3.6 Employees assigned to or working an Administrative schedule shall be allowed to work overtime only on weekends, regularly scheduled days off, and vacations of at least three (3) calendar days, when granted in advance. Vacations may be combined with regularly scheduled days off and/or to meet the three (3) calendar days-off requirement.

5.3.7 Employees in the Operations Division may work consecutive twenty – four (24) hour shifts and twelve (12) hour shifts up to a maximum of consecutive seventy two (72) hours. Employees must be off for twelve (12) hours directly before and after working a consecutive seventy-two (72) - hour shift before they are eligible to work another full-shift overtime. However, employees may work Special Overtime during the twelve (12) hours directly before and after working consecutive shift(s).

5.3.7.1 Vacation, or compensatory time off shall satisfy the twenty (20) hour requirement of Section 5.3.7 above only when such vacation, or compensatory time was scheduled prior to the request for or acceptance of the forty-eight (48) consecutive hour assignment.

5.3.7.2 Trades, early relief, or compensatory time off may not be used to shorten a shift to avoid the requirements of Section 5.3.7 above.

ARTICLE 6 - TEMPORARY DETAIL TO HIGHER POSITIONS

6.1 Employees in the classification of Fire Battalion Chief covered by this Agreement who are assigned by proper authority to perform the duties of a higher paid position within the Fire Department shall be paid in accordance with the following:

A. In excess of four (4) hours, but less than five (5) consecutive shifts or forty (40) hours, at the beginning rate of Fire Chief, Deputy.

B. For five (5) consecutive shifts or forty (40) hours, shall be paid at the first level of the position which they are filling which exceeds the level in 6.1.A. above for all hours so assigned and worked.

6.1.1 Employees assigned to Deputy Chief positions covered by this Agreement who are assigned in writing by proper authority to perform the duties of a higher paid position within the Fire Department shall be paid at a rate equal to one hundred and ten percent (110%) of the Deputy Chief's regular rate of pay for all hours so assigned and worked. In order to qualify for this compensation employees must work at least four (4) consecutive hours in the out of class assignment. The Department will assign a Deputy Chief in the event an employee is out on leave for 45 days.

6.1.2 The Fire Chief or their designee may formally place employees who are assigned to perform the duties of a higher-paid position in accordance with Section 6.1.1 on "off-duty standby" status for a fixed, predetermined period of time, during which the employee is required to remain on page communicator, a similar device or at home in a state of readiness to respond to duty at a moment's notice.

6.1.2.1 Employees formally placed on "off-duty standby" status in accordance with Section 6.1.2 above shall be compensated on the basis of ten percent (10%) of the straight time rate of pay of the acting assignment described above in Section 6.1.1. If the employee is actually called to perform the work of the acting position, the "off-duty standby" pay shall cease at that time. Thereafter, normal overtime rules apply. If applicable, the "off-duty standby" status shall resume when the work is completed.

6.1.2.2 Employees assigned to "off-duty standby" status in accordance with Section 6.1.2 above shall not sign up to work overtime that would conflict with the "off-duty standby" period(s). If, prior to being assigned to "off-duty standby" status, the employee has accepted any overtime assignment(s) that conflict with the assigned "off-duty standby" period, the employee shall so notify the Fire Chief or designee at the time the employee is notified that they will be assigned to "off-duty standby" status.

6.2 To qualify as an Operations Acting Deputy Chief, a Battalion Chief must have a minimum of two years' experience as an Operations Battalion Chief. Safety Officers are not eligible to act as Deputy 1 when working in their regularly assigned position.

ARTICLE 7 - VACATIONS

7.1 Effective January 1, 2018, each employee shall be granted a vacation in accordance with the following schedule:

1 thru 6 yrs. service	9 shifts (216 hours)
7 thru 14 yrs. service	10 shifts (240 hours)
15 thru 19 yrs. service	11 shifts (264 hours)
20 yrs. service	12 shifts (288 hours)
21 thru 24 yrs. service	13 shifts (312 hours)
25 yrs. service	14 shifts (336 hours)
26 or more yrs. service	15 shifts (360 hours)

7.1.1 Employees working a 45.7-hour average work week are required to use 24-hours of vacation to cancel a floating debit day on January1 of each calendar year, with the exception of employees designated as Supervising Chiefs.

7.1.2 Employees working an average forty (40) hour work week are required to use vacation leave equivalent to the number of regular scheduled hours (for example, if working four 10-hour days per week, must submit vacation leave for 10 hours; if working five 8-hour days per week, must submit vacation leave for 8 hours) on the following holidays:

New Year's Day
Martin Luther King's Birthday
Presidents' Day
Memorial Day
Labor Day
Veteran's Day
Thanksgiving Day
Day After Thanksgiving Day
Christmas Day

Employees working an average forty (40) hour workweek shall have the holiday off on Juneteenth and Indigenous Peoples' Day and shall use the holiday payroll leave code (currently HA) for these two holidays off.

Effective 2026 employees working an average forty (40) hour workweek shall have the holiday off on Independence Day and shall use the holiday payroll leave code (currently HA) for the holiday off.

7.1.3 Earned vacation in Section 7.1 reflects the addition of four (4) shifts of holiday off time. The practice of scheduling holiday offs shall be discontinued.

7.1.4 Admin Employees who are required to work on holidays in 7.1.2 shall be paid one and one-half (1½) times the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours worked and, in addition, another day off will then be rescheduled. For the rescheduled holiday off, the member must submit vacation leave per Section 7.1.2.2.

7.1.5 Elimination of holiday premium pay for personnel scheduled to work a 45.7-hour work week are in trade for other benefits gained in this Agreement.

7.1.5a Effective 2022 Employees working an average 45.7 - hourly workweek shall receive holiday premium pay that nets to one and a half time per hour on Juneteenth and Indigenous Peoples' Day.

Effective 2026 employees working an average 45.7 - hourly workweek shall receive holiday premium pay that nets to one and half time per hour on Independence Day.

7.2 Vacations for members of Local 2898 assigned to Operations are considered to be "unscheduled" and shall be granted upon request, with the exceptions of Independence Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve and Christmas. On those days, there must be one member signed up on the overtime register for each vacation day granted. However, where a member has been granted a day off on said holiday(s) due to a member having signed up on the overtime register and that member subsequently removes their name from the overtime register, the last member who was granted time off shall have their day off cancelled. Vacation requests for members assigned to administrative are subject to approval of the Employer with no request unreasonably denied.

7.2.1 Employees may cancel granted time off (unscheduled vacation, saved vacation, compensatory time or leave without pay) up to 20-hours before the start of the shift taken off. Granted time off may not be cancelled if requested less than 20-hours before the start of the shift taken off.

7.3 The bargaining unit shall be allowed three (3) opportunities per shift to schedule accumulated unscheduled vacation, saved vacation and compensatory time in 12-hour, half-shift increments (for example, two (2) 0800 to 2000 and one (1) 2000 to 0800, three (3) 0800 to 2000 or three (3) 2000 to 0800). The bargaining unit may exceed three (3) opportunities provided backfill is available.

7.4 Effective December 25, 2019 an employee may, following one (1) full calendar year of employment, carry over and/or accumulate ninety-six (96) hours of vacation annually, provided that, the number of vacation shifts carried over and/or accumulated shall not exceed one and one-half (1½) times the number of annual vacation hours for

which such employee is currently eligible. An employee who is unable to take their regularly scheduled vacation, or portion thereof, as a result of disability, military leave or other work-related reasons approved by the Fire Chief shall have said vacation held over to the next calendar year. Vacation held over must be scheduled and taken in the following year. Work-related vacation carry-over due to workload must be requested and approved by the end of the 3rd quarter. If the carry over vacation is not scheduled by February 1st of the following year, the Department will schedule the vacation for the employee.

7.5 An employee who separates from service with the Fire Department and is rehired by the Department within one (1) year from the date of separation, shall have all prior service time reinstated for purposes of vacation accrual.

7.6 Unpaid leaves of absence shall result in a loss of vacation granted in the next year by multiplying the given accrual factor by the number of scheduled hours of work (including debit shift hours) lost due to the unpaid leave and rounding to the nearest full hour.

Years of Service	Annual Hours of Work	
	2382	2088
1-6	.0907	.0575
7-14	.1008	.0690
15-19	.1108	.0805
20	.1209	.0920
21-24	.1310	.1035
25	.1411	.1150
26	.1511	.1265

As an example:
Hours of leave of absence: 11 shifts x 24 hours = 264 hours (20 yrs. service)
(2382 annual hours) 264 X .1209 = 31.917
= 32 hours to be deducted from next year's vacation hours

ARTICLE 8 - SICKNESS AND DEATH IN FAMILY

8.1 Employees assigned to a 40-hour average work week shall receive one (1) or, if necessary, for travel, two (2) shifts off duty with pay in the event of a death of a close relative. The second shift off is applicable only in instances where total travel of 200 miles or more is necessary. The intent of this Article is to provide time off from regularly scheduled duty to attend or make arrangements for a funeral in event of the death of a close relative.

8.2 Employees assigned to a 45.7-hour average work week shall receive one shift off duty with pay to attend the funeral of a close relative.

8.3 Employees notified of a death in the family while on duty shall be immediately excused from work for the balance of the shift if it is necessary that the employee be immediately off work to attend to such a situation. Such time off shall be with pay in addition to the benefit applicable. An employee who is working on an overtime basis will be allowed to leave work but will be paid only for hours actually worked.

8.4 For purposes of administration of this Article, a close relative is defined to include spouse, domestic partner, children, mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandchildren, and grandparents of employee and spouse, or domestic partner.

8.5 Emergency leave: The City agrees to allow up to a total of twelve (12) hours per calendar year off with pay for such employee when the Department is notified that the employee's spouse, domestic partner or child, or a parent of the employee or the employee's spouse or domestic partner has unexpectedly become seriously ill or has had a serious accident and it is necessary that the employee be immediately off work to attend to such a situation. This provision shall be applicable when notification of the need for emergency leave is given up to three (3) hours prior to the commencement of the work shift or during the work shift.

8.5.1 This Section shall be applicable twice each year; however, the total emergency leave hours shall not exceed twelve (12) in the calendar year. This time limit shall not apply to LEOFF II employees' use of sick leave for emergency purposes. LEOFF II employees who do not utilize all of their emergency leave in a calendar year shall have the remaining balance of their emergency leave credited to their sick leave balance for the next year.

8.5.2 For the administration of this Section, "child" shall be defined as every natural born child, stepchild, child legally adopted or made a legal ward of the employee.

8.5.3 An employee working a regularly scheduled shift may take the whole shift off if necessary but shall not be paid for more than 12-hours in any one calendar year. In

the event that the emergency situation requires the employee's presence for more than 12-hours, the employee shall have the option of utilizing one of the following to offset any hours beyond twelve:

A. Vacation time

B. Compensatory time

C. Sick Leave (per Sick Leave Ordinance)

8.5.4 An employee who is working on an overtime basis will be allowed to leave work in an emergency such as described above but will be paid only for hours actually worked.

8.6 The City agrees to allow the remaining portions of an employee's vacation, accumulated vacation days, or accumulated compensatory time to be used as Sickness and Death in Family Leave, as provided in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.

ARTICLE 9 - COMPENSATION FOR USE OF PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE

9.1 Any employee when required by the City to use their private automobile on Department business shall be compensated at the mileage rate (cents per mile) in effect at the time for other City employees (as specified by ordinance). This shall not cover any transportation to and from work. When an employee uses a private automobile to travel to Department sponsored training, or court appearances, mileage reimbursement will be based on the distance from the employee's assigned workplace to the training or court location. Mileage forms shall be provided by the City and be made available and on hand in every station.

9.2 Whenever an employee is notified of a detail to another assignment location during their off-duty time, the member shall receive thirty (30) minutes of pay at time and one-half (1 ½).

9.3 If an employee is detailed to another station after reporting to their scheduled place of employment, they may use their private automobile to effect the detail if Department transportation is not furnished. If the employee uses their private automobile for the detail, they shall be compensated in accordance with Section 9.1.

ARTICLE 10 - UNIFORM ALLOWANCE

10.1 The City shall provide and maintain at no cost to the employee all protective clothing and equipment pursuant to WAC 296-305-060. The City may issue said items directly, establish a procurement policy with a supplier or suppliers or reimburse employees for the purchase of said items in a timely manner which shall normally be within fourteen (14) calendar days of a request for reimbursement. The Department shall promulgate policies and procedures for same and shall notify the Union of subsequent modifications.

10.2 Employees shall be responsible for acquiring required uniform items in accordance with policy and procedure of the Department. The Department shall notify the Union of any changes to the required uniform.

10.3 Effective January 2, 2002, the base wage for each employee shall be increased in an amount equal two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) annually to cover the cost of replacement of said uniform items.

Effective December 17, 2025, the base wage for each employee shall be increased an additional one hundred dollars ($100.00) to cover the cost of replacement of said uniform items. This increase is in addition to the existing two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) for a total of Three hundred and fifty $350.

10.4 All employees shall be provided two (2) badges by the department upon promotion to rank of Battalion and Deputy Chief.

10.5 Protective equipment and clothing purchased by the Department or for which the employee was reimbursed pursuant to Section 10.1, shall remain the property of the Department and shall be returned to the Department upon an employee's separation from employment. The employee is responsible for the safekeeping of all City purchased clothing and equipment. Normally, such equipment shall be kept at the fire station to which the employee is assigned. Such clothing and equipment shall not be used by employees for other than work for the Seattle Fire Department.

ARTICLE 11 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

11.1 Any dispute between the Employer and the Union concerning the interpretation or claim of breach or violation of the express terms of this Agreement shall be deemed a grievance. Such a dispute shall be processed in accordance with this Article. Any other type of dispute between the parties as well as disputes involving (1) Public Safety Civil Service Commission Rules or Regulations whether specified in this Agreement or not, if there be such, (2) disciplinary/discharge action taken by the Employer, except as specified in Section 11.10 and Article 12; and (3) Article 23 - Pensions, shall not be subject to the procedure delineated in this Article.

Early Mediation Process. The City and the Fire Chiefs' Association encourage the use of the Early Mediation Process prior to issues becoming the subject of grievances. Participation in the process is entirely voluntary, confidential and does not impact grievance rights.

Any alleged grievance shall be taken up by the employee with the appropriate Deputy Chief within twenty – four (24) calendar days of the occurrence. If the aggrieved employee is a Deputy Chief, the grievance shall be taken up by the employee with their Assistant Chief. The above parties agree to make every effort to settle the grievance at this stage promptly; however, if no satisfactory settlement is reached, the following procedure shall apply:

Step 1. The grievance shall be reduced to written form by the aggrieved employee and/or Union, stating the Section of the Agreement allegedly violated and explaining the grievance in detail. The Union Representative shall present the written grievance to the Assistant Chief of the Department within ten (10) calendar days after the alleged grievance is taken up by the employee with the Deputy Chief or the Assistant Chief. The Assistant Chief or their designee shall convene a meeting within ten (10) calendar days after receipt of the written grievance, between the Union Representative, aggrieved employee, and any other witnesses and/or members of management whose presence is deemed necessary to a fair consideration of the grievance.

Ten (10) calendar days after the aforementioned meeting, the Assistant Chief shall transmit a copy of this decision to the aggrieved employee, the Union and the Chief of the Fire Department.

Step 2. A grievance which remains unresolved after the written decision is delivered in Step 1 shall be transmitted in writing by the aggrieved employee and/or Union involved to the Chief of the Fire Department with

a copy to the Director of Labor Relations. Said transmittal must be accompanied by the following information:

A. Nature of dispute
B. Contract provision(s) allegedly violated
C. Remedy sought

The Chief of the Fire Department shall not be required to consider a grievance which is not referred to them within ten (10) calendar days following the Step 1 decision. A grievance properly filed shall be investigated by the Chief of the Department and/or the City Labor Relations Director or their respective designees. Such investigation, if deemed appropriate by the Chief of the Fire Department, may include a conference with the employee involved and their Union representative, if they have designated one. The Director of Labor Relations or their designee may thereafter make a confidential recommendation to the Chief of the Fire Department. The Chief of the Department shall make a decision on the matter in writing within ten (10) calendar days from the date when it was first received by them; provided, however, the Chief of the Department may waive investigating and answering the grievance at Step 2 and defer a decision to Step 3 within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the grievance. Copies of the Chief's decision shall be furnished to the aggrieved, their Union representative and the Director of Labor Relations.

Step 3. A grievance which remains unresolved after the decision is rendered in Step 2 may be transmitted in writing to the Director of Labor Relations by the aggrieved employee and/or Union, requesting a review by the Grievance Board. The Grievance Board shall not be required to consider a grievance which is not referred to the Director of Labor Relations within ten (10) calendar days following written notification of the Step 2 decision. The Director of Labor Relations or their designee listed below shall convene the Grievance Board within ten (10) calendar days upon receipt of a written request for review.

The Grievance Board shall consist of:

- Presiding Chairperson - City Director of Labor Relations or City Labor Negotiator
- Member - Fire Chief, or their designee from within the department
- Member - President of the Union, Local 2898, I.A.F.F. or their designee from within Local 2898.

The Grievance Board shall issue its findings with recommendations for resolving the grievance in writing within ten (10) calendar days to the Chief of the Fire Department. The Chief shall within ten (10) calendar days

thereafter render a decision on the issue with a copy to Local 2898, the aggrieved employee and the Director of Labor Relations.

Step 4. If the contract grievance is not settled in Step 2 or 3, it may be referred by either the Union or the City to the Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission to supply both parties with a list of five (5) qualified arbitrators. If no agreement is reached between parties in the choice of an arbitrator from that list within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of said list, or the Union or the City opt to bypass a PERC list of arbitrators, the contract grievance shall be referred to the American Arbitration Association for arbitration to be conducted under its voluntary labor arbitration regulations.

Referral to arbitration (PERC or AAA) must be made within thirty (30) calendar days after the decision in Step 3 and to be accompanied by the following information:

A. Identification of the Section(s) of the Agreement allegedly violated.
B. Details of the nature of the alleged violation.
C. Position of the party who is referring the grievance to arbitration.
D. Question(s) which the arbitrator is being asked to decide.
E. Remedy sought.

If Arbitration has been timely requested, the parties may with mutual consent attempt Grievance Mediation. The process will use a mutually acceptable mediator and conclude within 30 days after the mutual request.

The parties agree to abide by the award made in connection with any arbitrable difference.

11.1.1 The Union and the City recognize the importance of the arbitration process to the Union and its members, the City, and the public in order to resolve workplace disputes. The expectation for arbitration is to have an arbitrator issue a fair and just decision based on the evidence. The parties recognize the value of arbitrators who have a reputation for integrity, independence, and impartiality. The parties have thus agreed to limit their selected arbitrators to those that are AAA qualified, which requires acceptability from both labor and management in order to achieve qualification. The parties also recognize the value of using arbitrators with experience arbitrating cases involving public safety and/or other public employees.

11.2 In connection with any arbitration proceeding held pursuant to this Agreement, it is understood as follows:

A. The arbitrator shall have no power to render a decision that will add to, subtract from, or alter, change, or modify the terms of this Agreement, and their power shall be limited to interpretation or application of the express terms of this Agreement, and all other matters shall be excluded from arbitration.

B. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive, and binding upon the City, the Union, and the employees involved.

C. The cost of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the City and the Union, and each party shall bear the cost of presenting its own case.

D. The arbitrator's decision shall be made in writing and shall be issued to the parties within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted to the arbitrator.

11.3 Any time limits stipulated in the Grievance Procedure may be extended for stated periods of time by the appropriate parties by mutual agreement in writing; and the parties may, by mutual agreement, waive any step or steps of the Grievance Procedure to advance said grievance in an effort to expedite the resolution.

11.4 If at any step in the grievance procedure management's answer is deemed unsatisfactory, the Union's and/or the aggrieved's reasons for non-acceptance must be presented in writing.

11.5 The City agrees to conduct all hearings concerning a grievance on on-duty hours of employees whenever practical.

11.6 Failure by an employee or the Union to comply with any time limitation of the procedure in this Article shall constitute withdrawal of the grievance. Failure by the Employer to comply with any time limitations of the procedure in this Article shall allow the Union to proceed to the next step.

11.7 Arbitration or grievance settlements shall not be made retroactive beyond the date of the occurrence or non-occurrence upon which the grievance is based, that date being twenty-four (24) or less days prior to the initial filing of the grievance.

11.8 Any dispute as to whether or not a particular complaint has merit as a grievance as defined in Section 11.1 above shall be processed through the grievance procedure at the initiation of either party to this Agreement.

11.9 The Grievance Procedure may be invoked by the City relative to a grievance filed on its behalf commencing at Step 2 of the Grievance Procedure.

11.10 In no event shall this Agreement alter or interfere with disciplinary procedures followed by the City or provided for by City Charter, Ordinance or Law; provided, however, disputes concerning disciplinary or discharge action shall not be subject to this Article but shall be processed in accordance with Public Safety Civil Service procedures and rules, unless such discipline involves the demotion, suspension or termination of a Battalion Chief, in which case grievance arbitration shall be available.

11.11 If the contract grievance is not settled in Step 2, it may be referred to Step 3 at the discretion of the initiating party within the time limits described therein or Step 3 may be waived, provided a grievance conference has been held and a grievance decision was rendered in Step 2. If Step 3 is waived, the issue may then be submitted to Step 4 within the time limits described therein.

11.12 The Union shall be afforded all rights and privileges in filing grievances as an aggrieved employee under this Article.

11.13 Where the designated Officer as defined in Section 11.1 above is part of the bargaining unit, a grievance decision by said Officer shall not necessarily be conclusive nor set a precedent. Said decision shall be subject to review and/or reversal by the Chief of the Fire Department at any time. In case a decision is set aside as described above, the ensuing grievance time limits shall become operative when the grievant or Union is notified of the reversal.

11.14 Employees covered by this Agreement will follow all written and verbal directives, even if such directives are allegedly in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 12 - DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL OF DISCIPLINE

12.1 The City shall have the right to discipline employees for just cause. As used herein, discipline shall be deemed to include a suspension without pay, demotion, discharge, and involuntary transfer for disciplinary reasons. Just cause is not required for counseling, performance improvement plans (PIP), or involuntary transfers for non-disciplinary reasons.

12.2 Discipline may be appealed under the grievance procedure outlined in Article 11 or, if applicable, through Civil Service, but not both. If there are dual filings with the grievance procedure and the Public Safety Civil Service Commission (PSCSC), the City will send a notice of such dual filings by certified mail to the employee(s) and the Union. The Union will notify the City within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the notice if it will use the grievance procedure. If no such notice is received by the City, the contractual grievance shall be deemed withdrawn.

12.3 Employees shall have the right to Union representation in all investigatory interviews that the employee reasonably believes will result in disciplinary action against them.

ARTICLE 13 - SICK LEAVE , MODIFIED DUTY AND LONG-TERM DISABILITY

13.1 Employees covered by this Agreement who are not granted disability leave pursuant to State Statute RCW Chapter 41.26,030(19) (disability leave) shall accrue sick leave at the rate of .046 hours for each regularly scheduled hour of work including paid time off.

13.1.1 Effective upon signing, and as directed by Local 2898 on an annual basis, employees covered by this Agreement who are not entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26, shall either receive a cash payment or cash out sick leave upon retirement into a VEBA trust fund designated by the Union to pay health insurance premiums or other legally authorized healthcare costs for eligible future retirees and dependents, at the following rates:

A. Accumulated sick leave hours between 0 and 400 shall be cashed out at 25%.
B. Accumulated sick leave hours between 401 and 800 shall be cashed out at 50%.
C. Accumulated sick leave hours above 800 shall be cashed out at 75%.

13.1.2 In the event of the death of an employee while employed by the City who is eligible for the sick leave cash out benefit described above in Section 13.1.1, such employee's beneficiary shall be paid a portion of the employee's accumulated and unused sick leave in accordance with Section 13.1.1.

13.1.3 Payoff in Sections 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 shall be made at the rate of pay of such employee upon retirement or death, respectively.

13.1.4 Employees who transfer to other City departments shall transfer all accumulated and unused sick leave to the new position in the accepting department.

13.2 For such employees identified in Sections 13.1 and 13.1.1 who are exposed to a communicable disease in the line of duty and for whom specific preventative medication is deemed necessary by a physician in order to prevent the employee from acquiring the disease, the City will reimburse any out-of-pocket costs for the preventative medication which the employee has incurred and for which he/she will not otherwise be reimbursed. To obtain reimbursement the employee shall present satisfactory documentation with a written request for reimbursement to the City for approval of payment.

13.3 At the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department, employees not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26, may be required to see a physician designated by the Chief of the Fire Department to verify disability resulting in layoff or claims of injury, illness, or any other disability which would prevent the employee from performing their duties.

13.3.1 Twenty-four (24) hour shift employees who are not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26 shall be required to obtain a physician's verification of illness/injury when their disability or the care of a dependent requires them to be absent from work for more than seventy two (72) consecutive hours; that is, if they miss a portion of a fourth consecutive shift. Twenty-four (24) hour shift employees must obtain this verification no later than the day of the fourth shift missed. Forty (40) hour per week employees are required to provide a physician's verification of illness/injury after thirty-two (32) consecutive hours are missed on sick leave or dependent care sick leave. Abuse of sick leave shall be grounds for discipline up to and including dismissal. The Department also has the right to require an employee whose sick leave usage is outside of expected norms to provide physician verification within six (6) business hours (0900 - 1700, Monday through Sunday) of notifying the Department of the disability, except where individual circumstances or legal requirements require more time.

13.4 The City agrees to allow the remaining portions of an employee's vacation, accumulated vacation days, or accumulated compensatory time to be used in place of sick leave for an employee who has exhausted their sick leave benefits.

A. This provision is applicable to employees covered under 13.1 and 13.1.1 of this Article.
B. Use of such time is subject to the same criteria for use of sick leave as described by Ordinance as cited above.

13.5 Leaves of absence without pay for medical reasons due to a non-duty related injury or illness may be granted to an employee who has exhausted all their paid sick leave for a period of up to six (6) months upon written approval by the City.

13.6 The Department at its discretion may offer, upon request, modified duty to members who are temporarily unable to work their regular assignment due to medical limitations resulting from injury, illness, or pregnancy, provided the Department determines such work is available. Such discretion will be exercised without discrimination or bias. A modified duty assignment need not be made if a member is unable to perform, even after reasonable accommodation, any of the modified duty assignments that are available given the member's work restrictions and other qualifications. A modified duty assignment is not intended to fill or replace a regular assignment nor is it designed to take work from another bargaining unit. This

provision shall be in accordance with Department Modified Duty Guidelines and in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

13.7 Applications for a leave of absence for medical reasons without pay or an extension thereof must be made in writing to the Fire Chief with a copy to the Personnel Director and notice of such application to the Union President. The granting of such a leave of absence, and extension thereof, or the refusal of such a leave and the reasons, therefore, must be in writing from the City. If granted, the City's response shall specify the length of the leave of absence and whether or not the applicant will be guaranteed a job at the scheduled expiration of said leave of absence.

13.8 Applications for leaves of absence for medical reasons must be accompanied by a doctor's statement indicating the reason necessitating such a leave and the approximate duration if known. An employee who is ready to return from a medical leave of absence must also submit to the Chief of the Fire Department a doctor's statement that they are physically and mentally able to resume their normal duties.

13.9 If the employee has not been granted an extension of the leave of absence and does not report for work when scheduled to return from the leave of absence, the employee is considered to have quit. The Department shall send a registered letter to the employee stating that they are considered to have terminated employment if no answer is received within five (5) working days of receipt of the letter.

13.10 If the employee's former position is not available, the employee shall be notified of the first available position of comparable classification for which the individual is qualified. Such notice shall be sent by registered mail by the Chief of the Fire Department to the employee's last known address, with a copy to the Union President. If the employee fails to report for work or otherwise respond to the Chief of the Fire Department within one (1) week from the date of receipt of the notification, or if the notification letter is returned unclaimed, the employee shall forfeit all reinstatement rights.

13.11 Under the terms and conditions of the parties' Memorandum of Agreement, dated April 1, 1999, the City shall provide mandatory payroll deduction for monthly premium costs of a disability insurance plan to be selected periodically and administered by the Union.

13.12 Employees may apply for Family Medical Leave in accordance with local, state, and federal law.

13.13 An employee who goes on leave does not have a greater right to reinstatement or other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the leave period.

13.14 Industrial Insurance. In no circumstances will the amount paid to an employee entitled to Industrial Insurance payments exceed the employee's gross pay minus mandatory deductions.

13.14.1 Employees must meet the standards listed in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.44.020 to be eligible for the benefit amount provided herein, which exceeds the rate required to be paid by state law, hereinafter referred to as supplemental benefits. These standards require that employees: 1) comply with all Department of Labor and Industries rules and regulations and related City of Seattle and Seattle Fire Department policies and procedures; 2) attend all treatments and meetings related to rehabilitation and work hardening, conditioning or other treatment arranged by the City and authorized by the attending physician; 3) accept modified or alternative duty assigned by supervisors when released to perform such duty by the attending physician; 4) attend all meetings scheduled by the City of Seattle Workers' Compensation unit or the Seattle Fire Department concerning the employee's status or claim when properly notified at least five (5) working days in advance of such meeting, unless other medical treatment conflicts with the meeting and the employee provides twenty-four (24) hours' notice of such meeting or examination.

13.14.2 The City will provide a copy of the eligibility requirements to employees when they file a workers' compensation claim. If records indicate two (2) no-shows, supplemental benefits may be terminated no sooner than seven (7) days after notification to the employee.

13.15 LEOFF I Dependent Care Leave

Employees covered by this Agreement who are entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26 (LEOFF I) will be provided a paid leave bank called "Dependent Care Leave" to use for dependent care.

The City authorizes the use of Dependent Care Leave to care for an eligible family member of the LEOFF 1 member who has an illness, injury, or health care appointment requiring the absence of the LEOFF I member from work, or when such absence is recommended by a health care professional. For purposed of Dependent Care Leave, "eligible family member" has the same meaning as provided in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.24.005(A); and "health care professional" has the same meaning as provided in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.24.005(B). Dependent Care Leave may not be used for any other purpose.

Effective January 1, 2009, at the beginning of each calendar year, each full-time LEOFF I member will accrue an additional forty-eight (48) hours of Dependent Care Leave to be added to the existing hours in their Dependent Care Leave bank. The annual accrual of Dependent Care Leave hours for part-time LEOFF I members will be prorated. Unused Dependent Care Leave hours will be carried over to the next

calendar year. There is no cap or maximum limit on the number of hours a LEOFF I member may accumulate in their Dependent Care Leave bank. LEOFF I members who transfer to other City departments may not transfer any accumulated or unused Dependent Care Leave to the new position in the accepting department. LEOFF I members may not donate Dependent Care Leave hours to other members or City employees. Dependent Care Leave hours may not be cashed out or paid off upon retirement or at any other time.

13.16 VOLUNTARY EMPLOYEE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION (VEBA)

Effective January 1, 2014, the City will contribute $50 per month to the VEBA specified by Local 2898 for employees covered by this Agreement who are not entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26.

ARTICLE 14 - JOINT LABOR MANAGEMENT AND JOINT SAFETY COMMITTEES

14.1 The Union and the City agree to maintain and actively engage in a Labor Management Relations Committee.

14.1.1 The Committee shall be composed of a balance of representation from represented employees which may be from any bargaining unit with employees assigned to the Fire Department and non-represented employees, which shall include the Director of Labor Relations or designee.

14.1.2 The Committee shall be co-chaired by a representative from labor and a representative from the Fire Department administration.

14.1.3 The purpose of the Committee is to deal with matters of general concern to employees and administrators of the Department. The Committee may engage in discussion concerning matters of a Collective Bargaining nature. However, any agreement that may change the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be subject to the ratification processes of the parties.

14.1.4 Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit, restrict, or reduce the management prerogatives outlined in this Agreement.

14.1.5 This Section shall not deny any employee their rights granted under provisions of City, State and/or Federal Law.

14.2 The Union shall have one voting member on the Joint Safety Committee. The member shall be appointed by the President of Local 2898.

ARTICLE 15 - UNION BUSINESS

15.1 Employees who are Union officials (three officers who constitute the Union's Executive Board) shall be granted one shift or a portion thereof without loss of pay to conduct Union business if a replacement acceptable to the Chief of the Department or their designee is arranged for by the Union. The cost of such replacement shall be paid by the Union.

15.1.1 Such employees may be granted time off without pay to conduct Union business at the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department.

15.1.2 All requests and arrangements for the time off shall be made by the Union official at least three shifts prior to the proposed time off whenever possible.

15.1.3 In emergencies, the request may be submitted orally and later confirmed in writing. While working on shift, Union officials agree not to transact Union business that interferes with Department functions or normal routine. Upon written approval of the Chief, the Union President and/or their designee from the Union's Executive Board may be granted a reasonable amount of time off per year with pay to conduct official Union business, excluding all State legislative lobbying or activities. The Union will maintain a log of the actual time spent pursuing approved Union activities.

15.2 Union business may be conducted in the fire stations with permission of the Chief of the Department.

15.3 The Department will allow the Union use of bulletin board space in each station in a convenient location, which the Union may use for the posting of notices of official Union business. Material posted shall not refer to political matters nor to generally controversial subjects.

15.4 The City agrees not to restrict written communications between Local 2898 and its members if such written communication does not result in interference with the routine or the effectiveness of the station.

15.5 The Union agrees that any City property or facilities, including department apparatus, shall not be used for any non-duty related activities unless expressly approved by the Fire Chief or their designee in writing. Such requests may be made verbally and later confirmed in writing.

ARTICLE 16 - MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

16.1 Any and all rights concerned with the management and operation of the Department are exclusively that of the City unless otherwise provided by the terms of this Agreement. The City has the authority to adopt rules for the operation of the Department and conduct of its employees, provided such rules are not in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement or with applicable law. The City has the right (among other actions) to discipline, temporarily lay off, or discharge employees for good cause, also to assign work and determine duties and performance standards of employees; to determine, establish and/or revise the method, processes and means of providing departmental services, to schedule hours of work; to determine the number of personnel to be assigned duty at any time; and to perform all other functions not otherwise expressly limited by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 17 - PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

17.1 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to give an employee the right to strike and no employee shall strike or refuse to perform their assigned duties to the best of their ability during the term of this Agreement. The Union agrees that it will not condone or cause any strike, slowdown, mass sick call or any other form of work stoppage or interference to the normal operation of the Seattle Fire Department during the term of this Agreement.

17.2 Neither an employee nor the City will intentionally waive any provisions of this Agreement unless such waiver is mutually agreed upon by the Union and the City.

17.3 In accordance with Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.64.010, as amended, it shall be a condition of employment that in the event there is made against an employee any claims and/or litigation arising from any conduct, acts or omissions of such employee in the scope and course of their City employment, the City Attorney of the City shall, at the request of the Chief and on behalf of said employee, investigate and defend such claims and/or litigation and, if a claim be deemed by the City Attorney a proper one or if judgment be rendered against such employee, said claim or judgment shall be paid by the City in accordance with procedures established by Ordinance 104526, as amended, for the settlement of claims and payment of judgments.

17.4 The parties recognize that delivery of municipal services in the most efficient, effective, and courteous manner is of paramount importance and interest to the City and Union and, as such, maximized productivity is recognized to be an obligation of employees covered by this Agreement. In order to achieve this goal, the parties further recognize that work procedures and assignments or the introduction of any and all new, improved, or automated methods or equipment to increase the productivity and performance of individual employee(s), company(s), and/or Department, may be established and/or revised as set forth in Article 16.

17.5 The City and Local 2898 recognize the value and importance of Human Resources, Race and Social Justice and Leadership topics. Management can require employees to participate in a maximum of sixteen (16) hours per year of required off-shift training related to Human Resources, Race and Social Justice and/or Leadership topics. Management will work with the Union through the labor management committee to determine a training delivery plan. Employees who are unable to attend the required training due to personal commitments or unanticipated events will be offered opportunities to make up the training when practicable.

ARTICLE 18 - MEDICAL CARE, DENTAL CARE, VISION CARE AND LIFE INSURANCE

18.1 Medical Dental and Vision Care Programs - For employees covered by this Agreement who were hired before October 1, 1977 and are covered by State Statute RCW 41.26, the City will provide medical, dental and vision care programs, as established by the City, for the dependents of eligible employees under conditions of the medical, dental and vision care contracts applicable to employees covered by this Agreement and which were in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement.

18.2 Medical, Dental and Vision Care Programs - For employees covered by this Agreement who are not covered by State Statute RCW 41.26 or who were hired on or after October 1, 1977, and who are not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26, the City shall provide a medical, dental and vision care programs, as established by the City, for eligible employees and their eligible dependents under conditions of the medical, dental and vision contracts applicable to employees covered by this Agreement and which were in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement.

18.3 Effective July 1, 2013, the Employer shall contribute ninety percent (90%) and the employee shall contribute ten percent (10%) of the medical, dental and vision premiums for employees covered under the plans identified for "Most City Employees".

18.4 The medical, dental and vision plans offered by the City do not have to remain exactly the same as the programs in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement, but the medical/dental benefits shall remain substantially the same. The City may, at its discretion, change the insurance carrier for any of the medical, dental or vision benefits covered above and provide an alternative plan through another carrier. Benefit plan design changes will be accomplished through the Citywide Health Care Committee, however, any contemplated modification(s) to the medical or dental benefits afforded under the existing health care program(s) or a change in carrier(s) shall first be discussed with the Union party to this Agreement.

18.5 The City, at its discretion, may provide, and later discontinue if it deems appropriate, any other medical care, dental care or vision care options.

18.6 The Parties agree to form a committee to review the options associated with moving the Local 2898 members into the Local 27 healthcare trust. The committee will work in the spirt of cooperation, collaboration and in the spirt of good faith. This committee will be made of subject matter experts to include but not limited to someone from the Local 27 trust authorized to negotiate on its behalf, a member of 2898, Subject matter experts regarding healthcare from the City and a SHR Labor negotiator, and a representative from the department. This committee may or may not make a

recommendation to the appropriate people in leadership. Nothing in this article requires any action other than to develop the possibility of options and/or feasibility of the movement from one healthcare trust to a different healthcare trust. With mutual agreement between the Parties this agreement may be reopened for bargaining for moving 2898 members to the Local 27 healthcare trust.

The Parties agree to begin meeting regularly on a mutually agreeable basis no later than the last quarter of 2025, and no less than once a quarter. The goal of this committee is to conclude their business by no later than the last quarter of 2026.

18.7 Life Insurance - The City shall offer a voluntary Group Term Life Basic Insurance option to eligible employees. The employee shall pay sixty percent (60%) of the monthly premium and the City shall pay forty percent (40%) of the monthly premium at a premium rate established by the City and the carrier. Premium refunds received by the City from the voluntary Group Term Life Basic Insurance option shall be administered as follows:

18.8 During the term of this Agreement, additional premium refunds shall be divided so that forty percent (40%) can be used by the City to pay for the City's share of the monthly premiums, and sixty percent (60%) shall be used for benefit of the employees participating in the Group Term Life Insurance Plan in terms of benefit improvements, to pay the employees' share of the monthly premiums or for life insurance purposes otherwise negotiated.

18.8.1 Whenever the Group Term Life Insurance Fund contains substantial rebate monies earmarked pursuant to Section 18.7, the Union shall be notified along with the Unions representing other City employees. The City will negotiate whether the sixty percent (60%) rebate attributable to employee contributions will be used to help pay the employees' share of monthly premiums or for life insurance purposes otherwise negotiated.

18.9 Employees under the age of 65 who retire from City service shall be entitled to participate in the medical plans offered to active employees. The costs of the premiums for the plans shall be paid by the retirees. The retirees may elect to obtain coverage for their dependents at the time of retirement pursuant to the same terms and conditions as may active employees. The City will provide this option to retirees with tiered-rate premiums. Employee's aged 65 and older may also participate in medical plans provided such coverage is available through a contracted insurance carrier.

18.10 There will be one enrollment period for retirees to select a particular medical option which will remain in effect until age 65 or after age 65 provided such coverage is available through the contracted insurance carrier. Retirees must elect coverage within thirty (30) days prior to retirement or no later than thirty (30) days after the

end of COBRA coverage and can only enroll eligible family members who were enrolled on a City medical plan immediately prior to retirement. Retirees can later remove dependents but cannot re-enroll them at a later date. However, a retiree's spouse or domestic partner may delay enrollment if they have coverage through another employer at the time the retiree is first eligible to enroll. When coverage is lost with that employer, the spouse or domestic partner shall provide proof of loss of coverage and enroll within thirty-one (31) days of loss of coverage. If a retiree declines coverage during the thirty (30) day initial enrollment period, they or their spouse, domestic partner or dependents cannot enroll at a later date. Any benefit changes to the medical and dental plans for active employees covered by this Agreement will automatically apply to the retiree plans.

18.11 The Department shall have the right to administer reasonable suspicion drug and alcohol testing, the terms of which have been negotiated pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement signed January 10, 2001.

18.12 The Department will compensate the employees covered by this agreement two (2) hours of overtime to complete the annual medical physical that has some component(s) of the NFPA - 1582, provided the employee provides a post physical doctor note that confirms the physical was completed.

ARTICLE 19 - GENERAL CONDITIONS

19.1 Employees covered by this Agreement shall be interviewed and/or counseled whenever possible prior to the submission of a transfer recommendation. When possible, they shall receive one (1) week written notice when their location of employment is being changed. In filling transfer vacancies, the City shall reasonably consider seniority, merit and ability, and employee wishes if an employee makes such wishes known to the Chief.

19.2 The parties agree that Battalion Chief assignments will be rotated on a regular basis as outlined in the Chief Rotation MOA dated February 22, 2018, as amended by the parties.

19.3 Notwithstanding any provisions of this Agreement, the Chief of the Fire Department or their designees may meet privately with an employee(s) covered by this Agreement for purposes of counseling relative to grievances, discipline or any other personal or departmental problems.

19.4 The City agrees to notify an employee a minimum of thirty (30) calendar days prior to lay-offs for any reason with the exception of disciplinary action or discharge for good cause shown.

19.5 The rank of Fire Chief, Deputy is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Safety Civil Service Commission and the creation and maintenance of such a rank shall be at the sole discretion of the Employer. When such a rank exists, selection of employees for the rank of Fire Chief, Deputy shall be at the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department.

19.6 Written correspondence addressed to the Fire Chief shall be date stamped with a copy of the correspondence returned to the author. This stamp shall indicate that the correspondence has been reviewed by the Fire Chief, not their designee.

19.7 Payroll Errors

A. In the event the City determines that there has been an error in an employee's paycheck, an underpayment shall be corrected as soon as practical and upon written notice an overpayment shall be corrected as follows:

1. If the overpayment involved only one (1) paycheck or the amount of the overpayment is less than fifty dollars ($50.00):
   a. By lump-sum payroll deduction; or
   b. By lump-sum payment from the employee.

2. If the overpayment involved multiple paychecks and the amount of the overpayment exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00):
   a. By a repayment schedule through payroll deduction not to exceed twenty-six (26) pay periods in duration, with a minimum payroll deduction of not less than twenty-five ($25.00) dollars per pay period; or
   b. By a repayment schedule not to exceed thirteen (13) pay periods, with a minimum payroll deduction of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00), if the employee does not agree to a repayment schedule.

3. By other means, as may be mutually agreed between the City and the employee.

B. If an employee separates from City service before an overpayment is repaid, any amount due the City will be deducted from their final paycheck.

19.8 Meal Reimbursement While on Travel Status

An employee shall be reimbursed for meals while on travel status at the federal per diem rate. An employee will not be required to submit receipts for meals and may retain any unspent portion of an advance cash allowance for meals.

19.9 Ethics and Elections Commission

Nothing contained within this Agreement shall prohibit the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission from administering the Code of Ethics, including, but not limited to, the authority to impose monetary fines for violations of the Code of Ethics. Such fines are not discipline under this Agreement and, as such, are not subject to the Grievance procedure contained within this Agreement. Records of any fines imposed, or monetary settlements shall not be included in the employee's personnel file. Fines imposed by the Commission shall be subject to appeal on the record to the Seattle Municipal Court.

In the event the employer acts on a recommendation by the Commission to discipline an employee, the employee's contractual rights to contest such discipline shall apply. No record of the disciplinary recommendations by the Commission shall be placed in the employee's personnel file unless such discipline is upheld or unchallenged. Commission hearings are to be closed if requested by the employee who is the subject of such hearing.

19.10 Personnel File

Employees may examine their own personnel files and are entitled to a copy of anything contained therein, at the City's expense. Employees may also add to their own personnel files a written response to any document placed in their personnel files.

19.11 Performance Appraisals

The Union recognizes the City's right to establish and/or revise performance appraisal systems.

19.12 Social Media Policy

The Union agrees that the Social Media Policy dated August 20, 2020 will apply to Local 2898 members.

19.13 Gender Workforce Equity

For the duration of this agreement, the Union agrees that the City may open negotiations associated with any changes to mandatory subjects related to Gender/Workforce Equity efforts.

19.14 Education Level Survey

The parties agree that the City may survey employees to determine education level during the term of the agreement.

ARTICLE 20 - PENSIONS

20.1 Pensions for employees and contributions to pension funds will be governed by the Washington State Statute in existence at the time.

ARTICLE 21 - SUBORDINATION OF AGREEMENT

21.1 It is understood that the parties hereto and the employees of the City are governed by the provisions of applicable Federal Law, State Law, and the City Charter. When any provisions thereof are in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, the provisions of said Federal Law, State Law, or City Charter are paramount and shall prevail.

21.2 It is also understood that the parties hereto and the employees of the City are governed by applicable City Ordinances and said Ordinances are paramount except where they conflict with the express provisions of this Agreement and except where, in the event of changes to the wages, hours or working condition of employees covered by this Agreement, bargaining is required by RCW 41.56.

ARTICLE 22 - SAVINGS CLAUSE

22.1 If any Article of this Agreement, or any Addenda hereto, should be held invalid by operation of law or by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction, or if compliance with or enforcement of any Article should be restrained by such tribunal, the remainder of this Agreement and Addenda shall not be affected thereby, and the parties shall enter into immediate collective bargaining negotiations for the purpose of arriving at a mutually satisfactory replacement of such Article.

ARTICLE 23 - ENTIRE AGREEMENT

23.1 The Agreement expressed herein in writing constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties, and nothing shall add to or supersede any of its provisions, except by mutual written agreement.

23.2 The parties acknowledge that each has had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any matter deemed a proper subject for collective bargaining. The results of the exercise of that right are set forth in this Agreement. Therefore, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the City and the Union for the duration of this Agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly, agrees to waive the right to oblige the other party to bargain with respect to any subject or matter whether or not specifically governed by this Agreement, provided that Local 2898 does not waive its right to obligate the City to bargain with respect to any changes proposed by the City in the wages, hours, or working conditions of employees covered by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 24 - DURATION OF AGREEMENT

24.1 This Agreement shall become effective upon signing by the parties and shall remain in effect through December 31, 2026. Written notice of intent to amend or terminate must be served by the parties five (5) months prior to the submission of the City budget in the calendar year 2025 as stipulated in RCW 41.56.440.

24.2 At the appropriate time as described in Section 24.1 above, any contract changes desired by either party must be included in the opening letter and shall not be accepted at a later date unless mutually agreed upon by both parties.

Signed this _____ day of _____ 2025.

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION,
IAFF, LOCAL 2898

_____
Dan Murray, President

_____
Paul Atwater, Secretary-Treasurer

_____
Eddie Nelson, Vice-President

CITY OF SEATTLE
Executed under the authority of
Ordinance

_____
Bruce Harrell, Mayor

APPENDIX A

A.1.1 Effective December 22, 2021, salaries shall be increased by 4% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months
Battalion Chief	$13,605	$14,108
Battalion Chief, Admin	$14,663	$15,166
Deputy Chief	$15,545	$16,225
Deputy Chief, Admin	$16,603	$17,283

A.1.2 A fifteen percent (15%) salary differential rounded to the nearest dollar shall be maintained between the top salary steps of the Fire Battalion Chief and Deputy Fire Chief classifications.

A.1.3 Effective December 23, 2020, employees holding the rank of Battalion Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive a premium equivalent to 7.5% of the top step of the Battalion Chief classification while so assigned.

A.1.4 Effective December 23, 2020, employees holding the rank of Deputy Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive a premium equivalent to 7.5% of the top step of the Battalion Chief classification while so assigned as set forth in A.1.4.1 below.

A.1.4.1 Employees holding the rank of Deputy Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive the premium noted in A.1.4 above only upon assignment by the department of a Battalion Chief to administrative duties, and only while a Battalion Chief is so assigned by the department, with the date of eligibility being the same date as that of the Battalion Chief so assigned. In the event there is no longer any Battalion Chief assigned to administrative duties, Deputy Chiefs assigned to administrative duties shall no longer be eligible for and therefore shall not receive said premium. *

A.1.5 Effective December 21, 2022, salaries shall be increased by 5% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months
Battalion Chief	$14,285	$14,813
Battalion Chief, Admin	$15,396	$15,924
Deputy Chief	$16,322	$17,036
Deputy Chief, Admin	$17,433	$18,147

A.1.6 Effective December 20, 2023, salaries shall be increased by 4% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months
Battalion Chief	$14,856	$15,406
Battalion Chief, Admin	$16,011	$16,561
Deputy Chief	$16,975	$17,717
Deputy Chief, Admin	$18,130	$18,872

A.1.7 Effective December 18, 2024, salaries shall be increased by 4% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months
Battalion Chief	$15,450	$16,022
Battalion Chief, Admin	$16,652	$17,224
Deputy Chief	$17,654	$18,426
Deputy Chief, Admin	$18,856	$19,628

A.1.8 Effective December 17, 2025, salaries shall be increased by 5% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months
Battalion Chief	$16,252	$16,852
Battalion Chief, Admin	$17,516	$18,116
Deputy Chief	$18,566	$19,376
Deputy Chief, Admin	$19,832	$20,640

A.2.1 Effective December 22, 2021 through December 16, 2025, monthly longevity premiums based upon the top pay step of the Fire Battalion Chief classification shall be added to the salaries in Section A.1.1, in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of Service	Percentage	12/22/21	12/21/22	12/20/23	12/18/24
Completion of fifteen (15) years of svc	5%	$705	$741	$770	$801
Completion of twenty (20) years of svc	8%	$1,129	$1,185	$1,232	$1,282
Completion of twenty-five (25) years of svc	11%	$1,552	$1,629	$1,695	$1,762
Completion of thirty (30) years of svc	12%	$1,693	$1,778	$1,849	$1,923

A.2.2 Effective December 17, 2025 the following monthly longevity premiums based upon the top pay step of the Fire Battalion Chief classification shall be added to the salaries in Section A.1.5, A.1.6, and A.2.1 during the life of this Agreement in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of Service	%	12/17/25	
• Completion of fifteen (15) years of service	6%	$1,011.00	$
• Completion of twenty (20) years of service	8%	$1,348.00	$
• Completion of twenty-five (25) years of service	12%	$2,022.00	$
• Completion of thirty (30) years of service	13%	$2,191.00	$

A.2.3 Longevity premiums shall be paid beginning with the first full pay period following the completion of the eligibility requirements. For the purpose of determining eligibility for longevity premiums, service shall be limited to time served in good standing as a uniformed member of the Seattle Fire Department.

A.3 All employees of the Seattle Fire Department shall be furnished a paycheck stub which designates the hourly rate paid; in addition, the paycheck stub shall also outline deductions authorized by the employee or required by law.

APPENDIX B - DEFERRED COMPENSATION

B.1 Beginning January 1, 2014, the City shall contribute 1.6% of the top step base salary of Battalion Chief to the City's deferred compensation program for all employees represented by Local 2898. The City's contribution shall be 1.6% regardless of whether or not the employee makes a voluntary contribution to the deferred compensation program. The parties agree that the payments made by the City to this program are not matching, and whether or not such payments should include the calculation for each employee's retirement benefit under RCW 41.16, RCW 41.18, RCW 41.18, RCW 41.20, RCW 41.26, or other public pension system shall be an issue of law about which the City shall take no position in any legal proceeding.

B.1.1 Beginning December 25, 2019, the City shall increase its contribution by 1% to a maximum contribution rate of 2.6% of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.

B.1.2 Effective December 17, 2025, the City shall increase its contribution by 0.4% to a maximum contribution rate of 3% of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Seattle Department of Human Resources	Jeff Clark	Candice Foote

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title: AN ORDINANCE relating to City employment; authorizing the execution of a collective bargaining agreement between The City of Seattle and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898, effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

Summary and Background of the Legislation: This legislation authorizes the Mayor to implement a collective bargaining agreement between The City of Seattle ("City") and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898 ("Local 2898"). The collective bargaining agreement is a five-year agreement on wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions for the period from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026. This legislation affects 31 regularly appointed City employees.

The collective bargaining agreement provides for base wage increases of 4 percent wage in 2022, 5 percent in 2023, 4 percent wage in 2024, 4 percent in 2025, and 5 percent in 2026. Effective 2022 through 2025, monthly longevity premiums will increase to 8, 11, and 12 percent for 20, 25 and 30 years of service, respectively. Effective in 2026, monthly longevity premiums will increase to 6, 12, and 13 percent for 15, 25, and 30 years of service, respectively. Also effective in 2026, contributions to deferred compensation will increase by 0.4 percent to a maximum of 3 percent of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.

The City and Local 2898 will continue to share health care costs, with the City contributing 90 percent and employees contributing 10 percent toward health care premiums. The City and Local 2898 also agree to form a committee to review options and the feasibility of moving Local 2898 members into the Local 27 firefighter healthcare trust.

The collective bargaining agreement provides for other working conditions. Employees will be compensated 2 hours of overtime to complete the annual medical physical. Employees who remotely or virtually attend required meetings off-shift will be compensated at 1 ½ times their regular straight time hourly rate for actual time worked, rounded to the next ½ hour. Effective 2026, the uniform allowance will increase by $100 to $350. Juneteenth and Indigenous Peoples' Day (and, effective in 2026, Independence Day) will be recognized as paid holidays for employees working an average 40 hour workweek, among other items.

Appropriations for this agreement will be included in the 2025 Year-end Supplemental for current year and retroactive payments associated with this agreement. Funding for 2026 will be included in the 2026 Proposed Budget. An estimate of those appropriations is included in the Summary of Financial Implications.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ☐ Yes ☒ No

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Expenditure Change ($); General Fund	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**
	$4,730,000	**$2,750,000**	**$2,750,000**	**$2,750,000**	**$2,750,000**
Expenditure Change ($); Other Funds	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**

2025 represents the difference between the 2025 Adopted Budget and the estimated cost of the retroactive payments for 2022, 2023, 2024, and part of 2025, plus 2025 remaining year needs for contract wage increases and additional holidays. 2026 represents the estimated cost to bring the 2026 Endorsed Budget wages to the 2026 agreement wage level including additional costs related to longevity and deferred compensation contribution changes. The labor contract will reopen in 2027, so estimated costs for this agreement remain flat in 2027 and 2028 pending future negotiations.

Table 1: CBO Costing Summary

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	5-Year Total
	(Baseline)	(Year 1)	(Year 2)	(Year 3)	(Year 4)	(Year 5)	$59,398,945
2021-2024 = payroll actuals, 2025-2026 = 2024 Actuals)	10,398,921	10,335,881	9,639,506	10,648,578	10,648,578	10,648,578	51,921,121
Incremental costs							
2022 - 4%		413,435	385,580	425,943	425,943	425,943	2,076,845
2023 - 5%			501,254	553,726	553,726	553,726	2,162,432
2024 - 4%				465,130	465,130	465,130	1,395,390
2025 - 4%					483,735	483,735	967,470
2026 - 5%						628,856	628,856
Longevity +1% (beginning in 2026)						118,098	118,098
Deferred Comp 0.4 (beginning in 2026)						47,239	47,239
Two additional holidays (beginning in 2022), + 1 holiday 2026		13,491	14,165	14,732	15,321	23,785	81,494
Total incremental costs, General Fund		426,926	901,000	1,459,531	1,943,855	2,746,512	7,477,824
Compounded Need		426,926	1,327,926	2,787,457	4,731,312	7,477,824	
NOTES:							
[1] Baseline wages are actuals from CBO for 2021 through 2024, and include all OT, benefits, retirement, deferred compensation contributions, longevity premiums, and taxes paid (~ 33 employees in unit in December, 2021).							
[2]Two additional holidays, along with yearly AWIs beginning in 2022. Third holiday beginning in 2026. Holidays have been calculated at $6,486/day in 2022 from new department finance input; AWIs added for each year of contract. Labor Relations calculated cost.							
[3]Proposal to increase deferred compensation benefit from current 2.6% to 3.0% (increase of 0.4%) to employees beginning in 2026. Increase only is shown. Labor Relations calculated cost.							
[4]Proposal to increase monthly longevity benefit for bargaining unit members with 15+ years of service by an additional 1.0% beginning in 2026. Increase only is shown. Labor Relations calculated cost.							

3.d. Other Impacts

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.
No.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.
N/A

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.

Legislation is required to implement bargained-for wages and changes to union members' working conditions. There may be other implications and legal risks for not authorizing this legislation.

Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.

There are financial and operational impacts to the Seattle Fire Department.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?
No.

b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?
No.

c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?
No.

d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.

i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.

This collective bargaining agreement includes enhancements to pay and working conditions for union members, some of whom are BIPOC and women.

ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.

iii. **What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?**
N/A

e. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.
N/A

ii. **Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**
N/A

f. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?
N/A

g. Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?
No.

5. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments:
Summary Attachment 1 – Bill Draft Agreement By and Between The City of Seattle and Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898

AGREEMENT

BY AND BETWEEN

THE CITY OF SEATTLE

AND

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION, IAFF, LOCAL 2898

AFL - CIO - CLC

Effective January 1, 2022
~~19~~ through December 31, 2026~~71~~

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AGREEMENT

BY AND BETWEEN

THE CITY OF SEATTLE

AND

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION, IAFF, LOCAL NO. 2898

AFL - CIO - CLC

PREAMBLE

The rules contained herein constitute an Agreement between the City of Seattle, hereinafter referred to as the "City" or the "Employer" and the Seattle Fire Chiefs Association, I.A.F.F., Local Union No. 2898, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," governing wages, hours, and working conditions as described herein.

The City and the Union agree that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for fair and reasonable compensation and working conditions for employees of the City as enumerated in this Agreement and to provide for the efficient and uninterrupted performance of municipal functions. This Agreement has been reached through the process of collective bargaining with the objective of serving the aforementioned purposes and with the further objective of fostering effective cooperation between the City and its employees.

ARTICLE 1 - RECOGNITION AND BARGAINING UNIT

1.1 The City hereby recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit of all supervisory uniformed personnel of the Fire Department holding the rank of Battalion Chief and Deputy Chief.

ARTICLE 2 - UNION ENGAGEMENT

2.1 The City and the Union will administer the provisions of this Article with regard to dues deduction and membership of employees in accord with their respective obligations under the law.

2.1.1 Any disputes concerning the amount of dues or fees and/or the responsibility of the Union to the employees covered by this Agreement shall not be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in this Agreement.

2.2 Neither party shall discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of membership or non-membership in the Union. Provided however, that this clause shall not restrict the Union from providing internal Union-sponsored benefits to Union members only.

2.3 The City shall make deductions on a regular basis from an employee's pay for the regular Union dues or other obligation agreed between the employee and the Union; provided such employees shall authorize said deductions in writing on a form to be filed with the City. The City shall remit such deductions to the Union. The performance of this function is recognized as a service to the Union by the Employer.

2.4 The Union recognizes that it is the Union's exclusive responsibility to notify employees of their options regarding association and/or membership. The Union agrees to indemnify and hold the Employer harmless from all claims, demands, suits or other forms of liability that arise against the Employer for deducting dues from union members, including those that have communicated a desire to revoke a previous deduction authorization, along with all other issues related to the deduction of dues or fees.

2.5 IAFF Local 2898, the Seattle Fire Department, and the City of Seattle share a commitment to attracting and retaining a skilled workforce that reflects the diversity of our community. We believe that diversity makes us stronger and furthers the City of Seattle's commitment to Workforce Equity. We will continue to partner in recruitment and workforce development initiatives to increase the participation of historically marginalized groups in fire protection and emergency medical services.

ARTICLE 3 - SALARIES

3.1 The minimum salaries to be paid by the City to employees in the bargaining unit during the period of this Agreement are set forth in Appendix A of this Agreement.

3.2 The hourly rate of pay for employees shall be determined as follows:

A. Monthly salary X 12 ÷ (52.2 x 45.7) = Hourly rate of pay for Operations Division (24-hour shift) schedules

B. For 40-hour employees: Monthly salary X 12 = Annual salary
Annual salary ÷ 2088 = Hourly rate

3.3 Employees who work, or are otherwise entitled to pay, for all scheduled shifts in a work schedule that averages 45.7 hours per week on an annual basis shall be paid for 91.4 hours a pay period regardless of the number of hours actually worked. The bi-weekly pay of employees who are absent from scheduled work and are in a non-pay status for less than two shifts during the pay period shall be computed by subtracting the number of hours absent from 91.4 and multiplying by the hourly rate of pay. When unpaid absence equals two or more scheduled working shifts in one pay period, payment will be made only for time worked.

3.4 When an employee's number of actual hours worked is affected by Daylight Savings Time adjustments, the employee shall not be compensated for any additional time worked as a result of said adjustments, nor shall their compensation be reduced for working less time as a result of said adjustments.

3.5 In the event an employee covered by this Agreement leaves the service of the Fire Department and within a year the Fire Department rehires said employee in the same classification to which assigned at date of termination, such employee shall be placed at the step in the salary range which is closest to the salary earned at the time of the original termination.

3.6 Upon promotion to a position in the bargaining unit, an employee previously in a position classified as Captain shall be granted service credit for work in an out of class basis in the position to which promoted if the conditions below are met. Similarly, upon promotion to a Deputy Chief position in the bargaining unit, an employee previously in a Battalion Chief position shall be granted service credit for work in an out of class basis in a Deputy Chief position if the following conditions are met:

A. The higher-level position to which the employee is promoted is in the same Fire Department unit (Operations, FAC, FMO, Paramedics) in which the out of class assignment was worked.

B. The out of class assignment continued for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately prior to the promotion. (The "consecutive months" will be

considered to have been interrupted if the employee was absent from duty for any reason for a total of eight or more shifts.)

ARTICLE 4 - HOURS OF DUTY

4.1 The number of hours assigned duty per week for employees under this Agreement shall be continued in accordance with provisions as set forth in this Agreement. Nothing herein shall limit the City in exercising discretion in varying the hours of duty of any employee. Employees working an average work week of 45.7 hours shall work a base schedule of a twenty-four (24) hour shift. Employees assigned to other divisions shall work forty (40) hours per /week.

4.1.1 In exigent circumstances such as earthquake, flood, pandemic, natural or manmade disaster, or danger to life or property or work so urgently necessary that its nonperformance will cause serious loss or damage to the City, the department may redeploy staff and/or adjust work schedules for up to two weeks or as mutually agreed.

4.2 ~~Employees in the Operations Division may work a maximum of two consecutive 24-hour shifts provided that such a work assignment does not affect the employees' ability to safely perform their duties on the job and that the employees have not worked another two consecutive 24-hour shifts earlier in that month.~~

4.3 Members working ~~two~~ consecutive shifts at their request are responsible for all issues regarding proper relief including compensation for a holdover member. The Department will assume responsibility for relief compensation when members are held over for emergencies or at the direction of the Department.

4.4 Members are responsible for monitoring their state of readiness. When a member's scheduled shift falls on the ~~second~~ consecutive shift and the member is not adequately rested to perform their duties, the member will inform their supervisor and request time off using accrued compensatory time, vacation, or sick leave.

4.5 Employees will have twenty-four (24) hours off duty before and after a change of schedule to or from Operations and Administrative schedules when participating in manipulative training or work or having travel time greater than four (4) hours. Employees will have at least twelve (12) hours off duty before and after a change of schedule when only participating in non-manipulative training or work or other deployments that mandate post-incident rehabilitation periods.

4.6 Operations Division Supervising Chiefs assigned to Deputy 1, Battalions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and the Safety Officer positions shall have their floating debit day cancelled without using a vacation day. The Fire Chief (or designee) shall name the Supervising Chiefs by the end of December of each year.

4.7 The City agrees to a Special Relief program for all employees covered by this Agreement. Early or Late Relief shall be permitted subject to approval by the Employer.

4.8 An employee shall be granted time off with pay on Volunteer Relief if a replacement from the Union is arranged to work in place of the employee, with the approval of the Fire Chief or their designee.

4.8.1 Requests and arrangements for Volunteer Relief shall be made by the Union at least one shift prior to the proposed time off whenever possible.

4.8.2 Volunteer Relief may be worked in twenty-four (24) hour and twelve (12) hour increments (0800 to 2000 shifts and 2000 to 0800 shifts).

4.9 Each employee working in the Operations Division shall be assigned a work number consisting of the employee's assigned platoon (A, B, C, D) and a number from 1 to 13. In addition to the employee's assigned platoon schedule, the employee is assigned to work on the days upon which the work number falls. These days shall be referred to as scheduled debit shifts.

4.9.1 Employees shall work, in addition to the regularly scheduled twenty-four (24) hour shifts, one (1) floating debit shift per year to result in an average 45.7-hour work week.

4.9.2 Employees in the Operations Division shall be scheduled to work 28 shifts excluding floating debit shifts per 104-day debit cycle. Usually this will be 26 days on the assigned shift and 2 debit days. If, due to a transfer, an employee is not scheduled to work 28 shifts during the cycle, the Department will assign additional shifts or provide time off so that the employee is scheduled for 28 shifts.

4.10 Employees may not accumulate more than 480 hours of compensatory time as a result of a merit trade. Employees with 480 hours or more of compensatory time who work a merit trade shall be paid straight time wages for hours worked. Employees with less than 480 hours of compensatory time who work a merit trade shall accrue compensatory time up to the 480-hour cap and shall be paid straight time wages for all hours worked above the 480-hour cap. The employee initiating the merit trade shall have the appropriate amount of compensatory time deducted from their total.

ARTICLE 5 - OVERTIME PAY

5.1 Work performed outside of the employee's regular scheduled shift(s) shall be compensated (pay or compensatory time) at the overtime rate of one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate of pay for actual hours worked. All overtime work must be approved in advance by the employee's authorizing authority.

5.1.1 All overtime compensation shall be at the rate of time and one-half (1 1/2). Such overtime compensation shall be in the form of pay or employees may receive compensatory time at the overtime rate in lieu of overtime pay upon approval of the Chief of the Department up to a maximum of 480 hours of accumulated compensatory time. All overtime hours in excess of 480 shall be in the form of pay. Any employee who has accumulated more than 480 hours of compensatory time shall not accumulate any more, including by merit trade, as set forth above in Section 4.10. Any overtime earned after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) threshold of 212 hours in a twenty-eight (28) day work period shall be in the form of pay in all cases. The FLSA period shall begin on the first day of a pay period, with the beginning on June 14, 1995. The overtime rate of pay shall be determined from the applicable straight time hourly rate. Additionally, overtime worked pursuant to reimbursable activity shall be compensated at the overtime rate in the form of pay and shall not be taken as compensatory time.

5.2 Effective January 1, 2018, any Department work which commences less than four (4) hours before or after a shift will be considered shift extension time. Such shift extension time shall be paid at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate to the next even one (1) hour time period for the first hour and for the actual time worked thereafter. When such shift extension time is taken in compensatory time instead of pay, the employee shall be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the regular straight time hourly rate to the next even one (1) hour time period for the first hour and rounded up to the nearest next half-hour for time worked thereafter.

5.2.1 Effective January 1, 2018, in the event that overtime is not an extension at the beginning or end of a normal shift, the minimum payment shall be four (4) hours at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate. Time worked in excess of the four (4) hour minimum shall be compensated for the actual time worked thereafter in accordance with Section 5.1. When time worked in excess of the four (4) hour minimum is taken in compensatory time instead of pay, the employee shall be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate rounded up to the nearest next half-hour for time worked thereafter. Except that effective upon ratification of this Agreement by both parties, employees who remotely or virtually attend required meetings off-shift shall

be compensated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the employee's regular straight time hourly rate for ~~a minimum of 1 hour~~actual time worked, rounded up to the next half hour.

5.3 Vacancies occurring in the Battalion and Deputy Chief ranks in the Operations Division not covered by a member working a debit shift shall be filled by those Battalion/Deputy Chiefs in the bargaining unit who have volunteered for overtime assignments to ensure that there are seven chiefs assigned to each platoon consistent with the 2017 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning Battalion 2 and the 2021 Acting BC MOA.

5.3.1 Employees shall be hired for overtime from a voluntary overtime signup list. Overtime hiring procedures will be in accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated January 30, 2009. If vacancies cannot be filled in accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated January 30, 2009, the Department may fill such overtime positions as its policy and procedure may provide. Employees shall be scheduled and called for overtime work in such a manner as will, as far as practicable, rotate overtime work opportunities among employees covered by this Agreement. If more than one employee has signed up to work overtime, the member with the fewest previously worked overtime hours in the calendar year shall be hired.

5.3.2 The Department shall maintain two separate overtime hiring lists: 1) a full-shift overtime hiring list for 20 hours or more, and 2) a partial-shift overtime hiring list for fewer than 20 hours. Members hired for Deputy 1 and Safety 2 must be eligible to work in those positions when hired from the partial-shift overtime list.

5.3.2.1 Employees shall have twenty (20) hours added to their "Hours Worked" balance when initially hired from the full-shift overtime hiring list. Hours will be reconciled upon the employee's overtime submittal.

5.3.2.2 Employees shall have four (4) hours added to their "Hours Worked" balance when initially hired from any partial-shift overtime hiring list. Hours will be reconciled upon the employee's overtime submittal.

5.3.3 The employees of the bargaining unit shall be granted access to the Department's Local 2898 modified overtime program. All requests for information as a result of this access shall be directed only to the Fire Chief or designee. Local 2898 shall use the department's electronic hiring, staffing, and timekeeping program, and members shall be granted access.

5.3.4 Employees shall not sign up to work overtime, nor be assigned to work overtime during any period of time when the overtime assignment would conflict with their regularly scheduled duty assignment(s) or their "off-duty standby" status, as described in Sections 6.1.2, 6.1.2.1, and 6.1.2.2. However, an employee assigned to

an Administrative schedule who is working overtime in Operations may use vacation or compensatory time off to complete the overtime shift before reporting to their regular administrative assignment.

5.3.5 Employees who receive an out-of-city-deployment will not be eligible to work overtime until all forms for all work performed while on deployment have been submitted. The Union agrees that the City shall be held harmless and indemnified against any and all errors related to eligibility to work overtime under this Section.

5.3.6 Employees assigned to or working an Administrative schedule shall be allowed to work overtime only on weekends, regularly scheduled days off, and vacations of at least three (3) calendar days, when granted in advance. Vacations may be combined with regularly scheduled days off and/or to meet the three (3) calendar days-off requirement.

5.3.7 ~~Employees shall not sign up, agree to, or otherwise work forty-eight (48) consecutive hours unless such work is completed at least twenty (20) hours prior to their next regularly scheduled assignment. This provision shall not preclude 'holdover' awaiting proper relief from duty. With mutual agreement between the management and the employees, the~~ Employees in the Operations Division may work consecutive twenty – four (24) hour shifts and twelve (12) hour shifts up to a maximum of consecutive seventy two (72) hours. Employees must be off for twelve (12) hours directly before and after working a consecutive seventy-two (72) - hour shift before they are eligible to work another full-shift overtime. However, employees may work Special Overtime during the twelve (12) hours directly before and after working consecutive shift(s).

5.3.7.1 Vacation, or compensatory time off shall satisfy the twenty (20) hour requirement of Section 5.3.7 above only when such vacation, or compensatory time was scheduled prior to the request for or acceptance of the forty-eight (48) consecutive hour assignment.

5.3.7.2 Trades, early relief, or compensatory time off may not be used to shorten a shift to avoid the requirements of Section 5.3.7 above.

ARTICLE 6 - TEMPORARY DETAIL TO HIGHER POSITIONS

6.1 Employees in the classification of Fire Battalion Chief covered by this Agreement who are assigned by proper authority to perform the duties of a higher paid position within the Fire Department shall be paid in accordance with the following:

A. In excess of four (4) hours, but less than five (5) consecutive shifts or forty (40) hours, at the beginning rate of Fire Chief, Deputy.

B. For five (5) consecutive shifts or forty (40) hours, shall be paid at the first level of the position which they are filling which exceeds the level in 6.1.A. above for all hours so assigned and worked.

6.1.1 Employees assigned to Deputy Chief positions covered by this Agreement who are assigned in writing by proper authority to perform the duties of a higher paid position within the Fire Department shall be paid at a rate equal to one hundred and ten ~~four~~ percent (110~~04~~%) of the Deputy Chief's regular rate of pay for all hours so assigned and worked. In order to qualify for this compensation employees must work at least four (4) consecutive hours in the out of class assignment. The Department will assign a Deputy Chief in the event an employee is out on leave for 45 days.

6.1.2 The Fire Chief or their designee may formally place employees who are assigned to perform the duties of a higher-paid position in accordance with Section 6.1.1 on "off-duty standby" status for a fixed, predetermined period of time, during which the employee is required to remain on page communicator, a similar device or at home in a state of readiness to respond to duty at a moment's notice.

6.1.2.1 Employees formally placed on "off-duty standby" status in accordance with Section 6.1.2 above shall be compensated on the basis of ten percent (10%) of the straight time rate of pay of the acting assignment described above in Section 6.1.1. If the employee is actually called to perform the work of the acting position, the "off-duty standby" pay shall cease at that time. Thereafter, normal overtime rules apply. If applicable, the "off-duty standby" status shall resume when the work is completed.

6.1.2.2 Employees assigned to "off-duty standby" status in accordance with Section 6.1.2 above shall not sign up to work overtime that would conflict with the "off-duty standby" period(s). If, prior to being assigned to "off-duty standby" status, the employee has accepted any overtime assignment(s) that conflict with the assigned "off-duty standby" period, the employee shall so notify the Fire Chief or designee at the time the employee is notified that they will be assigned to "off-duty standby" status.

6.2 To qualify as an Operations Acting Deputy Chief, a Battalion Chief must have a minimum of ~~-~~two ~~three~~ years' experience as an Operations Battalion Chief~~-.and must~~

~~complete the Deputy 1 Task Book prior to acting as Deputy 1.~~ Safety Officers are not eligible to act as Deputy 1 when working in their regularly assigned position.

ARTICLE 7 - VACATIONS

7.1 Effective January 1, 2018, each employee shall be granted a vacation in accordance with the following schedule:

1 thru 6 yrs. service	9 shifts (216 hours)
7 thru 14 yrs. service	10 shifts (240 hours)
15 thru 19 yrs. service	11 shifts (264 hours)
20 yrs. service	12 shifts (288 hours)
21 thru 24 yrs. service	13 shifts (312 hours)
25 yrs. service	14 shifts (336 hours)
26 or more yrs. service	15 shifts (360 hours)

7.1.1 Employees working a 45.7-hour average work week are required to use 24-hours of vacation to cancel a floating debit day on January1 of each calendar year, with the exception of employees designated as Supervising Chiefs.

7.1.2 Employees working an average forty (40) hour work week are required to use vacation leave equivalent to the number of regular scheduled hours (for example, if working four 10-hour days per week, must submit vacation leave for 10 hours; if working five 8-hour days per week, must submit vacation leave for 8 hours) on the following holidays:

New Year's Day
Martin Luther King's Birthday
Presidents' Day
Memorial Day
~~Independence Day~~
Labor Day
Veteran's Day
Thanksgiving Day
Day After Thanksgiving Day
Christmas Day

Employees working an average forty (40) hour workweek shall have the holiday off on Juneteenth and Indigenous Peoples' Day and shall use the holiday payroll leave code (currently HA) for these two holidays off.

Effective 2026 employees working an average forty (40) hour workweek shall have the holiday off on Independence Day and shall use the holiday payroll leave code (currently HA) for the holiday off.

7.1.3 Earned vacation in Section 7.1 reflects the addition of four (4) shifts of holiday off time. The practice of scheduling holiday offs shall be discontinued.

7.1.4 Admin Employees who are required to work on holidays in 7.1.2 shall be paid one and one-half (1½) times the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours worked and, in addition, another day off will then be rescheduled. For the rescheduled holiday off, the member must submit vacation leave per Section 7.1.2.~~21~~.

7.1.5 Elimination of holiday premium pay for personnel scheduled to work a 45.7-hour work week are in trade for other benefits gained in this Agreement.

7.1.? Effective 2022 Employees working an average 45.7 - hourly workweek shall receive holiday premium pay that nets to one and a half ~~d~~ time per hour on Juneteenth~~,~~ and Indigenous Peoples' Day.

Effective 2026 employees working an average 45.7 - hourly workweek shall receive holiday premium pay that nets to one and half time per hour on Independence Day.

7.2 Vacations for members of Local 2898 assigned to Operations are considered to be "unscheduled" and shall be granted upon request, with the exceptions of Independence Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve and Christmas. On those days, there must be one member signed up on the overtime register for each vacation day granted. However, where a member has been granted a day off on said holiday(s) due to a member having signed up on the overtime register and that member subsequently removes their name from the overtime register, the last member who was granted time off shall have their day off cancelled. Vacation requests for members assigned to administrative are subject to approval of the Employer with no request unreasonably denied.

7.2.1 Employees may cancel granted time off (unscheduled vacation, saved vacation, compensatory time or leave without pay) up to 20-hours before the start of the shift taken off. Granted time off may not be cancelled if requested less than 20-hours before the start of the shift taken off.

7.3 The bargaining unit shall be allowed ~~two~~three (~~2~~3) opportunities per shift to schedule accumulated unscheduled vacation, saved vacation and compensatory time in 12-hour, half-shift increments (for example, two~~one~~ (2~~1~~) 0800 to 2000 and one (1) 2000

to 0800, threetwo (32) 0800 to 2000 or threewo (32) 2000 to 0800). The bargaining unit may exceed twothree (32) opportunities provided backfill is available.

7.4 Effective December 25, 2019 an employee may, following one (1) full calendar year of employment, carry over and/or accumulate ninety-six (96) hours of vacation annually, provided that, the number of vacation shifts carried over and/or accumulated shall not exceed one and one-half (1½) times the number of annual vacation hours for which such employee is currently eligible. An employee who is unable to take their regularly scheduled vacation, or portion thereof, as a result of disability, military leave or other work-related reasons approved by the Fire Chief shall have said vacation held over to the next calendar year. Vacation held over must be scheduled and taken in the following year. Work-related vacation carry-over due to workload must be requested and approved by the end of the 3rd quarter. If the carry over vacation is not scheduled by February 1st of the following year, the Department will schedule the vacation for the employee.

7.5 An employee who separates from service with the Fire Department and is rehired by the Department within one (1) year from the date of separation, shall have all prior service time reinstated for purposes of vacation accrual.

7.6 Unpaid leaves of absence shall result in a loss of vacation granted in the next year by multiplying the given accrual factor by the number of scheduled hours of work (including debit shift hours) lost due to the unpaid leave and rounding to the nearest full hour.

Years of Service	Annual Hours of Work	
	2382	2088
1-6	.0907	.0575
7-14	.1008	.0690
15-19	.1108	.0805
20	.1209	.0920
21-24	.1310	.1035
25	.1411	.1150
26	.1511	.1265

As an example:
Hours of leave of absence: 11 shifts x 24 hours = 264 hours (20 yrs. service)
(2382 annual hours) 264 X .1209 = 31.917
= 32 hours to be deducted from next year's vacation hours

ARTICLE 8 - SICKNESS AND DEATH IN FAMILY

8.1 Employees assigned to a 40-hour average work week shall receive one (1) or, if necessary, for travel, two (2) shifts off duty with pay in the event of a death of a close relative. The second shift off is applicable only in instances where total travel of 200 miles or more is necessary. The intent of this Article is to provide time off from regularly scheduled duty to attend or make arrangements for a funeral in event of the death of a close relative.

8.2 Employees assigned to a 45.7-hour average work week shall receive one shift off duty with pay to attend the funeral of a close relative.

8.3 Employees notified of a death in the family while on duty shall be immediately excused from work for the balance of the shift if it is necessary that the employee be immediately off work to attend to such a situation. Such time off shall be with pay in addition to the benefit applicable. An employee who is working on an overtime basis will be allowed to leave work but will be paid only for hours actually worked.

8.4 For purposes of administration of this Article, a close relative is defined to include spouse, domestic partner, children, mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandchildren, and grandparents of employee and spouse, or domestic partner.

8.5 Emergency leave: The City agrees to allow up to a total of twelve (12) hours per calendar year off with pay for such employee when the Department is notified that the employee's spouse, domestic partner or child, or a parent of the employee or the employee's spouse or domestic partner has unexpectedly become seriously ill or has had a serious accident and it is necessary that the employee be immediately off work to attend to such a situation. This provision shall be applicable when notification of the need for emergency leave is given up to three (3) hours prior to the commencement of the work shift or during the work shift.

8.5.1 This Section shall be applicable twice each year; however, the total emergency leave hours shall not exceed twelve (12) in the calendar year. This time limit shall not apply to LEOFF II employees' use of sick leave for emergency purposes. LEOFF II employees who do not utilize all of their emergency leave in a calendar year shall have the remaining balance of their emergency leave credited to their sick leave balance for the next year.

8.5.2 For the administration of this Section, "child" shall be defined as every natural born child, stepchild, child legally adopted or made a legal ward of the employee.

8.5.3 An employee working a regularly scheduled shift may take the whole shift off if necessary but shall not be paid for more than 12-hours in any one calendar year. In

the event that the emergency situation requires the employee's presence for more than 12-hours, the employee shall have the option of utilizing one of the following to offset any hours beyond twelve:

A. Vacation time
B. Compensatory time
C. Sick Leave (per Sick Leave Ordinance)

8.5.4 An employee who is working on an overtime basis will be allowed to leave work in an emergency such as described above but will be paid only for hours actually worked.

8.6 The City agrees to allow the remaining portions of an employee's vacation, accumulated vacation days, or accumulated compensatory time to be used as Sickness and Death in Family Leave, as provided in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.

ARTICLE 9 - COMPENSATION FOR USE OF PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE

9.1 Any employee when required by the City to use their private automobile on Department business shall be compensated at the mileage rate (cents per mile) in effect at the time for other City employees (as specified by ordinance). This shall not cover any transportation to and from work. When an employee uses a private automobile to travel to Department sponsored training, or court appearances, mileage reimbursement will be based on the distance from the employee's assigned workplace to the training or court location. Mileage forms shall be provided by the City and be made available and on hand in every station.

9.2 Whenever an employee is notified of a detail to another assignment location during their off-duty time, the member shall receive thirty (30) minutes of pay at time and one-half (1 ½).

9.3 If an employee is detailed to another station after reporting to their scheduled place of employment, they may use their private automobile to effect the detail if Department transportation is not furnished. If the employee uses their private automobile for the detail, they shall be compensated in accordance with Section 9.1.

ARTICLE 10 - UNIFORM ALLOWANCE

10.1 The City shall provide and maintain at no cost to the employee all protective clothing and equipment pursuant to WAC 296-305-060. The City may issue said items directly, establish a procurement policy with a supplier or suppliers or reimburse employees for the purchase of said items in a timely manner which shall normally be within fourteen (14) calendar days of a request for reimbursement. The Department shall promulgate policies and procedures for same and shall notify the Union of subsequent modifications.

10.2 Employees shall be responsible for acquiring required uniform items in accordance with policy and procedure of the Department. The Department shall notify the Union of any changes to the required uniform.

10.3 Effective January 2, 20021~~9~~, the base wage for each employee shall be increased in an amount equal two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) annually to cover the cost of replacement of said uniform items.

Effective ~~January 2, 2026~~02December 17, 2025, the base wage for each employee shall be increased ~~in~~ an additional ~~amount equal to twothree~~one hundred ~~and fifty~~ dollars ($~~235~~100.00) ~~annually~~ to cover the cost of replacement of said uniform items. This increase is in addition to the existing two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) for a total of Three hundred and fifty $350.

10.4 All employees shall be provided two (2) badges by the department upon promotion to rank of Battalion and Deputy Chief.

10.5 Protective equipment and clothing purchased by the Department or for which the employee was reimbursed pursuant to Section 10.1, shall remain the property of the Department and shall be returned to the Department upon an employee's separation from employment. The employee is responsible for the safekeeping of all City purchased clothing and equipment. Normally, such equipment shall be kept at the fire station to which the employee is assigned. Such clothing and equipment shall not be used by employees for other than work for the Seattle Fire Department.

ARTICLE 11 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

11.1 Any dispute between the Employer and the Union concerning the interpretation or claim of breach or violation of the express terms of this Agreement shall be deemed a grievance. Such a dispute shall be processed in accordance with this Article. Any other type of dispute between the parties as well as disputes involving (1) Public Safety Civil Service Commission Rules or Regulations whether specified in this Agreement or not, if there be such, (2) disciplinary/discharge action taken by the Employer, except as specified in Section 11.10 and Article 12; and (3) Article 23 - Pensions, shall not be subject to the procedure delineated in this Article.

Early Mediation Process. The City and the Fire Chiefs' Association encourage the use of the Early Mediation Process prior to issues becoming the subject of grievances. Participation in the process is entirely voluntary, confidential and does not impact grievance rights.

Any alleged grievance shall be taken up by the employee with the appropriate Deputy Chief within ~~ten~~twenty – four (~~10~~24) calendar days of the occurrence. If the aggrieved employee is a Deputy Chief, the grievance shall be taken up by the employee with their Assistant Chief. The above parties agree to make every effort to settle the grievance at this stage promptly; however, if no satisfactory settlement is reached, the following procedure shall apply:

Step 1. The grievance shall be reduced to written form by the aggrieved employee and/or Union, stating the Section of the Agreement allegedly violated and explaining the grievance in detail. The Union Representative shall present the written grievance to the Assistant Chief of the Department within ten (10) calendar days after the alleged grievance is taken up by the employee with the Deputy Chief or the Assistant Chief. The Assistant Chief or their designee shall convene a meeting within ten (10) calendar days after receipt of the written grievance, between the Union Representative, aggrieved employee, and any other witnesses and/or members of management whose presence is deemed necessary to a fair consideration of the grievance.

Ten (10) calendar days after the aforementioned meeting, the Assistant Chief shall transmit a copy of this decision to the aggrieved employee, the Union and the Chief of the Fire Department.

Step 2. A grievance which remains unresolved after the written decision is delivered in Step 1 shall be transmitted in writing by the aggrieved employee and/or Union involved to the Chief of the Fire Department with

a copy to the Director of Labor Relations. Said transmittal must be accompanied by the following information:

A. Nature of dispute
B. Contract provision(s) allegedly violated
C. Remedy sought

The Chief of the Fire Department shall not be required to consider a grievance which is not referred to them within ten (10) calendar days following the Step 1 decision. A grievance properly filed shall be investigated by the Chief of the Department and/or the City Labor Relations Director or their respective designees. Such investigation, if deemed appropriate by the Chief of the Fire Department, may include a conference with the employee involved and their Union representative, if they have designated one. The Director of Labor Relations or their designee may thereafter make a confidential recommendation to the Chief of the Fire Department. The Chief of the Department shall make a decision on the matter in writing within ten (10) calendar days from the date when it was first received by them; provided, however, the Chief of the Department may waive investigating and answering the grievance at Step 2 and defer a decision to Step 3 within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the grievance. Copies of the Chief's decision shall be furnished to the aggrieved, their Union representative and the Director of Labor Relations.

Step 3. A grievance which remains unresolved after the decision is rendered in Step 2 may be transmitted in writing to the Director of Labor Relations by the aggrieved employee and/or Union, requesting a review by the Grievance Board. The Grievance Board shall not be required to consider a grievance which is not referred to the Director of Labor Relations within ten (10) calendar days following written notification of the Step 2 decision. The Director of Labor Relations or their designee listed below shall convene the Grievance Board within ten (10) calendar days upon receipt of a written request for review.

The Grievance Board shall consist of:

- Presiding Chairperson - City Director of Labor Relations or City Labor Negotiator
- Member - Fire Chief, or their designee from within the department
- Member - President of the Union, Local 2898, I.A.F.F. or their designee from within Local 2898.

The Grievance Board shall issue its findings with recommendations for resolving the grievance in writing within ten (10) calendar days to the Chief of the Fire Department. The Chief shall within ten (10) calendar days

thereafter render a decision on the issue with a copy to Local 2898, the aggrieved employee and the Director of Labor Relations.

Step 4. If the contract grievance is not settled in Step 2 or 3, it may be referred by either the Union or the City to the Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission to supply both parties with a list of five (5) qualified arbitrators. If no agreement is reached between parties in the choice of an arbitrator from that list within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of said list, or the Union or the City opt to bypass a PERC list of arbitrators, the contract grievance shall be referred to the American Arbitration Association for arbitration to be conducted under its voluntary labor arbitration regulations.

Referral to arbitration (PERC or AAA) must be made within thirty (30) calendar days after the decision in Step 3 and to be accompanied by the following information:

A. Identification of the Section(s) of the Agreement allegedly violated.
B. Details of the nature of the alleged violation.
C. Position of the party who is referring the grievance to arbitration.
D. Question(s) which the arbitrator is being asked to decide.
E. Remedy sought.

If Arbitration has been timely requested, the parties may with mutual consent attempt Grievance Mediation. The process will use a mutually acceptable mediator and conclude within 30 days after the mutual request.

The parties agree to abide by the award made in connection with any arbitrable difference.

11.1.1 The Union and the City recognize the importance of the arbitration process to the Union and its members, the City, and the public in order to resolve workplace disputes. The expectation for arbitration is to have an arbitrator issue a fair and just decision based on the evidence. The parties recognize the value of arbitrators who have a reputation for integrity, independence, and impartiality. The parties have thus agreed to limit their selected arbitrators to those that are AAA qualified, which requires acceptability from both labor and management in order to achieve qualification. The parties also recognize the value of using arbitrators with experience arbitrating cases involving public safety and/or other public employees.

11.2 In connection with any arbitration proceeding held pursuant to this Agreement, it is understood as follows:

A. The arbitrator shall have no power to render a decision that will add to, subtract from, or alter, change, or modify the terms of this Agreement, and their power shall be limited to interpretation or application of the express terms of this Agreement, and all other matters shall be excluded from arbitration.

B. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive, and binding upon the City, the Union, and the employees involved.

C. The cost of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the City and the Union, and each party shall bear the cost of presenting its own case.

D. The arbitrator's decision shall be made in writing and shall be issued to the parties within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted to the arbitrator.

11.3 Any time limits stipulated in the Grievance Procedure may be extended for stated periods of time by the appropriate parties by mutual agreement in writing; and the parties may, by mutual agreement, waive any step or steps of the Grievance Procedure to advance said grievance in an effort to expedite the resolution.

11.4 If at any step in the grievance procedure management's answer is deemed unsatisfactory, the Union's and/or the aggrieved's reasons for non-acceptance must be presented in writing.

11.5 The City agrees to conduct all hearings concerning a grievance on on-duty hours of employees whenever practical.

11.6 Failure by an employee or the Union to comply with any time limitation of the procedure in this Article shall constitute withdrawal of the grievance. Failure by the Employer to comply with any time limitations of the procedure in this Article shall allow the Union to proceed to the next step.

11.7 Arbitration or grievance settlements shall not be made retroactive beyond the date of the occurrence or non-occurrence upon which the grievance is based, that date being twenty-four (24) or less days prior to the initial filing of the grievance.

11.8 Any dispute as to whether or not a particular complaint has merit as a grievance as defined in Section 11.1 above shall be processed through the grievance procedure at the initiation of either party to this Agreement.

11.9 The Grievance Procedure may be invoked by the City relative to a grievance filed on its behalf commencing at Step 2 of the Grievance Procedure.

11.10 In no event shall this Agreement alter or interfere with disciplinary procedures followed by the City or provided for by City Charter, Ordinance or Law; provided, however, disputes concerning disciplinary or discharge action shall not be subject to this Article but shall be processed in accordance with Public Safety Civil Service

procedures and rules, unless such discipline involves the demotion, suspension or termination of a Battalion Chief, in which case grievance arbitration shall be available.

11.11 If the contract grievance is not settled in Step 2, it may be referred to Step 3 at the discretion of the initiating party within the time limits described therein or Step 3 may be waived, provided a grievance conference has been held and a grievance decision was rendered in Step 2. If Step 3 is waived, the issue may then be submitted to Step 4 within the time limits described therein.

11.12 The Union shall be afforded all rights and privileges in filing grievances as an aggrieved employee under this Article.

11.13 Where the designated Officer as defined in Section 11.1 above is part of the bargaining unit, a grievance decision by said Officer shall not necessarily be conclusive nor set a precedent. Said decision shall be subject to review and/or reversal by the Chief of the Fire Department at any time. In case a decision is set aside as described above, the ensuing grievance time limits shall become operative when the grievant or Union is notified of the reversal.

11.14 Employees covered by this Agreement will follow all written and verbal directives, even if such directives are allegedly in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 12 - DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL OF DISCIPLINE

12.1 The City shall have the right to discipline employees for just cause. As used herein, discipline shall be deemed to include a suspension without pay, demotion, discharge, and involuntary transfer for disciplinary reasons. Just cause is not required for counseling, performance improvement plans (PIP), or involuntary transfers for non-disciplinary reasons.

12.2 Discipline may be appealed under the grievance procedure outlined in Article 11 or, if applicable, through Civil Service, but not both. If there are dual filings with the grievance procedure and the Public Safety Civil Service Commission (PSCSC), the City will send a notice of such dual filings by certified mail to the employee(s) and the Union. The Union will notify the City within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the notice if it will use the grievance procedure. If no such notice is received by the City, the contractual grievance shall be deemed withdrawn.

12.3 Employees shall have the right to Union representation in all investigatory interviews that the employee reasonably believes will result in disciplinary action against them.

ARTICLE 13 - SICK LEAVE , MODIFIED DUTY AND LONG-TERM DISABILITY

13.1 Employees covered by this Agreement who are not granted disability leave pursuant to State Statute RCW Chapter 41.26,030(19) (disability leave) shall accrue sick leave at the rate of .046 hours for each regularly scheduled hour of work including paid time off.

13.1.1 Effective upon signing, and as directed by Local 2898 on an annual basis, employees covered by this Agreement who are not entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26, shall either receive a cash payment or cash out sick leave upon retirement into a VEBA trust fund designated by the Union to pay health insurance premiums or other legally authorized healthcare costs for eligible future retirees and dependents, at the following rates:

A. Accumulated sick leave hours between 0 and 400 shall be cashed out at 25%.
B. Accumulated sick leave hours between 401 and 800 shall be cashed out at 50%.
C. Accumulated sick leave hours above 800 shall be cashed out at 75%.

13.1.2 In the event of the death of an employee while employed by the City who is eligible for the sick leave cash out benefit described above in Section 13.1.1, such employee's beneficiary shall be paid a portion of the employee's accumulated and unused sick leave in accordance with Section 13.1.1.

13.1.3 Payoff in Sections 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 shall be made at the rate of pay of such employee upon retirement or death, respectively.

13.1.4 Employees who transfer to other City departments shall transfer all accumulated and unused sick leave to the new position in the accepting department.

13.2 For such employees identified in Sections 13.1 and 13.1.1 who are exposed to a communicable disease in the line of duty and for whom specific preventative medication is deemed necessary by a physician in order to prevent the employee from acquiring the disease, the City will reimburse any out-of-pocket costs for the preventative medication which the employee has incurred and for which he/she will not otherwise be reimbursed. To obtain reimbursement the employee shall present satisfactory documentation with a written request for reimbursement to the City for approval of payment.

13.3 At the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department, employees not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26, may be required to see a physician designated by the Chief of the Fire Department to verify disability resulting in layoff

or claims of injury, illness, or any other disability which would prevent the employee from performing their duties.

13.3.1 Twenty-four (24) hour shift employees who are not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26 shall be required to obtain a physician's verification of illness/injury when their disability or the care of a dependent requires them to be absent from work for more than ~~forty-eight~~seventy two (~~48~~72) consecutive hours; that is, if they miss a portion of a ~~third~~fourth consecutive shift. Twenty-four (24) hour shift employees must obtain this verification no later than the day of the third shift missed. Forty (40) hour per week employees are required to provide a physician's verification of illness/injury after thirty-two (32) consecutive hours are missed on sick leave or dependent care sick leave. Abuse of sick leave shall be grounds for discipline up to and including dismissal. The Department also has the right to require an employee whose sick leave usage is outside of expected norms to provide physician verification within six (6) business hours (0900 - 1700, Monday through Sunday) of notifying the Department of the disability, except where individual circumstances or legal requirements require more time.

13.4 The City agrees to allow the remaining portions of an employee's vacation, accumulated vacation days, or accumulated compensatory time to be used in place of sick leave for an employee who has exhausted their sick leave benefits.

A. This provision is applicable to employees covered under 13.1 and 13.1.1 of this Article.
B. Use of such time is subject to the same criteria for use of sick leave as described by Ordinance as cited above.

13.5 Leaves of absence without pay for medical reasons due to a non-duty related injury or illness may be granted to an employee who has exhausted all their paid sick leave for a period of up to six (6) months upon written approval by the City.

13.6 The Department at its discretion may offer, upon request, modified duty to members who are temporarily unable to work their regular assignment due to medical limitations resulting from injury, illness, or pregnancy, provided the Department determines such work is available. Such discretion will be exercised without discrimination or bias. A modified duty assignment need not be made if a member is unable to perform, even after reasonable accommodation, any of the modified duty assignments that are available given the member's work restrictions and other qualifications. A modified duty assignment is not intended to fill or replace a regular assignment nor is it designed to take work from another bargaining unit. This provision shall be in accordance with Department Modified Duty Guidelines ~~established November 24, 2020~~ and in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).~~.~~

13.6 Applications for a leave of absence for medical reasons without pay or an extension thereof must be made in writing to the Fire Chief with a copy to the Personnel Director and notice of such application to the Union President. The granting of such a leave of absence, and extension thereof, or the refusal of such a leave and the reasons, therefore, must be in writing from the City. If granted, the City's response shall specify the length of the leave of absence and whether or not the applicant will be guaranteed a job at the scheduled expiration of said leave of absence.

13.7 Applications for leaves of absence for medical reasons must be accompanied by a doctor's statement indicating the reason necessitating such a leave and the approximate duration if known. An employee who is ready to return from a medical leave of absence must also submit to the Chief of the Fire Department a doctor's statement that they are physically and mentally able to resume their normal duties.

13.8 If the employee has not been granted an extension of the leave of absence and does not report for work when scheduled to return from the leave of absence, the employee is considered to have quit. The Department shall send a registered letter to the employee stating that they are considered to have terminated employment if no answer is received within five (5) working days of receipt of the letter.

13.9 If the employee's former position is not available, the employee shall be notified of the first available position of comparable classification for which the individual is qualified. Such notice shall be sent by registered mail by the Chief of the Fire Department to the employee's last known address, with a copy to the Union President. If the employee fails to report for work or otherwise respond to the Chief of the Fire Department within one (1) week from the date of receipt of the notification, or if the notification letter is returned unclaimed, the employee shall forfeit all reinstatement rights.

13.10 Under the terms and conditions of the parties' Memorandum of Agreement, dated April 1, 1999, the City shall provide mandatory payroll deduction for monthly premium costs of a disability insurance plan to be selected periodically and administered by the Union.

13.11 Employees may apply for Family Medical Leave in accordance with local, state, and federal law.

13.12 An employee who goes on leave does not have a greater right to reinstatement or other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the leave period.

13.13 Industrial Insurance. In no circumstances will the amount paid to an employee entitled to Industrial Insurance payments exceed the employee's gross pay minus mandatory deductions.

13.13.1 Employees must meet the standards listed in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.44.020 to be eligible for the benefit amount provided herein, which exceeds the rate required to be paid by state law, hereinafter referred to as supplemental benefits. These standards require that employees: 1) comply with all Department of Labor and Industries rules and regulations and related City of Seattle and Seattle Fire Department policies and procedures; 2) attend all treatments and meetings related to rehabilitation and work hardening, conditioning or other treatment arranged by the City and authorized by the attending physician; 3) accept modified or alternative duty assigned by supervisors when released to perform such duty by the attending physician; 4) attend all meetings scheduled by the City of Seattle Workers' Compensation unit or the Seattle Fire Department concerning the employee's status or claim when properly notified at least five (5) working days in advance of such meeting, unless other medical treatment conflicts with the meeting and the employee provides twenty-four (24) hours' notice of such meeting or examination.

13.13.2 The City will provide a copy of the eligibility requirements to employees when they file a workers' compensation claim. If records indicate two (2) no-shows, supplemental benefits may be terminated no sooner than seven (7) days after notification to the employee.

13.14 LEOFF I Dependent Care Leave

Employees covered by this Agreement who are entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26 (LEOFF I) will be provided a paid leave bank called "Dependent Care Leave" to use for dependent care.

The City authorizes the use of Dependent Care Leave to care for an eligible family member of the LEOFF 1 member who has an illness, injury, or health care appointment requiring the absence of the LEOFF I member from work, or when such absence is recommended by a health care professional. For purposed of Dependent Care Leave, "eligible family member" has the same meaning as provided in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.24.005(A); and "health care professional" has the same meaning as provided in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.24.005(B). Dependent Care Leave may not be used for any other purpose.

Effective January 1, 2009, at the beginning of each calendar year, each full-time LEOFF I member will accrue an additional forty-eight (48) hours of Dependent Care Leave to be added to the existing hours in their Dependent Care Leave bank. The annual accrual of Dependent Care Leave hours for part-time LEOFF I members will be prorated. Unused Dependent Care Leave hours will be carried over to the next calendar year. There is no cap or maximum limit on the number of hours a LEOFF I member may accumulate in their Dependent Care Leave bank. LEOFF I members who transfer to other City departments may not transfer any accumulated or unused

Dependent Care Leave to the new position in the accepting department. LEOFF I members may not donate Dependent Care Leave hours to other members or City employees. Dependent Care Leave hours may not be cashed out or paid off upon retirement or at any other time.

13.15 VOLUNTARY EMPLOYEE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION (VEBA)

Effective January 1, 2014, the City will contribute $50 per month to the VEBA specified by Local 2898 for employees covered by this Agreement who are not entitled to disability leave under State Statute RCW 41.26.

ARTICLE 14 - JOINT LABOR MANAGEMENT AND JOINT SAFETY COMMITTEES

14.1 The Union and the City agree to maintain and actively engage in a Labor Management Relations Committee.

14.1.1 The Committee shall be composed of a balance of representation from represented employees which may be from any bargaining unit with employees assigned to the Fire Department and non-represented employees, which shall include the Director of Labor Relations or designee.

14.1.2 The Committee shall be co-chaired by a representative from labor and a representative from the Fire Department administration.

14.1.3 The purpose of the Committee is to deal with matters of general concern to employees and administrators of the Department. The Committee may engage in discussion concerning matters of a Collective Bargaining nature. However, any agreement that may change the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be subject to the ratification processes of the parties.

14.1.4 Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit, restrict, or reduce the management prerogatives outlined in this Agreement.

14.1.5 This Section shall not deny any employee their rights granted under provisions of City, State and/or Federal Law.

14.2 The Union shall have one voting member on the Joint Safety Committee. The member shall be appointed by the President of Local 2898.

ARTICLE 15 - UNION BUSINESS

15.1 Employees who are Union officials (three officers who constitute the Union's Executive Board) shall be granted one shift or a portion thereof without loss of pay to conduct Union business if a replacement acceptable to the Chief of the Department or their designee is arranged for by the Union. The cost of such replacement shall be paid by the Union.

15.1.1 Such employees may be granted time off without pay to conduct Union business at the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department.

15.1.2 All requests and arrangements for the time off shall be made by the Union official at least ~~onefour~~three shifts prior to the proposed time off whenever possible.

15.1.3 In emergencies, the request may be submitted orally and later confirmed in writing. While working on shift, Union officials agree not to transact Union business that interferes with Department functions or normal routine. Upon written approval of the Chief, the Union President and/or their designee from the Union's Executive Board may be granted a reasonable amount of time off per year with pay to conduct official Union business, excluding all State legislative lobbying or activities. The Union will maintain a log of the actual time spent pursuing approved Union activities.

15.2 Union business may be conducted in the fire stations with permission of the Chief of the Department.

15.3 The Department will allow the Union use of bulletin board space in each station in a convenient location, which the Union may use for the posting of notices of official Union business. Material posted shall not refer to political matters nor to generally controversial subjects.

15.4 The City agrees not to restrict written communications between Local 2898 and its members if such written communication does not result in interference with the routine or the effectiveness of the station.

15.5 The Union agrees that any City property or facilities, including department apparatus, shall not be used for any non-duty related activities unless expressly approved by the Fire Chief or their designee in writing. Such requests may be made verbally and later confirmed in writing.

ARTICLE 16 - MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

16.1 Any and all rights concerned with the management and operation of the Department are exclusively that of the City unless otherwise provided by the terms of this Agreement. The City has the authority to adopt rules for the operation of the Department and conduct of its employees, provided such rules are not in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement or with applicable law. The City has the right (among other actions) to discipline, temporarily lay off, or discharge employees for good cause, also to assign work and determine duties and performance standards of employees; to determine, establish and/or revise the method, processes and means of providing departmental services, to schedule hours of work; to determine the number of personnel to be assigned duty at any time; and to perform all other functions not otherwise expressly limited by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 17 - PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

17.1 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to give an employee the right to strike and no employee shall strike or refuse to perform their assigned duties to the best of their ability during the term of this Agreement. The Union agrees that it will not condone or cause any strike, slowdown, mass sick call or any other form of work stoppage or interference to the normal operation of the Seattle Fire Department during the term of this Agreement.

17.2 Neither an employee nor the City will intentionally waive any provisions of this Agreement unless such waiver is mutually agreed upon by the Union and the City.

17.3 In accordance with Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 4.64.010, as amended, it shall be a condition of employment that in the event there is made against an employee any claims and/or litigation arising from any conduct, acts or omissions of such employee in the scope and course of their City employment, the City Attorney of the City shall, at the request of the Chief and on behalf of said employee, investigate and defend such claims and/or litigation and, if a claim be deemed by the City Attorney a proper one or if judgment be rendered against such employee, said claim or judgment shall be paid by the City in accordance with procedures established by Ordinance 104526, as amended, for the settlement of claims and payment of judgments.

17.4 The parties recognize that delivery of municipal services in the most efficient, effective, and courteous manner is of paramount importance and interest to the City and Union and, as such, maximized productivity is recognized to be an obligation of employees covered by this Agreement. In order to achieve this goal, the parties further recognize that work procedures and assignments or the introduction of any and all new, improved, or automated methods or equipment to increase the productivity and performance of individual employee(s), company(s), and/or Department, may be established and/or revised as set forth in Article 16.

17.5 The City and Local 2898 recognize the value and importance of Human Resources, Race and Social Justice and Leadership topics. Management can require employees to participate in a maximum of sixteen (16) hours per year of required off-shift training related to Human Resources, Race and Social Justice and/or Leadership topics. Management will work with the Union through the labor management committee to determine a training delivery plan. Employees who are unable to attend the required training due to personal commitments or unanticipated events will be offered opportunities to make up the training when practicable.

ARTICLE 18 - MEDICAL CARE, DENTAL CARE, VISION CARE AND LIFE INSURANCE

18.1 Medical Dental and Vision Care Programs - For employees covered by this Agreement who were hired before October 1, 1977 and are covered by State Statute RCW 41.26, the City will provide medical, dental and vision care programs, as established by the City, for the dependents of eligible employees under conditions of the medical, dental and vision care contracts applicable to employees covered by this Agreement and which were in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement.

18.2 Medical, Dental and Vision Care Programs - For employees covered by this Agreement who are not covered by State Statute RCW 41.26 or who were hired on or after October 1, 1977, and who are not entitled to medical coverage under State Statute RCW 41.26, the City shall provide a medical, dental and vision care programs, as established by the City, for eligible employees and their eligible dependents under conditions of the medical, dental and vision contracts applicable to employees covered by this Agreement and which were in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement.

18.3 Effective July 1, 2013, the Employer shall contribute ninety percent (90%) and the employee shall contribute ten percent (10%) of the medical, dental and vision premiums for employees covered under the plans identified for "Most City Employees".

18.4 The medical, dental and vision plans offered by the City do not have to remain exactly the same as the programs in effect upon the effective date of this Agreement, but the medical/dental benefits shall remain substantially the same. The City may, at its discretion, change the insurance carrier for any of the medical, dental or vision benefits covered above and provide an alternative plan through another carrier. Benefit plan design changes will be accomplished through the Citywide Health Care Committee, however, any contemplated modification(s) to the medical or dental benefits afforded under the existing health care program(s) or a change in carrier(s) shall first be discussed with the Union party to this Agreement.

18.5 The City, at its discretion, may provide, and later discontinue if it deems appropriate, any other medical care, dental care or vision care options.

18.5 The Parties agree to form a committee to review the options associated with moving the Local 2898 members into the Local 27 healthcare trust. The committee will work in the spirt of cooperation, collaboration and in the spirt of good faith. This committee will be made of subject matter experts to include but not limited to someone from

the Local 27 trust authorized to negotiate on its behalf, a member of 2898, Subject matter experts regarding healthcare from the City and a SHR Labor negotiator , and a representative from the department. This committee may or may not make a recommendation to the appropriate people in leadership. Nothing in this article requires any action other than to develop the possibility of options and/or feasibility of the movement from one healthcare trust to a different healthcare trust. With mutual agreement between the Parties this agreement may be reopened for bargaining for moving 2898 members to the Local 27 healthcare trust.

The Parties agree to begin meeting regularly on a mutually agreeable basis no later than the last quarter of 2025, and no less than once a quarter. The goal of this committee is to conclude their business by no later then the last quarter of 2026.

18.6 Life Insurance - The City shall offer a voluntary Group Term Life Basic Insurance option to eligible employees. The employee shall pay sixty percent (60%) of the monthly premium and the City shall pay forty percent (40%) of the monthly premium at a premium rate established by the City and the carrier. Premium refunds received by the City from the voluntary Group Term Life Basic Insurance option shall be administered as follows:

18.7 During the term of this Agreement, additional premium refunds shall be divided so that forty percent (40%) can be used by the City to pay for the City's share of the monthly premiums, and sixty percent (60%) shall be used for benefit of the employees participating in the Group Term Life Insurance Plan in terms of benefit improvements, to pay the employees' share of the monthly premiums or for life insurance purposes otherwise negotiated.

18.7.1 Whenever the Group Term Life Insurance Fund contains substantial rebate monies earmarked pursuant to Section 18.7, the Union shall be notified along with the Unions representing other City employees. The City will negotiate whether the sixty percent (60%) rebate attributable to employee contributions will be used to help pay the employees' share of monthly premiums or for life insurance purposes otherwise negotiated.

18.8 Employees under the age of 65 who retire from City service shall be entitled to participate in the medical plans offered to active employees. The costs of the premiums for the plans shall be paid by the retirees. The retirees may elect to obtain coverage for their dependents at the time of retirement pursuant to the same terms and conditions as may active employees. The City will provide this option to retirees with tiered-rate premiums. Employee's aged 65 and older may also participate in medical plans provided such coverage is available through a contracted insurance carrier.

18.9 There will be one enrollment period for retirees to select a particular medical option which will remain in effect until age 65 or after age 65 provided such coverage is available through the contracted insurance carrier. Retirees must elect coverage within thirty (30) days prior to retirement or no later than thirty (30) days after the end of COBRA coverage and can only enroll eligible family members who were enrolled on a City medical plan immediately prior to retirement. Retirees can later remove dependents but cannot re-enroll them at a later date. However, a retiree's spouse or domestic partner may delay enrollment if they have coverage through another employer at the time the retiree is first eligible to enroll. When coverage is lost with that employer, the spouse or domestic partner shall provide proof of loss of coverage and enroll within thirty-one (31) days of loss of coverage. If a retiree declines coverage during the thirty (30) day initial enrollment period, they or their spouse, domestic partner or dependents cannot enroll at a later date. Any benefit changes to the medical and dental plans for active employees covered by this Agreement will automatically apply to the retiree plans.

18.10 The Department shall have the right to administer reasonable suspicion drug and alcohol testing, the terms of which have been negotiated pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement signed January 10, 2001.

18.11 The Department will compensate the employees covered by this agreement two (2) hours of overtime to complete the annual medical physical that has ~~the~~ some component(s) of the NFPA - 1582 , provided the employee provides a post physical doctor note that confirms the physical was completed.

ARTICLE 19 - GENERAL CONDITIONS

19.1 Employees covered by this Agreement shall be interviewed and/or counseled whenever possible prior to the submission of a transfer recommendation. When possible, they shall receive one (1) week written notice when their location of employment is being changed. In filling transfer vacancies, the City shall reasonably consider seniority, merit and ability, and employee wishes if an employee makes such wishes known to the Chief.

19.2 The parties agree that Battalion Chief assignments will be rotated on a regular basis as outlined in the Chief Rotation MOA dated February 22, 2018, as amended by the parties.

19.3 Notwithstanding any provisions of this Agreement, the Chief of the Fire Department or their designees may meet privately with an employee(s) covered by this Agreement for purposes of counseling relative to grievances, discipline or any other personal or departmental problems.

19.4 The City agrees to notify an employee a minimum of thirty (30) calendar days prior to lay-offs for any reason with the exception of disciplinary action or discharge for good cause shown.

19.5 The rank of Fire Chief, Deputy is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Safety Civil Service Commission and the creation and maintenance of such a rank shall be at the sole discretion of the Employer. When such a rank exists, selection of employees for the rank of Fire Chief, Deputy shall be at the discretion of the Chief of the Fire Department.

19.6 Written correspondence addressed to the Fire Chief shall be date stamped with a copy of the correspondence returned to the author. This stamp shall indicate that the correspondence has been reviewed by the Fire Chief, not their designee.

19.7 Payroll Errors

A. In the event the City determines that there has been an error in an employee's paycheck, an underpayment shall be corrected as soon as practical and upon written notice an overpayment shall be corrected as follows:

1. If the overpayment involved only one (1) paycheck or the amount of the overpayment is less than fifty dollars ($50.00):
   a. By lump-sum payroll deduction; or
   b. By lump-sum payment from the employee.

2. If the overpayment involved multiple paychecks and the amount of the overpayment exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00):
   a. By a repayment schedule through payroll deduction not to exceed twenty-six (26) pay periods in duration, with a minimum payroll deduction of not less than twenty-five ($25.00) dollars per pay period; or
   b. By a repayment schedule not to exceed thirteen (13) pay periods, with a minimum payroll deduction of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00), if the employee does not agree to a repayment schedule.

3. By other means, as may be mutually agreed between the City and the employee.

B. If an employee separates from City service before an overpayment is repaid, any amount due the City will be deducted from their final paycheck.

19.8 Meal Reimbursement While on Travel Status

An employee shall be reimbursed for meals while on travel status at the federal per diem rate. An employee will not be required to submit receipts for meals and may retain any unspent portion of an advance cash allowance for meals.

19.9 Ethics and Elections Commission

Nothing contained within this Agreement shall prohibit the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission from administering the Code of Ethics, including, but not limited to, the authority to impose monetary fines for violations of the Code of Ethics. Such fines are not discipline under this Agreement and, as such, are not subject to the Grievance procedure contained within this Agreement. Records of any fines imposed, or monetary settlements shall not be included in the employee's personnel file. Fines imposed by the Commission shall be subject to appeal on the record to the Seattle Municipal Court.

In the event the employer acts on a recommendation by the Commission to discipline an employee, the employee's contractual rights to contest such discipline shall apply. No record of the disciplinary recommendations by the Commission shall be placed in the employee's personnel file unless such discipline is upheld or unchallenged. Commission hearings are to be closed if requested by the employee who is the subject of such hearing.

19.10 Personnel File

Employees may examine their own personnel files and are entitled to a copy of anything contained therein, at the City's expense. Employees may also add to their own personnel files a written response to any document placed in their personnel files.

19.11 Performance Appraisals

The Union recognizes the City's right to establish and/or revise performance appraisal systems.

19.12 Social Media Policy

~~For the duration of this agreement, the parties will continue to negotiate a Social Media policy.~~ The Union agrees that the Social Media Policy dated August 20, 2020 will apply to local 2898 members.

19.13 Gender Workforce Equity

For the duration of this agreement, the Union agrees that the City may open negotiations associated with any changes to mandatory subjects related to Gender/Workforce Equity efforts.

19.14 Education Level Survey

The parties agree that the City may survey employees to determine education level during the term of the agreement.

ARTICLE 20 - PENSIONS

20.1 Pensions for employees and contributions to pension funds will be governed by the Washington State Statute in existence at the time.

ARTICLE 21 - SUBORDINATION OF AGREEMENT

21.1 It is understood that the parties hereto and the employees of the City are governed by the provisions of applicable Federal Law, State Law, and the City Charter. When any provisions thereof are in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, the provisions of said Federal Law, State Law, or City Charter are paramount and shall prevail.

21.2 It is also understood that the parties hereto and the employees of the City are governed by applicable City Ordinances and said Ordinances are paramount except where they conflict with the express provisions of this Agreement and except where, in the event of changes to the wages, hours or working condition of employees covered by this Agreement, bargaining is required by RCW 41.56.

ARTICLE 22 - SAVINGS CLAUSE

22.1 If any Article of this Agreement, or any Addenda hereto, should be held invalid by operation of law or by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction, or if compliance with or enforcement of any Article should be restrained by such tribunal, the remainder of this Agreement and Addenda shall not be affected thereby, and the parties shall enter into immediate collective bargaining negotiations for the purpose of arriving at a mutually satisfactory replacement of such Article.

ARTICLE 23 - ENTIRE AGREEMENT

23.1 The Agreement expressed herein in writing constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties, and nothing shall add to or supersede any of its provisions, except by mutual written agreement.

23.2 The parties acknowledge that each has had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any matter deemed a proper subject for collective bargaining. The results of the exercise of that right are set forth in this Agreement. Therefore, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the City and the Union for the duration of this Agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly, agrees to waive the right to oblige the other party to bargain with respect to any subject or matter whether or not specifically governed by this Agreement, provided that Local 2898 does not waive its right to obligate the City to bargain with respect to any changes proposed by the City in the wages, hours, or working conditions of employees covered by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 24 - DURATION OF AGREEMENT

24.1 This Agreement shall become effective upon signing by the parties and shall remain in effect through December 31, 2026~~1~~. Written notice of intent to amend or terminate must be served by the parties five (5) months prior to the submission of the City budget in the calendar year 2021 as stipulated in RCW 41.56.440.

24.2 At the appropriate time as described in Section 24.1 above, any contract changes desired by either party must be included in the opening letter and shall not be accepted at a later date unless mutually agreed upon by both parties.

Signed this _____ day of _____ 2021.

SEATTLE FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION,
IAFF, LOCAL 2898

CITY OF SEATTLE
Executed under the authority of
Ordinance 120107

~~Thomas Walsh, President~~

~~Jenny A. Durkan, Mayor~~

~~Debra Sutey, Secretary-Treasurer~~

APPENDIX A

A.1.1 Effective December 2~~26~~, 2021~~18~~, salaries shall be increased by ~~6.64~~% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

~~No later than March 31, 2025, each employee who is still employed by the City and still a member of the bargaining unit as of the date the payment is paid shall receive a one-time lump sum payment equal to three percent of the sum total of employee's gross wages for the years 2022, 2023 and 2024, as shown in Box 1 of the employee's W2 form for those years.~~

~~Example:~~

~~(2022 gross wage X 3%) + (2023 gross wage X 4%) + (2024 gross wage X 4%) = one-time lump sum payment.~~

~~This payment shall be subject to all standard payroll and other deductions (Taxes, Pension, L&I, Union dues, etc). The Parties agree that this flat, one-time payment shall be calculated and paid without regard to the employee's hours worked, overtime wages, or hourly pay rate in the years 2022, 2023, and 2024.~~

~~Classification~~	~~Start~~	~~6 months~~	~~18 months~~
~~Fire Battalion Chief~~	~~$11937~~	~~$12367~~	~~$12824~~
~~Fire Chief, Deputy~~	~~$13628~~	~~$14130~~	~~$14749~~

A.1.2 A fifteen percent (15%) salary differential rounded to the nearest dollar shall be maintained between the top salary steps of the Fire Battalion Chief and Deputy Fire Chief classifications.

A.1.3 Effective December 23, 2020, employees holding the rank of Battalion Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive a premium equivalent to 7.5% of the top step of the Battalion Chief classification while so assigned.

A.1.4 Effective December 23, 2020, employees holding the rank of Deputy Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive a premium equivalent to 7.5% of the top step of the Battalion Chief classification while so assigned as set forth in A.1.4.1 below.

A.1.4.1 Employees holding the rank of Deputy Chief assigned to administrative duties are eligible to receive the premium noted in A.1.4 above only upon assignment by the department of a Battalion Chief to administrative duties, and only while a Battalion Chief is so assigned by the department, with the date of eligibility being the same date as that of the Battalion Chief so assigned. In the event there is no longer any Battalion Chief assigned to administrative duties, Deputy Chiefs assigned to administrative duties shall no longer be eligible for and therefore shall not receive said premium. *

A.1.5 Effective December 215, 202219, salaries shall be increased by 2.75% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Classification	Start	6 months	18 months
Fire Battalion Chief	$12259	$12701	$13170
Fire Chief, Deputy	$13996	$14512	$15147

A.1.6 Employees shall receive a onetime cash bonus of 3% for hours worked in 2023 paid in the first quarter of 2025

Classification	Start	6 months	18 months
Fire Battalion Chief	$12627	$13082	$13565
Fire Battalion Chief, Admin	$13644	$14099	$14582
Fire Chief, Deputy	$14416	$14947	$15601
Fire Chief, Deputy, Admin	$15433	$15964	$16618

A.2.1 Effective December 20, 2023, salaries shall be increased by 4% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Effective December 18, 2024, salaries shall be increased by 4% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Effective December 17, 2025, salaries shall be increased by 5% and shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

Effective December 22, 20241, the wage scale for the Fire Battalion Chief and Fire Chief, Deputy classifications shall be reduced from 3 steps to 2 steps and shall be in accordance with the following schedule. The wage rates for the Fire Battalion Chief, Admin and Fire Chief, Deputy, Admin classifications depicted below are inclusive of the applicable step and the 7.5% administrative assignment premium: Employees shall receive a onetime cash bonus of 3% for hours worked in 2024 paid in the first quarter of 2025.

Classification	Start	6 months
Fire Battalion Chief	$13082	$13565
Fire Battalion Chief, Admin	$14099	$14582
Fire Chief, Deputy	$14947	$15601
Fire Chief, Deputy, Admin	$15964	$16618

A.2.2 Effective December 26, 2018 through December 24, 2019, monthly longevity premiums based upon the top pay step of the Fire Battalion Chief classification shall be added to the salaries in Section A.1.1, in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of Service	%	12/26/18
Completion of fifteen (15) years of service	5%	$641
Completion of twenty (20) years of service	7%	$898
Completion of twenty-five (25) years of service	10%	$1282
Completion of thirty (30) years of service	11%	$1411

A.2.3 Effective December 226, 202118 through December 1624, 202519, monthly longevity premiums based upon the top pay step of the Fire Battalion Chief classification shall be added to the salaries in Section A.1.1, in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of Service	%	12/226/2 1 1 8 Add Colom
Completion of fifteen (15) years of service	5%	$641
Completion of twenty (20) years of service	78%	$898
Completion of twenty-five (25) years of service	110%	$1282
Completion of thirty (30) years of service	121%	$1411

A2.2.3.A Effective December 2517, 202519, Section A.2.2 shall no longer be in effect and the following monthly longevity premiums based upon the top pay step of the Fire Battalion Chief classification shall be added to the salaries in Section A.1.5, A.1.6, and A.2.1 during the life of this Agreement in accordance with the following schedule:

Length of Service	%	12/2517/ 2519	12/23/20
• Completion of fifteen (15) years of service	56%	$659	$678
• Completion of twenty (20) years of service	8%	$1054	$1085
• Completion of twenty-five (25) years of service	121%	$1449	$1492

• Completion of thirty (30) years of service	132%	$1580	$1628

A.2.4 Longevity premiums shall be paid beginning with the first full pay period following the completion of the eligibility requirements. For the purpose of determining eligibility for longevity premiums, service shall be limited to time served in good standing as a uniformed member of the Seattle Fire Department.

A.3 All employees of the Seattle Fire Department shall be furnished a paycheck stub which designates the hourly rate paid; in addition, the paycheck stub shall also outline deductions authorized by the employee or required by law.

APPENDIX B - DEFERRED COMPENSATION (city moves off of our position)

B.1 Beginning January 1, 2014, the City shall contribute 1.6% of the top step base salary of Battalion Chief to the City's deferred compensation program for all employees represented by Local 2898. The City's contribution shall be 1.6% regardless of whether or not the employee makes a voluntary contribution to the deferred compensation program. The parties agree that the payments made by the City to this program are not matching, and whether or not such payments should include the calculation for each employee's retirement benefit under RCW 41.16, RCW 41.18, RCW 41.18, RCW 41.20, RCW 41.26, or other public pension system shall be an issue of law about which the City shall take no position in any legal proceeding.

B.1.1 Beginning December 25, 2019, the City shall increase its contribution by 1% to a maximum contribution rate of 2.6% of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.

B.1.2 Effective December 17,2025 the City shall increase its contribution by 0.4% to a maximum contribution rate of 3% of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.

APPENDIX C – MEMORANDUMS OF AGREEMENT

SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL
CENTRAL STAFF

September 4, 2025

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Seattle City Council
From: Amanda Allen, Analyst
Subject: Council Bill 121065 – Collective Bargaining Agreement for Local 2898

On September 9, 2025, the City Council will discuss and possibly vote on Council Bill (CB) 121065, which authorizes the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between The City of Seattle and the Seattle Fire Chiefs' Association, IAFF, Local 2898, effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026.

Overview of Key Points Regarding CB 121065:

- Implements a retroactive five-year agreement on wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions between January 1, 2022, and December 31, 2026.
- 31 employees affected
- Includes $4.73M in appropriations for current-year and retroactive payments will be included in the 2025 Year-end Supplemental.
- $2.75M will be included in the 2026 Proposed Budget to meet the needs of the CBA.
- Wage Increases are as follows: 2022 +4%, 2023 +5%, 2024 +4%, 2025 +4%, 2026 +5%.
- Effective 2022 through 2025, monthly longevity premiums will increase to 8, 11, and 12 percent for 20, 25 and 30 years of service, respectively.
- Effective in 2026, monthly longevity premiums will increase to 6, 12, and 13 percent for 15, 25, and 30 years of service, respectively.
- In 2026, contributions to deferred compensation will increase by 0.4 percent to a maximum of three percent of the top step base salary of the Battalion Chief classification.
- Overtime compensation is now provided for annual medica physicals and required off-shift virtual training.
- The uniform allowance will increase by $100 to $350.
- Juneteenth and Indigenous Peoples' Day (and, effective in 2026, Independence Day) will be recognized as paid holidays for fulltime employees.

cc: Ben Noble, Director
Lish Whitson, Lead Analyst

File #: CB 121052, **Version:** 2

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems.

WHEREAS, on October 8, 2024, the City Council passed Ordinance 127110, adopting the original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV); and

WHEREAS, the purpose of the CCTV camera program is to prevent crime, collect evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity, hold offenders accountable, and in conjunction with the Real-Time Crime Center, provide visual information to analysts in real-time that can assist officers in responding to calls; and

WHEREAS, subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), which section was enacted by Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance"; and

WHERAS, the CCTV pilot deployment areas authorized in the 2024 SIR were Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, and the Downtown Commercial Core; and

WHEREAS, the City Council increased the budget by $200,000 General Fund (2025), with an endorsement for $16,000 General Fund (2026), to expand the Closed-Circuit Television pilot on Aurora to extend the pilot site further south to 85th Street and further north to 145th Street; and

WHERAS, the majority of the cameras have been deployed in the Chinatown-International District, Aurora

Avenue North, and Downtown Core; and

WHEREAS, the material update adds the Stadium District, Garfield High School, and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District to the list of eligible CCTV deployment areas and clarifies the retention policy to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that no security incident has occurred before being deleted; and

WHEREAS, the new website seattle.gov/cctv is available to see the locations of the CCTVs and provides answers to the public regarding frequently asked questions about the CCTV program; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2, provided that, within the area surrounding Garfield High School as specified in Section 4.3 of the SIR, SPD shall only install cameras on the principal arterial street of 23rd Ave, and minor arterial streets of S. Jackson St. and E. Cherry St.

Section 2. The Seattle Police Department (SPD) shall include in the annual report required by Ordinance 127110 whether a warrant, subpoena, or court order that includes a non-disclosure order, has been used to obtain Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV), Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR), or other protected data from a contracted vendor. The report shall indicate how SPD will prevent future disclosure of data, including steps that might be taken to discontinue collecting certain data and whether to pause or end the CCTV pilot program. Upon receipt of this report, the Council might consider passing an ordinance to pause or end the CCTV program to prevent third parties from accessing Seattle's protected surveillance data.

Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this ____day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:
Attachment 1 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems
Attachment 2 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems

City of Seattle

2025 Surveillance Impact Report

Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems

Seattle Police Department

Surveillance Impact Report Versions:

- 2024 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems adopted by Ordinance 127110 on 10/08/2024.
- 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems

Surveillance Impact Report ("SIR") overview

About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "Surveillance Ordinance," on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City's executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the "Surveillance Policy".

How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department ("Seattle IT"). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.

Upcoming for Review	Initial Draft	Open Comment Period	Final Draft	Working Group	Council Review
The technology is upcoming for review, but the department has not begun drafting the surveillance impact report (SIR).	Work on the initial draft of the SIR is currently underway.	The initial draft of the SIR and supporting materials have been released for public review and comment. During this time, one or more public meetings will take place to solicit feedback.	During this stage the SIR, including collection of all public comments related to the specific technology, is being compiled and finalized.	The surveillance advisory working group will review each SIR's final draft and complete a civil liberties and privacy assessment, which will then be included with the SIR and submitted to Council.	City Council will decide on the use of the surveillance technology, by full Council vote.

Privacy Impact Assessment

Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA") is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

1.0 Abstract

1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology program is one component of an overall strategy of addressing felony crime at specific places. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, and enhanced lighting and cleaning.

The CCTV program is designed to be a pilot project, with independent researchers conducting an outcome evaluation to be completed two years after implementation. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the pilot project may be either discontinued or continued.

This SIR covers closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera systems proposed by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to deter and detect criminal activity. The CCTV camera systems are proposed to be installed at locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime is concentrated. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas. Signs acknowledging the use of the cameras will be posted in the immediate area of deployment, and street fliers will be distributed. In addition to the city-owned and operated CCTV cameras, privately-owned security systems will be able to voluntarily share video of storefronts and areas where the public has access with SPD. This voluntary sharing

of CCTV images of publicly accessible areas will increase the effectiveness of the technology-assisted crime prevention effort. CCTV camera systems contribute to averting harm to individuals and property and reducing crime by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations. For example, CCTVs could be used to review firearms-related homicides or aggravated assaults to identify the offender(s) and hold them accountable and provide justice for the victims and remove deadly weapons from the street.

1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

The City's police staffing crisis, now in its fourth year, has resulted in over 700 officers departing SPD since 2019. As of January 2024, 913 police officers are available for deployment in the city, the lowest number of in-service officers since 1991 and significantly below per-capita staffing relative to comparative jurisdictions. Low staffing levels also affect investigations, which hinders police effectiveness in solving cases and holding violent criminals accountable.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Implementing technology tools to bolster policing capabilities, as one part of a holistic crime prevention and reduction plan is essential to address ongoing gun violence, vehicle theft, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime at specific places, including within our most victimized communities.

The Crime Prevention Technology program is one component to this overall strategy of addressing this issue. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, and enhanced lighting and cleaning.

SPD's proposed CCTV camera systems would capture video of identifiable individuals, some of whom may be unaware of the recording, despite signage. Without appropriate safeguards, this raises significant privacy concerns which has resulted in this review. Recognizing these concerns, SPD proposes the CCTV camera systems will be utilized in a limited fashion and only in public-facing locations. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas and signs acknowledging use of the cameras will be posted.

2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview gives the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed.

2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

The theory of change supporting the program is that these technologies (1) bolster police effectiveness in public places where crime is concentrated when used with other crime

prevention efforts, including increased police patrols, enhanced lighting, graffiti mitigation, and others (CPTED), (2) deter criminal behavior when the public is aware of the cameras, and (3) gather evidence to hold offenders accountable. These efforts can improve public safety and enhance the public's confidence in the city government's ability to maintain safe neighborhoods.

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigation staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department.

The purpose of the CCTV program is to mitigate unprecedented patrol and investigations staffing shortages by leveraging evidence-based and industry-standard technologies to deter and detect persistent felony criminal behavior, gun violence, and human trafficking at specific places where these crimes are concentrated.

CCTV camera systems contribute to averting harm to individuals and property and reducing crime by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations thereby supporting closing investigative cases, holding criminals accountable, and removing deadly weapons off the street. For example, CCTVs could be used to review a firearms-related homicide to identify the suspect and provide information that would provide justice for the victims and remove deadly weapons from the street.

2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

Research has shown that CCTV cameras can be effective when deployed to address specific crime problems in specific geographic places and coupled with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) measures, other crime prevention technologies, patrol, and public support. The federal Department of Justice, the National Institute of Justice, and George Mason University's Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy rate the technology as "promising," meaning there is evidence of its effectiveness in preventing crime and aiding criminal investigations. Research is strong that CCTV increases the effectiveness of investigations.

In one broad study, researchers found that: "Results of this systematic review—based on 40 years of evaluation research—lend support for the continued use of CCTV to prevent crime as well as provide a greater understanding of some of the key mechanisms of effective use" [1]. The study also showed that there is evidence that "CCTV schemes incorporating active monitoring (n = 54) were associated with a significant reduction in crime" [2], highlighting the

[1] Piza, E., Welsh, B., Farrington, D. and Thomas, A. (2019). CCTV Surveillance for Crime Prevention: A 40-Year Systematic Review with Meta-Analysis. *Criminology & Public Policy, 18*(1): 135-159

[2] Ibid

role of active monitoring (e.g., Real-Time Crime Center) in enhancing the efficacy of CCTV systems.

Similar CCTV technology is widely used both internationally and domestically. Major cities in the United States with a comparable or greater number of residents to Seattle using CCTV include Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, and others. At least 43 municipalities in Washington State use some or all the technologies being proposed by SPD.

Here are some additional studies that look into these technologies:

- 2023 study of CCTV: "Evaluating the Effect of CCTV on Crime Occurrence and Case Clearances " by Amanda L. Thomas (cuny.edu)
- 2021 study of CCTV in Dallas. SocArXiv Papers | The effect of public surveillance cameras on crime clearance rates (osf.io)
- 2019 study of CCTV from New York. CCTV surveillance for crime prevention - Piza - 2019 - Criminology & Public Policy - Wiley Online Library.
- 2012 study of the St. Louis program. https://academic.oup.com/policing/article-abstract/6/1/26/1457126

SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the CCTV implementation through standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies (CCTV/RTCC/enhanced ALPR) will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.

The pilot portion of the program will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the “total cost of ownership of public safety,” Equity, Accountability, and Quality (“EAQ”), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

2.3 Describe the technology involved.

Each CCTV system consists of the following, with some variance depending on the specific technology/vendor solution that is selected:

- Cameras: these can range from simple fixed cameras to more sophisticated cameras with pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) as well as other capabilities (infrared night vision, high-definition imaging, etc.).
- Recording Devices: DVRs (digital video recorders) or NVRs (network video recorders) are used for storing video footage. DVRs are used for analog cameras, whereas NVRs are designed for IP (internet protocol cameras).
- Storage: the video footage is stored locally within hard drives within DVRs/NVRS for up to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to secure storage before being deleted. If video is identified as evidence in an investigation, it will be stored in SPD's secure electronic evidence storage.
- Video Management System: the software system that enables authorized users to view the live feed of the CCTV system and review recordings.
- Edge-Based Analytics capabilities: many modern CCTV systems have built-in processing power that enables them to perform a range of analytics such as motion detection and object recognition (e.g., identifying vehicles or people by the clothing they are wearing or items they may be carrying). "Edge-Based" refers to this processing being done on the camera, reducing the need for high network bandwidth. SPD will not use AI facial recognition tools.
- Technology exists for private owners of video security systems to voluntarily share streams of specific cameras with SPD.
- Data Encryption and Security: to ensure privacy and security, cloud-based systems encrypt data both in transit (when being uploaded) and at rest (when stored).
- Connectivity can either be through a wired fiber connection or via cellular modem.
- Cameras and supporting hardware (router, modem, DVR. etc.) that is self-contained in an enclosure that allows easy movement from one location to another if need be.
- Software that manages camera and supporting hardware, allowing monitoring of device status, power consumption, etc.

2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, equitable, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community, and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively.

CCTV camera systems contribute to averting harm to individuals and places and reduce crime by collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations.

2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

Seattle IT and SPD will collaborate to plan, procure, and deploy the technology. Operational management will be handled by SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), and SPD will also provide ongoing management and administration of the system (including user account creation, inventory management, audit log access, etc.). Technical support for the CCTV camera systems will be handled by Seattle IT and vendor support contracts. Seattle's Office of Inspector General (OIG) will be given access to the system at any time for auditing purposes. Other City departments or private contractors may be involved in installing the device dependent on permitting needs.

3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project/ technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the CCTV system.

Video may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR, CCTV, and RTCC technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

The CCTV cameras will be placed to capture events in plain view in public areas. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas and signs will be posted identifying their presence and use. Street fliers will also be distributed prior to camera activation in the affected areas.

Since minors (children) are present in public spaces, SPD may record video with children present, however, because disclosure of images of any minor is presumed highly offensive, images of an identifiable minor are almost always exempt from public disclosure.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies.

Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR, CCTV, and RTCC technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies.

CCTV camera systems will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive training in the CCTV video management system prior to authorization.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

4.0 Data Collection and Use

4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

Until data is extracted from the CCTV system's local storage, the data is temporarily stored on the device. Video may only be extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes (such as a dispatched call for service or investigations of crimes), as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

Video recordings will be kept on the cameras for up to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to secure storage and not retained for a longer duration unless manually extracted by authorized personnel via the video management system software. Private, 3rd party video, if used on SPD storage, will be subject to up to 30 days of retention after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to secure storage.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

In order to minimize inadvertent collection of data, the CCTV cameras will only be placed to capture events in plain view in public areas.

CCTV video recordings are automatically purged by the system up to 30 after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to secure storage.

Additionally, the CCTV camera systems will maintain a complete audit log of activities (including but not limited to personnel access and video extraction logs) and would be subject to an audit by the Office of Inspector General at any time.

4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

The desired deployment date for pilot areas is Spring of 2025.

For the initial pilot project, CCTV cameras will be temporarily placed at specific geographic locations to deter and detect criminal activity. Locations will be prioritized based on the concentration of gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes. The three initial pilot areas will be Aurora Avenue North in the North Precinct, downtown in areas along and adjacent to the Third Avenue corridor, and the Chinatown International District.

In addition to the initial program areas, there are three additional sites identified for CCTV cameras because of the concentration of gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes as well as other major upcoming city events that will be bring in hundreds of thousands of visitors to the location. Those locations are:

1. Areas around Lumen and T-Mobile Field, including parts of the southern portions of Pioneer Square.
2. Areas surrounding Garfield High School between S Jackson St. to the South, E Cherry St. to the North, 20th Ave. S to the West, and MLK Jr. Way to the East.

3. The Capitol Hill Nightlife District – E Union St. to the South, E Pine St. to the North, Broadway to the West, and 12th Ave. to the East. In addition, Neagle Pl. between E Pine and E Denny Way.

4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The technology will be in continuous operation. The possible initial pilot areas under consideration are Aurora Avenue North, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core including parts of Belltown. The exact duration of the pilot will be evaluated under a *Continuous Impact Assessment*[3] framework; however, time to prove an effect may vary depending on a number of factors. Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of year two.

4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

At a minimum, the installation of the CCTV systems will last for the duration of the initial pilot program. It may extend beyond that period if effective. The CCTV cameras may be moved if there is an emerging need in another area.

4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?

The cameras themselves will be visible to the public, and signs will be placed to alert the public to their presence and use.

4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?

Only authorized SPD, OPA and OIG users can access the CCTV camera feed or the data it captures. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

Access to video evidence is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy

[3] "Test-As-You-Go" for Hot Spots Policing: Continuous Impact Assessment with Repeat Crossover Designs | Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (springer.com)

12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information being used for law enforcement purposes can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

Data collected on 3rd party systems will be accessed by SPD personnel using the above guidelines, but will be owned by the 3rd party, unless taken into evidence. 3rd party streams that are recorded by SPD will be subject to Washington State public disclosure laws.

4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.

SPD's CCTV camera systems will not be used or operated by other law enforcement agencies. Video extracted/obtained as evidence may be shared with an outside agency, as described in SIR section 6.1. Vendors and external partners will not be able to view private criminal incident information unless it is being used for troubleshooting technical issues. Video shared with vendors for technical purposes will only be shared with permission from SPD.

4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?

Data will be accessed and used by police to provide precise data and information in real time to responding patrol and specialty units allowing them to make better decisions, reduce unnecessary work, and increase effectiveness, leading to better, more desired outcomes. Cameras may also be accessed to assist in active investigations. Data may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes (such as a dispatched call for service or investigations of crimes), as governed by SPD Policy 12.050. Recorded video will only be retained for up to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence lockers. Other City of Seattle departments may access cameras as defined by their internal policies.

4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?

Storage of CCTV video will take place within secure City of Seattle facilities under the administration of the Information Technology Department. If cloud storage is utilized, it will follow city security guidelines and will only be accessible to outside parties as part of system maintenance and support only when authorized.

Various measures will be in place to protect data from unauthorized access.

- Data Encryption
- Access control mechanisms (meeting CJIS requirements*)

- Strict user permission settings
- Industry standard network security measures (meeting CJIS requirements)

The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General upon request.

* Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets requirements for organizations that access or use criminal justice information. These requirements are referred to as "CJIS requirements" and are developed and audited for compliance by the FBI.

5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

5.1 How will data be securely stored?

The data will be encrypted at rest (where it is stored) and in transit (either through vendor encryption or through VPN on the City network side) as it's being transmitted from the camera device to the storage system, server, or cloud. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, the required records retention period for surveillance video that does not involve a specific incident is "Retain for 30 days after last recording or until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner, then Destroy." Data associated with criminal investigations will be saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the Office of Inspector General or other official auditors, will be allowed as needed.

5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

As noted in section 5.2 above, CCTV data stored by the city will be automatically purged by the system for up to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence lockers. Data collected from a private security system and stored on SPD storage will only be stored by the City for up to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence lockers.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with SPD Policy 6.060, such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General can audit for compliance at any time.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing it to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by CCTV cameras may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly executed research and confidentiality agreements as provided by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations, and to comply with legal requirements.

6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes ☒ No ☐

6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20, regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260 (auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems), and RCW Chapter 10.97 (Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Sharing agreements must meet the standards reflected in SPD Policy 12.055. Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260, and RCW Chapter 10.97.

Following Council approval of this SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the CCTV cameras may be used.

6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

CCTV cameras capture and record video of what is occurring within the range of the cameras. The devices do not check for accuracy.

In regard to overall outcomes, the goals of this project are:

1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in selected areas.
2. Reduction in 911 calls in selected areas.
3. To minimize crime displacement outside of selected areas.
4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

SPD will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur as a result of the initial pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The program will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

When reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, the CCTV cameras will be placed to capture events in plain view in public areas.

7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

Privacy risks revolve around improper collection of images of members of the general public. As it relates to CCTV recording, all CCTV cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas. Signs acknowledging the use of the cameras will be posted and street fliers will be distributed.

SMC 14.12 and SPD Policy 6.060 directs all SPD personnel that any documentation of information concerning a person's sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The purpose of policy 6.060 is "to ensure that the collection and review of such information serves a legitimate law enforcement purpose and does not unreasonably infringe upon individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy." SPD only documents sexual preferences or practices, political or religious activities if it is related to unlawful act, for example, a child pornography investigation.

Additionally, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures. The policy states that "employees shall not make decisions or take actions that are influenced by bias, prejudice, or discriminatory intent. Law enforcement and investigative decisions must be based upon observable behavior or specific intelligence," as well as outlining specifics related to this area.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

Inherent in video obtained through CCTV cameras is the risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in section 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes that allow for the Office of Inspector General to inspect the use and deployment of CCTV cameras.

8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Sharing of recorded video is primarily done through SPD's digital evidence management system. Records of when data was shared and who it is shared with is noted in the system audit logs. Digital evidence shared outside of the digital evidence management system (e.g., using media such as DVDs, thumb drives, etc. is done though SPD's Digital Forensic Unit, which logs requests.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

OIG conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.

Financial Information

Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current ☒ potential ☒

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
Q4 2024	Q2 2025	$1,100,000	$250,000	$50,000	General Fund

Notes:

Please consult the material update summary and fiscal note.

1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
$30,000	TBD	TBD	TBD	General Fund

Notes:

1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

The use of CCTV may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the CCTV and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities.

No funding beyond city General Fund dollars have been identified for this technology.

Expertise and References

Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report ("SIR"). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
Atlanta		Currently in use
Baltimore		Currently in use
Berkeley		Currently in use
Chicago		Currently in use
Los Angeles		Currently in use
New York		Currently in use
Philadelphia		Currently in use
Phoenix		Currently in use
Portland		Currently in use
San Diego		Currently in use
San Francisco		Currently in use

2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link
CCTV Surveillance for Crime Prevention: A 40-Year Systematic Review with Meta-Analysis	*Criminology & Public Policy* *18*(1): 135-159	CCTV Surveillance for Crime
Evaluating the Effect of CCTV on Crime Occurrence and Case Clearances in Fayetteville, North Carolina: A Microsynthetic Control Quasi-Experiment	CUNY	https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5467/
The effect of public surveillance cameras on crime clearance rates	SocArXiv Papers	https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/eh5bg

Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") and engagement for public comment worksheet

Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

In addition to completing the RET template sections below, the 2024 Council Budget Action SPD-900-A requested that the Executive, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) co-prepare a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis for these technologies, pursuant to the process that the Executive has already created to comply with the Surveillance Ordinance. Please see Appendix B: Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis.

Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments' ("Seattle IT") Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative ("RSJI") is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

1.0 Set Outcomes

1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?

☐ The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.

☐ There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
☒ The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
☒ The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

The information presented in this RET is specific to the initial pilot areas of Aurora Ave. N, Chinatown/International District, and the 3rd Ave./Downtown Core.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot is one integrated component to this overall strategy of addressing this issue. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, enhanced lighting, and enhanced cleaning.

The technology will be used for the following purposes:

- Closed-Circuit (CCTV) camera systems will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults, and other offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent, and removing deadly weapons from the street, thereby reducing the risk of harm to the public. It will also be used in real-time to assist coordination and deployment of patrol and specialty unit resources. For example, camera feeds in the Real-Time Crime Center can be used to assess the severity of incidents and either increase or decrease the resources dispatched to the scene accordingly.
- Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software helps provide situational awareness to increase officers' and the public's safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase the reliability of the location of victims and suspects, enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

Potential impacts on civil liberties include but are not limited to:

- Privacy concerns associated with surveillance of people, vehicles, and license plates in public places.
- Misuse of collected video and information/mission creep.
- Lack of transparency with the public on what is being done with recordings.
- Loss of personal autonomy with surveillance of an area.

To mitigate these potential community concerns, SPD will:

- Post signs indicating that police surveillance and video recordings are occurring.
- Ensure technology is being used for crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent crimes in the surveillance area.
- SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions.
- CCTV technology will only monitor public places, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks.
- Recorded material will only be kept for 30 days unless it is evidence of criminal behavior, in which case it will be transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence storage system.
- Provide access to CCTV, ALPR, and SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) user and device logs to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for compliance audits.
- Limit access to essential SPD personnel and accountability partners.
- The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.

Additionally, the technologies will only be implemented once the City's surveillance ordinance requirements are met and the City Council authorizes the use.

1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just

right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

The following neighborhoods are being considered for deploying the CCTV technologies. Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.

☐ all Seattle neighborhoods

- ☒ **Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th**
- ☐ Ballard
- ☒ **Belltown**
- ☐ Beacon Hill
- ☐ Capitol Hill
- ☐ Central District
- ☒ **Chinatown/International District**
- ☐ Columbia City
- ☒ **Downtown Commercial Core**
- ☐ Delridge
- ☐ First Hill
- ☐ Georgetown
- ☐ Greenwood / Phinney
- ☐ International District
- ☐ Interbay
- ☐ North
- ☐ Northeast
- ☐ Northwest
- ☐ Madison Park / Madison Valley
- ☐ Magnolia
- ☐ Rainier Beach
- ☐ Ravenna / Laurelhurst
- ☐ South Lake Union / Eastlake
- ☐ Southeast
- ☐ Southwest
- ☐ South Park
- ☐ Wallingford / Fremont
- ☐ West Seattle
- ☐ King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual Aid)
- ☐ Outside King County (Mutual Aid)

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

Downtown & Belltown Area

Chinatown-International District Area



Aurora Avenue North Corridor
(Aurora Ave, 85th to 145th Streets)

1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?

Race/Ethnicity	Aurora	Chinatown International District	Belltown	Downtown Commercial	Citywide
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	0.4%
Asian	14.0%	49.2%	30.4%	16.8%	16.9%
Black/African American	8.9%	8.6%	5.5%	11.1%	6.8%
Hispanic or Latino of Any Race	11.3%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	8.2%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Multiple Races	7.9%	5.8%	4.9%	5.6%	7.3%
White	56.2%	27.2%	50.8%	56.1%	59.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; OPCD

Note: Geographical areas provided are 2020 Census Block Assignments of Urban Villages within the Downtown Urban Center, with the exception of Aurora. Aurora's boundaries are based on ½ mile buffer from Aurora between Meridian and Greenwood, and from 85th to 145th.

1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?

CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as other accountability measures. This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias.

These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. They are focused on individuals only if they are present in these areas.

1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

Data from the technology may be shared outside SPD with other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters under the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA").

Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. To mitigate this possibility, SPD has established policies regarding disseminating data related to criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and authorized researchers. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior.

1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

As with decisions around data sharing, data storage and data retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. Video from CCTVs will be stored for 30 days unless imagery is needed for investigations or to comply with legal requirements. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, and other accountability measures.

1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you can / have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.

The most important unintended possible negative consequence related to the implementation of CCTVs and RTCC is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unreasonable surveillance. To mitigate this risk, SPD is enacting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under which SPD may utilize CCTVs and Real-Time Crime Center software. Access to user and device logs will be given to the OIG so they can audit the use of these technologies.

To prevent unintended outcomes, the City will develop signage in areas that are covered by the cameras' view to alert the public to their presence and use. Additionally, the Office of the Inspector General will have access at any time to monitor and evaluate the use of these technologies. During the public outreach sessions described below, the City will listen to feedback from the public and provide responses during the technology review process.

The potential positive impact will be reduced serious crime concentrated in the locations where the technologies are deployed. If achieved, these reductions will create a safer environment for everyone who lives, works, plays, or visits these areas.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and

acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies.

2.0 Public Outreach

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR.

3.0 Public Comment Analysis

The public comment period was June 3, 2025 to June 23, 2025.

3.1 Summary of Response Volume

Please see Appendix B.

3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.

Please see Appendix B.

3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Please see Appendix B.

4.0 Response to Public Comments

4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

Concerns that have been raised through public comment and engagement will be addressed in SPD policy. SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for CCTV.

5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

The goals of this project are:

1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area.
2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
3. To minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

We will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur as a result of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the Inspector General, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts. Further, the City will retain outside academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an evaluation plan related to the use of the technologies.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group ("working group"), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

"Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement."

Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR. Please consult Ordinance 127110 adopted by the City Council on 10/08/24 to view the original Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment.

Appendix A: Glossary

Accountable: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

Community outcomes: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

Contracting equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

DON: "department of neighborhoods."

Immigrant and refugee access to services: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle's civic, economic and cultural life.

Inclusive outreach and public engagement: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

Individual racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

Institutional racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

OCR: "Office for Civil Rights."

Opportunity areas: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

Racial equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person's race.

Racial inequity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person's race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

RET: "racial equity toolkit"

Seattle neighborhoods: (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

Stakeholders: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

Structural racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

Surveillance ordinance: Seattle City Council passed ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "surveillance ordinance."



SIR: "surveillance impact report", a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance 125376.

Workforce equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

CCTV 2025 Material Change, public comment received via Privacy Inbox

June 23rd, 2025

Dear Seattle City Leadership,

Here is my public comment on the SPD Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV) Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) currently going through the Material Update process.

I've provided my concerns and recommendations below in order of severity. You will find that the negatives far exceed any possible positives and as such **my overall recommendation is that the City of Seattle not deploy any CCTV and all the material updates to the system should be rescinded.**

Concerns & Recommendations:

1) SPD lied to the public and City Council: SPD never intended for the CCTV system to be a pilot.
   (a) The original SPD CCTV SIR was approved in October 2024. The wording in the original SPD CCTV SIR and the presentations by SPD to the public and to City Council described the CCTV system as a "pilot" (and verbally SPD also called it an "experiment") that would include data analysis and reporting back at the 1-year and 2-year marks; and that the pilot program would be terminated if the data suggests the technology is ineffective.
   (b) The first SPD CCTV cameras were mounted in the CID as of at least May 5th, 2025 and the whole SPD CCTV program was supposed to go live on May 20th, 2025.
   (c) The RTCC & CCTV material update process opened for public comment on June 3rd. This means that most of the cameras had only been up for 14 days and the longest any camera had been installed was still less than a full month.
   (d) The updates to the SPD CCTV SIR includes both expanding the geographic footprints that will have these surveillance cameras across the City and making the SPD CCTV system permanent, not a pilot anymore. So not only did SPD not wait to have even one year's worth of data but the timing of the release of the updated SIR to the public means that SPD had to have already been drafting the changes to make it permanent before even all so called pilot cameras were deployed.
   (e) SPD just used the "pilot" as a way to have an easier-to-approve SIR go through the entire Surveillance Ordinance process while having the more contentious (expanded & permanent cameras) version go through the expedited Material Update process (which doesn't require Seattle IT to hold any public engagement meetings, doesn't have an updated RET, doesn't get reviewed by the Community Surveillance Working Group, and deletes the record-breaking amount of negative feedback the City received when the original SIR was being reviewed).
   (f) SPD's deception is just hastening the erosion of any trust the community might have in the department. If your word means nothing - If you can't be honest in even your descriptions of your roadmap, then why should you ever be trusted to operate a surveillance technology?

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - no City department should be rewarded for lying to the public or City Council.

2) No efficacy: Existing data from a recent meta-analysis of the use CCTV systems, which is the same paper SPD referenced in their CCTV SIR, does not support deploying CCTV to reduce violent crime, as SPD proposes to do:
   (a) Specifically, the 2019 paper by Eric L. Piza (of City University of New York (CUNY)) and et. al titled "CCTV surveillance for crime prevention. A 40-year systematic review with meta-

analysis" [https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12419] states, "No significant effects were observed for violent crime or disorder" [Piza pdf page 21]; and instead that significant reductions were primarily seen in vehicle crime and property crime [Piza pdf page 20].

(b) The paper also shows that the vast majority of studies that looked at CCTV deployed in city centers (as SPD plans to do) found either undesirable or no significant effect (in 26 out of 33 studies) [Piza pdf page 18] and that the largest & most consistent effects were for CCTV deployed within car parks [Piza pdf page 29], which is not what SPD plans to do.

(c) SPD's framing of research as supporting their plan is (at best) misleading the public, since SPD didn't say (in SIR item 2.2) that the "specific crime problems in specific geographic places" where CCTV has been effective were regarding vehicle/property crime primarily in car parks.

(d) In CCTV SIR item 2.2 SPD says, "The federal Department of Justice, the National Institute of Justice, and George Mason University's Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy rate the technology as 'promising'"; but SPD didn't cited where this rating is supposedly taken from. Given how misleading the other statements on efficacy of the technology are in the SIR, it's hard for the public to have trust regarding this statement.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology.

3) Not cost effective: Again, even the paper cited by SPD in the CCTV SIR doesn't support the cost trade-off for deploying CCTV systems:

(a) The paper states, "Public safety agencies combatting violent crime problems may need to consider whether resources would be better allocated toward other crime prevention measures." [Piza pdf page 33]. It goes on to cover how also combining CCTV with Gunshot Detection Technology (GDT) did not improve results and was even more costly. Specifically, they stated, "... the introduction of GDT in Newark, New Jersey, did not improve active monitoring practices of CCTV. Given the high cost associated with technology, introducing additional camera operators and/or patrol officers into CCTV operations may be a more cost-effective measure than complementary crime control technologies" [Piza pdf page 34]

(b) The updated Fiscal Impact section of the SIR shows an initial acquisition cost of $1.175 million. As of June 22nd, 2025, SPD has 66 cameras spanning 3 geographic areas. That equals a cost of about $17,803 per camera.

(c) The material changes include adding three additional areas to be surveilled, which is a doubling of the distinct locations; but the actual geographic footprint (and therefore amount of cameras and their costs) could be quite larger than double given that at least 2 of the 3 new areas seems to likely cover a larger number of blocks that the prior locations (though this is unclear because SPD did not provide any maps of the proposed new areas nor any tally of the number of additional cameras proposed to be added). Even with a conservative estimate of simply doubling the costs, this would bring the initial acquisition to $2.35 million.

(d) Given the budget deficit the City is facing, it is unwise for the City to spend $2.35 million to surveil residents instead of providing social services and funding community-driven, proven solutions to reducing gun violence.

(e) This seems like a foot in the door for SPD to have an always ever increasing budget allocated to them to expand and deepen their surveillance. It will be a contract that is an investment in exceptionally costly, ineffective, reactive measures that are hard to remove and do nothing to actually help residents or reduce violence.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there are better uses of limited City funds.

4) Erosion of trust: Wide-spread deployment of CCTV will erode the trust individuals have in their neighbors and community. It creates the perception that everyone is watching them and they need to watch everyone else - that no place is safe. Just because certain public areas don't have an expectation of legal privacy does not mean they should instead have an expectation of surveillance (public or private). People should feel confident to move about their day throughout their community (irregardless of their geographic neighborhood) without feeling like their every move is being watched and recorded. The push towards this technology is also a push towards instilling a sense of paranoia.

(a) Moreover, this also specifically causes an erosion of trust between SPD and the communities they serve because SPD is constantly lying. For example, SPD lied when they told the public during the IT's public engagement meetings that the cameras were not going to be live monitored and then immediately turned around and told City Council they would be (and that they'd need yet more additional funding for that). And SPD lied about the costs, which keeps ballooning every time they publicly discuss the technology. And SPD lied when they said it was a pilot program.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - the City needs to build community trust, not erode it.

4) Racially-biased deployment: The Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the SIR hasn't been updated to reflect the additional locations added to be surveilled. This is on top of the many issues with the original RET itself:

(a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.

(b) RET item 1.4.1 in the SIR shows disparate impact in the locations chosen to be surveilled. Specifically, there is disproportionate impact on Native American residents in 4 out of 4 of the pilot locations, Black residents in 3 of the pilot locations, Asian & Latinx residents in 2 of the pilot locations, and Mixed folks in 1 of the pilot locations. Additionally, while the majority of Seattle residents are white, all of the pilot locations have an under-proportionate amount of white residents - thus meaning the pilot locations selected appear on paper to be racially motivated. I don't see how the impact won't be biased-based policing because if you are only looking for crime in non-white neighborhoods, then you're primarily going to find non-white suspects (and victims); whereas criminals in white neighborhoods (who are therefore likely white themselves) will fly under the radar of the police.

(c) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.

(d) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public - you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled - that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.

(e) Only 1 of the 2 public engagement meetings on these surveillance technologies was held near a pilot location and the 1 location that was also happened to be the location with the highest amount of white residents out of the 4 pilot locations. Why can SPD find the time to talk to surveillance technology vendors and the City can find the money to surveil residents, but

somehow doesn't have the time nor the money to even have host a community event in all of the pilot locations?

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - racist behavior (including with technology) has no place in Seattle.

6) Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws: Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed CCTV:

(a) For background, WA HB 1469 was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.

(b) And WA SB 5497 was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).

(c) SPD has confirmed that the video recordings will be streamed and recorded in the cloud (not on-premise with the City of Seattle).

(d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Idaho could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Axon Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Because Axon isn't a WA company, the data is not protected by the Shield Law; and because Fusus isn't a government law enforcement agency, the data is also not protected by the Keep WA Working Act.

(e) The amendment that passed in Council that altered the contract language with Axon does not address these concerns either because state/federal laws will always be honored by a judge over simple contract language. Additionally, if the judge who signed the warrant also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Axon might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD (regardless of what the contract says).

(f) These concerns are especially relevant now given the current administration and because SPD has already mounted a camera within range of viewing people who visit the Planned Parenthood on 105th and the Home Depot on Aurora.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - SPD must not weaken state laws nor endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. If City Council approves of this pilot anyways, then at a minimum, require that the CCTV data to be stored only on-premise.

7) Surveillance expansion: CCTV SIR item 1.1 states that "... privately-owned security systems will be able to voluntarily share video of storefronts and areas where the public has access with SPD." There are multiple concerns about this:

(a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.
(b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further invasion of privacy beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.
(c) SPD has provided zero information about if/how there will be any signs posted on _private property_ alerting the public that a _private_ video camera is being shared with SPD. This removes the ability for members of the public to provide even the facade of consent since they will have no way to be informed of what is happening and thus opt-out by leaving the area. This is especially troublesome since there is the potential for there to be more privately-owned cameras than SPD-owned ones, thus creating a large imbalance of the which cameras have signage and which don't.
(d) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have on-the-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, privately-owned CCTV videos (both live and recorded) should require a warrant signed by a judge before they can be viewed, accessed, or saved by SPD.

8) Location tracking: Some CCTV vendors advertise that they enable any generic camera connected to their CCTV system to automatically become an Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) camera. This would turn all the connected CCTV cameras into also being fixed-point, mounted ALPR cameras. Many academic researchers have covered the multitude of harms from ALPR systems, including University of Washington's Center for Human Rights [https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/]. Broadly speaking, the mass collection of location data has been shown to cause: social, cultural, scientific, & economic harm; psychological harm; political and democratic harm; politically damaging disclosures, blackmail, & extortion; and actual repression by governments (among other issues). As such, any ALPR capabilities need to be explicitly disclosed to the public for review and City Council assessment, not secretly added-on behind the scenes as a feature of the CCTV system.
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (not as a pilot program and certainly not any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, disallow the use of ALPR via the CCTV system (until SPD explicitly lists them in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council).

9) No limitations on use: Item 2.1 of the CCTV SIR says, "Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the CCTV data to only "serious felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest

sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc).
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, specify that the only allowable use of the CCTV system should be for felony crimes.

10) Undisclosed/Unapproved surveillance features: In item 2.3 of the CCTV SIR, when describing "Edge-Based Analytics capabilities", it says, "SPD will not use AI face recognition tools." However, face recognition isn't the only concern:

(a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the CCTV video data.
(b) Additionally, SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use a CCTV product that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual accessing the system not clicking the wrong buttons - meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. OPA Case 2020OPA-0305 and OPA Case 2020OPA-0731).
(c) SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use, so it's impossible for the public to provide a critique of their accuracy (especially the possible racial and/or age-based biases of those). Since SPD didn't list any accuracy checks they will perform in item 6.5 of the SIR, it seems SPD expects the City to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-and-balances on that.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, all edge-based analytics capabilities in the CCTV system must be disabled until SPD explicitly lists them in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council.

11) Unclear signage: The mounted notifying people that there are police surveillance cameras in use near an address are unclear and inadequate. The signs are too small with too small of font and not in high enough contrast colors, so people who are low-vision probably won't be able to read them. The sign are also only posted in English (even the signs posted in the CID), and SPD has not provided any plan to provide for notification to blind residents (such as perhaps an auditory announcement or chime when walking within a certain range of the cameras).
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, font size & contrast should be increased and there must be an auditory alert of some kind near the location of each camera.

12) Excessive data retention: The CCTV SIR says that SPD plans to retain CCTV data for up to 30 days. This has multiple issues:

(a) Retaining the CCTV data for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for CCTV data to use against their victims.
(b) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to CCTV data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this

cameras, and inbound/outbound Internet access to the cameras disabled (so all network traffic must be local to the City's network - or as strong a network security configuration as possible in the architecture).

14) Training: Item 3.3 of the CCTV SIR says, "Authorized personnel will receive training in the CCTV video management system prior to authorization." and item 7.2 says, "SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training." SPD does not mention creating nor providing any privacy or ethics training specific to the CCTV system. There should be training that:

(a) Advises that the cameras must not have their pan, tilt, or zoom altered to look inside private residences, to stalk/harass individuals, or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons)
(b) And that CCTV operators must not move the camera's viewing angle away from an area of police response, while police are still present.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the CCTV, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the cameras.

Please seriously consider my public comment. Thank you.

technology enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.

(c) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.

(d) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.

(e) But 30 days is the maximum retention period, not the minimum, and the exact guidance in the retention schedule is "for 30 days after last recording or until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner." It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would also be getting processed by the RTCC that will be handling the CCTV data).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.

13) Security & Compliance:

(a) Camera systems (both publicly & privately owned) have a long history of being exposed online and/or easily hacked. For example, at one point nearly 70 % of Washington D.C. MPD CCTVs had been hacked with ransomware. Frequently, not following security best practices as a pilot program and certainly not any of the material updates proposed is what has led to various cameras being hacked. This is worrisome given that SPD was found to not be following all the security best practices for their evidence storage [see Clerk File 322642 - pdf pages 16-17 of the OIG FLIR SUR] and is/was using end-of-life, unpatched cameras for SPD's internal CCTV system [see Clerk File 322692 - pdf pages 13-14 of the OIG Video Recording Systems SUR].

(b) Item 4.7 says, "Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials." It would be better if access wasn't just password-based, but was also using MFA/2FA (or even 2SA would be something).

(c) SPD has also not detailed whether a person must be on the SPD network in order to access both the centralized CCTV system and each of the cameras themselves.

(d) SPD hasn't confirmed whether the CCTV system will have granular access control, such as only supervisors/administrators being able to change the default pan, tilt, and/or zoom of the cameras (aka the preset 'return to home' configuration).

(e) Nor whether the CCTV system logs the username and timestamp when a camera's pan, tilt, or zoom are changed. For example, if the system does NOT log this and there was a news report about misuse of the CCTV system, then it might be impossible for the OIG/OPA to determine which employee was at fault.

(f) Item 5.4 in the SIR says that, "Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD"; but that doesn't make sense here. Wouldn't this mean that the unit supervisor for the homicide detectives and the supervisor for the gang unit (and so and so forth) would all each be responsible for ensuring data retention compliance of the CCTV system? That responsibility should be more centralized so as to ensure consistency in application of compliance requirements for a potentially widely-used system like the CCTV.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy CCTV (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the CCTV system to support: detailed logging, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), granular access control of the

From: Roxy Robles
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2025 1:10 PM
To: LEG_CouncilMembers <council@seattle.gov>; Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: NO TO EXPANDED SURVEILLANCE
Good afternoon,
I am writing as a resident concerned about increased surveillance in our city. These technologies were 'piloted' despite a huge amount of community dissent and after only three weeks of use. Three weeks is not nearly enough to pilot test a new technology and to gather information about its efficacy.
Not only does this raise concerns about the overuse and surveillance of already over-policed communities, this raises concerns about the council's ability to follow its own principle of 'good governance', with a consistent application of ethics, race and social justice principles, and data-driven results. I stand firmly against the additional use of surveillance technologies in our city a SPD is already unreliable, selectively responsive, and unbelievably brutal and racist.
SPD is constantly escalating situations, particularly with regard to people exercising their first amendment right to peaceful protest, and despite Shon Barnes' lip service to 'crime prevention' I have yet to see any marked change under his leadership. *We cannot continue to fund untested technologies for a brutal, racist, and unreliable police force!!!*
Roxy Robles *they/she*

From: Brooke Christiansen
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:45 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update Public Comment
Hello, I'm a constituent out of Cap Hill (zip code 98122) and my comment is a follow:
Instead of investing in surveillance tech, let's invest in solving the root causes of crime in this city: high rent (unregulated landlords); limited access to shelter, mental health support, addiction support, job support for (formerly) unhoused folks, etc.; our tax money going to policing and sweeps that may make our neighborhoods temporarily look cleaner but don't solve people's problems; etc.
Best,
Brooke

From: R. John Setzer
Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 12:00 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material update public comment
With all due respect,
We don't need more surveillance in Seattle. This isn't a police state, and SPD cannot be trusted with that power.

Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 9:19 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
Hello,
I am a constituent and a resident of north Seattle who thoroughly opposes expanding of citywide CCTV footage pilot program in the RTCC. More surveillance will NOT keep us safe. We need real programs and

funding for local community advocacy groups and schools instead of cameras to watch our comings and goings. Prioritize proaction instead of reaction!
N.Emery
She/her

From: Jared Howe
Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 12:54 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
Dear Seattle City Council,
I'm writing to express my strong opposition to the proposed expansion of CCTV surveillance in Seattle. This plan has moved forward without adequate public notification or transparency from City leadership, SPD, or local media—and the community deserves to be heard.
Research consistently shows that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or improve clearance rates. The SPD's own cited study—a 40-year meta-analysis—found *no significant impact on violent crime*. Additional studies from the UK, Dallas, and elsewhere echo these findings, emphasizing the cost-ineffectiveness and lack of investigatory value.
Beyond its ineffectiveness, CCTV undermines civil liberties, particularly for marginalized communities. Surveillance has a documented history of abuse—from targeting protests and abortion seekers to racial profiling and stalking. Expanding camera networks only increases the risk of misuse, especially as they tie into facial recognition and other AI-driven surveillance tools.
Seattle already has community-centered initiatives that work. Programs like the Regional Peacekeepers Collective and the Rainier Beach Restorative Resolutions project have reduced violence significantly—and offer far better ROI than surveillance tech.
I urge you to oppose the expansion of CCTV and instead invest in evidence-based, community-led safety solutions. Our city's future depends on trust, transparency, and truly equitable public safety.
Sincerely,
Jared Howe
Seattle, WA
District 2

From: Noel Rivard <nrivard67@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 10:44 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No to RTCC and CCTV!!!!
Cameras don't deter people or stop harm from happening, they are just for punishment. Call it what it is or get it out of my neighborhood.
The city's consideration of an off-premise real-time crime center software database is terrifying to me. Especially with the hell our federal administration is putting us through! Our state laws protect us to some degree, but the moving of our data to a third party removes those protections and threatens horrors unseen. PLEASE be diligent and push back in this.
Stop installing the tools for them to surveil and punish!! Get more creative. Do better for our city. Punishment doesn't stop harm from occurring. Get to the root problem. What other pathways could actually prevent this behavior?
I urge you to reconsider for our sake and yours because you live here too. The people their illegally detaining and deporting right now are also your neighbors. History proves, that what we allow to happen

to them, will eventually happen to us.
Noel Rivard (they/them)

From: Siobhan Hopp
Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 8:45 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR material updates public comment
NO expansion of surveillance! DO NOT give more data to SPD. SPD is violent, racially profiles, protects capital over people, and aids and abets ICE in kidnapping members of my community. They should be being given LESS power and LESS access, not more. I say NO to SDOT giving SPD access to more cameras!

From: Joelle Pretty
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 6:35 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>; LEG_CouncilMembers <council@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations
CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties
Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see
RTCC is a threat to women, immigrants, those utilizing their first amendment rights to free speech. It also creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate ALL residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights
I am opposed to these systems, to the Mayor and City Council expanding surveillance, and any officials in Seattle, King County, and Washington State (frankly, in the country) to cooperating with ICE.
KNOCK IT OFF
Sincerely,
Joelle Pretty, Seattle

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

Responses received via form:





10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Neighborhood
More details
Prefer not to identify 16
Ballard 16
Belltown 5
Beacon Hill 5
Capitol Hill 17
Central District 10
Columbia City 3
Delridge 0
First Hill 2
Georgetown 1
Greenwood / Phinney 13
International District 0
Interbay 0
North 6
Northeast 9
Madison Park/ Madison Valley 4
Magnolia 4
Queen Anne 5
Rainier Beach 1
Ravenna / Laurelhurst 3
South Lake Union 1
Southeast 0
Southwest 0
South Park 0
Uptown 0
Wallingford / Fremont 11
West Seattle 3
King County 6
Outside King County 0
0
5
10
15
20

Id	What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?	Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of spac	What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/ questions re what value do you see in this technology ?	What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/considerations that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?	Do you have any additional comments or questions?

		e in section one)		
1	I oppose to use if this technology as it increases harmful surveillance and magnifies negative impacts to the LGBT+, BIPOC and immigrant communities of our city		None	Do not expand the use of this technology
2	This is surveillance technology that can and will be used to target marginalized groups. Seattle is currently facing an epidemic of police-ICE collusion and abductions by ICE that violate constitutional rights. If you care about stopping criminals, the biggest criminals in our community are ICE and SPD. Surveillance technology will only further their crimes.			Consider how surveillance is used to perpetrate crimes by police against citizens.
3	CCTV does not reduce violent crime and is a threat to our civil liberties		None	Invest in actions that actually reduce violence, rather than surveilling people

4	This is excessive surveillance. We could be using these funds in so many other ways. We know that excessive surveillance tends to disproportionately impact homeless people, Black people, immigrants, and other communities who already have enough to deal with.	None	I urge City leadership to use an equity lens when making this decision. Who are the communities most impacted? How are their human rights being violated, whether intentionally or unintentionally? What could we be doing with these funds instead, that wouldn't involve surveilling people?
5	This technology is not proven to provide any measureable differences on crime outcomes. It is rife is potential abuse and misuse. We have a right to a degree of privacy in public spaces.	No value what so ever.	Consider the impact that this has on our populace especially the most vulnerable among us. This doesn't help them. We should be using the limited money we have on proven effective methods of addressing crime.
6	Lack of safeguards for the data, conducting this surveillance is an invasion of privacy, and it will likely be used to target already marginalized communities. This technology will not make us any safer.	None.	
7	Loss of public privacy and the technology being used for nefarious means by the government.	None. Stores already have their own cameras, why do we need them all over the public? They are not used to make us safer,	YES.

	they are tools to oppress the public and I for one feel immensel y less safe with it.	

8	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found “[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors.” CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties SPD officer abused surveillance to stalk a “hot” SPD employee The University of Hull Department of Social Policy	I worry about expanding this now that we see the rise of authoritarianism in our country. It could be "used for good" (I don't really believe that) but it can also absolutely be used for evil depending who controls it. I don't trust it.	No.	You have allowed ICE access to this footage. Shame on you.	We're watching. We're watching our country devolve into authoritarianism. You can choose to take actions to help it or not.	SPD has been cooperating with ICE. Are we not a sanctuary city anymore?	I want to know why you put SPD over your citizens?

looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…"

The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone."

In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.

CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious.

People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are being surveilled.

Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.

Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.

There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence

Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have

adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. These programs save money, research has shown every $1 invested saves $33.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and ha

9	This technology will be used unfairly to bias against marginalized communities. There won't be awareness that people are being surveilled by the police.		None		Consider telling people that you're planning to do this. Don't pretend to pilot the technology then ask for full access to the CCTV cameras immediately after the pilot starts.		
10	There's no way to train out bias in a consistent way. Nor in a way that gets rid of it 100% within in organization. This technology will be used to by the people who are biased and hateful to persecute those they feel are lesser. Mark. My. Words.	Just read it again.	None, for me basically. There is only value for the people who want to see others they hate persecuted.	Panopticon.	A right to privacy can extend to spaces where we want to feel alone. When there is a literal surveillance of everyone in the city, there is nowhere that one can feel at peace. The city is already isolating in a backwards way. Why can't we be able to choose when we are alone and when we are not?	nope	Would be best if we just had cameras in everyone's homes running all the time?
11	I don't want to live in constant surveillance when our current president is using it to arrest people who disagree with him or even when we have a decent president, hope that clears things up for you	You're ushering in a police state with all this surveillance while the president is arresting people who disagree with him? Please stop	zero	yeah, spend the money on social safety nets instead of cops and surveillance	instead of ushering in a police state, fix the homeless problem and tax the rich	Yeah, y'all need to tax the rich and support affordable housing before you put in cameras to watch out every move	
12	The cameras will obviously be used to create a penopticon to rope in LGBTQIA+, minorities, and other groups the Trump administration doesn't like. They should not exist.		None. It only benefits fascists and autocrats looking to destroy our rights.		The First and Fourth Amendments.	You have a chance to be on the right side of history, or just be more oppressors.	

13	I'm concerned that increased surveillance will lead to increased policing, particularly of vulnerable communities, and particularly reinforcing the school-to-prison pipeline in the case of cameras at schools. I'm also particularly concerned about police using this technology to further harass peaceful protestors given the current political climate, SPD's relationship to the current president (which can be inferred by 6 members of SPD participating in the January 6 attempted coup) and the long history of abuses by SPD against Seattle residents, queer residents especially (see: recent arrest of a trans person at Denny Blaine for simply enjoying the space like everyone else). Seattle's budget is already wildly bloated by spending money on our police force, this will only further that bloat. I wish we could dedicate these funds to something actually meaningful to residents like improving infrastructure and increasing affordable housing. I also worry that the data gathered by these cameras will end up sold to and/or held by private corporations, further invading our privacy as private individuals.	None, more cops have not made Seattle safer, just more policed.	Do Seattle residents need a panopticon to keep us safe? Has increasing police resources and invading communities ever increased safety? Who would be able to access the data gathered? Have SPD proven themselves to be responsible enough to manage this data? Do SPD have a vested interest in drumming up fears around crime? Should we exacerbate historic abuse perpetuated by police against POC and queer residents and high school students by increasing surveillance and by extension police presence? Would you put these in your neighborhood, or any of the public spaces you frequent? What groups are most likely to have their behaviors interpreted as criminal when existing in public spaces?

14	This kind of surveillance instills a sense of fear into the communities it is installed in. Also the increase in policing that will invariably follow these installations will disproportionately affect homeless populations, people of color, and queer people. We don't need more surveillance and policing. We need resources and community support.	None	Police cannot be used as a blanket "solution" to community safety and security. They actively make our communities less safe, especially when police forces (as they often do) contain white supremacists and virulently queerphobic people. I guarantee you that police will use these cameras as pretense to raid queer spaces and lead to even more fear and suffering on behalf of a queer community that is already under attack. But maybe that's what the city wants to see anyway considering the all but warm welcome city government has given to anti-trans bigots in cap hill and at city hall recently. Please don't make Seattle another place queer and trans people have to fear when it is one of the few safe-enough places we have left. Our communities need housing, healthcare, nutritious food, safe and accessible drinking water (I have friends who haven't had working water in their homes for months), walkability, and accessible transit. We need community care and safety measures, not policing.

15	I am concerned that this technology infringes upon citizens' rights to privacy as well as targets and endangers marginalized groups including the queer community, people of color, and immigrants.		Consider how implementing this technology will change the way people act under perceived surveillance and the way law enforcement will engage with your constituents.
16	Increased surveillance technology will inevitably be used disproportionately against marginalized communities to criminalize and police their lives. This technology is ineffective, unnecessary and only creates an anti-social environment for our city.	None	Who does it benefit? Who does it serve? Who is asking for this? How will it realistically be used? Who will be harmed?
17	Racial profiling, surveillance state, increasingly untrustworthy federal government (which SPD sometimes cooperates with). SPD should have to earn the trust of the people, and they have not done so.	None	
18	These technologies invade people's privacy and do nothing to prevent crime from happening. Instead of expanding surveillance, we should be investing in violence prevention and restorative justice efforts. There is also a significant concern that by continuing to expand CCTV access, we set up opportunity for folks coming to Washington to access medical care (abortions and gender affirming care) from other states to be monitored and punished by their state governments.	None.	

19	CCTV cameras do not decrease violence or meaningfully increase clearance rates. This has been studies & proven repeatedly: A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs British Home Office study found CCTV did not reduce crime or make people feel safer http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/leicestershire/4294693.stm A Dallas, TX study showing the only increases in clearance rates are for thefts. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-021-09477-8 CCTV cameras pose a massive risk for everyone. ICE has access CCTV footage from across the country including Washington State & supposed "sanctuary" states. https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/ Law enforcement in states with abortion bans have been able to search CCTV footage from abortion sanctuary states to look for people that have had abortions. https://www.404media.co/a-texas-cop-searched-license-plate-cameras-nationwide-for-a-woman-who-got-an-abortion/ No law, contract, agreement, or court decision can stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage because the current federal administration does not care about or follow the law or court decisions.	Absolutely none. This technology is an abuse of power with a universal adapter and should be removed from Seattle.	The issues on CCTV are very well documented and all came up last year when the Seattle community, Office of Civil Rights, and Community Surveillance Working Group all recommended against CCTV. Why is the city considering expanding this technology now when it is being used by ICE to disappear people and its abuses are so documented? Why is SPD moving to expand CCTV and change it from a "pilot" to a "program" less than 3 weeks after the supposed "pilot" went live across the city on May 20th? Where is the money for this camera expansion coming from? Relatedly, how is there money for this while the city is doing austerity and cutting services?	If the city cares about protecting the people of Seattle, it should be removing CCTV.

That’s even before considering all of the cases of individual officers abusing CCTV to spy on and blackmail people.

20	It turns the city into a surveillance state and has much potential for abuse.	Studies have shown that it doesn't reduce violent crime, so ultimately what is the point.	None	Vulnerable communities that will fall victim due to abuse and misuse of this technology.
21	I am concerned about the study that SPD cited to expand these cameras that showed these cameras do not affect violent crime rates and clearance rates, which are the two things most concerning in terms of public safety. I am concerned that SPD has collaborated with ICE and will share this information to target immigrants. I am concerned that police officer in Texas used WA CCTV camera footage to monitor people going to abortion clinics.		Do you have evidence that the CCTV you have is working?	How are you measuring the effectiveness of this technology? What is success and what is failure, and can you articulate a measurable standard? If it doesn't meet that standard, would you have the courage to roll it back? Can you roll it back, or do the police not answer to you?

22	CCTV surveillance raises serious concerns about civil liberties, racial justice, and community well-being. These cameras disproportionately target BIPOC and low-income neighborhoods, reinforcing systemic racism and a presumption of guilt. The presence of surveillance creates a climate of fear and control, not safety, and erodes trust in public institutions. The Seattle Police Department has a documented history of misusing surveillance tools—including spying on activists and leaking personal data—making it clear that abuse is not a hypothetical risk. This technology also poses a direct threat to our city's sanctuary policies and to people seeking abortion or gender-affirming care, especially when data is stored in the cloud or shared with other agencies.	I see little to no value in expanding CCTV use. Multiple studies, including a 40-year meta-analysis, show that CCTV does not reduce violent crime and has only limited impact on petty theft in places like parking lots. If anything, it creates a false sense of security while failing to address root causes of violence. Given its high costs and minimal effectiveness, it is not a justifiable public safety investment.	City leadership must consider the real harm this surveillance causes—especially to communities already over-policed—and weigh that against the lack of evidence that CCTV improves public safety. Investing millions into expanding this system is not only wasteful, it actively undermines trust and diverts resources from strategies that actually work, like community-led violence prevention, affordable housing, youth programs, and mental health support. Leadership must also recognize the risk of long-term misuse, data sharing, and mission creep, particularly when footage is managed through private or cloud-based systems with minimal oversight.		Before approving any expansion, the City should conduct independent impact assessments, publish clear policies on data use and retention, and engage meaningfully with communities most affected by surveillance. This is not just a technology issue—it's a human rights issue. Seattle has the opportunity to choose community safety over surveillance and should reject this proposal.

23	I am deeply concerned about the use of CCTV in our city. CCTV does not increase our safety as a community, it collects data about our movements as individuals, imposes psychological limitations on our freedom, creating a big brother dynamic with the city and state. More concerning is that there is plenty of historical and present day evidence that surveillance systems like this are used to trample civil liberties including that data being shared with ICE, against citizens who are invoking their free speech rights to protest, women and people seeking abortion care (the list goes on).	None	If you want to create safe communities, invest in people not surveillance technology. Studies show that the following work: violence interruption programs, increased public transit, restoring vacant land, green spaces, community hubs like public libraries, mental health and substance abuse treatment centers, income support to reduce and eliminate poverty, etc. No one said any of the above is easy or immediate, but the longer term ramifications is supremely better than trampling on people's civil liberties.	I will not vote for anyone that is a part of expanding the city's CCTV network.	
24	This will be used to surveil the same people being targeted by the trump administration - racialized people, poor people, youths, queer and trans people!	Stop expanding surveillance!			

25	- CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties. See item 2 in this document for specific examples: https://stopsurveillancecity.wordpress.com/closed-circuit-television-cameras-cctv/ - Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-27/when-police-abuse-surveillance-cameras). - Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray (https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-baltimore-cops-doctored-footage-of-freddie-grays-arrest).	None that would outweigh its harms.	Studies have shown that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. Meanwhile, investing in community-led solutions and restorative justice practices (over punitive/carceral/police-and-prisons practices) have been SHOWN to be effective in increasing public safety and lowering crime. I want City leadership to invest in solutions that have been proven to be effective, not CCTV which has been proven NOT to be effective. See this document (https://stopsurveillancecity.wordpress.com/closed-circuit-television-cameras-cctv/) for many specific examples and studies reaffirming the ineffectiveness of CCTV. See item 4 in the same document for specific examples of the many effective tools the city should use instead that are actually shown to decrease violence.	

26	CCTV surveillance raises serious concerns about civil liberties, racial justice, and community well-being. These cameras disproportionately target BIPOC and low-income neighborhoods, reinforcing systemic racism and a presumption of guilt. The presence of surveillance creates a climate of fear and control, not safety, and erodes trust in public institutions. The Seattle Police Department has a documented history of misusing surveillance tools—including spying on activists and leaking personal data—making it clear that abuse is not a hypothetical risk. This technology also poses a direct threat to our city's sanctuary policies and to people seeking abortion or gender-affirming care, especially when data is stored in the cloud or shared with other agencies.	I see little to no value in expanding CCTV use. Multiple studies, including a 40-year meta-analysis, show that CCTV does not reduce violent crime and has only limited impact on petty theft in places like parking lots. If anything, it creates a false sense of security while failing to address root causes of violence. Given its high costs and minimal effectiveness, it is not a justifiable public safety investment.	City leadership must consider the real harm this surveillance causes—especially to communities already over-policed—and weigh that against the lack of evidence that CCTV improves public safety. Investing millions into expanding this system is not only wasteful, it actively undermines trust and diverts resources from strategies that actually work, like community-led violence prevention, affordable housing, youth programs, and mental health support. Leadership must also recognize the risk of long-term misuse, data sharing, and mission creep, particularly when footage is managed through private or cloud-based systems with minimal oversight.		Before approving any expansion, the City should conduct independent impact assessments, publish clear policies on data use and retention, and engage meaningfully with communities most affected by surveillance. This is not just a technology issue—it's a human rights issue. Seattle has the opportunity to choose community safety over surveillance and should reject this proposal.

27	I've read that SPD plans to expand and make permanent their use of CCTV cameras throughout the city. From what I've read, CCTV doesn't make us safer. Instead, it's a threat to civil liberties…especially when (as happened in Oregon) the local police department shares footage with ICE.		I want my city to use viable, proven solutions like violence interruption programs, mental health services, and investments in libraries and green spaces, etc., to make our city safer and better. Not surveillance.
28	Surveillance technologies, like humans, have racial bias. I am very concerned that greater surveillance of our communities will lead to police disproportionately targeting Black and Brown people.	I'm a Garfield high school and Washington Middle school alum and the recent shootings there are devastating. But I know greater police presence and surveillance do not stop gun violence. Community programs that give youth resources and opportunities, social services that allow families to get stable work, housing, food, transportation, are what make our communities safer.	

29	I have concerns that this will be used to profile and target the most marginalized in our community	None	That SPD is consistently violent and have been under federal oversight for many years due to their actions- they don't need more tools to bully, harass, and assault people
30	There is no evidence that installing CCTV is going to effectively stop crimes. It will make the public feel watched and uncomfortable, especially those who are often subject to profiling by police departments. We do not need a surveillance state, especially one that local police who are in contention with public opinion have control over. Especially in minority and queer places. It also sets up a precident for further authoritarian pressure and control on daily lives of citizens. It is in opposition of freedom. It is security by aggression. While people should feel safe, they should also feel free. Safety should not have to come at cost.	None	How much authority over the lives of citizens they should exact. Does the state have the authority to be constantly monitoring its citizens. Is this security or is this control?

31	CCTV surveillance raises serious concerns about civil liberties, racial justice, and community well-being. These cameras disproportionately target BIPOC and low-income neighborhoods, reinforcing systemic racism and a presumption of guilt. The presence of surveillance creates a climate of fear and control, not safety, and erodes trust in public institutions. The Seattle Police Department has a documented history of misusing surveillance tools—including spying on activists and leaking personal data—making it clear that abuse is not a hypothetical risk. This technology also poses a direct threat to our city's sanctuary policies and to people seeking abortion or gender-affirming care, especially when data is stored in the cloud or shared with other agencies.		I see little to no value in expanding CCTV use. Multiple studies, including a 40-year meta-analysis, show that CCTV does not reduce violent crime and has only limited impact on petty theft in places like parking lots. If anything, it creates a false sense of security while failing to address root causes of violence. Given its high costs and minimal effectiveness, it is not a justifiable public safety investment.		City leadership must consider the real harm this surveillance causes—especially to communities already over-policed—and weigh that against the lack of evidence that CCTV improves public safety. Investing millions into expanding this system is not only wasteful, it actively undermines trust and diverts resources from strategies that actually work, like community-led violence prevention, affordable housing, youth programs, and mental health support. Leadership must also recognize the risk of long-term misuse, data sharing, and mission creep, particularly when footage is managed through private or cloud-based systems with minimal oversight.		Before approving any expansion, the City should conduct independent impact assessments, publish clear policies on data use and retention, and engage meaningfully with communities most affected by surveillance. This is not just a technology issue—it's a human rights issue. Seattle has the opportunity to choose community safety over surveillance and should reject this proposal.
32	The violation of every person's right to privacy.	N/A	None, complete waste.	N/A	Privacy is a right.	N/A	N/A

33	Increasing repression of the people by the police. Surveillance does not keep us safe, resources and social services do.	Technology will not save us. The police state will not save us. Give/provide people resources, not repression.	It'll get hacked and used against ICE	Resources over policing. Crime is a result of lack of resources, not police. We keep giving more and more money to them, with less and less results. POLICE ARE NOT THE SOLUTION.	The people DO NOT want a surveillance state.	Here is YOUR chance to stand up against authoritarianism
34	This is a waste of city money and an unnecessary intrusion on citizens.		None.	Consider your legacy. Authoritarianism or helping residents		

35	This technology will make the city of Seattle a dangerous, more unwelcoming surveillance state. People will be harmed by this technology. People will risk losing their lives because this technology will be abused by the ICE patrol that already kidnaps our community members and tears families apart. I am certain this CCTV will never help us, we have seen the harms it has done in destroying our community and our access to our streets, parks, public spaces in other places that it has been implemented in like London in the UK. CCTV is harmful and will be dangerous for everyone in Seattle. CCTV is susceptible to abuse and has never prevented violence or helped with crime rates. Putting cameras in shared spaces will further the discriminatory targeting that has been studied in the disproportionate surveillance of people of the global majority or Black people, Indigenous people and other people of color. The camera systems have susceptibility to be abused to stalk people and have led to abusive behaviors from operating the cameras to stalk people in their private spaces and homes. These technologies could be harmful in wrongful facial recognition and falsely accusing people by profiling people based on inaccurate technology information. There are no current enforceable legal limitations to privacy, invasions and protections against abuse of CCTV systems, which means that enforcing these before having protections beyond the fourth amendment in the US Constitution will be dangerous and Lack accountability and protections against abuse or violations. This technology act will enforced manufactured consent as not all people who will be in the public spaces will have voted on this or agreed to be filmed, which goes against their rights to not be filmed	There would be no value of this technology.	Please do not put this surveillance system in place. CCTV has extreme and dangerous, harms and potential risks to the communities that it surveils. This would be too costly and too risky to do.	I want you to understand the limitations and the high cost and false sense of security and risks to hacking and lack of effectiveness against crime that this technology has. It will further harm the community and promote a surveillance state that disconnects community and forces distrust from the City onto its people as well as between people and their community and fellow community members. CCTV has been abused and led to horrific incidences of stocking and discrimination of community members in cities that it has been in place.	Please refer to what I previously stated: This technology will make the city of Seattle a dangerous, more unwelcoming surveillance state. People will be harmed by this technology. People will risk losing their lives because this technology will be abused by the ICE patrol that already kidnaps our community members and tears families apart. I am certain this CCTV will never help us, we have seen the harms it has done in destroying our community and our access to our streets, parks, public spaces in other places that it has been implemented in like London in the UK. CCTV is harmful and will be dangerous for everyone in Seattle. CCTV is susceptible to abuse and has never prevented violence or helped with crime rates. Putting cameras in shared spaces will further the discriminatory targeting that has been studied in the disproportionate surveillance of people of the global majority or Black people, Indigenous people and other people of color. The camera systems have susceptibility to be abused to stalk people and have led to abusive behaviors from operating the cameras to stalk people in their private spaces and homes. These	Do not enforce this technology.

or surveilled in Seattle. I am worried that there is a lack of proportion between benefits and risks that this Act will have as it is intrusive and in violation of our rights, especially having severe mental and psychological and emotional effects on people, as well as the physical dangers that this technology poses to surveillance tactics of people. This technology will also take away from funds that would better go towards the well-being of the community of Seattle and benefit the structural protections of people, here and communities, families, schools, hospitals, public healthcare And other spaces that need more funding. This technology will be costly and dangerous. There needs to be better transparency about how such technologies would ever be used. There is no plan on how to prevent abuse Of the technology, which will leave loopholes for further harm. The widespread concerns about the potential harms of the constant monitoring of streets and public spaces in Seattle and beyond this technology is valid as it could be abused by those who hack or access the footage and use it harmfully. This technology includes many concerns about privacy and civil liberties. Ongoing maintenance and the initial financial cost of setting up. This technology will be harmful to the financial plans and budgeting of the city and SPD. This technology could lead to an overreliance on video footage from the CCTV and will lead to extra losses to the false notion that it will help with prevention of crime yet it can only record crime. The Technology would never stop crime or violence from happening. I'm concerned about the compliance to regulations on this technology as there need to be more regulations in place with how this would be set up and evolving as technology changes and

technologies could be harmful in wrongful facial recognition and falsely accusing people by profiling people based on inaccurate technology information. There are no current enforceable legal limitations to privacy, invasions and protections against abuse of CCTV systems, which means that enforcing these before having protections beyond the fourth amendment in the US Constitution will be dangerous and Lack accountability and protections against abuse or violations. This technology act will enforced manufactured consent as not all people who will be in the public spaces will have voted on this or agreed to be filmed, which goes against their rights to not be filmed or surveilled in Seattle. I am worried that there is a lack of proportion between benefits and risks that this Act will have as it is intrusive and in violation of our rights, especially having severe mental and psychological and emotional effects on people, as well as the physical dangers that this technology poses to surveillance tactics of people. This technology will also take away from funds that would better go towards the well-being of

		location regulations differ And the effectiveness of the cameras would diminish overtime, which would be a long term costly burden on the City of Seattle and SPD. As studies have shown in cities where CCTV has been brought up such as in London, the lack of trust in the community and employees rises with the furthering of CCTV presence, and could also reinforce more criminal activities to less surveilled areas.	the community of Seattle and benefit the structural protections of people, here and communities, families, schools, hospitals, public healthcare And other spaces that need more funding. This technology will be costly and dangerous. There needs to be better transparency about how such technologies would ever be used. There is no plan on how to prevent abuse Of the technology, which will leave loopholes for further harm. The widespread concerns about the potential harms of the constant monitoring of streets and public spaces in Seattle and beyond this technology is valid as it could be abused by those who hack or access the footage and use it harmfully. This technology includes many concerns about privacy and civil liberties. Ongoing maintenance and the initial financial cost of setting up. This technology will be harmful to the financial plans and budgeting of the city and SPD. This technology could lead to an overreliance on video footage from the CCTV and will lead to extra losses to the false notion that it will help with prevention of crime yet it can only record crime. The Technology would never stop crime or violence from

						happening. I'm concerned about the compliance to regulations on this technology as there need to be more regulations in place with how this would be set up and evolving as technology changes and location regulations differ And the effectiveness of the cameras would diminish overtime, which would be a long term costly burden on the City of Seattle and SPD. As studies have shown in cities where CCTV has been brought up such as in London, the lack of trust in the community and employees rises with the furthering of CCTV presence, and could also reinforce more criminal activities to less surve

36	expensive and ineffective	we do not need to expand surveillance	none	
37	There is very little evidence to show this stops crime. Even the study that SPD cites states that surveillance of this type had little to no effect on preventing or stopping crime. This surveillance will increase harassment of our communities and honestly, prevent them from thriving. Some of the culturally richest spaces in our city will be devestated by this.		None. This is a gross waste of resources that could be directed to actually preventing crime.	If the research doesn't show this is beneficial, why are we spending money on this?

38	The only study SPD cites - a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” I am concerned that expansion of CCTV and the risk it poses to vulnerable communities. CCTV will become a part of SPD's growing and expansive network of surveillance that is part of RTCC and accessible to agencies like ICE and Customs and border control - putting our immigrant communities at further risk. SPD has been inconsistent in whether cameras will be monitored 24/7 or only accessed in an investigation - but the data is accessible to SPD as well as any law enforcement agency across the country for warrant-less searches.	CCTV has not been shown to be effective as an investigatory tool.	CCTV has been shown to be effective in decreasing car theft in parking lots. But not of the locations that CCTV is being expanded too fit that definition - so I do not see a benefit to this material update	Evan with a seemingly "neutral" technology - members of LGBTQ+, immigrant, and BIPOC communities are disproportionately surveilled. Given the areas most heavily currently surveilled and the proposed expansion - SPD will certainly ensure this trend continues.	This technology is enormously expensive with little to no public benefit and potential for great public harm. Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group’s report on CCTV & RTCC “a majority of the working group is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies “ Public input into the obtaining of these technologies in the first place was overwhelmingly negative. Much of the public feedback warned that surveillance tools would be used by ICE and CBC to violate sanctuary city laws and that red states would use surveillance tools to track those seeking abortion care or gender-affirming care. Now, reports are coming in that this is in fact happening. https://www.theurbanist.org/2025/06/19/license-plate-readers-proliferate-in-washington-ice-overreach/ This "material update" of surveillance is putting further weapons in the hands of the Trump administration. We will hold our public officials accountable for these decisions especially as we	Look at the research. a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV - concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” This is the study SPD cited in the original SIR. If they had bothered to read the study they would see that it does not support SPD's claims.

see SPD act as "mutual aid" to federal agents and assist in disappearing our community members. Meanwhile Mayor Harrell and city council fail to make the kind of material investments in community that actually lead to public safety.

39	This is dangerous and infringes on our American right to organize. Increased surveillance will just allow for more government overreach into our personal lives, and directly contradicts with small government values. The SPD has demonstrated bias against transgender people (recently on May 24th in Cal Anderson), and also against others such as homeless people, migrants, and people of color. CCTV will allow police to attack those people and find ways to arrest people for any reason, regardless of justification.	No value.		Think about whether you want to have government organizations outside of Seattle requesting our footage and putting you in danger, or if you want your location to be known by those who despise you.	American values are about protecting our right to organize and allowing all to be free to demonstrate and protest against tyranny.
40	I am deeply concerned about the proposal to increase surveillance in my neighborhood. The SPD has not proven they will use this power responsibly, and I do not want myself or my neighbors to feel surveilled in our community.				
41			CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties. Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see.		

42	This surveillance infringes upon civil liberties and community well-being. CCTV cameras target low-income communities and Black, Indigenous and people of color populations, reinforcing negative racial stereotypes. SPD's track record with surveillance tools isn't good, thereby increasing risk of misuse. This system also puts our city's sanctuary policies at risk -- and in the current federal climate that puts anyone seeking abortion or gender-affirming care at even higher risk.	Very little. Research has shown that CCTV does not reduce violent crime. It does not address either end of violent crime--the causes or effects.		Please consider both the evidence about the harm CCTV causes and the lack of evidence that it improves public safety. Spending millions on this technology is wasteful. Those funds could be put to better use in community-led violence prevention, affordable housing, mental health and addicition treatment, and youth programs.	The City should conduct independent impact assessments, publish transparent policies on data use and retention, and engage with communities that would be directly affected by the tech.
43	The information gained will allow ICE to bypass Sanctuary laws and will target immigrants and LGDTQ+ individuals. This is a major element of a police state.	None		I would like them to consider individual privacy laws, and the rights of individuals	
44	It does not solve or prevent violent crime. It breeds distrust and is used disproportionately for marginalized people. There are other better ways to deal with crime…surveillance doesn't deal with the root problems. Please look at other ideas and possibilities before treating the whole city as a crime scene.	None, it's terrifying.	Time to trendsetters, think outside of the box, think about what really makes people feel safe. This does mone of that.	Get other options	

45	Surveillance is a powerful tool of social oppression. This will only increase violence. It will only lead to more discrimination and division. Adding more surveillance technology will only increase crime and increase violence towards innocent people	No. This is not the answer to a safer community	There is no value to this technology	Consider that Seattle is a safe haven for so many. Adding more surveillance technology will only increase crime and increase violence towards innocent people. Think about putting the funding for this into things that will actually help the Seattle community during this time
46	CCTV has no impact on deterring violent crime. It could be used for profound privacy violations.	None.		CCTV is only a surveillance tool, it does nothing to prevent or address the causes of crime. Our resources could be deployed more valuable elsewhere.
47	I'm deeply concerns that the police will use the information gathered by this technology to violate people's privacy. I'm even more concerned that the federal government will get its hands on this information and use it to terrorize the people of Seattle.	None whatsoever.		How the Trump administration could use the information gathered by this technology to promote its authoritarian agenda.
48	This technology will be implemented to profile individuals and create situations where folks are surveilled and monitored more than what is necessary to reduce crime. More cameras are not the answer here.	I see no value to this technology, and I see this as a thinly-veiled ruse to allow for more police intervention into daily life. This is dangerou		How this technology will truly be used, and if more police attention on the movement of the residents of Seattle is truly necessary (it's not).

		s technology that is not aimed at crime reduction.		
49	Increases to surveillance technology, especially at this time in history, is a foolish use of our resources. Especially considering that the federal government will seek any existing tool to harm immigrants, their political opponents, and people seeking abortion and gender care.	In a utopian future I can envision ways that this tech could be used for good, but we don't live in a utopian future, we live now. As a result, any value it could derive must be evaluated against the harm it will cause, and the risk to our most vulnerable populations are too great.	With the budget we have we can spend money catching people committing crimes — and in the process create tools for the current federal government to persecute minorities — or we can spend money improving our city and our citizen's lives, which has repeatedly been shown to prevent crimes. We should be doing the latter.	

50	Yes, I do have massive concerns about this technology in just the fact that it's yet another part of mass governmental surveillance that's been slowly expanding over the past few decades. The program already has already been likely used for helping track cross-state abortions. And as more and more states take away people's rights as we've seen over the past few years, it'll only be used for such purposes even further. Do not spy on citizens. Do not spy on your constituents. SPD is more than capable of doing its job without engaging in mass-surveillance.	None. Get rid of it. Now.	Consider whether it's worth conducting mass-surveillance on your constituents in exchange for extremely minor benefits, if any. Consider whether it's worth contributing to the erosion of both people's right to privacy, as well as assisting in interstate hunts for people trying to exercise their bodily autonomy. And don't lie to yourselves about how this will be "limited" or "only for certain criminal activities" because these kinds of things will and have always, always, ALWAYS expanded and have ALWAYS been co-opted. Please do not do this.

51	There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. This technology is inappropriate under the rights-violating conditions being imposed by the GOP Administration.	A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." The benefit of CCTV to public safety is questionable at best, while the harms from misuse (multiple instances confirmed in other locations) are significant.	No significant value!	None.	The harms to civil rights (particularly in vulnerable/historically harmed communities. The cost of this technology is not justified, therefore (especially given the city's budget shortfalls). Other methods of improving public safety (such as violence interruption programs, and addressing root causes of crime) have been shown to be effective, and our money would be better spent on these.		Why is Seattle City leadership (and SPD) so intent on using surveillance technologies--ShotSpotter, GPS tracking devices that can be shot onto cars, CCTV, RTCCE? All are expensive; none with a research-based record of success elsewhere, and all with privacy/civil rights issues?
52	I am concerned it will be used by ICE to find and detain/deport our immigrant community members. Studies have shown it does not reduce crime.		none		The harmful effects it will have on our immigrant community members.		
53	This is an invasion of privacy!	None	None	None	For what purpose is this technology being used?	None	None
54	My fear is that it will be used by ICE and in general we don't need more surveillance.		I do not see this being of value to achieve a safe city.		The future. Our immigrants. Our privacy. Consider all of this.	Please be aware of making decisions out of pressure from outside forces.	No.

55	We don't need spies in America!	Installed perhaps for the right reason but found to be useful for the wrong reasons like spying	The only value I see is in high crime areas		That we are a free country and should be able to move about when we want and with whom we want.	
56	Surveillance expansion will target LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, and BIPOC Youth.	This will terrorize our immigrant communities on a daily basis more than they already are!	NoneWa		Wa State is a safe haven. Surveillance tech takes this away.	
57	Unnecessary surveillance by an increasing surveilling government. This will potentially, eventually be used to target immigrants, protesters, etc.		None that outweighs the harm		Innocent people be targeted	
58	Privacy, especially use by ICE & other federal organizations.		None. Not for individuals but certainly for ICE.		Stop!	
59	This technology will not help with violent crime. The only study the SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” It is rife for abuse, racial discrimination and providing personal data to ICE. There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. An SPD officer abused surveillance to stalk a “hot” SPD employee.		None.	If implemented, what processes would be put in place for oversight to ensure this does not become a tool of discrimination and harassment.	It doesn't work and it puts our civil liberties at risk.	
60	It can be used against minorities and other defenseless people		None		How the information could be used in a partisan way.	
61	Freedom of movement for all people and social control this is not constitutional. This goes against personal rights . And does not speak to safety for citizens being targeted for ID and any other things those in power choose to target.		None!		That this will not create safety, it will allow abuse in tracking people	Please slow down and consider the costs of this tech.

	Freedom of movement for all of us.				
62	This expansion presents a clear danger to our community. Although it is viewed by some as a way of making our communities safer, it actually exposes us all, and particularly women and the LGBTQ community as well as marginalized ethnic groups, to authoritarian harassment. We really have a Big Brother who does not need more ways to watch us.	The value is not to ordinary citizens, but to an ever-growing authoritarian presence.	Research has shown CCTV has no significant effect on violent crime.		I am a retired lawyer and spent many years as a prosecutor. I do not make objection without considerable thought. We simply do not need to spend more money providing invasive surveillance.

63	Where do I begin? (1) CCTV, especially CCTV operated by SPD, represents a major threat to our civil liberties (a range of issues: privacy, footage being shared with other agencies, possiblity of abuse & blackmail, targeting of vulnerable populations, etc. (2) CCTV has not been demonstrated to reduce crime or help in law enforcement investigation. (3) There are other, better tools that may be used. (4) I have ZERO confidence that this tool can be used fairly by SPD, an agency that has been required in the past to have federal oversight because of their lack of integrity, transparency and accountability	I see no value in the potential use of this technology; I see only the potential for abuse and further movement toward a police and government surveillance state.	I ask that our city leaders think very seriously about whether they want our city to more fully embrace the surveillance state, especially at a time when our nation's president is adopting the tactics of autocrats and fascists. This is not who we are and it is certainly not the style of government that I want my civic leaders to be adopting. This is particularly true in a city with a Police Department that has a not so noble past (and an out of control Police Officers Union). I will also note that extremely few SPD officers actually live in Seattle; thus, they wouldn't even be subject to the surveillance that their organization is promoting.	Do not go there.
64	police power overreach	recycling it into something to enable peace and kindness	teach police to talk to people, share the space with us and reach out in person.	

65	Crime is lowering, no need to offer more tools to repressive regimes that can access the data (ice)		I see value in possibly decreasing prostitution on Aurora, if it's actually used!		Long term consequences to individual freedom, privacy and also increased targeting of minority pops.
66	It is not necessary for police use and could then be accessed and used in a damaging way by ICE.		None		do whatever can be done to prevent the police by using a cloud platform for this information.
67	We know that these tools, which we're out in place by King County Housing Authority, have generated surveillance data ICE has searched looking for people. Not criminals—just immigrants in most cases that had no criminal record, but who could have their status revoked so they could be detained and deported. This is not in the spirit of separating state and local resources from federal ICE enforcement. Don't expand the use of these tools.			I have a high degree of confidence in the police ability to investigate and prosecute crimes without these surveillance tools.	This is in effect spending city funds to seurveil communities that include immigrants, for federal agencies that are totally out of control right now.
68	This can be used to track women seeking abortions. It is also a threat to LGBTQ people.		I think it's dangers far outway any possible value.		I want them to consider the safety of all citizens.
69	This is a gross invasion of privacy	I do not want to live in a surveillance state. This would give the governmen t way too much power	None.	Don't get it!	Don't use it. The potentials for abuse are maximal and we cannot trust the federal government to deal with it properly.
70	My privacy. Everyone's privacy.	My major concern is identifying who really is ICE, Proud Boys, Oathkeeper s, another Lost Boyd white supremacis t group?	Not at this time.	No	Following the Constitution and our Rights as US citizens.

71	Tracking people and sharing this info with ICE is inhumane	That the information will be given to the highest bidder		Please don't install cctvs. It does not improve neighborhood safety.	How did you choose these locations? And how will you be using them in real time to prevent harm?
72	Now, more than ever, we do not need an increase of the surveillance state. These technologies are seldom actually used for any social good and provide infinite opportunities for abuse.		None worthwhile enough to cover the bad.	Not to further erode individual privacy for the illusion of safety.	

73	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found "[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors." CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties Police had used camera networks to spy on "immigration protests" There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV	See above	See above	See above	See above	See above	NA

storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.
A cop in Texas has used a database of CCTV footage to search for someone that had an abortion. The cop was able to search CCTV footage from Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority for people seeking abortion healthcare
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The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled..."
The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone."
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.
CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious.
People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are being surveilled.
Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.
Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.
There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions suc

74	CCTV has not been shown to have any impact on reducing violent crime, and has also not aided in the solving of crimes. More importantly, this technology HAS been used to profile, harass, spy on, and target American civilians, even those who have committed no crime. CCTV does not serve a public good, is frequently abused by police and law enforcement, and contributes to making our city and public spaces less free and less safe for all who live here. With the increase in illegal ICE raids that are sending our friends and neighbors who are lawfully in the United States and part of our communities to detention camps, any technology that increases surveillance plays an active role in destroying families and lives and destabilizing peace in our society. CCTV records being shared more widely and through cloud-based storage renders moot laws that have been put in place specifically to make Washington a sanctuary state for those who are being impacted by violence in other states, putting all of us in danger. I have an academic background in German and Soviet studies, and I can say with confidence that the widespread use of these technologies gives us as citizens more in common with those living under oppressive authoritarian regimes than the free world in which we are told we supposedly live. None of us - NONE of us, not one, can consider ourselves truly safe or trust that our constitutional rights will be upheld if CCTV technology continues to be expanded. Our youth are already struggling with a mental health crisis as a result of feeling constantly observed through social media. How much worse will this become if they know that they are constantly, literally being observed by police through	None. There are many other proven ways to reduce violence in communities that do not cause the same level of active harm as CCTV surveillance.	This is an opportunity for City leadership to prove that you are committed to serving the people of Seattle. You play an incredibly important role in protecting us from dangerous laws that make all of us less safe, and this is a clear instance in which there is a right and a wrong choice. As an American citizen and a proud Seattleite of many years, I am much more afraid of what ICE and our supposed law enforcement would do with expanded CCTV than I am of the whatever violence the expansion of these technologies would supposedly curb. We know this technology does not work for the stated purpose of protecting the people - instead it actively undermines our liberties. Do not sell us out.	Please see the following links with more information and studies on the impact of CCTV: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED436943.pdf https://www.404media.co/emails-reveal-the-casual-surveillance-alliance-between-ice-and-local-police/ https://www.thestranger.com/news/2025/05/02/80039485/what-jamie-tompkins-says-really-happened-at-spd https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/dcpolice/stories/stowe25.htm https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-27887275 https://scitechdaily.com/what-happens-to-your-brain-when-you-know-youre-being-watched/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-27/when-police-abuse-surveillance-cameras

cameras? The notion of expanding CCTV around high schools in particular, namely Garfield High School, will do nothing to keep our children safe and will only contribute to increasing their difficulties.

75	I have strong concerns about using the technology to make worse existing (unintentional) biases in law enforcement, profiling, and privacy. Obviously our founding fathers would not have such technology, but the Constitution and Bill of Rights protections against unreasonable searches and seizures suggests they would have been opposed.	It's a dangerous slippery slope into Big Brother authoritari an usage of surveillance footage.	There is little benefit, vs the social costs and toll on society of using it.	Please consider that once in use, there is no turning back. Conceptually, yes, but in reality, once it's in use, surveilling society become normalized.	If there were a more trustworthy group of people leading the federal executive branch, I might have different feelings. But those would be wrong. We must assume that eventually selfish, bad actors might take control--as they have--and use surveillance footage for bad purposes. Even if you are a fan of the current federal administration, there's the possibility that an administration you don't support comes into power--do you want that footage in their hands?
76	The security of vulnerable people is in jeopardy. This includes domestic violence victims and others. It takes away privacy and personal rights. It is being abused even as I write this.		It is being abused used at this point so NO!	That they are putting people in danger for living their normal legal lives. Big brother is constantly watching. It takes away our liberty.	

7 7	1. CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. * The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." * A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the countrysimilarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. * A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. * Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. * No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. * Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found "[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors." 2. CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties * Police had used camera networks to spy on "immigration protests" * There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy	4. There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence * Violence interruption programs work.Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. These	None. Especially in the current police state leaning climate.	Think about your commitment to the values of our city and do NOT do anything that betrays those values and feeds directly into the attacks on our protected residents. In other words, say NO to increasing surveillance that has shown no benefit but HAS shown harm.	Don't do it. We protect our residents and ICE doesn't.	

with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.

* A cop in Texas has used a database of CCTV footage to search for someone that had an abortion. The cop was able to search CCTV footage from Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority for people seeking abortion healthcare

* SPD officer abused surveillance to stalk a "hot" SPD employee

* The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…"

* The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone."

* In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.

* CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.

* CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious.

* People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are

programs save money, research has shown every $1 invested saves $33.

* Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruptio nand other community -led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighborin g cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

* Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investment s. Investment s restoring vacant land, the presence of street lighting, increasing public transportat ion, and community non-profits that tackle violence and build

being surveilled. 3. Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see * Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions. * Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.	community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. * Maintaining green spaces has been proven to reduce violence. Green spacesreducing violence has been extensively researched. * Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. * Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. * Poverty and income inequality are associated		

with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

* Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

* Increasing access to healthcare decreases crime. Unfortunately, decreasing access to healthcare increases crime.

78	I urge you to prevent the use of CCTV for the following reasons: CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found "[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors." CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties Police had used camera networks to spy on	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.	I see no value in using this technology. It will only do harm and is a waste of money.	More effective alternatives	Please stop the implementation of CCTV use in public. Make investments in communities that have been proven to get good results instead.	No CCTV in Seattle!

"immigration protests"

There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.

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These programs save money, research has shown every $1 invested saves $33.

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Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land, the presence of street lighting, increasing public transportation, and community non-profits that tackle violence

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associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

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79	CCTV, as it is currently being used and disseminated, seems fine, but an expansion to the "Cloud," making it accessible by ICE, etc, would be very detrimental for our civil liberties, especially at this wrought time when ICE is being used as a secret police by a president who doesn't respect the rule of law and the Constitution.						
80	It an atrocity and must not be used. Government overreach is not something we voted for.		None	no	The sanctity and privacy of each citizen.		
81	It's a threat to our immigrant community and those exercising their reproductive rights, and the Washington State laws enacted to protect them. Police have used camera networks to spy on “immigration protests.” There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. Police in Texas have used a database of CCTV footage to search (nationwide!) for someone who had an abortion. They were able to search CCTV footage from Washington State, other states with “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority for people seeking abortion healthcare	Research shows CCTV has "no significant effects on violent crime."The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop	NONE. We have systems in place that are safer for citizens that work well. And there are many other approaches, such as violence interruption programs, and investments in housing and mental health programs, that we could take to solve crime problems without the risks this system would place on us:		Refer to the points and data on this well-researched page: https://stopsurveillancecity.wordpress.com/closed-circuit-television-cameras-cctv/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2025-06-21&utm_campaign=Protect+our+immigrant+community+-+Stop+surveillance+expansion	I feel so strongly about this, that if my representative or a city-wide council member votes to support this, I will work very very hard to see that they do not keep their seat in the next election.	Why was there not more publicity about this to solicit community feedbacK?
82	I see the expansion of the cctv system as an unnecessary incursion into the privacy of the people of Seattle, I do not think it would benefit people whatsoever. There is the additional risk of this data falling into the hands of ICE, where it may be used to						

	deport our neighbors. I do not believe that more cctv cameras will stop crime in the city, just impose on the people of Seattle.				
83	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. CCTV does not reduce crime or make people feel safer. No independent study has found that Amazon Ring has any impact on crime or clearance rates. CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties. Police have used the camera networks to spy on "immigration protests". There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CcTV footage. Cloud based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws,and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people. CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious.	Police control CCTV cameras, the cameras see what the police want them to see. Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions. Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Deprtment repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray. Both violent crime and property crime can		Consider the mental health harm caused to a person who knows he/she/they are being surveilled. People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are being surveilled.	

		be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land,the presence of street lighting,increasing public transportation and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.		
84	Invasion of privacy, lack of data security, potential for misuse of information, dangerous surveillance state during a time of misuse if power		Abuse of privacy	Do not allow this
85	While CCTV units can be helpful in preventing and combating crime, they also retain the capacity to provide government agencies with means to control the population at large. Given the current political climate with right-wing, fascist-leaning actors in the national administration, I believe adding CCTV capacity poses a risk to the entire population and should be paused at the very least.			

86	I do not want to live in a world of surveillance. There is no need to expand what already feels like over reach of people's right to privacy. All the cameras on people feels truly Orwellian. Do not add to it!		I suppose if a child or elderly person with dementia was 'last seen' by one of those cameras it could be useful, but what seems to be happening at this time feels sinister really. Targeting POC, LBGTQ folks feels facist.	Do not expand it. Use the funds you would use for this and put it toward affordable housing, food insecurity, health care, and/or education. There are so many things the city need right now, and more surveillance is not one of them!
87	it violates human rights		i'm sure there is value but not as it is being used	protect the people of seattle. FIGHT ICE. They are imprisoning innocent people and keeping them in barbaric conditions
88	Privacy. Government using information against the people. Enabling autocracy.		None.	Reduce use and access to military-like tools in everyday policing
89	Its use for surveillance of individuals based on their race, lifestyle or immigration status.	It will be difficult to restrict access later on if desired.	I do not see Wisdom in giving this data to ICE. Giving ICE data to pursue individuals for incarceration, intimidation or deportation will increase the militarization of our society and decrease	Do not allow ICE to have access to Seattles data.

			liberty for us all.				
90	All humans deserve safety in their homes and in their lives and with their families		None		Civil liberty		
91	More intense surveillance state in a city where we uphold a lot of freedoms. I would rather fund the police and have heavier checks and balances for our local government and police than put something into place that makes the people scared. There is a worry face recognition will be used and people will not be able to peacefully protest anymore. Loss of a sense of freedom in seattle.		Maybe catching criminals which is a very very small portion of our society, so that still puts regular people up for scrutiny. A lot of our crime rights are also tied to our houseless ness problem. I would rather have more funding for police/soc ial services to integrate more intense help/viole nce break up for people on the streets.	How will it be used? What are all of our rights to not be on camera/jus t stay out of seattle? How does this benefit the general public who are not criminals and do not want to be in a surveillance state? What is the push for Seattle to implement these measures? What is the environme ntal impact as far as storing these/this would be a massive amount of data which takes plenty of resources, how will you protect our environme nt??	Regular citizens feel it is against our freedoms to constantly be watched in public. It is already an issue with random people filming in public. I worry about the right to assemble, the right for peaceful protest. If our freedoms are stripped and people are seen going into institutions like planned parenthood for any reason, they could be questioned.	Listen to the people and stand strong in Seattle. All of this shouldn't be done "under the table". People need to know exactly what you're doing and why.	I hope our representatives choose not to do this. It would be better to criminalize hard drugs and create a stronger police force than do this.
92	It adversely impacts our BIPOC and potentially our LGBTQIA+ communities.	I don't believe this is about crime prevention. Wouldn't we be better served by using the same monies on interventio	None	See #2	Vote NO	Remember, this is NOT about crime "prevention".	N/A

		n and support solutions? I'm tired of seeing my tax dollars wasted on things that don't deliver results.				
93	The Constitution's foundation is the fundamental right to an individuals privacy. This is protected in many places. The 5th amendment requires that police have a warrant to follow you and to track your movements. SPD's use of SDOT cameras violated that because they will be able to watch us no matter what we are doing. Millions of innocent people will be tracked by a government and the police will be able to access illegal amounts of information that they'd never otherwise have access to.	As is of course planned, this technology will predominantly impact already marginalized and over policed communities that already experience the state monopoly on violence more than any other community. The city should be ashamed that they are planning to surveil the LGBT, black, and Asian communities more than any others. These are hard working communities that come to Seattle for a better life to and contribute constantly to our collective well-being. Can SPD say the same?	None	No	Do you want to be watched during your back door dealings with big business?	You already have so many new cameras through those kiosks throughout downtown why do you need more? Is SPD so ineffective they can't do anything without violating every Seattlite's rights?

94	There already exists a method by which SPD can acquire CCTV footage. It's called getting a warrant with probable cause. The framers knew that the government would try to invade every aspect of our lives and created protections sot that our private lives would be sacrosanct. If SPD can't get it with a warrant, perhaps no crime was committed.	This is just a weak excuse to be able to throw our vulnerable populations in prison. Who knew that Seattle wanted to be as fascist as Florida and Trump?	None	Hands off our privacy	Give us the CCTV footage of your closed door meetings in which you force out the only city leaders who care about their communities.
95	I am appalled that this technology is being marketed to me as something that will make our city safer. This is a thinly veiled attempt at turning Seattle into an even stronger surveillance state that seeks out, tracks, and punishes BIPOC, immigrants, the unhoused, and the LGBT community. This technology will do nothing but harm marginalized communities. This technology will be used to kidnap and brutally deport people. SPD is ineffective and incapable of protecting our community. I would be stupid to believe that this technology would be used to "protect and serve" anyone but the wealthy, white, conservative class who want nothing more than to stamp out any semblance of difference or diversity in our community.		None		You claim that this city is welcoming to all, yet entertain these fascist police-state technologies. I do not feel safe here anymore. And it's not because of the "crimes" committed by the unhoused, POC, immigrants etc… it is because of SPD and its brutality and insistence on tracking our movements.
96	These are not normal times. Please do not increase surveillance on everyone				Stored, searchable, sharable data collected for what-if situations can easily be used for nefarious purposes. This is not the time to potentially assist bad actors

97	1) This is warrantless dragnet surveillance. All video being stored for 30 days means SPD would be mapping people's lives being able to figure out where people live, where they work, where they worship, the routes they take to work, etc. This map would be available to SPD & everyone with access to SPD's data. There is no legitimate use for this kind of map, all it does is create conditions where abuses are both easy & incredibly disastrous. These abuses aren't hypothetical. In recent weeks we've seen small-ish abuses like yet another SPD officer getting caught using a police database to stalk someone to massive like ICE & cops looking for people who've had abortions accessing nationwide surveillance databases. Those nationwide searches included data from Washington State despite the state's Keep Washington Work and Shield laws. The only reason reporters haven't discovered that SPD's existing data is being abused in nationwide searches like this is because SPD's CCTV & RTCC program has only been live for a month. There hasn't been any time for reporters, community members, anyone to get records on data access. There's barely been time for SPD's data to even be shared because it just went live at the end of May. SPD is ramming through this expansion before there's a chance for the community to see the full impacts of SPD's existing dragnet surveillance, SPD storing this a private, for-profit company's cloud guarantees this data will be shared. These systems are built to make data sharing between agencies as frictionless as possible, that's part of the sales pitch. This is functionally a secret expansion of surveillance. SPD has not done any	None, CCTV cameras don't reduce crime or increase clearance rates, they don't even make people feel safer. This has been studies repeated. Lots of studies showing this were submitted just last year when SPD was first asking for these technologies (the single study SPD included in the original SIR showed this). Not going to resubmit all of the studies because they were submitted just last year	How do you think any guardrails will keep the Trump Administration & ICE from accessing this data given their constant & blatant disregard for the law? How do you justify increasing surveillance now when ICE is kidnapping people on Seattle's streets with the assistance of SPD? How is there money for even more mass surveillance when the city is facing a budget deficit? Especially, when this is shown to not reduce violence. Why do things that are proven to reduce violence (ex. housing access, food access, mental health access, libraries, & violence intervention programs) constantly get defunded while surveillance that doesn't reduce violence gets more money? How do you think having Seattle under surveillance by the Trump Administration & ICE will impact tourism?		Keeping people in Seattle safe would require removing this & other surveillance by SPD and using that money to fund programs that are shown to reduce violence.

community outreach to let the public know this is being considered. SPD hasn't even done a press release or a post on social media. The only reason people know this is happening is because community members found single Seattle IT webpage that mentions it & have spread the word. There cannot be any consent of the governed/community consent because SPD hasn't let them know it is happening.

Being subjected to constant surveillance is harmful. Whose Streets Our Streets identified the level of surveillance in Seattle as already having "a psychological effect on the people being surveilled" (http://stopsurveillancecity.files.wordpress.com/2024/09/338c7-wsosautomatedenforcementsummary.pdf) and that was before SPD launched its CCTV & RTCC pilot. The effect is that people's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" (https://scitechdaily.com/what-happens-to-your-brain-when-you-know-youre-being-watched/). Expanding surveillance will increase these impacts and make people less safe.

There is no reason to believe any information SPD has provided for this material update or the underlying SIR given SPD's lengthy history of lying during the SIR process. Just last year, SPD definitely told the people of Seattle that it would not be actively monitoring CCTV cameras which was a lie, the minute the cameras were approved SPD demanded more money from the city to hire people to do active monitoring claiming that was the only way for them to work. SPD has also lied in the SIR for FLIR (https://www.realchangenews.org/news/2024/08/07/inside-spd-s-use-aerial-surveillance-during-2020-

protests), and just last month SPD provided misled people during the SIR for StarChase/pursuit mitigation trackers by claiming it was required to conform to WA law (The law does not say that, it says police departments should end each individual pursuit as soon as possible based on existing policies & technology, not that departments need to acquire new technologies).

98	It's an equity nightmare, cameras are being deployed in neighborhoods with disproportionately high numbers of renters, people of color, and poor people. This constant surveillance has negative effects on our health, it does not make a city better to feel that we are constantly being watched. This gives more discretion to SPD which has already shown it cares more about cracking down on protesters and gay people than it does about solving crimes that affect people. Giving cops who do not share values with the majority of people in Seattle or live in Seattle themselves access to cameras that can constantly monitor us is hostile to the people who live here and spending our money on it is an insult. It won't improve safety. People who are committing crimes aren't deterred by a camera that they might not even know exists. SPD has constantly demonstrated malice against those who don't agree with their broadly right wing values in the ways they violently assault and pursue people exercising speech in opposition to them. Giving those people access to cameras to watch seattleites 24/7 is a crime in and of itself. It will be abused and it reduces our perception of safety and security to feel that we're constantly under observation. This increase in the amount of networked surveillance also gives power to entities outside the city like the federal government and ICE and allows them to exercise control in this city contrary to the will of its people. Creating this surveillance in the first place is a huge liability because it is inevitable that outside agencies will eventually be able to access it. When that happens, we the citizens of this city will not have any say in how that footage is used by unaccountable people	To the people of Seattle it provides no value. To a repressive federal governme nt and sadistic police, it gives them more power to exercise at their discretion to harm people.	Consider that the pilot program itself was immensely unpopular with public comment being extremely slanted against it and with the city's own committees on equity and public safety recommending against it. This further expansion will continue to damage the reputation of elected officials if they demonstrate once again that they are more accountable to police unions and the DSA than the actual people who elect them and can decline to re-elect them.

	from far away places. It allows repression of immigrants and people seeking abortion at a minimum and can be used against even more people if the federal government decides to. The city which is already miserable will only become more miserable when those of us who live in the actual city are constantly monitored like an open air prison and the people in single family homes on the north end get to continue their lives as usual.		
99	I'm concerned information will be shared with ICE who will illegally abduct and detain immigrants. I also fear that as the country moves increasingly in the direction of fascism, that surveillance technology like this will be used to suppress our civil liberties. We do not want to live in a police state, and as such, the pros and cons of increasing surveillance technology should be carefully considered.	I presume it could be useful for finding people who have committed violent crimes and prosecuting them. However, from what I've read the use of	Please protect our city from sliding into a police state. The SPD and other law enforcement agencies should be kept separate from the agenda of the current US administration.

			CCTV has not reduced violent crime.			
100	I oppose expansion of surveillance on Seattle people, particularly targeting queer and bipoc people. This data will help feds unlawfully kidnap people off the streets					
101	As the Federal Government lurches towards a politicized police state, NOW is not the time to increase police surveillance powers, especially if it will be shared with ICE.					
102	I oppose increased survalence of Seattle streets that would further enable the unconstitutional actions of Trump regime.	There are no protections for seattle citizen constitutional rights in this plan.	It's great to use to save endangered species.	Don't make the residents of Seattle an endangered species.	Reread the the book 1984.	
103	It will be used to punish specific people and populations, such as people of color. It will impact privacy. It could be used to create databases of people for sexual and other crimes.		It could be used to solve crimes, but there doesn't seem to be a lot of evidence that it works for that purpose.			Right now the federal goverment is ignoring laws all over the country. We don't need to give them more tools.

104	I am deeply concerned about the expansion of CCTV in Seattle. First, there is no body of evidence suggesting that CCTV will reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. SPD cites a single study in its justification; however the meta-analysis that SPD cites found no significant effects on violent crime and determined that there was no body of research on the benefits of CCTV. These findings are echoed by studies in the UK and Texas which found the technology did not reduce crime or improve public safety. Second, CCTV threatens our civil liberties. It is deeply vulnerable to misuse by individual authorities and ICE, leaving Seattle residents vulnerable, particularly immigrants, people of color, and people accessing abortion care. Given the lack of evidence and the threat to our civil liberties, this expansion would be a misuse of city funds.	I see absolutely no value in the use of this technology. Particularly when our city is strapped for funds are there are evidence-based ways to reduce crime and improve safety. As a resident of Capitol Hill, I am deeply concerned about the negative impact that the proposed CCTV expansion will have on our right to privacy and our civil liberties.	City leadership should consider the many effective tools that exist to decrease community violence. For example, neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could also further invest in/expand models, such as the the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention. The Restorative Resolutions project led by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition has reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. There are promising evidence-based solutions that are cost-effective and present far better options for our city!	Who has SPD consulted in their planned expansion of CCTV in Seattle?

105	CCTV poses a serious threat to our civil liberties in this time of increasing national authoritarian government. Even with the supposed safeguards put in place with the legislation authorizing CCTV, there is ever reason to beleive that footage from these cameras will end-up in the hands of ICE or other Federal / State law enforcement who use it to try to enforce laws that directly contradict our values and laws in Seattle and the State of Washington. The risk of this misuse of this footage is too great, and the value of the cameras is too little. Seattle Police keep saying this tech will reduce violent crime – but there is zero evidence that it does, and only modest evidence that it reduces property crimes (ie crimes of being poor).	I am very concerned that this was proposed as a limited trial in a few neighborhoods – and now, just weeks after the cameras are operational – SPD is pushing for it to become permanent and expanded to new areas. The public review process for this tech saw a huge amount of popular opposition. City Council went ahead and approved it anyway – but with the caveat that it was to be a trial run to see if it actually had an impact on crime, and if the footage actually was secure from misuse by other agencies who do not share our values. This has not been anywhere near enough time to evaluate these	I see no value in this tech. We should not have it in our city.	Why is the current city administration bowing to ever whim and demand of SPD, especially considering the severe budget crunch we will soon be facing?	The voice and will of the people, who have been overwhelmingly opposed to this tech! Take a look at the public comment section of the surveillance impact report again.	Perhaps listen to your own experts - the Surveillance community working group opposed CCTV during the review process. Why don't you find out more about why they were opposed?	

		questions. It is against the spirit of the tech review process and the massive amount of feedback provided by the public expressing reservations about this tech to now decide the trial period is over.						
106	This technology will target the LBGTQIA and BIPOC youth.				We do not need tombe assisting ICE with targeting groups.			
107	Violations of privacy and my constitutional rights. This information being shared and feed into AI platforms		None	No	How the police have proven again and again that they act in racist, prejudiced ways towards citizens			
108	Unlawful surveillance of American citizens which would arrogate our civil rights.	That it would get into the wrong hands.	The price is too high for its benefits. We would be turning Seattle into a surveillance state similar to NYC.	I'm sure it would make SPD & ICE's jobs easier to the detriment of our democracy. I have much greater trust in the local police but none in A's which is kidnapping Americans off our streets.	That it would get into the hands of autocratic forces.	No	No	

109	I would request the city not expand its use of CCTV in public spaces. My concerns are related to the threat CCTV use could have for individual civil liberties. While CCTV use in private facilities, may reduce property crimes; widespread use in public areas has not been shown to reduce violent crimes. Constant monitoring of CCTV is impractical and expensive and liable to be biased, and should not be a substitute for more effective tools of community policing, violence interruption programs and preventive community-centered approaches to deal with the underlying causes of crime.	There is value in using CCTV in privately-owned, low-patrol areas, for instance to decrease car thefts in parking areas or to help identify shop lifters.	The cost of the technology versus its very questionable results and the adverse effects possible for individual civil liberties. It can't replace having a human presence in areas affected by higher crime rates.

1 1 0	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. -In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” -We should not be spending money on surveillance efforts that lack evidence of significant impact on violent crime. CCTV also poses a threat to civil liberties. -The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found “Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…”. The study also found “The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for ‘no obvious reason’ and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone.” -CCTV footage can be misused by ICE and there is no way to stop ICE from accessing it.		Can funds be redeployed to effective community investments? -Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments like restoring vacant land, the presence of street lighting, increasing public transportation, and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. -Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.	
1 1 1	Not only is this an unnecessary invasion of privacy, targeted mostly at POC neighborhoods, but these data are being used by ICE to facilitate deportations and by states with gender affirming/abortion care bans to prosecute people. I totally	none at all	Consider that the costs to vulnerable people outweigh any positive use of this technology.	

	object to generating this sort of data.			
112	It will endanger privacy of targeted groups		not needed	Do not use it
113	I am against surveillance in Seattle. I do not want police or artificial intelligence systems to watch me and my family as we go about our lives. Surveillance leads to self-censoring and a loss of individuality, creativity, and privacy. I do not want the federal government to legally or illegally access surveillance data collected in Seattle.		None	The harmful impacts of surveillance and policing fall disproportionately on individuals who have already experienced violence from white supremacy and colonialism. This program is structurally racist. City leaders should stop pursuing these police technologies and instead use the millions they would cost on public-health-based safety and community supports, like housing, food access, and libraries.
114	"or until determined that all evidence material to an incident under investigation has been transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence lockers." is an exception wide enough to drive a truck through. I understand the need to allow extended investigation under extreme cases, but it still needs a hard limit or it will be abused with the best will in the world. Furthermore, evidence transferred to	This information should not be transferred to or accessible by non-SPD law enforcement except in specific investigatory cases that have been		

	digital evidence lockers should be deleted after 10 years unless it has actually been used in a case.	reviewed by an SPD liason as consistent with Seattle and Washington State priorities for enforcement. The individual sphere of liberty for Washingtonians outweighs the political interest of politicians a thousand miles away.			
115	I think this technology will harm the communities it is imposed upon. Surveillance does not materially change the existence of crime, only oppresses those who have been put into situations of survival. A better use of funds would be more equitable housing, free higher education, more free food, more free hygiene facilities, more mental health care, rehabilitation facilities, free medical care, the list goes on and on. Surveillance solves no problems. It's a waste of resources.		None	It's useless and will inflict more harm than good.	Who may have access to this footage? Will this assist in the mass kidnappings perpetrated by ICE? What is the root cause of crime in these areas and how can you address that instead of criminalizing humans?
116	My concern lies in the misuse of such equipment to wrongfully convict folks, over policing of neighborhoods, the ethical concern of being constant surveillance.		I do not see a value in the use of this technology when other systems to help us already exist		Please take into account the overreaching effects of this decision and the ways it may harm our local communities.

117	This technology infringes on the civil liberties of people who have committed no crimes, and exacerbates the already disproportionate targeting of the young, people of color, LGTBQIA people, etc, and does not require a warrant.	WA state and Seattle are facing a budget crisis and are facing record costs due to lawsuits against SPD and other agencies. There is no reason to believe that this will reduce crime or increase case resolution and every reason to believe it will be abused in ways that end up costing even more money.	Negative value due to monetary cost for products, loss of civil liberties, liability issues, and other harms to our communities with no proven value to reduce crime	There are programs that really do reduce crime that this money could go to if it is truly burning a hole in the city's metaphorical pocket, although we all know there is a shortfall. What are you even thinking.	Surveillance makes us all less safe and it is hard to put the cat back into the bag once this sort of thing is normalized.	Seattle and WA cannot afford this wasteful proposal and SPD has not shown that it can be trusted with what it already has. Seeking these kinds of solutions has proven to be a huge embarrassment in other cities where it has not worked.	I get that people want to feel safe, but this is an irresponsible use of funds that will not work, especially given that there is data supporting other effective solutions.
118	Additional surveillance and tracking of citizens incurs the very real risk that the data will be used at the local level to unfairly target traditionally oppressed segments of our population. Additionally, this data could be shared, willingly or unwillingly, with our increasingly authoritarian federal government to target immigrants and other people the administration wishes to silence or deport.		There is little or no demonstrated value in increased CCTV surveillance.		Consider the very real likelihood that it will be abused at the expense of vulnerable populations.		

119	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. A study of Dallas, TX found "[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances" due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found "[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors." CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties Police had used camera networks to spy on "immigration protests" There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV	

storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.
A cop in Texas has used a database of CCTV footage to search for someone that had an abortion. The cop was able to search CCTV footage from Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority for people seeking abortion healthcare
SPD officer abused surveillance to stalk a "hot" SPD employee
The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…"
The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone."
In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men.
CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people.
CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious.
People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are being surveilled.
Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see

Cameras have been caught panning away from police violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions.
Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.
There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions suc

120	My concerns are MANY. Violation of privacy, potential infringement of citizens' constitutional rights, weaponization of footage by an increasingly fascist federal government, increasing racial disparities in policing, and so many other harms are very likely to occur if this proceeds! I live near Garfield Highschool. Why must I be surveilled while just going about my daily life? When I visited China, I expected surveillance by the repressive communist regime there, and i thought about how grateful I was to live in the US, where a democratic government would never allow such blatant violation of citizens' privacy! How deeply embarrassing and upsetting that I was so very wrong. I do not support the use of these cameras in my neighborhood, and I definitely do not support expanding them to cover more and more of our city!	Absolutely none. Any supposed value for "fighting crime" just actually wastes more taxpayer money incarcerating people who in fact need housing. The need for fighting crime in our city could be made obsolete by funding affordable housing, addiction treatment services, and other solutions to the root causes of most crime.	This technology is absolutely reprehensible and should not be allowed in our city!	Please think about how you would feel with a camera following your every move, and every move of your children and your neighbors, in your own neighborhood. Now think about the Trump administration having access to that footage, and being able to use it for whatever purpose they see fit. Imagine next month or next year, if the Trump administration has passed the anti-mask laws that they have threatened to pass, and how you could then be arrested for being seen on video leaving your own house with a mask on while sick with COVID, simply trying to protect your neighbors from germs. Now imagine what this same thought experiment might feel like for one of your constituents who is undocumented, or who has dark skin and is therefore more vulnerable to being wrongly accused when facial recognition software is used. So many of your neighbors are much more vulnerable than you are, and you are putting them at risk if you allow surveillance cameras onto their porches and their driveways. Please, do not allow this technology into my neighborhood!	Your constituents do not want this!	

121	Do not want to give information to Ice. I don't trust them. Don't know who they are especially when they are masked. Could be some of the people that Trump pardoned because they are all criminals.	The public needs to be protected from use of this technology.	None			
122	CCTV cameras will further erode trust in the police system among people that live in those areas. Constantly feeling watched will stifle expression.				Whether increasing surveillance in public areas actually reduces crime, and is that reduction significant enough to offset the psychological impact on people living in those areas.	
123	Vote against CCTV expansion as long as Trump is in office and ICE acts like this is a police state	No RTCC expansion as long as Trump is in office and ICE and Homeland Security act like this is a police state.	In general it can have value but we must be very careful about privacy issues.	No	How our privacy has already been stolen by the Trump administration and DOGE.	
124	An AI dystopia is what these technologies all seek to create -- CONTROL is an illusion, and a toxic one for governing bodies to try to enforce on the people who pay to create it. I don't want to live in a dystopian world.		I'm certain the hope is that AI can begin to replace people and policing -- NO, just NO.		Stop the push toward criminalizing the human responses to economic systems that seek to monetize us to death! Capitalism is killing us, and who is trying to put on the brakes??	We're not crazy because we don't want to be controlled. I'm law abiding and I don't want it.

1 2 5	We should absolutely not subject the public to this type of surveillance technology, especially at a time when the Trump administration is ignoring court orders and guardrails that would protect the public from inappropriate use of this technology by ICE or other government officials who are disregarding the constitution in front of our eyes.	SPD is an untrustworthy partner, and has repeatedly broken the public trust. Whether it's the DOJ consent decree from the Obama administration (with some aspects still in place), or their demonstrated excesses use of force during the 2020 George Floyd protests which resulted in payouts of tens of millions of dollars, the public does not and should not trust the SPD as a good faith partner to use this technology without racially profiling, or invasive surveillance.	The use of this technology is a waste of resources that could be utilized to benefit public safety. Public safety would be greatly enhanced by providing safe and affordable housing, access to food and free mental health resources. Give us service not surveillance.	Take this political moment seriously! The Trump administration and ICE may gain access to this technology illegally, as the federal government has committed to sending a more militarized police presence to Seattle. With the blatant disregard of court orders and the constitution, our city should not be developing this technology that can so easily fall into the wrong hands at this time.	SPD has a proven track record of being an untrustworthy partner. The people of Seattle do not trust this technology in the hands of SPD.	
1 2 6						

127	I believe that the federal government will seek any existing tool to harm immigrants, their political opponents, and people seeking abortion and gender care. I am DEEPLY concerned about furthering the ability of this administration to target vulnerable and oppressed communities.	Any value it could potentially have must be evaluated against the harm it will cause. And I believe it will be weaponized against our most vulnerable communities.	I want leadership to consider what is currently happening in our country, and the way that ICE is kidnapping people, ripping apart families, and terrorizing immigrants and black and brown people. This administration is aggressively attacking the rights of trans people and queer people. It is working to further erode reproductive rights. It is sending the Marines and National Guard to suppress peaceful protest against the wish of state leaders. There are legitimate claims of the US being on the brink of becoming a dictatorship. This is NOT the time in history to increase surveillance.	I beg you all to protect the people of Seattle by NOT implementing this.
128	Surveillance creates fear. Privacy is a fundamental right. CCTV is an incursion into innocent peoples lives. Don't extend it.		I don't want it.	
129	I'm very concerned that information from our license plates will be uploaded to a national database, which will be available to ICE, Border Control, etc….. This will endanger many in our marginalized communities (e.g., immigrants, trans folks, women). Is it not illegal in	I understand that this technology will add another tool in your 'tool belt' to fight	Please consider the importance in these rife times of maintaining our status as a sanctuary state and city.	

	Washington State for the police to cooperate with immigration enforcement? This seems to be a back door way to do so.		crime. However, the risks of joint a national surveillance system far outweigh the benefits.		
130	I'm extremely concerned with the proposal to expand the use of CCTV cameras used by SPD. Citizens have a right to privacy and being constantly surveilled will grow tensions between the public and SPD. Federal departments such as ICE have already used CCTV footage in other states to track and detain immigrants, and I believe that it is the city's responsibility to maintain itself as a sanctuary city and not allow for this expansion.	The increase in surveillance will no doubt lead to a disproportionate amount of arrests of marginalized groups in Seattle	none	Consider divesting funds from SPD to use for essential services such as housing and public schools.	
131	100% surveillance 24/7 does not make for a free society. “1984” was a cautionary tale, not a manual for how to govern a society. Increased CCTV does not keep citizens more safe, it just makes us less free.			Lead from your ideals, not your fears. Standing up to fascism and for true freedom is the most important work of our elected leaders at the moment.	
132	Major concerns. Mass surveillance, especially if the data gets into the hands of unaccountable and lawless government actors, is the antithesis to a free and democratic society. Right now the federal government is outright violating court orders and threatening to send citizens to overseas prisons without due process. These cameras will help facilitate the human rights abuses of innocent individuals and people who should have a day in court to defend themselves.		I think the risk far outweight the value.	The City of Seattle leadership should think about how to protect its citizens from federal government overreach.	Why is the U-District not listed as a neighborhood? It has nearly as many residents as Capitol Hill.

133	I am concerned about the threat that this expansion of CCTV use will pose to civil liberties, without any accompanying improvement in crime clearance rates. CCTV networks using cloud-based storage have been abused by ICE seeking to search national databases of CCTV footage, including in our sanctuary city (https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/), police forces in states that have criminalized abortion, and lawful protests.			I would strongly urge City leadership to think carefully about the unintended consequences of enabling increased surveillance for our most vulnerable community members and for citizens exercising their First Amendment protest rights.
134	This represents a further move to surveillance and dictatorship. It jeopardizes our freedom and does not offer protection.			
135				
136	With the lack of oversight and tracking, the potential for overreach overrides potential benefit. Research does not support that increased use of technology in this manner meaningfully reduces crime while raising many questions regarding safeguarding our rights. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs	With the current administration's tenuous connection to abiding to due process and abject overreach in ICE's mandate to meet numerical goals (vs just focusing on criminals), the use of technology is concerning given reports of ICE obtaining this information.	Right now, none.	First, use data! Be smarter. Second, must have robust oversight. Third, must have results tracking that has integrity and that is regularly shared with the public. Forth, clear evaluation of costs and benefits vs other proven methods for reducing crime by community investments, diversion programs, and the like.
137	In a time of gestapo kidnappings, don't further build the infrastructure for techno-fascism			Imagine

138	Expanding the surveillance capabilities of the city will only endanger its inhabitants, and will very likely be leveraged by state actors and agencies (i.e. ICE) to target immigrants and other vulnerable populations. Please do not move forward with this.	Please consider the harm you will be inflicting on some of our most vulnerable. This harm vastly outweighs any good these systems may do.

139	CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties Police had used camera networks to spy on “immigration protests” There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.”	None whatsoever.	DO NOT DO SPEND TAXPAYER DOLLARS ON THIS TECHNOLOGY.	Stop. Full stop.		There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. These programs save money, research has shown every $1 invested saves $33.
140	I do not want this to be used against the people	No need for increased surveillance	None		Not to be used against the people	N/a	N/a

141	I disagree with the digital surveillance methods because they create a mass amount of data about citizens that can be misused. Technology fails, horrible things could happen to someone on accident because the tech is inaccurate. Even more, I do not wish to live in a surveillance state where my moves as a member of the public are consistently tracked and entered into some database that I could never get into. It is an unnecessary waste of resources that could go into something more useful for citizens daily lives, like sidewalks, parks, or more transit connections.	I do not see any value in a stockpile of data over people that can be hijacked, misused to target individuals without due process, or generally using city resources for some unseen benefit to the people it is affecting.	Technology is not without the bias of people who have access to it. Implementing this sort of system will ultimately affect people who have less access to private space, such as our unhoused neighbors, and it is our responsibility to treat all those we share a city with as equal inhabitants.
142	Expanding this has been shown ineffective in stopping violent crimes. It does, however, pose a threat to civil liberties. There is also evidence that the police will not use CCTV footage judicially - posing the camera away from their own crimes. I do not support SPD providing anymore information to ICE about our neighbors, who are being disappeared from our cities.	I do not think we should live in a world of constant surveillance. Giving more to the police is not ideal.	Think about our large immigrant population and how damaging this could be. They are here legally, paying taxes, supporting our local economy. We do not want them disappeared with the help of SPD.
143	Please carefully consider any unintended negative consequences of adding cameras to selected communities. Evidence indicates that CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties at a time when these liberties are threatened. If so - now is not the time to make this change!		
144	Loss of transparency from SPD Lack of training in how to use this new technology	This technology could help in solving a crime but hopefully not using a crime to	

			solve a crime !	
145	Three weeks is NOT sufficient for a pilot program for any program, especially something obtaining sensitive data. These data will end up being used by bad actors, misaligned with Seattle's public opinion and politics.	Specific concerns include allowing bounty hunters and ICE agents to track immigrants, abortion seekers, and likely seekers of gender affirming care, or anyone else targeted by our currently hard right, fascism-inclined federal governmen t.	The value is to the current federal governme nt's non-democrati c intentions . While it may have some small use in local traffic safety, the risk to privacy far outweighs this.	As a fifth generation Washington resident, all proud Republicans, whose ancestors came here on the preacher train in the late 1800s, I feel I can speak for many when I say that this program is not aligned even with the majority opinion among right wing folks here. We want our privacy, and we value it for others. Do not let the heat of today's political climate invade the needs of our state and the will of its majority - left and right alike - specially in Seattle, where we are a sanctuary city for a reason (the voting public has already extensively spoken on this issue).
146	I object to a surveillance state		None	

147	I have significant concerns about this technology and strongly condemn its usage. We already have proof of SPD collaborating with ICE- there is no reason why this collaboration won't continue. This is in direct contradiction to Seattle's purported status as a sanctuary city and only makes the current rise in kidnappings even worse. Time and again I have commented that CCTV does nothing to prevent crime. All it does is increase surveillance. With the new Trump administration this is only made worse.	None. Nobody in the city wants this and we see your shady attempts to expand CCTV behind our backs.	Consider the rise in kidnappings that we've already seen. Conisder the decades of research that CCTV does nothing to reduce crime.

148	CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations. The only study SPD cites – a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” A study for the British Home Office examining 14 CCTV systems across the country similarly found that the cameras did not reduce crime or make people feel safer. A study of Dallas, TX found “[CCTV] cameras are likely not cost-effective in terms of increasing clearances” due to any increases in clearance rates being mostly limited to thefts. Research into burglaries in Thames Valley, UK found preserved video from CCTV cameras had no impact on whether or not burglaries were solved. No independent study has found Amazon Ring, one of the largest networks of CCTV cameras in the country, to have any impact on crime or clearance rates. Having a person constantly watch video from CCTV cameras will not magically improve outcomes of CCTV. Justice Department experiments have found “[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens is both boring and mesmerizing… This is particularly true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors.” CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties. Police have used camera networks to spy on “immigration protests.” There is no way to stop ICE from accessing CCTV footage. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE casually sharing surveillance data. And, cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases	These cameras will target the LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, and BIPOC Youth, the same people the Trump Administration is targeting. SPD asked for this expansion 3 weeks after their CCTV and RTCC cameras went live on May 20, 2025 showing SPD never intended for this surveillance to be a short-term “pilot.” SPD confirmed to Guy Oron that they have been providing “mutual aid” to ICE/Department of Homeland Security. Some of this “mutual aid” occurred while Interim Police Chief Shon Barnes was making the headline grabbing claim that he expects to go to jail because he won’t	None. I see no value in use of this technology.	The Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG)'s report on Closed Caption Television (CCTV) cameras and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) stated that “[a] majority of the working group is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies [CCTV and RTCC]” due to “[t]he amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions.” The CSWG’s role is to “[p]rovide to the Executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval." City leadership should not ignore the recommendations of the group responsible for assessing privacy, civil rights, and disparate impacts recommend for CCTV & RTCC.	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. These programs save money, research has shown every $1 invested saves $33. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community

of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. A cop in Texas has used a database of CCTV footage to search for someone that had an abortion. The cop was able to search CCTV footage from Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority for people seeking abortion healthcare. SPD officer abused surveillance to stalk a "hot" SPD employee. The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found "Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…" The University of Hull study also found "The young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for 'no obvious reason' and on the basis of categorical suspicion alone." In Washington, DC a police lieutenant was caught using police surveillance technology to blackmail gay men. CCTV camera operators have been caught using the cameras to spy on people. CCTV cameras open the door to expanding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), facial recognition, and a host of algorithms that "examine" how people are walking to determine if they're suspicious. People's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis and social anxiety disorder" when they know they are being surveilled.

Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see Cameras have been caught panning away from police cooperate with the Trump Administration. SPD and Mayor Harrell refuse to respond to questions from Hard Pressed about how many times ICE has asked for data sharing. SPD's claim that it is following the Keep Washington Working Act & Washington Shield Law is dubious. Standing up to Trump means not expanding surveillance!

investments. Investments restoring vacant land, the presence of street lighting, increasing public transportation, and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Maintaining green spaces has been proven to reduce violence. Green spaces reducing violence has been extensively researched. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes. Increasing access to healthcare

violence to avoid creating evidence of the police's actions. Police departments have been caught manipulating and "losing" CCTV footage. One of the most notorious instances was the Baltimore Police Department repeatedly releasing manipulated footage and "losing" footage related to the police killing of Freddie Gray.

decreases crime. Unfortunately, decreasing access to healthcare increases crime.

149	I am worried about my privacy	I do not want my actions to be surveilled.	I only see innocent citizens having their privacy taken away	Most immigrants and LGBTQ+ people are hardworking people that just want to live their lives. This technologly will wrongly target them.	Please do not adopt it.
150	My concern is that CCTV does not actually reduce crime and that I puts marginalized groups at risk. A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop.” The threat to civil liberties that CCTV will have is not worth it. There’s no way to prevent cops from handing footage over to ICE which would put immigrants at further risk. Cloud-based CCTV storage means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of CCTV footage including footage from police departments in Washington State. The University of Hull Department of Social Policy looking into who CCTV camera operators focused on found “Black people were between one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled…” So BIPOC communities will also be put at more risk. The danger CCTV poses to these communities is not worth that zero benefits they will have since they don’t actually reduce crime.				This technology will provide no benefit to people. What would have an actual impact on reducing crime would be to provide better social services to people who need them.

151	Three weeks is not sufficient time for a pilot program. There has been no time to collect data and analyze its effectiveness. We are currently in a huge budget shortfall. Adopting and expanding this program will add even more to Seattle's budget crisis. Green lighting this unproven program is budgetary bloat and fiscally irresponsible. CCTVs are an unnecessary surveillance technology. I do not want to be recorded by the nanny state. These expanded areas specifically target marginalized communities (BIPOC and queer people) and unhoused people. Bring back privacy.	None. They do not prevent crime.	Budget: This is not sensible. If you approve this program as permanent and fund it, you say you care more about a police surveillance program than sidewalks, parks, fire fighters, schools, libraries, etc.	
152	CCTV will not increase safety, but it will increase surveillance. It will waste funding that should go to true public safety measures like shelter beds, poverty reduction, and mental health services.	I see no value whatsoever.	We don't need flashy gadgets that have been proven to be ineffective at promoting a truly safe place for people to live. We know what increases safety: access to shelter, food, services, and education.	This would play into the Trump Administration's plans to surveil everyone and disappear political enemies. It would further degrade our civil liberties.

153	That more surveillance will lead to the further over policing of communities that have already suffered from over policing. That these recordings will be shared with ICE and other federal law enforcement that seek to target our city. And that it will lead to mistrust of the citizens of this city of their police force in a critical time where our relationship needs to be mended. This is not the way to mend that relationship.	I do not think this is the time to be instituting this technology. In fact I'm begging you to rethink this.		Please do not do this. I have lived in this city my whole life and worked in gun violence prevention work. This will not help us fight crime. This just adds to us being surveilled. Given what is happening in the world right now and the way the Federal government is ignoring and plowing over states rights and city rights I don't believe what would be captured on these recording would be secure.	This is a moment to make a good decision and not move towards more surveillance which will lead to more distrust from your citizens.
154	CCTV poses a threat to our civil liberties, especially our first amendment right of free speech, public protest, and public assembly. CCTV also harms by aiding in criminalizing people seeking abortions and gender-affirming healthcare. CCTV is a threat to women and survivors of sexual assault and stalking. CCTV harms immigrants by giving information directly to ICE, directly supporting the kidnapping of immigrants with no due process. Police control of CCTV cameras leads to censorship and selective punishment. CCTV creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all of our First and Fourth Amendment Rights. We should not expand CCTV!	I do not see any value in this technology. Real safety comes from community care, equitable access to resources, stable housing, food security, childcare, education, and jobs that pay a living wage.	No	I want City leadership to deeply examine the questions, "What is safety? Do I want safety for everyone?" I want City leadership truly listen to the voices of marginalized people and those standing up for them in the community and let those voices be a guide for what safety could look like instead of increased surveillance.	

155	It makes logistically possible the worst forms of authoritarianism as soon as the politics shift as they easily can and have already begun to do so, AND it makes more efficient (and thus easier and more likely) attempts to enforce bad policy that focuses on punishment rather than on compensating victims with progressive revenue and providing services to the people who make up the economic and social underclass		None, unless you count somethin g for politicians to brag about and pretend to have done somethin g good rather than what it actually is - worse than nothing	It's negative value because of the money wasted	The national politics of Immigration and Customs Enforcement gestapo deportations, the criminalization of abortion and trans healthcare, etc, AND the utter failure of carceral responses to even the crimes (safety related or not) that Seattle does have, AND the ease at which this can be hacked	Don't use it any of it. Remove the surveillance technology you alreay have.	It's not complicated. Just make a serious attempt at implementing progressive policy for once.
156	Trump and people like him can use it for all sorts of ills, also it puts us further down the road to wasting police time and court resources and jail resources on things that don't work rather than the services and victim-compensation that we know do.	It's a way to ignore the obvious and only answer. Punishmen t doesn't prevent crime. (Might work on white collar crime like wage theft). Ending poverty does. Progressive taxation will force the tech elite to decide whether to pay for the consequen ces of the problems they've caused or partially leave and stop causing those problems	None	It is too easy to be abused by governmen ts, it is too easy to be used "lawfully" but unethically to waste money traumatizin g people without improving constituent s lives, and it is too easy to hack because if it exists it will eventually be hacked	Don't	Your fake performative politics will not protect you - everyone can see that Seattle's problems are not being solved. Only progressive policy will actually be effective	Do not waste our money on this dangerous unhelpful crap.

157	This technology won't reduce crime and is ripe for abuse.	None	Investing in communities is the most effective way to decrease crime.

City of Seattle

2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems

Seattle Police Department

Overview

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security, and access controls for data that is gathered through Seattle Police Department's (SPD) Closed-Circuit Television Camera systems (CCTV). All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

1.0 Technology Description

The Seattle Police Department (SPD) proposes closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera systems to deter and detect criminal activity. CCTV camera systems contribute to averting harm to individuals and property and reducing crime by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations. The CCTV camera systems are proposed to be installed at locations where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime is concentrated. The cameras will face toward the street, sidewalk, and other public areas. Signs acknowledging use of the cameras will be posted. Privately-owned security systems will be able to share video streams of storefronts and areas where the public has access with SPD.

2.0 Purpose

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigations staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department.

The purpose of the CCTV program is to mitigate unprecedented patrol and investigations staffing shortages by leveraging evidence-based and industry-standard technologies to deter and detect persistent felony criminal behavior, gun violence, and human trafficking at specific places where crime is concentrated. The planned deployment areas are on Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, Chinatown-International District, the Stadium District, Garfield High School, the Capitol Hill Nightlife District, and the Downtown Commercial Core.

CCTV camera systems contribute to averting harm to individuals and property and reducing crime by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigations. For example, CCTVs could be used to review a firearms-related homicide to identify the suspect and provide information that would provide justice for the victims and remove deadly weapons from the street.

3.0 Data Collection and Use

Until data is extracted from the CCTV system's local storage, the data is temporarily stored on the device. Video may only be extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050. For most CCTV systems, the recordings are kept locally for 30 days, and not retained for a longer duration unless manually extracted by authorized personnel via the video management system software. Private, 3rd party video, if used, will be subject to the 30-day retention on SPD

storage, unless used as evidence for a criminal investigation.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

In order to minimize inadvertent collection of data, the CCTV cameras will only be placed to capture events in plain view in public areas where as a matter of law no reasonable expectation of privacy exists.

CCTV video recordings are automatically purged by the system after 30 days unless the footage holds evidentiary value related to criminal activity or assists in the pursuit of a criminal investigation.

Additionally, the CCTV camera systems will maintain a complete audit log of activities (including but not limited to personnel access and video extraction logs) and would be subject to an audit by the Office of Inspector General at any time.

5.0 Access & Security

Access

Only authorized SPD and OIG users can access the CCTV camera feed or the data while it resides on the devices. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

Access to video evidence is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

Data collected on 3rd party systems will be accessed by SPD personnel using the above guidelines, but will be owned by the 3rd party, unless taken into evidence.

Security

The data will be encrypted at rest (where it is stored) and in transit (either through vendor encryption or through VPN on the City network side) as it's being transmitted from the camera device to the storage system, server, or cloud. Per the Washington Secretary of State's Law Enforcement Records Retention Schedule, the required records retention period for surveillance video that does not involve a specific incident is "Retain for 30 days after last recording or until determined that no security incident has occurred, whichever is sooner, then Destroy."

Audits from the Office of Inspector General or other official auditors will be allowed as needed.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies.

Discrete pieces of data collected by CCTV cameras may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provide by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

7.0 Equity Concerns

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. The pilot portion of the program will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic

opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Seattle Police Department	Nick Zajchowski	Geoffrey Detweiler

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title:
AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems.

Summary and Background of the Legislation: The original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (Ordinance 127110) was adopted by the City Council on October 8, 2024. Subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance."

The CCTV pilot deployment areas authorized in the 2024 SIR were Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, and the Downtown Commercial Core. The material update adds the Stadium District, Garfield High School, and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District to the list of eligible CCTV deployment areas and clarifies the retention policy to 30 days after date of recording, or until determined that no security incident has occurred before being deleted.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ☐ **Yes** ☒ **No**

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City? ☒ **Yes** ☐ **No**

3.d. Other Impacts

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.

SPD was budgeted at $1.7 million for the Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot project to implement Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR), Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC), and Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV). The pilot locations for RTCC and CCTV are in the Chinatown-International District, Downtown Core, and Aurora Avenue North from 93rd to 130th. An additional $200,000 was added by the City Council to expand the Aurora

Avenue North installation southward to 85th and northward to 145th street. The annual maintenance and licensing costs are $40,000 for the pilot locations. An additional $425,000 is included in the 2025 budget to expand CCTV to the additional Garfield High School location. The 2026 FIFA World Cup budget proposal includes a $200,000 budget request to expand CCTV to the Stadium District location. The proposed Capitol Hill Nightlife District CCTV expansion does not have funding currently identified, but preliminary cost estimates are $400,000 one-time and $35,000 for annual maintenance and licensing. The annual maintenance and licensing costs are $40,000 for the Garfield High School location and $20,000 for the Stadium District location. The use of CCTV may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the CCTV and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.

There are expected to be impacts in the form of efficiencies in deploying patrol officers and assisting with investigations. These impacts will be explored as part of the planned evaluation of the pilot.

Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.
N/A

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?
No.

b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?
No.

c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?
No.

d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.

i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.
The original 2024 Surveillance Impact Report as required by the Surveillance Ordinance includes a Racial Equity Toolkit.

ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.
N/A

iii. What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?
The SIR documents were translated into the recommend languages and were posted online.

e. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.
No.

ii. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.
No.

f. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?
The pilot will be evaluated under a Continuous Impact Assessment framework. Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of year two.

g. Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?
No.

5. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments: None.

Lauren Henry
Full Council
September 9, 2025
D1

Amendment A to CB 121052 Material Update to CCTV Policies

Sponsor: Councilmembers Kettle

Co-Sponsor: Councilmember Rinck

Civil Immigration Use Results in CCTV Program Pause

Effect: While the City cooperates with federal immigration authorities in criminal matters, it does not do so in civil immigration matters except as required by law. The City is deploying the CCTV camera system program to address and improve our public safety posture. The City has stated that its CCTV camera systems data is not to be used in a federal civil immigration context and that it will oppose such use. This amendment is intended to address any future circumstance in which, despite our efforts, Seattle CCTV data is demanded by or released to federal authorities for a civil immigration matter. In this instance, SPD would pause the CCTV program in order for the City to consider its legal options and the policy choices underpinning the CCTV program.

This amendment authorizes a 60-day pause of the CCTV camera systems in the following circumstances: (1) the City or its vendor receives a warrant, subpoena, or court order for Seattle CCTV data in a federal civil immigration enforcement matter; or (2) the City or its vendor releases Seattle CCTV data for use in a federal civil immigration enforcement matter.

Upon notice of the CCTV camera system pause, the Council may consider passing an ordinance to extend the pause or end the CCTV program to prevent unwanted access to Seattle's protected surveillance data by federal officials for civil immigration enforcement purposes.

Amend CB 121052 to create a new Section 3 and renumber subsequent sections as follows:

Section 3. If the City or its vendor receives a warrant, subpoena, or court order for Seattle CCTV data in a federal civil immigration enforcement matter, or when required by law releases Seattle CCTV data for use in a federal civil immigration enforcement matter, SPD shall immediately pause use of the CCTV camera systems for 60 calendar days. Within two business days of the CCTV camera systems pause, SPD will report to the Council the circumstances that triggered the pause and the date that the CCTV camera systems use will resume. Upon receiving

the report, the Council may by ordinance extend the pause or end the CCTV program to prevent third parties from accessing Seattle's protected surveillance data.

DOSS
Full Council
September 9, 2025
D2

Amendment B to CB 121052 Material Update to RTCC Policies

Sponsor: Councilmember Rinck

Evaluation Requirements

Effect: This amendment would require the Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) to ensure that any evaluation plan of the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) pilot projects examines the following five components:

1. Examination of impacts on calls for service, police actions, and criminal incidents;
2. Examination of impacts on individuals involved police actions, criminal incidents, and cases assisted by the RTCC;
3. Examination of impacts on case clearance and investigative outcomes;
4. Process analysis of RTCC implementation and operations; and
5. Exploration of community perceptions.

Additionally, the evaluation plan should incorporate a methodology that utilizes control group areas and a quasi-experimental design to determine if CCTV, when used in combination with the RTCC, is associated with a reduction in violent crime, human trafficking or persistent felony crime.

If the evaluation does not show that use of CCTV is associated with a reduction in any or all of these things, then the Executive would need to consider, in compliance with the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) policies, discontinuing the pilot project.

This amendment would also attach to the ordinance the following documents:

1. 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.
2. 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Background: OIG staff have provided to Central Staff a draft of an evaluation plan that has been created by the University of Pennsylvania's (UPenn) Crime and Justice Policy Lab. This plan will likely serve as the basis for a contract that is currently under development.

The evaluation plan incorporates all of the above components, including a methodology that utilizes control group areas and a quasi-experimental design to determine if CCTV, when used in combination with the RTCC, is associated with a reduction in criminal activities.

UPenn researchers have reviewed this amendment and have indicated that it is consistent with the current evaluation plan. Additionally, this amendment will not limit their ability to incorporate additional evaluative components in the final contract, if desired.

1. Add a new Section 3 as follows and renumber subsequent sections:

Section 3. The Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) shall ensure that any evaluation plan of the CCTV and RTCC pilot projects examines the following five components:

A. Impacts on calls for service, police actions, and criminal incidents;

B. Impacts on individuals involved police actions, criminal incidents, and cases assisted by the RTCC;

C. Impacts on case clearance and investigative outcomes;

D. Process analysis of RTCC implementation and operations; and

E. Exploration of community perceptions.

Additionally, the evaluation plan shall reflect a methodology that utilizes control group areas and a quasi-experimental design to determine if CCTV, when used in combination with the RTCC, is associated with a reduction in violent crime, human trafficking, or persistent felony crime. If the evaluation does not show that CCTV is associated with a reduction in any or all of them, then the Executive shall, in compliance with the SIR policies in Section 1.1 and 2.2, consider discontinuing the pilot project.

2. Attach the following documents to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Attachment 1– 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.

Attachment 2 – 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Seattle
Office for Civil Rights

Policy Briefing Memo

Date: August 28, 2025
To: Councilmember Alexis Mercedes Rinck
From: Director Derrick Wheeler-Smith, Dr. Hajer Al-Faham, Ph.D.[1]
Subject: Council Bill (CB) 121052 and Council Bill (CB) 121053

PURPOSE

The purpose of this memo is to review the core provisions of Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 for the effectiveness of proposed surveillance technologies and the implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. The Seattle Office for Civil Rights (SOCR) safeguards civil rights and promotes equal opportunity by enforcing anti-discrimination laws, leading civil rights research and policy development, and advancing civic engagement and equity across the City of Seattle.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 propose expanding the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) piloted use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) surveillance technologies.[2] CB 121052 would expand SPD's placement of CCTV cameras into new areas of the city, while CB 121053 would authorize the integration of footage from the Seattle Department of Transportation's (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras into SPD's RTCC.[3] SOCR previously analyzed the proposed pilots of these technologies in 2024. The pilots were authorized by CB 120844 and CB 120845 in 2024, and any expansion of these pilots is subject to the requirements of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance 125376. This ordinance states that surveillance technologies should be carefully evaluated to balance potential criminal legal system benefits with strong protections for civil rights and liberties and safeguards against disparate impacts on racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities.[4]

Based on our analysis of scientific research evidence and the broader implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity, SOCR advises against the adoption of CB 121052 and CB 121053. Research has not demonstrated that surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," or "gun violence and human trafficking." The categories of crime these tools are said to address are described inconsistently and ambiguously in the proposed bills, 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs).[5] In contrast, a significant literature in law as well as the social and behavioral sciences shows that surveillance technologies can discourage civic engagement, weaken constitutional protections, and reinforce inequitable

[1] Excellent research support was provided by Jaclyn Tsiang, Damon Agnos, and Daisy Jaimez.
[2] CCTV consists of cameras placed in public to both record and provide a constant live feed to SPD. RTCC is software that enables SPD to collect all its information streams (e.g. CCTV feeds, dispatch and officer location info, 911 calls, Automated License Plate Reader data, records management systems) into one program.
[3] The 2024 legislation limited the deployment of CCTV cameras to locations in the Crime Prevention Technology pilot project: Aurora Avenue North, downtown in areas along and adjacent to the Third Avenue corridor, and the Chinatown International District. The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added under the 2025 legislation are the Stadium District, the area around Garfield High School, and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District. While the 2024 legislation approved the integration of the CCTV cameras data into SPD's RTCC, the proposed 2025 legislation seeks approval to integrate surveillance data from SDOT's traffic management cameras.
[4] To help encourage transparency and accountability, this ordinance not only requires Seattle City Council oversight but also the preparation of a Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) by any city department seeking to acquire and deploy surveillance technology. The full set of expectations established for an SIR are outlined in Ordinance 125376.
[5] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.

patterns of policing, monitoring, and enforcement.[6] These harms disproportionately affect communities that are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+.[7] SOCR's concerns are heightened by the national context, where local surveillance infrastructures that were originally justified in the name of safety, are leveraged by federal agencies in ways that undermine local autonomy, civil rights and liberties, and equity.[8]

Rather than expanding unproven surveillance technologies, SOCR recommends a five-part strategy that includes investing in community-based alternatives and service providers to work alongside SPD and mitigate capacity challenges; robust community engagement that includes revitalizing the Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG) to support public awareness of the risks, costs, and scope of surveillance technologies; narrowing CCTV usage and data retention to specified felony crimes; collaborative oversight and evaluation by SOCR and scholars without conflicts of interest; and mandating that pilots are defined by clear goals, terminology, and measurable outcomes.[9]

RESEARCH FINDINGS: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY & EFFICACY

As described by SPD in the Executive Overviews and SIRs, the purpose of investing in CCTV and RTCC technologies is to offset police operational issues (e.g., limited staff capacity) and enhance police effectiveness (e.g., reduction in 911 calls, improved police response times, crime clearance rates, community satisfaction) by reducing the interchangeably referenced "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[10] While the materials submitted by SPD state that efforts to prevent serious felony crimes have been unsuccessful, SPD's dashboard indicates violent crime citywide has dropped by 17% in 2025 compared to 2022, shootings are down 36%, and homicides are down 48%.[11] SPD's dashboard also indicates violent crime in the three areas identified for CCTV expansion has declined by 21% since 2022, calling into question the necessity of expanding surveillance.[12]

Reliance on surveillance technologies, in particular CCTV, warrants careful evaluation. While CCTV collects and generates large volumes of data, this data cannot be equated with improvements in staffing capacity, community trust, or public safety.[13] SPD identifies staffing capacity shortages as the central operational issue for safety and police effectiveness. However, surveillance technologies will not resolve this issue. As recently as 2020, SPD acknowledged that "up to 45% of SPD patrol service hours do not require an officer" and that there are "multiple

[6] Michener 2013, Shamas and Arastu 2013, Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Brayne 2017, Soss and Weaver 2017, Eubanks 2018, Arnett 2020, Moy 2021.
[7] Michener and Ford 2023 (racism, surveillance, and racialized policing), Gaynor and Blessett 2021 and Girardi 2021 (policing and 2SLGBTQ+ communities), Morgan 2021 and Thompson 2021 (disabled communities and policing).
[8] Examples are numerous and include President Trump's deployment of National Guard troops to Los Angeles as well as his previous deployment of Department of Homeland Security agents to interrogate Portland #BlackLivesMatter protesters.
[9] On the CSWG's website, it appears that the last meeting occurred in April 2025. The Surveillance Ordinance tasks the CSWG with providing a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that reviews any impacts on civil rights and liberties as well as disparate consequences for communities of color and marginalized communities. The CSWG authored a thorough assessment for the initial 2024 SIR on the CCTV and RTCC technologies. See Seattle Municipal Code 14.18.080 and this article by René J. Peters Jr., who served on the CSWG. As for the recommendation to partner with scholars, some of the most respected researchers include Dr. Ruha Benjamin, Ph.D., Tracey L. Meares, J.D., Dr. Joe Soss, Ph.D., Dr. Vesla Weaver, Ph.D., Dr. Amy Lerman, Ph.D., Dr. Spencer Piston, Ph.D., Dr. Monica C. Bell, Ph.D./J.D.
[10] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.
[11] Crime data was analyzed for January – August 2025 and compared against the same timeframe in 2022, when violent crime hit a 30-year peak. Data was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard on September 2nd, 2025.
[12] The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added are the Stadium District (K2), the area around Garfield High School (G2) and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District (E3). Data on violent crime was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard and analyzed using geographic boundaries of the corresponding Seattle Police Beats.
[13] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.

areas of service that would be better responded to by parties other than a sworn officer."[14] Given this data, the most appropriate response to mitigating operational issues of staffing is to establish greater role clarity. Police should focus on duties aligned with their training while behavioral health specialists, social workers, and service providers should respond to issues related to health crises, displacement and homelessness, and poverty. Realigning responsibilities would directly strengthen SPD's operational capacity and effectiveness.

Scientific and peer-reviewed research further underscore the limits of CCTV and RTCCs. The peer-reviewed literature in law, social science, and behavioral science does not support claims that these surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking.[15] The most persistent finding is that the evidence is, at best, inconclusive.[16] For example, criminologists evaluated 40 years of evidence and found that CCTV may reduce parking lot crime when this technology is supplemented by security guards, signage, and improvements in visibility by way of lighting.[17] Crucially, these scholars emphasize CCTV's measurable impact is limited to vehicle and property crimes, with modest overall effects and no significant reduction in violent crime.

Further, the scientific and peer-reviewed evidence on RTCCs remains limited. Researchers note that "little is known about their efficacy," and there are no nationally representative studies to date.[18] Of the limited peer-reviewed evaluations conducted, the findings suggest that effectiveness depends heavily on the presence of skilled analysts, efficient workflows, strong detective training, robust police-community trust and relationships, and strong forensic support staff.[19] In other words, RTCCs do not solve staffing capacity issues and may worsen these issues by adding new technical demands. Moreover, even when RTCCs function with this fleet of support, the benefits of the technology are retrospective: RTCCs may support investigations and case clearance, particularly for property crimes, but there is no established causal relationship between RTCCs and reduction in "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[20] Given the above, SOCR concludes that investing in role alignment and community relationships are more effective pathways to safety than expanding surveillance technologies that are resource-intensive, misaligned with SPD's stated operational challenges, and not backed by evidence.

COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE: CIVIL LIBERTIES, RIGHTS, AND EQUITY

A substantial body of scientific and peer-reviewed research documents the far-reaching costs of surveillance, particularly for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. These costs include legal estrangement, diminished civic

[14] The 2020 data is the most recent that we have been able to access, see SPD Budget Change Decision Points.
[15] The effectiveness of these technologies must be demonstrated with rigorous experimental research methods that rule out confounding variables. In criminology specifically, randomized controlled experiments are the gold standard for evaluating the causal effects of criminal legal system technologies, programs, and practices. However, as Piza et al. 2019 notes, "randomized controlled experiments are a rarity in the study of CCTV."
[16] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.
[17] SPD's 2025 SIR for CCTV also cites this study but neglects to present its findings in the same qualified manner as the authors. For example, the authors state "of particular salience is the continued need for CCTV to be narrowly targeted on vehicle crimes and property crimes" and they specify that the "16% reduction in crime" is statistically significant but modest overall because this finding was driven by a "51% reduction in crime in the car park schemes with CCTV in other settings have small and non-significant effects on crime." It is noteworthy that this research article examines CCTV globally and this further suggests the tenuous link between the installation of surveillance technologies and the deterrence of crime. As the authors write in their analysis of the data, "CCTV was associated with significant reductions in vehicle crime and property crime in general, with no significant effects observed for violent crime."
[18] Arietti 2024.
[19] Przeszlowski et al. 2023, Hollywood et al. 2019, Braga and Dusseault 2016, Carter and Carter 2015, Brunson and Wade 2019.
[20] Arietti 2024 and Przeszlowski et al. 2023 observe that use of surveillance technologies "may not be the most beneficial way forward for incidents involving violence" particularly against women or populations that tend to experience disproportionate gendered violence (e.g., murder, rape, and human trafficking).

engagement, adverse health, barriers to employment and suppressed wage growth, obstacles to accessing vital social services, disruption of family and community connections, and the erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties.[21] Beyond these harms, surveillance deployed by police communicates powerful societal messages, teaching "lessons on who is a citizen deserving of fairness and justice and who constitutes a group of dangerous *others* deserving of severe punishment, monitoring, and virtual branding."[22]

For communities who are overrepresented in police stops, arrests, and use-of-force incidents, living under conditions of surveillance technology intensifies the stigma and harms of criminalization.[23] Consider, for example, the proposed addition of CCTV around Garfield High School. These cameras may send a clear signal to young people in the area, particularly given SPD's documented racial disparities in use-of-force against Black youth, that they are suspects rather than community members.[24] SOCR is similarly concerned about the potential of surveillance technologies to discourage individuals who are low-income, unhoused, or disabled from seeking essential services. Moreover, the harms extend beyond individuals as entire neighborhoods will be marked as dangerous zones that need to be policed and surveilled closely.[25] It is worth considering the impact this will have on 2SLGBTQ+ communities in Capitol Hill, who are already contending with heightened exclusion locally and nationally.[26] The stigma produced by expanded surveillance technologies will compound economic disinvestment, reinforce segregation, and increase distrust between communities and local government.[27]

In addition to weighing racial and socioeconomic inequities, it is important to consider how these technologies will affect civil rights and liberties. CCTV and RTCC technologies are not neutral instruments, as they carry direct consequences for equal protection, privacy, and the freedoms of speech and association. When these surveillance systems are disproportionately deployed in neighborhoods where communities who are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ live, work, and gather, the result is a policy feedback loop that stigmatizes these communities as "concentrated crime" areas.[28] This outcome, in which racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities are subject to far greater surveillance than predominately White or affluent communities, raises serious civil rights and liberties concerns.

Specifically, the disparate monitoring and surveillance of some people but not others may constitute a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. CCTV and RTCC infrastructure also risk undermining privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and/or Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, as

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[21] Bell 2017 (legal estrangement), Michener 2013 (diminished civic engagement), Theall et al. 2022 and Sewell et al. 2016 (adverse health effects), Asad 2023 (barriers to employment and suppressed earnings), Madden et al. 2017 (obstacles to accessing vital social services), Roberts 2012 (disruption of family and community connections), Shamas and Arastu 2013 (erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties). Additionally, legal scholars have identified four specific ways that surveillance technologies exacerbate inequity: it perpetuates and obscures inequities in policing, relocates disparities from other domains to law enforcement, amplifies the harms of inequitable policing, and undermines efforts to monitor and address these injustices. Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Eubanks 2018, Moy 2021.

[22] Soss and Weaver 2017.

[23] Lerman and Weaver 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Gaynor 2018 , Boddie 2022.

[24] The Science of Justice: Seattle Police Department is a 2021 report on SPD use of force that identified the greatest racial disparities among young people ages 15 – 21. Of 563 incidents involving SPD use of force between 2014 – 2019, an overwhelming 59% of young people were Black American.

[25] Spatial analysis data indicates that the current and proposed CCTV cameras cover areas where Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ communities tend to live, work, and congregate. These areas are in census tracts made up of populations who are on average 49% people of color, 26% making an income below 200% of the poverty level, and 17% living with a disability. See Seattle's Race and Social Equity Index. Additionally, the current and proposed camera locations are concentrated on arterial streets where vulnerable populations are more likely to be present because they rent, use transit, or lack private public space for rest and recreation.

[26] Examples of this exclusion include a spate of executive orders targeting Trans people, book bans targeting LGBTQ representation, bias incidents against individuals and businesses/community spaces, prohibitions on gender-affirming care, and, most recently, a US Senator declaring that a CDC official should have been disqualified from government service because of his "lifestyle."

[27] Capers 2011, Justice and Meares 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017.

[28] See 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV.

these technologies systematically collect, store, and interconnect vast amounts of sensitive information about the everyday lives of people in Seattle.[29] Further, the knowledge that people's activities are continuously monitored and tracked by law enforcement will have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights to speech and association. It is crucial to underscore these concerns amid the broader national context of alarming federal overreach. Currently, the federal official appointed by the Trump Administration as the District of Columbia's "emergency police commissioner" can access that city's RTCC infrastructure for "federal purposes."[30] Any proposal to rely on law or the judiciary to constrain federal authorities must also account for the Administration's extraordinary success rate at the United States Supreme Court.[31] Cumulatively, these risks require careful assessment, oversight, and safeguards before further deployment of surveillance technologies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CB 121052 and CB 121053 would significantly expand surveillance technologies that remain in pilot stages and pose serious civil rights, civil liberties, and equity implications. SOCR offers the following community-centered recommendations for promoting safety, transparency, racial and socioeconomic equity, and the protection of civil rights and liberties:

- Prioritize community-based alternatives and social service provision.
    - Evidence shows that investments in community organizations and relationships can reduce crime more effectively than unproven surveillance technologies.[32]
    - Cities like Nashville, Austin, and Denver have chosen to move away from similar surveillance technologies due to the risk of federal co-opting of data and the undercutting of essential civil rights and liberties.[33]
    - Invest in recruiting and retaining service providers, behavioral health specialists, and social workers to reduce reliance on police for non-criminal and crisis-related issues.[34] This will not only mitigate the root causes of harm but also support police operational capacity by allowing officers to focus on issues that align with their skills and training.[35]

- Institute pilots with conceptual clarity and precise provisions tied to measurable outcomes.
    - Pilots must be grounded in consistent and precise terminology to allow for fair evaluation. Currently, the terms in CB 121052 and CB 121053, the 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 SIRs are used ambiguously and interchangeably. They range from "persistent felony crimes" to "serious and violent crimes" to "other persistent crimes" to "gun violence and human trafficking." Without conceptual clarity, evaluation becomes arbitrary, and accountability is impossible.

[29] United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
[30] Davidson 2025.
[31] Sheth and Whisnant 2025.
[32] Ramey and Shrider 2014's research analyzing the City of Seattle's Neighborhood Matching Fund identified significant reductions in violent crime as a result of the program. Other research has shown that the presence of libraries and the increase in library operating hours reduces crime rates (including homicides and aggravated assaults). Neto et al. 2021.
[33] Nashville voted against implementing a similar Real-Time Crime Center in 2024, citing concerns about privacy and potential federal misuse of footage. In May and June 2025, Austin and Denver paused their automated license plate reader contracts amid immigration-related privacy concerns. Other jurisdictions, including Oakland, CA, and Somerville, MA, have also passed similar ordinances.
[34] Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street (CAHOOTS), an alternative response program in Eugene, OR, that ran from 1989 to 2025, spurred similar pilot programs in other cities. Bell 2021. Similarly, in 2020, the City of Albuquerque created the Albuquerque Community Safety department which includes "trained professionals such as social workers, housing and homelessness specialists, violence prevention and diversion program experts."
[35] Continued investment in and more autonomy for Seattle's Community Assisted Response and Engagement (CARE) department will further support the ability "to safely assist community members in need and free up scarce police resources for higher priority calls."

  - Continuation and/or expansion of any pilot should depend on data and evaluation.
  - A concrete timeline and exit strategy must be in place to ensure technologies are discontinued if they fail to achieve defined goals.

- Limit CCTV use and data retention to protect civil rights and liberties.
  - Footage should be restricted to investigating serious violent offenses as defined in the RCW.
  - Data retention should be capped at 7-14 days to protect the people of Seattle, especially those who are exceptionally vulnerable such as individuals seeking gender-affirming care, reproductive care, housing services and resources, or immigration support.[36]
  - Use of data should be transparently reported not only to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Police Accountability (OPA) but also to SOCR, the CSWG, and the public.

- Ensure robust community engagement before, during, and after any surveillance adoption.
  - The technologies under consideration are complex, interconnected, and linked to other surveillance methods such as Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). The current City of Seattle publicly accessible materials on these technologies do not adequately explain the risks, costs, or potential scope.
  - The people of Seattle deserve clarity on what information can be recorded, how it may be aggregated, and the full range of possible uses. They also deserve clarity on how the City plans to protect data from federal overreach. This could include destruction of data when federal overreach appears likely.
  - Reports on data usage and access should be publicly accessible, written in plain language, and provided and updated monthly.[37]
  - While limited engagement occurred around gun violence prevention near the Garfield High School area, broader and more inclusive consultation is needed. This is especially true with residents, service providers, and others who frequent the areas affected.
  - Feedback should be gathered widely and assessed if additional surveillance changes the willingness of people to exercise their rights, access public places, and seek services and resources.

- Establish mandatory oversight and independent evaluation.
  - Any material updates should undergo the full Surveillance Impact Report Review process, including meaningful public awareness and engagement, application of the Racial Equity Toolkit, and review by the CSWG. Strengthening the CSWG and oversight generally by identifying best practices in other cities should also be explored.[38]
  - Pilot evaluations should be conducted by SOCR in collaboration with research scholars who have demonstrated expertise in technology, civil rights and liberties, and racial and socioeconomic equity.

[36] The CSWG recommended limiting data retention of CCTV recordings to 14 days in their Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment on CCTV and RTCC. Given increased federal data seizures, SPD should consider limiting data retention even further.
[37] See the City of Seattle's Executive Order, "Making Information Inclusive in Writing and Design." Examples of data that should be made available include: a map of where cameras are located; how many active cameras, both public and privately owned, are registered, integrated, or connected to the RTCC; make and model information of all cameras; how many individuals have access to data; information on RTCC searches not connected to an investigation; and external requests for footage access.
[38] The Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission might provide a valuable example.

Seattle
Community
Police Commission

September 4, 2025

VIA EMAIL

Dear Councilmembers,

We are writing to ask the City Council to vote against any expansion of surveillance pursuant to the CCTV and RTCC programs (Surveillance Pilot).[1] Expansion of these programs is currently scheduled for vote at City Council on September 9, 2025. We are strongly opposed to the expansion of surveillance technology while critical issues regarding privacy and civil rights remain unaddressed.

Community members are overwhelmingly against expansion. An immediate and consistent concern raised by community– and acknowledged, though not addressed, by the City Council – is the growing risk of actors outside the City misusing surveillance information against the Seattle community. By expanding, the City is breaching its commitment to scrutinize the surveillance: whether it works and its impact on civil rights during a two-year pilot before continuation or expansion.[2] Now, in the middle of the Surveillance Pilot, we lack that information necessary to weigh the risks.

Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion at this time, we recommend engaging more community perspective and convening an Executive Session to discuss the consequences and legal implications related to data sharing with federal agencies hostile to Washington laws that ensure gender affirming care, abortion, and immigration protections.

A. Premature Surveillance Expansion Increases Mistrust of the City and SPD

We lack the data and evidence necessary to evaluate the risks of infringement on civil rights and privacy and if the Surveillance Pilot is achieving its intended goals. Concerns raised by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group have not been addressed, and only one year into the Pilot, the two-year evaluation has not yet occurred. This information is necessary to address community concerns before expansion.

1. The City Has Not Fulfilled Its Promises to Listen to And Protect Community, Which Overwhelmingly Opposes Surveillance

Community members and community organizations remain opposed to the Surveillance Pilot. In August 2024, when the Pilot was proposed, dozens of residents spoke out in opposition, and numerous Civil Rights organizations—including the ACLU of Washington, OneAmerica, 350

Seattle, Chief Seattle Club, El Centro de la Raza, Gender Justice League, Massage Parlor Outreach Project, Planned Parenthood Alliance Advocates, and WA People's Privacy—urged Council to reject it.[3]

The City's own Community Surveillance Working Group, who conducted a Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for CCTV and RTCC, reviewed the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and letters from community organizations and public comments to conclude:

> "After reviewing the information, a majority of the working group ***is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies*** as described in the SIRs. ***The amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions both warrant pause on pilot deployment***…. This sentiment reflects the ***high degree of apprehension expressed by a vast majority of the public's comments[,] regarding the potential misuse*** of these technologies. These comments were overwhelmingly negative and voiced a ***serious concern and lack of trust*** within the community as a whole[.] [T]he working group believes that going forward with these acquisitions ***may serve to further erode*** with a significant portion ***the public's trust in SPD and negatively affect community relations***."[4]

At the August 12, 2025, Public Safety meeting, every community member offering public comment opposed expansion of the Surveillance Pilot. One speaker summarized the impact on our most vulnerable communities: "If we move all this data to a third-party cloud, we risk handing it over to ICE and anti-abortion states making it easier to target immigrants, women, trans people, and activists." Another explained how surveillance data is already being misused: "the President is liable to take over municipal police departments, this legislation would allow the police and whoever controls them more ability to target whoever they want...ICE is already using surveillance data like this....SPD itself has a history of biased enforcement....Council should reject all legislation that expands surveillance."

Community members also have significant concerns about the location of two of the three expansion areas to the Central District (Seattle's historically Black neighborhood, and Capitol Hill (Seattle's 2SLGBTQIA+ neighborhood, home to Cal Andersen park, home to several protests resulting in audit reviews of SPD response to protests during BLM protests and most recently, SPD's response to 2SLGBTQIA+ community protesters on May 24, 2025). Public comment from a member of Central District raised concerns about "erosion of our civil rights" and the "disparate impact on minority youth." A queer Capitol Hill resident "who's everyday life will be documented by these cameras" summarized the consequences: "good governance depends on policy data.... Expanding the program without waiting for information is a huge gamble of precious City resources.... When councilmembers wipe away the testimony of hundreds of people who've expressed their opposition...it frays the fabric of our civil society and democracy itself." These neighborhoods are home to communities that continue to be subjects of

significant police action and over policing, expanding surveillance compounds disproportionate impact.

2. Surveillance Expansion Has a Disproportionate Impact on the Civil Rights of Communities of Color

Surveillance technologies have a disparate impact on communities of color. In 2024, Seattle's Community Surveillance Working Group warned that the Surveillance Pilot could disproportionately harm communities of color, both through built-in bias in the technology itself and through increasing exposure to law enforcement and the criminal legal system.[5] We have already seen that biased impact in Seattle. Most recently, in Wallingford, where CCTV footage was used to wrongly identify and arrest an Asian man for arson and murder. He was interrogated for hours and jailed for a month; despite having a different name and offering his own in-house technology to prove he was home at the time of the crime.[6] Additionally, during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, the FBI and SPD surveilled protesters observing First Amendment rights without public knowledge or oversight, at the expense of residents' privacy and civil liberties.[7]

3. Oversight Recommendations Have Not Been Addressed

When the pilot was first proposed, the CPC recognized support for a "time-limited and location-limited pilot" so long as it included "continued community engagement and feedback from the community[,]" "determinations of metrics measurements before implementing any new use of these technologies[,]" and a two year period of time that would include an additional Surveillance Impact Report process to be repeated "before the program is made permanent **or expanded**." The CPC made clear the importance of community engagement and feedback and of the significance of data and oversight that was to be provided by the Office of the Inspector General.[8]

There remain unaddressed and outstanding recommendations regarding surveillance by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group intended to address the implications this surveillance has on our constitutional rights and civil liberties.[9] Some of these recommendations have been outstanding since 2019 (regarding the collection and recording First Amendment protests during BLM).[10] OIG's latest surveillance report addresses the need for protection of this data regarding third parties and notes that digital recordings marked for Evidence.com are stored indefinitely.

4. Risk of Misuse of Surveillance Data by the Federal Administration and Outside Actors

We are at an unprecedented time when the Trump Administration is undermining the sovereignty of state and local jurisdictions and targeting sanctuary cities, including Seattle. The Administration has intent to assert control of local law enforcement and local agencies in

sanctuary cities. They first issued executive orders in April, [11] then in June, they deployed the National Guard in L.A.[12] Just this month they announced a takeover of law enforcement in Washington, D.C., through deployment of the National Guard, declaring an emergency to address "out-of-control" violent crime, and deploying federal law enforcement and immigration agents through the City. [13] They have made clear their intentions to do so in other cities, most recently Chicago.[14] They recently sent a letter to Washington State and the City of Seattle demanding an end to "sanctuary jurisdiction" policies that limit police cooperation with ICE.[15] Now is not the time to expand surveillance that could be used by the Administration against our community members.

Equally concerning, yet less understood, are interoperable databases and third-party agreements, which often have the unintended consequence of violating civil rights.[16] Several sources have confirmed that ICE is using ALPR[17] and facial recognition data to track immigrants with local law enforcement agencies, some in sanctuary cities, often obtained informally and in violation of state and privacy laws.[18] Local surveillance information is also vulnerable to misuse through Fusion Centers, [19] and other interoperable databases, where the Administration has access to ALPR and facial recognition, allowing ICE to sidestep sanctuary city laws.[20] The Washington State Fusion Center "facilitate[s] information sharing" between local law enforcement and homeland security partners.[21] It serves as a "virtual network" where state, local, federal, and even private stakeholders share surveillance and law enforcement data. DHS officials work directly alongside SPD, WSP, and King County officers within Washington's Fusion Center. [22] Expanding surveillance in Seattle would only broaden the data available to ICE through this system.

We understand that SPD's immigration policy states: *"Employees will not initiate, maintain, or participate in any police action based on an individual's immigration status."* We trust SPD officers to comply with all applicable laws, but working side by side with federal agents at the Washington Fusion Center puts SPD officers in a difficult position. SPD officers might feel compelled to provide surveillance data, if requested, for any broadly defined "criminal" investigation by the current Administration. And failure to do so could result in increased scrutiny by the Administration.

5. **The Consent Decree Has Terminated, Community Trust and Oversight is Paramount**

We are urging City Council to reject expansion of the Surveillance Pilot at this time. Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion, we strongly recommend engaging community perspectives and convening an Executive Session to examine the potential consequences and legal implications of data collection and sharing under a hostile federal Administration.

The expansion of surveillance that lacks data establishing its efficacy, in the face of community opposition, and when doing so exposes the Seattle community to federal overreach and further misuse of private information will only sow further mistrust of City government and SPD. The City just emerged from federal oversight of SPD, this is the time to listen to and prioritize community voice in public safety and policing – voices asking for investments in housing, behavioral health, and community-based safety programs, not through expansion of untested surveillance prone to misuse and subject to harming communities most impacted by policing.

Sincerely,

Police Practices Workgroup
Community Police Commission

Cc:
All City Councilmembers
Mayor Bruce Harrell
Deputy Mayor Tim Burgess

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[1] This letter issues from the PPWG, a working group of the CPC. The CPC's regularly scheduled September meeting will not take place due to the scheduling conflict with the September 3, 2025, hearing on the Consent Decree at the Western District of Washington.
[2] 2024 CCTV Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 CCTV SIR FINAL.pdf; 2024 RTCC Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 RTCC SIR FINAL.pdf
[3] Harrell's Expanded Surveillance Program Clears Hurdle in Seattle Council » The Urbanist
[4] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[5] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[6] KUOW - Seattle man says dropped murder, arson charges against him were result of 'racist misidentification'
[7] FBI and SPD infiltrated Seattle 2020 protests, used informants and surveillance | May 28–June 3, 2025 | Real Change
[8] CPC Official Statement on SPD's Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Program, dated March 21, 2024. https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/CommunityPoliceCommission/Press%20Releases/2024/CPC%20Statement%2003.21.24%20SPD%20technology.pdf
[9] Office of the Inspector General's Consolidated Risk Surveillance Usage Review 2024, dated June 6, 2025 https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/OIG_Surveillance_Consolidated2024.pdf
[10] Follow-up Audit of SPD Compliance with Chapter 14.12 of Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/2023_Chapter_14.12_Audit.pdf
[11] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/protecting-american-communities-from-criminal-aliens/ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/02/2025-07790/strengthening-and-unleashing-americas-law-enforcement-to-pursue-criminals-and-protect-innocent
[12] Trump deploys California National Guard to LA to quell protests despite the governor's objections | The Seattle Times
[13] Trump's order to deploy troops in DC is his latest use of the National Guard in cities | The Seattle Times

[14] https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/26/politics/trump-national-guard-us-cities
[15] KUOW - As DOJ threatens WA over sanctuary laws, state officials double down on protections
[16] License Plate Readers Proliferate in Washington, Bringing Concerns over ICE Overreach, The Urbanist https://www.theurbanist.org/2025/06/19/license-plate-readers-proliferate-in-washington-ice-overreach/ (Reporting that that data collected by Flock Safety ALPRs, relied upon by the King County Housing Authority (KCHA), was recently shared with ICE and DHS. Authorities in Texas conducted a nationwide search of more than 83,000 ALPR cameras for a woman accessing abortion; the internal audit showed KCHA's data was searched).
[17] Who's Watching Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to Immigrant and Reproductive Rights in Washington State, https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/
[18] Immigration Police Can Already Sidestep US Sanctuary City Laws Using Data-Sharing Fusion Centers | WIRED https://www.wired.com/story/ice-sanctuary-cities-fusion-centers/ ; See also, ICE Outlines How Investigators Rely on Third-Party Facial Recognition services https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/06/ice-outlines-how-investigators-rely-third-party-facial-recognition-services/165846/#:~:text=Law%20enforcement%20agencies%20at%20every,methods%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20document%20states.
[19] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c1bfc7eee175995a4ceb638/t/673b7bdc7bfa22584f88e956/1731951581156/2024.11.19_STOP+Report_Deportation+Data+Centers_final.pdf
https://www.stopspying.org/deportation-data-centers
[20] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, above: for example, ICE agents in Philadelphia's Fusion Center used the City's automated license plate reader system to track undocumented drivers—despite sanctuary city laws prohibiting such actions. ICE's 2020 facial recognition manual also encouraged reliance on Fusion Center data (though DHS has since deleted the public link: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf).
[21] https://www.wsfc.wa.gov/About
[22] https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/WSFC1.png

DOSS
Full Council
Sept 9, 2025
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Amendment C to CB 121052 Material Update to CCTV Policies

Sponsor: Councilmember Rinck

Limit approval for CCTV Pilot

Effect: This amendment would prohibit use of the of Closed-Circuit Television Camera (CCTV) system beyond July 1, 2028, unless SPD submits to the Council and the Council passes an ordinance that includes a SIR and Executive Overview that reflect approval of a new acquisition of technology pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679.

The Council requests that the SIR and Executive Overview for the CCTV technology contain information, data, and recommendations that are included in the evaluation of the CCTV pilot program and requires that the new SIR meets all the requirements of a new technology to include public outreach and a Race and Social Justice Analysis.

This amendment would also attach to the ordinance the following documents:

1. 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.
2. 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Background: The SIR attached to CB 1210552 describes the CCTV program as a pilot program and notes that an evaluation will be conducted to determine if the program should be made ongoing. Staff for the Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) are in the process of drafting a contract for services with the University of Pennsylvania's (UPenn) Crime and Justice Policy Lab to evaluate the pilot program. OIG staff expect that the evaluation will be completed no later than December 31, 2027.

1. Amend Section 1 to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves until July 1, 2028 use of the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2, provided that, within the area surrounding Garfield High School as specified in Section 4.3 of the SIR, SPD shall only install

cameras on the principal arterial street of 23rd Ave, and minor arterial streets of S. Jackson St. and E. Cherry St.

SPD may not continue to use the CCTV technology after July 1, 2028, unless it submits to the Council and the Council passes an ordinance that includes a SIR and Executive Overview that reflect approval of a new acquisition of technology pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679. The Council requests that the SIR and Executive Overview for the CCTV technology contain information, data, and recommendations that are included in the evaluation of the CCTV pilot program and requires that the new SIR meets all the requirements of a new technology to include public outreach and a Race and Social Justice Analysis.

2. Attach the following documents to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Attachment 1– 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.

Attachment 2 – 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Seattle
Office for Civil Rights

Policy Briefing Memo

Date: August 28, 2025
To: Councilmember Alexis Mercedes Rinck
From: Director Derrick Wheeler-Smith, Dr. Hajer Al-Faham, Ph.D.[1]
Subject: Council Bill (CB) 121052 and Council Bill (CB) 121053

PURPOSE

The purpose of this memo is to review the core provisions of Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 for the effectiveness of proposed surveillance technologies and the implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. The Seattle Office for Civil Rights (SOCR) safeguards civil rights and promotes equal opportunity by enforcing anti-discrimination laws, leading civil rights research and policy development, and advancing civic engagement and equity across the City of Seattle.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 propose expanding the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) piloted use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) surveillance technologies.[2] CB 121052 would expand SPD's placement of CCTV cameras into new areas of the city, while CB 121053 would authorize the integration of footage from the Seattle Department of Transportation's (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras into SPD's RTCC.[3] SOCR previously analyzed the proposed pilots of these technologies in 2024. The pilots were authorized by CB 120844 and CB 120845 in 2024, and any expansion of these pilots is subject to the requirements of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance 125376. This ordinance states that surveillance technologies should be carefully evaluated to balance potential criminal legal system benefits with strong protections for civil rights and liberties and safeguards against disparate impacts on racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities.[4]

Based on our analysis of scientific research evidence and the broader implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity, SOCR advises against the adoption of CB 121052 and CB 121053. Research has not demonstrated that surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," or "gun violence and human trafficking." The categories of crime these tools are said to address are described inconsistently and ambiguously in the proposed bills, 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs).[5] In contrast, a significant literature in law as well as the social and behavioral sciences shows that surveillance technologies can discourage civic engagement, weaken constitutional protections, and reinforce inequitable

[1] Excellent research support was provided by Jaclyn Tsiang, Damon Agnos, and Daisy Jaimez.
[2] CCTV consists of cameras placed in public to both record and provide a constant live feed to SPD. RTCC is software that enables SPD to collect all its information streams (e.g. CCTV feeds, dispatch and officer location info, 911 calls, Automated License Plate Reader data, records management systems) into one program.
[3] The 2024 legislation limited the deployment of CCTV cameras to locations in the Crime Prevention Technology pilot project: Aurora Avenue North, downtown in areas along and adjacent to the Third Avenue corridor, and the Chinatown International District. The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added under the 2025 legislation are the Stadium District, the area around Garfield High School, and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District. While the 2024 legislation approved the integration of the CCTV cameras data into SPD's RTCC, the proposed 2025 legislation seeks approval to integrate surveillance data from SDOT's traffic management cameras.
[4] To help encourage transparency and accountability, this ordinance not only requires Seattle City Council oversight but also the preparation of a Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) by any city department seeking to acquire and deploy surveillance technology. The full set of expectations established for an SIR are outlined in Ordinance 125376.
[5] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.

patterns of policing, monitoring, and enforcement.[6] These harms disproportionately affect communities that are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+.[7] SOCR's concerns are heightened by the national context, where local surveillance infrastructures that were originally justified in the name of safety, are leveraged by federal agencies in ways that undermine local autonomy, civil rights and liberties, and equity.[8]

Rather than expanding unproven surveillance technologies, SOCR recommends a five-part strategy that includes investing in community-based alternatives and service providers to work alongside SPD and mitigate capacity challenges; robust community engagement that includes revitalizing the Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG) to support public awareness of the risks, costs, and scope of surveillance technologies; narrowing CCTV usage and data retention to specified felony crimes; collaborative oversight and evaluation by SOCR and scholars without conflicts of interest; and mandating that pilots are defined by clear goals, terminology, and measurable outcomes.[9]

RESEARCH FINDINGS: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY & EFFICACY

As described by SPD in the Executive Overviews and SIRs, the purpose of investing in CCTV and RTCC technologies is to offset police operational issues (e.g., limited staff capacity) and enhance police effectiveness (e.g., reduction in 911 calls, improved police response times, crime clearance rates, community satisfaction) by reducing the interchangeably referenced "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[10] While the materials submitted by SPD state that efforts to prevent serious felony crimes have been unsuccessful, SPD's dashboard indicates violent crime citywide has dropped by 17% in 2025 compared to 2022, shootings are down 36%, and homicides are down 48%.[11] SPD's dashboard also indicates violent crime in the three areas identified for CCTV expansion has declined by 21% since 2022, calling into question the necessity of expanding surveillance.[12]

Reliance on surveillance technologies, in particular CCTV, warrants careful evaluation. While CCTV collects and generates large volumes of data, this data cannot be equated with improvements in staffing capacity, community trust, or public safety.[13] SPD identifies staffing capacity shortages as the central operational issue for safety and police effectiveness. However, surveillance technologies will not resolve this issue. As recently as 2020, SPD acknowledged that "up to 45% of SPD patrol service hours do not require an officer" and that there are "multiple

[6] Michener 2013, Shamas and Arastu 2013, Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Brayne 2017, Soss and Weaver 2017, Eubanks 2018, Arnett 2020, Moy 2021.
[7] Michener and Ford 2023 (racism, surveillance, and racialized policing), Gaynor and Blessett 2021 and Girardi 2021 (policing and 2SLGBTQ+ communities), Morgan 2021 and Thompson 2021 (disabled communities and policing).
[8] Examples are numerous and include President Trump's deployment of National Guard troops to Los Angeles as well as his previous deployment of Department of Homeland Security agents to interrogate Portland #BlackLivesMatter protesters.
[9] On the CSWG's website, it appears that the last meeting occurred in April 2025. The Surveillance Ordinance tasks the CSWG with providing a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that reviews any impacts on civil rights and liberties as well as disparate consequences for communities of color and marginalized communities. The CSWG authored a thorough assessment for the initial 2024 SIR on the CCTV and RTCC technologies. See Seattle Municipal Code 14.18.080 and this article by René J. Peters Jr., who served on the CSWG. As for the recommendation to partner with scholars, some of the most respected researchers include Dr. Ruha Benjamin, Ph.D., Tracey L. Meares, J.D., Dr. Joe Soss, Ph.D., Dr. Vesla Weaver, Ph.D., Dr. Amy Lerman, Ph.D., Dr. Spencer Piston, Ph.D., Dr. Monica C. Bell, Ph.D./J.D.
[10] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.
[11] Crime data was analyzed for January – August 2025 and compared against the same timeframe in 2022, when violent crime hit a 30-year peak. Data was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard on September 2nd, 2025.
[12] The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added are the Stadium District (K2), the area around Garfield High School (G2) and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District (E3). Data on violent crime was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard and analyzed using geographic boundaries of the corresponding Seattle Police Beats.
[13] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.

areas of service that would be better responded to by parties other than a sworn officer."[14] Given this data, the most appropriate response to mitigating operational issues of staffing is to establish greater role clarity. Police should focus on duties aligned with their training while behavioral health specialists, social workers, and service providers should respond to issues related to health crises, displacement and homelessness, and poverty. Realigning responsibilities would directly strengthen SPD's operational capacity and effectiveness.

Scientific and peer-reviewed research further underscore the limits of CCTV and RTCCs. The peer-reviewed literature in law, social science, and behavioral science does not support claims that these surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking.[15] The most persistent finding is that the evidence is, at best, inconclusive.[16] For example, criminologists evaluated 40 years of evidence and found that CCTV may reduce parking lot crime when this technology is supplemented by security guards, signage, and improvements in visibility by way of lighting.[17] Crucially, these scholars emphasize CCTV's measurable impact is limited to vehicle and property crimes, with modest overall effects and no significant reduction in violent crime.

Further, the scientific and peer-reviewed evidence on RTCCs remains limited. Researchers note that "little is known about their efficacy," and there are no nationally representative studies to date.[18] Of the limited peer-reviewed evaluations conducted, the findings suggest that effectiveness depends heavily on the presence of skilled analysts, efficient workflows, strong detective training, robust police-community trust and relationships, and strong forensic support staff.[19] In other words, RTCCs do not solve staffing capacity issues and may worsen these issues by adding new technical demands. Moreover, even when RTCCs function with this fleet of support, the benefits of the technology are retrospective: RTCCs may support investigations and case clearance, particularly for property crimes, but there is no established causal relationship between RTCCs and reduction in "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[20] Given the above, SOCR concludes that investing in role alignment and community relationships are more effective pathways to safety than expanding surveillance technologies that are resource-intensive, misaligned with SPD's stated operational challenges, and not backed by evidence.

COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE: CIVIL LIBERTIES, RIGHTS, AND EQUITY

A substantial body of scientific and peer-reviewed research documents the far-reaching costs of surveillance, particularly for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. These costs include legal estrangement, diminished civic

[14] The 2020 data is the most recent that we have been able to access, see SPD Budget Change Decision Points.
[15] The effectiveness of these technologies must be demonstrated with rigorous experimental research methods that rule out confounding variables. In criminology specifically, randomized controlled experiments are the gold standard for evaluating the causal effects of criminal legal system technologies, programs, and practices. However, as Piza et al. 2019 notes, "randomized controlled experiments are a rarity in the study of CCTV."
[16] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.
[17] SPD's 2025 SIR for CCTV also cites this study but neglects to present its findings in the same qualified manner as the authors. For example, the authors state "of particular salience is the continued need for CCTV to be narrowly targeted on vehicle crimes and property crimes" and they specify that the "16% reduction in crime" is statistically significant but modest overall because this finding was driven by a "51% reduction in crime in the car park schemes with CCTV in other settings have small and non-significant effects on crime." It is noteworthy that this research article examines CCTV globally and this further suggests the tenuous link between the installation of surveillance technologies and the deterrence of crime. As the authors write in their analysis of the data, "CCTV was associated with significant reductions in vehicle crime and property crime in general, with no significant effects observed for violent crime."
[18] Arietti 2024.
[19] Przeszlowski et al. 2023, Hollywood et al. 2019, Braga and Dusseault 2016, Carter and Carter 2015, Brunson and Wade 2019.
[20] Arietti 2024 and Przeszlowski et al. 2023 observe that use of surveillance technologies "may not be the most beneficial way forward for incidents involving violence" particularly against women or populations that tend to experience disproportionate gendered violence (e.g., murder, rape, and human trafficking).

engagement, adverse health, barriers to employment and suppressed wage growth, obstacles to accessing vital social services, disruption of family and community connections, and the erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties.[21] Beyond these harms, surveillance deployed by police communicates powerful societal messages, teaching "lessons on who is a citizen deserving of fairness and justice and who constitutes a group of dangerous *others* deserving of severe punishment, monitoring, and virtual branding."[22]

For communities who are overrepresented in police stops, arrests, and use-of-force incidents, living under conditions of surveillance technology intensifies the stigma and harms of criminalization.[23] Consider, for example, the proposed addition of CCTV around Garfield High School. These cameras may send a clear signal to young people in the area, particularly given SPD's documented racial disparities in use-of-force against Black youth, that they are suspects rather than community members.[24] SOCR is similarly concerned about the potential of surveillance technologies to discourage individuals who are low-income, unhoused, or disabled from seeking essential services. Moreover, the harms extend beyond individuals as entire neighborhoods will be marked as dangerous zones that need to be policed and surveilled closely.[25] It is worth considering the impact this will have on 2SLGBTQ+ communities in Capitol Hill, who are already contending with heightened exclusion locally and nationally.[26] The stigma produced by expanded surveillance technologies will compound economic disinvestment, reinforce segregation, and increase distrust between communities and local government.[27]

In addition to weighing racial and socioeconomic inequities, it is important to consider how these technologies will affect civil rights and liberties. CCTV and RTCC technologies are not neutral instruments, as they carry direct consequences for equal protection, privacy, and the freedoms of speech and association. When these surveillance systems are disproportionately deployed in neighborhoods where communities who are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ live, work, and gather, the result is a policy feedback loop that stigmatizes these communities as "concentrated crime" areas.[28] This outcome, in which racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities are subject to far greater surveillance than predominately White or affluent communities, raises serious civil rights and liberties concerns.

Specifically, the disparate monitoring and surveillance of some people but not others may constitute a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. CCTV and RTCC infrastructure also risk undermining privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and/or Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, as

[21] Bell 2017 (legal estrangement), Michener 2013 (diminished civic engagement), Theall et al. 2022 and Sewell et al. 2016 (adverse health effects), Asad 2023 (barriers to employment and suppressed earnings), Madden et al. 2017 (obstacles to accessing vital social services), Roberts 2012 (disruption of family and community connections), Shamas and Arastu 2013 (erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties). Additionally, legal scholars have identified four specific ways that surveillance technologies exacerbate inequity: it perpetuates and obscures inequities in policing, relocates disparities from other domains to law enforcement, amplifies the harms of inequitable policing, and undermines efforts to monitor and address these injustices. Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Eubanks 2018, Moy 2021.

[22] Soss and Weaver 2017.

[23] Lerman and Weaver 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Gaynor 2018 , Boddie 2022.

[24] The Science of Justice: Seattle Police Department is a 2021 report on SPD use of force that identified the greatest racial disparities among young people ages 15 – 21. Of 563 incidents involving SPD use of force between 2014 – 2019, an overwhelming 59% of young people were Black American.

[25] Spatial analysis data indicates that the current and proposed CCTV cameras cover areas where Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ communities tend to live, work, and congregate. These areas are in census tracts made up of populations who are on average 49% people of color, 26% making an income below 200% of the poverty level, and 17% living with a disability. See Seattle's Race and Social Equity Index. Additionally, the current and proposed camera locations are concentrated on arterial streets where vulnerable populations are more likely to be present because they rent, use transit, or lack private public space for rest and recreation.

[26] Examples of this exclusion include a spate of executive orders targeting Trans people, book bans targeting LGBTQ representation, bias incidents against individuals and businesses/community spaces, prohibitions on gender-affirming care, and, most recently, a US Senator declaring that a CDC official should have been disqualified from government service because of his "lifestyle."

[27] Capers 2011, Justice and Meares 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017.

[28] See 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV.

these technologies systematically collect, store, and interconnect vast amounts of sensitive information about the everyday lives of people in Seattle.[29] Further, the knowledge that people's activities are continuously monitored and tracked by law enforcement will have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights to speech and association. It is crucial to underscore these concerns amid the broader national context of alarming federal overreach. Currently, the federal official appointed by the Trump Administration as the District of Columbia's "emergency police commissioner" can access that city's RTCC infrastructure for "federal purposes."[30] Any proposal to rely on law or the judiciary to constrain federal authorities must also account for the Administration's extraordinary success rate at the United States Supreme Court.[31] Cumulatively, these risks require careful assessment, oversight, and safeguards before further deployment of surveillance technologies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CB 121052 and CB 121053 would significantly expand surveillance technologies that remain in pilot stages and pose serious civil rights, civil liberties, and equity implications. SOCR offers the following community-centered recommendations for promoting safety, transparency, racial and socioeconomic equity, and the protection of civil rights and liberties:

- Prioritize community-based alternatives and social service provision.
    - Evidence shows that investments in community organizations and relationships can reduce crime more effectively than unproven surveillance technologies.[32]
    - Cities like Nashville, Austin, and Denver have chosen to move away from similar surveillance technologies due to the risk of federal co-opting of data and the undercutting of essential civil rights and liberties.[33]
    - Invest in recruiting and retaining service providers, behavioral health specialists, and social workers to reduce reliance on police for non-criminal and crisis-related issues.[34] This will not only mitigate the root causes of harm but also support police operational capacity by allowing officers to focus on issues that align with their skills and training.[35]

- Institute pilots with conceptual clarity and precise provisions tied to measurable outcomes.
    - Pilots must be grounded in consistent and precise terminology to allow for fair evaluation. Currently, the terms in CB 121052 and CB 121053, the 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 SIRs are used ambiguously and interchangeably. They range from "persistent felony crimes" to "serious and violent crimes" to "other persistent crimes" to "gun violence and human trafficking." Without conceptual clarity, evaluation becomes arbitrary, and accountability is impossible.

[29] United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
[30] Davidson 2025.
[31] Sheth and Whisnant 2025.
[32] Ramey and Shrider 2014's research analyzing the City of Seattle's Neighborhood Matching Fund identified significant reductions in violent crime as a result of the program. Other research has shown that the presence of libraries and the increase in library operating hours reduces crime rates (including homicides and aggravated assaults). Neto et al. 2021.
[33] Nashville voted against implementing a similar Real-Time Crime Center in 2024, citing concerns about privacy and potential federal misuse of footage. In May and June 2025, Austin and Denver paused their automated license plate reader contracts amid immigration-related privacy concerns. Other jurisdictions, including Oakland, CA, and Somerville, MA, have also passed similar ordinances.
[34] Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street (CAHOOTS), an alternative response program in Eugene, OR, that ran from 1989 to 2025, spurred similar pilot programs in other cities. Bell 2021. Similarly, in 2020, the City of Albuquerque created the Albuquerque Community Safety department which includes "trained professionals such as social workers, housing and homelessness specialists, violence prevention and diversion program experts."
[35] Continued investment in and more autonomy for Seattle's Community Assisted Response and Engagement (CARE) department will further support the ability "to safely assist community members in need and free up scarce police resources for higher priority calls."

  - Continuation and/or expansion of any pilot should depend on data and evaluation.
  - A concrete timeline and exit strategy must be in place to ensure technologies are discontinued if they fail to achieve defined goals.

- Limit CCTV use and data retention to protect civil rights and liberties.
  - Footage should be restricted to investigating serious violent offenses as defined in the RCW.
  - Data retention should be capped at 7-14 days to protect the people of Seattle, especially those who are exceptionally vulnerable such as individuals seeking gender-affirming care, reproductive care, housing services and resources, or immigration support.[36]
  - Use of data should be transparently reported not only to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Police Accountability (OPA) but also to SOCR, the CSWG, and the public.

- Ensure robust community engagement before, during, and after any surveillance adoption.
  - The technologies under consideration are complex, interconnected, and linked to other surveillance methods such as Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). The current City of Seattle publicly accessible materials on these technologies do not adequately explain the risks, costs, or potential scope.
  - The people of Seattle deserve clarity on what information can be recorded, how it may be aggregated, and the full range of possible uses. They also deserve clarity on how the City plans to protect data from federal overreach. This could include destruction of data when federal overreach appears likely.
  - Reports on data usage and access should be publicly accessible, written in plain language, and provided and updated monthly.[37]
  - While limited engagement occurred around gun violence prevention near the Garfield High School area, broader and more inclusive consultation is needed. This is especially true with residents, service providers, and others who frequent the areas affected.
  - Feedback should be gathered widely and assessed if additional surveillance changes the willingness of people to exercise their rights, access public places, and seek services and resources.

- Establish mandatory oversight and independent evaluation.
  - Any material updates should undergo the full Surveillance Impact Report Review process, including meaningful public awareness and engagement, application of the Racial Equity Toolkit, and review by the CSWG. Strengthening the CSWG and oversight generally by identifying best practices in other cities should also be explored.[38]
  - Pilot evaluations should be conducted by SOCR in collaboration with research scholars who have demonstrated expertise in technology, civil rights and liberties, and racial and socioeconomic equity.

[36] The CSWG recommended limiting data retention of CCTV recordings to 14 days in their Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment on CCTV and RTCC. Given increased federal data seizures, SPD should consider limiting data retention even further.
[37] See the City of Seattle's Executive Order, "Making Information Inclusive in Writing and Design." Examples of data that should be made available include: a map of where cameras are located; how many active cameras, both public and privately owned, are registered, integrated, or connected to the RTCC; make and model information of all cameras; how many individuals have access to data; information on RTCC searches not connected to an investigation; and external requests for footage access.
[38] The Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission might provide a valuable example.

Seattle
Community
Police Commission

September 4, 2025

VIA EMAIL

Dear Councilmembers,

We are writing to ask the City Council to vote against any expansion of surveillance pursuant to the CCTV and RTCC programs (Surveillance Pilot).[1] Expansion of these programs is currently scheduled for vote at City Council on September 9, 2025. We are strongly opposed to the expansion of surveillance technology while critical issues regarding privacy and civil rights remain unaddressed.

Community members are overwhelmingly against expansion. An immediate and consistent concern raised by community– and acknowledged, though not addressed, by the City Council – is the growing risk of actors outside the City misusing surveillance information against the Seattle community. By expanding, the City is breaching its commitment to scrutinize the surveillance: whether it works and its impact on civil rights during a two-year pilot before continuation or expansion.[2] Now, in the middle of the Surveillance Pilot, we lack that information necessary to weigh the risks.

Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion at this time, we recommend engaging more community perspective and convening an Executive Session to discuss the consequences and legal implications related to data sharing with federal agencies hostile to Washington laws that ensure gender affirming care, abortion, and immigration protections.

A. Premature Surveillance Expansion Increases Mistrust of the City and SPD

We lack the data and evidence necessary to evaluate the risks of infringement on civil rights and privacy and if the Surveillance Pilot is achieving its intended goals. Concerns raised by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group have not been addressed, and only one year into the Pilot, the two-year evaluation has not yet occurred. This information is necessary to address community concerns before expansion.

1. The City Has Not Fulfilled Its Promises to Listen to And Protect Community, Which Overwhelmingly Opposes Surveillance

Community members and community organizations remain opposed to the Surveillance Pilot. In August 2024, when the Pilot was proposed, dozens of residents spoke out in opposition, and numerous Civil Rights organizations—including the ACLU of Washington, OneAmerica, 350

Seattle, Chief Seattle Club, El Centro de la Raza, Gender Justice League, Massage Parlor Outreach Project, Planned Parenthood Alliance Advocates, and WA People's Privacy—urged Council to reject it.[3]

The City's own Community Surveillance Working Group, who conducted a Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for CCTV and RTCC, reviewed the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and letters from community organizations and public comments to conclude:

> "After reviewing the information, a majority of the working group ***is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies*** as described in the SIRs. ***The amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions both warrant pause on pilot deployment***…. This sentiment reflects the ***high degree of apprehension expressed by a vast majority of the public's comments[,] regarding the potential misuse*** of these technologies. These comments were overwhelmingly negative and voiced a ***serious concern and lack of trust*** within the community as a whole[.] [T]he working group believes that going forward with these acquisitions ***may serve to further erode*** with a significant portion ***the public's trust in SPD and negatively affect community relations***."[4]

At the August 12, 2025, Public Safety meeting, every community member offering public comment opposed expansion of the Surveillance Pilot. One speaker summarized the impact on our most vulnerable communities: "If we move all this data to a third-party cloud, we risk handing it over to ICE and anti-abortion states making it easier to target immigrants, women, trans people, and activists." Another explained how surveillance data is already being misused: "the President is liable to take over municipal police departments, this legislation would allow the police and whoever controls them more ability to target whoever they want...ICE is already using surveillance data like this....SPD itself has a history of biased enforcement....Council should reject all legislation that expands surveillance."

Community members also have significant concerns about the location of two of the three expansion areas to the Central District (Seattle's historically Black neighborhood, and Capitol Hill (Seattle's 2SLGBTQIA+ neighborhood, home to Cal Andersen park, home to several protests resulting in audit reviews of SPD response to protests during BLM protests and most recently, SPD's response to 2SLGBTQIA+ community protesters on May 24, 2025). Public comment from a member of Central District raised concerns about "erosion of our civil rights" and the "disparate impact on minority youth." A queer Capitol Hill resident "who's everyday life will be documented by these cameras" summarized the consequences: "good governance depends on policy data.... Expanding the program without waiting for information is a huge gamble of precious City resources.... When councilmembers wipe away the testimony of hundreds of people who've expressed their opposition...it frays the fabric of our civil society and democracy itself." These neighborhoods are home to communities that continue to be subjects of

significant police action and over policing, expanding surveillance compounds disproportionate impact.

2. Surveillance Expansion Has a Disproportionate Impact on the Civil Rights of Communities of Color

Surveillance technologies have a disparate impact on communities of color. In 2024, Seattle's Community Surveillance Working Group warned that the Surveillance Pilot could disproportionately harm communities of color, both through built-in bias in the technology itself and through increasing exposure to law enforcement and the criminal legal system.[5] We have already seen that biased impact in Seattle. Most recently, in Wallingford, where CCTV footage was used to wrongly identify and arrest an Asian man for arson and murder. He was interrogated for hours and jailed for a month; despite having a different name and offering his own in-house technology to prove he was home at the time of the crime.[6] Additionally, during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, the FBI and SPD surveilled protesters observing First Amendment rights without public knowledge or oversight, at the expense of residents' privacy and civil liberties.[7]

3. Oversight Recommendations Have Not Been Addressed

When the pilot was first proposed, the CPC recognized support for a "time-limited and location-limited pilot" so long as it included "continued community engagement and feedback from the community[,]" "determinations of metrics measurements before implementing any new use of these technologies[,]" and a two year period of time that would include an additional Surveillance Impact Report process to be repeated "before the program is made permanent **or expanded**." The CPC made clear the importance of community engagement and feedback and of the significance of data and oversight that was to be provided by the Office of the Inspector General.[8]

There remain unaddressed and outstanding recommendations regarding surveillance by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group intended to address the implications this surveillance has on our constitutional rights and civil liberties.[9] Some of these recommendations have been outstanding since 2019 (regarding the collection and recording First Amendment protests during BLM).[10] OIG's latest surveillance report addresses the need for protection of this data regarding third parties and notes that digital recordings marked for Evidence.com are stored indefinitely.

4. Risk of Misuse of Surveillance Data by the Federal Administration and Outside Actors

We are at an unprecedented time when the Trump Administration is undermining the sovereignty of state and local jurisdictions and targeting sanctuary cities, including Seattle. The Administration has intent to assert control of local law enforcement and local agencies in

sanctuary cities. They first issued executive orders in April, [11] then in June, they deployed the National Guard in L.A.[12] Just this month they announced a takeover of law enforcement in Washington, D.C., through deployment of the National Guard, declaring an emergency to address "out-of-control" violent crime, and deploying federal law enforcement and immigration agents through the City. [13] They have made clear their intentions to do so in other cities, most recently Chicago.[14] They recently sent a letter to Washington State and the City of Seattle demanding an end to "sanctuary jurisdiction" policies that limit police cooperation with ICE.[15] Now is not the time to expand surveillance that could be used by the Administration against our community members.

Equally concerning, yet less understood, are interoperable databases and third-party agreements, which often have the unintended consequence of violating civil rights.[16] Several sources have confirmed that ICE is using ALPR[17] and facial recognition data to track immigrants with local law enforcement agencies, some in sanctuary cities, often obtained informally and in violation of state and privacy laws.[18] Local surveillance information is also vulnerable to misuse through Fusion Centers, [19] and other interoperable databases, where the Administration has access to ALPR and facial recognition, allowing ICE to sidestep sanctuary city laws.[20] The Washington State Fusion Center "facilitate[s] information sharing" between local law enforcement and homeland security partners.[21] It serves as a "virtual network" where state, local, federal, and even private stakeholders share surveillance and law enforcement data. DHS officials work directly alongside SPD, WSP, and King County officers within Washington's Fusion Center. [22] Expanding surveillance in Seattle would only broaden the data available to ICE through this system.

We understand that SPD's immigration policy states: *"Employees will not initiate, maintain, or participate in any police action based on an individual's immigration status."* We trust SPD officers to comply with all applicable laws, but working side by side with federal agents at the Washington Fusion Center puts SPD officers in a difficult position. SPD officers might feel compelled to provide surveillance data, if requested, for any broadly defined "criminal" investigation by the current Administration. And failure to do so could result in increased scrutiny by the Administration.

5. **The Consent Decree Has Terminated, Community Trust and Oversight is Paramount**

We are urging City Council to reject expansion of the Surveillance Pilot at this time. Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion, we strongly recommend engaging community perspectives and convening an Executive Session to examine the potential consequences and legal implications of data collection and sharing under a hostile federal Administration.

The expansion of surveillance that lacks data establishing its efficacy, in the face of community opposition, and when doing so exposes the Seattle community to federal overreach and further misuse of private information will only sow further mistrust of City government and SPD. The City just emerged from federal oversight of SPD, this is the time to listen to and prioritize community voice in public safety and policing – voices asking for investments in housing, behavioral health, and community-based safety programs, not through expansion of untested surveillance prone to misuse and subject to harming communities most impacted by policing.

Sincerely,

Police Practices Workgroup
Community Police Commission

Cc:
All City Councilmembers
Mayor Bruce Harrell
Deputy Mayor Tim Burgess

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[1] This letter issues from the PPWG, a working group of the CPC. The CPC's regularly scheduled September meeting will not take place due to the scheduling conflict with the September 3, 2025, hearing on the Consent Decree at the Western District of Washington.
[2] 2024 CCTV Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 CCTV SIR FINAL.pdf; 2024 RTCC Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 RTCC SIR FINAL.pdf
[3] Harrell's Expanded Surveillance Program Clears Hurdle in Seattle Council » The Urbanist
[4] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[5] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[6] KUOW - Seattle man says dropped murder, arson charges against him were result of 'racist misidentification'
[7] FBI and SPD infiltrated Seattle 2020 protests, used informants and surveillance | May 28–June 3, 2025 | Real Change
[8] CPC Official Statement on SPD's Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Program, dated March 21, 2024. https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/CommunityPoliceCommission/Press%20Releases/2024/CPC%20Statement%2003.21.24%20SPD%20technology.pdf
[9] Office of the Inspector General's Consolidated Risk Surveillance Usage Review 2024, dated June 6, 2025 https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/OIG_Surveillance_Consolidated2024.pdf
[10] Follow-up Audit of SPD Compliance with Chapter 14.12 of Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/2023_Chapter_14.12_Audit.pdf
[11] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/protecting-american-communities-from-criminal-aliens/ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/02/2025-07790/strengthening-and-unleashing-americas-law-enforcement-to-pursue-criminals-and-protect-innocent
[12] Trump deploys California National Guard to LA to quell protests despite the governor's objections | The Seattle Times
[13] Trump's order to deploy troops in DC is his latest use of the National Guard in cities | The Seattle Times

[14] https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/26/politics/trump-national-guard-us-cities
[15] KUOW - As DOJ threatens WA over sanctuary laws, state officials double down on protections
[16] License Plate Readers Proliferate in Washington, Bringing Concerns over ICE Overreach, The Urbanist https://www.theurbanist.org/2025/06/19/license-plate-readers-proliferate-in-washington-ice-overreach/ (Reporting that that data collected by Flock Safety ALPRs, relied upon by the King County Housing Authority (KCHA), was recently shared with ICE and DHS. Authorities in Texas conducted a nationwide search of more than 83,000 ALPR cameras for a woman accessing abortion; the internal audit showed KCHA's data was searched).
[17] Who's Watching Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to Immigrant and Reproductive Rights in Washington State, https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/
[18] Immigration Police Can Already Sidestep US Sanctuary City Laws Using Data-Sharing Fusion Centers | WIRED https://www.wired.com/story/ice-sanctuary-cities-fusion-centers/ ; See also, ICE Outlines How Investigators Rely on Third-Party Facial Recognition services https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/06/ice-outlines-how-investigators-rely-third-party-facial-recognition-services/165846/#:~:text=Law%20enforcement%20agencies%20at%20every,methods%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20document%20states.
[19] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c1bfc7eee175995a4ceb638/t/673b7bdc7bfa22584f88e956/1731951581156/2024.11.19_STOP+Report_Deportation+Data+Centers_final.pdf
https://www.stopspying.org/deportation-data-centers
[20] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, above: for example, ICE agents in Philadelphia's Fusion Center used the City's automated license plate reader system to track undocumented drivers—despite sanctuary city laws prohibiting such actions. ICE's 2020 facial recognition manual also encouraged reliance on Fusion Center data (though DHS has since deleted the public link: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf).
[21] https://www.wsfc.wa.gov/About
[22] https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/WSFC1.png

DOSS
Full Council
Sept 9, 2025
D1

Amendment D to CB 121052 Material Update to CCTV Policies

Sponsor: Councilmember Strauss

Restrict all new cameras to the Stadium District

Effect: This amendment would restrict camera installations to the Stadium District as identified by boundaries listed in Section 4.3 of the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) that is attached to the ordinance. The Council could return to the question of authorizing camera installation in the Capitol Hill and Garfield High School areas at a future date.

1. Amend Section 1 to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2, provided that((~~, within the area surrounding Garfield High School as specified in Section 4.3 of the SIR, SPD shall only install cameras on the principal arterial street of 23rd Ave, and minor arterial streets of S. Jackson St. and E. Cherry St.~~)) SPD shall only install cameras within the Stadium District as identified by boundaries listed in Section 4.3 of the SIR.

DOSS
Full Council
Sept 9, 2025
D1

Amendment E to CB 121052 Material Update to CCTV Policies

Sponsor: Councilmember Rinck

Restrict Capitol Hill cameras to Arterial Streets

Effect: This amendment would restrict camera installations to arterial streets within the proposed new Capitol Hill Nightlife District, which is identified by boundaries listed in Section 4.3 of the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) that is attached to the ordinance.

The sponsor has indicated that camera installation should be limited to arterial streets until a program evaluation shows that CCTV deters violent crime, human trafficking or persistent felony crime. Additionally, that cameras placed on some, non-arterial and "Neighborhood Access" streets may infringe on individuals' privacy rights as there may be some reasonable expectation of privacy in and around parks, neighborhoods and other areas that contain housing. For these reasons, the sponsor indicates that the negative impacts of surveillance should be limited until the evaluation is completed.

Central Staff identified arterial streets and "Neighborhood Access" streets through the use of Seattle Department of Transportation's (SDOT) Seattle Streets Illustrated, which includes interactive maps that can be filtered by "Street Type Designation."[1] The street designations reflected in this amendment were consistent with SDOT data published on September 2, 2025.

Staff at the Seattle Police Department have indicated that there is an operational need to use cameras on streets with a view of Cal Anderson park, which has in the past been the location of some violent crimes. This amendment would prohibit cameras on certain streets that directly abut the park and therefore prohibit SPD from viewing the park through the cameras.

This amendment would also attach to the ordinance the following documents:

1. 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.
2. 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Background: On August 12, 2025, the Public Safety Committee passed an amendment that restricted camera installation to arterial streets within the proposed new area around Garfield High School. This amendment would extend the arterial street restriction to the Capitol Hill nightlife sites proposed in CB 121052.

[1] https://seattlecitygis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=dfeed51c66334b10a82e7a23dc42086f

1. Amend Section 1 to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2, provided that((~~, within the area surrounding Garfield High School as specified in Section 4.3 of the SIR,~~)) SPD shall, within the Capitol Hill and Garfield High School areas specified in Section 4.3 of the SIR, only install cameras on the ((~~principal~~)) following arterial streets: ((~~of 23rd Ave, and minor arterial streets of S. Jackson St. and E. Cherry St.~~))

A. Garfield High School Area: 23rd Ave., Jackson St., and E. Cherry St.; and

B. Capitol Hill Nightlife District: Broadway E., E. Union St., E. Pine St., E. Pike St., and 12th Ave.

2. Attach the following documents to CB 121052, as amended, as follows:

Attachment 1– 2025 SOCR Policy Memo re: CB 121052 and CB 121053.

Attachment 2 – 2025 CPC Letter to Council from PPWG – Regarding Expansion of the Surveillance Pilot

Seattle
Office for Civil Rights

Policy Briefing Memo

Date: August 28, 2025
To: Councilmember Alexis Mercedes Rinck
From: Director Derrick Wheeler-Smith, Dr. Hajer Al-Faham, Ph.D.[1]
Subject: Council Bill (CB) 121052 and Council Bill (CB) 121053

PURPOSE

The purpose of this memo is to review the core provisions of Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 for the effectiveness of proposed surveillance technologies and the implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. The Seattle Office for Civil Rights (SOCR) safeguards civil rights and promotes equal opportunity by enforcing anti-discrimination laws, leading civil rights research and policy development, and advancing civic engagement and equity across the City of Seattle.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Council Bill 121052 and Council Bill 121053 propose expanding the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) piloted use of Closed-Circuit Television Camera Systems (CCTV) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) surveillance technologies.[2] CB 121052 would expand SPD's placement of CCTV cameras into new areas of the city, while CB 121053 would authorize the integration of footage from the Seattle Department of Transportation's (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras into SPD's RTCC.[3] SOCR previously analyzed the proposed pilots of these technologies in 2024. The pilots were authorized by CB 120844 and CB 120845 in 2024, and any expansion of these pilots is subject to the requirements of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance 125376. This ordinance states that surveillance technologies should be carefully evaluated to balance potential criminal legal system benefits with strong protections for civil rights and liberties and safeguards against disparate impacts on racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities.[4]

Based on our analysis of scientific research evidence and the broader implications for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity, SOCR advises against the adoption of CB 121052 and CB 121053. Research has not demonstrated that surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," or "gun violence and human trafficking." The categories of crime these tools are said to address are described inconsistently and ambiguously in the proposed bills, 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs).[5] In contrast, a significant literature in law as well as the social and behavioral sciences shows that surveillance technologies can discourage civic engagement, weaken constitutional protections, and reinforce inequitable

[1] Excellent research support was provided by Jaclyn Tsiang, Damon Agnos, and Daisy Jaimez.
[2] CCTV consists of cameras placed in public to both record and provide a constant live feed to SPD. RTCC is software that enables SPD to collect all its information streams (e.g. CCTV feeds, dispatch and officer location info, 911 calls, Automated License Plate Reader data, records management systems) into one program.
[3] The 2024 legislation limited the deployment of CCTV cameras to locations in the Crime Prevention Technology pilot project: Aurora Avenue North, downtown in areas along and adjacent to the Third Avenue corridor, and the Chinatown International District. The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added under the 2025 legislation are the Stadium District, the area around Garfield High School, and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District. While the 2024 legislation approved the integration of the CCTV cameras data into SPD's RTCC, the proposed 2025 legislation seeks approval to integrate surveillance data from SDOT's traffic management cameras.
[4] To help encourage transparency and accountability, this ordinance not only requires Seattle City Council oversight but also the preparation of a Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) by any city department seeking to acquire and deploy surveillance technology. The full set of expectations established for an SIR are outlined in Ordinance 125376.
[5] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.

patterns of policing, monitoring, and enforcement.[6] These harms disproportionately affect communities that are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+.[7] SOCR's concerns are heightened by the national context, where local surveillance infrastructures that were originally justified in the name of safety, are leveraged by federal agencies in ways that undermine local autonomy, civil rights and liberties, and equity.[8]

Rather than expanding unproven surveillance technologies, SOCR recommends a five-part strategy that includes investing in community-based alternatives and service providers to work alongside SPD and mitigate capacity challenges; robust community engagement that includes revitalizing the Seattle Community Surveillance Working Group (CSWG) to support public awareness of the risks, costs, and scope of surveillance technologies; narrowing CCTV usage and data retention to specified felony crimes; collaborative oversight and evaluation by SOCR and scholars without conflicts of interest; and mandating that pilots are defined by clear goals, terminology, and measurable outcomes.[9]

RESEARCH FINDINGS: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY & EFFICACY

As described by SPD in the Executive Overviews and SIRs, the purpose of investing in CCTV and RTCC technologies is to offset police operational issues (e.g., limited staff capacity) and enhance police effectiveness (e.g., reduction in 911 calls, improved police response times, crime clearance rates, community satisfaction) by reducing the interchangeably referenced "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[10] While the materials submitted by SPD state that efforts to prevent serious felony crimes have been unsuccessful, SPD's dashboard indicates violent crime citywide has dropped by 17% in 2025 compared to 2022, shootings are down 36%, and homicides are down 48%.[11] SPD's dashboard also indicates violent crime in the three areas identified for CCTV expansion has declined by 21% since 2022, calling into question the necessity of expanding surveillance.[12]

Reliance on surveillance technologies, in particular CCTV, warrants careful evaluation. While CCTV collects and generates large volumes of data, this data cannot be equated with improvements in staffing capacity, community trust, or public safety.[13] SPD identifies staffing capacity shortages as the central operational issue for safety and police effectiveness. However, surveillance technologies will not resolve this issue. As recently as 2020, SPD acknowledged that "up to 45% of SPD patrol service hours do not require an officer" and that there are "multiple

[6] Michener 2013, Shamas and Arastu 2013, Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Brayne 2017, Soss and Weaver 2017, Eubanks 2018, Arnett 2020, Moy 2021.
[7] Michener and Ford 2023 (racism, surveillance, and racialized policing), Gaynor and Blessett 2021 and Girardi 2021 (policing and 2SLGBTQ+ communities), Morgan 2021 and Thompson 2021 (disabled communities and policing).
[8] Examples are numerous and include President Trump's deployment of National Guard troops to Los Angeles as well as his previous deployment of Department of Homeland Security agents to interrogate Portland #BlackLivesMatter protesters.
[9] On the CSWG's website, it appears that the last meeting occurred in April 2025. The Surveillance Ordinance tasks the CSWG with providing a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that reviews any impacts on civil rights and liberties as well as disparate consequences for communities of color and marginalized communities. The CSWG authored a thorough assessment for the initial 2024 SIR on the CCTV and RTCC technologies. See Seattle Municipal Code 14.18.080 and this article by René J. Peters Jr., who served on the CSWG. As for the recommendation to partner with scholars, some of the most respected researchers include Dr. Ruha Benjamin, Ph.D., Tracey L. Meares, J.D., Dr. Joe Soss, Ph.D., Dr. Vesla Weaver, Ph.D., Dr. Amy Lerman, Ph.D., Dr. Spencer Piston, Ph.D., Dr. Monica C. Bell, Ph.D./J.D.
[10] For CB 121052, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV. For CB 121053, SPD submitted the following supporting materials: 2025 SIR Executive Overview for RTCC and 2025 SIR for RTCC.
[11] Crime data was analyzed for January – August 2025 and compared against the same timeframe in 2022, when violent crime hit a 30-year peak. Data was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard on September 2nd, 2025.
[12] The three proposed locations where CCTV cameras will be added are the Stadium District (K2), the area around Garfield High School (G2) and the Capitol Hill Nightlife District (E3). Data on violent crime was pulled from SPD's Crime Dashboard and analyzed using geographic boundaries of the corresponding Seattle Police Beats.
[13] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.

areas of service that would be better responded to by parties other than a sworn officer."[14] Given this data, the most appropriate response to mitigating operational issues of staffing is to establish greater role clarity. Police should focus on duties aligned with their training while behavioral health specialists, social workers, and service providers should respond to issues related to health crises, displacement and homelessness, and poverty. Realigning responsibilities would directly strengthen SPD's operational capacity and effectiveness.

Scientific and peer-reviewed research further underscore the limits of CCTV and RTCCs. The peer-reviewed literature in law, social science, and behavioral science does not support claims that these surveillance technologies reduce "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking.[15] The most persistent finding is that the evidence is, at best, inconclusive.[16] For example, criminologists evaluated 40 years of evidence and found that CCTV may reduce parking lot crime when this technology is supplemented by security guards, signage, and improvements in visibility by way of lighting.[17] Crucially, these scholars emphasize CCTV's measurable impact is limited to vehicle and property crimes, with modest overall effects and no significant reduction in violent crime.

Further, the scientific and peer-reviewed evidence on RTCCs remains limited. Researchers note that "little is known about their efficacy," and there are no nationally representative studies to date.[18] Of the limited peer-reviewed evaluations conducted, the findings suggest that effectiveness depends heavily on the presence of skilled analysts, efficient workflows, strong detective training, robust police-community trust and relationships, and strong forensic support staff.[19] In other words, RTCCs do not solve staffing capacity issues and may worsen these issues by adding new technical demands. Moreover, even when RTCCs function with this fleet of support, the benefits of the technology are retrospective: RTCCs may support investigations and case clearance, particularly for property crimes, but there is no established causal relationship between RTCCs and reduction in "persistent felony crimes," "serious and violent crimes," and/or "gun violence and human trafficking."[20] Given the above, SOCR concludes that investing in role alignment and community relationships are more effective pathways to safety than expanding surveillance technologies that are resource-intensive, misaligned with SPD's stated operational challenges, and not backed by evidence.

COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE: CIVIL LIBERTIES, RIGHTS, AND EQUITY

A substantial body of scientific and peer-reviewed research documents the far-reaching costs of surveillance, particularly for civil rights, civil liberties, and equity. These costs include legal estrangement, diminished civic

[14] The 2020 data is the most recent that we have been able to access, see SPD Budget Change Decision Points.
[15] The effectiveness of these technologies must be demonstrated with rigorous experimental research methods that rule out confounding variables. In criminology specifically, randomized controlled experiments are the gold standard for evaluating the causal effects of criminal legal system technologies, programs, and practices. However, as Piza et al. 2019 notes, "randomized controlled experiments are a rarity in the study of CCTV."
[16] Researchers consistently find that the efficacy of these surveillance technologies is inconclusive: Piza et al. 2019, Taylor 2010, Cameron et al. 2008, King et al. 2008, Farrington et al. 2007, Gill and Spriggs 2005.
[17] SPD's 2025 SIR for CCTV also cites this study but neglects to present its findings in the same qualified manner as the authors. For example, the authors state "of particular salience is the continued need for CCTV to be narrowly targeted on vehicle crimes and property crimes" and they specify that the "16% reduction in crime" is statistically significant but modest overall because this finding was driven by a "51% reduction in crime in the car park schemes with CCTV in other settings have small and non-significant effects on crime." It is noteworthy that this research article examines CCTV globally and this further suggests the tenuous link between the installation of surveillance technologies and the deterrence of crime. As the authors write in their analysis of the data, "CCTV was associated with significant reductions in vehicle crime and property crime in general, with no significant effects observed for violent crime."
[18] Arietti 2024.
[19] Przeszlowski et al. 2023, Hollywood et al. 2019, Braga and Dusseault 2016, Carter and Carter 2015, Brunson and Wade 2019.
[20] Arietti 2024 and Przeszlowski et al. 2023 observe that use of surveillance technologies "may not be the most beneficial way forward for incidents involving violence" particularly against women or populations that tend to experience disproportionate gendered violence (e.g., murder, rape, and human trafficking).

engagement, adverse health, barriers to employment and suppressed wage growth, obstacles to accessing vital social services, disruption of family and community connections, and the erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties.[21] Beyond these harms, surveillance deployed by police communicates powerful societal messages, teaching "lessons on who is a citizen deserving of fairness and justice and who constitutes a group of dangerous *others* deserving of severe punishment, monitoring, and virtual branding."[22]

For communities who are overrepresented in police stops, arrests, and use-of-force incidents, living under conditions of surveillance technology intensifies the stigma and harms of criminalization.[23] Consider, for example, the proposed addition of CCTV around Garfield High School. These cameras may send a clear signal to young people in the area, particularly given SPD's documented racial disparities in use-of-force against Black youth, that they are suspects rather than community members.[24] SOCR is similarly concerned about the potential of surveillance technologies to discourage individuals who are low-income, unhoused, or disabled from seeking essential services. Moreover, the harms extend beyond individuals as entire neighborhoods will be marked as dangerous zones that need to be policed and surveilled closely.[25] It is worth considering the impact this will have on 2SLGBTQ+ communities in Capitol Hill, who are already contending with heightened exclusion locally and nationally.[26] The stigma produced by expanded surveillance technologies will compound economic disinvestment, reinforce segregation, and increase distrust between communities and local government.[27]

In addition to weighing racial and socioeconomic inequities, it is important to consider how these technologies will affect civil rights and liberties. CCTV and RTCC technologies are not neutral instruments, as they carry direct consequences for equal protection, privacy, and the freedoms of speech and association. When these surveillance systems are disproportionately deployed in neighborhoods where communities who are Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ live, work, and gather, the result is a policy feedback loop that stigmatizes these communities as "concentrated crime" areas.[28] This outcome, in which racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities are subject to far greater surveillance than predominately White or affluent communities, raises serious civil rights and liberties concerns.

Specifically, the disparate monitoring and surveillance of some people but not others may constitute a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. CCTV and RTCC infrastructure also risk undermining privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and/or Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, as

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[21] Bell 2017 (legal estrangement), Michener 2013 (diminished civic engagement), Theall et al. 2022 and Sewell et al. 2016 (adverse health effects), Asad 2023 (barriers to employment and suppressed earnings), Madden et al. 2017 (obstacles to accessing vital social services), Roberts 2012 (disruption of family and community connections), Shamas and Arastu 2013 (erosion of fundamental civil rights and liberties). Additionally, legal scholars have identified four specific ways that surveillance technologies exacerbate inequity: it perpetuates and obscures inequities in policing, relocates disparities from other domains to law enforcement, amplifies the harms of inequitable policing, and undermines efforts to monitor and address these injustices. Friedman and Ponomarenko 2015, Harcourt 2015, Joh 2017, Eubanks 2018, Moy 2021.

[22] Soss and Weaver 2017.

[23] Lerman and Weaver 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Gaynor 2018 , Boddie 2022.

[24] The Science of Justice: Seattle Police Department is a 2021 report on SPD use of force that identified the greatest racial disparities among young people ages 15 – 21. Of 563 incidents involving SPD use of force between 2014 – 2019, an overwhelming 59% of young people were Black American.

[25] Spatial analysis data indicates that the current and proposed CCTV cameras cover areas where Black, Indigenous, People of Color, low-income, disabled, and 2SLGBTQ+ communities tend to live, work, and congregate. These areas are in census tracts made up of populations who are on average 49% people of color, 26% making an income below 200% of the poverty level, and 17% living with a disability. See Seattle's Race and Social Equity Index. Additionally, the current and proposed camera locations are concentrated on arterial streets where vulnerable populations are more likely to be present because they rent, use transit, or lack private public space for rest and recreation.

[26] Examples of this exclusion include a spate of executive orders targeting Trans people, book bans targeting LGBTQ representation, bias incidents against individuals and businesses/community spaces, prohibitions on gender-affirming care, and, most recently, a US Senator declaring that a CDC official should have been disqualified from government service because of his "lifestyle."

[27] Capers 2011, Justice and Meares 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017.

[28] See 2025 SIR Executive Overview for CCTV and 2025 SIR for CCTV.

these technologies systematically collect, store, and interconnect vast amounts of sensitive information about the everyday lives of people in Seattle.[29] Further, the knowledge that people's activities are continuously monitored and tracked by law enforcement will have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights to speech and association. It is crucial to underscore these concerns amid the broader national context of alarming federal overreach. Currently, the federal official appointed by the Trump Administration as the District of Columbia's "emergency police commissioner" can access that city's RTCC infrastructure for "federal purposes."[30] Any proposal to rely on law or the judiciary to constrain federal authorities must also account for the Administration's extraordinary success rate at the United States Supreme Court.[31] Cumulatively, these risks require careful assessment, oversight, and safeguards before further deployment of surveillance technologies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CB 121052 and CB 121053 would significantly expand surveillance technologies that remain in pilot stages and pose serious civil rights, civil liberties, and equity implications. SOCR offers the following community-centered recommendations for promoting safety, transparency, racial and socioeconomic equity, and the protection of civil rights and liberties:

- Prioritize community-based alternatives and social service provision.
    - Evidence shows that investments in community organizations and relationships can reduce crime more effectively than unproven surveillance technologies.[32]
    - Cities like Nashville, Austin, and Denver have chosen to move away from similar surveillance technologies due to the risk of federal co-opting of data and the undercutting of essential civil rights and liberties.[33]
    - Invest in recruiting and retaining service providers, behavioral health specialists, and social workers to reduce reliance on police for non-criminal and crisis-related issues.[34] This will not only mitigate the root causes of harm but also support police operational capacity by allowing officers to focus on issues that align with their skills and training.[35]

- Institute pilots with conceptual clarity and precise provisions tied to measurable outcomes.
    - Pilots must be grounded in consistent and precise terminology to allow for fair evaluation. Currently, the terms in CB 121052 and CB 121053, the 2025 Executive Overviews, and the 2025 SIRs are used ambiguously and interchangeably. They range from "persistent felony crimes" to "serious and violent crimes" to "other persistent crimes" to "gun violence and human trafficking." Without conceptual clarity, evaluation becomes arbitrary, and accountability is impossible.

[29] United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
[30] Davidson 2025.
[31] Sheth and Whisnant 2025.
[32] Ramey and Shrider 2014's research analyzing the City of Seattle's Neighborhood Matching Fund identified significant reductions in violent crime as a result of the program. Other research has shown that the presence of libraries and the increase in library operating hours reduces crime rates (including homicides and aggravated assaults). Neto et al. 2021.
[33] Nashville voted against implementing a similar Real-Time Crime Center in 2024, citing concerns about privacy and potential federal misuse of footage. In May and June 2025, Austin and Denver paused their automated license plate reader contracts amid immigration-related privacy concerns. Other jurisdictions, including Oakland, CA, and Somerville, MA, have also passed similar ordinances.
[34] Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street (CAHOOTS), an alternative response program in Eugene, OR, that ran from 1989 to 2025, spurred similar pilot programs in other cities. Bell 2021. Similarly, in 2020, the City of Albuquerque created the Albuquerque Community Safety department which includes "trained professionals such as social workers, housing and homelessness specialists, violence prevention and diversion program experts."
[35] Continued investment in and more autonomy for Seattle's Community Assisted Response and Engagement (CARE) department will further support the ability "to safely assist community members in need and free up scarce police resources for higher priority calls."

  - Continuation and/or expansion of any pilot should depend on data and evaluation.
  - A concrete timeline and exit strategy must be in place to ensure technologies are discontinued if they fail to achieve defined goals.

- Limit CCTV use and data retention to protect civil rights and liberties.
  - Footage should be restricted to investigating serious violent offenses as defined in the RCW.
  - Data retention should be capped at 7-14 days to protect the people of Seattle, especially those who are exceptionally vulnerable such as individuals seeking gender-affirming care, reproductive care, housing services and resources, or immigration support.[36]
  - Use of data should be transparently reported not only to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Police Accountability (OPA) but also to SOCR, the CSWG, and the public.

- Ensure robust community engagement before, during, and after any surveillance adoption.
  - The technologies under consideration are complex, interconnected, and linked to other surveillance methods such as Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). The current City of Seattle publicly accessible materials on these technologies do not adequately explain the risks, costs, or potential scope.
  - The people of Seattle deserve clarity on what information can be recorded, how it may be aggregated, and the full range of possible uses. They also deserve clarity on how the City plans to protect data from federal overreach. This could include destruction of data when federal overreach appears likely.
  - Reports on data usage and access should be publicly accessible, written in plain language, and provided and updated monthly.[37]
  - While limited engagement occurred around gun violence prevention near the Garfield High School area, broader and more inclusive consultation is needed. This is especially true with residents, service providers, and others who frequent the areas affected.
  - Feedback should be gathered widely and assessed if additional surveillance changes the willingness of people to exercise their rights, access public places, and seek services and resources.

- Establish mandatory oversight and independent evaluation.
  - Any material updates should undergo the full Surveillance Impact Report Review process, including meaningful public awareness and engagement, application of the Racial Equity Toolkit, and review by the CSWG. Strengthening the CSWG and oversight generally by identifying best practices in other cities should also be explored.[38]
  - Pilot evaluations should be conducted by SOCR in collaboration with research scholars who have demonstrated expertise in technology, civil rights and liberties, and racial and socioeconomic equity.

[36] The CSWG recommended limiting data retention of CCTV recordings to 14 days in their Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment on CCTV and RTCC. Given increased federal data seizures, SPD should consider limiting data retention even further.
[37] See the City of Seattle's Executive Order, "Making Information Inclusive in Writing and Design." Examples of data that should be made available include: a map of where cameras are located; how many active cameras, both public and privately owned, are registered, integrated, or connected to the RTCC; make and model information of all cameras; how many individuals have access to data; information on RTCC searches not connected to an investigation; and external requests for footage access.
[38] The Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission might provide a valuable example.

Seattle
Community
Police Commission

September 4, 2025

VIA EMAIL

Dear Councilmembers,

We are writing to ask the City Council to vote against any expansion of surveillance pursuant to the CCTV and RTCC programs (Surveillance Pilot).[1] Expansion of these programs is currently scheduled for vote at City Council on September 9, 2025. We are strongly opposed to the expansion of surveillance technology while critical issues regarding privacy and civil rights remain unaddressed.

Community members are overwhelmingly against expansion. An immediate and consistent concern raised by community– and acknowledged, though not addressed, by the City Council – is the growing risk of actors outside the City misusing surveillance information against the Seattle community. By expanding, the City is breaching its commitment to scrutinize the surveillance: whether it works and its impact on civil rights during a two-year pilot before continuation or expansion.[2] Now, in the middle of the Surveillance Pilot, we lack that information necessary to weigh the risks.

Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion at this time, we recommend engaging more community perspective and convening an Executive Session to discuss the consequences and legal implications related to data sharing with federal agencies hostile to Washington laws that ensure gender affirming care, abortion, and immigration protections.

A. Premature Surveillance Expansion Increases Mistrust of the City and SPD

We lack the data and evidence necessary to evaluate the risks of infringement on civil rights and privacy and if the Surveillance Pilot is achieving its intended goals. Concerns raised by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group have not been addressed, and only one year into the Pilot, the two-year evaluation has not yet occurred. This information is necessary to address community concerns before expansion.

1. The City Has Not Fulfilled Its Promises to Listen to And Protect Community, Which Overwhelmingly Opposes Surveillance

Community members and community organizations remain opposed to the Surveillance Pilot. In August 2024, when the Pilot was proposed, dozens of residents spoke out in opposition, and numerous Civil Rights organizations—including the ACLU of Washington, OneAmerica, 350

Seattle, Chief Seattle Club, El Centro de la Raza, Gender Justice League, Massage Parlor Outreach Project, Planned Parenthood Alliance Advocates, and WA People's Privacy—urged Council to reject it.[3]

The City's own Community Surveillance Working Group, who conducted a Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment for CCTV and RTCC, reviewed the Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) and letters from community organizations and public comments to conclude:

> "After reviewing the information, a majority of the working group ***is unsupportive of any pilot deployment of these two technologies*** as described in the SIRs. ***The amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions both warrant pause on pilot deployment***…. This sentiment reflects the ***high degree of apprehension expressed by a vast majority of the public's comments[,] regarding the potential misuse*** of these technologies. These comments were overwhelmingly negative and voiced a ***serious concern and lack of trust*** within the community as a whole[.] [T]he working group believes that going forward with these acquisitions ***may serve to further erode*** with a significant portion ***the public's trust in SPD and negatively affect community relations***."[4]

At the August 12, 2025, Public Safety meeting, every community member offering public comment opposed expansion of the Surveillance Pilot. One speaker summarized the impact on our most vulnerable communities: "If we move all this data to a third-party cloud, we risk handing it over to ICE and anti-abortion states making it easier to target immigrants, women, trans people, and activists." Another explained how surveillance data is already being misused: "the President is liable to take over municipal police departments, this legislation would allow the police and whoever controls them more ability to target whoever they want...ICE is already using surveillance data like this....SPD itself has a history of biased enforcement....Council should reject all legislation that expands surveillance."

Community members also have significant concerns about the location of two of the three expansion areas to the Central District (Seattle's historically Black neighborhood, and Capitol Hill (Seattle's 2SLGBTQIA+ neighborhood, home to Cal Andersen park, home to several protests resulting in audit reviews of SPD response to protests during BLM protests and most recently, SPD's response to 2SLGBTQIA+ community protesters on May 24, 2025). Public comment from a member of Central District raised concerns about "erosion of our civil rights" and the "disparate impact on minority youth." A queer Capitol Hill resident "who's everyday life will be documented by these cameras" summarized the consequences: "good governance depends on policy data.... Expanding the program without waiting for information is a huge gamble of precious City resources.... When councilmembers wipe away the testimony of hundreds of people who've expressed their opposition...it frays the fabric of our civil society and democracy itself." These neighborhoods are home to communities that continue to be subjects of

significant police action and over policing, expanding surveillance compounds disproportionate impact.

2. Surveillance Expansion Has a Disproportionate Impact on the Civil Rights of Communities of Color

Surveillance technologies have a disparate impact on communities of color. In 2024, Seattle's Community Surveillance Working Group warned that the Surveillance Pilot could disproportionately harm communities of color, both through built-in bias in the technology itself and through increasing exposure to law enforcement and the criminal legal system.[5] We have already seen that biased impact in Seattle. Most recently, in Wallingford, where CCTV footage was used to wrongly identify and arrest an Asian man for arson and murder. He was interrogated for hours and jailed for a month; despite having a different name and offering his own in-house technology to prove he was home at the time of the crime.[6] Additionally, during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, the FBI and SPD surveilled protesters observing First Amendment rights without public knowledge or oversight, at the expense of residents' privacy and civil liberties.[7]

3. Oversight Recommendations Have Not Been Addressed

When the pilot was first proposed, the CPC recognized support for a "time-limited and location-limited pilot" so long as it included "continued community engagement and feedback from the community[,]" "determinations of metrics measurements before implementing any new use of these technologies[,]" and a two year period of time that would include an additional Surveillance Impact Report process to be repeated "before the program is made permanent **or expanded**." The CPC made clear the importance of community engagement and feedback and of the significance of data and oversight that was to be provided by the Office of the Inspector General.[8]

There remain unaddressed and outstanding recommendations regarding surveillance by the CPC, OIG, and the Community Surveillance Working Group intended to address the implications this surveillance has on our constitutional rights and civil liberties.[9] Some of these recommendations have been outstanding since 2019 (regarding the collection and recording First Amendment protests during BLM).[10] OIG's latest surveillance report addresses the need for protection of this data regarding third parties and notes that digital recordings marked for Evidence.com are stored indefinitely.

4. Risk of Misuse of Surveillance Data by the Federal Administration and Outside Actors

We are at an unprecedented time when the Trump Administration is undermining the sovereignty of state and local jurisdictions and targeting sanctuary cities, including Seattle. The Administration has intent to assert control of local law enforcement and local agencies in

sanctuary cities. They first issued executive orders in April, [11] then in June, they deployed the National Guard in L.A.[12] Just this month they announced a takeover of law enforcement in Washington, D.C., through deployment of the National Guard, declaring an emergency to address "out-of-control" violent crime, and deploying federal law enforcement and immigration agents through the City. [13] They have made clear their intentions to do so in other cities, most recently Chicago.[14] They recently sent a letter to Washington State and the City of Seattle demanding an end to "sanctuary jurisdiction" policies that limit police cooperation with ICE.[15] Now is not the time to expand surveillance that could be used by the Administration against our community members.

Equally concerning, yet less understood, are interoperable databases and third-party agreements, which often have the unintended consequence of violating civil rights.[16] Several sources have confirmed that ICE is using ALPR[17] and facial recognition data to track immigrants with local law enforcement agencies, some in sanctuary cities, often obtained informally and in violation of state and privacy laws.[18] Local surveillance information is also vulnerable to misuse through Fusion Centers, [19] and other interoperable databases, where the Administration has access to ALPR and facial recognition, allowing ICE to sidestep sanctuary city laws.[20] The Washington State Fusion Center "facilitate[s] information sharing" between local law enforcement and homeland security partners.[21] It serves as a "virtual network" where state, local, federal, and even private stakeholders share surveillance and law enforcement data. DHS officials work directly alongside SPD, WSP, and King County officers within Washington's Fusion Center. [22] Expanding surveillance in Seattle would only broaden the data available to ICE through this system.

We understand that SPD's immigration policy states: *"Employees will not initiate, maintain, or participate in any police action based on an individual's immigration status."* We trust SPD officers to comply with all applicable laws, but working side by side with federal agents at the Washington Fusion Center puts SPD officers in a difficult position. SPD officers might feel compelled to provide surveillance data, if requested, for any broadly defined "criminal" investigation by the current Administration. And failure to do so could result in increased scrutiny by the Administration.

5. **The Consent Decree Has Terminated, Community Trust and Oversight is Paramount**

We are urging City Council to reject expansion of the Surveillance Pilot at this time. Alternatively, if Council is opposed to rejecting expansion, we strongly recommend engaging community perspectives and convening an Executive Session to examine the potential consequences and legal implications of data collection and sharing under a hostile federal Administration.

The expansion of surveillance that lacks data establishing its efficacy, in the face of community opposition, and when doing so exposes the Seattle community to federal overreach and further misuse of private information will only sow further mistrust of City government and SPD. The City just emerged from federal oversight of SPD, this is the time to listen to and prioritize community voice in public safety and policing – voices asking for investments in housing, behavioral health, and community-based safety programs, not through expansion of untested surveillance prone to misuse and subject to harming communities most impacted by policing.

Sincerely,

Police Practices Workgroup
Community Police Commission

Cc:
All City Councilmembers
Mayor Bruce Harrell
Deputy Mayor Tim Burgess

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[1] This letter issues from the PPWG, a working group of the CPC. The CPC's regularly scheduled September meeting will not take place due to the scheduling conflict with the September 3, 2025, hearing on the Consent Decree at the Western District of Washington.
[2] 2024 CCTV Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 CCTV SIR FINAL.pdf; 2024 RTCC Surveillance Impact Report, SPD: 2024 RTCC SIR FINAL.pdf
[3] Harrell's Expanded Surveillance Program Clears Hurdle in Seattle Council » The Urbanist
[4] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[5] Surveillance Impact Report Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, The Community Surveillance Working Group: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SAWG/SAWG%20Documents%202024/CSWG%20Privacy%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%20Assessment_%20CCTV%20%26%20RTCC.docx.pdf
[6] KUOW - Seattle man says dropped murder, arson charges against him were result of 'racist misidentification'
[7] FBI and SPD infiltrated Seattle 2020 protests, used informants and surveillance | May 28–June 3, 2025 | Real Change
[8] CPC Official Statement on SPD's Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot Program, dated March 21, 2024. https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/CommunityPoliceCommission/Press%20Releases/2024/CPC%20Statement%2003.21.24%20SPD%20technology.pdf
[9] Office of the Inspector General's Consolidated Risk Surveillance Usage Review 2024, dated June 6, 2025 https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/OIG_Surveillance_Consolidated2024.pdf
[10] Follow-up Audit of SPD Compliance with Chapter 14.12 of Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes: https://www.seattle.gov/documents/Departments/OIG/Audits/2023_Chapter_14.12_Audit.pdf
[11] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/protecting-american-communities-from-criminal-aliens/ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/02/2025-07790/strengthening-and-unleashing-americas-law-enforcement-to-pursue-criminals-and-protect-innocent
[12] Trump deploys California National Guard to LA to quell protests despite the governor's objections | The Seattle Times
[13] Trump's order to deploy troops in DC is his latest use of the National Guard in cities | The Seattle Times

[14] https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/26/politics/trump-national-guard-us-cities
[15] KUOW - As DOJ threatens WA over sanctuary laws, state officials double down on protections
[16] License Plate Readers Proliferate in Washington, Bringing Concerns over ICE Overreach, The Urbanist https://www.theurbanist.org/2025/06/19/license-plate-readers-proliferate-in-washington-ice-overreach/ (Reporting that that data collected by Flock Safety ALPRs, relied upon by the King County Housing Authority (KCHA), was recently shared with ICE and DHS. Authorities in Texas conducted a nationwide search of more than 83,000 ALPR cameras for a woman accessing abortion; the internal audit showed KCHA's data was searched).
[17] Who's Watching Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to Immigrant and Reproductive Rights in Washington State, https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2022/12/07/whos-watching-washington/
[18] Immigration Police Can Already Sidestep US Sanctuary City Laws Using Data-Sharing Fusion Centers | WIRED https://www.wired.com/story/ice-sanctuary-cities-fusion-centers/ ; See also, ICE Outlines How Investigators Rely on Third-Party Facial Recognition services https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/06/ice-outlines-how-investigators-rely-third-party-facial-recognition-services/165846/#:~:text=Law%20enforcement%20agencies%20at%20every,methods%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20document%20states.
[19] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c1bfc7eee175995a4ceb638/t/673b7bdc7bfa22584f88e956/1731951581156/2024.11.19_STOP+Report_Deportation+Data+Centers_final.pdf
https://www.stopspying.org/deportation-data-centers
[20] See November 19, 2024 Report by STOP Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, above: for example, ICE agents in Philadelphia's Fusion Center used the City's automated license plate reader system to track undocumented drivers—despite sanctuary city laws prohibiting such actions. ICE's 2020 facial recognition manual also encouraged reliance on Fusion Center data (though DHS has since deleted the public link: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf).
[21] https://www.wsfc.wa.gov/About
[22] https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/WSFC1.png

File #: CB 121053, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software.

WHEREAS, on October 8, 2024, the City Council passed Ordinance 127111, adopting the original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Real-Time Crime Center software (RTCC); and

WHEREAS, the purpose of the RTCC program provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis-integrates dispatch, cameras, officer location, 911 calls, records management system, and other information into one single view. The software is used to alert real-time crime center staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey that information to officers who are responding in the field; and

WHEREAS, subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), which section was enacted by Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance"; and

WHEREAS, the material update will provide the Seattle Police Department (SPD) the ability to view the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC software; and

WHEREAS, the RTCC program went live in May 2025 and early examples of the RTCC program directly contributing to public safety outcomes include a drive-by shooting where the suspect was taken into custody, footage from a stabbing incident in the Chinatown-International District to assist investigators,

a female reporting an attempted robbery with the male suspect denying the allegations but the RTCC video footage showed the male grabbing the female's purse to disprove his story, and locating a suspect where the victim called 911 to report someone was following them with a knife; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2.

Section 2. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this ____day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:
Attachment 1 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Real-Time Crime Center
Attachment 2 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: Real-Time Crime Center

City of Seattle

2025 Surveillance Impact Report

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department

Surveillance Impact Report Versions:

- 2024 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Real-Time Crime Center Software adopted by Ordinance 127111 on 10/08/2024.
- 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Real-Time Crime Center Software

Surveillance Impact Report ("SIR") overview

About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "Surveillance Ordinance," on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City's executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the "Surveillance Policy".

How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department ("Seattle IT"). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.

Upcoming for Review	Initial Draft	Open Comment Period	Final Draft	Working Group	Council Review
The technology is upcoming for review, but the department has not begun drafting the surveillance impact report (SIR).	Work on the initial draft of the SIR is currently underway.	The initial draft of the SIR and supporting materials have been released for public review and comment. During this time, one or more public meetings will take place to solicit feedback.	During this stage the SIR, including collection of all public comments related to the specific technology, is being compiled and finalized.	The surveillance advisory working group will review each SIR's final draft and complete a civil liberties and privacy assessment, which will then be included with the SIR and submitted to Council.	City Council will decide on the use of the surveillance technology, by full Council vote.

Privacy Impact Assessment

Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA") is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

1.0 Abstract

1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot is one component of an overall strategy of addressing felony crime at specific places. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, and enhanced lighting and cleaning.

The Crime Prevention Technology program is designed to be a pilot project, with independent researchers conducting an outcome evaluation to be completed two years after implementation. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the pilot project may be either discontinued or continued.

This SIR covers the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software, one part of this pilot, and provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, cameras (such as CCTV and traffic monitoring cameras), officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one "pane of glass" (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and community safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects – enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions. RTCC also aids in investigations by aggregating multiple data sources into one location, helping provide detectives with actionable information that increases the quality of investigations and prosecutions, leading to increased accountability for criminal offenders.

1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

The City's police staffing crisis, now in its fourth year, has resulted in over 700 officers leaving SPD since 2019. As of January 2024, 913 police officers are available for deployment in the city, the lowest number of in-service officers since 1991 and significantly below per-capita staffing relative to comparative jurisdictions. Low staffing levels also affect investigations, which hinders police effectiveness in solving cases and holding violent criminals accountable.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic places, and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Implementing technology tools to bolster policing capabilities, as one part of a holistic crime prevention and reduction plan is essential to address ongoing gun violence, vehicle theft, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime at specific places, including within our most victimized communities.

Real-time crime center software brings several technologies deemed surveillance technologies (CCTV, ALPR, etc.) into one platform. In addition, some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies, if enabled. As a note, SPD will not use AI facial recognition technologies. Finally, the software stores information from these technologies either in the cloud or on-premise, creating some risks around data security and retention.

Due to these factors, the City of Seattle Privacy Office has deemed the technology surveillance technology, which triggered this review.

2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview provides the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed.

2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

The theory of change supporting the pilot project is that these technologies (1) bolster police effectiveness in public places where crime is concentrated when used with other crime prevention efforts, including increased police patrols, enhanced lighting, graffiti mitigation, and others (CPTED), (2) deter criminal behavior when public notice is posted, and (3) gather

evidence to hold offenders accountable. These efforts can improve public safety and enhance the public's confidence in the city government's ability to maintain safe neighborhoods.

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigation staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department.

RTCC software can help mitigate staffing shortages for both patrol officers and detectives by providing more reliable and accurate data on incidents in real-time.

The benefits of the RTCC for a victim(s):

- RTCC staff can use multiple technologies (CCTV, etc.) to pinpoint the location of crimes and identify the location of victims.
- RTCC staff can assess the scene before officers responding, helping speed up the deployment of emergency aid or lifesaving assistance.

Increased investigative information helps lead to justice for victims. The benefits of RTCC technology for a community:

- Increased investigative evidence can aid in the capture and prosecution of offenders, leading to reduced violence and fewer firearms on the street. Increased evidence can also help exonerate the innocent.
- Integration with CCTV cameras, SDOT traffic cameras, and real-time crime center software can provide detectives with precise information about suspect vehicle, appearance, and location, increasing correct identification of suspects and reducing unnecessary traffic stops and adverse interactions with the public.

The benefits of RTCC technology for an officer:

- Real-time crime center software can facilitate a coordinated, precise response to suspect apprehension, increasing the safety of arrests for all involved. The technology provides a data-driven orientation to police response and staffing.

Here is one example of how SPD might use the RTCC software to more efficiently utilize separate data sources to aid victims, capture dangerous suspects, and help remove firearms from the streets:

> A RTCC officer receives an alert through CAD and the RTCC software that there are gunshots on Aurora Avenue North. The software shows a map of the area on her monitor, with the associated dispatch call superimposed on the screen. Her map screen also automatically shows the feeds of the closest CCTV and SDOT traffic cameras, as well as nearby patrol car locations. She uses the RTCC software to enlarge the feed for the cameras north of the incident and sees a black Honda Civic moving at a high rate of speed in a northerly direction on Aurora.

Using the software, she quickly pulls up the camera recording where the gunshots were reported and visually ascertains that the shots were fired from a black Honda and that there is a person down on the ground. She advises over SPD radio that there is a possible gunshot victim and gives a description of the Honda and the license plate. She sees from the live camera feeds that the Honda is turning west on 125th Street, and that there is a patrol vehicle on that street 10 blocks west of Aurora and one 15 blocks south of the scene on Aurora. She advises over the radio that the suspect is heading west on 125th St. She goes back to the live camera view and surveys the shooting scene. The person is still down. No one else is at the scene. She relays via radio what she has seen through the RTCC software.

After the incident, she uses the RTCC software to create clips of all scenes showing the incident and the vehicle travel before, during and after the incident and uploads them from the RTCC software to the SPD digital evidence system.

At the same time this is happening, the officer driving north on Aurora gets dispatched to a possible shooting scene. The dispatcher informs her that there is a victim on the ground and the RTCC officer has observed no other people around the victim. The officer arrives on scene, exits her vehicle, takes a quick scan of the scene to confirm that the scene is secure. She grabs a first aid kit in her trunk, then runs to the victim on the ground and renders aid. In the background, she can hear the Fire Department sirens coming toward her. She radios dispatch and tells them the scene is secure for the arriving paramedics.

After the shooting scene is secure, a homicide detective arrives at the scene. Officers are using their flashlights and struggling to find bullet casings. The detective pulls up the RTCC application on his phone and brings up the information for the incident. He walks towards the officers and shows them the video – they move up the road a bit and eventually find the casings judging by the location of the vehicle in the video. The detective is satisfied there were no witnesses after watching the video again and proceeds with his work at the scene.

2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

Academic research related to the effect of real-time crime centers is limited because of their fairly recent implementation; however, a 2023 John Jay College of Criminal Justice study showed that a real-time crime center in Chicago, IL increased case clearance rates 5% for violent crime, 12% for property crime, and 11% for overall crime. The authors concluded that "RTCCs may provide investigative benefits to police through the integration of technologies and data, thus enhancing case solvability."

An extensive evaluation of the Chicago Police Department's use of a RTCC was completed by the RAND in 2019. This evaluation is meaningful because it highlighted the successes and failures of the CPD centers and made specific recommendations to increase their effectiveness.

Other studies on the effects of technologies integrated with RTCC software, such as CCTV, are discussed in their respective Surveillance Impact Reports.

SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the RTCC implementation through standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies (CCTV/RTCC/enhanced ALPR) will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.

This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the “total cost of ownership of public safety,” Equity, Accountability, and Quality (“EAQ”), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

2.3 Describe the technology involved.

The core functionality of RTCC software involves integrating multiple sources of information into a single “pane of glass” (a single view). The sources of information that are being integrated with the software are current or expected SPD technologies such as the department’s CAD system (computer-aided dispatch), closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic-monitoring cameras (as referenced in the “Closed Circuit Television ‘Traffic Cameras’ (Transportation)” SIR), automatic vehicle location (AVL) system, body and in-car video cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPR), digital evidence platforms, and 911 call systems.

Most of the technology comes into play around a mapping function which provides the overlay for all the other technologies. The mapping system includes roads, building layouts (when provided), and other layers like beat/sector boundaries. Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications, as well as mobile applications for use in the field.

While most integrations between RTCC software and department applications occur between vendor APIs, some RTCC vendors use hardware for CCTV cameras that allow for the recording of the camera video, providing the ability to playback CCTV or SDOT traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC environment. RTCC software for CCTV cameras can also provide in-application video analytics that use machine-learned algorithms to analyze camera feeds and, using object recognition, locate specific items, people based on clothing, or vehicles based on description. This technology complies with the city of Seattle's AI rules for use, requiring a "human in the loop" at the initiation and evaluation of the results. SPD will not use facial

recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends.

Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses or SDOT traffic monitoring cameras) to share specific camera feeds with agencies. This option would be fully voluntary at the discretion of the camera owners. Private camera owners can also set up conditional sharing, meaning they can determine the parameters of what, how, and when their camera feeds are shared. Some vendors also provide a registry so that private camera owners can share the location of the camera, but not the video feeds, so agencies can easily canvass for videos after an incident. The system can then allow SPD to send an email to all registered cameras in an area requesting relevant video. There is no obligation to share footage if a system is registered.

Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle and Reverse 911 and could be used in large-impact situations such as traffic re-routing, chemical spills, or other life-safety disruptions.

There are also features that allow a rapid video response to calls for service. For example, a community member that calls 911 may be sent a link to their phone to opt-in to a video chat with a 911 operator or officer to provide face-to-face communication to help facilitate accurate officer response and/or medical aid instruction. The caller would need to opt-in to allow the use of their camera, microphone, and GPS. This service could be used in an active shooter situation to help officers assess the situation or other rapidly changing emergency environments.

Other potential features include tools that enable incident planning and real-time management across the department, including freehand sketching of maps, iconography, and differing views for different groups of users, and editing access across a variety of connected devices. Integrating graphical illustration tools with live video and team geolocation creates a flexible and holistic view of emergent incidents, streamlining response capabilities. This feature would help incident commanders utilize mapping capabilities to better manage large-scale events.

Another potential feature allows officers to listen to 911 calls directly, helping to bring small details within the words, tone, or background that can aid responders in achieving desired outcomes. This feature would utilize 911 call recording already in use at the Seattle 911 call center.

Finally, some RTCC software systems have services that allow members of the public to anonymously submit multi-media tips by texting pictures, text, or video to a publicized number. Tips are then stored in the system for examination and potentially used as evidence.

2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.

The mission of the SPD is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, equitable, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's

priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively.

The RTCC software helps provide responsive police services to victims, witnesses, and members of the community by providing responders with more accurate and robust information that does not require significant staffing additions. Using technology that enables quicker, complex, and effective police response aligns with the SPD mission and will benefit the community as a whole.

2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

At the time of writing, planning is still underway for exactly who would use the RTCC software. The vision is for SPD to staff a real-time crime center with a combination of sworn officers and civilian staff, eventually transitioning to a more civilian-staffed model. Due to the wide functionality of RTCC software, it is likely incident commanders with appropriate training will be the primary users of the software, supported by sworn and civilian staff. The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.

3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

The RTCC will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access. Data and information obtained through the RTCC may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and

the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

The SPD does not currently have any policies related to RTCC. As the RTCC will be the platform for different technologies, such as CCTV, any video recordings that are captured will only be preserved as evidence if it is determined a crime has been committed.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies.

Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

The use of CCTV will comply with SMC Chapter 14.12, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes. All existing SPD policies related to technology and Criminal Justice Information Systems will apply to the RTCC. (Policy 12.050). All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only and personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with SPD policies.

Access to the RTCC will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive SPD-developed training in the use of the RTCC and related policy, operation, and procedures prior to receiving system access.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

4.0 Data Collection and Use

4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, SDOT traffic monitoring cameras, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

SDOT traffic monitoring cameras (as referenced in the "Closed Circuit Television 'Traffic Cameras' (Transportation)" SIR) will be utilized in the RTCC software for law enforcement purposes.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single window view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

The desired deployment date is mid-2024. SPD's vision is to have a RTCC staffed by a combination of sworn and civilian staff that will monitor the RTCC software and provide information to patrol officers and detectives. Access may be given to detectives and patrol officers in certain situations and with appropriate training. The system will be used by incident commanders at the scene of major crimes and other events requiring police engagement.

The SPD Technology and Innovation Unit will be the initial owner of the system and will manage implementation.

4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The technology will be in continuous operation.

4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

The installation of the RTCC software is permanent and will operate 24/7.

4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?

There will be no new physical objects or sensors collecting data as part of the RTCC software package. It integrates existing data sources into one centralized platform. Some of the data sources feeding into the RTCC do have physical equipment that is visible to the public, such as CCTV cameras.

4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.

Other law enforcement agencies have used similar RTCC platforms to share information during serious incidents that span jurisdictions. For example, an active shooter in the City of Atlanta was apprehended in a neighboring county that was using the same RTCC platform as the City of Atlanta.

Any direct usage by a different jurisdiction will be consistent with SPD policy.

4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?

RTCC software will be accessed and used for serious incidents happening in real-time to provide information to patrol resources. It will also be used to provide a comprehensive picture of numerous SPD systems to investigators.

Data held in the RTCC system may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?

RTCC software data will be stored within secure City of Seattle facilities under the administration of the Seattle Information Technology Department. If cloud storage is utilized, it will follow city security guidelines and only be accessible to outside parties as part of system maintenance and support only when authorized.

Various measures will be in place to protect data from unauthorized access.

- Data Encryption
- Access control mechanisms (meeting CJIS requirements*)
- Strict user permission settings
- Industry standard network security measures (meeting CJIS requirements)

The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General upon request.

* Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets requirements for organizations that access or use criminal justice information. These requirements are referred to as "CJIS requirements" and are developed and audited for compliance by the FBI.

5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

5.1 How will data be securely stored?

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

The retention period for data stored by RTCC software will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will be saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors, will be allowed as needed.

5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

Per SIR section 5.2, RTCC data collected without evidentiary value will be automatically purged by the system after 30 days.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with SPD Policy 6.060, such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the OIG, can audit for compliance at any time.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court

- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected or compiled by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers to execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to criminal activity as part of investigations, and to comply with legal requirements.

6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes ☒ No ☐

6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20, regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260 (auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems), and RCW Chapter 10.97 (Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Sharing agreements must meet the standards reflected in SPD Policy 12.055. Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260, and RCW Chapter 10.97.

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the RTCC software platform may be used.

6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

Real-time crime center software data comes from various SPD systems and is blended into one single view/location. Accuracy of data flows over APIs are checked at the point of development and monitored by system administrator and system logging thereafter. The system administrator is responsible for monitoring API versioning and change management to proactively plan and avoid issues. In addition, as data is being received and analyzed in the RTCC, specially trained individuals are reviewing and assessing the data and making judgments about the quality, accuracy, suitability, and value of the information being collected.

6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

Both the content and means of collection of information that may be utilized by the RTCC is regulated by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 7 of the Washington State Constitution, case law interpreting the same, Washington's Privacy Act, RCW 9.73, CFR Title 28, Part 23, and Seattle's Intelligence Ordinance, SMC Chapter 14.12.

7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

SMC 14.12 and SPD Policy 6.060 directs all SPD personnel that any documentation of information concerning a person's sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The purpose of policy 6.060 is "to ensure that the collection and review of such information serves a legitimate law enforcement purpose and does not unreasonably infringe upon individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy." SPD would only document sexual preferences or practices, political or religious activities if it is related to an unlawful act occurring, for example; as seen in a child pornography investigation.

Additionally, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures. The policy states that "employees shall not make decisions or take actions that are influenced by bias, prejudice, or discriminatory intent. Law enforcement and investigative decisions must be based upon observable behavior or specific intelligence," as well as outlining specifics related to this area.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

As stated above, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management system, and other information into one platform. With the nature of data obtained through the RTCC, there is some risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes that allow for authorized auditors, including the Office of Inspector General, to inspect use and deployment of the RTCC software. Additionally, the Office of Police Accountability can conduct investigations of possible violations of City and SPD privacy-related policies and laws.

8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Sharing of digital evidence outside the department is primarily done through SPD's digital evidence management system. Records of when data was shared and who it is shared with is noted in the system audit logs. Digital evidence shared outside of the digital evidence management system (e.g., using media such as DVDs, thumb drives, etc.) is done though SPD's Digital Forensic Unit, which logs requests.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

The Office of Inspector General conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.

Financial Information

Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
Q4 2024	Q2 2025	$300,000	$0	$100,000	General Fund

Notes:

Please consult the material update summary and fiscal note.

1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD

Notes:

1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

The use of RTCC software may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the RTCC software and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities.

No funding beyond city General Fund dollars has been identified for this technology.

Expertise and References

Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report ("SIR"). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
Atlanta		Currently in use
Detroit		Currently in use
Mesa, AZ		Currently in use
Orange County, CA		Currently in use
Washington DC		Deployed February 2024

2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link
Bureau of Justice Assistance RTCC		https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/RealTimeCrimeCenterInformation.pdf

Information		

Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") and engagement for public comment worksheet

Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

In addition to completing the RET template sections below, the 2024 Council Budget Action SPD-900-A requested that the Executive, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) co-prepare a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis for these technologies, pursuant to the process that the Executive has already created to comply with the Surveillance Ordinance. Please see Appendix B: Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis.

Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments' ("Seattle IT") Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative ("RSJI") is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

1.0 Set Outcomes

1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?

☐ The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.

☐ There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
☒ The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
☒ The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

The information presented in this RET is specific to the initial pilot areas of Aurora Ave. N, Chinatown/International District, and the 3rd Ave./Downtown Core.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot, including the RTCC, is one integrated component to this overall strategy of addressing this issue. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, enhanced lighting, and enhanced cleaning.

The technology will be used for the following purposes:

- Closed-Circuit (CCTV) camera systems will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults, and other offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent, and removing deadly weapons from the street, thereby reducing the risk of harm to the public.
- Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software helps provide situational awareness to increase officers' and the public's safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase the reliability of the location of victims and suspects, enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

Potential impacts on civil liberties include but are not limited to:

- Privacy concerns associated with surveillance of people, vehicles, and license plates in public places.
- Misuse of collected video and information/mission creep.
- Lack of transparency with the public on what is being done with recordings.
- Loss of personal autonomy with surveillance of an area.

To mitigate these potential community concerns, SPD will:

- Post signs indicating that police surveillance and video recordings are occurring.
- Notification of the technology being used will be shared with the neighborhoods where it is deployed through community meetings and active canvassing with street fliers.
- Ensure technology is being used for crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent crimes in the surveillance area.
- SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions.
- CCTV technology will only monitor public places, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks.
- Recorded material from CCTV cameras or the compilation of data at the RTCC, will only be kept for 30 days unless it is evidence of criminal behavior, in which case it will be transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence storage system. ALPR data will be maintained for 90 days and then deleted unless it contains evidence of criminal behavior.
- Provide access to CCTV, ALPR, and SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) user and device logs to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for compliance audits.
- The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.
- The Office of Police Accountability may conduct investigations of violations of SPD policies and laws related to privacy.

Additionally, the technologies will only be implemented once the City's surveillance ordinance requirements are met, and the City Council authorizes the use.

1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

The following neighborhoods are being considered for deploying the CCTV technologies. Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.

☐ all Seattle neighborhoods

- ☒ **Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th**
- ☐ Ballard
- ☒ **Belltown**
- ☐ Beacon Hill
- ☐ Capitol Hill
- ☐ Central District
- ☒ **Chinatown/International District**
- ☐ Columbia City
- ☒ **Downtown Commercial Core**
- ☐ Delridge
- ☐ First Hill
- ☐ Georgetown
- ☐ Greenwood / Phinney
- ☐ International District
- ☐ Interbay
- ☐ North
- ☐ Northeast
- ☐ Northwest
- ☐ Madison Park / Madison Valley
- ☐ Magnolia
- ☐ Rainier Beach
- ☐ Ravenna / Laurelhurst
- ☐ South Lake Union / Eastlake
- ☐ Southeast
- ☐ Southwest
- ☐ South Park
- ☐ Wallingford / Fremont
- ☐ West Seattle
- ☐ King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual Aid)
- ☐ Outside King County (Mutual Aid)

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

Downtown & Belltown Area *(Potential location)*



Chinatown-International District Area *(Potential)*



Aurora Avenue North Corridor
(Potential; Aurora Ave, 85th to 145th Streets)

1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?

Race/Ethnicity	Aurora	Chinatown International District	Belltown	Downtown Commercial	Citywide
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	0.4%
Asian	14.0%	49.2%	30.4%	16.8%	16.9%
Black/African American	8.9%	8.6%	5.5%	11.1%	6.8%
Hispanic or Latino of Any Race	11.3%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	8.2%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Multiple Races	7.9%	5.8%	4.9%	5.6%	7.3%
White	56.2%	27.2%	50.8%	56.1%	59.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; OPCD

Note: Geographical areas provided are 2020 Census Block Assignments of Urban Villages within the Downtown Urban Center, with the exception of Aurora. Aurora's boundaries are based on ½ mile buffer from Aurora between Meridian and Greenwood, and from 85th to 145th.

1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?

CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as other accountability measures. This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias.

These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. They are focused on individuals only if they are present in these areas.

1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

Data from the technology may be shared outside SPD with other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters under the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA").

Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. To mitigate this possibility, SPD has established policies regarding disseminating data related to criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and authorized researchers. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior.

1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

As with decisions around data sharing, data storage and data retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. Video from CCTVs will be stored for 30 days unless imagery is needed for investigations or to comply with legal requirements. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, and other accountability measures.

1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you/ have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.

The most important unintended possible negative consequence related to the implementation of CCTVs and the RTCC is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unreasonable surveillance. To mitigate this risk, SPD is enacting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under which SPD may utilize CCTVs and Real-Time Crime Center software. Access to user and device logs will be given to the OIG so they can audit the use of these technologies.

To prevent unintended outcomes, the City will develop and post signs in areas that are covered by the cameras' view to alert the public to their presence and use. Active canvassing in pilot locations and passing out street fliers will occur to further inform the public about the use of the technologies in the impacted neighborhoods. Additionally, the Office of the Inspector General will have access at any time to monitor and evaluate the use of these technologies. During the public outreach sessions described below, the City will listen to feedback from the public and provide responses during the technology review process.

The potential positive impact will be reduced serious crime concentrated in the locations where the technologies are deployed. If achieved, these reductions will create a safer environment for everyone who lives, works, plays, or visits these areas.

2.0 Public Outreach

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR.

3.0 Public Comment Analysis

The public comment period was June 3, 2025 to June 23, 2025.

3.1 Summary of Response Volume

Please see Appendix B.

3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.

Please see Appendix B.

3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Please see Appendix B.

4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on April 12, 2024.

4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

Concerns that have been raised through public comment and engagement will be addressed in SPD policy. SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for RTCC.

5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

The goals of this project are:

1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in specific geographic areas where the technologies are deployed.
2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
3. To measure and minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

We will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur because of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the Inspector General, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts. Further, the City will retain outside academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an evaluation plan related to the use of the technologies.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group ("working group"), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

"Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement."

Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR. Please consult Ordinance 127111 adopted by the City Council on 10/08/24 to view the original Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment.

Appendix A: Glossary

Accountable: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

Community outcomes: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

Contracting equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

DON: "department of neighborhoods."

Immigrant and refugee access to services: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle's civic, economic and cultural life.

Inclusive outreach and public engagement: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

Individual racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

Institutional racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

OCR: "Office for Civil Rights."

Opportunity areas: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

Racial equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person's race.

Racial inequity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person's race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

RET: "racial equity toolkit"

Seattle neighborhoods: (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

Stakeholders: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

Structural racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

Surveillance ordinance: Seattle City Council passed ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "surveillance ordinance."



SIR: "surveillance impact report", a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance 125376.

Workforce equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

CCTV 2025 Material Change, public comment received via Privacy Inbox

June 23rd, 2025

Dear Seattle City Leadership,

Here is my public comment on the SPD Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) currently going through the Material Update process.

I've provided my concerns and recommendations below in order of severity. You will find that the negatives far exceed any possible positives and as such **my overall recommendation is that the City of Seattle not deploy a RTCC and all the material updates to the system should be rescinded.**

Concerns & Recommendations:

1) Reactive, not preventative: SPD is misleading the public by calling this a "Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot". This not a pilot and the SPD RTCC contains data from on-going and historical crime incidents, so by it's very nature will be reactive (911 calls, etc). SPD even says in item 1.1 of the RTCC SIR that the "purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to ... reactively investigate incidents." The RTCC is not a crime prevention tool and mislabeling it as such diverts consideration away from truly preventative measures, which are not technology driven - and that is true for both community-oriented measures (like after-school programs, rehabilitation, workforce training, etc) and police/policy-driven measures (such as gun lock boxes, gun buy-back programs, requiring reporting of lost/stolen guns, trigger locks, etc).
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - effort should instead be placed on actual crime prevention measures.

2) Meager efficacy: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:

(a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]

(b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].

(c) Overall, the results from studies assessing the use of technology on crime clearances has been mixed; whereas other (non-technological) aspects have been shown to have a greater impact on case clearances. For example, the 2021 paper by Heather Prince (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the

research" [http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-04-2021-0054] states "newer research findings suggest that investigations-specific organizational policies focused on strengthening the capacity and accountability of investigative work, applying targeted resources to investigations, and increasing investigative effort in developing witnesses, evidence and responding to crime scenes could improve an agency's ability to affect clearance rates" [Prince pdf page 15] So it would be a better use of SPD's time and taxpayer's money to pursue these non-technological improvements that have shown measurable improvements in crime clearances.

(d) SPD already has had a RTCC (iBase) since 2015. If RTCCs were effective at helping clear cases, then that should already be evident in SPD's existing data (such as, mean time to suspect identification before vs after 2015, mean length of time to case clearance before vs after 2015, etc). Since SPD didn't provide such data, the public can only assume that the data SPD does have doesn't look promising regarding the use of a RTCC. Additionally, in item 1.1 of the RTCC, SPD said that a RTCC "helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions." So how many unnecessary stops did SPD conduct before vs after 2015? Moreover, how does the RTCC change the accuracy of suspect descriptions and how is that shown in SPD's data before vs after 2015?

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology.

3) Expensive: This is a poor use of taxpayer money and even of the SPD budget itself. It's also highly likely to be a ballooning amount of money year-over-year, beyond what the SIR implies:

(a) Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs and for which their cost information is publicly accessible, the average cost is $7.16 per person (that is, per person based on the population data from each city's 2020 Census). With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansions.

(b) Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million ... This does not include the costs of ongoing maintenance, technology, and personnel" [Arietti page 1]. The paper later goes on to list the costs specific to Chicago's RTCC as "about $10.6 million, plus an additional $600,000 annually" [Arietti page 4].

(c) The Fiscal Impact section of the RTCC SIR is lacking any data regarding the expected year-over-year costs for powering the RTCC equipment, staffing the RTCC room, bandwidth & data storage costs, the on-going subscription to the vendor's software & support package, and projected maintenance costs. Given the budget deficit the City is facing, it is unwise for the City to spend likely well over $1.8 million dollars to surveil residents instead of providing social services and funding community-driven, proven solutions to reducing gun violence.

(d) This seems like a foot in the door for SPD to have an always ever increasing budget allocated to them to expand and deepen their surveillance. It will be a contract that is an investment in exceptionally costly, ineffective, reactive measures that are hard to remove and do nothing to actually help residents or reduce violence.

(e) SPD says that this will replace their existing RTCC (iBase). However, SPD also uses iBase for other functionality (link analysis, which was the only approved used of iBase under the Surveillance Ordinance). This means that there will continue to be on-going costs for both iBase and the RTCC (Fusus). This is yet another way that SPD's expenditures will continue to balloon.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there are better uses of limited City funds.

4) Racially-biased deployment: The Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the SIR hasn't been updated to reflect the additional locations added to be surveilled. The old RET is now rather inaccurate since it doesn't include a map of the SDOT traffic camera locations or the proposed additional SPD CCTV locations and item 1.4.2 still says "CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated" which is no longer true because SDOT traffic cameras are all over the city and their placement is not related to felony crimes. This is on top of the many issues with the original RET itself:

(a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.
(b) RET item 1.4.1 in the SIR shows disparate impact in the locations chosen to be surveilled. Specifically, there is disproportionate impact on Native American residents in 4 out of 4 of the pilot locations, Black residents in 3 of the pilot locations, Asian & Latinx residents in 2 of the pilot locations, and Mixed folks in 1 of the pilot locations. Additionally, while the majority of Seattle residents are white, all of the pilot locations have an under-proportionate amount of white residents - thus meaning the pilot locations selected appear on paper to be racially motivated. I don't see how the impact won't be biased-based policing because if you are only looking for crime in non-white neighborhoods, then you're primarily going to find non-white suspects (and victims); whereas criminals in white neighborhoods (who are therefore likely white themselves) will fly under the radar of the police.
(c) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.
(d) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public - you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled - that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.
(e) Only 1 of the 2 public engagement meetings on these surveillance technologies was held near a pilot location and the 1 location that was also happened to be the location with the highest amount of white residents out of the 4 pilot locations. Why can SPD find the time to talk to surveillance technology vendors and the City can find the money to surveil residents, but somehow doesn't have the time nor the money to even have host a community event in all of the pilot locations?

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - racist behavior (including with technology) has no place in Seattle.

5) Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws: Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed RTCC:

(a) For background, WA HB 1469 was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing

information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.

(b) And WA SB 5497 was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).

(c) In item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications..." and SPD has confirmed that the video recordings will be streamed and recorded in the cloud (not on-premise with the City of Seattle).

(d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Idaho could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Axon Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Because Axon isn't a WA company, the data is not protected by the Shield Law; and because Fusus isn't a government law enforcement agency, the data is also not protected by the Keep WA Working Act.

(e) These risks to women, trans folks, and/or immigrants are so severe and tangible that as of April 2025, Nashville is no longer even considering deploying the very same tech that SPD has deployed (Axon Fusus): https://nashvillebanner.com/2025/04/28/metro-nashville-fusus-freddie-oconnell/

(f) The amendment that passed in Council that altered the contract language with Axon does not address these concerns either because state/federal laws will always be honored by a judge over simple contract language. Additionally, if the judge who signed the warrant also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Axon might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD (regardless of what the contract says).

(g) These concerns are especially relevant now given the current administration and because SPD has already mounted a camera within range of viewing people who visit the Planned Parenthood on 105th and the Home Depot on Aurora.

(h) SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create these risks to residents.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - SPD must not weaken state laws nor endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require that the RTCC to be on-premise.

6) Illegal use of SDOT cameras: Adding SDOT's traffic monitoring cameras to the SPD RTCC would violate numerous sections of Ordinance 125936 (2019 SDOT CCTV & LPR SIRs).

(a) Item 3.0 on page 150 of Ordinance 125936 states "The CCTV system and data shall be used only for traffic management purposes, except for when the City's Emergency Operations Center is activated to respond to an emergency or to monitor a major city-wide event, in which case the system may be used by other city personnel (e.g. Police and Fire). The system shall not be used for civil or criminal enforcement purposes." So it is illegal for SDOT cameras to be routinely & constantly used by SPD without an event happening. Moreover, this implies that video footage

from the SDOT traffic monitoring cameras would not be admissible in court since it was illegally captured.

(b) At least four other items (3.1, 4.3, 4.7, & 6.1) of Ordinance 125936 only lists users who will have access to FLIR Cameleon ITS and does not list any City departments that would have on-going use of the SDOT traffic camera video feeds outside of Cameleon, so the public and City Council did not consider nor assess this when passing Ordinance 125936.

(c) Similar wording in items 3.3, 4.2, 5.1, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 state that "Video images will not be recorded, except for compelling traffic operational needs. If they are recorded, any such recordings will be destroyed immediately after use. Recordings shall not be stored or disseminated." So it is illegal for SPD to create and store recordings of the SDOT traffic camera feeds.

(d) Similar wording in items 3.3, 4.0, 4.2, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 also state that "Operators may not intentionally use the CCTV cameras to discern any personally identifiable information that would enable the operators to identify a member of the public, unless doing so is necessary to allow the operator to perform a traffic management function." So the SDOT traffic camera feeds would not be of any investigative or evidentiary use to SPD anyways since they are not allowed to contain any personally identifiable information.

(e) Items 4.0 & 4.1 on page 153 of Ordinance 125936 state that "The SDOT CCTV System will not be used to collect any data other than the following: • Live-streamed feed of current traffic conditions • Recorded video of traffic for engineering studies • Still images of traffic conditions used in training materials or included in social media." So both SPD's routine, continuous access to the SDOT traffic cameras and the creation of any recordings from them is illegal.

(f) Similar wording in items 4.2, 4.7, 5.0, 5.3, 6.2, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 again limit the recordings to only traffic engineering studies and specify that the data retention period for those recordings is 10 days. So not only would SPD's use of the SDOT traffic cameras violate their purpose of use when recordings are made, but SPD would also violate the law if they stored the recordings for 30 days, as they currently plan to do so.

(g) Items 6.0 & 6.1 on pages 159 - 160 of Ordinance 125936 states that users accessing the streams must be "notified that the system is intended to be used to monitor traffic and for no other purpose." So again, SPD's use of the SDOT traffic cameras would violate the SIR.

(h) Additionally, multiple items in Ordinance 125936 would be inaccurate if the SDOT traffic cameras were added to the SPD RTCC: items 7.3, 7.4, & 8.1; the RET, and the Community Surveillance Working Group's Privacy & Civil Liberties Impact Assessment.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - SPD must not violate local laws, including the requirements laid out in any Surveillance Impact Report signed by the Mayor.

7) Surveillance expansion: RTCC SIR item 2.3 states that "Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies." There are multiple concerns about this:

(a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.

(b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further

invasion of privacy beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.

(c) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have on-the-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, privately-owned CCTV videos (both live and recorded) should require a warrant signed by a judge before they can be viewed, accessed, or saved by SPD.

8) Hidden/unknowable surveillance features: In item 1.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says, "some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies" and in item 2.3, SPD says that they "will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends." However, face recognition and predictive policing aren't the only concerns:

(a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the data.

(b) SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use an RTCC that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual using the RTCC not clicking the wrong buttons - meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. OPA Case 2020OPA-0305 and OPA Case 2020OPA-0731).

(c) The vendor that SPD plans to use for the RTCC (Fusus) advertises that their system is "continuously evolving along with its database of profiles for search and analysis" and that Fusus is continuously updating the AI capabilities of the RTCC via weekly updates to the system. SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use. Not only that but SPD won't even know beforehand what are all the capabilities this system will have even after it's live and in-use (for possibly years). New features can and will be added to the RTCC both without SPD's awareness and without any public oversight or control - thus (again) elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

(d) In item 6.5 of the RTCC SIR, SPD didn't mention any accuracy checks they were planning to perform of the AI capabilities of the RTCC. So it seems SPD expects both the City and the public to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-and-balances on that.

(e) Moreover, even SPD themselves doesn't want automated assessment of their own videos, so why should residents be subjected to surveillance tools that even SPD doesn't like? https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/decision-to-halt-program-analyzing-seattle-police-bodycam-video-under-scrutiny/

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, all edge-based analytics and/or AI capabilities in the RTCC must be disabled until SPD explicitly lists them individually in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council.

9) No limitations on use: Item 5.1 of the RET in the RTCC SIR says the number one goal for the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the RTCC to only "felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc).
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, specify that the only allowable use of the RTCC is for felony crimes.

10) Unidentified data sources: In item 4.1 of the RTCC SIR, SPD lists the data sources to the RTCC and closes with "and other information systems." This wording leaves open the door for future data integrations to the RTCC to be configured but never go through the Surveillance Ordinance process. For example, SPD could add social media data/analysis to the RTCC and that would not generate a new or updated SIR. No department should be above the scope of the Ordinance.
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, strike "and other information systems" from item 4.1 of the SIR.

11) Excessive data retention: In item 4.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy..." This has multiple issues:

(a) 30 days is too long to keep data on innocent people just going about their day.
(b) Retaining the RTCC data (which includes ALPR and CCTV data) for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for data to use against their victims.
(c) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to RTCC data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this group of pilot technologies enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.
(d) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.
(e) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.
(f) It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would be getting processed by the RTCC).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.

12) Duplication causing confusion in an emergency: Item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, says "Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle..." Seattle already has an opt-in alert notification system (AlertSeattle - https://alert.seattle.gov/). Having two separate systems that perform overlapping functionality of

notifying residents in the case of an emergency is a bad idea because it could result in residents believing that they are subscribed for all emergency alerts when they are only subscribed to SPD's RTCC-based alerting system. If there is a non-SPD emergency, residents won't receive the alert because they are subscribed to the wrong system. There should be only one emergency alert system used by the City of Seattle and it should be whatever system the City's Office of Emergency Management officially designates as such. All city departments should feed their alert data to the OEM-designated system (as is already the case).
Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, the public alert notification feature of the RTCC must be disabled.

13) Security & Compliance:
- (a) Item 4.7 says, "Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials." It would be better if access wasn't just password-based, but was also using MFA/2FA (or even 2SA would be something).
- (b) SPD has also not detailed whether a person must be on the SPD network in order to access the RTCC or if remote access will be permitted.
- (c) SPD hasn't confirmed whether the RTCC will have granular access control.
- (d) Nor whether the RTCC logs the username and timestamp when a camera's pan, tilt, or zoom are changed; or when an ALPR search is conducted. For example, if the system does NOT log this and there was a news report about misuse of the RTCC, then it might be impossible for the OIG/OPA to determine which employee was at fault.
- (e) Item 5.4 in the SIR says that, "Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD"; but that doesn't make sense here. Wouldn't this mean that the unit supervisor for the homicide detectives and the supervisor for the gang unit (and so and so forth) would all each be responsible for ensuring data retention compliance of the RTCC? That responsibility should be more centralized so as to ensure consistency in application of compliance requirements for a potentially widely-used system like the RTCC.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the RTCC to support: detailed logging for all features, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and granular access control of any cameras.

14) Training: Item 3.3 of the RTCC SIR says, "Authorized personnel will receive training in the RTCC management system prior to authorization." and item 7.2 says, "SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training." SPD does not mention creating any privacy or ethics training specific to the RTCC. There should be training that:
- (a) That RTCC features must never be used outside the scope of an active call or investigation; and that employees found to have used the RTCC outside that scope would be personally liable for their actions.
- (b) That ALPR data especially must be treated as sensitive information never to be used for personal purposes (such as stalking an ex/significant-other/neighbor/etc).
- (c) Advises that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their pan/tilt/zoom altered to look inside private residences, to stalk/harass individuals, or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons)

(d) And that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their camera's viewing angle moved away from an area of police response, while police are still present.
(e) Additionally, the RTCC SIR doesn't mention any policy that prohibits the user of the RTCC from taking screenshots, screen-recordings, or pictures/recordings using their cell phone or other mobile device. This especially impacts any victims, passerby, or anyone in the vicinity who are only partially clothed or fully naked, especially if unconscious.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the RTCC, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the system.

Please seriously consider my public comment. Thank you.

From: Roxy Robles
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2025 1:10 PM
To: LEG_CouncilMembers <council@seattle.gov>; Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: NO TO EXPANDED SURVEILLANCE
Good afternoon,
I am writing as a resident concerned about increased surveillance in our city. These technologies were 'piloted' despite a huge amount of community dissent and after only three weeks of use. Three weeks is not nearly enough to pilot test a new technology and to gather information about its efficacy.
Not only does this raise concerns about the overuse and surveillance of already over-policed communities, this raises concerns about the council's ability to follow its own principle of 'good governance', with a consistent application of ethics, race and social justice principles, and data-driven results. I stand firmly against the additional use of surveillance technologies in our city a SPD is already unreliable, selectively responsive, and unbelievably brutal and racist.
SPD is constantly escalating situations, particularly with regard to people exercising their first amendment right to peaceful protest, and despite Shon Barnes' lip service to 'crime prevention' I have yet to see any marked change under his leadership. *We cannot continue to fund untested technologies for a brutal, racist, and unreliable police force!!!*
Roxy Robles *they/she*

From: Brooke Christiansen
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:45 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update Public Comment
Hello, I'm a constituent out of Cap Hill (zip code 98122) and my comment is a follow:
Instead of investing in surveillance tech, let's invest in solving the root causes of crime in this city: high rent (unregulated landlords); limited access to shelter, mental health support, addiction support, job support for (formerly) unhoused folks, etc.; our tax money going to policing and sweeps that may make our neighborhoods temporarily look cleaner but don't solve people's problems; etc.
Best,
Brooke

From: R. John Setzer
Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 12:00 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material update public comment
With all due respect,
We don't need more surveillance in Seattle. This isn't a police state, and SPD cannot be trusted with that power.

Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 9:19 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
Hello,
I am a constituent and a resident of north Seattle who thoroughly opposes expanding of citywide CCTV footage pilot program in the RTCC. More surveillance will NOT keep us safe. We need real programs and

funding for local community advocacy groups and schools instead of cameras to watch our comings and goings. Prioritize proaction instead of reaction!
N.Emery
She/her

From: Jared Howe
Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 12:54 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
Dear Seattle City Council,
I'm writing to express my strong opposition to the proposed expansion of CCTV surveillance in Seattle. This plan has moved forward without adequate public notification or transparency from City leadership, SPD, or local media—and the community deserves to be heard.
Research consistently shows that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or improve clearance rates. The SPD's own cited study—a 40-year meta-analysis—found *no significant impact on violent crime*. Additional studies from the UK, Dallas, and elsewhere echo these findings, emphasizing the cost-ineffectiveness and lack of investigatory value.
Beyond its ineffectiveness, CCTV undermines civil liberties, particularly for marginalized communities. Surveillance has a documented history of abuse—from targeting protests and abortion seekers to racial profiling and stalking. Expanding camera networks only increases the risk of misuse, especially as they tie into facial recognition and other AI-driven surveillance tools.
Seattle already has community-centered initiatives that work. Programs like the Regional Peacekeepers Collective and the Rainier Beach Restorative Resolutions project have reduced violence significantly—and offer far better ROI than surveillance tech.
I urge you to oppose the expansion of CCTV and instead invest in evidence-based, community-led safety solutions. Our city's future depends on trust, transparency, and truly equitable public safety.
Sincerely,
Jared Howe
Seattle, WA
District 2

From: Noel Rivard <nrivard67@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 10:44 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: No to RTCC and CCTV!!!!
Cameras don't deter people or stop harm from happening, they are just for punishment. Call it what it is or get it out of my neighborhood.
The city's consideration of an off-premise real-time crime center software database is terrifying to me. Especially with the hell our federal administration is putting us through! Our state laws protect us to some degree, but the moving of our data to a third party removes those protections and threatens horrors unseen. PLEASE be diligent and push back in this.
Stop installing the tools for them to surveil and punish!! Get more creative. Do better for our city. Punishment doesn't stop harm from occurring. Get to the root problem. What other pathways could actually prevent this behavior?
I urge you to reconsider for our sake and yours because you live here too. The people their illegally detaining and deporting right now are also your neighbors. History proves, that what we allow to happen

to them, will eventually happen to us.
Noel Rivard (they/them)

From: Siobhan Hopp
Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 8:45 AM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR material updates public comment
NO expansion of surveillance! DO NOT give more data to SPD. SPD is violent, racially profiles, protects capital over people, and aids and abets ICE in kidnapping members of my community. They should be being given LESS power and LESS access, not more. I say NO to SDOT giving SPD access to more cameras!

From: Joelle Pretty
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 6:35 PM
To: Privacy <Privacy@seattle.gov>; LEG_CouncilMembers <council@seattle.gov>
Subject: SIR Material Update public comment
CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations
CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties
Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see
RTCC is a threat to women, immigrants, those utilizing their first amendment rights to free speech. It also creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate ALL residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights
I am opposed to these systems, to the Mayor and City Council expanding surveillance, and any officials in Seattle, King County, and Washington State (frankly, in the country) to cooperating with ICE.
KNOCK IT OFF
Sincerely,
Joelle Pretty, Seattle

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

Responses received via form:






10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Neighborhood
More details
Prefer not to identify 18
Ballard 10
Belltown 4
Beacon Hill 10
Capitol Hill 11
Central District 10
Columbia City 5
Delridge 0
First Hill 1
Georgetown 1
Greenwood / Phinney 13
International District 0
Interbay 0
North 7
Northeast 9
Madison Park/ Madison Valley 5
Magnolia 4
Queen Anne 2
Rainier Beach 3
Ravenna / Laurelhurst 3
South Lake Union 2
Southeast 0
Southwest 1
South Park 0
Uptown 0
Wallingford / Fremont 10
West Seattle 4
King County 4
Outside King County 1
Northeast
9 (7%)
0
5
10
15
20

11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

More details



12. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

More details



Id	What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?	Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of space in section one)	What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/questions re what value do you see in this technology?	What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/considerations that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?	Do you have any additional comments or questions?
1	I oppose the use of this		Bone		Do not expand the		

	technology as it increases the negative outcomes for LGBT+, BIPOC and immigrant communities and increases harmful surveillance in our city at a time when at all government levels surveillance is being used to harm many communities			use of the these cameras and discontinue using them
2	Surveillance tools only serve to help commit violence against marginalized groups. In the past few weeks Seattle has seen SPD collude with ICE, Tukwila PD collude with ICE, and these agents & officers have violated the constitution and abducted citizens.			Consider how this surveillance technology is being used to target and hurt marginalized communities.
3	Cloud hosting puts data at risk of breaches, threatening to expose people who	RTCC can act as a license plate reader, and cloud based data storage would allow ICE to	None - it gives away our right to privacy and will be abused	Widespread access to spy on our community is not necessary and does not keep us safe.

	travel to WA for abortions or people escaping domestic violence	surveil and harm immigrant communities			Engage the community and find what people need. Address root causes. Consider how those in power will use this data to harm innocent people.	
4	Moving the on-premise RTCC database to an off-premise, cloud-hosted database exponentially risks people's personal information and their safety by exposing the RTCC information to access by any entity that can remotely access (whether authorized or not) the cloud-based database. Cloud-based software and databases are much more vulnerable to hacking than on-premise systems that have inherent	A remote RTCC database poses severe harms to vulnerable populations: Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. Homeless people, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance.	none			city's legal liability when (not if) people's personal information is breached.

	physical barriers to access.	Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access the data directly, thereby circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a history of accessing data directly from private surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent state/local laws.		
5	We know that this technology disproportionately impacts homeless people, Black people, immigrants, and other communities that already have enough to deal with. Also, I don't trust these surveillance technologies. What are they really used for? What is done with the data they gather?	None		I want to urge City leadership to use an equity lens when considering making such a decision. Who is most impacted and why? Whose rights are being violated, whether intentionally or unintentionally? What else could these funds/resources be used for, instead of

					surveilling people?		
6	A cloud-based RTCC would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. This technology should not be based in the cloud or with a private third party.		No value. We have it already and do not need it managed by a private third party out side of Washington state control.		Do not use this technology it will be used to punish those seeking Healthcare in Washington.		
7	Lack of safeguards for the data being collected, invasion of privacy, and likelihood that these tools will be used to target already marginalized communities. This technology will not make us any safer.		None.				
8	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being	Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly Seattle has a	No. Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs	We're devolving into a state of authoritarianism. Do you want to be part of the problem or solution?	SPD is assisting ICE SPD confirmed to Guy Oron that they have been providing "mutual aid" to

obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted

long history of participatory democracy dating at least as far back as the 1919 general strike. Seattle has seen mass protests for labor rights, abortion rights, anti-war protests, and protests around issues of international trade policies, and most recently mass demonstrations advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, police violence against protesters is not unprecedented. After SPD's betrayal of the public trust in the summer of 2020, the city recently paid a $10M settlement. Violence against protestors in 2020 is one of the principal

software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to

RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates.
In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.RTCC software is expensive RTCC

work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in

ICE/Department of Homeland Security. SPD says its assistance dispersing community members so ICE can kidnap people doesn't violate the Keep Washington Working Act which bars local police from collaborating with ICE. Some of this "mutual aid" occurred while Interim Police Chief Shon Barnes was making the headline grabbing claim that he expects to go to jail because he won't cooperate with the Trump Administration.

SPD and Mayor Harrell refuse to respond to questions from Hard Pressed about how

RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care.
The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama.
Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data.
RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies.
Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012.
SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors.
During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC).
SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including

bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner.
The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass.
SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to

software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.
RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions , operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology - especially in light of the fact that

violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides.
This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.
Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments.
Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.
Many communities across the

many times ICE has asked for data sharing.
The only thing preventing ICE from accessing all of SPD's surveillance data (including 30 days of video and 90 days of license plate scans) is SPD's dubious claim that it will follow the Keep Washington Working Act & Washington Shield Law (read on for more info on how meaningless these assurances are) and won't cooperate with ICE.

Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus. Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents RTCC software including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC opens up the opportunity for those exercising dissent to be tracked and surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being Seattle is anticipating a $250 million shortfall in 2025 Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million". country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income

companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance targeted, and risks the threat of police retaliation. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters. Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents. Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime,	Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentati on or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned

poverty, and unemployment than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs). By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies	cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass.

				that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities. Police surveillance systems have been used by ICE and to target people seeking abortion healthcare even in sanctuary states The Burner and Notes from the Emerald City have details			
9	RTCC software is	There are MANY	no	Creates a system ripe	Threat of harm to all	Threat of harm to	Threat of harm to

expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year.
RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year.
The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology - especially in

effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work.
Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced

Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime.
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Only 1% to

for abuse and potential to violate all residents’ First and Fourth Amendment Rights
Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women’s health clinics
RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.
RTCC

people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly
Seattle has a long history of participatory democracy dating at least as far back as the 1919 general strike. Seattle has seen mass protests for labor rights, abortion rights, anti-war protests, and protests around issues of international trade policies, and most recently mass demonstrations advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza.
Unfortunately, police violence against protesters is not unprecedented. After SPD’s betrayal of the public trust in the summer of

immigrants
ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployment than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement.
RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs).
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women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents
RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation.
Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor.
Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals.
The threat to vulnerable

light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a $250 million shortfall in 2025 Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand	violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community	0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.	software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing	2020, the city recently paid a $10M settlement. Violence against protestors in 2020 is one of the principal reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012. SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency	access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities.	communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

dollars to $11 million".	lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides	mailbox numbers and overgrown grass. SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera	operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches,

	better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.	network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.	among other settings. RTCC opens up the opportunity for those exercising dissent to be tracked and targeted, and risks the threat of police retaliation. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives		

			Matter protesters.		
10	spend money on socials safety nets instead of surveillance	zero	stop trying to put us under constant surveillance and fix the homeless and housing crisis with social safety nets, higher ages and taxing the rich		Yeah, you;re ruining the city because you won't tax the rich and help the homeless
11	Establishing a penopticon to monitor citizens is the height of autocratic dystopia. It will has already been used to target LGBTQIA+, minorities, and those seeking abortions.	None.	Eliminate it in its entirety. Redistribute the police budget to transit and climate resilience.	The First and Fourth Amendments.	Here's your chance to be on the right side of history, or be just more autocrats.
12	I worry that the data gathered by these cameras will end up sold to and/or held by private corporations, further invading our privacy as private individuals. With a move to cloud-based RTCC, these violations are	None, SPD already have onsite RTCC.	Do you trust any of the private corporations who may have an interest in this data to use it responsibly? What is the benefit to residents to move to cloud as opposed to the existing system?		

basically assured. Moving RTCC offsite opens up data security risks and would enable other states to circumvent our Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which exist to protect people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already have an RTCC, and have already used it to abuse Seattle residents (stalking former partners, inappropriately sharing information regarding a domestic violence investigation with an involved party, monitoring peaceful protestors after the protest is over, etc).

13	This proposal is a risk to Washingtonian's privacy and freedoms to go about their lives, as there is a strong potential that this technology will make it easier for bad actors to misuse civilians' information for unequal policing and political persecution.			
14	Racial profiling, surveillance state, increasingly untrustworthy federal government (which SPD sometimes cooperates with). SPD should have to earn the trust of the people, and they have not done so.	None		
15	RTCC poses a massive risk for everyone. The more data stored in a location the more of a tempting	Absolutely none. This technology is an abuse of power with a universal adapter and should be	The issues on RTCC are very well documented and all came up last year when the Seattle community,	If the city cares about protecting the people of Seattle, it should remove RTCC.

target it is. This is both as a target for ICE & other law enforcement agencies to access (which they have) and for hackers to target. RTCC companies have been caught using data obtained from hacks & security breaches in their algorithms. https://www.404media.co/license-plate-reader-company-flock-is-building-a-massive-people-lookup-tool-leak-shows/ ICE has access RTCC databases from across the country including Washington State & supposed "sanctuary" states. https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-	removed from Seattle.	Office of Civil Rights, and Community Surveillance Working Group all recommended against RTCC. Why is the city considering expanding this technology now when it is being used by ICE to disappear people and its abuses are so documented? Where is the money for this expansion coming from? Relatedly, how is there money for this while the city is doing austerity and cutting services? Why was SPD allowed to submit the original SIR for RTCC without estimating an annual cost only to be allowed to say it needed millions of dollars per

ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/ Law enforcement in states with abortion bans have utilized RTCC to search nationwide databases of surveillance data. Including surveillance data from abortion sanctuary states to look for people that have had abortions. https://www.404media.co/a-texas-cop-searched-license-plate-cameras-nationwide-for-a-woman-who-got-an-abortion/ No law, contract, agreement, or court decision can stop ICE from accessing RTCC databases because the current federal administratio n does not		year for RTCC as soon as the technology was approved?

	care about or follow the law or court decisions That's even before considering all of the cases of individual officers abusing RTCC to spy on and blackmail people.				
16	It is a breach of privacy for the general public and will put vulnerable communities at risk.	There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC It would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.	None	It's effect on vulnerable communities.	
17	RTCCs dramatically expand the city's surveillance capabilities, collecting real-time data about people's locations, habits, and associations. This infrastructure reinforces racial profiling, targets already over-		Any claims of value are minimal and overstated. While RTCCs are sometimes credited with minor improvements in clearing cases, such as a 5% increase in Chicago, there is no meaningful evidence that they reduce gun violence	City leadership should consider how much public money is being funneled into a system that has little proven impact on safety. As outlined by the ACLU and Stop Surveillance City, these funds—over $2 million—	Before making any decisions, the City should hold public hearings and require independent studies on the impact of surveillance on civil rights. Communities most impacted by policing must have a voice in this process. Seattle has a

	policed communities, and puts undocumented people and those seeking reproductive or gender-affirming care at risk. According to Stop Surveillance City, Seattle police have a documented history of abusing surveillance tools, including spying on protestors and activists. There's no reason to believe a Real-Time Crime Center would be any different, especially with no independent oversight or accountability.		or make communities safer. Stop LAPD Spying and other watchdog groups have shown these systems mainly serve to intensify police presence, not solve crime. They create a high-tech illusion of safety while failing to address the root causes of harm.	would be far better spent on proven community-based solutions like housing, youth programs, mental health care, and violence interruption. RTCCs are not a public safety necessity—they are a political and technological overreach.	choice: continue down a path of expanding surveillance and criminalization, or invest in real public safety rooted in care, equity, and community. We urge you to reject the RTCC proposal.
18	This will be used to further surveil and criminalize our most vulnerable neighbors! This is a huge invasion of	Waste of money! In a cost of living crisis in an increasingly unaffordable city, in a housing and groceries crisis, where safety nets are being cut,		That it is a waste of money and a huge violation of residents' privacy.	

	privacy for everyone!	this is the absolute last thing any regular person needs!		
19	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. Moving the on-premise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company would enable	None that would outweigh its harms.		This technology is expensive and studies show it has either no, or negligible, impact on solving crime. I want City dollars to be spent on solutions that have been PROVEN to be effective at reducing crime — such as community-led violence interruption programs — not systems like this which have not. See this document (https://docs.google.com/document/d/14EhNiDMb7M8Z7TafyZsbxGOfdelDOGzRYxZNd3biwlE/edit) for specific examples of the many effective tools the city should use instead, which are

other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. My concerns include the examples of harm caused by this type of technology listed here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14EhNiDMb7M8Z7TafyZsbxGOfdelDOGzRYxZNd3biwIE/edit This technology is expensive and studies show it has either no, or negligible, impact on solving crime. I want City dollars to be spent on solutions that have been PROVEN to be effective at reducing			actually shown to decrease violence.

	crime — such as community-led violence interruption programs — not systems like this which have not.				
20	I strongly oppose moving our onsite real-time crime center (RTCC) to the cloud. It will be less protected there and more vulnerable to requests for data from other states — states that have strong, negative views of women's right to abortion, of trans people, and of immigrants.			I want my city to use viable, proven solutions like violence interruption programs, mental health services, and investments in libraries and green spaces, etc., to make our city safer and better. Not surveillance, and not by moving RTCC in a way that will put people in danger.	
21	I am against the use of this technology.	I am against the expansion.	None		
22	That SPD will use this to target, harass, and profile marginalized community members		Absolutely no value	SPD has a long history of using their tools and resources against the community to the point of being under federal	Stop wasting our resources and tax dollars on SPD and fund what the community actually needs!

				oversight for many years- they do not need more tools and resources!	
23	RTCCs dramatically expand the city's surveillance capabilities, collecting real-time data about people's locations, habits, and associations. This infrastructure reinforces racial profiling, targets already over-policed communities, and puts undocumented people and those seeking reproductive or gender-affirming care at risk. According to Stop Surveillance City, Seattle police have a documented history of abusing surveillance tools, including spying on protestors	Any claims of value are minimal and overstated. While RTCCs are sometimes credited with minor improvements in clearing cases, such as a 5% increase in Chicago, there is no meaningful evidence that they reduce gun violence or make communities safer. Stop LAPD Spying and other watchdog groups have shown these systems mainly serve to intensify police presence, not solve crime. They create a high-tech illusion of safety while failing to address the root causes of harm.	City leadership should consider how much public money is being funneled into a system that has little proven impact on safety. As outlined by the ACLU and Stop Surveillance City, these funds—over $2 million—would be far better spent on proven community-based solutions like housing, youth programs, mental health care, and violence interruption. RTCCs are not a public safety necessity—they are a political and technological overreach.	Before making any decisions, the City should hold public hearings and require independent studies on the impact of surveillance on civil rights. Communities most impacted by policing must have a voice in this process. Seattle has a choice: continue down a path of expanding surveillance and criminalization, or invest in real public safety rooted in care, equity, and community. We urge you to reject the RTCC proposal.	

	and activists. There's no reason to believe a Real-Time Crime Center would be any different, especially with no independent oversight or accountabilit y.						
24	My concern is that this technology will violate Seattlite's right to privacy, and make Seattlites anxious and paranoid about being watched all the time.	N/A	None, it would be a complete waste of our already thin budget.	N/A	Privacy is a RIGHT.	N/A	N/A
25	Surveillance is a powerful tool of social repression and state violence against its populace	It's use to support ICE and their enforced dissappearan ces of peoples.	None. It will only be used to harm people.	We keep us safe, not endless surveillance	The immense harm it will cause to already marginalized and abused portions of our population. NO POLICE STATE		Could we use this to track the City Council members movements?
26	I do not want more police surveillance.		None. SPD is big enough and has enough resources.		Expanding other programs to benefit residents material situation.		

27	This is an invasion of privacy and implements strategies utilized by fascist governments.	None	This technology does not represent the values of Seattle, and it is NOT what the people want. Please do not allow this abuse of power in our city.
28	It's frightening, if could be hacked and used against people and it won't reduce crime.	None, we do not need increased surveillance.	How it's going to affect everyone, the cost vs. benefit and how little it's going to make a difference in crime.
29	Surveillance is used primarily to harm people of color and other marginalized groups. Police in this city are already bad enough at protecting the people, providing our data and privacy is only going to lead to more unnecessary violence. Allowing even more citywide surveillance is a huge injustice to		City leadership must place restrictions on this technology, cops already patrol in these areas more frequently. This frequent patrolling is what causes divides, inequalities, and contributes to higher crime rates. The addition to real time high definition cameras protects no one and can only be used

	the city. Desired expansion into even more marginalized spaces will not help cops catch bad guys, it will help cops racially profile, brutalize, and discriminate against our own people.			to retroactively bring some sort of justice. Any funds towards this project could easily be used towards other programs that truly keep communities safe such as hard reduction, community centers, and funding for education.	
30	I oppose the expansion of surveillance	none	expensive and ineffective	FOCUS ON INVESTING IN OUR HEALTH AND EDUCATION, NOT POLICING	
31	This technology will make it less safe for marginalized people in Seattle. Transgender and queer people are already targeted by police, as seen in police brutality recently at Cal Anderson Park on May 24. Efforts to criminalize being	There is no value.		Consider the danger of the federal government or military coming to Seattle to take our data and use it for their own means. And consider the people who don't want to have their identity constantly found on a police	Rather than investing in this technology and the constant sweeps on homeless encampments, we should spend more money giving them affordable housing. South Lake Union and other areas must create affordable housing for

	transgender are being made in many other states (and at a federal level). Allowing more security cameras to track and store information about us is extraordinary dangerous. Moreover, this detracts from us being a sanctuary city for migrants. We need to protect our friends and family no matter what. Migrants provide an essential role in our economy, and without them we will face higher costs, longer wait times at our favorite restaurants, and we will lose what makes Seattle special.			security screen.	those who need it.
32	ICE and Border patrol are using cloud-based surveillance tools to	There is no evidence whatsoever that RTCC lives up to the vendor	I do not see any value in this technology.	There is no evidence whatsoever that that RTCC has any public	

conduct warrant-less searches and violate sanctuary city laws. Vendor contracts are insufficient to protect the data. This has been reported on by 404 media. https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/ Furthermore the Trump administration has informed ICE employees that they are at liberty to conduct warrant-less searches https://www.thehandbasket.co/p/ice-warrantless-arrests-castanon-nava Any expansion of this technology is a weapon in the hands of the Trump administration and puts our immigrant communities at risk.	claims. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. This technology is costly and a waste of city dollars at a time when the cities deficit and federal cuts threaten vulnerable communities. This technology and any expansion of it and especially ending its definition of a "pilot" without any evaluation of the program and only 3 weeks after its implementation in unconscionable.		benefit. In fact, I have spoken to Brian Maxey, who stated that the benefits of RTCC were "anecdotal and hypothetical" Cloud-bases surveillance tools are a weapon in the hands of the Trump administration and will be used to violate our sanctuary laws. We will hold our city leaders accountable for the decision to pursue RTCC and to ignore public input which has been largely dis favorable of the technology.

33	This adds to SPD's enormous surveillance network. This allows data to go to the cloud where it can be hacked. This allows SPD to cooperate with ICE, CBP, etc.	None	Why would we want to expand SPD's already enormous surveillance network? Why would we want to do anything that could lead to data sharing with ICE, CBP, etc.?
34	It can be used to target women, immigrants, and LGBTQ+ individuals. SPD already has plenty of surveilance technology. The cost of this program could be better spent on hiring.	None	Consider the privacy rights of the population at large. This is police state stuff!
35	Surveillance is a powerful tool of social oppression. This will only increase violence. It will only lead to more discriminatio n and division. Adding more surveillance technology will only increase crime and increase violence	No value. This is dangerous.	Think of where else the funding for this could go. Preventive care for the people!

	towards innocent people		
36	Many. Please do not expand.		Please direct funds towards affordable housing and human services.
37	This technology is a threat to our first and fourth amendment rights. It will be harmful to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents because the third party RTCC software is not protected and can be used negatively on law-abiding community members by out of state individuals or prosecuting agents. It will allow circumnavigation of WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which	I see no value in this technology. Studies show that it is actually not effective in reducing violent crime. But there are many cases where it has been used by law enforcement to harass people and divulge private information about people fleeing domestic violence and other state violence which is wrong.	I'd urge them to consider where that money could be spent elsewhere to actually improve the lives of those underserved or most vulnerable. Why not scale the effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier

	WA residents voted on and needs to be upheld. It is also expensive and would needlessly add to our already $250 million shortfall of the 2025 budget. Studies also show that it is actually not affective in reducing violent crime. Please, do not vote to outsource this surveillance to a third part.			Beach neighborhood by 33%? Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.	
38	More surveillance is not more safety, and adding even more cameras is not the answer to reducing crime or other issues. More cameras on the streets will be used for purposes other than safety and this should not be done under any	None, it will not aid in keeping Seattle safe.	I see no value in this, and I understand this to be purely a move to further surveil and monitor the residents of Seattle.	How this technology will truly be implemented over safety measures. This technology is easily manipulated and used to profile people.	More cameras is not the answer.

	circumstances.						
39	The use of these cameras so widely has been policy acceptable specifically because it was not used by police. I am deeply concerned about the privacy implications of this data was used freely by the police. Not to mention the Trump administration.		None.		How this change violates the trust of Seattle's citizens. How this helps further the authoritarian goals of the Trump administration.		
40	I am concerned about the potential for cloud-based systems to enable data to be accessed by other parties and thus circumvent Washington's protections such as the Shield Law and Keep Washington Working laws.	I am concerned about any third part private company having access to law enforcement data. I prefer the the RTCC be kept on premise rather than off premise.	I do not see value in expanding this technologoy to be for cloud-based systems.	Please, please do take the perspectives of your constituents into account. We do not know how things will move federally and with AI in the future, we need to move cautiously to uphold our core constitutional values.	See the above comments. This is a risky step, without clear benefit, that opens Washingtonian's up to greater surveillance by federal and third party companies. We can't fully know how data captured now will be used in the future. I fully support the SPD in accessing information	Please see above comments.	Remember that we need to make decisions now with a forethought to our future generations. No decision will be perfect but we need to consider privacy and freedom with the awareness that these rights are not ensured to be respected moving forward.

			to solve crimes. I do not support maintaining this information on the cloud by a third party private company, without greater data protections. Thank you so much for hearing me.	
41	Increasing surveillance will increase racial profiling, and make it easier for the police and state agencies to track and target vulnerable individuals & groups, putting them in more danger. The technology is used to criminalize & harm my immigrant neighbors, neighbors who live unsheltered, neighbors who use drugs, neighbors who work in the sex trade, and my		Consider how the use and expansion and sharing of this technology puts your already vulnerable constituents in more danger, and contributes to ever widening state repression and control of the people.	

	neighbors of color.					
42	I am concerned about how it might be used outside of the state and beyond our state laws, bounty hunter laws from Idaho, for example. Other examples could be federal over reach. Not into this tech. Not down. No, please.	I do not approve of this level of invasive surveillance in general.	No value that I approve of.	Who this is actually going to effect, who is this immediately going to impact, and who is it actual helping. How could this be abused, by who, and what would the consequences of that be? Are there better uses for these funds and personnel?	Don't do it.	Please, don't do it.
43	Yes, I do have massive concerns about this technology in just the fact that it's yet another part of mass governmental surveillance that's been slowly expanding over the past few decades. The program already has already been likely used for helping track cross-state abortions. And as more			Consider whether it's worth conducting mass-surveillance on your constituents in exchange for extremely minor benefits, if any. Consider whether it's worth contributing to the erosion of both people's right to privacy, as well as assisting in interstate hunts for		

	and more states take away people's rights as we've seen over the past few years, it'll only be used for such purposes even further. Do not spy on citizens. Do not spy on your constituents. SPD is more than capable of doing its job without engaging in mass-surveillance.		people trying to exercise their bodily autonomy. And don't lie to yourselves about how this will be "limited" or "only for certain criminal activities" because these kinds of things will and have always, always, ALWAYS expanded and have ALWAYS been co-opted. Please do not do this.	
44	Expanding civilian transportation technology to police makes us less safe, not more safe. The police do not need more data. In addition there is a history of police departments collaborating with federal authorities, such as ICE. Integrating traffic data with the police decreases	This is an irrelevant question without also considering the direct and potential harm this would cause. When those are first evaluated the risk is so high, that no value in implementing this camera integration project could offset.		Remember that the current federal government wants to deport immigrants black and brown residents, stop abortion healthcare, and ban gender healthcare. Every step you take to expand the surveillance infrastructure is building more tools that they will

	the barrier to federal authorities' access, which increases the danger to our most vulnerable citizens.				use when they have the chance, regardless of your intent.	
45	I am concerned that this expansion will endanger those traveling to our state seeking reproductive Healthcare and transgender healthcare.	We have RTCC technology and do not need to involve a 3rd party.	I understand the value of the current system to law enforcement. The cons outweigh the pros when we send it to the cloud and enable a nationwide spying capability.	See #1		
46	This is clear over-reach and abuse of surveillance technology against citizens; moreover it weakens our state's protections		Quite valuable to authoritarian style government			It should be bone-chilling that we have normalized such intrusiveness
47	It would put our privacy at risk for being free to travel between states for lifesaving healthcare needs.		I don't think it's safe to outsource like this.	That it could override Washington's laws for privacy protection!	THE PEOPLE DON'T WANT IT.	
48	Exposing information to ICE that		None			

	they should not have		
49	RTCC and CCTV do not provide any benefit to mitigate all of the harm they cause. They neither reduce violence nor increase clearance (arrest rates) for violent crime. A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime or disorder". Despite RTCC's high price tag ("initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars and $11 million"), studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. These technologies will foster the	None	RTCC and CCTV do not provide any benefit to mitigate all of the harm they cause. They neither reduce violence nor increase clearance (arrest rates) for violent crime. A 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV – concludes "no significant effects observed for violent crime or disorder". Despite RTCC's high price tag ("initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars and $11 million"), studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates.

very spirit of distrust and disunity that you claim to hope they will end. that response should be increased investment in equitable and evidence-based strategies for gun violence prevention while also offering meaningful support to victims and survivors. Violence can be reduced by investments in violence interruption programs, mental health treatment, substance-abuse-treatment facilities, affordable housing, emergency financial assistance, and libraries. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Evidence

supports that this is a causal link, inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Surveillance contributes to disinvestment in communities. Seattle is required to have a balanced budget, every dollar spent on surveillance is a dollar that cannot be invested in any of the evidence-based strategies for violence prevention listed above or otherwise invested in our communities as mental health supports, programs for kids, parks/public spaces, affordable housing, jobs/job skill training, and food access. Police have a lengthy

history of mis-using and abusing surveillance to blackmail people, target people based on their religion, spy on people, and cover up violence by police. SPD has a history of abusing the surveillance tools it already has, including to spy on protestors, stalk former romantic partners, and leak information about domestic violence victims. Additionally, SPD has a history of providing inaccurate information in Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for the technologies it wants. SPD has done this with CCTV & RTCC at least once already. On February 12, 2024, SPD Captain

James Britt told the public that SPD would absolutely not actively monitor CCTV feeds in the RTCC. Nick Zajchowski from SPD contradicted this in the June 26, 2024 meeting of the Community Surveillance Working Group saying that SPD would be actively monitoring the camera feeds at least part of the time. Cloud-based surveillance tools destroy Seattle's ability to act as a sanctuary city and render Washington State's Shield Law and the Keep Washington Working Act meaningless. Surveillance creates a map of people's lives that Immigration and Customs

	Enforcement (ICE) and law enforcement & private individuals in other states, including ones with bans on abortion and/or transgender healthcare, can access through the for-profit companies storing it. The CCTV pilot specifies the Aurora corridor and includes the Planned Parenthood located on Aurora Avenue and 105th. The rate of people coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington increased by 36% in 2023.		
50	So many! It makes our city less safe. It takes away our privacy protections.	None.	Outsourcing means we would lose our Seattle/WA privacy laws which we cannot do!
51	Having sensitive information essentially		We are in scary times. Your public words of

owned and outsourced to an unregulated, private 3rd party system is a huge concern and puts many vulnerable populations at risk of exploitation - people from other states coming to WA for gender affirming care or abortions, for one thing ... it also puts immigrants at risk and violates (in an indirect way) the reassurance that has been provided that the police are not collecting data and sharing it with ICE, etc; if a 3rd party has access to this information and shares it with ICE or others, and we are complicit in supplying the information to a third party system, then we are complicit in the whole system.	reassurance about protecting the safety of the most vulnerable among us mean very little if your actions directly or indirectly put those same folks at great risk. WA is a beacon of hope in the country right now. I have friends from all over who have talked about moving here, visiting here, etc. Those same people will absolutely NOT come, even to visit, if they know their information is being collected and shared with private, unregulated 3rd party systems. They are not safe where they stand. And I feel like I (as a queer person) am standing on sand every day, even in this

					"progressive" state because of decisions like these. Please protect us.
52	Seriously? The GOP/Trump administration has ICE and Homeland Security officers acting like the Secret Police, and Seattle City Council proposes to make surveillance data available to those entities (and others)?	This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state	None whatsoever.		Whether the City leadership really wants to make violations of Constitutional rights even easier--and whether the majority of the city's electorate supports this use of our tax dollars (especially given the city's budget woes).

		laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.			
53	Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalization of those seeking reproductive care.		none		The need to protect our vulnerable citizens from additional, unnecessary surveillance.
54	My concerns are vast but it boils down to a concern for the safety and well being of women receiving access to safe abortions. Beyond that	I wouldn't want this available to law enforcement even in a climate that WASN'T objectively out of control, as	I do not see the value of this if a safer society is the goal. And I imagine that a safer society is a non-controversial idea.	Giving a powerful tool like this to assist the illegal deportation of immigrants is not good for this city, or this country.	Consider the extremism that is becoming more palatable by the sheer mass of petitions, requests and threats from this

	we know this data will be available to border patrol, ICE etc and I don't think in this climate anyone can argue that this will make anyone safer. This will negatively affect quality of life for many people.	this current one is.			Presidential administratio n and those in support of it; consider it daily and stay sane.		
55	This further endangers women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.		None		Reveals sensitive personal info including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation.		
56	Unnecessary surveillance by a government that is already targeting vulnerable people, as well as people who are standing up for our democracy.		none that outweighs the costs and risks		Do not risk harming vulnerable peoples.		
57	In the current political environment there is danger that this information will be used by agencies	None	I can see no value in sharing this information. If there is a legitimate need then the information can be	None who is going to use	Who is going to use this information and for what purpose.	None	Do not approve this sharing of information.

	that not law abiding.	requested in a lawful manner in a supena.		
58	Please, PLEASE, help protect our innocent residents and citizens! Please please do NOT help ICE!	Sure, great, but NOT to aid illegal and wrong actions on behalf of bad people!	Please do not use this technology to hurt innocent people. Please!	I thought I read on Substack that our police chief was going to protect our people. ?
59	I don't want it to track people to the degree it will be able to. It's an invasion of privacy. I do not want to put my tax dollars towards this.			
60	I'm concerned about federal access to this information. If it's not in the cloud no one can ask Seattle, Seattle PD, or a cloud provider for it.	No value for individuals; tremendous value for ICE.	Don't use it. The fact of the existence of the data makes it exceedingly vulnerable to the feds. Even if access is granted "accidentally" or if the courts require that the data is handed over.	
61	You can be used to Target defenseless individuals.	None	Do the disadvantages outweigh the advantages?	

62	This database is available to ICE and will be used to fuel its brutal, careless, and illegal campaign against immigrants regardless of their status and anyone who challenges their illegal actions that ignore the rule of law, the Constitution, and the authority of the Congress.				The reason given in question 1 is sufficient to reject use of this technology. ICE has become a threat to every American.	
63	police power overreach		recycling it into something to enable peace	just don't do it	handshakes are more powerful than digital eyes	
64	RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPRs), CCTV, among other police surveillance	This technology can be abused and accessed by third parties when stored in the cloud and poses a threat of harm and misuse to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly. It	None	This powerful technology should not be passed without an opportunity for serious consideration and public comment. We are seeing a dangerous rise in authoritarianism at the federal level and having a cloud-based RTCC runs the risk of having	They need to consult with privacy advocates, including the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation, to fully understand the threat	Once you go down this road, you cannot easily turn back, so you should be incredibly careful and thoughtful.

tools. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. The City Council's attempt to move the on-premise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people	is also expensive, unnecessary, and has little likelihood of making Seattle any safer.	Seattle contribute to spying on private citizens who are exercising their legal rights.

	seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents			
65	I have so many concerns. (1) Creation of a RTCC will create a system that will become a MAGNET for abuse as well as the potential to	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained	None. I see only potential for abuse and harm	Do you want to create a police and surveillance state in our area? Do you want this to be your legacy? Are your values that much aligned with

violate the 1st & 4th amendment rights of all residents. (2) Surveillance technology does not aid law enforcement in solving crimes (despite all the tv shows and movies...) (3) This technology represents a very real threat of harm to immigrants - if footage is obtained by ICE, CBP, etc (4) This technology poses a threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly – especially because its use puts our city solidly into the "surveillance state" and SPD (with its history of required federal	from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. AND this technology is expensive.		our autocrat Dictator wanna be President??

	oversight due to bad behavior) has a history of using surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protesters. . (5) Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents - historic use of the technology to track religious and sexual minorities, to stalk women/sexual abuse survivors, immigrants, etc (6) Threat of harm by being used to track and intimidate by residents seeking abortion and gender-affirming healthcare		
66	the use of this cloud based platform could allow ICE and border control to	None	Do whatever is in your power to stop the use of a cloud based program that could be

	access information for at risk immigrants.		used by ICE and therefore put at risk immigrants in unnecessary harms way.	
67	We know that these tools, which were put in place by King County Housing Authority, have generated surveillance data ICE has searched in order to look for people. Not criminals—just immigrants in most cases that had no criminal record, but who could have their status revoked so they could be detained and deported. This is not in the spirit of separating state and local resources from federal ICE enforcement. Don't expand the use of these tools.	In terms of sending surveillance data to national, private databases, there are no benefits and many dangerous uses to which this data could be put.	Consider the uses this data is being put to that have nothing to do with local law enforcement.	Instead of expanding the use of these systems, their use needs to be curtailed. As a resident I and others will be watching this issue closely; this is where we need to put "welcoming" promises into action.

68	Invasion of privacy and data sharing risks to indifivual freedoms	It gives the government too much power	None		Do not expand the abiity of the government to spy on the population		
69	It is used by law enforcement all over the country. It can be used to track women who have had an abortion, to track immigrants and to track LBGTQ people.		None that outlays the threat to our citizens.		Taking care of all our citizens.		
70	These technologies can easily be used to target those the trump administratio n is (trans youth, BIPOC, immigrants)		It's not helpful, please stop spending money on surveillance		Do not approve the use of this technology please.		
71	RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras, automated license plate	See above	See above	See above	See above	See above	See above

readers (ALPRs), CCTV, among other police surveillance tools. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation.

The City Council is attempting to move the on-premise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA

					Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming

healthcare: Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care.

The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far

away as Texas and Alabama.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving

gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus.

Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority, for someone that had an

abortion RTCC software makes it impossible to keep surveillance data from ICE. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to casually share surveillance data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. RTCC software was used by police to spy on “immigration protests”

	RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal inform					
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reproductive care. The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly	ns advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately, police violence against protesters is not unprecedented. After SPD's betrayal of the public trust in the summer of 2020, the city recently paid a $10M settlement. Violence against protestors in 2020 is one of the principal reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012. SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video

taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus. Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the	streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network

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states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests" RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile	LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters. Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and

individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.	women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In

Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployme nt than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs). By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border	Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass. SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone

	Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws.	involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance.		
73	This takes away our liberty and privacy for living normal legal lives. The government does not have the right to use any kind of cameras to watch our		Because it has gotten out of hand and gone too far it needs to be stopped altogether. Government can not be trusted to use it legally. It is	Personal rights and liberties.

	people. That is destroying the rights we were given in the constitution.		abusive. So no.				
74	The City Council is attempting to move the on-premise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being	Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care. The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in		Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployme nt than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs).	Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoo ds that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeeper s Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action

obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has already

By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the

how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged

Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus.
Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents
RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion "sanctuary" laws, and non-police

degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities.
Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly
Seattle has a long history of participatory democracy dating at least as far back as the 1919 general strike. Seattle has seen mass protests for labor rights, abortion rights, anti-war protests, and protests around issues of international trade policies, and most recently mass demonstratio ns advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately , police violence against protesters is not unprecedent

officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass.
SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership.

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SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation

RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests" RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters, hidden of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of

hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC opens up the opportunity for those exercising dissent to be tracked and targeted, and risks the threat of police retaliation. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has

CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime. RTCC software is expensive RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions , operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to

	used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.	spend even more money on its products every year. The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a $250 million shortfall in 2025 Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper referenced by

							SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million".	
75	This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those	Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployment than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement.	Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC	There is no value to the proposed change, only harm.	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective	Protect our rights, do not make the proposed change. Use options that have been proven to make a positive difference instead.	Drop this proposal. NO cloud-based offsite RTCC!

outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare

Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio

RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs).

By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law.

ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of

software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.

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The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County,

coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime.

n of those seeking reproductive care.

The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama.

Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

Recently an Idaho

ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities.

Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly

Seattle has a long history of participatory democracy dating at least as far back as the 1919 general strike. Seattle has seen mass protests for labor rights, abortion rights, anti-war protests, and protests around issues of international trade policies, and most recently mass demonstratio ns advocating

Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass.

SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year,

Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes.

Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community.

Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-

mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon.

The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus.

Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents

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Unfortunately, police violence against protesters is not unprecedented. After SPD's betrayal of the public trust in the summer of 2020, the city recently paid a $10M settlement. Violence against protestors in 2020 is one of the principal reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012.

SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video

an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership.

The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus.

RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the

abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing.

Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.

Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority, for someone that had an abortion RTCC software makes it impossible to keep surveillance data from ICE. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to casually share surveillance data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from	streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle’s emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network	software’s AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinance. Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase),” other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the

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access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is	rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.	small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology - especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a $250 million shortfall in 2025 Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale

	using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.	(post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million".		
76	I am concerned about putting seekers of reproductive care and gender affirming care, and immigrants at risk of having their personal identifying information shared with law enforcement. Washington State has the Shield Act	While I would say it could help prevent or discourage youth gun violence, I do not think that is the case. What would really prevent youth gun violence is economic and cultural opportunities for youth and connectedness amongst our communities.	Our country is in a slide toward authoritarianism. We see officers in face masks seizing people without judicial warrants authorizing them to do so, and we know those who are detained in this way are not having	

and Keep WA Working Act which were passed to protect people, but a cloud-based RTCC would not be bound to follow those laws. I am also concerned about surveillance data being used against people exercising their first amendment rights in protest against the government. Especially considering the current national climate in which people are being detained when they haven't broken the law, I am very much opposed to moving to a cloud-based RTCC that makes Washingtonian's data available to third parties and circumvents Washington's	Surveillance cameras do not create any of those things, and in fact they destabilize families and communities if they are used to aid in the detention of immigrants.	their due process rights honored. Seattle should not be taking any steps that can make it easier for our vulnerable neighbors to be tracked down and kidnapped by federal agents.

	more robust privacy and human rights protections.				
77	RTCC, as it is currently being used and disseminated, seems fine, but an expansion to the "Cloud," making it accessible by ICE, etc, would be very detrimental to our civil liberties, especially at this wrought time when ICE is being used as a secret police by a president who doesn't respect the rule of law and the Constitution.				
78	Over stepping of citizens privacy.		Vote it down		
79	This cloud-based change (rather than the current on-premise system) will enable other states to share sensitive data about people and thereby circumvent	NONE. We have systems in place that are safer for citizens that work well. And there are many other approaches, such as violence interruption programs,	Consider ALL of these points and the data that backs them up: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14EhNiDMb7M8Z7TafyZsbxGOfdelDOGzR	I feel so strongly about this, that if my representative (and the city-wide representatives) vote in favor of this system, I will work very very hard to make	Why has City Council not publicized its consideration of this system more widely, held community hearings, and aggressively searched for feedback. (It has a ring of

WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect people seeking reproductive healthcare, gender-affirming care, and immigrant workers. We know the pressures are real because data from Washington Medicaid Services has been shared with DHS and ICE WITHOUT its permission (or even knowledge). It would also be a threat to demonstrator s exercising their first amendment right. (The city is still under a 2012(!) consent decree for abridging those rights!) Seattle already uses its existing surveillance system to watch	and investments in housing and mental health programs, that we could take to solve crime problems without the risks this system would place on us:	YxZNd3biwlE/edit?tab=t.0	sure they are not elected next time.	the House GOP passing legislation in the middle of the night.)

demonstrators. We do NOT need to expand this capability.

Surveillance technology does NOT help law enforcement in fighting crime! The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)," other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the

	investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." RRTC is expensive! Let's use the money toward solving our housing problems rather than surveilling Seattleites. PLEASE DO NOT FORCE SEATTLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A GROWING SURVEILLANCE STATE. DO NOT VOTE FOR RRTC SOFTWARE!					
80	RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs). By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly;	Yes, I do because it has been used in the past against peaceful protestors. Also, this data has been used to stalk and intimidate people for personal reasons. Outrageous! The data has also been used to monitor and track certain communities.	None.	Consider all the harms and the cost! There are many effective tools the city of Seattle could use instead that DO WORK! Violence interruption programs work such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective which has reduced violence in the Rainier	Do not consign Seattle to becoming a Surveillance State! RTCC software like Fusu continually adds new image algorithms and integrations with third party applications via the software's AI capabilities - a nightmare which will	Yes! SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (i-base) is on-premise, so it does not create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to

circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities. Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech,	Moving to a cloud platform allows CBC and ICE to access automated license plate reader data directly which circumvents Washington State Law. SPD has used surveillance data to spy on protestors and shared it with US Marshalls, Wa State Dept of Corrections and a private citizen. RTCC opens up the opportunity for those exercising dissent to be tracked and targeted, ans risks the threat of police retaliation. RTCC software like Fusus allow police to view camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. Surveillance technology will bot aid	Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities and access to affordable housing. Direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.	result in multiple unforced errors not to mention invasion of privacy, violation of civil liberties at the very least. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.	obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state lawd and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

	public protest and assembly	law enforcement in solving crime. RTCC deployment by SPD would cost approximately $5.3Million dollars.	
81	I do not want the surveillance state to be expanded, and I do not want cctv coverage of the city. It is absolutely reprehensible and will only lead to continued overpolicing of marginalized groups. I don't want my car to be tracked as I go from place to place, the police should not have that data.		None whatsoever.
82	I am very concerned about expanded surveillance. The research I am aware of shows no public safety benefits, and meanwhile are are increasingly	The proposed expansion areas furthermore are clearly highly racialized. This is not okay.	

	living in a police state. I want Seattle to be a community where everyone feels safe, but constantly under the microscope.				
83	Data centralization and pooling is terrifying -- with ICE tearing families apart and authorities from other states trying to enforce their draconian abortion control restrictions here, the best protection for Seattle's residents is data minimization. Don't collect data on us and above all do not plug that data into larger sharing networks.	I don't care if the tech is supposedly set up in a way that ICE/CBP would need a warrant to get to it. They have shown themselves to be completely untrustworthy and the only way to ensure that they can't get it is to not collect it --- or at the very least not put it out on the cloud.			
84	It doesn't appear to be very effective according to the research that's been done on it.	I don't want to assist ICE in their detention of people especially the way they've offered	Not enough to out weigh its cons.		l

		no legal process to many who are trying to obey our laws.					
85	Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care. The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington,	Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion “sanctuary” laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority, for someone that had an abortion RTCC software makes it impossible to keep surveillance data from ICE. Local police	Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployme nt than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs). By moving to	Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly Seattle has a long history of participatory democracy dating at least as far back as the 1919 general strike. Seattle has seen mass protests for labor rights, abortion rights, anti-war protests, and protests around issues of international trade policies, and most recently mass demonstratio ns advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. Unfortunately , police violence against protesters is not	Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents’ First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women’s health clinics RTCC software creates conditions that are ripe for police abuse, as it provides little, if any, oversight for how police use it, little	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that RTCC "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase),” other studies of RTCC show no effect on violent crime clearance rates. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were “no significant effects observed for violent crime” and “a body of research on the	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoo ds that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeeper s Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and

increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has already attempted to	departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to casually share surveillance data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests" RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather	a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk	unprecedented. After SPD's betrayal of the public trust in the summer of 2020, the city recently paid a $10M settlement. Violence against protestors in 2020 is one of the principal reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012. SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department	documentation or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously	investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.	their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land

get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus.	enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and Burmingham	it poses to vulnerable communities.	of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras, helicopters,	monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass. SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership. The privatization	and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated

	police also used this technology, in conjunction with other tools, to track Muslim residents. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.	hidden cameras, police body cameras, and cameras in schools and churches, among other settings. RTCC opens up the opportunity for those exercising dissent to be tracked and targeted, and risks the threat of police retaliation. Surveillance is about the power to watch and intervene in a variety of situations, whether criminal or not, and surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that	of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's	with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

			NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.	Surveillance Ordinance.	
86	It is unnecessary and an over reach of power. The SPD should not be in cooperation with ICE agents, rounding up many innocent people due to their skin color or physical presentation. This is Orwellian and a very wrong use of technology... against the people.	In this case, I do not. I mentioned in the CCTV answer that if there was a child or elder with dementia it might be helpful to identify where they were last seen, but beyond that, it becomes fascist.		Keep it human scale. People to people. If someone is committing a crime, then deal with it. Keep ICE out as much as possible. ICE agents are the minions of a racist, fascist administration that wants to go back to pre civil war times with all the power centered in white men who dictate what religion people should adhere to.	Look into your hearts. If you have or had loved ones who were terrified that they would lose everything they've worked for and been hard working contributors to our society, wouldn't you be frightened for them? Its really not a stretch.
87	we do not want ICE violating the privacy of the people of seattle. We do not want them harming or harassing the people of seattle. they do not need more	i'm sure there is value, but ICE has no problem breaking laws. Why make it easier for them?		consider who we are as a city	

	ways of violating us				
88	Privacy. Government using information against the people. Enabling autocracy.	None		Reduce surveillance	
89	This data is not for use to increase the surveillance of people in our community based on personal characteristics of race, lifestyle choices or immigration status.			Do not share This data with ICE.	
90	Surveillance state seems against our freedoms when there are plenty of cameras outside businesses. Making the people of seattle more scared, and people already have an issue being filmed in public. I don't see how they will protect us further. Face recognition		Who is going to be watching? Where is this content stored? What value does the city see? Is this a direct response to Trump's comments about a surveillance state?	How the people of seattle feel as a majority democratic city when the surveillance state was introduced by Trump. Based on his recent actions I doubt the city's intentions of implementing this in Seattle.	Listen to the people as the state still has power. Don't feel pressured into something the people don't want or our representatives become complacent and part of the problem. Introduce benefit to the people and be more outright in how you plan

	used wrongly/unjustly. I have experienced crime in this area where there would have				to use all of this.
91	My concerns are frankly innummerable. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. A cloud-based RTCC creates the risk of data exposure, which would put essentially every person in Seattle at risk should a bad actor get their hands on the collected information. SPD already has what it needs in its current system, and there is no benefit to	Please see these links with more information on the dangers of this technology: https://www.wired.com/story/license-plate-reader-alpr-surveillance-abortion/ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/01/idaho-mother-son-kidnap-charges-abortion https://www.thestranger.com/news/2023/12/21/79315926/texas-tried-to-get-seattle-childrens-hospital-health-records-on-trans-patients https://www.realchangenews.org/news/2024/08/07/inside-spd-s-	Absolutely none.	Please consider the cost of this technology - both the literal dollars, and the human price as well. The negative impact of cloud-based data storage cannot be overstated. Please make the right choice to protect the people you were elected to serve. You are in a unique position to make a real difference - do not squander that responsibility.	

anyone except those who would exploit our private data in expanding the system to a cloud-based structure. These bad actors are not theoretical - Washington State passed our Shield Law to protect those seeking necessary life-saving healthcare from other states, and there are bounty hunters and agencies in other states trying to track those people down to jail them, or worse. Moving to a cloud-based RTCC system will do nothing but undermine the very important sanctuary laws we have passed, and it is not an exaggeration to say that this choice would cost	use-aerial-surveillance-during-2020-protests https://www.thestranger.com/slog-am/2024/01/25/79356578/slog-am-seattle-settles-2020-protest-lawsuit-for-10-million-nitrogen-execution-scheduled-for-tonight-no-medical-care-for-floridas-transge https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/major-hack-of-camera-company-offers-four-key-lessons-on-surveillance https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/neighborhood-watch-out-cops-are-incorporating-private-cameras-their-real-time https://projects.tampabay.com/projects/2020/investigations/polic

lives. ICE is already active in our communities, kidnapping residents who are here legally and have committed no crimes. These are our friends and neighbors who are disappearing, not faceless criminals, and families are being destroyed by these actions. Children are unable to go to school for fear of raids, and their parents can't so much as shop for groceries without fear. Cloud-based RTCC would enable ICE to continue and expend their illegal operations, and I very much doubt that they will stop with their current targets. History has shown over and over and	e-pasco-sheriff-targeted/intelligence-led-policing/ https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2020OPA-0455ccs042621.pdf https://www.vera.org/community-violence-intervention-programs-explained

over and over again that this kind of violence will expand unchecked if given the opportunity, and cloud-based RTCC is exactly the kind of opportunity that will allow them to target anyone they want, for any reason, regardless of the law. Expanded surveillance has a chilling effect on first amendment rights, and puts American citizens in danger simply for speaking their minds. This affects EVERYONE, not just a few groups. Every single person in Seattle will be in significantly greater danger and at risk of physical threat with expanded surveillance. If we knew we could trust the

information collected would be used for public good, this might be a different story - but we know from experience and history that it will not be.

RTCC is also expensive. Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. On top of this, it has also not proven to be effective at reducing crime, making it

essentially useless for its stated purpose. There are many proven ways to reduce crime, like violence interruption programs and community-led safety initiatives. Why would we put more money towards something that does not work and makes us all less safe, when we could instead put that funding towards proven methods that reduce poverty, provide crucial resources to those that need them, and improve all of our lives?

Please protect your city, your community, and yourselves by refusing to expand RTCC.

92	I believe this adversely impacts our BIPOC and potentially our LGBTQIA+ communities.	This is NOT about crime prevention. A much better and proven solution is to use the same monies and resources towards intervention and support solutions.	None	See #2	Remember, this is NOT about crime "prevention".	This is NOT a proven crime prevention solution. Whereas intervention and support solutions are.	N/A
93	I am concerned that this technology will be used to track people's movements across the city and in turn, be used to track down and harm marginalized communities. I am concerned that this technology will be used to assist ICE kidnappings, punish those seeking healthcare, track/disappear the unhoused, and harm the LGBT+ community. This technology has no positive benefit. SPD has proven		None		If this city is truly as welcoming as it claims to be, it will oppose this technology. Do you want to lead a city whose values are not in line with its actions? Again, I emphasize that this technology will harm marginalized communities including BIPOC, immigrants, the unhoused, and the LGBT community. I thought I was supposed to be safe here.		

	themselves to be incompetent, ineffective, and consistently incapable of protecting our community. Why should I believe that they have our best interests at heart? This technology will do nothing but harm marginalized communities and I vehemently oppose its use and implementation.						
94	It is a violation of privacy, and too far along the road of a surveillance state. I do not feel comfortable having my tax dollars support a third-party surveillance company. I would rather have better training for officers.		This technology takes out the human element, which is already way too far gone. Again, I would rather support the training and development of human beings to deal with our complex issues as a city.	Police officers are already stretched so thin. I want their focus to actually be on protection and service, not surveillance.	Don't spend money on this technology! As a voter, I am paying attention and will vote and act and canvas accordingly.	Invest in human beings, and do more to provide a social safety net for the citizens of our city. Don't spend money on this invasive technology.	Thank you for the hard work of city government. Please do the right thing and help public servants by supporting them in other ways.
95	We are not living in normal times. Do not	AI is not ready for prime time. It's not the time to		Please -- don't capture tons of unnecessary	These times are not business as usual.		

	increase surveillance and accessible storage at this time.	watch everyone doing everything. The use is too easily shifted		data on a maybe or what-if basis	Democracy is eroding. This is not the time to increase searchable/shareable data.	
96	1) This is warrantless dragnet surveillance. The RTCC storing data for 30 days means SPD would be mapping people's lives being able to figure out where people live, where they work, where they worship, the routes they take to work, etc. This map would be available to SPD & everyone with access to SPD's data. There is no legitimate use for this kind of map, all it does is create conditions where abuses are both easy & incredibly disastrous. These abuses aren't hypothetical.		None, RTCC don't reduce crime or increase clearance rates, it doesn't even make people feel safer. This has been studies repeated. Lots of studies showing this were submitted just last year when SPD was first asking for it		How do you think any guardrails will keep the Trump Administration & ICE from accessing this data given their constant & blatant disregard for the law? How do you justify increasing surveillance now when ICE is kidnapping people on Seattle's streets with the assistance of SPD? How is there money for even more mass surveillance when the city is facing a budget deficit? Especially, when this is shown to not	Keeping people in Seattle safe would require removing this & other surveillance by SPD (ex. CCTV & ALPRs) and using that money to fund programs that are shown to reduce violence. Removing RTCC alone would free up millions of dollars per year that could go to programs that reduce violence.

In recent weeks we've seen small-ish abuses like yet another SPD officer getting caught using a police database to stalk someone to massive like ICE & cops looking for people who've had abortions accessing nationwide surveillance databases. Those nationwide searches included data from Washington State despite the state's Keep Washington Work and Shield laws. Nashville abandoned its pursuit of FUSUS (SPD's RTCC) in April due to these risks. https://nashvillebanner.com/2025/04/28/metro-nashville-fusus-freddie-oconnell/ reduce violence. Why do things that are proven to reduce violence (ex. housing access, food access, mental health access, libraries, & violence intervention programs) constantly get defunded while surveillance that doesn't reduce violence gets more money?

How do you think having Seattle under surveillance by the Trump Administration & ICE will impact tourism?

How do you think installing more surveillance which makes people's brains act similar to psychosis will increase safety or reduce violence?

The only reason reporters haven't discovered that SPD's existing data is being abused in nationwide searches like this is because SPD's CCTV & RTCC program has only been live for a month. There hasn't been any time for reporters, community members, anyone to get records on data access. There's barely been time for SPD's data to even be shared because it just went live at the end of May. SPD is ramming through this expansion before there's a chance for the community to see the full impacts of SPD's existing dragnet surveillance,

SPD storing this a private,

for-profit company's cloud guarantees this data will be shared. These systems are built to make data sharing between agencies as frictionless as possible, that's part of the sales pitch.

This is functionally a secret expansion of surveillance. SPD has not done any community outreach to let the public know this is being considered. SPD hasn't even done a press release or a post on social media. The only reason people know this is happening is because community members found single Seattle IT webpage that mentions it & have spread the word.

There cannot be any consent of the governed/community consent because SPD hasn't let them know it is happening.

Being subjected to constant surveillance is harmful. Whose Streets Our Streets identified the level of surveillance in Seattle as already having "a psychological effect on the people being surveilled" (http://stopsurveillancecity.files.wordpress.com/2024/09/338c7-wsosautomatedenforcementsummary.pdf) and that was before SPD launched its CCTV & RTCC pilot. The effect is that people's brains act in a manner similar to "psychosis

and social anxiety disorder" (https://scitechdaily.com/what-happens-to-your-brain-when-you-know-youre-being-watched/). Expanding surveillance will increase these impacts and make people less safe.

There is no reason to believe any information SPD has provided for this material update or the underlying SIR given SPD's lengthy history of lying during the SIR process. Just last year, SPD definitely told the people of Seattle that it would not be actively monitoring CCTV cameras which was a lie, the minute the cameras were approved SPD

demanded more money from the city to hire people to do active monitoring claiming that was the only way for them to work. SPD has also lied in the SIR for FLIR (https://www.realchangenews.org/news/2024/08/07/inside-spd-s-use-aerial-surveillance-during-2020-protests), and just last month SPD provided misled people during the SIR for StarChase/pursuit mitigation trackers by claiming it was required to conform to WA law (The law does not say that, it says police departments should end each individual pursuit as soon as possible based on existing policies & technology,

	not that departments need to acquire new technologies).			
97	The RTCC is an invasion of privacy that makes the city a more hostile place to live for normal people and doesn't make things any safer. As study after study has shown this kind of live surveillance is not a deterrent against crime but it does make quality of life worse for people who feel the constant surveillance. It's extremely unequitable disproportionately affecting communities of color and poor people who live in high density areas. SPD has not earned the trust of the community to be continuously	It has no value to the people of Seattle, just value to SPD and business owners who benefit from repression and the increased hostility of public space	City leadership already ignored the clearly spoken voice of the people on RTCC once. SPD, SPOG, and the vendors who you are sending our hard earned tax dollars to want these surveillance programs but the people who you actually need to vote for you do not. Consider that expanding the RTCC once again goes against the clear will of the voting public as well as the city's own committees that provide recommendations on equity in policing.	

monitoring us, and if they had that trust they wouldn't need to. The RTCC also allows other agencies throughout the country to surveil us and make our expressed values around immigration and abortion access meaningless. By accepting the RTCC we invite other jurisdictions to exercise control over and surveil residents of our city including immigrants but also people who are coming here to access reproductive healthcare. The city cannot have a commitment to being a sanctuary city and upholding reproductive rights while allowing the RTCC

98	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, transgender individuals, and lawful immigrants.	I don't see that the potential value of this technology is worth the risks to our civil rights. Please consider that the country already is quickly moving towards a fascist state. This technology will be used to further the agenda of a government intent on taking away the rights we have in a democratic society.	The City leadership should have as a top priority the protection of our democratic ideals, our civil rights and to keep our law enforcement agencies separate from national encroachment. Of course we want to reduce crime in our city, but not at the expense of our civil rights. Also, it seems that the City has made headway in reducing crime with the technology it already possesses. Please hire more police officers and reform criminal justice as necessary without adopting cloud based surveillance technology that will put us at such	

				risk. Thank you.	
99	As our country lurches towards autocratic politicized police state, NOW is not the time to expand police surveillance powers, especially if data is to be shared with ICE.				
100	I oppose increased surveillance of Seattle people. I fear it being used by feds to kidnap people				
101	It will be used to target minorities, especially by ICE. I believe there are better options for reducing crime. When information goes into the cloud, local organizations have less control over it.	None.	Why don't we find better ways of preventing crime instead of setting up a big brother style system? There are too many ways for that sort of technology to be abused.	What sort of city do we want? Do we want a city where everyone works together to make a safe and welcoming place to live or visit? Or do we want some weird police state where everyone knows we are being watched by	Don't spend money on this. It won't have enough benefits to justify the cost. Technoloy ages out. In a few years, all of this tech will be obsolete. Lasting solutions involve people working together. It's a harder process and it

				someone, but we don't who that someone is or what they might do with the information.		certainly isn't flashy. But I would sleep better knowing that I don't have to worry about folks being snatched off the street, or wondering who is creating a database for their own, illegal purposes.
102	Invasion of privacy. Targeting of immigrants, queer people, bipoc, etc. We should not support Trump's targeting of individuals.		We need to support our immigrant community.	ICE is ripping families apart for no good reason other than quotas.	I don't want Big Brother watching!	
103	Please do not expand the use of RTCC to a third party vendor. My concerns are for the privacy and safety of citizens who might be targeted by this technology allowing the possibility to circumvent Washington State's Shield Law and Keep WA Working	I see some value in in-house, well-controlled surveillance to help with crime prevention and investigation.		Consider the potential harm that could arise if RTCC surveillance was released into the hands of potentially violent persons outside of the control of local SPD authority.		

	Act. Allowing a third party vendor access to sensitive records is a step too far, and has been rejected by other jurisdictions out of concern for people's safety. With a third party vendor, there is a greater possibility of data being accessed by those who might cause harm to potential persons under surveillance.						
104	A Real Time Crime Center is a software that uploads all of Seattle's surveillance to a cloud-based platform making it available to ICE, Customs and Border Patrol, and other law enforcement agencies across the country that will have access to the	No	None	It should not be made available to ICE and CPB	No	No	

	data without a warrant.	
105	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. A move to the cloud creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights -Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in	The paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million". We should redeploy funds to solutions that work. -Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. -Poverty and income

		2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics.		inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence.
106		I worry about it circumventing protections that Washington has in place and endangers anyone on trumppian hate lists (trans folks, abortion seekers, immigrants). Please make it harder for	Lots of value! But also easy to make mistakes that could put many vulnerable people in very real danger. Let's make sure each step in new tech does more good than harm.	Privacy, civil rights, avoiding federal surveillance or making it easy for law enforcement to collaborate with authoritarian tactics of fear and surveillance

	folks outside Washington state to surveille our citizens.			
107	I'm concerned for our privacy. I'm concerned that these are mostly in POC areas. But mostly I'm alarmed that we are collecting data that can be terribly misused. It could be subpoenaed to prosecute people coming from out of state for abortion or gender-affirming care. Who knows what Trump and his cronies might do with them?	none whatsoever.		Consider that the adverse uses of these data would be far worse than any possible benefit.
108	this will endanger targeted groups	none, not needed	do not approve	

109	I am against surveillance in Seattle. I do not want police or artificial intelligence systems to watch me and my family as we go about our lives. Surveillance leads to self-censoring and a loss of individuality, creativity, and privacy. I do not want the federal government to legally or illegally access surveillance data collected in Seattle.	None.	The harmful impacts of surveillance and policing fall disproportionately on individuals who have already experienced violence from white supremacy and colonialism. This program is structurally racist. City leaders should stop pursuing these police technologies and instead use the millions they would cost on public-health-based safety and community supports, like housing, food access, and libraries.
110	Inappropriate to expand these systems given recent federal overreach.		
111	The overpolicing of communities is quite concerning.	I see no use of this overreaching surveillance	Please consider the effects it may have on our communities to be

	With only the use of constant surveillance we cannot understand the broader story of the situations we see unfold. I fear that this data will be used to wrongfully convict our friends and family		in the hands of the police		constantly watched by authority.		
112	I oppose the increased use of surveillance on my community. Linking up police access to the existing cameras and adding new one adds risk to all our communities especially immigrant, queer and POC people	Do not do this	Too much constitutionally protected private and personal data becomes available to all types of law enforcement SPD, ICE, KSC, national guard, WSP	No	Protecting our constitutional rights. Stopping ICE, keeping the government out of our lives.	As a voter I have been watching your votes and am disappointed in what you have been doing.	No
113	Surveillance data should be held within the jurisdiction responsible for it. Saying it would be cheaper to hold the data in a contractor's facility means that the city						

	doesn't value the security of the surveillance data. Once the contractor has our data stored out of state, it can be shared with other entities based on local laws, rather than subject to the laws we enacted to protect the data from exposing people in Washington to risks from outside jurisdictions.							
114	This technology infringes on the civil liberties of people who have committed no crimes, and exacerbates the already disproportionate targeting of the young, people of color, LGTBQIA people, etc, and does not require a	WA state and Seattle are facing a budget crisis and are facing record costs due to lawsuits against SPD and other agencies. There is no reason to believe that this will reduce crime or increase case resolution and every reason to believe it will be abused in	Negative value due to monetary cost for products, loss of civil liberties, liability issues, and other harms to our communities with no proven value to reduce crime.	There are other solutions to crime that actually work. I realize these often involve giving money to community organizations rather than the police but maybe, given SPDs track record, we shouldn't give them anything that they can abuse and get themselves	This proposal would result in so much liability for the city and SPD. Once you start collecting data on people do you have a plan in place to protect that data? Do you have a plan in place to ensure it will not be abused, or disclosed without authorization ? What will	It is hard to truly appreciate the value of privacy until it is lost, and even harder to get it back, if it is possible at all. Do you want this as your legacy?	Please please please do literally anything else with the city's money. It would be more beneficial to turn it into confetti for a parade or to set it on fire than to spend it on this.

	warrant to be shared.	ways that end up costing even more money, and result in harm to our community.		into more trouble with.	you do if those plans fail?
1 1 5	In a time of extreme authoritarian overreach on the part of the federal government, any additional surveillance and data gathering at the local level (such as expanded RTCC) runs the risk of that data being acquired and misused by the federal government.		There is little or no demonstrated value in the expansion of RTCC		

	RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPRs), CCTV, among other police surveillance tools. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation.
116	The City Council is attempting to move the on-premise RTCC

database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers.

SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-

	based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.			
117	False positives and the possible addition of AI tools reduces transparency and accountability.		The lack of trust in SPD will only get worse.	
118	With the FASCIST regime currently occupying our white house, NOW is NOT the	Where is the moral voice in the implementation of these -- I can't imagine there has been any.		

	time to create tools that they will use in any of their witch hunts, ie towards trans, immigrants, and political enemies. NO, just NO!!	Please stop, don't do this. And don't do this in our names, with our taxes!			
119	I am concerned the cloud-based storage part of this system will endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents by making data and surveillance available to out of state and federal government agencies. This is not a hypothetical – this is happening, and WILL happen to sensitive data on Seattle residents and visitors if we continue to contract for-profit company with out of state data storage servers vulnerable to secret		I don't see that this tech has any value. It is very expensive, it throws even more of our city budget to the police department which directly results in less funding for the social services and programs that actually keep our neighborhoods safe.	SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. SPD has lost the trust of wide swaths of Seattle residents because of their violent, escalating crowd-control tactics, poor leadership, right-wing police union, and significant representation of white supremacists within SPD ranks. What possible reason do we have to trust SPD with more surveillance tech? Why should we believe SPD will do what they say they	The current city leadership seems to believe they have a "mandate" from the voters regarding public safety. However, I would like them to consider that perhaps they have misinterpreted this "mandate" as they have run roughshod over democratic processes (such as public comment and community advisory committees) that have been informing them that their police legislation – RTCC and CCTV, SOAP

	subpoenas and governmental pressure to share that data in ways that will be both legal and illegal.	as they collect and store this sensitive data?	and SODA zones, &etc. – are deeply unpopular and not what the people of Seattle want for our city.
120	Availability of this information from license plate ID to ICE etc.		
121	- Footage is stored for 30 days. Why is it stored for so long? - Nashville abandoned its pursuit on FUSUS (the RTCC SPD uses) in April 2025 because it didn't believe any guardrails would keep the Trump Administration & ICE from accessing it. - By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventin	Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Why are we privileging strategies that have not worked to reduce	

g Washington State Law. - RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance.	violent crime over ones that do?

	I have significant concerns about the use of cloud-based RTCC solution will put sensitive data about Seattle residents and visitors within the reach of the Federal government, circumventing our state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act. This is concerning a wide range of people, but particularly so for immigrants, gender minorities, those seeking abortions, and protestors exercising their first amendment rights.			
122	Additionally, the use of solutions such as Fusus to expand police surveillance technologies, in particular to include the use of private security	A benefit to public safety has been claimed, however there is not evidence to support a signficant improvement to public safety.		The privacy and safety of Seattle residents, and those visiting Seattle, in the face of hostility from the Federal government and law enforcement from other states.

	cameras, represents a highly concerning increase in the polices ability to conduct wide-scale surveillance of Seattle residents.			
123	Increases to surveillance technology, at this time in history, is a terrible idea. The federal government will seek any existing tool to harm immigrants, their political opponents, and people seeking	Whatever good this could do, it will not outweigh the harm. Not now, not with this administratio n. Possibly not ever.	Please consider every thing that is happening in our country right now. Our most vulnerable communities are under attack. I am legitimately afraid the US is on its way to becoming a dictatorship,	Seattle will NOT be a sanctuary city, or a refuge for LGBTQ+ people and people seeking abortions if there is city wide surveillance.

	abortion and gender care.			if it isn't one already. I am already scared and increased surveillance is only going to make things worse.
124	I'm very concerned that this technology can be accessed by a national database, making it available to ICE, Border Patrol, and law enforcement across the country. This poses grave danger to all of us in these rife political times with a Federal Government pushing the boundaries of executive powers and overreach. I'm particularly concerned regarding the dangers posed by this technology for our marginalized communities (immigrants, transgender folks, and		I understand that this will add another tool in the 'tool belt' of law enforcement . That said, the risks far outweigh the benefits.	

	women). Is it not illegal in Washington State to share information with ICE? Does this technology not risk our status as a sanctuary state/city?				
125	The further erosion of privacy. Use to target specific vulnerable groups.		Put civil liberties and democratic values first. Don't let fear guide your decision making, but principles. What is the highest and best good for all?	Please protect our civil liberties. They are in grave danger at the moment and we need your help to maintain them. Thank you.	Thank you for standing up for our citizenry!
126	Major concerns. Mass surveillance, especially if the data gets into the hands of unaccountable and lawless government actors, is the antithesis to a free and democratic society. Right now the federal government is outright violating court orders and threatening to	The risks far outweigh the rewards.	How is the City of Seattle protecting residents against federal government overreach? How is the city protecting the human rights of its residents? What happens if this data gets into the hands of bad actors?	We are living in a country with federal leadership that outright violating civil liberties, refusing to obey judicial orders, and is not giving immigrants due process before sending to overseas prisons. Does the city of Seattle really want to give the federal government more information	

	send citizens to overseas prisons without due process. These cameras will help facilitate the human rights abuses of innocent individuals and people who should have a day in court to defend themselves.			that lead to the downfall of democracy and irrevocably ruins peoples lives?	
127	Data from Seattle's surveillance should NOT be available to ICE or border patrol without a warrant.	I'm fine with police accessing this data to help with crimes. However, this information should be only accessible to police.			
128	I am concerned that this could be used to violate the rights of people in Seattle.	The theoretical cases in which it could be helpful seem so unlikely that they are not worth mention.	How easy it would be for the data the City collects to be hacked, DOGE-ed, or otherwise leaked to entities that could use it in a harmful way.	Even where it's not being used, the existence of this technology could have a chilling effect on exercise of our First Amendment rights, and could make vulnerable people such as immigrants feel less safe and more	Please vote NO on surveillance technology.

					limited in our communities.
129	Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalization of those seeking reproductive care.	RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests"	None	We do not need more surveillance	
130	Without regulation and appropriate oversight, the overreach of MAGA states to use data to find individuals seeking reproductive care is my primary concern. Also, it is		With this administration and city council, none	Use data! Track results! Be transparent about effectiveness /costs! Learn from other cities!	

	unclear to me how to keep this information from inappropriate use by ICE, rendering our vulnerable communities less safe and making Seattle less safe for all given proliferation of fear.						
131	Traffic cameras should not be incorporated into SPD's Real Time Crime Center. Increasing surveillance is an infringement on the privacy of Seattle residents. It will allow another avenue for federal authorities such as ICE to track individuals, going against Seattle's supposed status as a Sanctuary City.	Increased surveillance will likely affect marginalized communities at a disproportionate level compared to white Seattle citizens.	Traffic cameras should remain as is without being implemented into SPD.	No	Consider divesting funds from SPD and into social services.	No.	No.
132	Expanding the surveillance capabilities	I do not want to live in a city that abets the federal			Consider the harm you'll be inflicting, which vastly		

	of the city will only endanger its inhabitants, and will very likely be leveraged by state actors and agencies (i.e. ICE) to target immigrants and other vulnerable populations. Please do not move forward with this.	government in harming/targeting vulnerable communities.		outweighs the good these systems might do, and think about other areas that desperately need this funding.
133	There is already a real time crisis center. We do not need to partner with private companies that favor profit over any benefit to citizens.		None. Do not give our data to non public entities.	Imagine the misuse of this kind of amassing of data- the danger outweighs any benefit.
134	There is no need for a cloud-based RTCC, which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. It is expensive and a threat to our most vulnerable citizens.			Think about who in Seattle is actually impacted by this. Think about our most vulnerable citizens.

	Please carefully consider any unintended consequences of moving the RTCC database to be a cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. As I understand it, this change will enable others to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers.		
135	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests	Please carefully consider any unintended consequences of moving the RTCC database to be a cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company.	

	from those outside Washington state. A cloud-based RTCC - at least at this moment in time - could weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. Please carefully consider whether this is something that should be done now (or ever).			
136	This technology allows bounty hunters and ICE agents to track immigrants, abortion seekers, and likely seekers of gender affirming care, or anyone else targeted by our currently hard right, fascism-		The value is to the current federal government's non-democratic intentions. While it may have some small use in local traffic safety, the risk to privacy far outweighs this.	As a fifth generation Washington resident, all proud Republicans, whose ancestors came here on the preacher train in the late 1800s, I feel I can speak for many when I say that this program is not aligned

	inclined federal government.		even with the majority opinion among right wing folks here. We want our privacy, and we value it for others. Do not let the heat of today's political climate invade the needs of our state and the will of its majority - left and right alike - specially in Seattle, where we are a sanctuary city for a reason (the voting public has already extensively spoken on this issue).	
137	That this will inflict more harm than good on our King County communities, especially in areas that are underprivileged and underserved- by encouraging police overstep and presence when it is not warranted.	None.	The current authoritarian use of power that is happening in the White House and how it has already been affecting our communities and endangering lives. If you truly want to protect Seattleites, please	Again, please think carefully about the times we are currently living in and whether you want to actually protect the people of Seattle, or potentially cause irreparable harm under

	Over surveillance at this dangerous time in our country will only harm our neighbors, and facilitate police cooperation with ICE or military forces/federal powers. What happens when they come for US citizens? Will this technology help to hand them over? If this is actually about protecting Seattleites, this is not the way.		consider whether this tool would actually do that or would potentially endanger us all through an overpowered surveillance system that could be easily wielded against its own people? Or taken over by federal authority when they come for our city? Please rise to meet this moment, as this moment is not normal and we are truly facing the threat of fascism. And a President who thinks himself a king and does not follow the law or Constitution.	the guise of “protection”.
1 3 8	I oppose a surveillance state	None		

139	Nashville abandoned its pursuit on FUSUS (the RTCC SPD uses) in April 2025 because it didn't believe any guardrails would keep the Trump Administration & ICE from accessing it. Many anti-abortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalization of those seeking reproductive care. The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. RTCC software like Fusus recruits a vast assortment of privately owned cameras that allow the company to bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage	I see no value in using this technology.	SPD's asked for these proposed material updates to the Surveillance Impact Reports for both their CCTV and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) 3 weeks after their CCTV and RTCC cameras went live on May 20, 2025 showing SPD never intended for this surveillance to be a short-term "pilot." SPD confirmed to Guy Oron that they have been providing "mutual aid" to ICE/Department of Homeland Security. Some of this "mutual aid" occurred while Interim Police Chief Shon Barnes was making the headline grabbing claim that he expects to go	The Community Surveillance Working Group's report on RTCC was "unsupportive of any ...deployment of the these two technologies [CCTV & RTCC]" due to "[t]he amount and urgency of the concerns and outstanding questions." The City leadership should not ignore the CSWG.	RTCC software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. RTCC software, and other companies selling subscriptions, operate on the land-and-expand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology - especially in light of the	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence besides increasing surveillance. Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoods that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeepers Collective coordinated by the Regional Office of Gun Violence Prevention and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition and their Restorative

from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. RTCC software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon.

without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The privatization of policing represented by relying on private consumers to expand the camera network undermines democratic values, effectively excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance apparatus. RTCC software like Fusus continually adds new image recognition algorithms and integrations with third-party applications via the software's AI capabilities. This continuous introduction

to jail because he won't cooperate with the Trump Administratio n. SPD and Mayor Harrell refuse to respond to questions from Hard Pressed about how many times ICE has asked for data sharing. The only thing preventing ICE from accessing all of SPD's surveillance data (including 30 days of video and 90 days of license plate scans) is SPD's dubious claim that it will follow the Keep Washington Working Act & Washington Shield Law. Standing up to Trump means saying no to surveillance technology!

fact that Seattle is anticipating a $250 million shortfall in 2025. Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is $7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of $5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to $11 million".

Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%. Richmond, CA has chosen to invest in violence interruption and other community-led safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community

The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender-affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus. RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority, for someone that had an abortion.	of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. In a 40 year systematic review with meta-analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured license plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.			non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community-centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance-abuse-treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and

ICE is terrorizing immigrant communities under Trump. The Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs). By moving to a cloud-based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventing Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private ALPR surveillance companies that market their products to				homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

police, in order to circumvent any local sanctuary laws. The department gets a lot of use out of this data, as seen by them running thousands of searches of ALPR databases in a single month as early as 2019. ICE's utilization of this data shows the degree of risk it poses to vulnerable communities. RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.

Surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests." In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting Black Lives Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

	SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his ex-girlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership.			
140	It has no real benefit and will harm women and minorities the most	I see no value except to strip individuals of their privacy	People in WA deserve their privacy and do not need their information uploaded to ICE so they	

			can be illiegally abducted
141	Data privacy is being violated by integrating traffic cameras into a crime center. Right now, the Trump administration, ICE, and "red" states with anti-abortion and anti-gender affirming care laws are using any data that they can get from other databases to attack people. Traffic cameras are about traffic laws, not other types of law enforcement. I am tired of being filmed everywhere. There are no rules about data storage. No one takes privacy or safety seriously. How long will these videos be stored? Where will	Traffic cameras make our streets safer by getting people to follow traffic laws. That's it.	If Seattle truly is a safe city for immigrants, trans people, people seeking abortions, etc., then we need to live by those values. This data will be abused. It will not be stored safely, and bad actors will get into it. This also expands SPD's budget. SPD has the LARGEST budget in the City. This means that we, as a city, value SPD over anything else, and we don't have other services because our elected officials have said that SPD is the most important department. We have a budget shortfall because of SPD's out-of-control

	they be stored? Who will have access? There are no governance thoughts put around this.			spending and coming in over budget every single year. It is fiscally irresponsible to keep expanding their budget.
142	That more surveillance will lead to the further over policing of communities that have already suffered from over policing. That these recordings will be shared with ICE and other federal law enforcement	Please don't do this.	No I do not. It is a slippery slope to go down with this.	This is a time where we should be coming together as a city. By installing this technology you are breaching a level of trust with your constituents. This will not be forgotten. Please please do the right thing and do

	that seek to target our city. And that it will lead to mistrust of the citizens of this city of their police force in a critical time where our relationship needs to be mended. This is not the way to mend that relationship.		institute this technology. This will not make our city safer and just adds to potential animosity between Seattle law enforcement and the populace.
1 4 3	SPD should not have access to traffic cameras. This will erode our civil liberties even further by making it even easier for police and ICE to target black and brown communities, immigrants, and anyone they don't like.	None, whatsoever.	Please focus your resources on building more housing, mental health resources, education, and reducing poverty. Police surveillance will not make us safer, nor will it solve the root causes of inequality and suffering, which make us unsafe.

144	RTCC software such as Fusus poses a threat to our civil liberties, especially our first amendment right of free speech, public protest, and public assembly. RTCC also harms by aiding in criminalizing people seeking abortions and gender-affirming healthcare. RTCC is a threat to women and survivors of sexual assault and stalking. RTCC harms immigrants by giving information directly to ICE, directly supporting the kidnapping of immigrants with no due process. Police control of RTCC cameras leads to censorship and selective	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.	I do not see any value in this technology. Real safety comes from community care, equitable access to resources, stable housing, food security, childcare, education, and jobs that pay a living wage.	I want City leadership to deeply examine the questions, "What is safety? Do I want safety for everyone?" I want City leadership truly listen to the voices of marginalized people and those standing up for them in the community and let those voices be a guide for what safety could look like instead of increased surveillance.

	punishment. RTCC creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all of our First and Fourth Amendment Rights. Do not expand and allow SPD to purchase another RTCC software to harm our neighbors.			
145	RTCC software makes it impossible to keep surveillance data from ICE. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to casually share surveillance	ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployment than those	None. Nashville abandoned its pursuit on FUSUS (the RTCC SPD uses) in April 2025 because it didn't believe any guardrails would keep the Trump Administration & ICE from accessing it.	

	data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority.	that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement.		
146	I'm against SPD obtaining a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.	Less surveillance, not more.	This a dangerous direction and a slippery slope eroding our freedom.	No to adding a cloud-based RTCC system. Our vulnerable communities would be targeted even more. We are NOT that type of community in Seattle.
147	This technology will not decrease crime and is ripe for abuse.		None	Investing in communities is the most effective way to decrease crime.

City of Seattle

2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department

Overview

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security, and access controls for data that is gathered through Seattle Police Department's (SPD) Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC). All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

1.0 Technology Description

Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, cameras (such as CCTV and traffic monitoring cameras), officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one “pane of glass” (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

2.0 Purpose

The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and citizen safety, and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects – enabling quicker aide and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

3.0 Data Collection and Use

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, SDOT traffic monitoring cameras, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

SDOT traffic monitoring cameras (as referenced in the “Closed Circuit Television ‘Traffic Cameras’ (Transportation)” SIR) will be utilized in the RTCC software for law enforcement purposes.

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention

policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

5.0 Access & Security

Access

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

Security

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

Retention period for data stored in RTCC software storage will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will get saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors will be allowed as needed.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies,

as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

7.0 Equity Concerns

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Seattle Police Department	Nick Zajchowski	Geoffrey Detweiler

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title:
AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software.

Summary and Background of the Legislation: The original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Real-Time Crime Center software (Ordinance 127111) was adopted by the City Council on October 8, 2024. Subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance."

The material update will provide the Seattle Police Department (SPD) the ability to view the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC software.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ☐ **Yes** ☒ **No**

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City? ☐ **Yes** ☒ **No**

3.d. Other Impacts

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.

SPD's current budget includes $2.0 million included in the 2025 budget and $3.7 million in 2026 to fully staff the RTCC by the end of 2026. The annual licensing costs for RTCC are $330,000. The use of RTCC software, when strategically integrated with the CCTV Crime Prevention Technology Pilot, may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the RTCC software and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.
N/A

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.

There are expected to be impacts in the form of efficiencies in deploying patrol officers and assisting with investigations. These impacts will be explored as part of the planned evaluation of the pilot.

Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.

The material update will provide the Seattle Police Department (SPD) the ability to view the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC software.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?
No.

b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?
No.

c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?
No.

d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.

i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.
The original 2024 Surveillance Impact Report as required by the Surveillance Ordinance includes a Racial Equity Toolkit.

ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.
N/A

iii. What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?
The SIR documents were translated into the recommend languages and were posted online.

e. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.
No.

ii. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.
No.

f. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?
The pilot will be evaluated under a Continuous Impact Assessment framework. Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of year two.

g. Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?
No.

5. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments: None.

File #: CB 121046, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE relating to public works contracts; amending provisions of the small works roster and contractor bond processes to align with state law; and amending Sections 20.40.020 and 20.48.010 of the Seattle Municipal Code.

WHEREAS, RCW 35.22.620 previously allowed certain contracts to be awarded using a small works roster process under RCW 39.04.155; and

WHEREAS, RCW 39.04.155 was repealed and replaced with RCW 39.04.151 through RCW 39.04.154 to reflect programmatic revisions to the establishment and use of the small works rosters for select public works projects in Washington State, including the establishment of a statewide roster option available to participating agencies through the Municipal Research Services Center, the creation of a new Public Works Small Business Enterprise (PWSBE) Certification Program through the Office of Minority and Women's Business Enterprises, the addition of a Direct Contracting Option for small works roster public works projects estimated to cost $150,000 or less, and the option for agencies to waive state retainage and contract bond requirements for small works roster projects of $5,000 or less; and

WHEREAS, RCW 35.22.620 was amended to delete "RCW 39.04.155" and add "RCW 39.04.151 through RCW 39.04.154"; and

WHEREAS, chapter 39.08 RCW provides public works contractors with the option to have ten percent of the contract amount retained in lieu of providing a contract bond for public works projects of $150,000 or less; and

WHEREAS, the City believes that the RCW changes align with the City's equity in contracting policies by

facilitating opportunities for small businesses to participate as prime contractors on select City public works projects; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Section 20.40.020 of the Seattle Municipal Code, last amended by Ordinance 123361, is amended as follows:

20.40.020 Small Works Roster((.))

The Director of Finance and Administrative Services shall establish ((~~and~~)) , use, or administer a Small Works Roster for ((~~use on~~)) City of Seattle public works projects ((~~that meet the requirements of~~)) pursuant to Revised Code of Washington (RCW) ((~~39.04.155~~)) 39.04.151 and 39.04.152 and 35.22.620, as ((~~now or hereafter~~)) amended. The Director shall adopt ((~~rules and regulations regarding~~)) policies and procedures for the use of ((~~the~~)) a Small Works Roster. The Director may also execute interagency agreements or other contractual documents as required to establish, use, or administer such a Small Works Roster.

Section 2. Section 20.48.010 of the Seattle Municipal Code, last amended by Ordinance 120782, is amended as follows:

20.48.010 Contractor's bond required

Before any contract for a public work or improvement shall be valid or binding against the City, the contractor shall make, execute, and deliver to the City a bond(s) that meet(s) the requirements of chapter 39.08 RCW as ((~~now or hereafter~~)) amended, except as specified in subsections 20.48.010.A and 20.48.010.B. ((~~Such bond shall be in an amount equal to not less than 25 percent, nor more than 100 percent of the full contract price agreed to be paid for such public work or improvement.~~))

A. For contracts of $5,000 or less, the ((~~Contract~~)) awarding ((~~authorities~~)) authority shall determine whether to require bond or retainage for ((~~limited~~)) public works projects awarded under ((~~the provisions of~~)) RCW ((~~39.04.155(3)~~)) 39.04.152, as ((~~now or hereafter~~)) amended.

B. For contracts of $150,000 or less, but greater than $5,000, in lieu of providing a contract bond, the

contractor may elect for the City to retain ten percent of the contract amount pursuant to chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW.

If a bond is required, ((~~a~~)) the bond shall: (1) be in an amount equal to not less than 25 percent, nor more than 100 percent, of the full contract price agreed to be paid for such public work or improvement; (2) name the City as obligee((~~,~~)) ; and ((~~shall~~)) (3) be filed with the City Clerk. The amount of ((~~the bond to be required of any contractor~~)) a required bond shall be: (1) stated in the call for bids for the doing of the public work or improvement; or (2) if there is no call for bids, as required by the department awarding the contract.

Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Finance and Administrative Services	Adrian Matanza	Lorine Cheung

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title: AN ORDINANCE relating to public works contracts; amending provisions of the small works roster and contractor bond processes to align with state law; and amending Sections 20.40.020 and 20.48.010 of the Seattle Municipal Code.

Summary and Background of the Legislation: Public works contracting in the State of Washington is governed by State law. In 2023, the State Legislature revised the laws regarding the small works roster program, which also included changes to contract bonding requirements for these small public works projects. The program went into effect in July of 2024. The small works roster program applies to small public works contracts estimated to cost below $350,000 with a new Direct Contracting option available for small works roster projects estimated below $150,000.

This legislation is primarily technical in nature as the City has existing municipal code authorizing a small works roster program as well as requiring contract bonding for its public works projects. This legislation updates this existing code by updating references to statutory provisions that have been repealed and replaced with the new small works roster provisions, including contract bonding allowances for small public works projects.

The proposed legislation updates City municipal code to reference the new State small works roster statutory citations. This includes the authorization to contract with the Municipal Research Services Center to administer the newly created statewide small works roster program.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ☐ **Yes** ☒ **No**

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City? ☒ **Yes** ☐ **No**

Expenditure Change ($); General Fund	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**
Expenditure Change ($); Other Funds	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**
		$1,200	**$1,200**	**$1,200**	**$1,200**

Revenue Change ($); General Fund	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
Revenue Change ($); Other Funds	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**
			$1,200	**$1,200**	**$1,200**

Number of Positions	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
Total FTE Change	**2025**	**2026 est.**	**2027 est.**	**2028 est.**	**2029 est.**

3.a. Appropriations

☐ **This legislation adds, changes, or deletes appropriations.**

3.b. Revenues/Reimbursements

☐ **This legislation adds, changes, or deletes revenues or reimbursements.**

3.c. Positions

☐ **This legislation adds, changes, or deletes positions.**

3.d. Other Impacts

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.

This has an on-going cost of $1200 that will be billed out through FAS allocations to all City Departments. The ongoing cost is to contract with Municipal Research Services Center to utilize a software platform to administer the small works roster program.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.

These can be absorbed in the first year of legislation but will be added into the FAS allocation in future years.

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.

The City would not be able to move forward in developing a small works roster program for its small public works projects, which would be in conflict with the expressed interest specified in the Mayor's Executive Order 2023-07, Section 5.

Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.

With FAS as the centralized administrator of public works contracting for the City, FAS anticipates minimal impact to other City capital departments as their public works responsibilities will remain primarily the same with a few exceptions. For instance, other City departments will use different solicitation templates in drafting the solicitation materials for a small works roster public works project. FAS will provide these templates to departments after determining the small works roster is the appropriate contracting option.

Additionally, FAS will work with departments to project potential use of the small works roster as part of the annual development of their WMBE goals.

FAS anticipates no impact to City employees performing construction work resulting from the small works roster program. There are stringent requirements the City complies with regarding public works performed by City employees under State law, RCW 35.22.620. In addition, the City has its own Contracting Out policies in place that each department must comply with prior to contracting out for the services. FAS will collaborate with City capital departments in developing the procedures for use of the small works roster and the procedure resulting from this collaboration will address the statutory and Contracting Out requirements.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation? No

b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation? Yes

c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property? No

d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.

i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.

Developing and implementing a small works roster program is in direct alignment with the *Mayor's Executive Order 2023-07:Equity and Opportunity in City*

Contracting. While the City's change is technical in nature, FAS believes participating in the State developed effort will have a positive impact on the referenced communities. This conclusion is based on the information developed and promoted by the State legislature in revising the small works roster program requirements, including but not limited to the following Intent note following RCW 39.04.010:

*NEW SECTION. **Sec. 1.** The legislature finds the need to increase equity and efficiencies in public works procurement. The legislature further finds that small, minority, women, and veteran-owned businesses are essential to a robust and high-functioning economy, which provides high quality living wage jobs throughout the state. The legislature further finds that public works contracting agencies need a streamlined and effective method for delivering small public works projects while protecting worker rights. Therefore, the legislature intends to provide a small business definition, best practices to be included in inclusion plans, and to update and revise the small and limited works roster process to increase administrative efficiency, to encourage greater participation and utilization by small, minority, women, and veteran-owned businesses, and continue to protect the rights of workers engaging in public works projects." [2023 c 395 s 1.]*

By implementing a program consistent with state law, the City will be able to utilize the new small works roster Direct Contracting processing option which aligns with the City's contracting equity and opportunity values. The Direct Contracting option allows the agency to contract directly with a single roster firm meeting the small, minority, women, or veteran-owned business eligibility requirements for small works roster projects estimated to cost below $150,000 (For projects above $150,000 to $350,000, the City will solicit to all firms in the respective small works roster categories.)

It is the City's intent to provide more prime contracting opportunities to small, minority, women, and veteran's owned businesses using the Direct Contracting roster option. Use of this Direct Contracting option will require compliance with the new race and gender-neutral public works small business certification requirements managed by the State of Washington Office of Minority & Women's Business Enterprises (OMWBE). This certification requirement may be a new requirement for many of the firms interested in doing business with the City. FAS will engage with the contracting community as part of program development to assess the impact of the new certification requirements, including but not limited to soliciting input from the City's WMBE Advisory Committee and Tabor 100.

The impact to City programs is also beneficial as developing a small works roster program will provide additional contracting methods for procuring City public works projects. The use of the statewide roster system through the Municipal Research Services Center should also improve contractor access to these smaller projects.

ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.

iii. What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?
FAS intends to apply the following in its communications to the public, including:

- Send notice to the contracting community via the City's Online Business Directory
- Post notice on the City's FAS Purchasing and Contracting external website, which includes the ability for the webpage content to be translated through Google Translate
- Post notice on City solicitation platform OpenGov
- Publish notice of City's adoption of the statewide small works roster through Municipal Research Services Center, Daily Journal of Commerce
- Publicize and conduct community outreach events and present on City adoption of small works roster program, including but not limited to our Regional Contracting Forum, Reverse Vendor Trade Show, our First Friday monthly events as well as the community events FAS participates in, such as Tabor 100 monthly meetings, NAMC. We will also work with the City's Technical Assistance Services Providers on outreach and communication

While the plan is not in-language, access to the translation services will be provided through language line and assistance with in-language staff, when necessary.

e. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.

Not applicable

ii. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.

Not applicable

f. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?

The Mayor's Executive Order, 2023-07, Equity and Opportunity in City Contracting specified that FAS shall lead the City in identifying and evaluating the impact of potential changes to procurement and public works policies that could improve equity in City contracting. Areas of exploration included small works roster development and bonding

requirements. As a result, by adopting this legislation, the City will have another contracting tool at its disposal that is in alignment with its contracting equity goals as recently reiterated in this Executive Order. On a long-term basis, FAS will work with other City capital departments to increase utilization of the Direct Contracting Option for small works roster projects under $150,000, along with use of the additional bonding requirements with the goal of increasing prime contracting opportunities for small or women and minority businesses. In addition to using existing WMBE reporting for tracking participation, FAS will be able to report on roster utilization, including small business/WMBE utilization via the statewide roster reporting tools.

g. Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization? No

5. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments: None.

File #: CB 121049, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

ORDINANCE _____

COUNCIL BILL _____

AN ORDINANCE relating to land use and zoning; amending Chapter 23.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) at page 8 of the Official Land Use Map to rezone land in the Lake City neighborhood.

WHEREAS, the Lake City Community Center was severely damaged by fire in 2023 and Seattle Parks and Recreation and the Seattle Office of Housing are partnering to pursue an innovative project to rebuild the community center in a mixed-use building with a new community center at the ground level and multiple stories of affordable housing above it; and

WHEREAS, Seattle continues to face significant housing affordability challenges as an estimated 32 percent of all households in the city are cost burdened, and of these, close to 50,000 households are severely cost-burdened and at especially high risk of housing insecurity; and

WHEREAS, new rent- and income-restricted affordable housing is one of the most direct ways the City can support affordable housing for its residents and aid community members at risk of displacement; and

WHEREAS, rebuilding a new Lake City community center is a high priority for residents and workers in Lake City and a new community center will provide an important public service to households throughout Lake City and adjacent neighborhoods; and

WHEREAS, this ordinance would increase development capacity for housing and community serving uses and maintain a Mandatory Housing Affordability requirement on a group of parcels that include currently lightly used or vacant properties; and

WHEREAS, this proposal will be compatible with the planned land use pattern envisioned in the

Comprehensive Plan and the Seattle Municipal Code, since the proposal meets rezone criteria, and would be consistent with the precedent of the mix of uses in other nearby areas and would provide a more gradual stepped transition between higher intensity and lower intensity zoned areas; and

WHEREAS, a State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) Determination of Non-Significance (DNS) was issued on June 9, 2025; and

WHEREAS, the proposed rezone meets criteria in the Land Use Code as discussed in the Director's Report accompanying this ordinance; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. The Official Land Use Map, Chapter 23.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code, is amended to rezone properties identified on page 8 of the Official Land Use Map as shown on Attachment 1 to this ordinance.

Section 2. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2025, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

President _____ of the City Council

Approved / returned unsigned / vetoed this ____day of _____, 2025.

_____

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Lake City Rezone Map

Attachment 1 - Lake City Rezone Map



Rezone area

Map prepared by
OPCD. June 2025

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Office of Planning & Community Development (OPCD)	Jonathan Morales	Jennifer Breeze

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title: AN ORDINANCE relating to land use and zoning; amending Chapter 23.32 of the Seattle Municipal Code at page 8 of the Official Land Use Map to rezone land in the Lake City neighborhood.

Summary and background of the Legislation: This proposal would implement zoning changes on land in the Lake City neighborhood on a collection of four land parcels totaling approximately 3.1 acres, including three parcels that are city-owned, and one parcel that is privately owned. The parcels are located along 28th Ave NE, east and west, and between NE 125th St and NE 127th St.

The parcels have a high potential for infill development with affordable multi-family housing and community serving uses. Two parcels are owned by Seattle Parks and Recreation and Seattle Finance and Administrative Service, which is currently proposed to have a new Lake City Community Center with affordable housing on its upper floors. The primary effect of the rezone is a ten-foot increase in height for existing Neighborhood Commercial (NC) zoned parcels, and changes to existing LR3 zones to unify the proposed zoning to NC-85 throughout.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ___ Yes __X__ No

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation amend the Adopted Budget? ___ Yes __X__ No

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to the City of Seattle that are not reflected in the above, including direct or indirect, short-term or long-term costs?
The legislation is expected to expedite and help facilitate infill development of affordable housing and community serving uses in the Lake City neighborhood. Future development on the subject sites would require permits, and as a result, permit fees would be charged by the City. The legislation will have minor impacts to SDCI staff, as they will be called on to update the zoning maps.

Is there financial cost or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation?
Not implementing this legislation could delay commencement of affordable housing and community uses in the Lake City neighborhood. Furthermore, a proposed Lake City Community Center and affordable housing project could help preserve per unit public

funding by $6,000 or 2%, which may not be possible if the legislation does not get implemented.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Does this legislation affect any departments besides the originating department?
The Office of Housing has tentatively awarded funds for possible affordable housing developments on sites affected by this legislation. The legislation will assist moving forward with possible redevelopment permit applications and eventual OH allocation of the funds. Seattle Parks and Recreation has a proposed project to rebuild the community center on sites affected by this legislation.

b. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?
Yes. A public hearing is expected to be held in Fall 2025.

c. Does this legislation require landlords or sellers of real property to provide information regarding the property to a buyer or tenant?
No.

d. Is publication of notice with *The Daily Journal of Commerce* and/or *The Seattle Times* required for this legislation?
A SEPA Notice for this action was published in the Daily Journal of Commerce on June 9, 2025. Publication for the Public Hearing would be noticed in the Daily Journal of Commerce.

e. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?
The legislation will apply to four parcels along 28th Ave, between NE 125th St and NE 127th St, in the Lake City neighborhood, as described above.

f. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative. Does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?
This legislation will assist in allowing potential development of affordable housing and community-serving uses that have strong support from organizations affiliated with communities of color. Expected future uses include city-funded affordable housing and a new Lake City Community Center.

g. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s).
No new initiative or major programmatic expansion is proposed.

Attachments: None.

Director's Report
Lake City Rezone
June 2025

PROPOSAL SUMMARY

The Office of Planning and Community Development (OPCD) proposes legislation to rezone land in the Lake City neighborhood on a collection of four land parcels on two blocks near the heart of the Lake City Hub Urban Village and proposed Urban Center per the One Seattle Plan. The parcels have a high potential for infill development with affordable multi-family housing and community serving uses. The parcels are owned by the City of Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR), City of Seattle Finance and Administrative Service (FAS), the City of Seattle Public Library (SPL), and one parcel in private ownership by Bank of America that is currently used as a local branch. The parcels in ownership by SPR and FAS are expected to host development of a new Lake City Community Center with affordable housing on its upper floors.

In total the proposal would affect approximately 3.1 acres of land. The parcels are located to the east and the west sides of 28th Ave. NE in the blocks to the north of NE. 125th St. See also maps and photographs on the following pages.

The proposal would change the zoning of the four parcels to a Neighborhood Commercial zone with an 85' height limit. The majority of the affected area is currently zoned Neighborhood Commercial with a 75' height limit. Therefore, the primary effect of this proposal is to increase the height limit by 10' and increase the allowed maximum Floor Area Ratio (FAR) by 0.25 from 5.5 to 5.75. The intent is to incrementally increase capacity for housing and affordable housing in an efficient way by allowing construction with five full stories of wood-framed construction to be located over two stories of space that can accommodate commercial and community-oriented uses at street level. Other nuances to the proposed zoning change are described later in this director's report.

Affected Area



Proposed Rezone



View of the Lake City Community Center Site Looking in a Northerly Direction

PROPOSAL AND ANALYSIS

The sites proposed for rezone include lands owned by the City of Seattle. The incremental zoning changes would increase development capacity to support greater densities or quantities of affordable housing. The proposed rezone supports development that would be in efficient configurations for cost-effective construction due to topographical factors, construction methods, and parcel size. No housing units will be eliminated since there is no existing housing on site. Although this proposal does not include construction, the zoning envelopes could facilitate an estimated 500 new housing units using general assumptions. No redevelopment or new housing is anticipated on the site of Seattle Public Library.

On the parcel owned by the Seattle Parks Department, not-for-profit affordable housing providers are interested in potential redevelopment of a new Lake City Community Center on the ground floor with rent- and income-restricted housing above. If this potential redevelopment proceeds, the affordable housing component of this development could likely be financed in part with support by the Office of Housing. The potential developer is interested in constructing a 7-story apartment building. If permitted, new apartment homes would be within one-half mile of frequent transit service on the # line on Lake City Way and would house Individuals/Families at 50-60% Area Median Income and Feature 2-3 bedroom 'family-sized' units. The site is directly adjacent to the Albert Davis Park and the Lake City Library and is therefore a location exceptionally well-served by public services.

In May of 2025 the Tent City 4 temporary encampment for unsheltered persons moved to the Lake City Community Center site. The community of around 100 people will stay there for up to six months according to an agreement with the City. Since planning and design for any future development would take much longer than six months before any construction might begin, this proposal does not affect the temporary land use as an encampment for unsheltered persons that will be present within the rezone area. The encampment will voluntarily move before any permanent construction on the Lake City Community Center site. The organization that runs the encampment has an enduring promise of not staying in any single location for more than one year.

The proposed rezone area also includes a private parcel of land currently occupied by a one-story Bank of America branch and large surface parking area. Inclusion of this parcel makes for a logical pattern of zones that stair-step down from 95' at Lake City Way, to 85' on the proposed rezone area, to 75' west of the proposed rezone area, and to 55' further west. Inclusion of the Bank of America parcel extends the housing capacity aspects of the rezone to a larger geography on a site that is well-positioned for future infill development.

Parcel Configuration and Correction of Boundary Mismatches

The land owned by SPR is a large irregular parcel that contains both the community center / housing site and Albert Davis Park. This proposal only seeks to rezone the portion of this parcel that will be occupied by the community center and housing. The part of the parcel used as the Albert Davis Park space is zoned Lowrise 3. This proposal does not seek to change the LR3 zoning on the Albert Davis Park, except for a small portion of the LR3 zoned area along the east edge of the park that is intended to be used as part of the community center and housing footprint. This sliver of land is proposed for a rezone from LR3 to NC3-85. Additionally, a sliver of land to the north of the community center along the 28th Ave. NE frontage is zoned NC3-55 because the parcel boundary does not match the zoning boundary here.

This sliver of land will be rezoned from NC3-55 to NC3-85. These changes are corrections of inconsistences between zoning boundaries and parcel boundaries on slivers of land and are not considered to be material or substantive changes to the zoning in the area.

Existing zoning on the Seattle Public Library site is the Neighborhood Commercial 2 (NC2) designation while the rest of the commercial land in the area is Neighborhood Commercial 3 (NC3). NC3 allows for a slightly larger range of commercial uses and larger maximum size of use for certain commercial uses than NC2. This proposal would not change the NC2 designation of the library site. No change or redevelopment at the library site is anticipated.

Pedestrian Overlay Zone

Parcels fronting NE. 125th St. would retain the existing Pedestrian overlay zone. The pedestrian overlay zone is intended to ensure that commercial frontages and building features that are conducive to a pleasant pedestrian-oriented environment are located in new development that faces certain streets. Prior Lake City community plans called for NE. 125th St. to be a pedestrian oriented street with a P zone and this proposal does not alter the extent of the P zone designation.

Housing Affordability

The most direct effect of this proposal on housing affordability is to encourage redevelopment of the community center and associated housing project. The redevelopment contemplated would yield approximately 113 affordable housing units available to households with incomes at 60% of AMI or below in family-sized homes. The proposed zoning increase is expected to increase the total number of affordable homes by 19 over the 94 that would likely result without the upzone, based on development assumptions. Furthermore, the increased capacity improves efficiency as it would reduce the per-unit public funding by OH by approximately $6,000 or 2%.

The same type of efficiencies would be realized for redevelopment on other sites in the rezone area that may happen in the future – namely at the Bank of America site. This large, conveniently shaped parcel could accommodate approximately 400 homes. All areas within the rezone will continue to be subject to the City's Mandatory Housing Affordability (MHA). The current (M) suffix is proposed to be maintained in the rezone, which requires 5% of housing units to be set aside as affordable or an in-lieu payment of $9.25 per sq. ft. Through MHA, redevelopment at the Bank of America site could be expected to yield approximately 20 affordable homes or $3.5M of in-lieu payment.

Public Engagement

The Lake City Community Center (LCCC) has been a key part of the neighborhood's history, serving as a hub for community activities. Formerly operated by the Lions Club and later Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) from 2017 to 2023, it brought together people of all ages and cultures despite its small capacity. Community members express the importance of the site as a public gathering place to City of Seattle staff through various channels, especially to Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) staff engaged in replacement of the community center.

After a fire in April 2023 led to its closure and demolition in early 2024, plans began for redevelopment. This redevelopment plans to combine a new community center with affordable housing and services near transit, offering multiple benefits to the growing neighborhood. In 2024 a not-for-profit affordable housing provider conducted community outreach regarding their desire to redevelop the affected sites.

The new Lake City Community Center is being designed through a close collaboration between the Development Team and Seattle Parks and Recreation staff. Providing valuable input along the way is the Project Advisory Team (PAT), a dedicated group of Lake City community members who bring diverse ages, experiences, and connections to local organizations. The PAT is closely engaged in the design process and supports the proposed rezone for additional height to accommodate increased housing capacity.

Additional opportunities for public comment is being provided through the SEPA environmental review process. Community members will have the opportunity to comment on the proposed zoning change during the City Council public hearing and City Council deliberation on the proposed action.

State Environmental Policy Act Review (SEPA)
OPCD is issuing a SEPA checklist and a determination of non-significance (DNS) in June of 2025 for the proposed rezone. The decision will be published in the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce and the City's Land Use Information Bulletin with a 14-day comment period.

Compatibility with Existing Use and Development Pattern
A complete analysis of the SMC rezone criteria is provided below to document whether the rezone is appropriate. In addition, the following provides an overview of the compatibility between uses that could occur under the proposed rezones and the surrounding existing context and land use.

The area is entirely within the Lake City Urban Center as proposed in the One Seattle Plan update and is currently characterized as a Hub Urban Village in the Seattle 2035 Comprehensive Plan. One Seattle Plan Growth Strategy Policy G.S 4.3 provides a description of the planned vision and intent for growth within urban centers relevant to this rezone:

> *GS. 4.3 Allow a wide range of housing types in Urban Centers. Urban Centers should generally allow buildings of 3 to 8 stories. Buildings greater than 8 stories may be appropriate in Urban Centers near significant transit investments, especially light rail stations, or near existing concentrations of amenities and services.*

The proposed rezone to the 85' height limit would facilitate new buildings in the 7-8 story range, consistent with GS 4.3.

The general vicinity of the rezone area is characterized by a wide range of existing land uses and building scales including but not limited to: 2-4 story multifamily residential structures; low-scale office and retail buildings; places of worship; public buildings such as the library; surface parking areas; and a scattering of larger 6-7 story mixed use structures. The 6-7 mixed-use structures in the vicinity are located along Lake City Way NE on the east side of that arterial roadway. The broader Lake City neighborhood includes several large auto dealerships. The Pierre Ford Service and Parts Department is located adjacent to the rezone area directly north of the Bank of America parcel. This varied pattern of existing land uses and scale is typical for an Urban Centers in Seattle. Infill mixed use development of 5-7 stories of wood-framed construction over a 1-2 story base is entirely compatible with and appropriate for the context. A

new-mixed use development would be consistent with the scale and functions of existing activities in the area and would continue the trend of other recent developments in nearby blocks. The only buildings currently on rezone area sites are the Seattle Public Library, which is not expected to change, and the Bank of America local branch buildings and its associated parking.

The following adjacencies are found within the blocks affected by the rezone. The north half of the block adjacent to the Bank of America site is entirely occupied by the Pierre Ford Service and Parts Department. In the block with City-owned land, the 4 story Villager Apartments building is located directly west of the library site, and the Albert Davis Park is located directly west of the part of the site expected for the new community center and housing. To the north of the city-owned land is another a 4-story mixed use multifamily structure with a small studio space for yoga at the ground floor. To the northwest of the rezone area there is a cluster of 1-story structures that appear to house a cross fit gym and an indoor baseball training facility. Potential new development is not expected to cause incompatible adjacencies with the auto parts and services use, or the cross-fit and athletics uses, or the existing mixed-use structure to the north of the community center site.

Interface with Albert Davis Park

The interface of potential new development in the rezone area with the Albert Davis Park could cause some impact on the park. Up to a 7-story mixed use structure is likely to be developed directly east of an active open space public park. Impacts could include shadowing effects on the park at certain times of day and the visual impact of a tall structure located very close to the park. However, any proposed housing and community center project will undergo careful design and is being led by SPR. Any proposed project will undergo review by the Seattle Design Commission. It is expected that this high degree of oversight, and leadership by SPR will result in design choices that minimize potential negative impacts on the park. Possible treatments may include design that allows for direct access and a porous connection between the ground level community center and the adjacent Albert Davis Park space.

Pattern of Zoned Height Limits

With regard to zoned height limits, the proposed rezones would provide a stepped transition from higher intensity commercial zoning to the east along Lake City Way (NC3-95)., to the NC-85 zone on the proposed rezone area, then to more moderately scaled mixed use zoning of NC-75 and NC-55 further west. The proposal would also create a stepped series of height limits in the south-to-north direction from the subject parcels down to NC-55 and eventually to residential multifamily zones.

REZONE CRITERIA EVALUATION

Tables below evaluate all SMC rezone criteria relevant to the proposal.

General Rezone Evaluation and Rezone Criteria

SMC	Criterion	Evaluation
23.34.007	**Rezone Evaluation**	
23.34.007.B	No single criterion or group of criteria shall be applied as an absolute requirement or test of the appropriateness of a zone designation, nor is there a hierarchy or priority of rezone considerations, unless a provision indicates the intent to constitute a requirement or sole criterion.	Noted. Criteria are balanced in this evaluation.
23.34.007.C	Compliance with the provisions of this Chapter 23.34 shall constitute consistency with the Comprehensive Plan for the purpose of reviewing proposed rezones, except that Comprehensive Plan Shoreline Environment Policies shall be used in shoreline environment redesignations as provided in subsection 23.60A.042.C.	Noted. This evaluation is used for Comp Plan consistency analysis.
23.34.008	**General rezone criteria**	
23.34.008.B	Match Between Zone Criteria and Area Characteristics. The most appropriate zone designation shall be that for which the provisions for designation of the zone type and the locational criteria for the specific zone match the characteristics of the area to be rezoned better than any other zone designation.	The site is already zoned NC2 and NC3 and this designation closely matches the characteristics for this zone as noted below. The height limit is proposed to change.
23.34.008.C	Zoning History and Precedential Effect. Previous and potential zoning changes both in and around the area proposed for rezone shall be examined.	In 2019 the City incrementally rezoned the area to implement MHA.
23.34.008.D	Neighborhood Plans.	
1.	For the purposes of this title, the effect of a neighborhood plan, adopted or amended by the City Council after January 1, 1995, shall be as expressly	The Lake City Urban Design framework from 2016 was the last neighborhood planning document to be prepared for the area. Legislation to change zoning in Lake City to implement the plan was adopted in 2016.

	established by the City Council for each such neighborhood plan	
2.	Council adopted neighborhood plans that apply to the area proposed for rezone shall be taken into consideration.	The neighborhood plan was taken into consideration and this proposal does not deviate from guidance of the plan.
3.	Where a neighborhood plan adopted or amended by the City Council after January 1, 1995 establishes policies expressly adopted for the purpose of guiding future rezones, but does not provide for rezones of particular sites or areas, rezones shall be in conformance with the rezone policies of such neighborhood plan.	The Urban Design Framework provides some guidance for specific zones. This proposal is generally consistent with the plan's guidance but the proposal incrementally increases the height limit over what's included in the plan. OPCD believes this change is consistent with the plan including specific guidance in the plan about enhancing the civic center of Lake City and infill development.
4.	If it is intended that rezones of particular sites or areas identified in a Council adopted neighborhood plan are to be required, then the rezones shall be approved simultaneously with the approval of the pertinent parts of the neighborhood plan.	No amendment to a neighborhood plan is proposed or necessary.
23.34.008.E	**Zoning Principles**	
1.	The impact of more intensive zones on less intensive zones, or industrial and commercial zones on other zones, shall be minimized by the use of transitions or buffers, if possible. A gradual transition between zoning categories, including height limits, is preferred.	A transition between more intensive commercial zoning to the east on Lake City Way (NC-95) and to lower intensity commercial zoning to the west (NC-55) would be created by the proposal. Overall, this makes the transition more gradual.
2.	Physical buffers may provide an effective separation between different uses and intensities of development.	The area is generally flat without major natural physical features. A tapered landscape of height limits is the primary mechanism to achieve transition.
3.	**Zone boundaries**	
3.a.	In establishing boundaries, the following elements shall be considered: 1) Physical buffers as described in subsection 23.34.008.E.2; and 2) Platted lot lines.	Most of the zone boundaries are at lot lines or street edges. Minor corrections to zone boundaries not at a lot line are a part of this proposal for the parcel owned by Seattle Parks Department. The changes harmonize zone boundaries with the extent of the property for the future

		Community Center and housing development.
3.b.	Boundaries between commercial and residential areas shall generally be established so that commercial uses face each other across the street on which they are located, and face away from adjacent residential areas. An exception may be made when physical buffers can provide a more effective separation between uses.	The proposal would not change the pattern of commercially zoned areas facing each other across streets.
4.	In general, height limits greater than 55 feet should be limited to urban villages. Height limits greater than 55 feet may be considered outside of urban villages where higher height limits would be consistent with an adopted neighborhood plan, a major institution's adopted master plan, or where the designation would be consistent with the existing built character of the area.	The rezone area is within the proposed Lake City Urban Center (proposed in the One Seattle Plan update), and within the existing Lake City Hub Urban Village. Building heights up to 8 stories are appropriate for urban centers according to the One Seattle Plan Comprehensive Plan policy GS 4.3. The current designation as a Hub Urban Village is generally less dense than urban centers, as described in the Seattle 2035 Comprehensive Plan.
23.34.008.F	**Impact Evaluation.** The evaluation of a proposed rezone shall consider the possible negative and positive impacts on the area proposed for rezone and its surroundings	See below.
F.1	Factors to be examined include, but are not limited to, the following:	See below.
a.	Housing, particularly low-income housing;	The proposed rezone area would have a high likelihood of being developed with rent- and income-restricted affordable housing. There is no existing housing on site and therefore no risk of displacement.
b.	Public services;	Excellent public services are in place as discussed in the SEPA checklist and this Director's Report.
c.	Environmental factors, such as noise, air and water quality, terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna, glare, odor, shadows, and energy conservation;	Factors were considered and discussed in the SEPA checklist and decision.

d.	Pedestrian safety;	There are sidewalks in place on adjacent streets and improved bus stops within ¼ mile walk on NE 125th St. and on Lake City Way NE.
e.	Manufacturing activity;	None in the vicinity.
f.	Employment activity;	Future uses on the site are expected to be primarily residential
g.	Character of areas recognized for architectural or historic value;	No historic resources or landmarks are known to be on the site or immediate vicinity.
h.	Shoreline view, public access, and recreation.	There are no views or shorelines in the affected area.
F.2	Service capacities. Development which can reasonably be anticipated based on the proposed development potential shall not exceed the service capacities which can reasonably be anticipated in the area, including:	See rows below.
a.	Street access to the area;	Street access capacity would not be exceeded as discussed in the SEPA checklist and DNS.
b.	Street capacity in the area;	None of these capacities would be exceeded as discussed in the SEPA checklist, and environmental determination.
c.	Transit service;	
d.	Parking capacity;	
e.	Utility and sewer capacity;	
f.	Shoreline navigation;	Not applicable.
23.34.008.G	Changed circumstances. Evidence of changed circumstances shall be taken into consideration in reviewing proposed rezones, but is not required to demonstrate the appropriateness of a proposed rezone. Consideration of changed circumstances shall be limited to elements or conditions included in the criteria for the relevant zone and/or overlay designations in this Chapter 23.34.	No major changed circumstances to physical conditions on the ground, however, Lake City is proposed as an Urban Center in the proposed *One Seattle Plan*. The rezone would be compatible and similar to other development in the immediate vicinity, and would meet the proposed densities envisioned for Urban Centers.
23.34.008.I	Critical areas. If the area is located in or adjacent to a critical area (Chapter 25.09), the effect of the rezone on the critical area shall be considered.	No major ones present in the rezone area, see SEPA checklist.
c.	The number of existing single-family structures, not including detached accessory dwelling units, has been very stable or increasing in the last five years, or	There are no single family structures in the rezone area.

d.	The area's location is topographically and environmentally suitable for single-family residential developments.	The parcel size and position in a business district and on an arterial road make it more suitable for mixed use commercial or multi-family use.

23.34.009	**Height limits of the proposed rezone**	
If a decision to designate height limits in residential, commercial, or industrial zones is independent of the designation of a specific zone, in addition to the general rezone criteria of Section 23.34.008, the following shall apply:		
A.	Function of the zone. Height limits shall be consistent with the type and scale of development intended for each zone classification. The demand for permitted goods and services and the potential for displacement of preferred uses shall be considered.	The 85' height limit is consistent with the intended scale of mixed use development. There is no risk of residential displacement.
B.	Topography of the area and its surroundings. Height limits shall reinforce the natural topography of the area and its surroundings, and the likelihood of view blockage shall be considered.	The area is generally flat and no views will be blocked by the 85' limit.
C.1	The height limits established by current zoning in the area shall be given consideration.	The existing height limit is 10' less than proposed. Adjacent land to the east along Lake City Way is already zoned with a 95' height limit.
C.2	In general, permitted height limits shall be compatible with the predominant height and scale of existing development, particularly where existing development is a good measure of the area's overall development potential.	Within the neighborhood area there are several existing 5-7 story mixed use buildings, built within the last 25 years. This is the predominant pattern of recent development.
D.1	Height limits for an area shall be compatible with actual and zoned heights in surrounding areas excluding buildings developed under Major Institution height limits; height limits permitted by the underlying zone, rather than heights permitted by the Major Institution designation, shall be used for the rezone analysis.	The proposed 85' height limit is consistent with adjacent property zoned with a 95' height limit and other 75' height limits nearby. Nearby structures on Lake City Way NE are 3 to 8 stories tall.
D.2	A gradual transition in height and scale and level of activity between zones shall be provided unless major physical buffers, as described in subsection 23.34.008.D.2, are present.	A gradual transition in height limits from 95' (NC3-95), to 85 (NC3-85), to 75' (NC3-75), to 55' (NC3-55), to Lowrise zones would be created by the proposal.

E.	Neighborhood plans	The 2016 Lake City Urban Design Framework addresses the rezone area. The plan has been consulted and OPCD determines that the proposed changes are consistent with the vision and intent of the plan.
23.34.072	**Designation of commercial zones**	
A.	The encroachment of commercial development into residential areas shall be discouraged.	The zone is already NC and would not extend commercial zoning into new areas.
B.	Areas meeting the locational criteria for a single-family designation may be designated as certain neighborhood commercial zones as provided in Section 23.34.010.	Not applicable.
C.	Preferred configuration of commercial zones shall not conflict with the preferred configuration and edge protection of residential zones as established in Sections 23.34.010 and 23.34.011 of the Seattle Municipal Code	A transition from the NC commercial area to multifamily residential would be provided.
D.	Compact, concentrated commercial areas, or nodes, shall be preferred to diffuse, sprawling commercial areas	The commercial area is contiguous with the existing commercial zones and mixed use center of the neighborhood.
E.	The preservation and improvement of existing commercial areas shall be preferred to the creation of new business districts.	The area is already zoned commercial.
23.34.076	**Neighborhood Commercial 3 (NC3) zones, function and locational criteria.**	
A.	**Function**. To support or encourage a pedestrian-oriented shopping district that serves the surrounding neighborhood and a larger community, citywide, or regional clientele; that provides comparison shopping for a wide range of retail goods and services; that incorporates offices, business support services, and residences that are compatible with the retail character of the area; and where the following characteristics can be achieved:	See below.
A.1	A variety of sizes and types of retail and other commercial businesses at street level;	The zone designation would remain NC2 and NC3.
A.2	Continuous storefronts built to the front lot line	The zone would continue to promote a continuous line of storefronts stretching along NE 125th St.
A.3	An atmosphere attractive to pedestrians;	Streets in the vicinity have wide sidewalks and recent

		pedestrian improvements. The P designation on NE 125th St. would be retained.
A.4	Shoppers can drive to the area, but walk from store to store	Shoppers could walk from store to store and to nearby institutions including the proposed Community Center and existing public library.
B.	**Locational Criteria.** A Neighborhood Commercial 3 zone designation is most appropriate on land that is generally characterized by the following conditions:	
B.1	The primary business district in an urban center or hub urban village;	The area is entirely in the Lake City Urban Center.
B.2	Served by principal arterial;	Lake City Way NE two blocks to the east is a principal arterial and is on the frequent transit network.
B.3	Separated from low-density residential areas by physical edges, less-intense commercial areas or more-intense residential areas;	There are not strong edges to buffer residential areas
B.5	Excellent transit service	Transit service is excellent. The 65 and 75 buses run on NE 125th St. and the 61, 322, 372 and 522 run on Lake City Way NE. All are within ¼ mile walking distance from the rezone area.

CONCLUSION

This proposed rezone is consistent with the SMC rezone criteria as demonstrated in this report, and the Comprehensive Plan. A SEPA Determination of Non-Significance has been issued. The proposal would support important public policy objectives including encouraging affordable housing and it could provide a support to community-based organizations providing services in a future publicly owned Community Center. In addition to supporting policy goals on City-owned land, the proposal would more broadly increase the capacity for infill housing on another parcel not owned by the City of Seattle. The proposed rezone is recommended for approval by the OPCD Director.

Legislation Text

File #: CF 314536, **Version:** 1

Council waiver or modification of development standards to allow installation of 32 netting poles at Jefferson Park Golf Course (Project No. 3039491-LU; Type V).



DESIGNATION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS

- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 1 - STEEP SLOP (40% AVERAGE)
- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 2 - POTENTIAL SLIDE AREA
- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 4 - WETLAND
- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 8 - KNOWN SLIDE (INITIAL POINT)
- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 9 -WILDLIFE HABITAT
- ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA 11 - PEAT SETTLEMENT PRONE AREAS

NOTE: THIS VICINITY MAP SHOWS THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HAS BEEN GENERATED BASED ON THE INFORMATION FOUND ON THE ONLINE MAP TOOL, "SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION & INSPECTION GIS", FROM THE CITY OF SEATTLE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MAP IS TO HELP IDENTIFY ONLY THE ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF THE PROJECT LOCATION. FOR COORDINATION OF ALL ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS PLEASE REFERENCE THE CITY OF SEATTLE ONLINE MAPPING TOOL. ENGEL AND COMPANY TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION DEPICTED ON THIS MAP. IT IS OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT DETAILED PROPERTY INFORMATION SUCH AS TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEY, WETLAND REPORTS AND A WILDLIFE STUDY BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION.

N

VICINITY MAP

N.T.S.

PROPERTY OWNER:

SEATTLE PARKS AND RECREATION
ADDRESS: 300 ELLIOTT AVENUE W., SUITE 100, SEATTLE, WA 98119

PROPERTY INFORMATION:

TAX PARCEL NUMBER: 162404-9080

LEGAL DESCRIPTION: POR OF NW 1/4 STR 16-24-4 LY SLY OF S SPOKANE ST LESS POR FOR BEACON AVE S TGW POR OF SW 1/4 SD STR 16-24-4 LY N OF N LN OF GL 5 & GL 5 EXTENDED E TO W MGN OF BEACON AVE S & LY ELY OF BEACON AVE S LESS PORS FOR BEACON AVE S & FOR CHEASTY BLVD LESS POR LY WLY OF SD AVE & N OF PT 429.5 FT S OF SW1/4 COR&PLT S MGN SD ST PER ORD #65498 TGW POR OF SE 1/4 SD STR 16-24-4 DAF BAAP ON W LN OF SD SUBD SD PT BEING DIST 1972.02 FT S FR NW COR THOF TH S ALG SD W LN A DIST OF 170.45 FT TH NELY & NLY & NWLY ALG ARC OF CRV TO LFT HAVING A RAD OF 105.00 FT AN ARC DIST OF 198.87 FT TO POB PER ORDS #29997 & 29951

JudgeNetting Mountain West
2904 S. 2000 W.
Syracuse, UT 84075
Ph: (801) 388-4178

coastal Netting • Steel Pole • Company
2933 Sixteenth Street
Bakersfield, California
(661) 631-1582

		ENGEL & COMPANY *Engineers* 4009 UNION AVENUE BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305 www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025	DRAWN RAG DATE 9/10/2024 CHECKED JCE APPROVED -	Vicinity Map Golf Ball Netting Barrier **Jefferson Park Golf Course** 4101 Beacon Avenue South Seattle, WA 98108
DATE	ISSUED FOR			SHEET NO. T1.0

24162

file: p:\judge netting mountain west\24762 - jefferson park\Drawings\24762T10.dwg layout: 24762T10 scale: 1 by: (Unnamed Profile) date: 9/10/2024 9:46 AM

STATEMENT OF SPECIAL INSPECTIONS

Testing Agency: | Date: 12-Dec-23
Project Name: Jefferson Park Golf Course | Owner:
Project Description: Golf Ball Netting Barrier
Project Location: 4101 Beacon Avenue South | City: Seattle, WA 98108
R.D.P. of Record: Joseph C. Engel | Engel & Co. Job No.: 24762
Soils Report by: Pangeo Incorporated | File No.: 19-328 | Date: April 1, 2021

The special inspector shall refer to the approved construction drawings, IBC 2018 Chapter 17 and the documents referenced therein to verify the following selected items:

Frequency of inspection; check all applicable conditions

Continuous	Periodic		REMARKS
		CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION (SEE IBC 2018 TABLE 1705.3)	
	☐	1. Inspect reinforcement, including prestressing tendons, and verify placement.	
		2. Reinforcing bar welding:	
	☐	a. Verify weldability of reinforcing bars other than ASTM A706;	
	☐	b. Inspect single-pass fillet welds, maximum 5/16";	
☐		c. Inspect all other welds.	
	☐	3. Inspect anchors cast in concrete.	
		4. Inspect anchors post-installed in hardened concrete members.	
☐		a. Adhesive anchors installed in horizontally or upwardly inclined orientations to resist sustained tension loads.	
	☐	b. Mechanical anchors and adhesive anchors not defined in 4.a.	
	■	5. Verify use of required design mix.	
■		6. Prior to concrete placement, fabricate specimens for strength tests, perform slump and air content tests, and determine the temperature of the concrete.	
■		7. Inspect concrete and shotcrete placement for proper application techniques.	
	☐	8. Verify maintenance of specified curing temperature and techniques.	
		9. Inspect prestressed concrete for:	
☐		a. Application of prestressing forces;	
☐		b. Grouting of bonded prestressing tendons.	
	☐	10. Inspect erection of precast concrete members.	
	☐	11. Verify in-situ concrete strength, prior to stressing of tendons in post-tensioned concrete and prior to removal of shores and forms from beams and structural slabs.	
	■	12. Inspect formwork for shape, location and dimensions of the concrete member being formed.	
		SOILS INSPECTIONS (SEE IBC 2018 TABLE 1705.6)	
	☐	1. Verify materials below shallow foundations are adequate to achieve the design bearing capacity.	
	■	2. Verify excavations are extended to proper depth and have reached proper material.	
	■	3. Perform classification and testing of compacted fill materials.	
■		4. Verify use of proper materials, densities and lift thicknesses during placement and compaction of compacted fill.	
	■	5. Prior to placement of compacted fill, inspect subgrade and verify that site has been prepared properly.	
		CAST-IN-PLACE DEEP FOUNDATIONS (SEE IBC 2018 TABLE 1705.8)	
■		1. Inspect drilling operations and maintain complete and accurate records for each element.	
■		2. Verify placement locations and plumbness, confirm element diameters, bell diameters (if applicable), lengths, embedment into bedrock (if applicable) and adequate end-bearing strata capacity. Record concrete or grout volumes.	
☐	■	3. For concrete elements, perform tests and additional special inspections in accordance with Section 1705.3.	
		MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS	
■	■	Site Dewatering and Other Requirements Found in Soils Report	
☐	☐		

SPECIAL INSPECTION NOTES:

Copies of all necessary test and inspection records shall be filed with building official overseeing the project, as well as the registered design professional in responsible charge of the project, the engineer in charge of structural design and the soils engineer.

All test specimens shall be consistent with the materials, workmanship and details to be used throughout this project.

The contractor responsible for overseeing the construction of the main lateral force resisting systems on this project shall submit a written statement of responsibility to the building official and the owner prior to the commencement of work on that particular system that shall contain the following (per IBC 2018 1704.4):

1 *Acknowledgment of awareness of the special requirements contained in the statement of special inspections*
2 *Acknowledgment that control will be exercised to obtain conformance with the construction documents approved by the building official*
3 *Procedures for exercising control within the contractor's organization, the method and frequency of reporting and the distribution of reports*
4 *Identification and qualifications of the person(s) exercising such control and their position(s) in the organization.*

It shall be the responsibility of the contractor to read and understand the above inspection requirements and to coordinate the testing schedule with the appropriate testing agency.

STATEMENT OF SPECIAL INSPECTIONS (cont'd)

INSPECTION OF WELDING:

AISC 360: TABLE N5.4-1 **Inspection Tasks Prior to Welding**	**QC**	**QA**
Welding procedure specifications (WPSs) available	P	P
Manufacturer certifications for welding consumables available	P	P
Material identification (type/grade)	O	O
Welder identification system[1]	O	O
Fit-up of groove welds (including joint geometry) • Joint preparation • Dimensions (alignment, root opening, root face, bevel) • Cleanliness (condition of steel surfaces) • Tacking (tack weld quality and location) • Backing type and fit (if applicable)	O	O
Configuration and finish of access holes	O	O
Fit-up of fillet welds • Dimensions (alignment, gaps at root) • Cleanliness (condition of steel surfaces) • Tacking (tack weld quality and location)	O	O
Check welding equipment	O	-

[1] The fabricator or erector, as applicable, shall maintain a system by which a welder who has welded a joint or member can be identified. Stamps, if used, shall be the low-stress type.

AISC 360: TABLE N5.4-2 **Inspection Tasks During Welding**	**QC**	**QA**
Use of qualified welders	O	O
Control and handling of welding consumables • Packaging • Exposure control	O	O
No welding over cracked tack welds	O	O
Environmental conditions • Wind speed within limits • Precipitation and temperature	O	O
WPS followed • Settings on welding equipment • Travel speed • Selected welding materials • Shielding gas type/flow rate • Preheat applied • Interpass temperature maintained (min./max.) • Proper position (F, V, H, OH)	O	O
Welding techniques • Interpass and final cleaning • Each pass within profile limitations • Each pass meets quality requirements	O	O

AISC 360: TABLE N5.4-3 **Inspection Tasks After Welding**	**QC**	**QA**
Welds cleaned	O	O
Size, length and location of welds	P	P
Welds meet visual acceptance criteria • Crack prohibition • Weld/base-metal fusion • Crater cross section • Weld profiles • Weld size • Undercut • Porosity	P	P
Arc strikes	P	P
k-area[1]	P	P
Backing removed and weld tabs removed (if required)	P	P
Repair activities	P	P
Document acceptance or rejection of welded joint or member	P	P

[1] When welding of doubler plates, continuity plates or stiffeners has been performed in the k-area, visually inspect the web k-area for cracks within 3 in. (75 mm) of the weld.

Quality control *QC inspection tasks shall be performed by the fabricator's or erector's quality control inspector (QCI), as applicable, in accordance with Sections N5.4, N5.6 and N5.7. Tasks in Tables N5.4-1 through N5.4-3 and Tables N5.6-1 through N5.6-3 listed for QC are those inspections performed by the QCI to ensure that the work is performed in accordance with the construction documents. For QC inspection, the applicable construction documents are the shop drawings and the erection drawings, and the applicable referenced specifications, codes and standards.*

Quality assurance *(QA) inspection of fabricated items shall be made at the fabricator's plant. The quality assurance inspector (QAI) shall schedule this work to minimize interruption to the work of the fabricator. QA inspection of the erected steel system shall be made at the project site. The QAI shall schedule this work to minimize interruption to the work of the erector. The QAI shall review the material test reports and certifications as listed in Section N3.2 for compliance with the construction documents. QA inspection tasks shall be performed by the QAI, in accordance with Sections N5.4, N5.6 and N5.7. Tasks in Tables N5.4-1 through N5.4-3 and N5.6-1 through N5.6-3 listed for QA are those inspections performed by the QAI to ensure that the work is performed in accordance with the construction documents.*

O *– Observe these items on a random basis. Operations need not be delayed pending these inspections.*
P *– Perform these tasks for each welded joint or member.*

GENERAL NOTES

2018 INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE GOVERNS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION.
THESE GENERAL NOTES SHALL APPLY TO ALL SHEETS IN THIS SET OF PLANS.

SAFETY REGULATIONS – ADMIN. CODE, GENERAL SAFETY ORDERS ("OSHA") IS APPLICABLE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS PROJECT AND PROVISIONS THEREOF MUST BE FOLLOWED. ENGEL & COMPANY ENGINEERS IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MEANS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION, NOR FOR SAFETY ON THE JOBSITE. THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE INTENDED TO BE AND TO REMAIN SOLELY THOSE OF THE BUILDER.

ALL DIMENSIONS WHICH ARE DEPENDENT ON EXISTING CONDITIONS SHALL BE FIELD VERIFIED PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION.

FOUNDATION DESIGN IS BASED ON THE SOILS REPORT PREPARED BY PANGEO INCORPORATED PROFESSIONALS, INC. PROJECT NO. 19–328, DATED APRIL 1,2021. THE SITE SHALL BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOUND IN THE SOILS REPORT.

CONCRETE SHALL HAVE A COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH OF 3000 PSI MINIMUM IN 28 DAYS. USE NO MORE THAN 6.6 GALLONS OF WATER PER SACK OF CEMENT. (DESIGN IS BASED ON A COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH OF 2500 PSI IN 28 DAYS. THEREFORE SPECIAL INSPECTION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

WELDING SHALL BE DONE BY A CERTIFIED WELDER USING THE SHIELDED ARC PROCESS AND E80 SERIES ELECTRODES. WELDS SHALL BE FULL SECTION, FULL PENETRATION AND SHALL DEVELOP THE FULL STRENGTH OF THE SMALLER OF THE PARTS JOINED UNLESS THE PLANS SHOW OTHERWISE. ALL SHOP WELDING SHALL BE DONE USING THE SHIELDED ELECTRIC ARC PROCESS BY CERTIFIED WELDERS USING APPROVED ELECTRODES. NO FIELD WELDING WITHOUT SPECIAL INSPECTION. ALL WELDING PER AWS D1.1, USE E8018 ELECTRODES. NO FIELD WELDING IS EXPECTED TO BE PART OF THIS PROJECT.

STRUCTURAL STEEL –

ALL FLAT PLATES AND SHAPES SHALL CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASTM A36.

(EXCEPT 8.625" DIAMETER X .252" THICK WALL PIPE) 16" DIAMETER AND SMALLER PIPE SHALL BE DUAL CERTIFIED API 5L X65 (65 KSI MIN. YIELD) AND ASTM 572 GRADE 65. ALTERNATE FOR 16" DIAMETER AND SMALLER PIPE; PIPE SHALL BE ASTM A252 PROVIDED THAT THE STEEL CERTIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPE ARE AVAILABLE AND SHOW THE STEEL TO HAVE A MINIMUM YIELD STRENGTH OF 65 KSI.

8.625 DIAMETER X .252" THICK WALL PIPE SHALL BE DUAL CERTIFIED API 5L X 57 (57 KSI MIN. YIELD) AND ASTM 572 GRADE 57. ALTERNATE FOR 8.625" DIAMETER X .252" THICK WALL PIPE SHALL BE ASTM A252 PROVIDED THAT THE STEEL CERTIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPE ARE AVAILABLE AND SHOW THE STEEL TO HAVE A MINIMUM YIELD STRENGTH OF 57 KSI.

24", 30", 36", 42" DIAMETER PIPE (30" DIAMETER x .625" THICK WALL PIPE) SHALL BE ASTM A252 PROVIDED THAT THE STEEL CERTIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPE ARE AVAILABLE AND SHOW THE STEEL TO HAVE A MINIMUM YIELD STRENGTH OF 65 KSI.

30" DIAMETER x .625" THICK WALL PIPE SHALL BE ASTM A252 PROVIDED THAT THE STEEL CERTIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPE ARE AVAILABLE AND SHOW THE STEEL TO HAVE A MINIMUM YIELD STRENGTH OF 70 KSI.

WHERE SHOWN ON POLE SCHEDULE, 24" DIAMETER x .500" THICK WALL PIPE SHALL BE ASTM A252 PROVIDED THAT THE STEEL CERTIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPE ARE AVAILABLE AND SHOW THE STEEL TO HAVE A MINIMUM YIELD STRENGTH OF 70 KSI.

CABLE STRAND AND WIRE ROPE SHALL BE 1 X 7 EXTRA HIGH STRENGTH GALVANIZED STRAND FOR TOP, INTERMEDIATE, BOTTOM AND VERTICAL CABLES AND 6 X 19 GALVANIZED IWRC WIRE ROPE FOR GUY CABLES WITH THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM BREAKING STRENGTHS:

1x7 GALVANIZED WIRE ROPE:
5/16" NOMINAL DIAMETER: 11,200 LBS.
3/8" NOMINAL DIAMETER: 15,400 LBS.

6X19 GALVANIZED IWRC WIRE ROPE:
1/2" NOMINAL DIAMETER: 26,280 LBS

NETTING AND ITS ATTACHMENT IS BY OTHERS. NET SHALL HAVE NO MORE THAN 8% EQUIVALENT SOLID WIND DRAG. THE ATTACHMENT OF THE NET SHALL BE SUCH THAT IN WEATHER CONDITIONS WHICH RESULT IN HEAVY ICE BUILDUP ON THE NET (AND/OR HEAVY ICE BUILDUP AND STRONG WINDS), THE NETTING CONNECTION SHALL RELEASE OR "BREAK AWAY" SO AS TO PREVENT ANY DAMAGE TO THE STEEL CABLES, STEEL POLES AND/OR FOUNDATIONS.

WIRE ROPE FITTINGS SHALL DEVELOP THE BREAK STRENGTH OF THE CABLE PER THE MANUFACTURER (CROSBY OR EQUAL).

PAINT SHALL BE BLACK "STRYK 5388" ANTI–CORROSION COATING SYSTEM, 3–COAT PROCESS, APPLY 6–COATS TO BOTTOM OF POLE.

GENERAL CONTRACTOR SHALL VERIFY AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DIMENSIONS AND CONDITIONS AT THE JOB SITE. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BRACING AND SHORING ALL EXCAVATIONS, TEMPORARY STRUCTURES, AND PARTIALLY COMPLETED PORTIONS OF THE WORK.

ENGEL & COMPANY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ONSITE INSPECTION TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH MATERIALS AND/OR WORKMANSHIP SPECIFIED HEREIN. ENGEL & COMPANY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY CHANGES IN THE PLANS OR SPECIFICATIONS UNLESS APPROVAL IS AUTHORIZED IN WRITING. WORKMANSHIP IS TO BE OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY AND IN ALL CASES TO FOLLOW ACCEPTED CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES AND CITY/COUNTY STANDARDS. PLEASE REVIEW ALL PLANS AND SPECS PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION.

WIND LOADING INFORMATION

OCCUPANCY CATEGORY: II
BASIC WIND SPEED: 97 MPH, NET DENSITY = 8%
EXPOSURE: C

SCOPE OF WORK

THESE PLANS ARE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN NEW ERRANT BALL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM FOR THE JEFFERSON PARK GOLC COURSE IN SEATTLE, WA. ALL STEEL POLES, FOUNDATIONS AND NETTING HARDWARE SHOWN IS PROPOSED AS NEW CONSTRUCTION. DESIGN IS NOT INTENDED TO RE USE ANY EXISTING ELEMENTS FROM ANY PRIOR INSTALLATION ON SITE THAT WERE INSTALLED AND DESIGNED BY OTHERS. ALL WORK NOT SPECIFICALLY CALLED OUT FOR ON THESE SETS OF PLANS IS BY OTHERS.

JudgeNetting Mountain West
2904 S. 2000 W.
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coastal Netting • Steel Pole • Component
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BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305
www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025

			DRAWN	RAG/EM
			DATE	9/10/2024
			CHECKED	JCE
DATE	ISSUED FOR		APPROVED	-

Notes and Specifications
Golf Ball Netting Barrier
Jefferson Park Golf Course
4101 Beacon Avenue South
Seattle, WA 98108

SHEET NO. **S1.0** OF

24762

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POLE & FOUNDATION SCHEDULE

POLE NUMBER	MAX. POLE TRIBUTARY SPACING	MAX. POLE HT. ABOVE FINISHED GRADE	* SPLICE HEIGHT	POLE SIZE			"S"	YIELD (KSI)	SPLICE DETAIL	FOUNDATION	
				DIAMETER	WALL THICKNESS	PIPE YIELD (KSI)				SIZE	DEPTH
1A	53'	44.5'	N/A	12.75"	.281"	65	N/A	N/A	N/A	2'-0" ϕ	14'-6"
1B	53'	44.5'	N/A	12.75"	.281"	65	N/A	N/A	N/A	2'-0" ϕ	15'-0"
2B	53'	60'	13'	16" / 16"	.250" / .250"	65 / 65	.250"	50	DETAIL 3 ON SHEET S1.1	2'-0" ϕ	14'-6"
2A	53'	74.5'	13'	16" / 16"	.375" / .375"	65 / 65	.375"	50	DETAIL 3 ON SHEET S1.1	2'-0" ϕ	16'-0"
3B	53'	80'	21'	16" / 20"	.250" / .281"	65 / 65	.250"	50	DETAIL 3 ON SHEET S1.1	2'-0" ϕ	19'-0"
4B	55'	99'	36'	16" / 24"	.375" / .375"	65 / 65	.375"	50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	20'-0"
3A	52'	108.5'	45'	16" / 24"	.375" / .438"	65 / 65	.375"	50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	20'-0"
14B	52'	108.5'	45'	16" / 24"	.375" / .438"	65 / 65	.375"	50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	22'-0"
5B	54'	120.5'	62' / 21'	16" / 24" / 24"	.375" / .438" / .562"	65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .438"	50 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 2 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	23'-6"
12B & 13B	53'	129.5'	64' / 26'	16" / 24" / 24"	.375" / .500" / .688"	65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .500"	50 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 2 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	23'-6"
10B & 11B	53'	133.5'	73' / 24'	16" / 24" / 30"	.375" / .438" / .500"	65 / 65 / 70	.375" / .438"	50 / 50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 2 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-6" ϕ	25'-6"
6B, 7B, 8B & 9B	56.5'	138'	80' / 30'	16" / 24" / 30"	.375" / .500" / .524"	65 / 65 / 70	.375" / .500"	50 / 50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 2 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-0" ϕ	26'-6"
4A, 5A, & 6A	53'	146'	87' / 31'	16" / 24" / 30"	.375" / .562" / .625"	65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .562"	50 / 50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 2 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-6" ϕ	24'-0"
7A, 8A, 9A, & 10A	52.5'	144.5'	45' / 61' / 20'	16" / 24" / 24" / 30"	.375" / .500" / .688" / .625"	65 / 65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .500" / .688"	50 / 65 / 50	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 4 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 1 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-6" ϕ	24'-6"
11A, 12A, & 13A	52.5'	152'	93' / 62' / 22'	16" / 24" / 30" / 36"	.375" / .375" / .500" / .515"	65 / 65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .375" / .500"	65 / 65 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 4 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 1 ON SHEET S1.1	3'-6" ϕ	25'-0"
14A	52.5'	153'	96' / 62' / 20'	16" / 24" / 30" / 30"	.375" / .375" / .500" / .515"	65 / 65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .375" / .500"	65 / 65 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 4 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 1 ON SHEET S1.1	4'-0" ϕ	25'-0"
15A, 16A & 17A	52.5'	161'	103' / 70' / 30'	16" / 24" / 30" / 30"	.375" / .375" / .500" / .618"	65 / 65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .375" / .500"	65 / 65 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 4 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 1 ON SHEET S1.1	4'-0" ϕ	25'-6"
18A	52.5'	162'	106' / 56' / 20'	16" / 24" / 30" / 36"	.375" / .375" / .562" / .515"	65 / 65 / 65 / 65	.375" / .375" / .562"	65 / 65 / 65	DETAIL 6 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 4 ON SHEET S1.1 / DETAIL 1 ON SHEET S1.1	4'-0" ϕ	25'-6"

- * SPLICE HEIGHTS INDICATED ARE DISTANCES ABOVE THE FINISHED GRADE
- POLE SPACING IN SCHEDULE IS MAXIMUM, SEE PLAN
- WALL THICKNESS SHOWN ARE ACTUAL
-POLES ENDING IN "A" CORRESPOND TO HOLE #11, POLES ENDING IN "B" CORRESPOND TO HOLE #12
-FOR FOUNDATION DETAIL, SEE (D / S1.4)

Jefferson Park Pole Schedule			
Pole Number	**Finished Grade Elevation (ft.)**	**Pole Height above finished grade (ft.)**	**Elevation at Top of Pole (ft.)**
1a	**343.0**	**44.5**	387.5
2a	**343.0**	**74.5**	417.5
3a	**342.0**	**108.5**	450.5
4a	**341.0**	**143.0**	484.0
5a	**339.0**	**145.0**	484.0
6a	**338.0**	**146.0**	484.0
7a	**336.0**	**148.0**	484.0
8a	**336.0**	**148.0**	484.0
9a	**335.0**	**149.0**	484.0
10a	**334.5**	**149.5**	484.0
11a	**332.0**	**152.0**	484.0
12a	**332.0**	**152.0**	484.0
13a	**332.0**	**152.0**	484.0
14a	**331.0**	**153.0**	484.0
15a	**325.0**	**159.0**	484.0
16a	**325.0**	**159.0**	484.0
17a	**323.0**	**161.0**	484.0
18a	**322.0**	**162.0**	484.0
1b	**274.0**	**40.0**	314.0
2b	**274.0**	**60.0**	334.0
3b	**275.0**	**80.0**	355.0
4b	**275.5**	**99.0**	374.5
5b	**276.0**	**120.5**	396.5
6b	**279.0**	**138.0**	417.0
7b	**280.0**	**137.0**	417.0
8b	**280.0**	**137.0**	417.0
9b	**281.0**	**136.0**	417.0
10b	**283.5**	**133.5**	417.0
11b	**284.5**	**132.5**	417.0
12b	**287.5**	**129.5**	417.0
13b	**289.5**	**127.5**	417.0
14b	**291.0**	**107.0**	398.0



PLAN AND POLE LOCATIONS SHOWN ABOVE WERE DRAWN WITH THE INPUT FROM THE OWNER AND THEIR PROJECT MANAGER AT JUDGE NETTING. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE POLES LOCATIONS BE SURVEYED AND MARKED PRIOR TO ANY CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID ANY PROPERTY LINES, EASEMENTS OR EXISTING STRUCTURES. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR TO CONTACT 811 AND TO FIELD VERIFY ANY UNDERGROUND UTILITIES TO AVOID INTERFERENCE PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION.



PLAN AND POLE LOCATIONS SHOWN ABOVE WERE DRAWN WITH THE INPUT FROM THE OWNER AND THEIR PROJECT MANAGER AT JUDGE NETTING. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE POLES LOCATIONS BE SURVEYED AND MARKED PRIOR TO ANY CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID ANY PROPERTY LINES, EASEMENTS OR EXISTING STRUCTURES. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR TO CONTACT 811 AND TO FIELD VERIFY ANY UNDERGROUND UTILITIES TO AVOID INTERFERENCE PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION.

N

HOLE #12
POLE LAYOUT PLAN
1" = 60'

N

HOLE #11
POLE LAYOUT PLAN
1" = 60'

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Ph: (801) 388-4178

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(661) 631-1582

		ENGEL & COMPANY *Engineers* 4009 UNION AVENUE BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305 www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025	DRAWN RAG/EM/ILR	Pole Layout Plan and Pole Schedules
			DATE 9/10/2024	Golf Ball Netting Barrier **Jefferson Park Golf Course** 4101 Beacon Avenue South Seattle, WA 98108
			CHECKED JCE	SHEET NO. S1.1
DATE	ISSUED FOR		APPROVED .	. OF .

24762

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

C #11A-14A POLES DETAIL

1" = 30'-0"

F.G. - DENOTES FINISHED GRADE
* - DENOTES HEIGHT ABOVE FINISHED GRADE



B #7A-10A POLES DETAIL

1" = 30'-0"

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

A #1A-6A POLES DETAIL

1" = 30'-0"

F.G. - DENOTES FINISHED GRADE
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

D #15A-18A POLES DETAIL

1" = 30'-0"

F.G. - DENOTES FINISHED GRADE
* - DENOTES HEIGHT ABOVE FINISHED GRADE

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Bakersfield, California
(661) 631-1582

		ENGEL & COMPANY *Engineers* 4009 UNION AVENUE BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305 www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025	DRAWN RAG/EM/ILR DATE 9/10/2024 CHECKED JCE APPROVED -	Pole Elevations Golf Ball Netting Barrier **Jefferson Park Golf Course** 4101 Beacon Avenue South Seattle, WA 98108
DATE	ISSUED FOR			SHEET NO. S1.2 . OF .

24762

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

G1 - DENOTES ½"Φ GALVANIZED 6X19 EXTRA EXTRA IMPROVED PLOW WIRE ROPE

G2 - DENOTES ⅝"Φ GALVANIZED 6X19 EXTRA EXTRA IMPROVED PLOW WIRE ROPE

(E) #1B-14B POLES ELEVATION

1" = 30'-0"

F.G. - DENOTES FINISHED GRADE

* - DENOTES HEIGHT ABOVE FINISHED GRADE

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DATE	ISSUED FOR

ENGEL & COMPANY
Engineers
4009 UNION AVENUE
BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305
www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025

DRAWN RAG/EM/ILR
DATE 9/10/2024
CHECKED JCE
APPROVED -

Pole Elevations

Golf Ball Netting Barrier

Jefferson Park Golf Course

4101 Beacon Avenue South
Seattle, WA 98108

SHEET NO. **S1.3**

. OF .

24762

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

1 **30 INCH TO 30 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



2 **24 INCH TO 24 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



3 **16 INCH TO 16 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



4 **30 INCH TO 24 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



5 **20 INCH TO 16 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



6 **24 INCH TO 16 INCH POLE SPLICE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS

SEAM WELD SCHEDULE			
SOCKET SPLICE THICKNESS	MIN. THROAT REQUIRED	WELD LENGTH	WELD SPACING
.375" WALL AND SMALLER	1/4"	3"	12" O.C.
.500" WALL	3/8"	4"	12" O.C.
.625" WALL	7/16"	4"	12" O.C.
.750" WALL	1/2"	4"	12" O.C.



7 **SINGLE SEAM WELD DETAIL** N.T.S.
- ALIGN SEAM PERPENDICULAR TO AXIS OF NETTING
- SEE PIPE SCHEDULE FOR PIPE THICKNESS



8 **POLE FOUNDATION DETAIL** 1/4" = 1'-0"



9 **SPIRAL WELD TO STRAIGHT SEAM OR ROLLED PIPE DETAIL** 3/4" = 1'-0"
SEE SCHEDULE FOR SPLICE LOCATIONS



11 **WEEP HOLE DETAIL** 1" = 1'-0"
✳WEEP HOLE TO BE INSTALLED PERPENDICULAR TO AXIS OF NETTING



10 **SLIP JOINT SPLICE WELD DETAIL** N.T.S.

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		ENGEL & COMPANY Engineers 4009 UNION AVENUE BAKERSFIELD, CA 93305 www.engelengineers.com (661) 327-7025	DRAWN RAG/EM
			DATE 9/10/2024
			CHECKED JCE
DATE	ISSUED FOR		APPROVED -

Details
Golf Ball Netting Barrier
Jefferson Park Golf Course
4101 Beacon Avenue South
Seattle, WA 98108

SHEET NO. **S1.4** OF .
24762

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*** INSTALL ⅜" STRAND & PRE FORM ON THE HORIZONTAL LOCATED SECOND FROM THE TOP & BOT. HORIZONTAL
** INSTALL CLIPS PER MFR'S INSTRUCTION MANUAL
* INDICATES BOTH SIDE

PART SCHEDULE (EQUAL OR EXCEED)

1	¾" GALV. D.A. BOLT w/ NUT	5	¾" GALV. SPRING WASHER	9	(4) GALV. MALLEABLE WIRE ROPE CLIP, MATCH WIRE ROPE CLIP SIZE TO CABLE SIZE	12	⅜" 1x7 E.H.S. STRAND	15	*** ⅜" 1X7 GALV. E.H.S. STAND
2	PL 3x¼ x 0'-3" GALV. CURVE WASHER	6	⅜" 1x7 E.H.S. STRAND	10	⅞" GALV. BOLT TYPE SHACKLE	13	⅜" GALV. PRE FORM GRIP		
3	¾" GALV. THIMBLEYE NUT	7	⅜" GALV. PRE FORM GRIP	11	HEAVY DUTY GALV. ½" WIRE ROPE THIMBLE	14	*** ⅜" GALV. PRE FORM GRIP		
4	GALV. DOWN GUY ATTACHMENT	8	½" 6x19 GALV. WIRE ROPE						

DETAIL A



TOP LINE POLE | TOP ANGLE POLE | TOP END POLE

DETAIL B



INTERMEDIATE LINE POLE | INTERMEDIATE ANGLE POLE | INTERMEDIATE END POLE

DETAIL C



BOTTOM LINE POLE | BOTTOM ANGLE POLE | BOTTOM END POLE

1 TYPICAL CABLE DETAIL

1" = 1'-0"

* ALL HARDWARE CONNECTION HOLES TO BE ⅞"Φ MAG DRILLED



4 POLE TOP CAP DETAIL

3/4" = 1'-0"



NOTE A:
PL ¼" FOR POLE Φ 24" & SMALLER
PL ⅜" FOR POLE Φ 30" & 36"
PL ½" FOR POLE Φ GREATER THAN 36"

3 POLE BASE CAP DETAIL

3/4" = 1'-0"



PLAN

2 LOCATION OF BRACING GUY CABLE DETAIL

1/16" = 1'-0"

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		DATE	9/10/2024
		CHECKED	JCE
		APPROVED	-

Details
Golf Ball Netting Barrier
Jefferson Park Golf Course
4101 Beacon Avenue South
Seattle, WA 98108

SHEET NO. S1.5 OF -

24162

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

1 TOP CONNECTION FOR GUY CABLES
DETAIL
3" = 1'-0"



2 GROUND ANCHOR GUY CONNECTION
DETAIL
3" = 1'-0"



3 GROUND ANCHOR
DETAIL
1/4" = 1'-0"

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Syracuse, UT 84075
Ph: (801) 388-4178

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				SHEET NO. S1.6
DATE	ISSUED FOR			- OF -

24162

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

VICINITY MAP

SCALE: 1" = 1 MILE



LOCATION MAP

SCALE: 1" = 400'

SHEET INDEX

SHT NO	DWG NO	SHEET DESCRIPTION	COURSE HOLE NUMBER
1	C1.0	COVER SHEET AND NOTES	
2	C2.0	CSC/SOIL PLAN	HOLE 12
3	C2.1	CSC/SOIL PLAN	HOLE 12
4	C2.2	CSC/SOIL PLAN	HOLE 11
5	C2.3	CSC/SOIL PLAN	HOLE 11
6	C2.4	CSC/SOIL PLAN	HOLE 11

PROJECT DRAINAGE SUMMARY

ONLY PROPOSED NEW OR REPLACED HARD SURFACES FOR PROJECT ARE CONCRETE POLE FOUNDATIONS. TOTAL POLE FOUNDATIONS IMPERVIOUS AREA IS 255 SF FOR PROJECT. PER COMPLETED OSM CALCLULATOR, NO ONSITE STORMWATER BMPS ARE REQUIRED FOR PROJECT.

THIS PLAN SET PROVIDES CSC/SOIL PLANS AND DETAILS PER CITY OF SEATTLE STORMWATER MANUAL.

GENERAL NOTES

1. ALL WORK SHALL CONFORM TO THE 2023 CITY OF SEATTLE (COS) STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR ROAD, BRIDGE, AND MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION, THE 2023 CITY OF SEATTLE STANDARD PLANS, AND SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (SDOT) DIRECTORS RULE 01-2017 FOR RIGHT OF WAY OPENING AND RESTORATION RULES (ROWORR). A COPY OF THESE DOCUMENTS SHALL BE ON SITE AT ALL TIMES DURING CONSTRUCTION.
2. A COPY OF THE APPROVED PLANS AND PERMITS MUST BE ON SITE WHENEVER CONSTRUCTION IS IN PROGRESS.
3. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL OBTAIN AND COMPLY WITH ALL PERMITS REQUIRED FOR WORK WITHIN THE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY. ALL PUBLIC ROADWAY OPERATIONS AND TRAFFIC CONTROL MEASURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF AN APPROVED TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN PER SDOT REQUIREMENTS AND COS SPECIFICATION SECTION 1-10.2(5).
4. PAVED SURFACES IN THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY INCLUDING ROADWAYS, SIDEWALKS, AND CURBS THAT ARE DAMAGED BY CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES SHALL BE REPAIRED AS DIRECTED BY THE ENGINEER.
5. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL CONTACT THE UTILITIES UNDERGROUND LOCATION CENTER (1-800-424-5555) NO LESS THAN TWO DAYS AND NO MORE THAN 10 DAYS PRIOR TO ANY EXCAVATION THAT MIGHT AFFECT UNDERGROUND FACILITIES. SEE COS SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 1-07.28. A PRIVATE/THIRD PARTY LOCATE SERVICE SHALL BE USED TO LOCATE/IDENTIFY BURIED UTILITIES ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.
6. THE CONTRACTOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF AND HAZARD CREATED BY OVERHEAD POWER AND OTHER UTILITIES. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL MEET WITH UTILITY OWNERS PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION AND SHALL TAKE WHATEVER PRECAUTIONS ARE REQUIRED BY LAW AND REGULATIONS, UTILITY OWNERS, AND SAFE CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES. SEE COS SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 1-05.2 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON ELECTRICAL SAFETY AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
7. ALL LOCATIONS OF EXISTING UTILITIES SHOWN HEREON HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY FIELD SURVEY OR OBTAINED FROM AVAILABLE RECORDS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED APPROXIMATE ONLY AND NOT NECESSARILY COMPLETE. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF ALL UTILITY LOCATIONS SHOWN AND TO FURTHER DISCOVER AND AVOID ANY OTHER UTILITIES NOT SHOWN HEREON WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN.
8. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF ALL WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE ENGINEER. IT SHALL BE THE CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO COORDINATE AND SCHEDULE APPROPRIATE INSPECTIONS, ALLOWING PROPER ADVANCE NOTICE. THE ENGINEER MAY REQUIRE RECONSTRUCTION, AT CONTRACTOR'S EXPENSE, OF ITEMS THAT DO NOT MEET CITY STANDARDS OR THAT WERE CONSTRUCTED WITHOUT INSPECTION.
9. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS PLAN ARE THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THEY DO NOT REPLACE, REPEAL, ABROGATE, SUPERSEDE, OR AFFECT ANY OTHER MORE STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS, RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, OR RESTRICTIONS.
10. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL LOCATE AND PROTECT ALL CASTINGS AND UTILITIES DURING CONSTRUCTION.
11. IN ACCORDANCE WITH COS SPECIFICATION SECTION 7-20.3, THE CONTRACTOR SHALL ADJUST ALL MAINTENANCE HOLE CASTINGS, DRAINAGE STRUCTURE LIDS, VALVE BOXES, AND UTILITY ACCESS STRUCTURES TO FINISHED GRADE WITHIN AREAS AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS.
12. TRUCK TRAFFIC SHALL BE MINIMIZED THROUGH THE NEIGHBORHOODS. TRUCK TRAFFIC SHALL USE ARTERIAL ROUTES WHERE POSSIBLE.
13. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL COMPLY WITH CITY OF SEATTLE'S TRUCK-IDLING PROVISION OF 2008.
14. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL NOTIFY THE SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT (SFD) AT LEAST TWENTY-FOUR (24) HOURS IN ADVANCE OF ALL WATER SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS, HYDRANT SHUTOFFS, AND STREET CLOSURES OR OTHER ACCESS BLOCKAGE. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL ALSO NOTIFY THE DISPATCHER OF ALL NEW, RELOCATED, OR ELIMINATED HYDRANTS RESULTING FROM THIS WORK. CONTACT THE SFD DISPATCHER AT (206)-386-1494 AND CAPTAIN BRIAN MAIER OF FIRE STATION 14 AT (206)-386-1414.
15. ANY CONSTRUCTION OR INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES AFFECTING TRANSIT OPERATIONS MUST BE COORDINATED THROUGH METRO TRANSIT CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION CENTER. FOR NOTIFICATION INFORMATION AND GUIDELINES, PLEASE VISIT: HTTP://WWW.KINGCOUNTY.GOV/TRANSPORTATION/KCDOT/METROTRANSIT/CONSTRUCTION.ASPX OR CONTACT CONSTRUCTION COORDINATORS AT 206-477-1140. PLEASE PROVIDE FIVE BUSINESS DAYS NOTIFICATION FOR BUS REROUTES AND THREE BUSINESS DAYS NOTIFICATION FOR BUS STOP IMPACTS.

EROSION/SEDIMENTATION CONTROL (ESC) NOTES

1. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPER EROSION CONTROLS MEETING LOCAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE MAINTENANCE, REPLACEMENT AND UPGRADING OF THESE ESC FACILITIES AS NECESSARY DURING CONSTRUCTION IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE APPLICANT/CONTRACTOR UNTIL ALL CONSTRUCTION IS APPROVED.
2. THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF CONSTRUCTION, IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR TO INSURE THAT SEDIMENT LADEN WATER DOES NOT LEAVE THE SITE, ENTER THE DRAINAGE SYSTEM OR VIOLATE APPLICABLE WATER STANDARDS.
3. DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD, ESC FACILITIES SHALL BE UPGRADED (E.G. ADDITIONAL SUMPS, RELOCATION OF DITCHES AND SILT FENCES, ETC.) AS NEEDED FOR UNEXPECTED STORM EVENTS.
4. THE ESC FACILITIES SHALL BE INSPECTED DAILY BY THE APPLICANT/CONTRACTOR AND MAINTAINED AS NECESSARY OR AS DIRECTED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUED FUNCTIONING.
5. BETWEEN MAY 1ST AND SEPTEMBER 30TH ANY AREA STRIPPED OF VEGETATION, WHERE NO FURTHER WORK IS ANTICIPATED FOR A PERIOD OF 7 DAYS SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY STABILIZED WITH THE APPROVED ESC METHODS (E.G. SEEDING, MULCHING, NETTING, EROSION BLANKETS, ETC.) BETWEEN OCTOBER 1ST AND APRIL 30TH THE PERIOD SHALL BE 2 DAYS.
6. THE ESC FACILITIES ON INACTIVE SITES SHALL BE INSPECTED AND MAINTAINED.
7. IF NECESSARY TO PREVENT TRACKING OFF-SITE, STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ENTRANCES SHALL BE INSTALLED AT THE BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTAINED FOR THE DURATION OF THE PROJECT. ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT ALL PAVED AREAS ARE KEPT CLEAN FOR THE DURATION OF THE PROJECT.
8. CONSTRUCTION EROSION CONTROL MEASURES MUST BE IN PLACE PRIOR TO ANY EARTH DISTURBANCE.
9. NO SEDIMENT SHALL BE TRACKED ONTO PAVED STREETS OR ROADWAYS. SEDIMENT SHALL BE REMOVED FROM TRUCKS AND EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO LEAVING THE CONSTRUCTION SITE. IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF THE TESC SYSTEM RESULTING IN SEDIMENT TRACKING ONTO PAVEMENT, THE CONTRACTOR SHALL IMPLEMENT MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TO CORRECT THE SITUATION. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL EMPLOY EMERGENCY MEASURES TO REMOVED SEDIMENT FROM PAVED SURFACES, AS NEEDED. STREET SWEEPING SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN EMERGENCY MEASURE AND NOT A BASIC COMPONENT OF THE TESC SYSTEM. SEDIMENT TRACKED ONTO PAVED SURFACES SHALL NOT BE WASHED INTO STORM DRAINS OR OTHER UTILITY INLETS.
10. PROVIDE CB PROTECTION ON SITE AND IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THE PROJECT SITE.
11. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL PROVIDE SUMPS, PUMPS, AND STORMWATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS AND CONSTRUCT INTERCEPTOR SWALES NECESSARY FOR DEWATERING. NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SYSTEMS TO BE AS REQUIRED BY CONTRACTOR'S OPERATIONS AND SEQUENCING.
12. THE EROSION CONTROL MEASURES DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED A MINIMUM AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROTECT ADJACENT PROPERTIES, INCLUDING THE ROW, THE DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM AND RECEIVING WATERS.

CONSTRUCTION STORMWATER CONTROL (CSC) GENERAL NOTES

1. A FIRST GROUND DISTURBANCE INSPECTION IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO START OF WORK ON ALL SITES WITH LAND DISTURBING ACTIVITY. SCHEDULE A FIRST GROUND DISTURBANCE INSPECTION FOR AN ISSUED BUILDING PERMIT AT 206-684-8900 OR ONLINE AS DESCRIBED AT http://www.seattle.gov/sdci/inspections/site-development-inspections
2. THE APPLICANT SHALL DESIGNATE AN EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL (ESC) SUPERVISOR WHO SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPS). FOR LARGE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, THE ESC SUPERVISOR SHOULD BE A CERTIFIED EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL LEAD (CESCL). PROVIDE THE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF THE ESC SUPERVISOR TO THE SITE INSPECTOR AT THE FIRST GROUND DISTURBANCE INSPECTION.
3. BMPS SHALL BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO STARTING CONSTRUCTION TO ENSURE SEDIMENT-LADEN WATER DOES NOT LEAVE THE PROJECT SITE OR ENTER ROADSIDE DITCHES, STORM DRAINS, SURFACE WATERS, OR WETLANDS.
4. THE BMPS INCLUDED IN THIS PLAN ARE THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTICIPATED SITE CONDITIONS. THE APPLICANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT BMPS ARE MODIFIED AS NEEDED FOR UNEXPECTED STORM EVENTS OR OTHER UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO ACCOUNT FOR CHANGING SITE CONDITIONS.
5. ANY AREAS OF DISTURBED SOIL THAT WILL NOT BE WORKED FOR TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS DURING THE WET SEASON (OCT 1 TO APRIL 30) OR SEVEN DAYS DURING THE DRY SEASON (MAY 1 TO SEPT 30) SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY STABILIZED WITH APPROVED BMPS METHODS (E.G. STRAW, MULCH, PLASTIC COVERING, COLD MIX, ETC.)
6. GRADING AND/OR SOIL DISTURBING ACTIVITIES MAY BE LIMITED OR PROHIBITED FOR CERTAIN SITES SUBJECT TO ECA STANDARDS (I.E. ECA STEEP SLOPES, LANDSLIDE PRONE AREAS, ETC.) BETWEEN OCTOBER 31ST AND APRIL 1ST. IF NOTED IN THE GEOTECHNICAL SPECIAL INSPECTIONS REQUIREMENTS, A GRADING SEASON EXTENSION LETTER (GSEL) ISSUED BY SDCI IS REQUIRED FOR ALL GRADING AND/OR SOIL DISTURBING ACTIVITIES DURING THIS PERIOD. THE GEOTECHNICAL SPECIAL INSPECTOR MUST SUBMIT ELECTRONIC APPLICATIONS FOR A GSEL USING THE SDCI PROJECT PORTAL. ALLOW FOUR TO SIX WEEKS FOR PROCESSING. FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE GSEL PRIOR TO OCTOBER 31 MAY RESULT IN A WORK STOPPAGE.
7. CITY STREETS AND SIDEWALKS SHALL BE KEPT CLEAN AT ALL TIMES. NO MATERIAL SHALL BE STORED ON CITY STREETS OR SIDEWALKS WITHOUT A STREET USE PERMIT FROM THE SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (SDOT).
8. POLLUTION CONTROL MEASURES SHALL BE FOLLOWED TO ENSURE THAT NO LIQUID PRODUCTS OR CONTAMINATED WATER ENTERS ANY STORM DRAINAGE FACILITIES OR OTHERWISE LEAVES THE PROJECT SITE. ANY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR LIQUID PRODUCTS THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO POLLUTE RUNOFF SHALL BE STORED AND DISPOSED OF PROPERLY.
9. ENSURE THAT WASHOUT FROM CONCRETE TRUCKS IS PERFORMED OFF-SITE OR IN DESIGNATED CONCRETE WASHOUT AREAS ONLY. DO NOT WASH OUT CONCRETE TRUCKS ONTO THE GROUND, OR TO STORM DRAINS OR OPEN DITCHES. DO NOT DUMP EXCESS CONCRETE ONSITE, EXCEPT IN DESIGNATED CONCRETE WASHOUT AREAS.
10. ALL AREAS OF DISTURBED SOIL SHALL BE FULLY STABILIZED WITH THE APPROPRIATE SOIL AMENDMENT AND COVER MEASURES AT COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT. TYPICAL COVER MEASURES INCLUDE LANDSCAPING OR HYDROSEED WITH MULCH.

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CHECKED	PA	9/12/2024

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Seattle Parks & Recreation
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SCALE: 1" = 20'

JEFFERSON GOLF COURSE RENOVATION

COVER SHEET AND NOTES

JOB	PC
	CO
VPI #	
C1.0	
SHEET 1 OF 6	

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

DATUM

NAVD 88

LEGEND

- STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ENTRANCE (1/C2.1)
- CATCH BASIN PROTECTION
- TREE PROTECTION (1/C2.3)
- REMOVE TREE
- FILTER FABRIC FENCE (2/C2.1)
- CONSTRUCTION LIMIT

NOTES

1. SEE SHEET C1.0 FOR GENERAL NOTES AND EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION CONTROL NOTES.
2. REMOVE EXISTING SITE STRUCTURES AS NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT IMPROVEMENTS. REFER TO NETTING DWGS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
3. PROTECT ALL EXISTING TREES NOT EXPRESSLY INDICATED FOR REMOVAL. REFER TO TREE PROTECTION DETAIL FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
4. ALL DISTURBED LANDSCAPED AREAS SHALL BE AMENDED WITH SOIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CITY OF SEATTLE REQUIREMENTS. THIS SHALL CONSIST OF A MINIMUM OF 6" OF COMPOST AMENDED TOPSOIL AND TILLED TO 12" MINIMUM DEPTH.
5. PRESERVE AND PROTECT ALL UTILITIES AND SURFACE IMPROVEMENTS NOT INDICATED FOR REMOVAL.
6. ALL LOCATIONS OF EXISTING UTILITIES SHOWN HEREON HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM AVAILABLE RECORDS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED APPROXIMATE ONLY AND NOT NECESSARILY COMPLETE. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF ALL UTILITY LOCATIONS SHOWN AND FURTHER DISCOVER AND AVOID ANY OTHER UTILITIES NOT SHOWN HEREON WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN. UTILITIES ARE SHOWN FOR REFERENCE ONLY.
7. COORDINATE EXTENTS OF DEMOLITION AND SITE MODIFICATIONS WITH JUDGE NETTING AS REQUIRED FOR SITE ACCESS AND STAGING. STAGE DEMOLITION TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE HARD SURFACE WORK PAD AND LAYOUT AREAS OR PROVIDE TEMPORARY GRAVEL SURFACING OR TEMPORARY LAYDOWN PADS AS NECESSARY.
8. COORDINATE ALL UTILITY DEMOLITION WITH CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS AND PROVIDE TEMPORARY BYPASS AND PUMPING SYSTEMS AS REQUIRED BY CONTRACTORS OPERATIONS.
9. THE EROSION CONTROL MEASURES SHOWN ON THE DRAWINGS ARE CONSIDERED A MINIMUM AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROTECT ADJACENT PROPERTIES, INCLUDING THE ROW, THE DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM AND RECEIVING WATERS.
10. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL SECURE ALL NECESSARY PERMITS FOR WORK WITHIN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY VIA SDOT MINOR UTILITY PERMIT.
11. TREE PROTECTION SHALL INCLUDE TEMPORARY CHAINLINK OR SIMILAR RIGID FENCING LOCATED AT DRIPLINE OF TREE.

ALL NEW AND REPLACED LAWN AND LANDSCAPE AREAS SHALL RECEIVE POST-CONSTRUCTION SOIL AMENDMENT PER DETAIL 3/SHEET C2.1.

SEE SHEETS C2.2-C2.4 FOR HOLE 11 PLANS

POST CONSTRUCTION SOIL MANAGEMENT PLAN

AT THE END OF PROJECT, ALL AREAS DISTURBED AND NOT COVERED WITH A HARD SURFACE MUST BE AMENDED PER THE SOIL AMENDMENT DETAIL BELOW AND PROBE TO 12-INCHES AT THE SITE FINAL INSPECTION.

LABEL ALL AREAS DISTURBED AND NOT COVERED WITH A HARD SURFACE AS ONE OF THE FOLLOWING: SA (SOIL AMENDMENT AREA) or ND (NON-DISTURBED AREA).

- NON-DISTURBED AREA (ND): VEGETATED AREAS THAT WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO LAND DISTURBING ACTIVITY DO NOT REQUIRE SOIL AMENDMENT IF THEY ARE FENCED AND CONTINUOUSLY PROTECTED THROUGHOUT CONSTRUCTION. THE FENCING MUST BE IN PLACE AT THE FIRST GROUND DISTURBANCE INSPECTION. NO DISTURBANCE, INCLUDING VEHICLE TRAFFIC OR MATERIAL STORAGE, IS ALLOWED IN THESE AREAS UNTIL FINAL INSPECTION.
- SOIL AMENDMENT AREA (SA): VEGETATED OR COMPOST AREAS (TURF AND LANDSCAPE) MUST BE AMENDED PER THE SOIL AMENDMENT DETAIL. THIS INCLUDES AREAS IMPACTED BY CLEARING AND GRADING, STOCKPILING, SITE ACCESS, PATHWAYS AND MATERIALS OR EQUIPMENT STORAGE.

CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE

1. INSTALLATION OF TREE PROTECTION FENCING.
2. THE FENCE LOCATION SHALL BE DETERMINED IN THE FIELD BY THE CLIENTS URBAN FORESTER DEPENDING ON THE SITE EVALUATION BY APPLICANTS URBAN FORESTER.
3. CONSTRUCT STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ENTRANCE AS REQUIRED. ADJUST AS NECESSARY TO ACCOMODATE CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONS.
4. INSTALL FILTER FABRIC FENCING.
5. INSTALL ADDITIONAL SEDIMENTATION MEASURES (SEDIMENT TRAPS, INTERCEPTOR SWALES, ETC.) AS REQUIRED.
6. DEMO ACP AND CLEAR AREAS NECESSARY TO ACCOMODATE NEW CONSTRUCTION. PROTECT ANY CLEARING DEBRIS STOCKPILED ON THE SITE WITH PLASTIC COVERING OR APPROVED COVER.
7. EXCAVATE AND GRADE AREAS NECESSARY FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION. PROTECT ANY EXCAVATION SPOILS STOCKPILED ON THE SITE WITH PLASTIC COVERING. REMOVE FILTER FABRIC FENCING AS REQUIRED FOR BUILDING CONSTRUCTION.
8. UPGRADE TESC FACILITIES AS NEEDED.
9. IMMEDIATELY STABILIZE EXPOSED BACKFILLED AREAS WITH MULCH OR SPECIFIED PERMANENT RESTORATION PLANTING.
10. UPON COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTING IMPROVEMENTS INSTALL PERMANENT PLANTING AND REMOVE EROSION CONTROL BMPS.

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CSC/SOIL PLAN

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Seattle Parks & Recreation

ORDINANCE NO. PW NO.

SCALE: 1" = 20'

JEFFERSON GOLF COURSE RENOVATION

JOB PC CO
VPI #
C2.0
SHEET 2 OF 6

VAULT SERIAL #	DATE	MARK	NATURE REVISIONS	MADE	CHK'D	REV'D
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

DATUM

NAVD 88

LEGEND

- STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ENTRANCE (1/C2.1)
- CATCH BASIN PROTECTION
- TREE PROTECTION (1/C2.3)
- REMOVE TREE
- FILTER FABRIC FENCE (2/C2.1)
- CONSTRUCTION LIMIT

NOTES

1. SEE SHEET C1.0 FOR GENERAL NOTES AND EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION CONTROL NOTES.
2. REMOVE EXISTING SITE STRUCTURES AS NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT IMPROVEMENTS. REFER TO NETTING DWGS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
3. PROTECT ALL EXISTING TREES NOT EXPRESSLY INDICATED FOR REMOVAL. REFER TO TREE PROTECTION DETAIL FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
4. ALL DISTURBED LANDSCAPED AREAS SHALL BE AMENDED WITH SOIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CITY OF SEATTLE REQUIREMENTS. THIS SHALL CONSIST OF A MINIMUM OF 6" OF COMPOST AMENDED TOPSOIL AND TILLED TO 12" MINIMUM DEPTH.
5. PRESERVE AND PROTECT ALL UTILITIES AND SURFACE IMPROVEMENTS NOT INDICATED FOR REMOVAL.
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9. THE EROSION CONTROL MEASURES SHOWN ON THE DRAWINGS ARE CONSIDERED A MINIMUM AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROTECT ADJACENT PROPERTIES, INCLUDING THE ROW, THE DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM AND RECEIVING WATERS.
10. THE CONTRACTOR SHALL SECURE ALL NECESSARY PERMITS FOR WORK WITHIN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY VIA SDOT MINOR UTILITY PERMIT.
11. TREE PROTECTION SHALL INCLUDE TEMPORARY CHAINLINK OR SIMILAR RIGID FENCING LOCATED AT DRIPLINE OF TREE.

ALL NEW AND REPLACED LAWN AND LANDSCAPE AREAS SHALL RECEIVE POST-CONSTRUCTION SOIL AMENDMENT PER DETAIL 3/SHEET C2.1.

STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ACCESS



STABILIZED ACCESS SHALL BE USED IN ALL AREAS OF THE SITE WITH VEHICLE TRAFFIC AND PARKING, INCLUDING PLANTING STRIPS. RECYCLED CONCRETE IS NOT ALLOWED.

SYMBOL: (CE)

1/C2.1 STABILIZED CONSTRUCTION ENTRANCE
NTS

FILTER FENCE



NOTE: ANGLE SILT FENCE BACK UP THE SLOPE AT THE END OF RUN.

SYMBOL: (FF)

2/C2.1 FILTER FABRIC FENCE
NTS

SOIL AMENDMENT



NOTES:
1. POST CONSTRUCTION SOIL AMENDMENT IS REQUIRED ON ALL AREAS NOT COVERED BY HARD SURFACE WHERE SOIL IS DISTURBED DURING CONSTRUCTION.
2. SOIL AMENDMENT MUST PASS A 12 INCH MINIMUM PROBE TEST.
3. IMPORT TOPSOIL, IF USED, MUST MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEATTLE STORMWATER MANUAL, VOL. 1, SECTIONS 5.1.5.1 AND 5.1.5.3.

SYMBOL: (SA) AREA REQUIRING SOIL AMENDMENT

3/C2.1 SOIL AMENDMENT
NTS

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PETER M. APOSTOL — STATE OF WASHINGTON — 5163 — REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER

Seattle Parks & Recreation

ORDINANCE NO. PW NO.

SCALE: 1" = 20'

JEFFERSON GOLF COURSE RENOVATION

CSC/SOIL PLAN

JOB PC CO
VPI #
C2.1
SHEET 3 OF 6

VAULT SERIAL #	DATE	MARK	NATURE REVISIONS	MADE CHK'D	REV'D
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

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SCALE: 1" = 20'

DATUM

NAVD 88

LEGEND

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- CATCH BASIN PROTECTION
- TREE PROTECTION (1/C2.3)
- REMOVE TREE
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- CONSTRUCTION LIMIT

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STOCKPILE AND EXPOSED SLOPE COVERING



SYMBOL: (SP)

1/C2.2 **STOCKPILE AND EXPOSED SLOPE COVERING**

NTS

CSC/SOIL PLAN

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JEFFERSON GOLF COURSE RENOVATION

JOB: PC / CO
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SHEET 4 OF 6

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TREE & VEGETATION PROTECTION

TREE PROTECTION FENCING AND SIGN

1. CHAIN LINK FENCE REQUIRED (NO ORANGE CONSTRUCTION FENCE OR PLYWOOD)
2. MINIMUM 6' HIGH
3. FENCE SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY RIGID POSTS DRIVEN INTO THE GROUND AT 8' MAXIMUM INTERVALS
4. MUST BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO DEMOLITION OR GROUND DISTURBANCE
5. KEPT IN PLACE FOR THE DURATION OF CONSTRUCTION
6. NO DUMPING OF ANY MATERIALS IN THE PROTECTION AREA
7. NO SOIL DISTURBANCE OR ACTIVITY ALLOWED WITHIN FENCED AREA: MATERIAL STORAGE/STOCKPILING, PARKING, EXCAVATION, DUMPING, OR WASHING
8. MODIFICATIONS OF THESE REQUIREMENTS BY APPROVAL OF SDCI PLANNER ONLY
9. IF ROOTS GREATER THAN 2 INCH FOUND OUTSIDE OF FENCING, PROTECT BY HAND EXCAVATION AND, IF NECESSARY, CUT CLEANLY AND KEEP MOIST
10. USE 3 INCHES OR DEEPER WOOD CHIP MULCH OUTSIDE FENCED AREAS TO PROTECT FEEDER ROOTS

VEGETATION PROTECTION (DOES NOT APPLY TO TREES)

1. ORANGE MESH OR SIMILAR OPEN MATERIAL
2. PROTECT VEGETATION OUTSIDE CONSTRUCTION ZONE WITH FENCING AS SHOWN



TREE & VEGETATION FENCING AROUND ENTIRE DRIP LINE ON PERMIT SITE. ALTERNATIVE TREE PROTECTION, IF APPROVED BY SDCI, AS SHOWN ON SITE PLAN

LINK TO REQUIRED TREE PROTECTION SIGNAGE:

SYMBOL: —o—o—o— (TPF)

1 / C2.3 **TREE PROTECTION**

NTS

COMPOST SOCK





(SHOWN AS SLOPE PROTECTION)

1. COMPOST SOCK SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD SPECIFICATION 9.14.4(9). COMPOST SOCK SHALL BE A MINIMUM OF 10" IN DIAMETER OR SIZED TO SUIT CONDITIONS AS SPECIFIED BY THE ENGINEER.
2. ALWAYS INSTALL COMPOST SOCK PERPENDICULAR TO SLOPE AND ALONG CONTOUR LINES.
3. REMOVE SEDIMENT FROM THE UP SLOPE SIDE OF THE COMPOST SOCK WHEN ACCUMULATION HAS REACHED 1/2 OF THE EFFECTIVE HEIGHT OF THE COMPOST SOCK.
4. MAY BE USED IN PLACE OF FILTER FENCE FOR PERIMETER CONTROL.

SYMBOL: —o—o—o— (CS)

2 / C2.3 **COMPOST SOCK**

NTS



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SHEET	5 OF 6

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Mon Sep-12-24 4:24pm

SEE SHEETS C2.0-C2.1 FOR HOLE 12 PLANS



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SHEET 6 OF 6	

CITY OF SEATTLE
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION AND INSPECTIONS

Record Number: 3039491-LU

Council File Number: CF #314536

Applicant: Shannon Glass for Seattle Parks and Recreation

Address of Proposal: 4100 Beacon Ave S

SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL

Council Land Use Action to allow installation of 32 netting poles. Project includes footings and netting for new poles (ranging at 20 feet to 160 feet) at Jefferson Park Golf Course.

The following approvals are required:

I. **Council Land Use Action (SMC Chapter 23.76.064)** – to exceed the height in NR3 zone.
II. **Special Exception (SMC Chapter 23.64)** – to exceed the height limit for Airport Height Overlay District.

SEPA DETERMINATION

- ☐ Determination of Nonsignificance (DNS)
  - ☐ Pursuant to SEPA substantive authority provided in SMC 25.05.660, the proposal has been conditioned to mitigate environmental impacts.
  - ☐ No mitigating conditions of approval are imposed.
- ☐ Determination of Significance (DS) – Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
- ☐ Determination made under prior action.
- ☒ Exempt

In accordance with SEPA (RCW 43.21C), a SEPA Exemption was made under a prior action by Seattle Parks and Recreation (David Graves, August 12, 2019).

BACKGROUND

Additional proposal summary according to information in the project file:

> *" Jefferson Park Golf Course is owned by Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) and occupies approximately 123 acres on the top of Beacon Hill. The golf course consists of an 18-hole regulation length golf course, 9-hole par 3 course, driving range, practice green, clubhouse with adjoining café, and support facilities. Jefferson Park Golf Course is Seattle's oldest municipal golf course. The area occupied by the golf course and adjacent park was part of the original Seattle park master plan developed by the Olmsted brothers in 1903 and the location of the golf course*

and the park roadway on the west side were built as planned. Other features of the master plan west of Beacon Avenue were not implemented.

Jefferson Park Golf Course holes 11 and 12 are located in the northeast corner of the site, adjacent to residential dwellings. There have been issues with golf balls leaving the site and landing in surrounding roads and private property. There are identified Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs) across and adjacent to the golf course, as shown on the Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections' GIS database. The area along the north and east edge of the golf course where the netting poles will be installed contains Steep Slope ECAs and there is a Known Slide Area ECA on the adjacent property to the east, both associated with the east facing slope of Beacon Hill.

Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) is proposing to install netting along holes 11 and 12 at Jefferson Park Golf Course to reduce golf balls traveling out of the golf course. The proposed work includes:

- *Hole 11 – Install 16 poles ranging in height from 20' to 160' with netting in between the poles. This netting would be along the east side of the golf hole from the tee to about 200 yards out. All work would be on the golf course and require removal and/or relocation of 10 trees. Work involves installing footings for the poles, new poles and netting between these poles.*

- *Hole 12 – Install 16 poles ranging in height from 40' to 157' with netting in between the poles. This netting would be along the north side of the golf hole from the tee to about 250 yards out. All work would be on the golf course and require removal and/or relocation of 10 trees. Work involves installing footings for the poles, new poles and netting between these poles.*

The work will include clearing the vegetation in the area where the netting and poles are proposed, drilling holes and pouring concrete for the pole foundations, installing the poles and installing the netting. There will be no change in grades and no change to stormwater facilities. No areas of native vegetation will be disturbed; lawn areas that are damaged during construction/installation will be repaired and restored. To the extent that trees need to be removed, new trees will be replanted at the required ratio of two new trees for every one tree removed."

Pursuant to SMC 25.09.045 Exemptions, Seattle Parks and Recreation (David Graves, August 12, 2019), determined the proposal is unlikely to result in substantial disturbance of the underlying Steep Slope and Known Slide Area ECA's;

*"As the proposed netting and pole improvements are maintenance and remodeling of an existing recreation facility involving no material expansions or changes in use beyond that previously existing, they are **exempt** from environmental review under SEPA. Furthermore, as the proposal is routine maintenance/remodeling of an existing public facility and will not substantially disturb the underlying designated Steep Slope and Known Slide Area ECAs, the proposal is **exempt** from the provisions of SMC Ch. 25.09, Regulations for Environmentally Critical Areas."*

SITE AND VICINITY

Site Description: The project site is located in the Beacon Hill neighborhood of Seattle and is currently developed with the 18-hole Jefferson Park Golf Course, a nine-hole course, a driving range, a clubhouse, a cart barn and accessory parking. The site is bounded by S. Spokane St, 24th Ave S, Cheasty Blvd, and Beacon Ave S.



The top of this image is north. This map is for illustrative purposes only. In the event of omissions, errors or differences, the documents in SDCI's files will control.

Site Zone: Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3)

Zoning Pattern: (North) Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3)
(South) Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3)
(East) Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3)
(West) Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3), MIO-240-MR (M), MIO-105-LR3 (M), MIO-37-LR2 (M)

Environmentally Critical Areas: There are ECA Liquefaction Prone Areas, Steep Slope, Wetlands, and Wildlife Habitat Areas mapped on site.

PUBLIC COMMENT

The public comment period ended on April 14, 2025. Comments were received and carefully considered, to the extent that they raised issues within the scope of this review. These areas of public comment related to cultural and archeological resources, property damage, maintenance, wildlife impact, height impacts, stormwater impacts, tree removal, and view blockage.

Seattle Parks and Recreation summarizes the public comments they received as follows:

"Seventy-nine public comments were submitted for this project. Sixty-four comments support the project, eleven comments oppose the project, and three comments were neutral.

- *Comments in support of the project noted the value of restoring holes 11 and 12 to their original design and full course length, which will improve the recreational value and quality of play. Comments noted the historical significance of the Olmsted-designed course, the importance of equitable investment in underserved south Seattle, and safety benefits for adjacent properties. There were also comments describing how shortening the length of holes 11 and 12 in response to neighbor complaints about errant balls has diminished the overall playing experience at the golf course. SPR's response:*

    - *The project will restore holes 11 and 12 to their original configuration and provide public safety and protection of private property.*

- *Comments opposing the project described concerns that the pole and netting will remove trees, create an environmental or wildlife hazard, obstruct access and visibility into the course, be an eyesore, decrease nearby home values, diminish the quality of the neighborhood, and set a precedent for allowing future development that exceeds allowable heights. There were also comments about failure to explore alternatives to netting, lack of environmental study, lack of*

public outreach, inadequate trajectory studies, stormwater issues in the adjacent right of way, and poor golf course maintenance. SPR's response:

- *The project will impact one tree on Hole 11. Three trees will be planted within Jefferson Park in compliance with the City of Seattle tree replacement requirements.*
- *SPR Golf Operations staff and Premiere Golf Centers report that there have been no impacts to wildlife related to pole and netting systems in Seattle municipal golf courses. Also see attached "Netting Report to Address Potential Bird Strikes" (Tanner Consulting Group, April 29, 2025) which attests to the widespread use of sports netting and minimal risk to bird strikes or entanglement.*
- *Access to and within the course will be unchanged by the project.*
- *The transparent netting fabric will have minimal visual impact. The netting will be installed along the edge of the fairways. Trees that have been planted along the property line will buffer the visual impact of the poles and netting.*
- *The purpose of the project is to address errant golf balls travelling outside the golf course, which provides public safety and protection of private property.*
- *SPR's 2019 Strategic Business Plan for the Future of City of Seattle Owned Municipal Golf Courses (https://www.seattle.gov/parks/about-us/plans-and-reports/recreation-plans- and-reports/municipal-golf-course-study) identified the errant ball issue holes 11 to 12 at Jefferson Park Golf Course. SPR and Premier Golf Centers worked on a plan to reroute holes from a counterclockwise pattern to a clockwise pattern. As the design was developed, it was determined that permitting requirements, tree loss, extensive course closure for construction, lost revenue, and overall project costs outweighed the option of installing netting.*
- *SPR issued a SEPA Determination of Non-Significance (DNS) for this project. See attached.*
- *SPR held two public meetings for this project on September 10, 2020 and January 28, 2023.*
- *Tanner Consulting Group prepared a ball trajectory study for Holes 11 and 12 in 2018, which was updated in 2024 in coordination with SPR and the engineering consultants to ensure minimal tree loss. The analysis considers golf ball flight trajectory for different golfer skill levels, and environmental factors such as wind speed and elevation changes. See attached Ball Trajectory / Netting Plan, Tanner Consulting (June 5, 2024)*
- *The project limits are on SPR property. There is no scope of work in the adjacent rights of way. The project will be constructed in compliance with current stormwater code requirements.*
- *The pole and netting system is engineered for strength and longevity, and will be constructed of weather-resistant materials, including engineered steel poles and secure fittings."*

I. ANALYSIS – COUNCIL LAND USE ACTION

Public parks are City facilities permitted outright in Neighborhood Residential zones. Development standards for neighborhood residential zones are found in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) Chapter 23.44. SMC 23.76.064 includes provisions for the City Council to waive or modify applicable development standards, accessory use requirements, special use requirements or conditional use criteria for City facilities. Seattle Parks and Recreation seeks a Council Approval under SMC 23.76.064 to modify height development standards to allow the height of netting and poles for holes 11 and 12 to exceed the height limit by 130 feet.

SMC 23.76.050 requires the Director to prepare a written report on Type V application, which includes the following analysis and information:

1. ***The written recommendations or comments of any affected City departments and other governmental agencies having an interest in the application;***

   Seattle Parks and Recreation - As the proposed netting and pole improvements are maintenance and remodeling of an existing recreation facility involving no material expansions or changes in use beyond that previously existing, it is determined that this project is exempt from environmental review under SEPA. Furthermore, as the proposal is routine maintenance/remodeling of an existing public facility and will not substantially disturb the underlying designated Steep Slope and Known Slide Area ECAs, the proposal is exempt from the provisions of SMC Ch. 25.09, Regulations for Environmentally Critical Areas. (David Graves, August 12, 2019).

   Federal Aviation Administration - The Parks Department obtained a Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation *(FAA, Aeronical Study No. 2021-ANM-10008-OE, January 17, 2023)* for 32 structures described as "Pole Golf course netting" for the subject site. As a condition to this Determination, the FAA requires that *"the structure is to be marked/lighted in accordance with FAA Advisory circular 70/7460-1 M, Obstruction Marking and Lighting, red lights-Chapters 4,5(Red),&15."*

2. ***Responses to written comments submitted by interested citizens;***

   Please see the discussion under 'Public Comments' above. All public comments are available online at the Seattle Services Portal (Permits, Licenses and Regulatory Compliance - Seattle Services Portal | seattle.gov) by entering the project number (3039491-LU).

3. ***An evaluation of the proposal based on the standards and criteria for the approval sought and consistency with applicable City policies;***

   Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) Chapter 23.44 includes standards and criteria for proposed development in Neighborhood Residential zones. Public parks are a permitted use in Neighborhood Residential zones. The project meets all applicable development standards for Neighborhood Residential zones with the exception of the allowable height limit. The requested development standard modification is discussed below:

   a. Explanation for why the netting and poles are required,

      The proposal includes netting and netting poles up to 160 feet (130 feet higher than the code allows. According to information submitted by Seattle Parks and Recreation:

      "…Course changes due to the removal of trees at Jefferson Park has resulted in downgrading the course for tournament play because the length of two holes had to be reduced in order to reduce ball trespass issues into neighboring homes. The course now plays to a par of 69. Due to the removal of perimeter protective trees on holes 7, 11 and 12, hole 11 was changed from a 463 yard par 4 to about a 150 yard par 3. The 12th hole was changed from a 197 yard par 3 to a very short, about 90 yard par 3."

These changes, intended to be temporary, have resulted in declined rounds of play and reduced revenues for the golf course. When the pole and netting system are installed, the holes will be restored to their original playing configurations and full course play.

b. Ball Flight Study summary,

To support the requested increase in netting and pole height, Seattle Parks and Recreation submitted a Ball Trajectory Study for Holes 11 and 12 (*Tanner Consulting Group, 2024).* The analysis considers golf ball flight trajectory for different golfer skill levels, and environmental factors such as wind speed and elevation changes.

c. How the netting and pole design limits the impact of the height in the NR zone and its relationship to the comprehensive plan/policies.

According to information submitted by Seattle Parks and Recreation:

"The pole heights range from 20 feet to 160 feet tall. The netting fabric is transparent and will result in minimal visual impact. The netting will be installed in SPR property, along the edge of the fairway. The poles are setback approximately 40 feet from the S Spokane St curb at hole 12, and approximately 40 feet from the 24th Ave S curb at hole 11. Trees that have been planted along the property line will buffer the visual impact of the poles and netting."

The Land Use Code has been developed in accordance with Comprehensive Plan policies. Regarding height limits in Neighborhood Residential zones, the Comprehensive Plan policy LU70 requires, "Establish height limitations in single-family residential areas that establish predictable maximum heights, maintain a consistent height limit throughout the building envelope, maintain the scale relationship between a structure and its site, address varying topographic conditions, control view blockage and encourage pitched roofs."

The height limitation of 30 feet is appropriate for most structures in Neighborhood Residential zones and is most consistent with the Comprehensive Plan when applied to residential or institutional structures typically found in Neighborhood Residential zones and the pattern of development resulting from relatively small lots. However, the height limit of 30 feet does not address the site-specific requirements necessary for the Parks Department to address public safety and playability concerns at the Jefferson Golf Course.

Seattle Parks and Recreation has also indicated that the taller net poles and nets will be made of the most transparent material available for the purpose. The use of the most transparent material available serves to mitigate the effect of the taller poles and netting so that the proposal is not inconsistent with the applicable Comprehensive Plan policies.

SDCI recommends approval of this requested modification to development standards to allow nets and net poles of up to 160 feet in height.

4. All environmental documentation, including any checklist, EIS or DNS;

Seattle Parks and Recreation submitted a SEPA/ECA Exemption memo, dated August 12, 2019, by David Graves. Seattle Parks and Recreation also submitted a Ball Trajectory Study for holes 11 and 12, which is referenced above, and are attached as Attachments A and B of this report.

5. The Director's recommendation to approve, approve with conditions, or deny a proposal.

Based on the analysis provided above, SDCI recommends the following:

SDCI recommends **approval with conditions** of the requested modifications to the development standards to allow for nets and net poles of up to 160 feet in height, subject to the requirement that the structure is to be marked/lighted in accordance with FAA Advisory circular 70/7460-1 M, Obstruction Marking and Lighting, red lights-Chapters 4,5(Red), &15. This note is to be added to the Building Permit drawing set prior to issuance.

II. ANALYSIS – SPECIAL EXCEPTION FOR AIRPORT HEIGHT OVERLAY DISTRICT

The Director may permit a structure to exceed the limits of the Airport Height Overlay District as a special exception pursuant to Chapter 23.76, Procedures for Master Use Permits and Council Land Use Decisions. Because the Special Exception is part of a Council Land Use Decision, SDCI is making a recommendation to Council. A Special Exception shall only be permitted if the Director finds that all of the following conditions exist:

A. The Federal Aviation Administration advises the Director that the exception to the height limits does not create a hazard to aviation.

The Federal Aviation Administration provided a Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation for all the proposed driving range poles and nets on January 17, 2023. The FAA referenced Aeronautical Study numbers 2021-ANM-1008-OE. The proposal meets this criterion.

B. The additional height is necessary for the successful physical function of the structure.

Seattle Parks and Recreation has demonstrated that the additional height is necessary for the successful function of the driving range to reduce the occurrence of golf ball "trespass" (i.e., ball flight exceeding the net height). The proposal meets this criterion.

C. The exception will not result in re-routing of aircraft.

The FAA Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation notes that the proposal would have no substantial adverse effect on the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable airspace by aircraft. The proposal meets this criterion.

D. The structure is designed to minimize adverse impacts of lighting on surrounding uses while complying with the lighting requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration.

The FAA Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation includes the requirement that *"the structure is to be marked/lighted in accordance with FAA Advisory circular 70/7460-1 M, Obstruction Marking and Lighting, red lights-Chapters 4,5(Red),&15."* The required lighting over the height limit is minimal and will have no adverse impacts on the surrounding uses. The proposal, with this lighting requirement, meets this criterion.

RECOMMENDATION – COUNCIL LAND USE ACTION & SPECIAL EXCEPTION

This COUNCIL LAND USE ACTION application is RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL subject to the condition listed at the end of this decision.

RECOMMENDED CONDITIONS – COUNCIL LAND USE ACTION

Prior to Issuance of Construction Permit

1. The structure is to be marked/lighted in accordance with FAA Advisory circular 70/7460-1 M, Obstruction Marking and Lighting, red lights-Chapters 4,5(Red),&15.

David Sachs, Senior Land Use Planner
Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections

Date: July 31, 2025

3039491-LU Recommendation CA SE SEPA

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION
OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE

Council waiver or modification of development standards to allow installation of 32 netting poles at Jefferson Park Golf Course (Project No. 3039491-LU, Type V).	)))))	C.F. 314536 Application 3039491-LU FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION

Background

Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR) proposes to add netting and poles to holes 11 and 12 as part of the restoration of the Bill Wright Golf Complex at Jefferson Park. Portions of the netting and poles will exceed zoned height limits and are intended to address errant golf ball trespass associated with restored tee locations.

As proposed, the project requires City Council approval under Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) Section 23.76.064, which section also authorizes Council to modify development standards for City facilities. SPR requests a waiver of development standards to allow the poles and netting to exceed the height limit.

The Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections (SDCI) reviewed the proposal and issued its Analysis and Recommendation on July 31, 2025. SDCI recommends approval of the project.

On September 3, 2025, the Council's Land Use Committee was briefed on the project, held a public hearing, and made a recommendation to the Council.

Findings of Fact

The City Council hereby adopts the following Findings of Fact:

1. The Bill Wright Golf Complex at Jefferson Park is located at 4100 Beacon Avenue South.

2. The site is zoned Neighborhood Residential 3 (NR3).

3. SPR submitted an application (Project No. 3039491-LU) to install netting and poles along the northern edge of holes 11 and 12 at the Bill Wright Golf Complex at Jefferson Park.

4. The Seattle Land Use Code sets a base height limit for structures NR3 zones of 32 feet (SMC 23.44.012).

5. Pursuant to SMC 23.76.064 B, the City Council may waive or modify development standards for City facilities.

6. SPR seeks a City Council modification of the height development standard of the NR3 zone to permit the poles and netting.

Development Standard	Code Requirement	Proposed Modification
SMC 23.44.012 Height limits	The maximum height permitted for any structure not located in a required yard is 32'.	Allow 32 poles with suspended netting with heights up to 160 feet.

7. The project also requires that SDCI grant a special exception for the poles to exceed height limits within the Airport Height Overlay District, SMC Chapter 23.64.010.

8. SDCI and SPR received public comments on multiple topics related to the project. There were both comments in favor of the poles and netting and comments identifying concerns with environmental and wildlife hazards associated with the poles and netting and the overall appearance of the poles and netting.

9. SMC 23.76.050 requires that the SDCI Director evaluate the proposal based on the standards and criteria for the approval sought and consistency with applicable City policies.

10. SMC 23.76.050 also requires consultation with other governmental agencies. Here that includes the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which on January 17, 2023, issued a Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation requiring that the poles be marked and lighted.

11. SDCI reviewed the proposed project and issued its Analysis and Recommendation on July 31, 2025. SDCI recommends that the Council conditionally approve the modification to development standards.

Conclusions

The City Council hereby adopts the following Conclusions:

1. The proposed facility is a City facility as defined by SMC 23.84A.006.

2. The City Council has authority to waive or modify a development standard for a City facility under SMC 23.76.064 B.

3. SPR has demonstrated that the proposed pole and netting height is necessary to minimize trespass from errant golf balls and reduce the risk to public safety and private property.

Decision

Subject to the condition described below, the City Council grants the following modifications of development standards for the proposed improvements at the Bill Wright Golf Complex at Jefferson Park.

Development Standard	Proposed Waiver or Modification
SMC 23.44.012 Height limits	Allow 32 poles with suspended netting with heights up to 160 feet.

Condition

1. The structure is to be marked/lighted in accordance with FAA Advisory circular 70/7460-1 M, Obstruction Marking and Lighting, red lights-Chapters 4,5(Red), &15.

Dated this__ _____ day of _____, 2025.

_____
City Council President