	SPD Real-Time Crime Center Material Update ORD D1a	
1	Section 2. This ordinance shall take	effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code
2	Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.	
3	Passed by the City Council the	day of, 2025,
4	and signed by me in open session in authen	tication of its passage this day of
5	, 2025.	
6		
7		President of the City Council
8	Approved / returned unsigned /	vetoed thisday of, 2025.
9		
10		Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor
11	Filed by me this day of	, 2025.
11	Thed by me tims day of _	
12		
13		Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk
		, ,
14	(Seal)	
15	Attachments:	
16 17	Attachment 1 – 2025 Surveillance Impact F	Report: Real-Time Crime Center Report Executive Overview: Real-Time Crime Center
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Template last revised February 19, 2025



2025 Surveillance Impact Report

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department

Surveillance Impact Report Versions:

- 2024 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Real-Time Crime Center Software adopted by <u>Ordinance 127111</u> on 10/08/2024.
- 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Real-Time Crime Center Software



Surveillance Impact Report ("SIR") overview

About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "Surveillance Ordinance," on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City's executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the "Surveillance Policy".

How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department ("Seattle IT"). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

- 1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
- 2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.

Upcoming for Review	Initial Draft	Open Comment Period	Final Draft	Working Group	Council Review
The technology is upcoming for review, but the department has not begun drafting the surveillance impact report (SIR).	Work on the initial draft of the SIR is currently underway.	The initial draft of the SIR and supporting materials have been released for public review and comment. During this time, one or more public meetings will take place to solicit feedback.	During this stage the SIR, including collection of all public comments related to the specific technology, is being compiled and finalized.	The surveillance advisory working group will review each SIR's final draft and complete a civil liberties and privacy assessment, which will then be included with the SIR and submitted to Council.	City Council will decide on the use of the surveillance technology, by full Council vote.



Privacy Impact Assessment

Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA") is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

- 1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
- 2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

1.0 Abstract

1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot is one component of an overall strategy of addressing felony crime at specific places. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, and enhanced lighting and cleaning.

The Crime Prevention Technology program is designed to be a pilot project, with independent researchers conducting an outcome evaluation to be completed two years after implementation. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the pilot project may be either discontinued or continued.

This SIR covers the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software, one part of this pilot, and provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, cameras (such as CCTV and traffic monitoring cameras), officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one "pane of glass" (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.



The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and community safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects – enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions. RTCC also aids in investigations by aggregating multiple data sources into one location, helping provide detectives with actionable information that increases the quality of investigations and prosecutions, leading to increased accountability for criminal offenders.

1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

The City's police staffing crisis, now in its fourth year, has resulted in over 700 officers leaving SPD since 2019. As of January 2024, 913 police officers are available for deployment in the city, the lowest number of in-service officers since 1991 and significantly below per-capita staffing relative to comparative jurisdictions. Low staffing levels also affect investigations, which hinders police effectiveness in solving cases and holding violent criminals accountable.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic places, and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Implementing technology tools to bolster policing capabilities, as one part of a holistic crime prevention and reduction plan is essential to address ongoing gun violence, vehicle theft, human trafficking, and persistent felony crime at specific places, including within our most victimized communities.

Real-time crime center software brings several technologies deemed surveillance technologies (CCTV, ALPR, etc.) into one platform. In addition, some RTCC software uses nongenerative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies, if enabled. As a note, SPD will not use AI facial recognition technologies. Finally, the software stores information from these technologies either in the cloud or on-premise, creating some risks around data security and retention.

Due to these factors, the City of Seattle Privacy Office has deemed the technology surveillance technology, which triggered this review.

2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview provides the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed.

2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

The theory of change supporting the pilot project is that these technologies (1) bolster police effectiveness in public places where crime is concentrated when used with other crime prevention efforts, including increased police patrols, enhanced lighting, graffiti mitigation, and others (CPTED), (2) deter criminal behavior when public notice is posted, and (3) gather



evidence to hold offenders accountable. These efforts can improve public safety and enhance the public's confidence in the city government's ability to maintain safe neighborhoods.

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigation staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department.

RTCC software can help mitigate staffing shortages for both patrol officers and detectives by providing more reliable and accurate data on incidents in real-time.

The benefits of the RTCC for a victim(s):

- RTCC staff can use multiple technologies (CCTV, etc.) to pinpoint the location of crimes and identify the location of victims.
- RTCC staff can assess the scene before officers responding, helping speed up the deployment of emergency aid or lifesaving assistance.

Increased investigative information helps lead to justice for victims. The benefits of RTCC technology for a community:

- Increased investigative evidence can aid in the capture and prosecution of offenders, leading to reduced violence and fewer firearms on the street. Increased evidence can also help exonerate the innocent.
- Integration with CCTV cameras, SDOT traffic cameras, and real-time crime center software can provide detectives with precise information about suspect vehicle, appearance, and location, increasing correct identification of suspects and reducing unnecessary traffic stops and adverse interactions with the public.

The benefits of RTCC technology for an officer:

Real-time crime center software can facilitate a coordinated, precise response to suspect apprehension, increasing the safety of arrests for all involved. The technology provides a data-driven orientation to police response and staffing.

Here is one example of how SPD might use the RTCC software to more efficiently utilize separate data sources to aid victims, capture dangerous suspects, and help remove firearms from the streets:

A RTCC officer receives an alert through CAD and the RTCC software that there are gunshots on Aurora Avenue North. The software shows a map of the area on her monitor, with the associated dispatch call superimposed on the screen. Her map screen also automatically shows the feeds of the closest CCTV and SDOT traffic cameras, as well as nearby patrol car locations. She uses the RTCC software to enlarge the feed for the cameras north of the incident and sees a black Honda Civic moving at a high rate of speed in a northerly direction on Aurora.



Using the software, she quickly pulls up the camera recording where the gunshots were reported and visually ascertains that the shots were fired from a black Honda and that there is a person down on the ground. She advises over SPD radio that there is a possible gunshot victim and gives a description of the Honda and the license plate. She sees from the live camera feeds that the Honda is turning west on 125th Street, and that there is a patrol vehicle on that street 10 blocks west of Aurora and one 15 blocks south of the scene on Aurora. She advises over the radio that the suspect is heading west on 125th St. She goes back to the live camera view and surveys the shooting scene. The person is still down. No one else is at the scene. She relays via radio what she has seen through the RTCC software.

After the incident, she uses the RTCC software to create clips of all scenes showing the incident and the vehicle travel before, during and after the incident and uploads them from the RTCC software to the SPD digital evidence system.

At the same time this is happening, the officer driving north on Aurora gets dispatched to a possible shooting scene. The dispatcher informs her that there is a victim on the ground and the RTCC officer has observed no other people around the victim. The officer arrives on scene, exits her vehicle, takes a quick scan of the scene to confirm that the scene is secure. She grabs a first aid kit in her trunk, then runs to the victim on the ground and renders aid. In the background, she can hear the Fire Department sirens coming toward her. She radios dispatch and tells them the scene is secure for the arriving paramedics.

After the shooting scene is secure, a homicide detective arrives at the scene. Officers are using their flashlights and struggling to find bullet casings. The detective pulls up the RTCC application on his phone and brings up the information for the incident. He walks towards the officers and shows them the video – they move up the road a bit and eventually find the casings judging by the location of the vehicle in the video. The detective is satisfied there were no witnesses after watching the video again and proceeds with his work at the scene.

2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

Academic research related to the effect of real-time crime centers is limited because of their fairly recent implementation; however, a 2023 John Jay College of Criminal Justice study showed that a real-time crime center in Chicago, IL increased case clearance rates 5% for violent crime, 12% for property crime, and 11% for overall crime. The authors concluded that "RTCCs may provide investigative benefits to police through the integration of technologies and data, thus enhancing case solvability."

An extensive evaluation of the Chicago Police Department's use of a RTCC was completed by the RAND in 2019. This evaluation is meaningful because it highlighted the successes and failures of the CPD centers and made specific recommendations to increase their effectiveness.



Other studies on the effects of technologies integrated with RTCC software, such as CCTV, are discussed in their respective Surveillance Impact Reports.

SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the RTCC implementation through standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies (CCTV/RTCC/enhanced ALPR) will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.

This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

2.3 Describe the technology involved.

The core functionality of RTCC software involves integrating multiple sources of information into a single "pane of glass" (a single view). The sources of information that are being integrated with the software are current or expected SPD technologies such as the department's CAD system (computer-aided dispatch), closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic-monitoring cameras (as referenced in the "Closed Circuit Television 'Traffic Cameras' (Transportation)" SIR), automatic vehicle location (AVL) system, body and in-car video cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPR), digital evidence platforms, and 911 call systems.

Most of the technology comes into play around a mapping function which provides the overlay for all the other technologies. The mapping system includes roads, building layouts (when provided), and other layers like beat/sector boundaries. Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications, as well as mobile applications for use in the field.

While most integrations between RTCC software and department applications occur between vendor APIs, some RTCC vendors use hardware for CCTV cameras that allow for the recording of the camera video, providing the ability to playback CCTV or SDOT traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC environment. RTCC software for CCTV cameras can also provide inapplication video analytics that use machine-learned algorithms to analyze camera feeds and, using object recognition, locate specific items, people based on clothing, or vehicles based on description. This technology complies with the city of Seattle's AI rules for use, requiring a "human in the loop" at the initiation and evaluation of the results. SPD will not use facial



recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends.

Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses or SDOT traffic monitoring cameras) to share specific camera feeds with agencies. This option would be fully voluntary at the discretion of the camera owners. Private camera owners can also set up conditional sharing, meaning they can determine the parameters of what, how, and when their camera feeds are shared. Some vendors also provide a registry so that private camera owners can share the location of the camera, but not the video feeds, so agencies can easily canvass for videos after an incident. The system can then allow SPD to send an email to all registered cameras in an area requesting relevant video. There is no obligation to share footage if a system is registered.

Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle and Reverse 911 and could be used in large-impact situations such as traffic re-routing, chemical spills, or other life-safety disruptions.

There are also features that allow a rapid video response to calls for service. For example, a community member that calls 911 may be sent a link to their phone to opt-in to a video chat with a 911 operator or officer to provide face-to-face communication to help facilitate accurate officer response and/or medical aid instruction. The caller would need to opt-in to allow the use of their camera, microphone, and GPS. This service could be used in an active shooter situation to help officers assess the situation or other rapidly changing emergency environments.

Other potential features include tools that enable incident planning and real-time management across the department, including freehand sketching of maps, iconography, and differing views for different groups of users, and editing access across a variety of connected devices. Integrating graphical illustration tools with live video and team geolocation creates a flexible and holistic view of emergent incidents, streamlining response capabilities. This feature would help incident commanders utilize mapping capabilities to better manage large-scale events.

Another potential feature allows officers to listen to 911 calls directly, helping to bring small details within the words, tone, or background that can aid responders in achieving desired outcomes. This feature would utilize 911 call recording already in use at the Seattle 911 call center.

Finally, some RTCC software systems have services that allow members of the public to anonymously submit multi-media tips by texting pictures, text, or video to a publicized number. Tips are then stored in the system for examination and potentially used as evidence.

2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.

The mission of the SPD is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, equitable, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's



priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively.

The RTCC software helps provide responsive police services to victims, witnesses, and members of the community by providing responders with more accurate and robust information that does not require significant staffing additions. Using technology that enables quicker, complex, and effective police response aligns with the SPD mission and will benefit the community as a whole.

2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

At the time of writing, planning is still underway for exactly who would use the RTCC software. The vision is for SPD to staff a real-time crime center with a combination of sworn officers and civilian staff, eventually transitioning to a more civilian-staffed model. Due to the wide functionality of RTCC software, it is likely incident commanders with appropriate training will be the primary users of the software, supported by sworn and civilian staff. The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.

3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

The RTCC will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access. Data and information obtained through the RTCC may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and



the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

The SPD does not currently have any policies related to RTCC. As the RTCC will be the platform for different technologies, such as CCTV, any video recordings that are captured will only be preserved as evidence if it is determined a crime has been committed.

SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies.

Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for each surveillance technology, including those proposed here. The need for ALPR and CCTV technologies and the strategic deployment of the SPD policies is driven by gun violence and persistent felony crime at specific locations. SPD's use of these technologies will focus on these crimes.

The use of CCTV will comply with <u>SMC Chapter 14.12</u>, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes. All existing SPD policies related to technology and Criminal Justice Information Systems will apply to the RTCC. (<u>Policy 12.050</u>). All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only and personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with SPD policies.

Access to the RTCC will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive SPD-developed training in the use of the RTCC and related policy, operation, and procedures prior to receiving system access.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (<u>SPD Policy 5.001</u>), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in <u>SPD Policy 5.002</u>.



4.0 Data Collection and Use

4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, SDOT traffic monitoring cameras, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

SDOT traffic monitoring cameras (as referenced in the "Closed Circuit Television 'Traffic Cameras' (Transportation)" SIR) will be utilized in the RTCC software for law enforcement purposes.

<u>SPD Policy 7.010</u> governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single window view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

The desired deployment date is mid-2024. SPD's vision is to have a RTCC staffed by a combination of sworn and civilian staff that will monitor the RTCC software and provide information to patrol officers and detectives. Access may be given to detectives and patrol officers in certain situations and with appropriate training. The system will be used by incident commanders at the scene of major crimes and other events requiring police engagement.

The SPD Technology and Innovation Unit will be the initial owner of the system and will manage implementation.



4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The technology will be in continuous operation.

4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

The installation of the RTCC software is permanent and will operate 24/7.

4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?

There will be no new physical objects or sensors collecting data as part of the RTCC software package. It integrates existing data sources into one centralized platform. Some of the data sources feeding into the RTCC do have physical equipment that is visible to the public, such as CCTV cameras.

4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.

Other law enforcement agencies have used similar RTCC platforms to share information during serious incidents that span jurisdictions. For example, an active shooter in the City of Atlanta was apprehended in a neighboring county that was using the same RTCC platform as the City of Atlanta.

Any direct usage by a different jurisdiction will be consistent with SPD policy.



4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?

RTCC software will be accessed and used for serious incidents happening in real-time to provide information to patrol resources. It will also be used to provide a comprehensive picture of numerous SPD systems to investigators.

Data held in the RTCC system may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?

RTCC software data will be stored within secure City of Seattle facilities under the administration of the Seattle Information Technology Department. If cloud storage is utilized, it will follow city security guidelines and only be accessible to outside parties as part of system maintenance and support only when authorized.

Various measures will be in place to protect data from unauthorized access.

- Data Encryption
- Access control mechanisms (meeting CJIS requirements*)
- Strict user permission settings
- Industry standard network security measures (meeting CJIS requirements)

The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General upon request.

* Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets requirements for organizations that access or use criminal justice information. These requirements are referred to as "CJIS requirements" and are developed and audited for compliance by the FBI.

5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

5.1 How will data be securely stored?

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?



The retention period for data stored by RTCC software will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will be saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors, will be allowed as needed.

5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

Per SIR section 5.2, RTCC data collected without evidentiary value will be automatically purged by the system after 30 days.

<u>SPD Policy 7.010</u> governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with <u>SPD Policy 6.060</u>, such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (<u>SPD Policy 5.001</u>), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in <u>SPD Policy 5.002</u>.

5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the OIG, can audit for compliance at any time.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court



- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per <u>SPD Policy 12.080</u>, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected or compiled by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers to execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by <u>SPD Policy 12.055</u>. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to criminal activity as part of investigations, and to comply with legal requirements.


6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes ⊠ No □

6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of <u>CFR Title 28, Part 20</u>, regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of <u>WAC 446-20-260</u> (auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems), and <u>RCW Chapter 10.97</u> (Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.



6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Sharing agreements must meet the standards reflected in <u>SPD Policy 12.055</u>. Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of <u>CFR Title 28</u>, <u>Part 20</u>. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of <u>WAC 446-20-260</u>, and <u>RCW Chapter 10.97</u>.

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the RTCC software platform may be used.

6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

Real-time crime center software data comes from various SPD systems and is blended into one single view/location. Accuracy of data flows over APIs are checked at the point of development and monitored by system administrator and system logging thereafter. The system administrator is responsible for monitoring API versioning and change management to proactively plan and avoid issues. In addition, as data is being received and analyzed in the RTCC, specially trained individuals are reviewing and assessing the data and making judgments about the quality, accuracy, suitability, and value of the information being collected.

6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (<u>RCW 10.97.030</u>, <u>SPD Policy 12.050</u>). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

Both the content and means of collection of information that may be utilized by the RTCC is regulated by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 7 of the Washington State Constitution, case law interpreting the same, Washington's Privacy Act, RCW 9.73, CFR Title 28, Part 23, and Seattle's Intelligence Ordinance, SMC Chapter 14.12.



7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

<u>SPD Policy 12.050</u> mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

SMC 14.12 and SPD Policy 6.060 directs all SPD personnel that any documentation of information concerning a person's sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The purpose of policy 6.060 is "to ensure that the collection and review of such information serves a legitimate law enforcement purpose and does not unreasonably infringe upon individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy." SPD would only document sexual preferences or practices, political or religious activities if it is related to an unlawful act occurring, for example; as seen in a child pornography investigation.

Additionally, <u>SPD Policy 5.140</u> forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures. The policy states that "employees shall not make decisions or take actions that are influenced by bias, prejudice, or discriminatory intent. Law enforcement and investigative decisions must be based upon observable behavior or specific intelligence," as well as outlining specifics related to this area.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

As stated above, RTCC software integrates dispatch, camera, officer location, 911 calls, records management system, and other information into one platform. With the nature of data obtained through the RTCC, there is some risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes that allow for authorized auditors, including the Office of Inspector General, to inspect use and deployment of the RTCC software. Additionally, the Office of Police Accountability can conduct investigations of possible violations of City and SPD privacy-related policies and laws.



8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Sharing of digital evidence outside the department is primarily done through SPD's digital evidence management system. Records of when data was shared and who it is shared with is noted in the system audit logs. Digital evidence shared outside of the digital evidence management system (e.g., using media such as DVDs, thumb drives, etc.) is done though SPD's Digital Forensic Unit, which logs requests.

Per <u>SPD Policy 12.080</u>, the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

The Office of Inspector General conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.



Financial Information

Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current \square potential \boxtimes

carrent — pote					
Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
Q4 2024	Q2 2025	\$300,000	\$0	\$100,000	General Fund

Notes:

Please consult the material update summary and fiscal note.

1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current \square potential \boxtimes

<u> </u>				
Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD

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IV	U	ι	C	3	•

1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

The use of RTCC software may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the RTCC software and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities.

No funding beyond city General Fund dollars has been identified for this technology.



Expertise and References

Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report ("SIR"). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
Atlanta		Currently in use
Detroit		Currently in use
Mesa, AZ		Currently in use
Orange County, CA		Currently in use
Washington DC		Deployed February 2024

2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publica tion	Link
Bureau of Justice Assistan ce RTCC		https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/RealTimeCrimeCenterInformation.pdf





Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") and engagement for public comment worksheet

Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities.
 Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

In addition to completing the RET template sections below, the 2024 Council Budget Action SPD-900-A requested that the Executive, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the Inspector General for Public Safety (OIG) co-prepare a Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) analysis for these technologies, pursuant to the process that the Executive has already created to comply with the Surveillance Ordinance. Please see Appendix B: Office for Civil Rights RET Analysis.

Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments' ("Seattle IT") Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative ("RSJI") is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

1.0 Set Outcomes

1.1. Seattle City Council has	s defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance
ordinance, and they serve a	as important touchstones for the risks departments are being
asked to resolve and/or mi	tigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this
technology?	
☐ The technology disparate	ely impacts disadvantaged groups.



\square There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City
entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually
agreed-upon service.

☑ The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.

☐ The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

The information presented in this RET is specific to the initial pilot areas of Aurora Ave. N, Chinatown/International District, and the 3rd Ave./Downtown Core.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated at specific geographic places in the city. This concentrated crime is often anchored at these places and requires a holistic crime-prevention strategy.

The Crime Prevention Technology pilot, including the RTCC, is one integrated component to this overall strategy of addressing this issue. These technologies will be coupled with police patrols, continued investments in community-based initiatives, enhanced lighting, and enhanced cleaning.

The technology will be used for the following purposes:

- Closed-Circuit (CCTV) camera systems will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults, and other offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent, and removing deadly weapons from the street, thereby reducing the risk of harm to the public.
- Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software helps provide situational awareness to
 increase officers' and the public's safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having
 real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase the reliability of the
 location of victims and suspects, enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having
 better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by
 officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

Potential impacts on civil liberties include but are not limited to:

- Privacy concerns associated with surveillance of people, vehicles, and license plates in public places.
- Misuse of collected video and information/mission creep.
- Lack of transparency with the public on what is being done with recordings.
- Loss of personal autonomy with surveillance of an area.

To mitigate these potential community concerns, SPD will:



- Post signs indicating that police surveillance and video recordings are occurring.
- Notification of the technology being used will be shared with the neighborhoods where it is deployed through community meetings and active canvassing with street fliers.
- Ensure technology is being used for crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent crimes in the surveillance area.
- SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions.
- CCTV technology will only monitor public places, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks.
- Recorded material from CCTV cameras or the compilation of data at the RTCC, will
 only be kept for 30 days unless it is evidence of criminal behavior, in which case it will
 be transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence storage system. ALPR data will be
 maintained for 90 days and then deleted unless it contains evidence of criminal
 behavior.
- Provide access to CCTV, ALPR, and SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) user and device logs to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for compliance audits.
- The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.
- The Office of Police Accountability may conduct investigations of violations of SPD policies and laws related to privacy.

Additionally, the technologies will only be implemented once the City's surveillance ordinance requirements are met, and the City Council authorizes the use.

1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.



It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

The following neighborhoods are being considered for deploying the CCTV technologies. Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.

\square all Seattle neighborhoods	
Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th	☐ Northwest
☐ Ballard	☐ Madison Park / Madison Valley
☑ Belltown	☐ Magnolia
☐ Beacon Hill	☐ Rainier Beach
☐ Capitol Hill	☐ Ravenna / Laurelhurst
☐ Central District	☐ South Lake Union / Eastlake
☑ Chinatown/International District	\square Southeast
☐ Columbia City	☐ Southwest
Downtown Commercial Core	☐ South Park
☐ Delridge	☐ Wallingford / Fremont
☐ First Hill	☐ West Seattle
☐ Georgetown	☐ King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual
\square Greenwood / Phinney	Aid)
☐ International District	☐ Outside King County (Mutual Aid)
\square Interbay	
☐ North	
☐ Northeast	

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.



Downtown & Belltown Area (Potential location)





Chinatown-International District Area (Potential)



Aurora Avenue North Corridor

(Potential; Aurora Ave, 85th to 145th Streets)






1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?

Race/Ethnicity	Aurora	Chinatown International District	Belltown	Downtown Commercial	Citywide
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	0.4%
Asian	14.0%	49.2%	30.4%	16.8%	16.9%
Black/African American	8.9%	8.6%	5.5%	11.1%	6.8%
Hispanic or Latino of Any Race	11.3%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	8.2%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Multiple Races	7.9%	5.8%	4.9%	5.6%	7.3%
White	56.2%	27.2%	50.8%	56.1%	59.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; OPCD

Note: Geographical areas provided are <u>2020 Census Block Assignments of Urban Villages</u> within the Downtown Urban Center, with the exception of Aurora. Aurora's boundaries are based on ½ mile buffer from Aurora between Meridian and Greenwood, and from 85th to 145th.



1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?

CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. <u>SPD Policy 5.140</u> forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as other accountability measures. This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias.

These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. They are focused on individuals only if they are present in these areas.

1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

Data from the technology may be shared outside SPD with other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters under the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA").

Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. To mitigate this possibility, SPD has established policies regarding disseminating data related to criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and authorized researchers. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior.

1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

As with decisions around data sharing, data storage and data retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. Video from CCTVs will be stored for 30 days unless imagery is needed for investigations or to comply with legal requirements. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids biasbased policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected biasbased behavior, and other accountability measures.

1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you/ have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.



The most important unintended possible negative consequence related to the implementation of CCTVs and the RTCC is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unreasonable surveillance. To mitigate this risk, SPD is enacting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under which SPD may utilize CCTVs and Real-Time Crime Center software. Access to user and device logs will be given to the OIG so they can audit the use of these technologies.

To prevent unintended outcomes, the City will develop and post signs in areas that are covered by the cameras' view to alert the public to their presence and use. Active canvassing in pilot locations and passing out street fliers will occur to further inform the public about the use of the technologies in the impacted neighborhoods. Additionally, the Office of the Inspector General will have access at any time to monitor and evaluate the use of these technologies. During the public outreach sessions described below, the City will listen to feedback from the public and provide responses during the technology review process.

The potential positive impact will be reduced serious crime concentrated in the locations where the technologies are deployed. If achieved, these reductions will create a safer environment for everyone who lives, works, plays, or visits these areas.

2.0 Public Outreach

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR.

3.0 Public Comment Analysis

The public comment period was June 3, 2025 to June 23, 2025.

3.1 Summary of Response Volume

Please see Appendix B.

3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Please see Appendix B.

3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.

Please see Appendix B.



3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Please see Appendix B.

4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on April 12, 2024.

4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

Concerns that have been raised through public comment and engagement will be addressed in SPD policy. SPD is developing an omnibus surveillance technology policy to provide general guidance on several topics, including value and equity statements for technology use, an explanation of the surveillance ordinance requirements, internal processes for technology approval and acquisition, general tracking metrics for surveillance technologies, retention requirements and limitations, and general use requirements for surveillance technologies. Additionally, issues and guidance unique to specific surveillance technologies would be included for each technology. As such, the department will create a policy section for RTCC.

5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

The goals of this project are:

- 1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in specific geographic areas where the technologies are deployed.
- 2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
- 3. To measure and minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
- 4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

We will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur because of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the Inspector General, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts. Further, the City will retain outside academic subject matter experts to develop and manage an evaluation plan related to the use of the technologies.



Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group ("working group"), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

"Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement."

Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR. Please consult <u>Ordinance 127111</u> adopted by the City Council on 10/08/24 to view the original Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment.



Appendix A: Glossary

Accountable: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

Community outcomes: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

Contracting equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

DON: "department of neighborhoods."

Immigrant and refugee access to services: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle's civic, economic and cultural life.

Inclusive outreach and public engagement: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

Individual racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

Institutional racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

OCR: "Office for Civil Rights."

Opportunity areas: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

Racial equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person's race.



Racial inequity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person's race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

RET: "racial equity toolkit"

Seattle neighborhoods: (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

Stakeholders: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

Structural racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

Surveillance ordinance: Seattle City Council passed ordinance <u>125376</u>, also referred to as the "surveillance ordinance."



SIR: "surveillance impact report", a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance <u>125376</u>.

Workforce equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.



Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

CCTV 2025 Material Change, public comment received via Privacy Inbox

June 23rd, 2025

Dear Seattle City Leadership,

Here is my public comment on the SPD Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) currently going through the Material Update process.

I've provided my concerns and recommendations below in order of severity. You will find that the negatives far exceed any possible positives and as such my overall recommendation is that the City of Seattle <u>not</u> deploy a RTCC and all the material updates to the system should be rescinded.

Concerns & Recommendations:

1) Reactive, not preventative: SPD is misleading the public by calling this a "Technology Assisted Crime Prevention Pilot". This not a pilot and the SPD RTCC contains data from on-going and historical crime incidents, so by it's very nature will be reactive (911 calls, etc). SPD even says in item 1.1 of the RTCC SIR that the "purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to ... reactively investigate incidents." The RTCC is not a crime prevention tool and mislabeling it as such diverts consideration away from truly preventative measures, which are not technology driven - and that is true for both community-oriented measures (like after-school programs, rehabilitation, workforce training, etc) and police/policy-driven measures (such as gun lock boxes, gun buy-back programs, requiring reporting of lost/stolen guns, trigger locks, etc).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - effort should instead be placed on actual crime prevention measures.

- 2) <u>Meager efficacy</u>: The low effectiveness does not outweigh the high monetary cost + significant privacy/civil liberties risks:
 - (a) The 2024 paper by Rachael Arietti (of City University of New York) titled "Do real-time crime centers improve case clearance? An examination of Chicago's strategic decision support centers" [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2023.102145], which SPD referenced in the RTCC SIR, shows that RTCCs deployed in Chicago had the largest effect (which was still modest) for property crime clearance. However, in item 5.1 of the RET inside the RTCC SIR, SPD says the number one goal of the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." This goal is out of alignment with what RTCCs are shown to achieve. Specifically, the paper said that RTCCs "appeared to have a relatively smaller impact on violent crime clearance (5% increase)" [Arietti page 6]
 - (b) Other studies have also shown minimal to no effect of RTCCs on violent crime. For example, the 2019 paper by Christopher Koper (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Evaluation of the Milwaukee Police Department's Crime Gun Intelligence Center" [https://crimegunintelcenters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MPD-CGIC-Evaluation-2019_Final-Report.pdf] found "In general, there were no upward trends in the percentage of incidents cleared during the post-[RTCC] period (2014-2017) for any of the offense types" [Koper pdf page 36].
 - (c) Overall, the results from studies assessing the use of technology on crime clearances has been mixed; whereas other (non-technological) aspects have been shown to have a greater impact on case clearances. For example, the 2021 paper by Heather Prince (of George Mason University) and et. al. titled "Effective police investigative practices: an evidence-assessment of the

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- research" [http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-04-2021-0054] states "newer research findings suggest that investigations-specific organizational policies focused on strengthening the capacity and accountability of investigative work, applying targeted resources to investigations, and increasing investigative effort in developing witnesses, evidence and responding to crime scenes could improve an agency's ability to affect clearance rates" [Prince pdf page 15] So it would be a better use of SPD's time and taxpayer's money to pursue these non-technological improvements that have shown measurable improvements in crime clearances.
- (d) SPD already has had a RTCC (iBase) since 2015. If RTCCs were effective at helping clear cases, then that should already be evident in SPD's existing data (such as, mean time to suspect identification before vs after 2015, mean length of time to case clearance before vs after 2015, etc). Since SPD didn't provide such data, the public can only assume that the data SPD does have doesn't look promising regarding the use of a RTCC. Additionally, in item 1.1 of the RTCC, SPD said that a RTCC "helps reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions." So how many unnecessary stops did SPD conduct before vs after 2015? Moreover, how does the RTCC change the accuracy of suspect descriptions and how is that shown in SPD's data before vs after 2015?

<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there is no point to deploying an ineffective technology.

- 3) Expensive: This is a poor use of taxpayer money and even of the SPD budget itself. It's also highly likely to be a ballooning amount of money year-over-year, beyond what the SIR implies:
 - (a) Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs and for which their cost information is publicly accessible, the average cost is \$7.16 per person (that is, per person based on the population data from each city's 2020 Census). With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilot-phase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansions.
 - (b) Even the paper referenced by SPD in the SIR mentions the "substantial costs associated with RTCCs, with initial costs ranging between several hundred thousand dollars to \$11 million ... This does not include the costs of ongoing maintenance, technology, and personnel" [Arietti page 1]. The paper later goes on to list the costs specific to Chicago's RTCC as "about \$10.6 million, plus an additional \$600,000 annually" [Arietti page 4].
 - (c) The Fiscal Impact section of the RTCC SIR is lacking any data regarding the expected year-over-year costs for powering the RTCC equipment, staffing the RTCC room, bandwidth & data storage costs, the on-going subscription to the vendor's software & support package, and projected maintenance costs. Given the budget deficit the City is facing, it is unwise for the City to spend likely well over \$1.8 million dollars to surveil residents instead of providing social services and funding community-driven, proven solutions to reducing gun violence.
 - (d) This seems like a foot in the door for SPD to have an always ever increasing budget allocated to them to expand and deepen their surveillance. It will be a contract that is an investment in exceptionally costly, ineffective, reactive measures that are hard to remove and do nothing to actually help residents or reduce violence.
 - (e) SPD says that this will replace their existing RTCC (iBase). However, SPD also uses iBase for other functionality (link analysis, which was the only approved used of iBase under the Surveillance Ordinance). This means that there will continue to be on-going costs for both iBase and the RTCC (Fusus). This is yet another way that SPD's expenditures will continue to balloon.

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<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - there are better uses of limited City funds.

- 4) Racially-biased deployment: The Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) included inside the SIR hasn't been updated to reflect the additional locations added to be surveilled. The old RET is now rather inaccurate since it doesn't include a map of the SDOT traffic camera locations or the proposed additional SPD CCTV locations and item 1.4.2 still says "CCTV will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated" which is no longer true because SDOT traffic cameras are all over the city and their placement is not related to felony crimes. This is on top of the many issues with the original RET itself:
 - (a) The RET doesn't appear have been drafted in consult with the Office of Civil Rights, as required by City Council.
 - (b) RET item 1.4.1 in the SIR shows disparate impact in the locations chosen to be surveilled. Specifically, there is disproportionate impact on Native American residents in 4 out of 4 of the pilot locations, Black residents in 3 of the pilot locations, Asian & Latinx residents in 2 of the pilot locations, and Mixed folks in 1 of the pilot locations. Additionally, while the majority of Seattle residents are white, all of the pilot locations have an under-proportionate amount of white residents thus meaning the pilot locations selected appear on paper to be racially motivated. I don't see how the impact won't be biased-based policing because if you are only looking for crime in non-white neighborhoods, then you're primarily going to find non-white suspects (and victims); whereas criminals in white neighborhoods (who are therefore likely white themselves) will fly under the radar of the police.
 - (c) RET item 1.4.2 in the SIRs states, "This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias." SPD has not provided any explanation as to how deploying this technology in racially-biased locations won't generate racially-biased policing outcomes.
 - (d) This is made worse by SPD's response to the RET question asking how they will mitigate the risks for racial bias in the deployment and SPD answered that these technologies "will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions." So SPD is basically saying that residents can avoid SPD police biases (and invasion of their privacy) by not going outside in public you need to stay home if you don't want to be surveilled that it's up to residents to protect themselves against SPD biases.
 - (e) Only 1 of the 2 public engagement meetings on these surveillance technologies was held near a pilot location and the 1 location that was also happened to be the location with the highest amount of white residents out of the 4 pilot locations. Why can SPD find the time to talk to surveillance technology vendors and the City can find the money to surveil residents, but somehow doesn't have the time nor the money to even have host a community event in all of the pilot locations?

<u>Recommendation</u>: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - racist behavior (including with technology) has no place in Seattle.

- 5) <u>Enabling circumvention of Seattle & WA state laws:</u> Women, trans folks, and immigrant residents are placed in increased harm by SPD's proposed RTCC:
 - (a) For background, <u>WA HB 1469</u> was passed in 2023 and created a Shield Law in WA state (now under RCW 7.115). Among other things, the WA Shield Law prohibits WA state, local agencies, & law enforcement and WA-based companies & other private entities from providing

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- information to, complying with subpoenas, or cooperating with an outside state related to bans or bounty hunting that state might have related to reproductive or gender-affirming healthcare.
- (b) And <u>WA SB 5497</u> was passed in 2019 and created the Keep Washington Working Act (now under multiple RCW sub-sections). Among other things, the Keep Washington Working Act restricts the extent to which local law enforcement agencies (such as SPD) may participate in enforcement of federal immigrant laws (such as by assisting ICE by collecting information about residents which may be undocumented).
- (c) In item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Most RTCC vendors provide this service via cloud-based web applications..." and SPD has confirmed that the video recordings will be streamed and recorded in the cloud (not on-premise with the City of Seattle).
- (d) Data stored off-premise (aka "in the cloud", "cloud-based", or "Software-as-a-Service", SaaS) is at risk of being subject to legal requests for that data directly from the platform provider by entities external to WA state. For example, a judge from Idaho could sign a subpoena/warrant that requests Axon Fusus (the proposed RTCC provider for SPD) to provide ALPR data for vehicles used by and/or CCTV recordings of people visiting Seattle who were suspected of having an abortion or assisting in providing trans healthcare. Or ICE could issue requests for ALPR and/or CCTV data specific to undocumented people that they believe might be in the Seattle area. Because Axon isn't a WA company, the data is not protected by the Shield Law; and because Fusus isn't a government law enforcement agency, the data is also not protected by the Keep WA Working Act.
- (e) These risks to women, trans folks, and/or immigrants are so severe and tangible that as of April 2025, Nashville is no longer even considering deploying the very same tech that SPD has deployed (Axon Fusus): https://nashvillebanner.com/2025/04/28/metro-nashville-fusus-freddie-oconnell/
- (f) The amendment that passed in Council that altered the contract language with Axon does not address these concerns either because state/federal laws will always be honored by a judge over simple contract language. Additionally, if the judge who signed the warrant also signed a gag order for those requests, then not only would SPD be unable to stop such information sharing but also Axon might be legally blocked from even disclosing that the request(s) exist to SPD (regardless of what the contract says).
- (g) These concerns are especially relevant now given the current administration and because SPD has already mounted a camera within range of viewing people who visit the Planned Parenthood on 105th and the Home Depot on Aurora.
- (h) SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on-premise, so it doesn't create these risks to residents. Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) SPD must not weaken state laws nor endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require that the RTCC to be on-premise.
- 6) $\underline{\text{Illegal use of SDOT cameras:}}$ Adding SDOT's traffic monitoring cameras to the SPD RTCC would violate numerous sections of Ordinance 125936 (2019 SDOT CCTV & LPR SIRs).
 - (a) Item 3.0 on page 150 of Ordinance 125936 states "The CCTV system and data shall be used only for traffic management purposes, except for when the City's Emergency Operations Center is activated to respond to an emergency or to monitor a major city-wide event, in which case the system may be used by other city personnel (e.g. Police and Fire). The system shall not be used for civil or criminal enforcement purposes." So it is illegal for SDOT cameras to be routinely & constantly used by SPD without an event happening. Moreover, this implies that video footage

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- from the SDOT traffic monitoring cameras would not be admissible in court since it was illegally captured.
- (b) At least four other items (3.1, 4.3, 4.7, & 6.1) of Ordinance 125936 only lists users who will have access to FLIR Cameleon ITS and does not list any City departments that would have ongoing use of the SDOT traffic camera video feeds outside of Cameleon, so the public and City Council did not consider nor assess this when passing Ordinance 125936.
- (c) Similar wording in items 3.3, 4.2, 5.1, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 state that "Video images will not be recorded, except for compelling traffic operational needs. If they are recorded, any such recordings will be destroyed immediately after use. Recordings shall not be stored or disseminated." So it is illegal for SPD to create and store recordings of the SDOT traffic camera feeds.
- (d) Similar wording in items 3.3, 4.0, 4.2, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 also state that "Operators may not intentionally use the CCTV cameras to discern any personally identifiable information that would enable the operators to identify a member of the public, unless doing so is necessary to allow the operator to perform a traffic management function." So the SDOT traffic camera feeds would not be of any investigative or evidentiary use to SPD anyways since they are not allowed to contain any personally identifiable information.
- (e) Items 4.0 & 4.1 on page 153 of Ordinance 125936 state that "The SDOT CCTV System will not be used to collect any data other than the following: • Live-streamed feed of current traffic conditions • Recorded video of traffic for engineering studies • Still images of traffic conditions used in training materials or included in social media." So both SPD's routine, continuous access to the SDOT traffic cameras and the creation of any recordings from them is illegal.
- (f) Similar wording in items 4.2, 4.7, 5.0, 5.3, 6.2, & 7.2 of Ordinance 125936 again limit the recordings to only traffic engineering studies and specify that the data retention period for those recordings is 10 days. So not only would SPD's use of the SDOT traffic cameras violate their purpose of use when recordings are made, but SPD would also violate the law if they stored the recordings for 30 days, as they currently plan to do so.
- (g) Items 6.0 & 6.1 on pages 159 160 of Ordinance 125936 states that users accessing the streams must be "notified that the system is intended to be used to monitor traffic and for no other purpose." So again, SPD's use of the SDOT traffic cameras would violate the SIR.
- (h) Additionally, multiple items in Ordinance 125936 would be inaccurate if the SDOT traffic cameras were added to the SPD RTCC: items 7.3, 7.4, & 8.1; the RET, and the Community Surveillance Working Group's Privacy & Civil Liberties Impact Assessment.

<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed) - SPD must not violate local laws, including the requirements laid out in any Surveillance Impact Report signed by the Mayor.

- 7) <u>Surveillance expansion:</u> RTCC SIR item 2.3 states that "Some RTCC vendors produce hardware that allows for private camera owners (such as private businesses) to share specific camera feeds with agencies." There are multiple concerns about this:
 - (a) CCTV recordings from nearby business are already being used and leveraged by SPD during investigations, so continuously, on-going access to live video feeds from private entities is unnecessary.
 - (b) SPD would have no control over technically ensuring that only camera feeds that are of publicly accessible areas are shared with SPD. For example, a business with multiple camera feeds may not consider that certain cameras the business has should not have their feeds shared with SPD since the viewing range includes non-public-facing locations. This could result in even further

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- invasion of privacy beyond which even a reasonable judge would have granted outside the confines of specific time duration as part of a targeted investigation thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond the oversight of the judicial branch.
- (c) SPD would have no control over when or where various private video feeds are added or removed from the system; nor would SPD have control over whether the video feeds have onthe-fly AI-generated overlays within the video stream content itself before the feed is made available to SPD - thus elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, privately-owned CCTV videos (both live and recorded) should require a warrant signed by a judge before they can be viewed, accessed, or saved by SPD.

- 8) <u>Hidden/unknowable surveillance features:</u> In item 1.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says, "some RTCC software uses non-generative AI, such as object detection, to analyze those surveillance technologies" and in item 2.3, SPD says that they "will not use facial recognition technology. In addition, SPD would not use analytics available in some platforms that combine different data sources and use algorithms or AI to present trends." However, face recognition and predictive policing aren't the only concerns:
 - (a) Gait recognition, behavior analysis, and emotion analysis would also be concerning functionalities that the system might have. None of those tools should be used on the data.
 - (b) SPD hasn't confirmed that they will only use an RTCC that allows them to disable such features system-wide. This is important because without it, it relies on each individual using the RTCC not clicking the wrong buttons meaning there is no technical guardrail; and past behavior from SPD has shown that individual employees are willing to violate both SPD Policy and the Surveillance Ordinance (i.e. OPA Case 2020OPA-0305 and OPA Case 2020OPA-0731).
 - (c) The vendor that SPD plans to use for the RTCC (Fusus) advertises that their system is "continuously evolving along with its database of profiles for search and analysis" and that Fusus is continuously updating the AI capabilities of the RTCC via weekly updates to the system. SPD has not disclosed to the public what are all the edge-based capabilities are they want to use. Not only that but SPD won't even know beforehand what are all the capabilities this system will have even after it's live and in-use (for possibly years). New features can and will be added to the RTCC both without SPD's awareness and without any public oversight or control thus (again) elevating the surveillance ability of SPD beyond both public scrutiny and the oversight supposedly enshrined via the Surveillance Ordinance (S.M.C. 14.18).
 - (d) In item 6.5 of the RTCC SIR, SPD didn't mention any accuracy checks they were planning to perform of the AI capabilities of the RTCC. So it seems SPD expects both the City and the public to just trust whatever functionality the vendor provides - without any checks-andbalances on that.
 - (e) Moreover, even SPD themselves doesn't want automated assessment of their own videos, so why should residents be subjected to surveillance tools that even SPD doesn't like? https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/decision-to-halt-program-analyzing-seattle-police-bodycam-video-under-scrutiny/

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, all edge-based analytics and/or AI capabilities in the RTCC must be disabled until SPD explicitly lists them individually in the SIR during an open public comment period and then receives approval to use them from City Council.

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- 9) No limitations on use: Item 5.1 of the RET in the RTCC SIR says the number one goal for the project is "Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area." However, nothing in the SIR limits the use of the RTCC to only "felony crimes". This is a bait-and-switch tactic whereby SPD is using the public's fear of the scariest sounding crimes to justify a surveillance technology that in practice will have unlimited use and very likely will instead commonly be used to harass those most often on-foot (poor folks, sex workers, homeless, tweens/minors, etc). Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, specify that the only allowable use of the RTCC is for felony crimes.
- 10) <u>Unidentified data sources:</u> In item 4.1 of the RTCC SIR, SPD lists the data sources to the RTCC and closes with "and other information systems." This wording leaves open the door for future data integrations to the RTCC to be configured but never go through the Surveillance Ordinance process. For example, SPD could add social media data/analysis to the RTCC and that would not generate a new or updated SIR. No department should be above the scope of the Ordinance. Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, strike "and other information systems" from item 4.1 of the SIR.
- 11) Excessive data retention: In item 4.2 of the RTCC SIR, SPD says that "Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention policy..." This has multiple issues:
 - (a) 30 days is too long to keep data on innocent people just going about their day.
 - (b) Retaining the RTCC data (which includes ALPR and CCTV data) for such a long period of time enables stalkers to issue Public Records Act (PRA) requests (potentially repeatedly) for data to use against their victims.
 - (c) It also means that bounty hunters from states outside of WA can use the PRA request process to get access to RTCC data without needing to issue a warrant. This is yet another way this group of pilot technologies enables outside jurisdictions to get around our Shield Law, which is meant to protect people coming to WA state for reproductive or gender-affirming care.
 - (d) And it means that ICE can also use the PRA request process to get around Seattle's Sanctuary City policy, which was meant to protect our immigrant residents.
 - (e) Meanwhile, SPD will have to pay the storage costs for all that unneeded, excessive data.
 - (f) It should not take SPD 30 days to figure out if a crime occurred at a given location. The SPD CAD and RMS data should be sufficient to somewhat quickly determine if a crime occurred (like say 48 hours, which is the data retention period requested by the Community Surveillance Working Group and City Council for SPD ALPR data, which would be getting processed by the RTCC).

<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, limit data retention period to 48 hours for data not exported as evidence.

12) <u>Duplication causing confusion in an emergency:</u> Item 2.3 of the RTCC SIR, says "Some RTCC software vendors also include public-facing features such as notification software that allows an agency to push out real-time information to the public in the form of texts for those who opt-in. These functions are like Alert Seattle..." Seattle already has an opt-in alert notification system (AlertSeattle - https://alert.seattle.gov/). Having two separate systems that perform overlapping functionality of

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notifying residents in the case of an emergency is a bad idea because it could result in residents believing that they are subscribed for all emergency alerts when they are only subscribed to SPD's RTCC-based alerting system. If there is a non-SPD emergency, residents won't receive the alert because they are subscribed to the wrong system. There should be only one emergency alert system used by the City of Seattle and it should be whatever system the City's Office of Emergency Management officially designates as such. All city departments should feed their alert data to the OEM-designated system (as is already the case).

<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, the public alert notification feature of the RTCC must be disabled.

13) Security & Compliance:

- (a) Item 4.7 says, "Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials." It would be better if access wasn't just password-based, but was also using MFA/2FA (or even 2SA would be something).
- (b) SPD has also not detailed whether a person must be on the SPD network in order to access the RTCC or if remote access will be permitted.
- (c) SPD hasn't confirmed whether the RTCC will have granular access control.
- (d) Nor whether the RTCC logs the username and timestamp when a camera's pan, tilt, or zoom are changed; or when an ALPR search is conducted. For example, if the system does NOT log this and there was a news report about misuse of the RTCC, then it might be impossible for the OIG/OPA to determine which employee was at fault.
- (e) Item 5.4 in the SIR says that, "Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD"; but that doesn't make sense here. Wouldn't this mean that the unit supervisor for the homicide detectives and the supervisor for the gang unit (and so and so forth) would all each be responsible for ensuring data retention compliance of the RTCC? That responsibility should be more centralized so as to ensure consistency in application of compliance requirements for a potentially widely-used system like the RTCC.

<u>Recommendation:</u> SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the RTCC to support: detailed logging for all features, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and granular access control of any cameras.

- 14) <u>Training:</u> Item 3.3 of the RTCC SIR says, "Authorized personnel will receive training in the RTCC management system prior to authorization." and item 7.2 says, "SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training." SPD does not mention creating any privacy or ethics training specific to the RTCC. There should be training that:
 - (a) That RTCC features must never be used outside the scope of an active call or investigation; and that employees found to have used the RTCC outside that scope would be personally liable for their actions.
 - (b) That ALPR data especially must be treated as sensitive information never to be used for personal purposes (such as stalking an ex/significant-other/neighbor/etc).
 - (c) Advises that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their pan/tilt/zoom altered to look inside private residences, to stalk/harass individuals, or to otherwise use the system for personal reasons)

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Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

- (d) And that the cameras accessible via the RTCC must not have their camera's viewing angle moved away from an area of police response, while police are still present.
- (e) Additionally, the RTCC SIR doesn't mention any policy that prohibits the user of the RTCC from taking screenshots, screen-recordings, or pictures/recordings using their cell phone or other mobile device. This especially impacts any victims, passerby, or anyone in the vicinity who are only partially clothed or fully naked, especially if unconscious.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy a RTCC (and certainly not implement any of the material updates proposed); but if City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require the creation & utilization of privacy & ethics training specific to the RTCC, including covering examples of expressly forbidden use of the system.

Please seriously consider my public comment. Thank you.

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Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

From: Roxy Robles

Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2025 1:10 PM

To: LEG_CouncilMembers < council@seattle.gov>; Privacy < privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: NO TO EXPANDED SURVEILLANCE

Good afternoon,

I am writing as a resident concerned about increased surveillance in our city. These technologies were 'piloted' despite a huge amount of community dissent and after only three weeks of use. Three weeks is not nearly enough to pilot test a new technology and to gather information about its efficacy. Not only does this raise concerns about the overuse and surveillance of already over-policed communities, this raises concerns about the council's ability to follow its own principle of 'good governance', with a consistent application of ethics, race and social justice principles, and data-driven results. I stand firmly against the additional use of surveillance technologies in our city a SPD is already unreliable, selectively responsive, and unbelievably brutal and racist.

SPD is constantly escalating situations, particularly with regard to people exercising their first amendment right to peaceful protest, and despite Shon Barnes' lip service to 'crime prevention' I have yet to see any marked change under his leadership. We cannot continue to fund untested technologies for a brutal, racist, and unreliable police force!!!

Roxy Robles they/she

From: Brooke Christiansen

Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:45 PM To: Privacy < Privacy@seattle.gov >

Subject: SIR Material Update Public Comment

Hello, I'm a constituent out of Cap Hill (zip code 98122) and my comment is a follow:

Instead of investing in surveillance tech, let's invest in solving the root causes of crime in this city: high rent (unregulated landlords); limited access to shelter, mental health support, addiction support, job support for (formerly) unhoused folks, etc.; our tax money going to policing and sweeps that may make our neighborhoods temporarily look cleaner but don't solve people's problems; etc.

Best, Brooke

From: R. John Setzer

Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 12:00 PM To: Privacy < Privacy @seattle.gov >

Subject: SIR Material update public comment

With all due respect,

We don't need more surveillance in Seattle. This isn't a police state, and SPD cannot be trusted with that power.

Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 9:19 AM To: Privacy < Privacy @ seattle.gov >

Subject: SIR Material Update public comment

Hello,

I am a constituent and a resident of north Seattle who thoroughly opposes expanding of citywide CCTV footage pilot program in the RTCC. More surveillance will NOT keep us safe. We need real programs and

funding for local community advocacy groups and schools instead of cameras to watch our comings and goings. Prioritize proaction instead of reaction!

N.Emery She/her

From: Jared Howe

Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 12:54 PM To: Privacy < Privacy@seattle.gov >

Subject: SIR Material Update public comment

Dear Seattle City Council,

I'm writing to express my strong opposition to the proposed expansion of CCTV surveillance in Seattle. This plan has moved forward without adequate public notification or transparency from City leadership, SPD, or local media—and the community deserves to be heard.

Research consistently shows that CCTV does not reduce violent crime or improve clearance rates. The SPD's own cited study—a 40-year meta-analysis—found *no significant impact on violent crime*. Additional studies from the UK, Dallas, and elsewhere echo these findings, emphasizing the cost-ineffectiveness and lack of investigatory value.

Beyond its ineffectiveness, CCTV undermines civil liberties, particularly for marginalized communities. Surveillance has a documented history of abuse—from targeting protests and abortion seekers to racial profiling and stalking. Expanding camera networks only increases the risk of misuse, especially as they tie into facial recognition and other AI-driven surveillance tools.

Seattle already has community-centered initiatives that work. Programs like the Regional Peacekeepers Collective and the Rainier Beach Restorative Resolutions project have reduced violence significantly—and offer far better ROI than surveillance tech.

I urge you to oppose the expansion of CCTV and instead invest in evidence-based, community-led safety solutions. Our city's future depends on trust, transparency, and truly equitable public safety.

Sincerely, Jared Howe Seattle, WA District 2

From: Noel Rivard <<u>nrivard67@gmail.com</u>> Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2025 10:44 AM To: Privacy <<u>Privacy@seattle.gov</u>> Subject: No to RTCC and CCTV!!!!

Cameras don't deter people or stop harm from happening, they are just for punishment. Call it what it is or get it out of my neighborhood.

The city's consideration of an off-premise real-time crime center software database is terrifying to me. Especially with the hell our federal administration is putting us through! Our state laws protect us to some degree, but the moving of our data to a third party removes those protections and threatens horrors unseen. PLEASE be diligent and push back in this.

Stop installing the tools for them to surveil and punish!! Get more creative. Do better for our city. Punishment doesn't stop harm from occurring. Get to the root problem. What other pathways could actually prevent this behavior?

I urge you to reconsider for our sake and yours because you live here too. The people their illegally detaining and deporting right now are also your neighbors. History proves, that what we allow to happen

to them, will eventually happen to us. Noel Rivard (they/them)

From: Siobhan Hopp

Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 8:45 AM To: Privacy < Privacy@seattle.gov>

Subject: SIR material updates public comment

NO expansion of surveillance! DO NOT give more data to SPD. SPD is violent, racially profiles, protects capital over people, and aids and abets ICE in kidnapping members of my community. They should be being given LESS power and LESS access, not more. I say NO to SDOT giving SPD access to more cameras!

From: Joelle Pretty

Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2025 6:35 PM

To: Privacy < Privacy@seattle.gov>; LEG_CouncilMembers < council@seattle.gov>

Subject: SIR Material Update public comment

CCTV will NOT reduce violent crime or aid in police investigations

CCTV poses a threat to civil liberties

Police control CCTV camera, the cameras see what the police want them to see

RTCC is a threat to women, immigrants, those utilizing their first amendment rights to free speech. It also creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate ALL residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights


I am opposed to these systems, to the Mayor and City Council expanding surveillance, and any officials in Seattle, King County, and Washington State (frankly, in the country) to cooperating with ICE.


KNOCK IT OFF

Sincerely,


Joelle Pretty, Seattle


Responses received via form:






Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)





More details






12. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

More details





I d	What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?	Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of space in section one)	What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/q uestions re what value do you see in this technology?	What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/c onsideration s that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?	Do you have any additional comments or questions?
1	I oppose the use of this		Bone		Do not expand the		

technology as			use o	of the
it increases			these	е
the negative			came	eras and
outcomes for				ontinue
LGBT+,			using	gthem
BIPOC and				
immigrant				
communities				
and increases				
harmful				
surveillance				
in our city at a				
time when at				
all				
government				
levels				
surveillance				
is being used				
to harm many				
communities				
COMMINICIO				
Surveillance				
tools only				
serve to help				
commit				
violence				
against				
marginalized				
groups. In the				
past few				
weeks Seattle				
has seen SPD				
collude with				
ICE, Tukwila				
PD collude			Cons	sider how
with ICE, and			this	Side How
these agents				eillance
& officers				
& oπicers have violated				nology is
				g used to
the			targe	t anu
constitution			hurt	inglized
and abducted				ginalized
2 citizens.			comr	munities.
Cloud hosting	RTCC can act		Wide	espread
puts data at	as a license			ss to spy
risk of	plate reader,	None - it gives	on ou	
breaches,	and cloud	away our right		munity is
threatening to	based data	to privacy and		ecessary
ovnoso		will be		does not
3 expose	storage would	abused		
people who	allow ICE to		кеер	us safe.

travel to WA surveil and for abortions harm or people immigrant escaping communities domestic

violence

Engage the community and find what people need. Address root causes. Consider how those in power will use this data to harm innocent people.

Moving the A remote on-premise **RTCC RTCC** database database to poses severe an offharms to premise, vulnerable cloud-hosted populations: Many antidatabase exponentially abortion risks people's states, personal including information neighboring and their Idaho, have passed safety by exposing the bounty hunter **RTCC** laws. This information creates a to access by market and any entity demand to hunt down that can this data for remotely access people (whether believed to authorized or have gone to not) the Seattle to get cloud-based reproductive database. healthcare. Cloud-based Homeless software and people, who databases have no are much option for more privacy, are vulnerable to likely to hacking than become on-premise targets of

systems that

have inherent

mass

surveillance.

none

liability when (not if) people's personal information is breached.

city's legal

physical barriers to Customs and

access.

Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access the data directly, thereby circumventin g Washington State Law. ICE has a history of accessing data directly from private surveillance

companies that market their

products to police, in order to circumvent state/local laws.

We know that

this

technology

disproportion ately impacts

homeless people, Black

people,

immigrants, and other

communities that already

have enough

to deal with. Also, I don't

trust these surveillance

technologies.

What are they really used for? What is done with the

data they 5 gather?

None

I want to urge

City

leadership to use an equity lens when

considering making such

a decision. Who is most impacted and

why? Whose rights are

being violated, whether

intentionally

unintentionall y? What else could these

funds/resour ces be used for, instead of

					surveilling people?		
6	A cloud-based RTCC would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. This technology should not be based in the cloud or with a private third party.		No value. We have it already and do not need it managed by a private third party out side of Washington state control.		Do not use this technology it will be used to punish those seeking Healthcare in Washington.		
7	Lack of safeguards for the data being collected, invasion of privacy, and likelihood that these tools will be used to target already marginalized communities. This technology will not make us any safer.		None.				
8	SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is on- premise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being	Threat of harm to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly Seattle has a	No. Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based	Surveillance technology will NOT aid law enforcement in solving crime. The 2024 paper that SPD cites states that	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs	We're devolving into a state of authoritariani sm. Do you want to be part of the problem or solution?	SPD is assisting ICE SPD confirmed to Guy Oron that they have been providing "mutual aid" to

obtained	long history of	software can	RTCC	work.	ICE/Departm
from third	participatory	be hacked.	"appeared to	Neighborhoo	ent of
parties or	democracy	This	have a	ds that have	Homeland
legal requests	dating at	happened in	relatively	adopted a	Security. SPD
from those	least as far	2021 when	smaller	Cure	says its
outside	back as the	hackers	impact on	Violence	assistance
Washington	1919 general	gained	violent crime	Model or	dispersing
state. There is	strike. Seattle	access to	clearance	Group	community
no reason for	has seen	Verkada -	(5%	Violence	members so
SPD to obtain	mass	giving them	increase),"	Intervention	ICE can
a cloud-	protests for	access to	other studies	Models have	kidnap
based RTCC	labor rights,	150,000	of RTCC show	seen	people
which would	abortion	cameras	no effect on	homicides	doesn't
weaken state	rights, anti-	inside	violent crime	and assaults	violate the
laws and	war protests,	schools,	clearance	decrease 30-	Keep
endanger	and protests	hospitals,	rates.	50%. The city	Washington
women, trans	around issues	gyms, police	In a 40 year	could scale	Working Act
folks, and	of	stations,	systematic	effective	which bars
immigrant	international	prisons,	review with	community-	local police
residents.	trade	offices and	meta-	led solutions	from
	policies, and	women's	analysis of	such as the	collaborating
Threat of	most recently	health clinics	the efficacy	Regional	with ICE.
harm to	mass	RTCC	of CCTV the	Peacekeeper	Some of this
abortion and	demonstratio	software	authors	s Collective	"mutual aid"
gender-	ns advocating	creates	concluded	coordinated	occurred
affirming	for a	conditions	there were	by the	while Interim
healthcare	ceasefire in	that are ripe	"no	Regional	Police Chief
Many anti-	Gaza.	for police	significant	Office of Gun	Shon Barnes
abortion	Unfortunately	abuse, as it	effects	Violence	was making
states,	, police	provides	observed for	Prevention	the headline
including	violence	little, if any,	violent crime"	and the	grabbing
neighboring	against	oversight for	and "a body	Rainier Beach	claim that he
Idaho, have	protesters is	how police	of research	Action	expects to go
passed	not	use it, little	on the	Coalition and	to jail
bounty hunter	unprecedent	documentati	investigatory	their	because he
laws. This	ed. After	on or	benefits of	Restorative	won't
creates a	SPD's	auditable	CCTV has yet	Resolutions	cooperate
market and	betrayal of	logs, and few	to develop."	project,	with the
demand to	the public	transparency	Only 1% to	which has	Trump
hunt down	trust in the	mechanisms.	0.2% of ALPR	already	Administratio
this data for	summer of	RTCC	captured	reduced	n.
people	2020, the city	software like	license plates	violence in	
believed to	recently paid	Fusus	are either on	the Rainier	SPD and
have gone to	a \$10M	recruits a vast	a hot list or	Beach	Mayor Harrell
Seattle to get	settlement.	assortment of	associated	neighborhood	refuse to
reproductive	Violence	privately	with any	by 33%.	respond to
healthcare. If	against	owned	crime.RTCC	Richmond,	questions
SPD switches	protestors in	cameras that	software is	CA has	from Hard
over to a	2020 is one of	allow the	expensive	chosen to	Pressed
cloud-hosted	the principal	company to	RTCC	invest in	about how

RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care. The rate of out-of-state abortions, those coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far away as Texas and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. **RTCC** software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state.

reasons that Seattle remains under the consent decree that it has been under for excessive use of force since 2012. SPD has used existing surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protestors. During the 2020 protests for racial justice, SPD used live video streaming to record peaceful protestors, and shared it with U.S. Marshalls, Washington State Department of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on

protestors

including

access to

bypass laws and restrictions that normally limit police, including viewing camera footage without a warrant or ongoing consent from the owner. The risk is not hypothetical as seen by other law enforcement agencies: In Pasco County, Florida, which operates an RTCC, the sheriff's office's predictive policing system encouraged officers to continuously monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass. SPD has a track record of officers abusing their

software are subscription products meaning the city will have to pay for it every single year. **RTCC** software, and other companies selling subscriptions , operate on the land-andexpand strategy where it starts off small with a city to get its proverbial foot in the door and then increases the amount the city is buying from them every year. In other words, a for profit company will be pushing Seattle to spend even more money on its products every year. The city cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology especially in

light of the

fact that

violence interruption and other communityled safety initiatives and they have seen a drop in the number of homicides. This is in contrast to neighboring cities like Oakland and San Francisco that have increased their police budgets and have not seen a decline in violent crime. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Investments restoring vacant land and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the

many times ICE has asked for data sharing. The only thing preventing ICE from accessing all of SPD's surveillance data (including 30 days of video and 90 days of license plate scans) is SPD's dubious claim that it will follow the Keep Washington Working Act & Washington Shield Law (read on for more info on how meaningless these assurances are) and won't cooperate with ICE.

Recently an including one surveillance Seattle is country are Idaho mother on Sept. 23, technology. In anticipating a making 2021 SPD \$250 million and son were 2023, that investments charged with called for Officer shortfall in in kidnapping justice for the Swartz used 2025 preventative for allegedly death of police data to Looking at communitytaking a Jaahnavi stalk his exfour other US centered minor across Kandula, who girlfriend; in cities that approaches state lines to died Jan. 23, 2020, an have and are access 2023, as a officer deployed seeing a abortion care result of accessed RTCCs, the reduction in in Oregon. being hit by confidential average cost crime and The state of SPD officer information is \$7.16 per violence in Texas has Kevin Dave about a person. With the already while driving domestic Seattle's community. attempted to his officer violence 2020 Violent crime get data from vehicle as investigation population of can be Seattle she walked and shared it 737,015, this reduced by Children's through a with would put the investments Hospital for in mental marked someone full-scale any Texas crosswalk. involved; and (post-pilothealth residents **RTCC** phase) RTCC just last year, treatment, receiving software is a an officer deployment providing gendervast network performed an by SPD in the substanceunauthorized affirming of cameras ballpark of abusecare. As soon which can search for \$5.3 million, treatment as SPD include personal not including facilities, and switches over doorbell reasons to the additional access to to a cloudcameras, reveal a costs for the affordable hosted RTCC citizen's CCTV and drones, housing. database, red robots, fixed firearm **ALPR** Poverty and states will surveillance ownership. income expansion. start issuing cameras, The Even the inequality are helicopters, subpoenas to privatization paper associated access data hidden of policing referenced by with violence, represented directly from cameras, SPD in the especially Fusus. SIR mentions assault and police body by relying on Threat of cameras, and private the homicide. harm to cameras in consumers to "substantial Inequality women, schools and expand the costs predicts sexual churches, camera associated homicides with RTCCs, assault and among other network better than stalking settings. undermines with initial any other survivors, and RTCC opens democratic costs ranging variable. vulnerable up the values, between Evidence marginalized opportunity effectively several supports that community for those excluding hundred this is a residents thousand causal link. exercising Seattle **RTCC** dissent to be residents dollars to \$11 And direct software tracked and from being million". income

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

and

This

continuous

introduction

surveillance

tools would

of Seattle's

Surveillance

Ordinance.

be in violation

of new and

unvetted

companies targeted, and like Fusus risks the rely on private threat of consumers to police expand the retaliation. camera Surveillance network is about the which gather power to enough data watch and to reveal intervene in a sensitive variety of personal situations, information, whether criminal or including where not, and someone surveillance lives, works, technology and their has the religious potential to affiliation. have a Individuals, chilling effect homeowner on free associations, speech rights. In 2021 or businesses that opt into LAPD RTCC may be requested able to bulk camera access the data targeting data directly **Black Lives** from the Matter vendor. protesters. In Hostile New York City individuals there is could access evidence that NYPD has data to stalk or harass used individuals. surveillance The threat to technology to vulnerable surveille communities **Black Lives** is NOT Matter hypothetical, protesters. as seen by Creates a the actions of system ripe other law for abuse and enforcement potential to agencies: violate all NYP officers residents' used mass First and surveillance Fourth

able to support has provide input been found to and oversight reduce firearm on the growing violence. Seattle Opening libraries and surveillance apparatus. expanding **RTCC** library hours software like both reduce Fusus violence and continually property adds new crimes. image recognition algorithms integrations with thirdparty applications via the software's AI capabilities.

technology to Amendment record and Rights Cloud-based everyone software can parked in be hacked.

front of a This

mosque, and happened in Burmingham 2021 when police also hackers used this gained technology, in access to conjunction Verkada with other giving them tools, to track access to Muslim 150,000 residents. cameras Homeless inside residents, schools, who have no hospitals, option for gyms, police privacy, are stations, likely to prisons, become offices and targets of women's mass health clinics **RTCC** surveillance.

California is software using AI to creates identify and conditions target its that are ripe homeless for police residents. abuse, as it Threat of provides harm to little, if any, immigrants oversight for ICE has a how police use it, little history of terrorizing documentati immigrant on or communities. auditable Jurisdictions logs, and few that do not transparency use local mechanisms.

resources to RTCC

enforce software like

federal Fusus

immigration recruits a vast laws have assortment of lower rates of privately crime, owned

poverty, and cameras that unemployme allow the nt than those company to that chose to bypass laws collaborate. It was with this restrictions knowledge that normally that the Keep limit police, Washington including Working Act viewing was passed camera to prevent footage data sharing without a between warrant or immigration ongoing and local law consent from enforcement. the owner. **RTCC** The risk is not software like hypothetical Fusus can as seen by turn any other law camera into enforcement an automated agencies: In license plate Pasco County, readers (ALPRs). Florida, By moving to which a cloudoperates an based RTCC, the sheriff's platform, Customs and office's Border predictive Control (CBC) policing and ICE can system access encouraged officers to automated license plate continuously reader data monitor and directly; harass circumventin residents for g Washington minor code State Law. violations ICE has a such as practice of missing accessing mailbox

data directly

from private

surveillance companies

ALPR

numbers and

overgrown

grass.

63

that market

their

products to

police, in

order to

circumvent

any local

sanctuary

laws. The

department

gets a lot of

use out of

this data, as

seen by them

running

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searches of

ALPR

databases in

a single

month as

early as 2019.

ICE's

utilization of

this data

shows the

degree of risk

it poses to

vulnerable

communities.

Police

surveillance

systems have

been used by

ICE and to

target people

seeking

abortion

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even in

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The Burner

and Notes

from the

Emerald City

have details

9 RTCC	There are	no	Creates a	Threat of	Threat of	Threat of	
software is	MANY		system ripe	harm to all	harm to	harm to	

RTCC could use to will NOT aid will and products community of the products of the products community of the products of the produc							
to pay for it to interruption in The 2024 Rights and assembly to programs paper that Cloud-based year. Work. SPD cites software can other work. SPD cites software can other adopted a "appeared to companies" companies Cure have a 2021 when selling Violence relatively hackers backed sthe subscriptions where it is always and several to the land-and-where increases the companies of RTCC show where it seem increases the door and then increases the community- line adopted and or where were year. In propriet coordinated of CCTV the creating and project, and project	RTCC software are subscription products	tools the city could use to decrease community	technology will NOT aid law enforcement	potential to violate all residents' First and	exercising First Amendment Rights of free	ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant	sexual assault and stalking survivors, and
every single year. work. SPD cites software can software can software, and work. SPD cites software can software, and other adopted a "appeared to companies" Cure have a selling Violence relatively hackers back as the subscriptions Model or smaller gained strategy Models have (5% access to the land-and-expand Intervention strategy Models have (5% access to where it seen increase)," 150,000 labor rights, and sasaults off hornicides or other toor in the could scale correspond that the courage amount the courage amount the courage where wery year. In Peacekeeper on its project, expendit on the more rovery year. In Coulds can be pushing Seattle to Office of Gun is more more money on the form of the seponder of their or expensive their on project, and project, and project, and project, and project, benefits of expensive middles. The products range in project, benefits of expensive middles. The products range in project, benefits of expensive middles. The products range in project, be medit to develop." The city control of the project, and project,	city will have				public protest	Jurisdictions	
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dollars to \$11	lead to	mailbox 	operations
million".	reductions in	numbers and	center (EOC).
	both violent	overgrown	SPD has
	crime and	grass.	continued to
	property	SPD has a	use existing
	crimes.	track record	surveillance
	Many	of officers	to spy on
	communities	abusing their	protestors
	across the	access to	including
	country are	surveillance	including one
	making	technology. In	on Sept. 23,
	investments	2021 SPD	2023, that
	in	Officer	called for
	preventative	Swartz used	justice for the
	community-	police data to	death of
	centered	stalk his ex-	Jaahnavi
	approaches	girlfriend; in	Kandula, who
	and are	2020, an	died Jan. 23,
	seeing a	officer	2023, as a
	reduction in	accessed	result of
	crime and	confidential	being hit by
	violence in	information	SPD officer
	the	about a	Kevin Dave
	community.	domestic	while driving
	Violent crime	violence	his officer
	can be	investigation	vehicle as
	reduced by	and shared it	she walked
	investments	with	through a
	in mental	someone	marked
	health	involved; and	crosswalk.
	treatment,	just last year,	RTCC
	providing	an officer	software is a
	substance-	performed an	vast network
	abuse-	unauthorized	of cameras
	treatment	search for	which can
	facilities, and	personal	include
	access to	reasons to	doorbell
	affordable 	reveal a	cameras,
	housing.	citizen's	drones,
	Poverty and .	firearm	robots, fixed
	income	ownership.	surveillance
	inequality are	The	cameras,
	associated	privatization	helicopters,
	with violence,	of policing	hidden
	especially	represented	cameras,
	assault and	by relying on	police body
	homicide.	private	cameras, and
	Inequality	consumers to	cameras in
	predicts	expand the	schools and
	homicides	camera	churches,

better than	network	among other
any other	undermines	settings.
variable.	democratic	RTCC opens
Evidence	values,	up the
supports that	effectively	opportunity
this is a	excluding	for those
causal link.	Seattle	exercising
And direct	residents	dissent to be
income	from being	tracked and
support has	able to	targeted, and
been found to	provide input	risks the
reduce	and oversight	threat of
firearm	on the	police
violence.	growing	retaliation.
Opening	Seattle	Surveillance
libraries and	surveillance	is about the
expanding	apparatus.	power to
library hours	RTCC	watch and
both reduce	software like	intervene in a
violence and	Fusus	variety of
property	continually	situations,
crimes.	adds new	whether
	image	criminal or
	recognition	not, and
	algorithms	surveillance
	and	technology
	integrations	has the
	with third-	potential to
	party	have a
	applications	chilling effect
	via the	on free
	software's Al	speech
	capabilities.	rights. In 2021
	This	LAPD
	continuous	requested
	introduction	bulk camera
	of new and	data targeting
	unvetted	Black Lives
	surveillance	Matter
	tools would	protesters. In
	be in violation	New York City
	of Seattle's	there is
	Surveillance	evidence that
	Ordinance.	NYPD has
		used
		surveillance
		technology to
		surveille
		Black Lives

			Matter protesters.		
1 0	spend money on socials safety nets instead of surveillance	zero	stop trying to put us under constant surveillance and fix the homeless and housing crisis with social safety nets, higher ages and taxing the rich		Yeah, you;re ruining the city because you won't tax the rich and help the homeless
	Establishing a penopticon to monitor citizens is the height of autocratic dystopia. It will has already been used to target LGBTQIA+, minorities, and those seeking abortions.	None.	Eliminate it in its entirety. Redistribute the police budget to transit and climate resilience.	The First and Fourth Amendments .	Here's your chance to be on the right side of history, or be just more autocrats.
1 2	I worry that the data gathered by these cameras will end up sold to and/or held by private corporations, further invading our privacy as private individuals. With a move to cloud- based RTCC, these violations are	None, SPD already have onsite RTCC.	Do you trust any of the private corporations who may have an interest in this data to use it responsibly? What is the benefit to residents to move to cloud as opposed to the existing system?		

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

basically

assured.

Moving RTCC

offsite opens

up data

security risks

and would

enable other

states to

circumvent

our Shield

Law and Keep

WA Working

Act, which

exist to

protect

p. 0 . 0 0 .

people

seeking

reproductive

healthcare

and

immigrant

workers. SPD

already have

an RTCC, and

have already

used it to

abuse Seattle

residents

(stalking

former

partners,

inappropriate

ly sharing

information

regarding a

domestic

violence

investigation

with an

involved

party,

monitoring

peaceful

protestors

after the

protest is

over, etc).

more of a

tempting

This proposal is a risk to Washingtonia n's privacy and freedoms to go about their lives, as there is a strong potential that this technology will make it easier for bad actors to misuse civilians' information for unequal policing and 1 political 3 persecution. Racial profiling, surveillance state, increasingly untrustworthy federal government (which SPD sometimes cooperates with). SPD should have to earn the trust of the people, and 1 they have not None 4 done so. RTCC poses a The issues on If the city massive risk Absolutely RTCC are very cares about for everyone. none. This well protecting the technology is documented people of The more an abuse of and all came Seattle, it data stored in power with a up last year should a location the universal when the remove

adapter and

should be

Seattle

community,

RTCC.

target it is.	removed from	Office of Civil	
This is both	Seattle.	Rights, and	
as a target for		Community	
ICE & other		Surveillance	
law		Working	
enforcement		Group all	
agencies to		recommende	
access		d against	
(which they		RTCC. Why is	
have) and for		the city	
hackers to		considering	
target.		expanding	
		this	
RTCC		technology	
companies		now when it	
have been		is being used	
caught using		by ICE to	
data obtained		disappear	
from hacks &		people and	
security		its abuses are	
breaches in		so	
their		documented?	
algorithms.			
https://www.		Where is the	
404media.co/		money for	
license-plate-		this	
reader-		expansion	
company-		coming from?	
flock-is-		Relatedly,	
building-a-		how is there	
massive-		money for	
people-		this while the	
lookup-tool-		city is doing	
leak-shows/		austerity and	
		cutting	
ICE has		services?	
access RTCC			
databases		Why was SPD	
from across		allowed to	
the country		submit the	
including		original SIR	
Washington		for RTCC	
State &		without	
supposed		estimating an	
"sanctuary"		annual cost	
states.		only to be	
https://www.		allowed to	
404media.co/		say it needed	
ice-taps-into-		millions of	
nationwide-		dollars per	

ai-enabledyear for RTCC cameraas soon as networkthe data-shows/ technology was Law approved? enforcement in states with abortion bans have utilized RTCC to search nationwide databases of surveillance data. Including surveillance data from abortion sanctuary states to look for people that have had abortions. https://www. 404media.co/ a-texas-copsearchedlicense-platecamerasnationwidefor-a-womanwho-got-anabortion/ No law, contract, agreement, or court decision can stop ICE from accessing RTCC databases because the current federal administratio n does not

care about or follow the law or court decisions That's even before considering all of the cases of individual officers abusing RTCC to spy on and blackmail people. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloudbased RTCC It is a breach It would of privacy for weaken state the general laws and public and endanger will put women, trans vulnerable folks, and It's effect on 1 communities immigrant vulnerable 6 at risk. residents. None communities.

RTCCs	Any claims of	City	Before
dramatically	value are	leadership	making any
expand the	minimal and	should	decisions, the
city's	overstated.	consider how	City should
surveillance	While RTCCs	much public	hold public
capabilities,	are	money is	hearings and
collecting	sometimes	being	require
real-time	credited with	funneled into	independent
data about	minor	a system that	studies on
people's	improvement	has little	the impact of
locations,	s in clearing	proven	surveillance
habits, and	cases, such	impact on	on civil rights.
associations.	as a 5%	safety. As	Communities
This	increase in	outlined by	most
infrastructure	Chicago,	the ACLU and	impacted by
reinforces	there is no	Stop	policing must
racial	meaningful	Surveillance	have a voice
1 profiling,	evidence that	City, these	in this
targets	they reduce	funds—over	process.
already over-	gun violence	\$2 million—	Seattle has a

policed communities, and puts undocument ed people and those seeking reproductive or genderaffirming care at risk. According to Stop Surveillance City, Seattle police have a documented history of abusing surveillance tools, including spying on protestors and activists. There's no reason to believe a Real-Time Crime Center would be any different, especially with no independent oversight or accountabilit у.

or make communities safer. Stop LAPD Spying and other watchdog groups have shown these systems mainly serve to intensify police presence, not solve crime. They create a high-tech illusion of safety while failing to

address the

root causes

of harm.

would be far better spent on proven communitybased solutions like housing, youth programs, mental health care, and violence interruption. RTCCs are not a public safety necessitythey are a political and technological overreach.

choice: continue down a path of expanding surveillance and criminalizatio n, or invest in real public safety rooted in care, equity, and community. We urge you to reject the **RTCC** proposal.

Waste of money! In a This will be cost of living used to crisis in an further surveil increasingly unaffordable and criminalize city, in a our most housing and vulnerable groceries neighbors! crisis, where This is a huge safety nets invasion of are being cut,

That it is a waste of money and a huge violation of residents' privacy.

privacy for this is the everyone! absolute last

thing any regular person needs!

SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is onpremise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloud-

based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents. Moving the on-premise RTCC database to

managed by a
third-party,

private
company
would enable

None that

outweigh its

would

harms.

cloud-hosted

an off

premise,

database

technology is expensive and studies show it has either no, or negligible, impact on solving crime. I want City dollars to be spent on solutions that have been PROVEN to be effective at reducing crime — such

This

communityled violence interruption programs not systems like this which have not. See this document (https://docs. google.com/d ocument/d/1 4EhNiDMb7M 8Z7TafyZsbxG OfdelDOGzR YxZNd3biwIE/ edit) for specific examples of the many effective

tools the city should use instead, which are

other states	actually
to circumvent	shown to
WA state's	decrease
Shield Law	violence.
and Keep WA	
Working Act,	
which are	
meant to	
protect both	
people	
seeking	
reproductive	
healthcare	
and	
immigrant	
workers.	
My concerns	
include the	
examples of	
harm caused	
by this type of	
technology	
listed here:	
https://docs.g	
oogle.com/do	
cument/d/14	
EhNiDMb7M8	
Z7TafyZsbxG	
OfdelDOGzR	
YxZNd3biwlE/	
edit	
This	
technology is	
expensive	
and studies	
show it has	
either no, or	
negligible,	
impact on	
solving crime.	
I want City	
dollars to be	
spent on	
solutions that	
have been	
PROVEN to	
be effective	
at reducing	

crime — such as community-led violence interruption programs — not systems like this which have not.					
I strongly oppose moving our onsite real-time crime center (RTCC) to the cloud. It will be less protected there and more vulnerable to requests for data from other states — states that have strong, negative views of women's right to abortion, of trans people, and of immigrants.			I want my city to use viable, proven solutions like violence interruption programs, mental health services, and investments in libraries and green spaces, etc., to make our city safer and better. Not surveillance, and not by moving RTCC in a way that will put people in danger.		
I am against the use of this technology.	I am against the expansion.	None			
That SPD will use this to target, harass, and profile marginalized community members		Absolutely no value	SPD has a long history of using their tools and resources against the community to the point of being under federal	Stop wasting our resources and tax dollars on SPD and fund what the community actually needs!	

oversight for many yearsthey do not need more tools and resources!

RTCCs			
dramatically	Any claims of		
expand the	value are	City	
city's	minimal and	leadership	
surveillance	overstated.	should	
capabilities,	While RTCCs	consider how	
collecting	are	much public	Before
real-time	sometimes	money is	making any
data about	credited with	being	decisions, the
people's	minor	funneled into	City should
locations,	improvement	a system that	hold public
habits, and	s in clearing	has little	hearings and
associations.	cases, such	proven	require
This	as a 5%	impact on	independent
infrastructure	increase in	safety. As	studies on
reinforces	Chicago,	outlined by	the impact of
racial	there is no	the ACLU and	surveillance
profiling,	meaningful	Stop	on civil rights.
targets	evidence that	Surveillance	Communities
already over-	they reduce	City, these	most
policed	gun violence	funds—over	impacted by
communities,	or make	\$2 million—	policing must
and puts	communities	would be far	have a voice
undocument	safer. Stop	better spent	in this
ed people	LAPD Spying	on proven	process.
and those	and other	community-	Seattle has a
seeking	watchdog	based	choice:
reproductive	groups have	solutions like	continue
or gender-	shown these	housing,	down a path
affirming care	systems	youth	of expanding
at risk.	mainly serve	programs,	surveillance
According to	to intensify	mental health	and
Stop	police	care, and	criminalizatio
Surveillance	presence, not	violence	n, or invest in
City, Seattle	solve crime.	interruption.	real public
police have a		RTCCs are	
documented	They create a high-tech	not a public	safety rooted in care,
history of	illusion of		·
abusing		safety	equity, and
surveillance	safety while	necessity—	community.
tools,	failing to	they are a	We urge you
including	address the	political and	to reject the
2 spying on	root causes	technological	RTCC
protestors	of harm.	overreach.	proposal.

and activists. There's no reason to believe a Real-Time Crime Center would be any different, especially with no independent oversight or accountabilit y.						
My concern is that this technology will violate Seattlite's right to privacy, and make Seattlites anxious and paranoid about being watched all the time.	N/A	None, it would be a complete waste of our already thin budget.	N/A	Privacy is a RIGHT.	N/A	N/A
Surveillance is a powerful tool of social repression and state violence 2 against its 5 populace	It's use to support ICE and their enforced dissappearan ces of peoples.	None. It will only be used to harm people.	We keep us safe, not endless surveillance	The immense harm it will cause to already marginalized and abused portions of our population. NO POLICE STATE		Could we use this to track the City Council members movements?
I do not want 2 more police 6 surveillance.		None. SPD is big enough and has enough resources.		Expanding other programs to benefit residents material situation.		

This is an invasion of privacy and implements strategies utilized by 2 fascist 7 governments.	None	This technology does not represent the values of Seattle, and it is NOT what the people want. Please do not allow this abuse of power in our city.
It's frightening, if could be hacked and used against people and it won't reduce crime.	None, we do not need increased surveillance.	How it's going to affect everyone, the cost vs. benefit and how little it's going to make a difference in crime.
Surveillance is used primarily to harm people of color and other marginalized groups. Police in this city are already bad enough at protecting the people, providing our data and privacy is only going to lead to more unnecessary violence. Allowing even more citywide surveillance is a huge		City leadership must place restrictions on this technology, cops already patrol in these areas more frequently. This frequent patrolling is what causes divides, inequalities, and contributes to higher crime rates. The addition to real time high definition cameras protects no one and can
9 is a nuge injustice to		only be used

the city.			to	
Desired			retroactively	
expansion			bring some	
into even			sort of	
more			justice. Any	
marginalized			funds	
spaces will			towards this	
not help cops			project could	
catch bad			easily be	
guys, it will			used towards	
help cops			other	
racially			programs that	
profile,			truly keep	
brutalize, and			communities	
discriminate			safe such as	
against our			hard	
own people.			reduction,	
			community	
			centers, and	
			funding for	
			education.	
			FOCUS ON	
			INVESTING IN	
			OUR HEALTH	
			AND	
I oppose the		expensive	EDUCATION,	
3 expansion of		and	NOT	
0 surveillance	none	ineffective	POLICING	
This				Rather than
technology				investing in
will make it			Consider the	this
less safe for			danger of the	technology
marginalized			federal	and the
people in			government	constant
Seattle.			or military	sweeps on
Transgender			coming to	homeless
and queer			Seattle to	encampment
people are			take our data	s, we should
already			and use it for	spend more
targeted by			their own	money giving
police, as			means. And	them
seen in police			consider the	affordable
brutality			people who	housing.
recently at			don't want to	South Lake
Cal Anderson			have their	Union and
			HOTO CHOIL	C
			identity	other areas
Park on May			identity	other areas
Park on May 24. Efforts to	There is no		constantly	must create
Park on May	There is no value.			

transgender			security	those who
are being			screen.	need it.
made in				
many other				
states (and at				
a federal				
level).				
Allowing				
more security				
cameras to				
track and				
store				
information				
about us is				
extraordinary				
dangerous.				
Moreover, this				
detracts from				
us being a				
sanctuary city				
for migrants.				
We need to				
protect our				
friends and				
family no				
matter what. Migrants				
provide an				
essential role				
in our				
economy,				
and without				
them we will				
face higher				
costs, longer				
wait times at				
our favorite				
restaurants,				
and we will				
lose what				
makes				
Seattle				
special.				
ICE and	There is no		There is no	
Border patrol	evidence	I do not see	evidence	
are using	whatsoever	any value in	whatsoever	
3 cloud-based	that RTCC	this	that that	
surveillance	lives up to the	technology.	RTCC has any	
tools to	vendor		public	

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

claims. The conduct warrant-less 2024 paper searches and that SPD cites violate states that sanctuary city RTCC laws. Vendor "appeared to have a contracts are insufficient to relatively protect the smaller data. This has impact on been violent crime reported on clearance by 404 media. (5% https://www. increase)," 404media.co/ other studies ice-taps-intoof RTCC show nationwideno effect on violent crime ai-enabledcameraclearance networkrates. This data-shows/ technology is Furthermore costly and a the Trump waste of city administratio dollars at a n has time when informed ICE the cities employees deficit and that they are federal cuts at liberty to threaten conduct vulnerable warrant-less communities. searches This technology https://www.t hehandbaske and any expansion of t.co/p/icewarrantlessit and arrestsespecially castanonending its nava Any definition of a expansion of "pilot" this without any evaluation of technology is a weapon in the program the hands of and only 3 the Trump weeks after administratio its n and puts implementati our immigrant on in communities unconsciona at risk. ble.

benefit. In fact, I have spoken to Brian Maxey, who stated that the benefits of RTCC were "anecdotal and hypothetical" Cloud-bases surveillance tools are a weapon in the hands of the Trump administratio n and will be used to violate our sanctuary laws. We will hold our city leaders accountable for the decision to pursue RTCC and to ignore public input which has been largely dis favorable of the technology.

	This adds to SPD's enormous surveillance network. This allows data to go to the cloud where it can be hacked. This allows SPD to cooperate with ICE, CBP, etc.	None	Why would we want to expand SPD's already enormous surveillance network? Why would we want to do anything that could lead to data sharing with ICE, CBP, etc.?
	It can be used to target women, immigrants, and LGBTQ+ individuals. SPD already has plenty of surveilance technology. The cost of this program could be better spent on hiring.	None	Consider the privacy rights of the population at large. This is police state stuff!
3 5	Surveillance is a powerful tool of social oppression. This will only increase violence. It will only lead to more discriminatio n and division. Adding more surveillance technology will only increase crime and increase violence	No value. This is dangerous.	Think of where else the funding for this could go. Preventive care for the people!

Act, which

towards innocent people Please direct funds towards affordable Many. Please housing and 3 do not human 6 expand. services. This I'd urge them technology is to consider a threat to our where that first and money could fourth be spent amendment elsewhere to rights. It will actually be harmful to improve the lives of those women, underserved sexual assault and or most I see no value vulnerable. stalking in this survivors, and Why not scale technology. vulnerable the effective Studies show marginalized communitythat it is community led solutions actually not residents such as the effective in because the Regional reducing third party Peacekeeper violent crime. **RTCC** s Collective But there are software is coordinated many cases not protected by the where it has and can be Regional been used by used Office of Gun law negatively on Violence enforcement law-abiding Prevention to harass and the community people and Rainier Beach members by divulge out of state Action private individuals or Coalition and information prosecuting their about people agents. It will Restorative fleeing Resolutions allow domestic circumnaviga project, violence and tion of WA which has other state state's Shield already violence reduced Law and Keep which is **WA Working** violence in wrong.

the Rainier

WA residents	Beach
voted on and	neighborhood
needs to be	by 33%? Both
upheld.	violent crime
It is also	and property
expensive	crime can be
and would	reduced by
needlessly	community
add to our	investments.
already \$250	Investments
million	restoring
shortfall of	vacant land
the 2025	and
budget.	community
Studies also	non-profits
show that it is	that tackle
actually not	violence and
affective in	build
reducing	community
violent crime.	lead to
Please, do	reductions in
not vote to	both violent
outsource	crime and
this	property
surveillance	crimes.
to a third part.	
More	
surveillance	
is not more	
safety, and	
adding even	
more .	
cameras is	
not the	
answer to	How this
reducing	technology

technology crime or will truly be other issues. I see no value implemented More in this, and I over safety cameras on understand measures. the streets this to be This will be used purely a move technology is for purposes to further easily other than None, it will surveil and manipulated More safety and not aid in monitor the and used to cameras is this should keeping residents of profile not the not be done Seattle safe. Seattle. people. answer. under any

circumstance

s.

The use of these cameras so widely has been policy acceptable specifically because it was not used by police. I am deeply How this concerned change about the violates the trust of privacy implications Seattle's of this data citizens. How was used this helps freely by the further the police. Not to authoritarian mention the goals of the Trump Trump 3 administratio administratio 9 n. None.

Iam concerned about the potential for cloud-based Iam systems to concerned enable data about any to be third part accessed by private other parties company and thus having circumvent access to law I do not see Washington's enforcement value in protections data. I prefer expanding such as the the the RTCC this Shield Law be kept on technologoy

premise

rather than

off premise.

to be for

systems.

cloud-based

and Keep

Washington

0 Working laws.

Please, please do take the perspectives of your constituents into account. We do not know how things will move federally and with AI in the future, we need to move cautiously to uphold our core constitutional values.

See the above comments. This is a risky step, without clear benefit, that opens Washingtonia n's up to greater surveillance by federal and third party companies. We can't fully know how data captured now will be used in the future. I fully support the SPD in accessing

information

Please see

comments.

above

Remember that we need to make decisions now with a forethought to our future generations. No decision will be perfect but we need to consider privacy and freedom with the awareness that these rights are not ensured to be respected moving forward.

to solve crimes. I do not support maintaining this information on the cloud by a third party private company, without greater data protections. Thank you so much for hearing me.

Increasing surveillance will increase racial profiling, and make it easier for the police and state agencies to track and target vulnerable individuals & groups, putting them Consider how in more the use and danger. The expansion technology is and sharing used to of this criminalize & technology harm my puts your immigrant already neighbors, vulnerable neighbors constituents who live in more unsheltered, danger, and neighbors contributes to who use ever widening drugs, state neighbors repression who work in and control of the sex trade, the people. and my

neighbors of					
color.					
I am concerned about how it might be used outside of the state and beyond our state laws, bounty hunter laws from Idaho, for example. Other examples could be federal over reach. Not into this tech. 4 Not down. 2 No, please.	I do not approve of this level of invasive surveillance in general.	No value that I approve of.	Who this is actually going to effect, who is this immediately going to impact, and who is it actual helping. How could this be abused, by who, and what would the consequence s of that be? Are there better uses for these funds and personnel?	Don't do it.	Please, don't do it.
Yes, I do have massive concerns about this technology in just the fact that it's yet another part of mass governmental surveillance that's been slowly expanding over the past few decades. The program already has already been likely used for helping track cross-state abortions. And as more			Consider whether it's worth conducting mass- surveillance on your constituents in exchange for extremely minor benefits, if any. Consider whether it's worth contributing to the erosion of both people's right to privacy, as well as assisting in interstate hunts for		

and more people trying states take to exercise away their bodily people's autonomy. rights as And don't lie we've seen to yourselves about how over the past few years, it'll this will be only be used "limited" or for such "only for purposes certain even further. criminal activities" Do not spy on citizens. Do because these kinds of not spy on your things will constituents. and have SPD is more always, than capable always, **ALWAYS** of doing its job without expanded engaging in and have ALWAYS been masssurveillance. co-opted. Please do not do this.

Expanding civilian transportatio n technology to police makes us less safe, not more safe. The police do not need more data. In addition there is a history of police departments collaborating with federal authorities, such as ICE. Integrating traffic data with the police decreases

This is an irrelevant question without also considering the direct and potential harm this would cause. When those are first evaluated the risk is so high, that no value in implementing this camera integration project could

offset.

Remember that the current federal government wants to deport immigrants black and brown residents, stop abortion healthcare, and ban gender healthcare. Every step you take to expand the surveillance infrastructure is building more tools that they will

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

the barrier to use when federal they have the authorities' chance, access, regardless of which your intent. increases the danger to our most vulnerable citizens. **I** understand I am concerned the value of that this the current expansion system to law will endanger enforcement. those The cons outweigh the traveling to We have our state pros when we seeking RTCC send it to the reproductive technology cloud and Healthcare and do not enable a and need to nationwide 4 transgender involve a 3rd spying 5 healthcare. party. capability. See #1 This is clear over-reach and abuse of surveillance technology against It should be Quite bone-chilling citizens; moreover it valuable to that we have weakens our authoritarian normalized 4 state's style such 6 protections government intrusiveness It would put our privacy at risk for being free to travel That it could between override I don't think states for Washington's lifesaving it's safe to laws for THE PEOPLE 4 healthcare outsource privacy **DON'T WANT** 7 needs. like this. protection! IT. Exposing information None to ICE that

they should not have

RTCC and CCTV do not RTCC and provide any CCTV do not benefit to provide any mitigate all of benefit to the harm they mitigate all of cause. They the harm they neither cause. They reduce neither violence nor reduce increase violence nor clearance increase (arrest rates) clearance for violent (arrest rates) crime. A 40 for violent year crime. A 40 systematic year review with systematic metareview with analysis of metathe efficacy analysis of of CCTV the efficacy concludes of CCTV -"no concludes significant "no effects significant observed for effects violent crime observed for or disorder". violent crime Despite or disorder". RTCC's high Despite price tag RTCC's high ("initial costs price tag ranging ("initial costs between ranging several between hundred several thousand hundred dollars and thousand \$11 million"), dollars and studies of \$11 million"), RTCC show studies of no effect on RTCC show violent crime no effect on clearance violent crime rates. These clearance technologies None rates. will foster the

very spirit of distrust and disunity that you claim to hope they will end. that response should be increased investment in equitable and evidencebased strategies for gun violence prevention while also offering meaningful support to victims and survivors. Violence can be reduced by investments in violence interruption programs, mental health treatment, substanceabusetreatment facilities, affordable housing, emergency financial assistance, and libraries. Poverty and income inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Evidence

supports that	
this is a	
causal link,	
inequality	
predicts	
homicides	
better than	
any other	
variable.	
Surveillance	
contributes to	
disinvestmen	
tin	
communities.	
Seattle is	
required to	
have a	
balanced	
budget, every	
dollar spent	
on	
surveillance	
is a dollar	
that cannot	
be invested in	
any of the	
evidence-	
based	
strategies for	
violence	
prevention listed above	
or otherwise	
invested in	
our	
communities	
as mental	
health	
supports,	
programs for	
kids,	
parks/public	
spaces,	
affordable	
housing,	
jobs/job skill	
training, and	
food access.	
Police have a	
lengthy	

history of mis-using and abusing surveillance to blackmail people, target people based on their religion, spy on people, and cover up violence by police. SPD has a history of abusing the surveillance tools it already has, including to spy on protestors, stalk former romantic partners, and leak information about domestic violence victims. Additionally, SPD has a history of providing inaccurate information in Surveillance Impact Reports (SIRs) for the technologies it wants. SPD has done this with CCTV & RTCC at least once already. On February 12, 2024, SPD Captain

James Britt told the public that SPD would absolutely not actively monitor CCTV feeds in the RTCC. Nick Zajchowski from SPD contradicted this in the June 26, 2024 meeting of the Community Surveillance Working Group saying that SPD would be actively monitoring the camera feeds at least part of the time. Cloud-based surveillance tools destroy Seattle's ability to act as a sanctuary city and render Washington State's Shield Law and the Keep Washington Working Act meaningless. Surveillance creates a map of people's lives that Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) and law enforcement & private individuals in other states, including ones with bans on abortion and/or transgender healthcare, can access through the for-profit companies storing it. The CCTV pilot specifies the Aurora corridor and includes the Planned Parenthood located on Aurora Avenue and 105th. The rate of people coming from other states to seek abortion in Washington increased by 36% in 2023.		
So many! It makes our city less safe. It takes away our privacy protections.	None.	Outsourcing means we would lose our Seattle/WA privacy laws which we cannot do!
Having sensitive information essentially		We are in scary times. Your public words of

owned and reassurance outsourced to about protecting the an safety of the unregulated, private 3rd most party system vulnerable is a huge among us concern and mean very puts many little if your vulnerable actions populations directly or at risk of indirectly put exploitation those same people from folks at great risk. WA is a other states coming to WA beacon of for gender hope in the affirming care country right or abortions, now. I have for one thing friends from ... it also puts all over who immigrants at have talked risk and about moving violates (in an here, visiting indirect way) here, etc. the Those same reassurance people will that has been absolutely provided that NOT come, the police are even to visit, not collecting if they know data and their sharing it with information is ICE, etc; if a being 3rd party has collected and access to this shared with information private, and shares it unregulated with ICE or 3rd party others, and systems. we are They are not complicit in safe where supplying the they stand. information And I feel like to a third I (as a queer party system, person) am then we are standing on complicit in sand every the whole day, even in system. this

"progressive" state because of decisions like these. Please protect us.

This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers.

has a real time crime center. SPD's existing RTCC (iBase) is onpremise, so it doesn't create the

risk of data

obtained

from third

parties or

from those

Washington

state. There is

no reason for

SPD to obtain

outside

legal requests

being

SPD already

Seriously? The GOP/Trump administratio n has ICE and Homeland Security officers acting like the Secret Police, and Seattle City Council proposes to make surveillance data available to those

5 entities (and

2 others)?

a cloudbased RTCC which would weaken state

None whatsoever.

Whether the City leadership really wants to make violations of Constitutiona l rights even easier--and whether the majority of the city's electorate supports this use of our tax dollars (especially given the city's budget woes).

laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Many antiabortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted **RTCC** database, we The need to enable the protect our criminalizatio vulnerable n of those citizens from seeking additional, 5 reproductive unnecessary 3 care. none surveillance. My concerns Consider the I do not see are vast but it I wouldn't extremism the value of Giving a boils down to want this that is this if a safer powerful tool a concern for available to becoming society is the like this to the safety and law more goal. And I assist the well being of enforcement palatable by imagine that illegal women even in a the sheer a safer deportation receiving climate that mass of of immigrants society is a WASN'T access to petitions, nonis not good safe objectively requests and for this city, or controversial out of threats from abortions. idea. this country. Beyond that control, as this

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

we know this this current Presidential data will be one is. administratio available to n and those in border patrol, support of it; ICE etc and I consider it don't think in daily and stay this climate sane. anyone can argue that this will make anyone safer. This will negatively affect quality of life for many people. Reveals sensitive personal info including This further where endangers someone women, trans lives, works, folks, and and their 5 immigrant religious 5 residents. None affiliation. Unnecessary surveillance by a government that is already targeting vulnerable people, as well as people who none that Do not risk outweighs the are standing harming 5 up for our costs and vulnerable 6 democracy. risks peoples. In the current I can see no political value in environment sharing this there is information. Who is going danger that If there is a to use this Do not this legitimate information approve this need then the information None who is and for what sharing of will be used information None going to use purpose. None information. by agencies can be

that not law abiding.	requested in a lawful manner in a supena.		
Please, PLEASE, help protect our innocent residents and citizens! Please please 5 do NOT help 8 ICE!	Sure, great, but NOT to aid illegal and wrong actions on behalf of bad people!	Please do not use this technology to hurt innocent people. Please!	I thought I read on Substack that our police chief was going to protect our people. ?
I don't want it to track people to the degree it will be able to. It's an invasion of privacy. I do not want to put my tax dollars towards this.			
I'm concerned about federal access to this information. If it's not in the cloud no one can ask Seattle, Seattle PD, or 6 a cloud 0 provider for it.	No value for individuals; tremendous value for ICE.	Don't use it. The fact of the existence of the data makes it exceedingly vulnerable to the feds. Even if access is granted "accidentally" or if the courts require that the data is handed over.	
You can be used to Target defenseless individuals.	None	Do the disadvantage s outweigh the advantages?	

This database is available to ICE and will be used to fuel its brutal, careless, and illegal campaign against immigrants regardless of their status and anyone who challenges their illegal actions that ignore the rule of law, the Constitution, and the 6 authority of 2 the Congress.

The reason given in question 1 is sufficient to reject use of this technology. ICE has become a threat to every American.

6	police power overreach		recycling it into something to enable peace	just don't do it	handshakes are more powerful than digital eyes	
6 4	RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras, automated license plate readers (ALPRs), CCTV, among other police surveillance	This technology can be abused and accessed by third parties when stored in the cloud and poses a threat of harm and misuse to all people exercising First Amendment Rights of free speech, public protest and assembly. It	None	This powerful technology should not be passed without an opportunity for serious consideration and public comment. We are seeing a dangerous rise in authoritariani sm at the federal level and having a cloud-based RTCC runs the risk of having	They need to consult with privacy advocates, including the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation, to fully understand the threat	Once you go down this road, you cannot easily turn back, so you should be incredibly careful and thoughtful.

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

tools. RTCC is also software like expensive, Fusus can unnecessary, turn any and has little likelihood of camera into an automated making license plate Seattle any readers safer.

Seattle
contribute to
spying on
private
citizens who
are exercising
their legal
rights.

(ALPRs)
which gather
enough data
to reveal
sensitive
personal
information,
including
where
someone
lives, works,
and their
religious
affiliation.

The City Council's attempt to move the onpremise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both

people

seeking reproductive healthcare and

immigrant

workers.

SPD already

has a real

time crime

center. SPD's

existing RTCC

(iBase) is on-

premise, so it

doesn't

create the

risk of data

being

obtained

from third

parties or

legal requests

from those

outside

Washington

state. There is

no reason for

SPD to obtain

a cloud-

based RTCC

which would

weaken state

laws and

endanger

women, trans

folks, and

immigrant

residents

I have so SPD already many has a real concerns. (1) time crime center. SPD's Creation of a RTCC will existing RTCC create a (iBase) is onsystem that premise, so it will become a doesn't MAGNET for create the abuse as well risk of data 6 as the being potential to obtained

None. I see only potential for abuse and harm Do you want
to create a
police and
surveillance
state in our
area? Do you
want this to
be your
legacy? Are
your values
that much
aligned with

violate the 1st	from third	our autocrat	
& 4th	parties or	Dictator	
amendment	legal requests	wanna be	
rights of all	from those	President??	
residents. (2)	outside		
Surveillance	Washington		
technology	state. There is		
does not aid	no reason for		
law	SPD to obtain		
enforcement	a cloud-		
in solving	based RTCC		
crimes	which would		
(despite all	weaken state		
the tv shows	laws and		
and	endanger		
movies) (3)	women, trans		
This	folks, and		
technology	immigrant		
represents a	residents.		
very real	AND this		
threat of	technology is		
harm to	expensive.		
	expensive.		
immigrants -			
if footage is			
obtained by			
ICE, CBP, etc			
(4) This			
technology			
poses a			
threat of			
harm to all			
people 			
exercising			
First			
Amendment			
Rights of free			
speech,			
public protest			
and assembly			
– especially			
because its			
use puts our			
city solidly			
into the			
"surveillance			
state" and			
SPD (with its			
history of			
required			
federal			

control to

oversight due to bad behavior) has a history of using surveillance systems to spy on peaceful protesters.. (5) Threat of harm to women, sexual assault and stalking survivors, and vulnerable marginalized community residents historic use of the technology to track religious and sexual minorities, to stalk women/sexua l abuse survivors, immigrants, etc (6) Threat of harm by being used to track and intimidate by residents seeking abortion and genderaffirming healthcare the use of this Do whatever cloud based is in your platform power to stop could allow the use of a ICE and cloud based border program that None

could be

access information

for at risk

immigrants. immigrants in unnecessary harms way. We know that these tools, which were put in place by King County Housing Authority, have generated surveillance data ICE has searched in order to look for people. Not criminalsjust immigrants in most cases that had no criminal record, but who could have their status Instead of revoked so expanding the they could be use of these detained and In terms of systems, their deported. sending use needs to surveillance This is not in be curtailed. As a resident I the spirit of data to and others separating national, state and private will be local databases, watching this resources there are no Consider the issue closely; from federal benefits and uses this data this is where ICE is being put to we need to many enforcement. dangerous that have put Don't expand uses to which nothing to do "welcoming" 6 the use of this data with local law promises into 7 these tools. could be put. enforcement. action.

used by ICE

put at risk

and therefore

Invasion of privacy and data sharing risks to 6 indifivual freedoms	It gives the government too much power	None		Do not expand the abiity of the government to spy on the population		
It is used by law enforcement all over the country. It can be used to track women who have had an abortion, to track immigrants and to track 6 LBGTQ 9 people.		None that outlays the threat to our citizens.		Taking care of all our citizens.		
These technologies can easily be used to target those the trump administratio n is (trans youth, BIPOC, immigrants)		It's not helpful, please stop spending money on surveillance		Do not approve the use of this technology please.		
RTCC software is a cloud-based software platform designed for real-time crime centers to integrate multiple surveillance technologies such as cameras, automated license plate	See above	See above	See above	See above	See above	See above

readers (ALPRs), CCTV, among other police surveillance tools. RTCC software like Fusus can turn any camera into an automated license plate readers (ALPRs) which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. The City Council is attempting to move the onpremise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA



healthcare:
Many anti-
abortion
states,
including
neighboring
ldaho, have
passed
bounty hunter
laws. This
creates a
market and
demand to
hunt down
this data for
people
believed to
have gone to
Seattle to get
reproductive healthcare. If
SPD switches
over to a
cloud-hosted
RTCC
database, we
enable the
criminalizatio
n of those
seeking
reproductive
care.
The rate of
out-of-state
abortions,
those coming
from other
states to seek
abortion in
Washington,
increased by
36% in 2023
and included
20 different
states
including neighboring
Idaho and
states as far



```
gender-
affirming
care. As soon
as SPD
switches over
to a cloud-
hosted RTCC
database, red
states will
start issuing
subpoenas to
access data
directly from
Fusus.
Threat of
harm to
women,
sexual
assault and
stalking
survivors, and
vulnerable
marginalized
community
residents
RTCC
software
enabled a
Texas cop to
search
surveillance
data from
across the
county,
including
Washington
State, other
states with
abortion
"sanctuary"
laws, and
non-police
entities
including the
King County
Housing
Authority, for
someone that
had an
```

abortion RTCC software makes it impossible to keep surveillance data from ICE. Local police departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to casually share surveillance data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority. RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests"

RTCC software companies like Fusus rely on private consumers to expand the camera network which gather enough data to reveal sensitive personal inform

Threat of Threat of harm to harm to all abortion and people genderexercising affirming First healthcare Amendment Many anti-Rights of free abortion speech, states, public protest including and assembly neighboring Seattle has a Idaho, have long history of passed participatory bounty hunter democracy dating at laws. This creates a least as far back as the market and demand to 1919 general hunt down strike. Seattle this data for has seen people mass believed to protests for have gone to labor rights, abortion Seattle to get reproductive rights, antihealthcare. If war protests, SPD switches and protests over to a

around issues of trade

cloud-hosted

database, we

criminalizatio

enable the

n of those

seeking

RTCC

international policies, and most recently mass demonstratio

want to live their lives in peace and have no idea about the harms of this type of data collection. I doubt that many people will give input because they aren't experts in this type of technology and naively believe that it will make them safer.

Most people

A functioning democracy needs the population to feel more empowered, not less. This type of technology takes power away from individual citizens and gives it to who knows who-the highest bidder?

None

reproductive ns advocating

care. for a

The rate of ceasefire in

out-of-state Gaza.

abortions, Unfortunately those coming , police from other violence states to seek against abortion in protesters is

Washington, not increased by unprecedent 36% in 2023 ed. After SPD's and included 20 different betrayal of states the public including trust in the neighboring summer of Idaho and 2020, the city states as far recently paid away as Texas a \$10M and Alabama. settlement. Anti-abortion Violence groups have a against history of protestors in using license 2020 is one of

plate data. the principal **RTCC** reasons that software Seattle allows data to remains be shared under the across law consent enforcement decree that it

agencies. has been Third party under for agencies in excessive use anti-abortion of force since

states could 2012.

use this data SPD has used to criminally existing prosecute surveillance systems to those seeking abortion in spy on Washington peaceful state. protestors. Recently an During the Idaho mother 2020 protests and son were for racial charged with justice, SPD kidnapping used live for allegedly video

streaming to taking a record minor across state lines to peaceful access protestors, abortion care and shared it in Oregon. with U.S. Marshalls, The state of Texas has Washington already State attempted to Department get data from Seattle Corrections, Children's and to a Hospital for private citizen any Texas volunteering residents at Seattle's receiving emergency genderoperations affirming center (EOC). care. As soon SPD has as SPD continued to switches over use existing to a cloudsurveillance hosted RTCC to spy on database, red protestors states will including including one start issuing subpoenas to on Sept. 23, access data 2023, that directly from called for Fusus. justice for the Threat of death of harm to Jaahnavi Kandula, who women, died Jan. 23, sexual assault and 2023, as a result of stalking survivors, and being hit by

vulnerable SPD officer marginalized **Kevin Dave** community while driving residents his officer **RTCC** vehicle as software she walked enabled a through a Texas cop to marked crosswalk. search surveillance **RTCC**

data from software is a across the vast network

county, of cameras including which can Washington include State, other doorbell states with cameras, abortion drones, "sanctuary" robots, fixed laws, and surveillance non-police cameras, entities helicopters, including the hidden King County cameras, police body Housing Authority, for cameras, and someone that cameras in had an schools and abortion churches, **RTCC** among other software settings. makes it RTCC opens impossible to up the keep opportunity surveillance for those data from exercising ICE. Local dissent to be police tracked and targeted, and departments are very cozy risks the with ICE and threat of RTCC makes police it easier for retaliation. Surveillance them to casually is about the share power to surveillance watch and data. And, intervene in a RTCC means variety of ICE is able to situations, search whether nationwide criminal or databases of not, and surveillance surveillance technology data including has the data from potential to police have a departments chilling effect in on free Washington speech State, other rights. In 2021 states with LAPD "sanctuary" requested laws, and bulk camera non-police data targeting entities **Black Lives** including the Matter King County protesters. In New York City Housing Authority. there is **RTCC** evidence that software was NYPD has used by used surveillance police to spy technology to on surveille "immigration protests" **Black Lives RTCC** Matter software protesters. companies like Fusus Creates a rely on private system ripe consumers to for abuse and expand the potential to camera violate all network residents' First and which gather enough data Fourth to reveal Amendment sensitive Rights

sensitive Rights
personal Cloud-based
information, software can
including be hacked.
where This

someone happened in lives, works, 2021 when and their hackers religious gained affiliation. access to Individuals, Verkada homeowner giving them associations, access to or businesses 150,000 that opt into cameras RTCC may be inside able to schools, access the hospitals, data directly gyms, police from the stations, vendor. prisons, Hostile offices and

individuals women's could access health clinics data to stalk **RTCC** or harass software individuals. creates The threat to conditions vulnerable that are ripe communities for police is NOT abuse, as it hypothetical, provides as seen by little, if any, oversight for the actions of other law how police enforcement use it, little documentati agencies: NYP officers on or used mass auditable surveillance logs, and few technology to transparency record and mechanisms. monitor **RTCC** everyone software like parked in Fusus recruits a vast front of a mosque, and assortment of Burmingham privately police also owned used this cameras that allow the technology, in conjunction company to with other bypass laws tools, to track and Muslim restrictions residents. that normally Homeless limit police, residents, including who have no viewing option for camera privacy, are footage likely to without a become warrant or targets of ongoing consent from mass surveillance. the owner. California is The risk is not using AI to hypothetical identify and as seen by target its other law

homeless

residents.

enforcement

agencies: In

Threat of Pasco harm to County, immigrants Florida, ICE has a which history of operates an terrorizing RTCC, the sheriff's immigrant communities. office's Jurisdictions predictive that do not policing use local system resources to encouraged enforce officers to federal continuously monitor and immigration laws have harass lower rates of residents for minor code crime, poverty, and violations unemployme such as nt than those missing that chose to mailbox collaborate. It numbers and was with this overgrown knowledge grass. that the Keep SPD has a Washington track record Working Act of officers was passed abusing their to prevent access to data sharing surveillance between technology. In immigration 2021 SPD and local law Officer enforcement. Swartz used **RTCC** police data to software like stalk his ex-Fusus can girlfriend; in turn any 2020, an camera into officer an automated accessed license plate confidential readers information (ALPRs). about a By moving to domestic a cloudviolence based investigation platform, and shared it Customs and with Border someone

involved; and

just last year,

an officer

Control (CBC)

and ICE can

of cameras to

watch our

access

automated performed an license plate unauthorized reader data search for directly; personal circumventin reasons to g Washington reveal a State Law. citizen's ICE has a firearm practice of ownership. accessing The data directly privatization from private of policing **ALPR** represented surveillance by relying on companies private that market consumers to their expand the products to camera police, in network order to undermines circumvent democratic any local values, sanctuary effectively laws. excluding Seattle residents from being able to provide input and oversight on the growing Seattle surveillance. This takes away our liberty and Because it privacy for has gotten living normal out of hand legal lives. and gone too The far it needs to government be stopped does not have altogether. the right to Government Personal 7 use any kind can not be rights and

liberties.

trusted to use

it legally. It is

	people. That is destroying the rights we were given in the constitution.		abusive. So no.			
	The City Council is attempting to move the on- premise RTCC database to an off premise, cloud-hosted database managed by a third-party, private company. This change will enable other states to circumvent WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect both people seeking reproductive healthcare and immigrant workers. SPD already has a real time crime center. SPD's	Threat of harm to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare Many antiabortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted RTCC database, we enable the criminalizatio n of those seeking reproductive care.		Threat of harm to immigrants ICE has a history of terrorizing immigrant communities. Jurisdictions that do not use local resources to enforce federal immigration laws have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployme nt than those that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement. RTCC software like	Creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all residents' First and Fourth Amendment Rights Cloud-based software can be hacked. This happened in 2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada - giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics RTCC software creates	There are MANY effective tools the city could use to decrease community violence Violence interruption programs work. Neighborhoo ds that have adopted a Cure Violence Model or Group Violence Intervention Models have seen homicides and assaults decrease 30-50%. The city could scale effective community-led solutions such as the Regional Peacekeeper s Collective coordinated by the
	existing RTCC	The rate of		Fusus can	conditions	Regional
	(iBase) is on-	out-of-state		turn any	that are ripe	Office of Gun
	premise, so it	abortions,		camera into	for police	Violence
	doesn't	those coming		an automated	abuse, as it	Prevention
7	create the	from other		license plate	provides	and the
4	risk of data	states to seek		readers	little, if any,	Rainier Beach
-	being	abortion in		(ALPRs).	oversight for	Action

obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloudbased RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Washington, increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including neighboring Idaho and states as far and Alabama. Anti-abortion groups have a history of using license plate data. **RTCC** software allows data to be shared across law enforcement agencies. Third party agencies in anti-abortion

away as Texas states could use this data to criminally prosecute those seeking abortion in Washington state. Recently an Idaho mother and son were charged with kidnapping for allegedly taking a minor across state lines to access abortion care in Oregon. The state of Texas has

already

By moving to how police a clouduse it, little based documentati platform, on or Customs and auditable Border logs, and few Control (CBC) transparency and ICE can mechanisms. access **RTCC** software like automated license plate Fusus reader data recruits a vast directly; assortment of circumventin privately g Washington owned State Law. cameras that ICE has a allow the practice of company to bypass laws accessing data directly and from private restrictions **ALPR** that normally surveillance limit police, companies including that market viewing their camera

footage

without a

warrant or

the owner.

consent from

The risk is not

hypothetical

enforcement

agencies: In

operates an

RTCC, the

predictive

encouraged

policing

system

sheriff's

office's

Pasco

County,

Florida,

which

as seen by

other law

ongoing

products to

circumvent

any local

sanctuary

laws. The

department

gets a lot of

this data, as

seen by them

thousands of

searches of

databases in

early as 2019.

utilization of

this data

shows the

use out of

running

ALPR

a single

ICE's

month as

police, in

order to

Coalition and their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already reduced violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood by 33%.

attempted to	degree of risk	officers to
get data from	it poses to	continuously
Seattle	vulnerable 	monitor and
Children's	communities.	harass
Hospital for	Threat of	residents for
any Texas	harm to all	minor code
residents	people 	violations
receiving	exercising	such as
gender-	First	missing
affirming	Amendment	mailbox
care. As soon	Rights of free	numbers and
as SPD	speech,	overgrown
switches over	public protest	grass.
to a cloud-	and assembly	SPD has a
hosted RTCC	Seattle has a	track record
database, red	long history of	of officers
states will	participatory	abusing their
start issuing	democracy	access to
subpoenas to	dating at	surveillance
access data	least as far	technology. In
directly from	back as the	2021 SPD
Fusus.	1919 general	Officer
Threat of	strike. Seattle	Swartz used
harm to	has seen	police data to
women,	mass	stalk his ex-
sexual	protests for	girlfriend; in
assault and	labor rights,	2020, an
stalking	abortion	officer
survivors, and	rights, anti-	accessed
vulnerable	war protests,	confidential
marginalized	and protests	information
community	around issues	about a
residents	of	domestic
RTCC	international	violence
software	trade	investigation
enabled a	policies, and	and shared it
Texas cop to	most recently	with
search	mass	someone
surveillance	demonstratio	involved; and
data from	ns advocating	just last year,
across the	for a	an officer
county,	ceasefire in	performed an
including	Gaza.	unauthorized
Washington	Unfortunately	search for
State, other	, police	personal
states with	violence	reasons to
abortion	against	reveal a
"sanctuary"	protesters is	citizen's
laws, and	not	firearm
non-police	unprecedent	ownership.

***	1. 46.	T1
entities	ed. After	The
including the	SPD's	privatization
King County	betrayal of	of policing
Housing	the public	represented
Authority, for	trust in the	by relying on
someone that	summer of	private
had an	2020, the city	consumers to
abortion	recently paid	expand the
RTCC	a \$10M	camera
software	settlement.	network
makes it	Violence	undermines
impossible to	against	democratic
keep	protestors in	values,
surveillance	2020 is one of	effectively
data from	the principal	excluding
ICE. Local	reasons that	Seattle
police	Seattle	residents
departments	remains	from being
are very cozy	under the	able to
with ICE and	consent	provide input
RTCC makes	decree that it	and oversight
it easier for	has been	on the
them to	under for	growing
casually	excessive use	Seattle
share	of force since	surveillance
surveillance	2012.	apparatus.
data. And,	SPD has used	RTCC
RTCC means	existing	software like
ICE is able to	surveillance	Fusus
search	systems to	continually
nationwide	spy on	adds new
databases of	peaceful	image
surveillance	protestors.	recognition
data	During the	algorithms
including	2020 protests	and
data from	for racial	integrations
police	justice, SPD	with third-
departments	used live	party
in	video	applications
Washington	streaming to	via the
State, other	record	software's Al
states with	peaceful	capabilities.
"sanctuary"	protestors,	This
laws, and	and shared it	continuous
non-police	with U.S.	introduction
entities	Marshalls,	of new and
including the	Washington	unvetted
King County	State	surveillance
Housing	Department	tools would
Authority.	of	be in violation

RTCC	Corrections,	of Seattle's
software was	and to a	Surveillance
used by	private citizen	Ordinance.
police to spy	volunteering	Surveillance
on	at Seattle's	technology
"immigration	emergency	will NOT aid
protests"	operations	law
RTCC	center (EOC).	enforcement
software	SPD has	in solving
companies	continued to	crime.
like Fusus	use existing	The 2024
rely on private	surveillance	paper that
consumers to	to spy on	SPD cites
expand the	protestors	states that
camera	including	RTCC
network	including one	"appeared to
which gather	on Sept. 23,	have a
enough data	2023, that	relatively
to reveal	called for	smaller
sensitive	justice for the	impact on
personal	death of	violent crime
information,	Jaahnavi	clearance
including	Kandula, who	(5%
where	died Jan. 23,	increase),"
someone	2023, as a	other studies
lives, works,	result of	of RTCC show
and their	being hit by	no effect on
religious	SPD officer	violent crime
affiliation.	Kevin Dave	clearance
Individuals,	while driving	rates.
homeowner	his officer	In a 40 year
associations,	vehicle as	systematic
or businesses	she walked	review with
that opt into	through a	meta-
RTCC may be	marked	analysis of
able to	crosswalk.	the efficacy
access the	RTCC	of CCTV the
data directly	software is a	authors
from the	vast network	concluded
vendor.	of cameras	there were
Hostile	which can	"no
individuals	include	significant
could access	doorbell	effects
data to stalk	cameras,	observed for
or harass	drones,	violent crime
individuals.	robots, fixed	and "a body
The threat to	surveillance	of research
vulnerable	cameras,	on the
communities	helicopters,	investigatory
is NOT	hidden	benefits of

hypothetical,	cameras,	CCTV has yet
as seen by	police body	to develop."
the actions of	cameras, and	Only 1% to
other law	cameras in	0.2% of ALPR
enforcement	schools and	captured
agencies:	churches,	license plates
NYP officers	among other	are either on
used mass	settings.	a hot list or
surveillance	RTCC opens	associated
technology to	up the	with any
record and	opportunity	crime.
monitor	for those	RTCC
everyone	exercising	software is
parked in	dissent to be	expensive
front of a	tracked and	RTCC
mosque, and	targeted, and	software are
Burmingham	risks the	subscription
police also	threat of	products
used this	police	meaning the
technology, in	retaliation.	city will have
conjunction	Surveillance	to pay for it
with other	is about the	every single
tools, to track	power to	year.
Muslim	watch and	RTCC
residents.	intervene in a	software, and
Homeless	variety of	other
residents,	situations,	companies
who have no	whether	selling
option for	criminal or	subscriptions
privacy, are	not, and	, operate on
likely to	surveillance	the land-and-
become	technology	expand
targets of	has the	strategy
mass	potential to	where it
surveillance.	have a	starts off
California is	chilling effect	small with a
using AI to	on free	city to get its
identify and	speech	proverbial
target its	rights. In 2021	foot in the
homeless	LAPD	door and then
residents.	requested	increases the
	bulk camera	amount the
	data targeting	city is buying
	Black Lives	from them
	Matter	every year. In
	protesters. In	other words,
	New York City	a for profit
	there is	company will
	evidence that	be pushing
	NYPD has	Seattle to

used spend even more money surveillance technology to on its surveille products **Black Lives** every year. Matter The city protesters. cannot afford this ineffective and expensive technology especially in light of the fact that Seattle is anticipating a \$250 million shortfall in 2025 Looking at four other US cities that have deployed RTCCs, the average cost is \$7.16 per person. With Seattle's 2020 population of 737,015, this would put the full-scale (post-pilotphase) RTCC deployment by SPD in the ballpark of \$5.3 million, not including the additional costs for the CCTV and ALPR expansion. Even the paper

referenced by

SPD in the
SIR mentions
the
"substantial
costs
associated
with RTCCs,
with initial
costs ranging
between
several
hundred
thousand
dollars to \$11
million".

THE LATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PA	
will enable harm to system ripe MANY	
other states immigrants for abuse and effective	
to circumvent ICE has a potential to tools the city	
WA state's history of violate all could use to	
Shield Law terrorizing residents' decrease	
and Keep WA immigrant First and community	
Working Act, communities. Fourth violence	
which are Jurisdictions Amendment Violence	
meant to that do not Rights interruption	
protect both use local Cloud- programs	
people resources to based work.	
seeking enforce software can Neighborhoo	
reproductive federal be hacked. ds that have	
healthcare immigration This adopted a	
and laws have happened in Cure	
immigrant lower rates of 2021 when Violence	
workers. crime, hackers Model or	
poverty, and gained Group	
SPD already unemployme access to Violence	
has a real nt than those Verkada - Intervention	
time crime that chose to giving them Models have	
center. SPD's collaborate. It access to seen Protect our	
existing RTCC was with this 150,000 homicides rights, do not	
(iBase) is on- knowledge cameras and assaults make the	
premise, so it that the Keep inside decrease 30-	
doesn't Washington schools, 50%. The city change. Use	
create the Working Act hospitals, could scale options that	
risk of data was passed gyms, police effective have been	
being to prevent stations, There is no community-	
	Drop this
from third between offices and proposed such as the positive p	proposal. NO
	cloud-based
5 legal requests and local law health clinics harm. Peacekeeper instead.	offsite RTCC!
from those enforcement. RTCC s Collective	

outside	RTCC	software	coordinated
Washington	software like	creates	by the
state. There is	Fusus can	conditions	Regional
no reason for	turn any	that are ripe	Office of Gun
SPD to obtain	camera into	for police	Violence
a cloud-	an automated	abuse, as it	Prevention
based RTCC	license plate	provides	and the
which would	readers	little, if any,	Rainier Beach
weaken state	(ALPRs).	oversight for	Action
laws and	By moving	how police	Coalition and
endanger	to a cloud-	use it, little	their
women, trans	based	documentati	Restorative
folks, and	platform,	on or	Resolutions
immigrant	Customs and	auditable	project,
residents.	Border	logs, and few	which has
	Control (CBC)	transparency	already
Threat of	and ICE can	mechanisms.	reduced
harm to	access	RTCC	violence in
abortion and	automated	software like	the Rainier
gender-	license plate	Fusus	Beach
affirming	reader data	recruits a vast	neighborhood
healthcare	directly;	assortment of	by 33%.
	circumventin	privately	Richmond,
Many	g Washington	owned	CA has
anti-abortion	State Law.	cameras that	chosen to
states,	ICE has a	allow the	invest in
including	practice of	company to	violence
neighboring	accessing	bypass laws	interruption
Idaho, have	data directly	and	and other
passed	from private	restrictions	community-
bounty hunter	ALPR	that normally	led safety
laws. This	surveillance	limit police,	initiatives and
creates a	companies	including	they have
market and	that market	viewing	seen a drop in
demand to	their	camera	the number of
hunt down	products to	footage	homicides.
this data for	police, in	without a	This is in
people	order to	warrant or	contrast to
believed to	circumvent	ongoing	neighboring
have gone to	any local	consent from	cities like
Seattle to get	sanctuary	the owner.	Oakland and
reproductive	laws. The	The risk is	San
healthcare. If	department	not	Francisco
SPD switches	gets a lot of	hypothetical	that have
over to a	use out of	as seen by	increased
cloud-hosted	this data, as	other law	their police
RTCC	seen by them	enforcement	budgets and
database, we	running	agencies: In	have not seen
enable the	thousands of	Pasco	a decline in
criminalizatio	searches of	County,	violent crime.

n of those	ALPR	Florida,	Both violent
seeking	databases in	which	crime and
reproductive	a single	operates an	property
care.	month as	RTCC, the	crime can be
The rate	early as 2019.	sheriff's	reduced by
of out-of-	ICE's	office's	community
state	utilization of	predictive	investments.
abortions,	this data	policing	Investments
those coming	shows the	system	restoring
from other	degree of risk	encouraged	vacant land
states to seek	it poses to	officers to	and
abortion in	vulnerable	continuously	community
Washington,	communities.	monitor and	non-profits
increased by	Threat of	harass	that tackle
36% in 2023	harm to all	residents for	violence and
and included	people	minor code	build
20 different	exercising	violations	community
states	First	such as	lead to
including	Amendment	missing	reductions in
neighboring	Rights of free	mailbox	both violent
Idaho and	speech,	numbers and	crime and
states as far	public protest	overgrown	property
away as Texas	and assembly	grass.	crimes.
and Alabama.	Seattle	SPD has a	Many
Anti-	has a long	track record	communities
abortion	history of	of officers	across the
groups have a	participatory	abusing their	country are
history of	democracy	access to	making
using license	dating at	surveillance	investments
plate data.	least as far	technology. In	in
RTCC	back as the	2021 SPD	preventative
software	1919 general	Officer	community-
allows data to	strike. Seattle	Swartz used	centered
be shared	has seen	police data to	approaches
across law	mass	stalk his ex-	and are
enforcement	protests for	girlfriend; in	seeing a
agencies.	labor rights,	2020, an	reduction in
Third party	abortion	officer	crime and
agencies in	rights, anti-	accessed	violence in
anti-abortion	war protests,	confidential	the
states could	and protests	information	community.
use this data	around issues	about a	Violent
to criminally	of	domestic	crime can be
prosecute	international	violence	reduced by
those seeking	trade	investigation	investments
abortion in	policies, and	and shared it	in mental
Washington	most recently	with	health
state.	mass	someone	treatment,
Recently	demonstratio	involved; and	providing
an Idaho	ns advocating	just last year,	substance-

., .	•	· · ·	
mother and	for a	an officer	abuse-
son were	ceasefire in	performed an	treatment
charged with	Gaza.	unauthorized	facilities, and
kidnapping		search for	access to
for allegedly	Unfortunately	personal	affordable
taking a	, police	reasons to	housing.
minor across	violence	reveal a	Poverty and
state lines to	against	citizen's	income
access	protesters is	firearm	inequality are
abortion care	not	ownership.	associated
in Oregon.	unprecedent	The	with violence,
The state	ed. After	privatization	especially
of Texas has	SPD's	of policing	assault and
already	betrayal of	represented	homicide.
attempted to	the public	by relying on	Inequality
get data from	trust in the	private	predicts
Seattle	summer of	consumers to	homicides
Children's	2020, the city	expand the	better than
Hospital for	recently paid	camera	any other
any Texas	a \$10M	network	variable.
residents	settlement.	undermines	Evidence
receiving	Violence	democratic	supports that
gender-	against	values,	this is a
affirming	protestors in	effectively	causal link.
care. As soon	2020 is one of	excluding	And direct
as SPD	the principal	Seattle	income
switches over	reasons that	residents	support has
to a cloud-	Seattle	from being	been found to
hosted RTCC	remains	able to	reduce
database, red	under the	provide input	firearm
states will	consent	and oversight	violence.
start issuing	decree that it	on the	Opening
subpoenas to	has been	growing	libraries and
access data	under for	Seattle	expanding
directly from	excessive use	surveillance	library hours
Fusus.	of force since	apparatus.	both reduce
Threat of	2012.	RTCC	violence and
harm to	SPD has	software like	property
women,	used existing	Fusus	crimes.
sexual	surveillance	continually	
assault and	systems to	adds new	
stalking	spy on	image	
survivors, and	peaceful	recognition	
vulnerable	protestors.	algorithms	
marginalized	During the	and	
community	2020 protests	integrations	
residents	for racial	with third-	
RTCC	justice, SPD	party	
software	used live	applications	
enabled a	video	via the	

Texas cop to	streaming to	software's Al
search	record	capabilities.
surveillance	peaceful	This
data from	protestors,	continuous
across the	and shared it	introduction
county,	with U.S.	of new and
including	Marshalls,	unvetted
Washington	Washington	surveillance
State, other	State	tools would
states with	Department	be in violation
abortion	of	of Seattle's
"sanctuary"	Corrections,	Surveillance
laws, and	and to a	Ordinance.
non-police	private citizen	
entities	volunteering	
including the	at Seattle's	
King County	emergency	Surveillance
Housing	operations	technology
Authority, for	center (EOC).	will NOT aid
someone that	SPD has	law
had an	continued to	enforcement
abortion	use existing	in solving
RTCC	surveillance	crime.
software	to spy on	The 2024
makes it	protestors	paper that
	•	SPD cites
impossible to	including	
keep	including one	states that
surveillance	on Sept. 23,	RTCC
data from	2023, that	"appeared to
ICE. Local	called for	have a
police	justice for the	relatively
departments	death of	smaller
are very cozy	Jaahnavi	impact on
with ICE and	Kandula, who	violent crime
RTCC makes	died Jan. 23,	clearance
it easier for	2023, as a	(5%
them to	result of	increase),"
casually	being hit by	other studies
share	SPD officer	of RTCC show
surveillance	Kevin Dave	no effect on
data. And,	while driving	violent crime
RTCC means	his officer	clearance
ICE is able to	vehicle as	rates.
search	she walked	In a 40 year
nationwide	through a	systematic
databases of	marked	review with
surveillance	crosswalk.	meta-
data	RTCC	analysis of
including	software is a	the efficacy
data from	vast network	of CCTV the

police	of cameras	authors
departments	which can	concluded
in	include	there were
Washington	doorbell	"no
State, other	cameras,	significant
states with	drones,	effects
"sanctuary"	robots, fixed	observed for
laws, and	surveillance	violent crime"
non-police	cameras,	and "a body
entities	helicopters,	of research
including the	hidden	on the
King County	cameras,	investigatory
Housing	police body	benefits of
Authority.	cameras, and	CCTV has yet
RTCC	cameras in	to develop."
software was	schools and	Only 1% to
used by	churches,	0.2% of ALPR
police to spy	among other	captured
on	settings.	license plates
"immigration	RTCC opens	are either on
protests"	up the	a hot list or
RTCC	opportunity	associated
software	for those	with any
companies	exercising	crime.
like Fusus	dissent to be	ommo.
rely on private	tracked and	
consumers to	targeted, and	RTCC
expand the	risks the	software is
	threat of	
camera		expensive RTCC
network	police	
which gather	retaliation.	software are
enough data	O : !!!	subscription
to reveal	Surveillance	products
sensitive	is about the	meaning the
personal	power to	city will have
information,	watch and	to pay for it
including	intervene in a	every single
where	variety of	year.
someone	situations,	RTCC
lives, works,	whether	software, and
and their	criminal or	other
religious	not, and	companies
affiliation.	surveillance	selling
Individuals,	technology	subscriptions
homeowner	has the	, operate on
associations,	potential to	the land-and-
or businesses	have a	expand
that opt into	chilling effect	strategy
RTCC may be	on free	where it
able to	speech	starts off

access the	rights. In 2021	small with a
data directly	LAPD	city to get its
from the	requested	proverbial
vendor.	bulk camera	foot in the
Hostile	data targeting	door and then
individuals	Black Lives	increases the
could access	Matter	amount the
data to stalk	protesters. In	city is buying
or harass	New York City	from them
individuals.	there is	every year. In
The threat	evidence that	other words,
to vulnerable	NYPD has	a for profit
communities	used	company will
is NOT	surveillance	be pushing
hypothetical,	technology to	Seattle to
as seen by	surveille	spend even
the actions of	Black Lives	more money
other law	Matter	on its
enforcement	protesters.	products
agencies:	p. o to o to . o .	every year.
NYP officers		The city
used mass		cannot afford
surveillance		this
technology to		ineffective
record and		and
monitor		expensive
everyone		technology -
parked in		especially in
front of a		light of the
mosque, and		fact that
Burmingham 		Seattle is
police also		anticipating a
used this		\$250 million
technology, in		shortfall in
conjunction		2025
with other		Looking at
tools, to track		four other US
Muslim		cities that
residents.		have
Homeless		deployed
residents,		RTCCs, the
who have no		average cost
option for		is \$7.16 per
privacy, are		person. With
likely to		Seattle's
become		2020
targets of		population of
mass		737,015, this
surveillance.		would put the
California is		full-scale
Gaulottila is		านแ-จบสเซ

using AI to	(post-pilot-	
identify and	phase) RTCC	
target its	deployment	
homeless	by SPD in the	
residents.	ballpark of	
	\$5.3 million,	
	not including	
	the additional	
	costs for the	
	CCTV and	
	ALPR	
	expansion.	
	Even the	
	paper	
	referenced by	
	SPD in the	
	SIR mentions	
	the	
	"substantial	
	costs	
	associated	
	with RTCCs,	
	with initial	
	costs ranging	
	between	
	several	
	hundred	
	thousand	
	dollars to \$11	
	million".	
Lam	While I would	Our country

I am While I would Our country concerned say it could is in a slide about putting help prevent toward seekers of or discourage authoritariani reproductive youth gun sm. We see care and violence, I do officers in gender not think that face masks is the case. affirming seizing care, and What would people immigrants at really prevent without risk of having youth gun judicial their personal violence is warrants identifying economic authorizing information and cultural them to do shared with opportunities so, and we law for youth and know those enforcement. connectedne who are Washington ss amongst detained in State has the our this way are Shield Act communities. not having

Appendix B: Public Comment Period (6/03/25 to 6/23/25)

and Keep WA Working Act which were passed to protect people, but a cloud-based RTCC would not be bound to follow those laws. I am also concerned about surveillance data being used against

surveillance
data being
used against
people
exercising
their first
amendment
rights in
protest
against the

Especially considering the current national climate in

government.

which people are being

detained

when they haven't

broken the law, I am very

much

opposed to

moving to a

cloud-based

RTCC that

makes

Washingtonia

n's data

available to

third parties

and

circumvents

Washington's

Surveillance
cameras do
not create
any of those
things, and in
fact they
destabilize
families and
communities
if they are
used to aid in
the detention

immigrants.

their due process rights honored. Seattle should not be taking any steps that can make it easier for our vulnerable neighbors to be tracked down and kidnapped by federal

agents.

more robust privacy and human rights protections.

RTCC, as it is currently being used and disseminated , seems fine, but an expansion to the "Cloud," making it accessible by ICE, etc, would be very detrimental to our civil liberties, especially at this wrought time when ICE is being used as a secret police by a president who doesn't respect the rule of law 7 and the 7 Constitution.

Over stepping

7 of citizens

8 privacy.

Vote it down

This cloud-	NONE. We		I feel so	Why has City
based change	have systems	Consider ALL	strongly	Council not
(rather than	in place that	of these	about this,	publicized its
the current	are safer for	points and	that if my	consideration
on-premise	citizens that	the data that	representativ	of this system
system) will	work well.	backs them	e (and the	more widely,
enable other	And there are	up:	city-wide	held
states to	many other	https://docs.g	representativ	community
share	approaches,	oogle.com/do	es) vote in	hearings, and
sensitive data	such as	cument/d/14	favor of this	aggressively
7 about people	violence	EhNiDMb7M8	system, I will	searched for
and thereby	interruption	Z7TafyZsbxG	work very very	feedback. (It
circumvent	programs,	OfdelDOGzR	hard to make	has a ring of

WA state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act, which are meant to protect people seeking reproductive healthcare, gender- affirming care, and immigrant workers. We know the pressures are real because data from Washington Medicaid Services has been shared with DHS and ICE WITHOUT its permission (or even	and investments in housing and mental health programs, that we could take to solve crime problems without the risks this system would place on us:	YxZNd3biwIE/ edit?tab=t.0	sure they are not elected next time.	the House GOP passing legislation in the middle of the night.)
knowledge). It would also be a threat to demonstrator s exercising their first amendment right. (The city is still under a 2012(!) consent decree for abridging those rights!) Seattle already uses its existing surveillance system to watch				



The data has

monitor and

track certain

communities.

None.

also been

used to

and ICE can

automated

license plate

reader data

directly;

access

investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." RRTC is expensive! Let's use the money toward solving our housing problems rather than surveilling Seattleites. PLEASE DO **NOT FORCE SEATTLE TO PARTICIPATE** IN A **GROWING SURVEILLAN** CE STATE. DO **NOT VOTE** FOR RRTC SOFTWARE! **RTCC** Yes, I do Consider all Do not Yes! SPD software like because it the harms consign already has a Fusus can has been and the cost! Seattle to real time turn any used in the There are becoming a crime center. Surveillance camera into past against many SPD's existing effective State! RTCC RTCC (i-base) an automated peaceful license plate protestors. tools the city software like is onreaders Also, this of Seattle Fusu premise, so it (ALPRs). data has could use continually does not By moving to been used to instead that adds new create the DO WORK! a cloudstalk and risk of data image based intimidate Violence algorithms being platform, people for interruption and obtained Customs and personal programs integrations from third Border with third reasons. work such as parties or Control (CBC) Outrageous! the Regional party legal requests

Peacekeeper

s Collective

which has

violence in

the Rainier

reduced

applications

software's Al

capabilities -

a nightmare

which will

via the

from those

Washington

state. There

is no reason

for SPD to

outside

144

circumventin Moving to a g Washington cloud State Law. platform ICE has a allows CBC practice of and ICE to accessing access data directly automated from private license plate **ALPR** reader data surveillance directly which companies circumvents that market Washington their State Law. SPD has used products to police, in surveillance order to data to spy on circumvent protestors any local and shared it sanctuary with US laws. The Marshalls, department Wa State gets a lot of Dept of use out of Corrections this data, as and a private seen by them citizen. RTCC running opens up the thousands of opportunity searches of for those **ALPR** exercising databases in dissent to be a single tracked and month as targeted, ans early as 2019. risks the ICE's threat of utilization of police this data retaliation. **RTCC** shows the degree of risk software like it poses to Fusus allow vulnerable police to view communities. camera Threat of footage harm to all without a people warrant or exercising ongoing First consent from Amendment the owner. Rights of free Surveillance speech, technology will bot aid

Beach neighborhood by 33%. Both violent crime and property crime can be reduced by community investments. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substanceabusetreatment facilities and access to affordable housing. Direct income support has been found to reduce firearm violence. Opening libraries and expanding library hours both reduce violence and property crimes.

obtain a
cloud-based
RTCC which
would
weaken state
lawd and
endanger
women, trans
folks, and
immigrant
residents.

result in

multiple

unforced

mention

privacy,

errors not to

invasion of

violation of

at the very

least. This

continuous

introduction

surveillance

tools would

of Seattle's

Surveillance

Ordinance.

be in violation

of new and

unvetted

civil liberties

public protest

and assembly

law

enforcement in solving

crime. RTCC deployment by SPD would cost approximatel y \$5.3Million dollars. I do not want the surveillance state to be expanded, and I do not want cctv coverage of the city. It is absolutely reprehensible and will only lead to continued overpolicing of marginalized groups. I don't want my car to be tracked as I go from place to place, the police should 8 not have that None 1 data. whatsoever. I am very concerned about expanded The proposed surveillance. expansion The research I areas am aware of furthermore shows no are clearly public safety highly benefits, and racialized. meanwhile This is not are are 2 okay. increasingly

living in a police state. I want Seattle to be a community where everyone feels safe, but constantly under the microscope.

It doesn't

Data centralization and pooling is terrifying -with ICE tearing families apart and I don't care if authorities the tech is from other supposedly states trying set up in a to enforce way that their ICE/CBP draconian would need a abortion warrant to get control to it. They restrictions have shown here, the best themselves to protection for be Seattle's completely residents is untrustworthy data and the only minimization. way to ensure Don't collect that they data on us can't get it is and above all to not collect do not plug it --- or at the that data into very least not 8 larger sharing put it out on 3 networks. the cloud. I don't want

to assist ICE appear to be in their very effective detention of according to people the research Not enough especially the 8 that's been to out weigh way they've 4 done on it. its cons. offered

no legal process to many who are trying to obey our laws.

	Threat of	Threat of	Threat of	Threat of	Creates a	Surveillance	There are
	harm to	harm to	harm to	harm to all	system ripe	technology	MANY
	abortion and	women,	immigrants	people	for abuse and	will NOT aid	effective
	gender-	sexual	ICE has a	exercising	potential to	law	tools the city
	affirming	assault and	history of	First	violate all	enforcement	could use to
	healthcare	stalking	terrorizing	Amendment	residents'	in solving	decrease
	Many anti-	survivors, and	immigrant	Rights of free	First and	crime.	community
	abortion	vulnerable	communities.	speech,	Fourth	The 2024	violence
	states,	marginalized	Jurisdictions	public protest	Amendment	paper that	Violence
	including	community	that do not	and assembly	Rights	SPD cites	interruption
	ŭ	residents	use local	Seattle has a	Cloud-based	states that	·
	neighboring Idaho, have	RTCC	5.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	long history of	software can	RTCC	programs work.
	•	software	resources to enforce	•	be hacked.		
	passed			participatory		"appeared to	Neighborhoo
	bounty hunter	enabled a	federal	democracy	This	have a	ds that have
	laws. This	Texas cop to	immigration	dating at	happened in	relatively	adopted a
	creates a	search	laws have	least as far	2021 when	smaller	Cure
	market and	surveillance	lower rates of	back as the	hackers	impact on	Violence
	demand to	data from	crime,	1919 general	gained	violent crime	Model or
	hunt down	across the	poverty, and	strike. Seattle	access to	clearance	Group
	this data for	county,	unemployme	has seen	Verkada -	(5%	Violence
	people	including	nt than those	mass	giving them	increase),"	Intervention
	believed to	Washington	that chose to	protests for	access to	other studies	Models have
	have gone to	State, other	collaborate. It	labor rights,	150,000	of RTCC show	seen
	Seattle to get	states with	was with this	abortion	cameras	no effect on	homicides
	reproductive	abortion	knowledge	rights, anti-	inside 	violent crime	and assaults
	healthcare. If	"sanctuary"	that the Keep	war protests,	schools,	clearance	decrease 30-
	SPD switches	laws, and	Washington	and protests	hospitals,	rates.	50%. The city
	over to a	non-police	Working Act	around issues	gyms, police	In a 40 year	could scale
	cloud-hosted	entities	was passed	of	stations,	systematic	effective
	RTCC	including the	to prevent	international	prisons,	review with	community-
	database, we	King County	data sharing	trade	offices and	meta-	led solutions
	enable the	Housing	between	policies, and	women's	analysis of	such as the
	criminalizatio	Authority, for	immigration	most recently	health clinics	the efficacy	Regional
	n of those	someone that	and local law	mass	RTCC	of CCTV the	Peacekeeper
	seeking	had an	enforcement.	demonstratio	software	authors	s Collective
	reproductive	abortion	RTCC	ns advocating	creates	concluded	coordinated
	care.	RTCC	software like	for a	conditions	there were	by the
	The rate of	software	Fusus can	ceasefire in	that are ripe	"no	Regional
	out-of-state	makes it	turn any	Gaza.	for police	significant	Office of Gun
	abortions,	impossible to	camera into	Unfortunately	abuse, as it	effects	Violence
	those coming	keep	an automated	, police	provides	observed for	Prevention
	from other	surveillance	license plate	violence	little, if any,	violent crime"	and the
8	states to seek	data from	readers	against	oversight for	and "a body	Rainier Beach
5	abortion in	ICE. Local	(ALPRs).	protesters is	how police	of research	Action
	Washington,	police	By moving to	not	use it, little	on the	Coalition and

increased by 36% in 2023 and included 20 different states including	departments are very cozy with ICE and RTCC makes it easier for them to	a cloud- based platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC)	unprecedent ed. After SPD's betrayal of the public trust in the	documentati on or auditable logs, and few transparency mechanisms.	investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR	their Restorative Resolutions project, which has already	
neighboring Idaho and	casually share	and ICE can access	summer of 2020, the city	RTCC software like	captured license plates	reduced violence in	
states as far	surveillance	automated	recently paid	Fusus	are either on	the Rainier	
away as Texas	data. And,	license plate	a \$10M	recruits a vast	a hot list or	Beach	
and Alabama.	RTCC means	reader data	settlement.	assortment of	associated	neighborhood	
Anti-abortion	ICE is able to	directly;	Violence	privately	with any	by 33%.	
groups have a	search nationwide	circumventin	against	owned	crime.	Richmond, CA has	
history of	databases of	g Washington State Law.	protestors in 2020 is one of	cameras that allow the		chosen to	
using license plate data.	surveillance	ICE has a	the principal	company to		invest in	
RTCC	data	practice of	reasons that	bypass laws		violence	
software	including	accessing	Seattle	and		interruption	
allows data to	data from	data directly	remains	restrictions		and other	
be shared	police	from private	under the	that normally		community-	
across law	departments	ALPR	consent	limit police,		led safety	
enforcement	in	surveillance	decree that it	including		initiatives and	
agencies.	Washington	companies	has been	viewing		they have	
Third party	State, other	that market	under for	camera		seen a drop in	
agencies in	states with	their	excessive use	footage		the number of	
anti-abortion	"sanctuary"	products to	of force since	without a		homicides.	
states could	laws, and	police, in	2012.	warrant or		This is in	
use this data	non-police	order to	SPD has used	ongoing		contrast to	
to criminally	entities	circumvent	existing	consent from		neighboring	
prosecute	including the	any local	surveillance	the owner.		cities like	
those seeking abortion in	King County Housing	sanctuary laws. The	systems to	The risk is not hypothetical		Oakland and San	
Washington	Authority.	department	spy on peaceful	as seen by		Francisco	
state.	RTCC	gets a lot of	protestors.	other law		that have	
Recently an	software was	use out of	During the	enforcement		increased	
Idaho mother	used by	this data, as	2020 protests	agencies: In		their police	
and son were	police to spy	seen by them	for racial	Pasco		budgets and	
charged with	on	running	justice, SPD	County,		have not seen	
kidnapping	"immigration	thousands of	used live	Florida,		a decline in	
for allegedly	protests"	searches of	video	which		violent crime.	
taking a	RTCC	ALPR	streaming to	operates an		Both violent	
minor across	software	databases in	record	RTCC, the		crime and	
state lines to	companies	a single	peaceful	sheriff's		property	
access	like Fusus	month as	protestors,	office's		crime can be	
abortion care	rely on private	early as 2019.	and shared it	predictive		reduced by	
in Oregon.	consumers to	ICE's	with U.S.	policing		community	
The state of	expand the	utilization of	Marshalls,	system		investments.	
Texas has already	camera network	this data shows the	Washington State	encouraged officers to		Investments restoring	
attempted to	which gather	degree of risk	Department	continuously		vacant land	
attorniption to		238100 01 11010	_ opartmont	23mmadady		. acan tana	

wat data f	aman,	ikmark	-4	manusikan an d	a.a.d
get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender- affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud- hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus.	enough data to reveal sensitive personal information, including where someone lives, works, and their religious affiliation. Individuals, homeowner associations, or businesses that opt into RTCC may be able to access the data directly from the vendor. Hostile individuals could access data to stalk or harass individuals. The threat to vulnerable communities is NOT hypothetical, as seen by the actions of other law enforcement agencies: NYP officers used mass surveillance technology to record and monitor everyone parked in front of a mosque, and	it poses to vulnerable communities.	of Corrections, and to a private citizen volunteering at Seattle's emergency operations center (EOC). SPD has continued to use existing surveillance to spy on protestors including including one on Sept. 23, 2023, that called for justice for the death of Jaahnavi Kandula, who died Jan. 23, 2023, as a result of being hit by SPD officer Kevin Dave while driving his officer vehicle as she walked through a marked crosswalk. RTCC software is a vast network of cameras which can include doorbell cameras, drones, robots, fixed surveillance cameras,	monitor and harass residents for minor code violations such as missing mailbox numbers and overgrown grass. SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his exgirlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership. The	and community non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community- centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance- abuse- treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are
			•		
	Burmingham		helicopters,	privatization	associated

hidden police also of policing with violence, used this cameras, represented especially technology, in police body by relying on assault and conjunction homicide. cameras, and private with other cameras in consumers to Inequality tools, to track schools and expand the predicts Muslim churches, camera homicides residents. among other better than network Homeless settings. undermines any other residents, RTCC opens democratic variable. who have no up the values, Evidence option for opportunity effectively supports that this is a privacy, are for those excluding likely to Seattle causal link. exercising become dissent to be residents And direct targets of tracked and from being income mass targeted, and able to support has been found to surveillance. risks the provide input California is threat of and oversight reduce using AI to police on the firearm identify and retaliation. growing violence. target its Surveillance Seattle Opening homeless is about the libraries and surveillance residents. power to apparatus. expanding watch and **RTCC** library hours intervene in a software like both reduce Fusus violence and variety of situations, continually property adds new whether crimes. criminal or image not, and recognition surveillance algorithms technology and has the integrations potential to with thirdhave a party chilling effect applications on free via the speech software's AI rights. In 2021 capabilities. LAPD This continuous requested introduction bulk camera data targeting of new and **Black Lives** unvetted Matter surveillance tools would protesters. In New York City be in violation there is of Seattle's evidence that

		NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille Black Lives Matter protesters.	Surveillance Ordinance.	
It is unnecessary and an over reach of power. The SPD should not be in cooperation with ICE agents, rounding up many innocent people due to their skin color or physical presentation. This is Orwellian and a very wrong use of technology 8 against the 6 people.	In this case, I do not. I mentioned in the CCTV answer that if there was a child or elder with dementia it might be helpful to identify where they were last seen, but beyond that, it becomes fascist.		Keep it human scale. People to people. If someone is committing a crime, then deal with it. Keep ICE out as much as possible. ICE agents are the minions of a racist, fascist administratio n that wants to go back to pre civil war times with all the power centered in white men who dictate what religion people should adhere to.	Look into your hearts. If you have or had loved ones who were terrified that they would lose everything they've worked for and been hard working contributors to our society, wouldn't you be frightened for them? Its really not a stretch.
we do not want ICE violating the privacy of the people of seattle. We do not want them harming or harassing the people of seattle. they do not need more	i'm sure there is value, but ICE has no problem breaking laws. Why make it easier for them?		consider who we are as a city	

	ways of violating us				
	Privacy. Government using information against the people. Enabling autocracy.	None		Reduce surveillance	
	This data is not for use to increase the surveillance of people in our community based on personal characteristic s of race, lifestyle choices or immigration status.			Do not share This data with ICE.	
9 0	Surveillance state seems against our freedoms when there are plenty of cameras outside businesses. Making the people of seattle more scared, and people already have an issue being filmed in public. I don't see how they will protect us further. Face recognition		Who is going to be watching? Where is this content stored? What value does the city see? Is this a direct response to Trump's comments about a surveillance state?	How the people of seattle feel as a majority democratic city when the surveillance state was introduced by Trump. Based on his recent actions I doubt the city's intentions of implementing this in Seattle.	Listen to the people as the state still has power. Don't feel pressured into something the people don't want or our representativ es become complacent and part of the problem. Introduce benefit to the people and be more outright in how you plan

used
wrongly/unjus
tly. I have
experienced
crime in this
area where
there would
have

to use all of this.

My concerns Please see are frankly these links innummerabl with more e. SPD's information existing RTCC on the (iBase) is ondangers of premise, so it this doesn't technology: create the https://www. risk of data wired.com/st ory/licensebeing obtained plate-readerfrom third alprparties or surveillanceabortion/ legal requests from those https://www.t outside heguardian.c Washington om/usstate. A news/2023/n cloud-based ov/01/idaho-RTCC creates mother-sonthe risk of kidnapdata chargesexposure, abortion which would https://www.t hestranger.co put essentially m/news/2023 every person /12/21/79315 in Seattle at 926/texasrisk should a tried-to-getbad actor get seattletheir hands childrenson the hospitalcollected healthinformation. records-on-SPD already transhas what it patients needs in its https://www.r current ealchangene system, and ws.org/news/ Absolutely

there is no

benefit to

2024/08/07/i

nside-spd-s-

none.

Please consider the cost of this technology both the literal dollars, and the human price as well. The negative impact of cloud-based data storage cannot be overstated. Please make the right choice to protect the people you were elected to serve. You are in a unique position to make a real difference do not squander that responsibility.

anyone	use-aerial-
except those	surveillance-
who would	during-2020-
exploit our	protests
private data	https://www.t
in expanding	hestranger.co
the system to	m/slog-
a cloud-	am/2024/01/
based	25/79356578/
structure.	slog-am-
These bad	seattle-
actors are not	settles-2020-
theoretical -	protest-
Washington	lawsuit-for-
State passed	10-million-
our Shield	nitrogen-
Law to	execution-
protect those	scheduled-
seeking	for-tonight-
necessary	no-medical-
life-saving	care-for-
healthcare	floridas-
from other	transge
states, and	https://www.
there are	aclu.org/new
bounty	s/civil-
hunters and	liberties/majo
agencies in	r-hack-of-
other states	camera-
trying to track	company-
those people	offers-four-
down to jail	key-lessons-
them, or	on-
worse.	surveillance
Moving to a	https://www.
cloud-based	eff.org/deepli
RTCC system	nks/2023/05/
will do	neighborhood
nothing but	-watch-out-
undermine	cops-are-
the very	incorporating
important	-private-
sanctuary	cameras-
laws we have	their-real-
passed, and it	time
is not an	https://projec
exaggeration	ts.tampabay.
to say that	com/projects
this choice	/2020/investi
would cost	gations/polic

lives.	e-pasco-
	sheriff-
ICE is already	targeted/intel
active in our	ligence-led-
communities,	policing/
kidnapping	https://www.
residents who	seattle.gov/D
are here	ocuments/De
legally and	partments/O
have	PA/ClosedCa
committed	seSummaries
no crimes.	/2020OPA-
These are our	0455ccs0426
friends and	21.pdf
neighbors	https://www.v
who are	era.org/comm
disappearing,	unity-
not faceless	violence-
criminals,	intervention-
and families	programs-
are being	explained
destroyed by	
these	
actions.	
Children are	
unable to go	
to school for	
fear of raids,	
and their	
parents can't	
so much as	
shop for	
groceries	
without fear.	
Cloud-based	
RTCC would	
enable ICE to continue and	
expend their	
illegal operations,	
and I very	
much doubt	
that they will	
stop with	
their current	
targets.	
History has	
shown over	
and over and	
and over and	

over and over again that this kind of violence will expand unchecked if given the opportunity, and cloudbased RTCC is exactly the kind of opportunity that will allow them to target anyone they want, for any reason, regardless of the law. Expanded surveillance has a chilling effect on first amendment rights, and puts American citizens in danger simply for speaking their minds. This affects EVERYONE, not just a few groups. Every single person in Seattle will be in significantly greater danger and at risk of physical threat with expanded surveillance. If we knew we could trust the





I believe this adversely impacts our BIPOC and potentially 9 our LGBTQIA+ 2 communities.	None	See #2	Remember, this is NOT about crime "prevention".	This is NOT a proven crime prevention solution. Whereas intervention and support solutions are.	N/A
I am concerned that this technology will be used to track people's movements across the city and in turn, be used to track down and harm marginalized communities. I am concerned that this technology will be used to assist ICE kidnappings, punish those seeking healthcare, track/disappe ar the unhoused, and harm the LGBT+ community. This technology has no positive benefit. SPD has proven	None		If this city is truly as welcoming as it claims to be, it will oppose this technology. Do you want to lead a city whose values are not in line with its actions? Again, I emphasize that this technology will harm marginalized communities including BIPOC, immigrants, the unhoused, and the LGBT community. I thought I was supposed to be safe here.		

has proven

themselves to be incompetent, ineffective, and consistently incapable of protecting our community. Why should I believe that they have our best interests at heart? This technology will do nothing but harm marginalized communities and I vehemently oppose its use and implementati						
on. It is a violation of privacy, and too far along the road of a surveillance state. I do not feel comfortable having my tax dollars support a third-party surveillance company. I would rather have better 9 training for 4 officers. We are not	Al is not ready	This technology takes out the human element, which is already way too far gone. Again, I would rather support the training and development of human beings to deal with our complex issues as a city.	Police officers are already stretched so thin. I want their focus to actually be on protection and service, not surveillance.	Don't spend money on this technology! As a voter, I am paying attention and will vote and act and canvas accordingly.	Invest in human beings, and do more to provide a social safety net for the citizens of our city. Don't spend money on this invasive technology.	Thank you for the hard work of city government. Please do the right thing and help public servants by supporting them in other ways.
We are not living in normal times.	Al is not ready for prime time. It's not the time to		Please don't capture tons of unnecessary	These times are not business as usual.		

	increase surveillance and accessible storage at this time.	watch everyone doing everything. The use is too easily shifted		data on a maybe or what-if basis	Democracy is eroding. This is not the time to increase searchable/s hareable data.	
9 6	1) This is warrantless dragnet surveillance. The RTCC storing data for 30 days means SPD would be mapping people's lives being able to figure out where people live, where they work, where they worship, the routes they take to work, etc. This map would be available to SPD & everyone with access to SPD's data. There is no legitimate use for this kind of map, all it does is create conditions where abuses are both easy & incredibly disastrous. These abuses aren't		None, RTCC don't reduce crime or increase clearance rates, it doesn't even make people feel safer. This has been studies repeated. Lots of studies showing this were submitted just last year when SPD was first asking for it		How do you think any guardrails will keep the Trump Administratio n & ICE from accessing this data given their constant & blatant disregard for the law? How do you justify increasing surveillance now when ICE is kidnapping people on Seattle's streets with the assistance of SPD? How is there money for even more mass surveillance when the city is facing a budget deficit? Especially, when this is	Keeping people in Seattle safe would require removing this & other surveillance by SPD (ex. CCTV & ALPRs) and using that money to fund programs that are shown to reduce violence. Removing RTCC alone would free up millions of dollars per year that could go to programs that reduce violence.
	hypothetical.				shown to not	

In recent reduce weeks we've violence. seen small-Why do things ish abuses that are like yet proven to another SPD reduce officer getting violence (ex. caught using housing a police access, food database to access, stalk mental health someone to access, massive like libraries, & ICE & cops violence intervention looking for people programs) who've had constantly abortions get defunded accessing while surveillance nationwide surveillance that doesn't databases. reduce Those violence gets nationwide more money? searches included data How do you from think having Washington Seattle under State despite surveillance the state's by the Trump Keep Administratio Washington n & ICE will Work and impact Shield laws. tourism? Nashville abandoned How do you its pursuit of think FUSUS (SPD's installing RTCC) in April more due to these surveillance risks. which makes https://nashvi people's llebanner.co brains act m/2025/04/2 similar to 8/metropsychosis will nashvilleincrease fusussafety or freddiereduce oconnell/ violence?

The only reason reporters haven't discovered that SPD's existing data is being abused in nationwide searches like this is because SPD's CCTV & RTCC program has only been live for a month. There hasn't been any time for reporters, community members, anyone to get records on data access. There's barely been time for SPD's data to even be shared because it just went live at the end of May. SPD is ramming through this expansion before there's a chance for the community to see the full impacts of SPD's existing

SPD storing this a private,

dragnet surveillance,

for-profit

company's

cloud

guarantees

this data will

be shared.

These

systems are

built to make

data sharing

between

agencies as

frictionless as

possible,

that's part of

the sales

pitch.

This is

functionally a

secret

expansion of

surveillance.

SPD has not

done any

community

outreach to

let the public

know this is

being

considered.

SPD hasn't

even done a

press release

or a post on

social media.

The only

reason

people know

this is

happening is

because

community

members

found single

Seattle IT

webpage that

mentions it &

have spread

the word.

There cannot

be any

consent of

the

governed/co

mmunity

consent

because SPD

hasn't let

them know it

is happening.

Being

subjected to

constant

surveillance

is harmful.

Whose

Streets Our

Streets

identified the

level of

surveillance

in Seattle as

already

having "a

psychological

effect on the

people being

surveilled"

(http://stopsu

rveillancecity.

files.wordpre

ss.com/2024/

09/338c7-

wsosautomat

edenforceme

ntsummary.p

df) and that

was before

SPD

launched its

CCTV & RTCC

pilot. The

effect is that

people's

brains act in a

manner

similar to

"psychosis

and social

anxiety

disorder"

(https://scite

chdaily.com/

what-

happens-to-

your-brain-

when-you-

know-youre-

being-

watched/).

Expanding

surveillance

will increase

these

impacts and

make people

less safe.

There is no

reason to

believe any

information

SPD has

provided for

this material

update or the

underlying

SIR given

SPD's lengthy

history of

lying during

the SIR

process. Just

last year, SPD

definitely told

the people of

Seattle that it

would not be

actively

monitoring

CCTV

cameras

which was a

lie, the

minute the

cameras were

approved

SPD

demanded

more money

from the city

to hire people

to do active

monitoring

claiming that

was the only

way for them

to work. SPD

has also lied

in the SIR for

FLIR

(https://www.

realchangene

ws.org/news/

2024/08/07/i

nside-spd-s-

use-aerial-

surveillance-

during-2020-

protests), and

just last

month SPD

provided

misled

people during

the SIR for

StarChase/pu

rsuit

mitigation

trackers by

claiming it

was required

to conform to

WA law (The

law does not

say that, it

says police

departments

should end

each

individual

pursuit as

soon as

possible

based on

existing

policies &

technology,

not that departments need to acquire new technologies)

٠

The RTCC is an invasion of privacy that makes the city a more City hostile place leadership to live for already normal ignored the people and clearly doesn't make spoken voice things any of the people safer. As on RTCC study after once. SPD, study has SPOG, and shown this the vendors kind of live who you are surveillance sending our is not a hard earned deterrent tax dollars to against crime want these but it does surveillance make quality programs but of life worse the people for people who you who feel the actually need constant to vote for you surveillance. do not. It's extremely Consider that unequitable expanding the disproportion RTCC once ately It has no again goes affecting value to the against the communities people of clear will of of color and Seattle, just the voting poor people value to SPD public as well who live in and business as the city's high density owners who own areas. SPD benefit from committees has not repression that provide earned the and the recommenda trust of the increased tions on community to 9 hostility of equity in be 7 public space policing. continuously

monitoring us, and if they had that trust they wouldn't need to. The RTCC also allows other agencies throughout the country to surveil us and make our expressed values around immigration and abortion access meaningless. By accepting the RTCC we invite other jurisdictions to exercise control over and surveil residents of our city including immigrants but also people who are coming here to access reproductive healthcare. The city cannot have a commitment to being a sanctuary city and upholding reproductive rights while allowing the RTCC

The City leadership should have as a top priority the protection of

our

democratic
ideals, our
civil rights
and to keep
our law
enforcement
agencies
separate from
national
encroachmen

encroachmen t. Of course we want to reduce crime

in our city, but
not at the
expense of
our civil
rights. Also, it
seems that
the City has
made
headway in
reducing
crime with

the

technology it already possesses. Please hire more police officers and reform criminal justice as necessary without adopting cloud based surveillance

technology

that will put

us at such

SPD already
has a real
time crime
center. SPD's
existing RTCC
(iBase) is onpremise, so it
doesn't
create the

create the
risk of data
being
obtained
from third
parties or
legal requests
from those
outside
Washington
state. There is

a cloudbased RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, sexual assault and stalking

no reason for

SPD to obtain

9 and lawful8 immigrants.

survivors,

transgender

individuals,

I don't see that the potential value of this technology is worth the risks to our civil rights. Please consider that the country already is quickly moving towards a fascist state. This technology

will be used

to further the

agenda of a

government

taking away

the rights we

democratic

intent on

have in a

society.

risk. Thank you.

As our country lurches towards autocratic politicized police state, NOW is not the time to expand police surveillance powers, especially if data is to be 9 shared with 9 ICE.

> I oppose increased surveillance of Seattle people. I fear it being used

- 1 by feds to
- 0 kidnap
- 0 people

			What sort of	Don't spend
			city do we	money on
			want? Do we	this. It won't
It will be used to target minorities, especially by ICE. I believe there are better options for reducing		Why don't we find better ways of preventing crime instead	want? Do we want a city where everyone works together to make a safe and welcoming place to live or visit? Or do	this. It won't have enough benefits to justify the cost. Technoloy ages out. In a few years, all of this tech will be obsolete.
crime. When information goes into the cloud, local organizations 1 have less 0 control over 1 it.	None.	of setting up a big brother style system? There are too many ways for that sort of technology to be abused.	we want some weird police state where everyone knows we are being watched by	Lasting solutions involve people working together. It's a harder process and it

certainly isn't someone, but we don't who flashy. But I that someone would sleep is or what better they might do knowing that I with the don't have to information. worry about folks being snatched off the street, or wondering who is creating a database for their own, illegal purposes. Invasion of privacy. Targeting of immigrants, queer people, bipoc, etc. ICE is ripping We should not support We need to families apart 1 Trump's support our for no good I don't want 0 targeting of immigrant reason other Big Brother 2 individuals. community. than quotas. watching! Please do not expand the use of RTCC to a third party vendor. Consider the My concerns potential are for the harm that privacy and could arise if safety of RTCC citizens who surveillance might be I see some was released targeted by value in ininto the this house, wellhands of technology controlled potentially allowing the surveillance violent possibility to to help with persons circumvent crime outside of the Washington prevention control of State's Shield local SPD and Law and Keep investigation. authority. WA Working

access to the

```
Act. Allowing
  a third party
  vendor
  access to
  sensitive
  records is a
  step too far,
  and has been
  rejected by
  other
  jurisdictions
  out of
  concern for
  people's
  safety. With a
  third party
  vendor, there
  is a greater
  possibility of
  data being
  accessed by
  those who
  might cause
  harm to
  potential
  persons
  under
  surveillance.
  A Real Time
  Crime Center
  is a software
  that uploads
  all of Seattle's
  surveillance
  to a cloud-
  based
  platform
  making it
  available to
  ICE, Customs
  and Border
  Patrol, and
  other law
  enforcement
  agencies
                                                                    It should not
  across the
                                                                    be made
  country that
0
                                                                    available to
4 will have
                   No
                                                                    ICE and CPB
                                                                                                     No
                                   None
                                                                                    No
```

data without a warrant.

SPD already The paper has a real referenced by time crime SPD in the center. SPD's SIR mentions existing RTCC the (iBase) is on-"substantial premise, so it costs doesn't associated with RTCCs, create the risk of data with initial costs ranging being obtained between from third several parties or hundred thousand legal requests dollars to \$11 from those outside million". Washington state. There is We should no reason for redeploy SPD to obtain funds to a cloudsolutions that based RTCC work. which would -Both violent crime and weaken state laws and property endanger crime can be women, trans reduced by folks, and community immigrant investments. residents. Investments restoring A move to the vacant land cloud creates a system ripe community for abuse and non-profits that tackle potential to violate all violence and residents' build First and community Fourth lead to Amendment reductions in Rights both violent -Cloud-based crime and software can property be hacked. crimes. 0 This -Poverty and 5 happened in income

2021 when hackers gained access to Verkada giving them access to 150,000 cameras inside schools, hospitals, gyms, police stations, prisons, offices and women's health clinics. inequality are associated with violence, especially assault and homicide. Inequality predicts homicides better than any other variable. Evidence supports that this is a causal link. And direct income support has been found to reduce firearm

violence.

I worry about

it

circumventin g protections that Washington has in place and endangers anyone on trumppian hate lists (trans folks, abortion seekers,

immigrants).

Please make

it harder for

But also easy to make mistakes that could put many vulnerable people in very real danger. Let's make sure each step in new tech does more good than harm.

Lots of value!

Privacy, civil rights, avoiding federal surveillance or making it easy for law enforcement to collaborate with

authoritarian tactics of fear

and

surveillance

folks outside

8 groups

Washington state to surveille our citizens. l'm concerned for our privacy. l'm concerned that these are mostly in POC areas. But mostly I'm alarmed that we are collecting data that can be terribly misused. It could be subpoenaed to prosecute people coming from out of state for abortion or gender-Consider that affirming the adverse care. Who uses of these knows what data would Trump and be far worse 1 his cronies than any 0 might do with possible none 7 them? whatsoever. benefit. this will 1 endanger 0 targeted none, not do not

approve

needed

The harmful impacts of surveillance and policing fall disproportion I am against ately on surveillance individuals in Seattle. I who have do not want already police or experienced artificial violence from intelligence white systems to supremacy watch me and and my family colonialism. as we go This program about our is structurally lives. racist. Surveillance leads to self-City leaders censoring should stop and a loss of pursuing individuality, these police technologies creativity, and and instead privacy. use the I do not want millions they the federal would cost on government publicto legally or health-based illegally safety and access community surveillance supports, like 1 data housing, food 0 collected in access, and 9 Seattle. None. libraries.

Inappropriate to expand these

- 1 systems given
- 1 recent federal
- 0 overreach.

The Please overpolicing consider the 1 of I see no use effects it may of this communities have on our 1 is quite overreaching communities concerning. surveillance to be

	With only the use of constant surveillance we cannot understand the broader story of the situations we see unfold. I fear that this data will be used to wrongfully convict our friends and family		in the hands of the police		constantly watched by authority.		
1	I oppose the increased use of surveillance on my community. Linking up police access to the existing cameras and adding new one adds risk to all our communities especially immigrant, queer and POC people	Do not do this	Too much constitutional ly protected private and personal data becomes available to all types of law enforcement SPD, ICE, KSC, national guard, WSP	No	Protecting our constitutional rights. Stopping ICE, keeping the government out of our lives.	As a voter I have been watching your votes and am disappointed in what you have been doing.	No
1 1 3	Surveillance data should be held within the jurisdiction responsible for it. Saying it would be cheaper to hold the data in a contractor's facility means that the city						

doesn't value the security of the surveillance data. Once the contractor has our data stored out of state, it can be shared with other entities based on local laws, rather than subject to the laws we enacted to protect the data from exposing people in Washington to risks from outside jurisdictions.

> This technology infringes on the civil liberties of people who have committed no crimes, and exacerbates the already disproportion ate targeting of the young, people of color, **LGTBQIA** people, etc, and does not

require a

Seattle are facing a budget crisis and are facing record costs due to lawsuits against SPD and other agencies. There is no reason to believe that this will reduce crime or increase case resolution and every reason to believe it will

be abused in

WA state and

Negative value due to monetary cost for products, loss of civil liberties, liability issues, and other harms to our communities with no proven value to reduce crime.

would result There are in so much other liability for solutions to the city and crime that SPD. Once actually work. you start I realize these collecting often involve data on giving money people do to community you have a organizations plan in place rather than to protect the police but that data? Do maybe, given you have a SPDs track plan in place record, we to ensure it shouldn't give will not be them abused, or disclosed anything that they can without abuse and get authorization

? What will

themselves

This proposal

It is hard to truly appreciate the value of privacy until it is lost, and even harder to get it back, if it is possible at all. Do you want this as your legacy?

Please please
please do
to literally
anything else
with the city's
of money. It
until it would be
nd more
der beneficial to
back, turn it into
confetti for a
at parade or to
bu set it on fire
s as than to spend
acy? it on this.

warrant to be shared.

ways that end up costing even more

money, and result in harm

to our community.

into more trouble with.

you do if those plans

fail?

In a time of

extreme

authoritarian

overreach on

the part of the

federal

government,

any

additional surveillance

and data

gathering at the local level

(such as expanded RTCC) runs

the risk of

that data There is little

being or no

acquired and demonstrate
1 misused by d value in the
1 the federal expansion of
5 government. RTCC

181

RTCC

software is a

cloud-based

software

platform

designed for

real-time

crime centers

to integrate

multiple

surveillance

technologies

such as

cameras,

automated

license plate

readers

(ALPRs),

CCTV, among

other police

surveillance

tools. RTCC

software like

Fusus can

turn any

camera into

an automated

license plate

readers

(ALPRs)

which gather

enough data

to reveal

sensitive

personal

information,

including

where

someone

lives, works,

and their

religious

affiliation.

The City

Council is

- attempting to
- move the on-
- ₆ premise

RTCC

database to

an off

premise,

cloud-hosted

database

managed by a

third-party,

private

company.

This change

will enable

other states

to circumvent

WA state's

Shield Law

and Keep WA

Working Act,

which are

meant to

protect both

people

seeking

reproductive

healthcare

and

immigrant

workers.

SPD already

has a real

time crime

center. SPD's

existing RTCC

(iBase) is on-

premise, so it

doesn't create the

risk of data

being

obtained

from third

parties or

legal requests

from those

outside

Washington

state. There is

no reason for

SPD to obtain

a cloud-

based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

False positives and the possible addition of Al tools reduces transparency 1 and

1 accountabilit

7 y.

With the Where is the **FASCIST** moral voice in

regime the

currently implementati on of these -occupying our white I can't

house, NOW imagine there is NOT the has been any. The lack of trust in SPD will only get worse.

time to create Please stop, tools that don't do this. they will use And don't do in any of their this in our witch hunts, names, with ie towards our taxes! trans, immigrants, and political enemies.

NO, just NO!!

Iam concerned the cloudbased storage part of this system will endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents by making data and surveillance available to out of state and federal government agencies. This is not a hypothetical this is happening, and WILL happen to sensitive data on Seattle residents and visitors if we continue to contract forprofit company with out of state data storage 1 servers

1

vulnerable to

secret

I don't see that this tech has any value. It is very expensive, it throws even more of our city budget to the police department which directly results in less funding for the social services and programs that actually keep our neighborhood s safe.

SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. SPD has lost the trust of wide swaths of Seattle residents because of their violent, escalating crowdcontrol tactics, poor leadership, right-wing police union, and significant representatio n of white supremacists within SPD ranks. What possible reason do we have to trust SPD with more surveillance tech? Why should we believe SPD will do what they say they

The current city leadership seems to believe they have a "mandate" from the voters regarding public safety. However, I would like them to consider that perhaps they have misinterprete d this "mandate" as they have run roughshod over democratic processes (such as public comment and community advisory committees) that have been informing them that their police legislation -RTCC and CCTV, SOAP

and SODA subpoenas as they and collect and zones, &etc. governmental store this are deeply pressure to sensitive unpopular share that data? and not what data in ways the people of that will be Seattle want both legal for our city. and illegal.

Availability of

this

information

- 1 from license
- 2 plate ID to
- 0 ICE etc.

- Footage is Richmond, stored for 30 CA has days. Why is chosen to it stored for invest in violence so long? - Nashville interruption abandoned and other its pursuit on community-FUSUS (the led safety RTCC SPD initiatives and uses) in April they have 2025 because seen a drop in it didn't the number of believe any homicides. guardrails This is in contrast to would keep the Trump neighboring Administratio cities like n & ICE from Oakland and accessing it. San - By moving to Francisco that have a cloudbased increased platform, their police Customs and budgets and Border have not seen Control (CBC) a decline in and ICE can violent crime. access Why are we automated privileging license plate strategies that have not reader data 2 worked to directly; circumventin reduce

g Washington	violent crime
State Law.	over ones
- RTCC	that do?
software like	
Fusus	
continually	
adds new	
image	
recognition	
algorithms	
and	
integrations	
with third-	
party	
applications	
via the	
software's Al	
capabilities.	
This	
continuous	
introduction	
of new and	
unvetted	
surveillance	
tools would	
be in violation	
of Seattle's	
Surveillance	
Ordinance.	

I have significant concerns about the use of cloudbased RTCC solution will put sensitive data about Seattle residents and visitors within the reach of the Federal government, circumventin g our state's Shield Law and Keep WA Working Act. This is concerning a wide range of people, but particularly so for immigrants, gender minorities, those seeking abortions, and protestors exercising their first amendment rights.

Additionally, the use of solutions such as Fusus to expand police surveillance technologies, in particular to include the use of private

security

A benefit to public safety has been claimed, however there is not evidence to support a signficant improvement to public safety.

The privacy and safety of Seattle residents, and those visiting Seattle, in the face of hostility from the Federal government and law enforcement from other states.

cameras, represents a highly concerning increase in the polices ability to conduct wide-scale surveillance of Seattle residents.

Increases to surveillance technology, at this time in history, is a terrible idea. The federal government will seek any existing tool to harm immigrants, their political opponents, and people seeking Whatever good this Could do, it will not outweigh the harm. Not now, not with this administratio n. Possibly not ever.	Please consider every thing that is happening in our country right now. Our most vulnerable communities are under attack. I am legitimately afraid the US is on its way to becoming a dictatorship,	Seattle will NOT be a sanctuary city, or a refuge for LGBTQ+ people and people seeking abortions if there is city wide surveillance.
---	---	--

abortion and gender care.

if it isn't one already. I am already scared and increased surveillance is only going to make things worse.

I'm very concerned that this technology can be accessed by a national database, making it available to ICE, Border Patrol, and law

enforcement across the country. This poses grave danger to all of us in these rife political times with a Federal Government

boundaries of executive powers and overreach. I'm

pushing the

particularly concerned regarding the dangers posed by this technology for our

marginalized
communities
(immigrants,
transgender
folks, and

I understand that this will add another tool in the 'tool belt' of law

enforcement . That said, the risks far outweigh the benefits. women). Is it not illegal in Washington State to share information with ICE? Does this technology not risk our status as a sanctuary state/city?

Put civil liberties and Please democratic protect our values first. civil liberties. Don't let fear They are in guide your grave danger The further at the decision erosion of making, but moment and privacy. Use principles. we need your to target What is the help to Thank you for 1 specific highest and standing up maintain 2 vulnerable best good for them. Thank for our 5 groups. all? citizenry! you. We are living

Major concerns. Mass surveillance, especially if the data gets into the hands of unaccountabl e and lawless government actors, is the antithesis to a free and democratic society. Right now the federal government is outright violating

court orders

threatening to

2

6 and

The risks far outweigh the rewards.

How is the City of Seattle protecting residents against federal government overreach? How is the city protecting the human rights of its residents? What happens if this data gets into the hands of bad

actors?

in a country with federal leadership that outright violating civil liberties, refusing to obey judicial orders, and is not giving immigrants due process before sending to overseas prisons. Does the city of Seattle really want to give the federal government more

information

send citizens to overseas prisons without due process. These cameras will help facilitate the human rights abuses of innocent individuals and people who should have a day in court to defend themselves.

that lead to the downfall of democracy and irrevocably ruins peoples lives?

I'm fine with police accessing Data from this data to Seattle's help with surveillance crimes. should NOT However, this be available information to ICE or should be 1 border patrol only 2 without a accessible to 7 warrant. police.

The theoretical cases in which it could be helpful seem so unlikely that they are not worth mention.

How easy it would be for the data the City collects to be hacked, DOGE-ed, or otherwise leaked to entities that could use it in a harmful way.

it's not being used, the existence of this technology could have a chilling effect on exercise of our First Amendment rights, and could make vulnerable people such as immigrants

feel less safe

and more

Even where

Please vote NO on surveillance technology.

I am
concerned
that this
could be
used to
violate the
1 rights of
2 people in
8 Seattle.

limited in our communities.

Many antiabortion states, including neighboring Idaho, have passed bounty hunter laws. This creates a market and demand to hunt down this data for people believed to have gone to Seattle to get reproductive healthcare. If SPD switches over to a cloud-hosted **RTCC** RTCC database, we enable the software was criminalizatio used by n of those police to spy 1 seeking We do not on 2 reproductive "immigration need more 9 care. protests" None surveillance Without regulation and

appropriate oversight, the overreach of MAGA states Use data! to use data to Track results! find Be individuals transparent seeking about reproductive With this effectiveness care is my administratio /costs! Learn primary n and city from other concern. cities! council, none Also, it is

1

unclear to me how to keep this information from inappropriate use by ICE, rendering our vulnerable communities less safe and making Seattle less safe for all given proliferation of fear. Traffic cameras should not be incorporated into SPD's Real Time Crime Center. Increasing surveillance is an infringement on the privacy of Seattle residents. It will allow another avenue for Increased federal surveillance authorities will likely affect such as ICE to track marginalized communities Traffic individuals, Consider going against at a cameras Seattle's disproportion should divesting supposed ate level remain as is funds from 1 status as a compared to without being SPD and into 3 Sanctuary white Seattle implemented social 1 City. citizens. into SPD. No services. No. No. Expanding I do not want Consider the harm you'll be the to live in a city 3 that abets the inflicting, surveillance capabilities federal which vastly

of the city will

government

only

in

endanger its

harming/targe

inhabitants, and will very

likely be

ting vulnerable communities.

leveraged by state actors and agencies

(i.e. ICE) to

target

immigrants

and other

vulnerable

populations. Please do not

move forward

with this.

good these systems might do, and think about other areas that desperately need this funding.

outweighs the

There is

already a real

time crisis

center. We do

not need to partner with

private

companies

that favor

1 profit over

3 any benefit to

3 citizens.

Imagine the misuse of this

kind of

amassing of

data-the danger

outweighs any benefit.

entities.

None. Do not

give our data

to non public

There is no

need for a

cloud-based

RTCC, which

would

weaken state

laws and

endanger

women, trans

folks, and

immigrant

residents. It is expensive

and a threat

1 to our most

3 vulnerable 4 citizens.

Think about who in

Seattle is

actually

impacted by

this. Think

about our most

vulnerable

citizens.

```
Please
  carefully
  consider any
  unintended
  consequence
  s of moving
  the RTCC
  database to
  be a cloud-
  hosted
  database
  managed by a
  third-party,
  private
  company. As I
  understand it,
  this change
  will enable
  others to
  circumvent
  WA state's
  Shield Law
  and Keep WA
  Working Act,
  which are
  meant to
   protect both
   people
  seeking
  reproductive
  healthcare
  and
  immigrant
  workers.
                                                                   Please
  SPD already
                                                                   carefully
  has a real
                                                                   consider any
  time crime
                                                                   unintended
  center. SPD's
                                                                   consequence
  existing RTCC
                                                                   s of moving
  (iBase) is on-
                                                                   the RTCC
  premise, so it
                                                                   database to
  doesn't
                                                                   be a cloud-
  create the
                                                                   hosted
  risk of data
                                                                   database
  being
                                                                   managed by a
1 obtained
                                                                   third-party,
3 from third
                                                                   private
  parties or
                                                                   company.
   legal requests
```

from those outside Washington state. A cloud-based RTCC - at least at this moment in time - could weaken state laws and endanger women, trans folks, and immigrant residents.

Please carefully consider whether this is something that should be done now (or ever).

This technology allows bounty hunters and ICE agents to track immigrants, abortion seekers, and likely seekers of gender affirming care, or anyone else targeted by our currently

hard right,

fascism-

The value is to the current federal government's non-democratic intentions. While it may have some small use in local traffic safety, the risk to privacy far outweighs this.

As a fifth generation Washington resident, all proud Republicans, whose ancestors came here on the preacher train in the late 1800s, I feel I can speak for many when I say that this program is not aligned

inclined federal government. even with the majority opinion among right wing folks here. We want our privacy, and we value it for others. Do not let the heat of today's political climate invade the needs of our state and the will of its majority - left and right alike - specially in Seattle, where we are a sanctuary city for a reason (the voting public has already extensively spoken on this issue).

That this will The current inflict more authoritarian Again, please harm than use of power think good on our that is carefully King County happening in about the the White communities, times we are especially in House and currently areas that are how it has living in and underprivileg already been whether you ed and affecting our want to underservedcommunities actually protect the by and encouraging endangering people of police lives. If you Seattle, or overstep and truly want to potentially presence protect cause 3 when it is not Seattleites, irreparable None. warranted. please harm under

Over consider the guise of "protection". surveillance whether this at this tool would dangerous actually do that or would time in our country will potentially only harm our endanger us neighbors, all through an and facilitate overpowered police surveillance cooperation system that with ICE or could be military easily forces/federal wielded powers. What against its happens own people? when they Or taken over come for US by federal citizens? Will authority this when they technology come for our help to hand city? Please them over? If rise to meet this is this moment, actually as this about moment is protecting not normal Seattleites, and we are this is not the truly facing the threat of way. fascism. And a President who thinks himself a king and does not follow the law or

Constitution.

- 1 I oppose a
- 3 surveillance

8 state None

	Nachvilla	SDD alroady		SDD's saked		DTCC	Thoro are
	Nashville	SPD already		SPD's asked		RTCC	There are MANY
	abandoned	has a real		for these		software are	effective
	its pursuit on	time crime		proposed material		subscription	
	FUSUS (the RTCC SPD	center. SPD's		updates to		products	tools the city could use to
		existing RTCC (iBase) is on-		the		meaning the city will have	decrease
	uses) in April 2025 because	premise, so it		Surveillance		to pay for it	
	it didn't	doesn't				, ,	community violence
	believe any	create the		Impact Reports for		every single	besides
	guardrails	risk of data		both their		year. RTCC	increasing
	would keep	being		CCTV and		software, and	surveillence.
	the Trump	obtained		Real-Time		other	Violence
	Administratio	from third		Crime Center		companies	interruption
	n & ICE from	parties or		(RTCC) 3		selling	programs
	accessing it.	legal requests		weeks after		subscriptions	work.
	Many anti-	from those		their CCTV		, operate on	Neighborhoo
	abortion	outside		and RTCC		the land-and-	ds that have
	states,	Washington		cameras		expand	adopted a
	including	state. There is		went live on		strategy	Cure
	neighboring	no reason for		May 20, 2025		where it	Violence
	Idaho, have	SPD to obtain		showing SPD		starts off	Model or
	passed	a cloud-		never		small with a	Group
	bounty hunter	based RTCC		intended for		city to get its	Violence
	laws. This	which would		this	The	proverbial	Intervention
	creates a	weaken state		surveillance	The Community	foot in the	Models have
	market and	laws and		to be a short-	Surveillance	door and then	seen
	demand to	endanger		term "pilot."	Working	increases the	homicides
	hunt down	women, trans		SPD	Group's	amount the	and assaults
	this data for	folks, and		confirmed to	report on	city is buying	decrease 30-
	people	immigrant		Guy Oron that	RTCC was	from them	50%. The city
	believed to	residents.		they have	"unsupportiv	every year. In	could scale
	have gone to	RTCC		been	e of any	other words,	effective
	Seattle to get	software like		providing	deployment	a for profit	community-
	reproductive	Fusus		"mutual aid"	of the these	company will	led solutions
	healthcare. If	recruits a vast		to	two	be pushing	such as the
	SPD switches	assortment of		ICE/Departm	technologies	Seattle to	Regional
	over to a	privately		ent of	[CCTV &	spend even	Peacekeeper
	cloud-hosted	owned		Homeland	RTCC]" due to	more money	s Collective
	RTCC	cameras that		Security.	"[t]he amount	on its	coordinated
	database, we	allow the		Some of this	and urgency	products	by the
	enable the	company to		"mutual aid"	of the	every year.	Regional
	criminalizatio	bypass laws		occurred	concerns and	The city	Office of Gun
	n of those	and		while Interim	outstanding	cannot afford	Violence
	seeking	restrictions		Police Chief	questions."	this	Prevention
	reproductive	that normally		Shon Barnes	The City	ineffective	and the
	care. The rate of out-of-	limit police,		was making the headline	leadership	and expensive	Rainier Beach Action
1	state	including viewing	I see no value	grabbing	should not	technology -	Coalition and
3	abortions,	camera	in using this	claim that he	ignore the	especially in	their
9	those coming	footage	technology.	expects to go	CSWG.	light of the	Restorative
		. 30.000					

from other	without a	to jail	fact that	Resolutions
states to seek	warrant or	because he	Seattle is	project,
abortion in	ongoing	won't	anticipating a	which has
Washington,	consent from	cooperate	\$250 million	already
increased by	the owner.	with the	shortfall in	reduced
36% in 2023	The	Trump	2025. Looking	violence in
and included	privatization	Administratio	at four other	the Rainier
20 different	of policing	n. SPD and	US cities that	Beach
states	represented	Mayor Harrell	have	neighborhood
including	by relying on	refuse to	deployed	by 33%.
neighboring	private	respond to	RTCCs, the	Richmond,
Idaho and	consumers to	questions	average cost	CA has
states as far	expand the	from Hard	is \$7.16 per	chosen to
away as Texas	camera	Pressed	person. With	invest in
and Alabama.	network	about how	Seattle's	violence
Anti-abortion	undermines	many times	2020	interruption
groups have a	democratic	ICE has	population of	and other
history of	values,	asked for	737,015, this	community-
using license	effectively	data sharing.	would put the	led safety
plate data.	excluding	The only thing	full-scale	initiatives and
RTCC	Seattle	preventing	(post-pilot-	they have
software	residents	ICE from	phase) RTCC	seen a drop in
allows data to	from being	accessing all	deployment	the number of
be shared	able to	of SPD's	by SPD in the	homicides.
across law	provide input	surveillance	ballpark of	This is in
enforcement	and oversight	data	\$5.3 million,	contrast to
agencies.	on the	(including 30	not including	neighboring
Third party	growing	days of video	the additional	cities like
agencies in	Seattle	and 90 days	costs for the	Oakland and
anti-abortion	surveillance	of license	CCTV and	San
states could	apparatus.	plate scans)	ALPR	Francisco
use this data	RTCC	is SPD's	expansion.	that have
to criminally	software like	dubious	Even the	increased
prosecute	Fusus	claim that it	paper	their police
those seeking	continually	will follow the	referenced by	budgets and
abortion in	adds new	Keep	SPD in the	have not seen
Washington	image	Washington	SIR mentions	a decline in
state.	recognition	Working Act &	the	violent crime.
Recently an	algorithms	Washington	"substantial	Both violent
Idaho mother	and	Shield Law.	costs	crime and
and son were	integrations	Standing up	associated	property
charged with	with third-	to Trump	with RTCCs,	crime can be
		•	with initial	reduced by
kidnapping for allegedly	party applications	means saying no to		community
taking a	via the	surveillance	costs ranging between	investments.
_	software's Al			
minor across		technology!	several	Investments
state lines to	capabilities.		hundred	restoring
access	This		thousand	vacant land
abortion care	continuous		dollars to \$11	and
in Oregon.	introduction		million".	community

The state of Texas has already attempted to get data from Seattle Children's Hospital for any Texas residents receiving gender- affirming care. As soon as SPD switches over to a cloud- hosted RTCC database, red states will start issuing subpoenas to access data directly from Fusus. RTCC software enabled a Texas cop to search surveillance data from across the county, including Washington State, other states with abortion "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the King County Housing Authority, for someone that	of new and unvetted surveillance tools would be in violation of Seattle's Surveillance Ordinance. In a 40 year systematic review with meta- analysis of the efficacy of CCTV the authors concluded there were "no significant effects observed for violent crime" and "a body of research on the investigatory benefits of CCTV has yet to develop." Only 1% to 0.2% of ALPR captured ticense plates are either on a hot list or associated with any crime.	non-profits that tackle violence and build community lead to reductions in both violent crime and property crimes. Many communities across the country are making investments in preventative community- centered approaches and are seeing a reduction in crime and violence in the community. Violent crime can be reduced by investments in mental health treatment, providing substance- abuse- treatment facilities, and access to affordable housing. Poverty and income inequality are associated

ICE is homicide. terrorizing Inequality immigrant predicts communities homicides under Trump. better than The Keep any other Washington variable. Working Act Evidence was passed supports that to prevent this is a data sharing causal link. between And direct income immigration and local law support has enforcement. been found to **RTCC** reduce firearm software like Fusus can violence. turn any Opening libraries and camera into an automated expanding license plate library hours readers both reduce (ALPRs). By violence and moving to a property cloud-based crimes. platform, Customs and Border Control (CBC) and ICE can access automated license plate reader data directly; circumventin g Washington State Law. ICE has a practice of accessing data directly from private **ALPR** surveillance companies that market their products to

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police, in
order to
circumvent
any local
sanctuary
laws. The
department
gets a lot of
use out of
this data, as
seen by them
running
thousands of
searches of
ALPR
databases in
a single
month as
early as 2019.
ICE's
utilization of
this data
shows the
degree of risk
it poses to
vulnerable
communities.
RTCC means
ICE is able to
search
nationwide
databases of
surveillance
data
including
data from
police
departments
Washington
State, other
states with
"sanctuary"
laws, and
non-police
entities
including the
King County
Housing
Authority.
```

Surveillance technology has the potential to have a chilling effect on free speech rights. RTCC software was used by police to spy on "immigration protests." In 2021 LAPD requested bulk camera data targeting **Black Lives** Matter protesters. In New York City there is evidence that NYPD has used surveillance technology to surveille **Black Lives** Matter protesters. Homeless residents, who have no option for privacy, are likely to become targets of mass surveillance. California is using AI to identify and target its homeless residents.

SPD has a track record of officers abusing their access to surveillance technology. In 2021 SPD Officer Swartz used police data to stalk his exgirlfriend; in 2020, an officer accessed confidential information about a domestic violence investigation and shared it with someone involved; and just last year, an officer performed an unauthorized search for personal reasons to reveal a citizen's firearm ownership.

It has no real benefit and will harm 1 women and 4 minorities the 0 most

I see no value except to strip individuals of their privacy People in WA deserve their privacy and do not need their information uploaded to ICE so they

can be illiegally abducted

Data privacy		If Seattle truly
is being		is a safe city
violated by		for
integrating		immigrants,
traffic		trans people,
cameras into		people
a crime		seeking
center. Right		abortions,
now, the		etc., then we
Trump		need to live
administratio		by those
n, ICE, and		values. This
"red" states		data will be
with anti-		abused. It will
abortion and		not be stored
anti-gender		safely, and
affirming care		bad actors
laws are		will get into it.
using any		
data that they		This also
can get from		expands
other		SPD's budget.
databases to		SPD has the
attack		LARGEST
people.		budget in the
Traffic		City. This
cameras are		means that
about traffic		we, as a city,
laws, not		value SPD
other types of		over anything
law		else, and we
enforcement.		don't have
		other
I am tired of		services
being filmed		because our
		elected
everywhere.		
There are no		officials have
rules about	Traffic	said that SPD
data storage.	cameras	is the most
No one takes	make our	important
privacy or	streets safer	department.
safety		We have a
seriously.	by getting	budget
How long will	people to	shortfall
these videos	follow traffic	because of
he stored?	laws. That's	SPD's out-of-
	it.	
Where will		control

they be spending and stored? Who coming in will have over budget access? every single There are no year. It is governance fiscally thoughts put irresponsible around this. to keep expanding their budget.

surveillance will lead to the further over policing of communities that have already suffered from over policing. That these recordings will be shared with ICE and other federal law

enforcement

4

2

That more

No I do not. It is a slippery slope to go down with this.

Please don't

do this.

where we should be coming together as a city. By installing this technology you are breaching a level of trust with your constituents. This will not be forgotten. Please please do the right thing and do

This is a time

that seek to target our city. And that it will lead to mistrust of the citizens of this city of their police force in a critical time where our relationship needs to be mended. This is not the way to mend that relationship.

institute this technology. This will not make our city safer and just adds to potential animosity between Seattle law enforcement and the populace.

SPD should not have access to traffic cameras. This will erode our civil liberties even further by making it even easier for police and ICE to target black and brown communities, immigrants, 1 and anyone

4 they don't

3 like.

None, whatsoever. Please focus your resources on building more housing, mental health resources, education, and reducing poverty. Police surveillance will not make us safer, nor will it solve the root causes of inequality and suffering, which make us unsafe.

RTCC software such as Fusus poses a threat to our civil liberties, especially our first amendment right of free speech, public protest, and public assembly. RTCC also harms by aiding in criminalizing people

criminalizing
people
seeking
abortions and
genderaffirming
healthcare.
RTCC is a
threat to
women and
survivors of
sexual
assault and
stalking.
RTCC harms

by giving information directly to ICE, directly supporting the kidnapping of immigrants with no due process.

immigrants

Police control
of RTCC
cameras
leads to
censorship
and selective

(iBase) is onpremise, so it doesn't create the risk of data being obtained from third parties or legal requests from those outside Washington state. There is no reason for SPD to obtain a cloudbased RTCC which would

weaken state

women, trans

laws and

endanger

folks, and

immigrant

residents.

SPD already

has a real

time crime

center. SPD's

existing RTCC

I do not see any value in this technology. Real safety comes from community care, equitable access to resources, stable housing, food security, childcare, education, and jobs that pay a living

wage.

I want City leadership to deeply examine the questions, "What is safety? Do I want safety for everyone?"

I want City leadership truly listen to the voices of marginalized people and those standing up for them in the community and let those voices be a guide for what safety could look like instead of increased surveillance.

punishment. RTCC creates a system ripe for abuse and potential to violate all of our First and Fourth Amendment Rights. Do not expand and allow SPD to purchase another RTCC software to harm our neighbors.

RTCC ICE has a software history of None. makes it terrorizing Nashville impossible to immigrant abandoned communities. keep its pursuit on surveillance Jurisdictions FUSUS (the data from that do not RTCC SPD ICE. Local use local uses) in April police resources to 2025 because departments enforce it didn't federal are very cozy believe any with ICE and immigration guardrails RTCC makes laws have would keep it easier for lower rates of the Trump them to crime, Administratio casually poverty, and 4 n & ICE from share unemployme 5 accessing it. surveillance nt than those

data. And, RTCC means ICE is able to search nationwide databases of surveillance data including data from police departments in Washington State, other states with "sanctuary" laws, and non-police entities including the	that chose to collaborate. It was with this knowledge that the Keep Washington Working Act was passed to prevent data sharing between immigration and local law enforcement.		
King County Housing Authority. I'm against SPD			No to adding
obtaining a cloud-based RTCC which would weaken state laws and endanger women, trans 1 folks, and 4 immigrant 6 residents.	Less surveillance, not more.	This a dangerous direction and a slippery slope eroding our freedom.	a cloud- based RTCC system. Our vulnerable communities would be targeted even more. We are NOT that type of community in Seattle.
This technology will not decrease crime and is ripe for abuse.		None	Investing in communities is the most effective way to decrease crime.



2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

Real-Time Crime Center

Seattle Police Department



Overview

This Executive Overview documents information about the collection, use, sharing, security, and access controls for data that is gathered through Seattle Police Department's (SPD) Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC). All information provided here is contained in the body of the full Surveillance Impact Review (SIR) document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

1.0 Technology Description

Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software provides a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. At its core, RTCC software integrates dispatch, cameras (such as CCTV and traffic monitoring cameras), officer location, 911 calls, records management systems, and other information into one "pane of glass" (a single view). The software is used to alert RTCC staff to a serious criminal event, see multiple streams of information overlaid on a map view, and convey information to officers responding in the field.

2.0 Purpose

The purpose of RTCC software is to provide situational awareness to increase officer and citizen safety, and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase reliability regarding the location of victims and suspects — enabling quicker aide and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

3.0 Data Collection and Use

The RTCC software integrates data from other SPD systems into a centralized location for real-time information and analysis. Data feeding into RTCC could come from dispatch, CCTVs, SDOT traffic monitoring cameras, officer location, 911 calls, records management systems (RMS), ALPR, geographic information systems (GIS), and other information systems. Information from some of these systems may be stored in storage related to the RTCC software to provide a comprehensive record of an incident. Storage of information not used for investigations or law-enforcement uses would be for 30 days maximum.

SDOT traffic monitoring cameras (as referenced in the "Closed Circuit Television 'Traffic Cameras' (Transportation)" SIR) will be utilized in the RTCC software for law enforcement purposes.

<u>SPD Policy 7.010</u> governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

4.0 Data Minimization & Retention

The RTCC software is used to integrate data from various sources used by SPD into one place, a single view. All data sources have their own pre-existing controls in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection, as outlined in previous surveillance impact reports for the relevant technology.

The RTCC software itself will store some of the data from the integrated systems to provide a comprehensive picture of an incident. Data that is not part of a criminal investigation will be subject to a 30-day retention



policy, after which it will be purged from the system.

5.0 Access & Security

Access

Only authorized SPD, OPA, and OIG users can access the RTCC software platform. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 - Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 - Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 - Use of Cloud Storage Services.

All use of the RTCC will be for legitimate law enforcement purposes only. Personal or inappropriate use or dissemination of information can result in internal discipline, termination, and penalties under federal or state law.

Security

Any incident or multimedia data extracted from the system will be stored in a method compliant with the FBI's CJIS requirements. The specific details are vendor dependent, but could include either cloud storage or on-premise storage. The storage configuration may vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

Retention period for data stored in RTCC software storage will be 30 days, data will be overwritten after that retention period expires. Data associated with criminal investigations will get saved as evidence in SPD's digital evidence locker consistent with retention guidelines for evidence.

Audits from the OIG or other official auditors will be allowed as needed.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, <u>Chapter 42.56 RCW</u> ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (<u>RCW 10.97.030</u>, <u>SPD Policy 12.050</u>). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per <u>SPD Policy 12.080</u>, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies,



as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by the RTCC software may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by <u>SPD Policy 12.055</u>. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

7.0 Equity Concerns

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids biasbased policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE

Department:	Dept. Contact:	CBO Contact:
Seattle Police Department	Nick Zajchowski	Geoffrey Detweiler

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title:

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Real-Time Crime Center software.

Summary and Background of the Legislation: The original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Real-Time Crime Center software (Ordinance 127111) was adopted by the City Council on October 8, 2024. Subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance."

The material update will provide the Seattle Police Department (SPD) the ability to view the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC software.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM	
Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?	☐ Yes ⊠ No
3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS	
Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City?	☐ Yes ⊠ No
3.d. Other Impacts	

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.

SPD's current budget includes \$2.0 million included in the 2025 budget and \$3.7 million in 2026 to fully staff the RTCC by the end of 2026. The annual licensing costs for RTCC are \$330,000. The use of RTCC software, when strategically integrated with the CCTV Crime Prevention Technology Pilot, may help mitigate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by more effectively deploying patrol resources to incidents and follow-up investigations. However, use of the RTCC software and the other related technologies being assessed does not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings.

If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources. $\rm N/A$

Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.

There are expected to be impacts in the form of efficiencies in deploying patrol officers and assisting with investigations. These impacts will be explored as part of the planned evaluation of the pilot.

Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.

The material update will provide the Seattle Police Department (SPD) the ability to view the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) traffic monitoring cameras in the RTCC software.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

- a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation? No.
- Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation? No.
- c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property? $N_{\rm O}$
- d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.
 - i. How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.
 - The original 2024 Surveillance Impact Report as required by the Surveillance Ordinance includes a Racial Equity Toolkit.
 - ii. Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation. $\rm N\!/\!A$

iii. What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?

The SIR documents were translated into the recommend languages and were posted online.

e. Climate Change Implications

i. Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.

No.

- ii. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.

 No.
- f. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?

 The pilot will be evaluated under a Continuous Impact Assessment framework. Outside academic subject matter experts will be retained to design and manage an evaluation plan with an assessment at the end of one year and another at the end of year two.
- g. Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?

 No.

5. ATTACHMENTS

Summary Attachments: None.