



# SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

## Public Safety Committee

### Agenda

**Tuesday, June 10, 2025**

**9:30 AM**

**Council Chamber, City Hall  
600 4th Avenue  
Seattle, WA 98104**


**Robert Kettle, Chair  
Rob Saka, Vice-Chair  
Joy Hollingsworth, Member  
Cathy Moore, Member  
Sara Nelson, Member**

**Chair Info: 206-684-8807; [Robert.Kettle@seattle.gov](mailto:Robert.Kettle@seattle.gov)**

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# SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

## Public Safety Committee

### Agenda

**June 10, 2025 - 9:30 AM**

#### **Meeting Location:**

Council Chamber, City Hall , 600 4th Avenue , Seattle, WA 98104

#### **Committee Website:**

<https://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-safety>

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This meeting also constitutes a meeting of the City Council, provided that the meeting shall be conducted as a committee meeting under the Council Rules and Procedures, and Council action shall be limited to committee business.

Members of the public may register for remote or in-person Public Comment to address the Council. Details on how to provide Public Comment are listed below:

Remote Public Comment - Register online to speak during the Public Comment period at the meeting at

<https://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment>

Online registration to speak will begin one hour before the meeting start time, and registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair.

In-Person Public Comment - Register to speak on the Public Comment sign-up sheet located inside Council Chambers at least 15 minutes prior to the meeting start time. Registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair.

Pursuant to Council Rule VI.C.10, members of the public providing public comment in Chambers will be broadcast via Seattle Channel.

Please submit written comments to all Councilmembers four hours prior to the meeting at [Council@seattle.gov](mailto:Council@seattle.gov) or at Seattle City Hall, Attn: Council Public Comment, 600 4th Ave., Floor 2, Seattle, WA 98104.

*Please Note: Times listed are estimated*

**A. Call To Order**

**B. Approval of the Agenda**

**C. Public Comment**

**D. Items of Business**

1.     [CB 120996](#)     **AN ORDINANCE** relating to emergency medical services; authorizing execution, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, of an agreement with King County regarding the imposition and allocation of property tax revenues generated by a six-year, voter-approved King County-wide tax levy for emergency medical services; approving the submittal by King County of a proposition to the voters seeking authority to levy those additional taxes; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

Attachments:   [Att 1 - 2026-2031 EMS Levy ILA between KC and Seattle](#)  
[Att 1 Ex 1 - EMS Levy Overview – Proposed Financial Plan \(KC March 2025 Forecast\)](#)

Supporting Documents:   [Summary and Fiscal Note](#)  
[Presentation](#)  
[Central Staff Memo](#)

**Briefing, Discussion, and Possible Vote** (10 minutes)

**Presenters:** Harold D Scoggins, Chief, Seattle Fire Department;  
Michelle Plorde, Director, King County Emergency Medical Services Division; Karina Bull, Council Central Staff

2.     [CB 120994](#)     **AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Tracking Devices; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.**

Attachments:   [Att 1 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Tracking Devices](#)  
                      [Att 2 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview Tracking Devices](#)

Supporting Documents:   [Summary and Fiscal Note](#)  
                                  [Central Staff Memo](#)  
                                  [Presentation](#)

**Briefing, Discussion, and Possible Vote** (20 minutes)

**Presenters:** Captain James Britt, Seattle Police Department; Tamaso Johnson, Council Central Staff

3.     [Appt 03175](#)     **Appointment of Shon Fitzgerald Barnes as Seattle Police Chief.**

Attachments:   [Appointment Packet](#)  
  
Supporting Documents:   [Chief Barnes Written Responses to Council Questions](#)

**Briefing and Discussion** (75 minutes)

**Presenters:** Natalie Walton-Anderson, Chief of Public Safety, Mayor's Office; Shon Barnes, Interim Chief, Seattle Police Department

## E. Adjournment



## Legislation Text

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**File #:** CB 120996, **Version:** 1

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### CITY OF SEATTLE

### ORDINANCE \_\_\_\_\_

### COUNCIL BILL \_\_\_\_\_

AN ORDINANCE relating to emergency medical services; authorizing execution, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, of an agreement with King County regarding the imposition and allocation of property tax revenues generated by a six-year, voter-approved King County-wide tax levy for emergency medical services; approving the submittal by King County of a proposition to the voters seeking authority to levy those additional taxes; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

WHEREAS, King County desires to place before the qualified electors of King County a ballot proposition authorizing the County to levy additional regular property taxes in amounts up to 25 cents per \$1,000 of assessed valuation each year, for exactly six consecutive years, on all taxable property within King County for the support of emergency medical services (EMS), pursuant to the powers granted to it in RCW 84.52.069; and

WHEREAS, RCW 84.52.069 does not permit a county-wide regular tax levy for emergency medical services to be placed on the ballot until after the legislative authority of 75 percent of all cities having a population in excess of 50,000 within such county has approved such action; and

WHEREAS, King County proposes to carry out its obligation to provide emergency medical services on a County-wide basis by, among other actions, making funds available for expenses incurred in the City's independent emergency medical services program by allocating and transferring to the City that portion of the tax revenues generated by the County EMS tax levy that is attributable to taxable property within the City of Seattle, with certain minimum amounts established; NOW, THEREFORE,

**BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

Section 1. The placing before the qualified electors of King County, pursuant to the powers granted to King County by RCW 84.52.069, of a ballot proposition on November 4, 2025, authorizing the County to levy each year for exactly six consecutive years commencing in 2025 (for collection beginning in 2026) additional regular property taxes Countywide in amounts up to \$0.25 per \$1,000 dollars of assessed valuation on all taxable property within King County, for the support of emergency medical services (EMS), is approved, conditioned upon the execution by King County, prior to placement of the measure on the ballot, of the interlocal agreement authorized by Section 2 of this ordinance, and subject to the terms of that agreement.

Section 2. The Mayor is authorized to execute, for and on behalf of The City of Seattle, an agreement with King County substantially in the form of the attached Exhibit A, "Interlocal Cooperation Agreement for Allocation of Property Tax Revenues between The City of Seattle and King County." No deviation from the form of agreement shown in Exhibit A may reduce the City's right to receive the minimum amounts shown in Paragraph 3 of Exhibit A.

Section 3. Execution by the Mayor of the agreement authorized by Section 2 of this ordinance prior to the effective date of this ordinance is ratified and confirmed.

Section 4. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force on the latest of: (a) 30 days after its approval by the Mayor; (b) 30 days after the Mayor's unsigned return; (c) 45 days after Council passage if the Mayor does not return within ten days after presentation; (d) the date of reconsidered Council passage of this ordinance over the Mayor's disapproval; or (e) the date the King County Executive signs, on behalf of King County, the agreement authorized by Section 2 of this ordinance, having first been authorized to do so by ordinance or motion of the King County Council.

Passed by the City Council the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025, and signed by  
me in open session in authentication of its passage this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_  
  
President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Approved /    returned unsigned /    vetoed this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_  
  
Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_  
  
Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:

Attachment 1 - 2026-2031 EMS Levy ILA between KC and Seattle

Exhibit 1 - Emergency Medical Services Levy Overview - Proposed Financial Plan (King County  
March 2025 Forecast)



INTERLOCAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT FOR ALLOCATION OF  
PROPERTY TAX REVENUES

BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE

AND

KING COUNTY

(2026—2031)

THIS AGREEMENT is entered into pursuant to the "Interlocal Cooperation Act," codified as Ch. 39.34 RCW, by and between The City of Seattle ("The City") and King County ("The County"); WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the County desires to place before the qualified electors of King County a ballot proposition authorizing the County to levy additional regular property taxes County-wide in amounts up to 25 cents per thousand dollars of assessed valuation each year for six consecutive years on all taxable property within King County for the support of emergency medical services ("EMS") pursuant to the powers granted to it in RCW 84.52.069; and

WHEREAS, the City operates and funds an emergency medical services program which is independent from, but coordinated with, the County's program; and

WHEREAS, a portion of the revenues to be collected pursuant to the county-wide EMS levy will be attributable to taxable property located within the legal boundaries of the City; and

WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to reimburse and transfer to the City for the support of its emergency medical services program all revenues to be collected pursuant to the county-wide EMS levy from the taxable property located within the legal boundaries of the City of Seattle; and

WHEREAS, the County has determined that the reimbursement and transfer agreement set forth below will not affect the County's ability to provide emergency medical service throughout the County; and

WHEREAS, RCW 84.52.069 provides that no county-wide EMS levy proposal may be placed on the ballot without the legislative authority of at least 75% of those cities with a population exceeding 50,000.

Now, Therefore, the parties agree as follows:

1. The County shall submit to the qualified electors of King County at a general election to be held on November 4, 2025, a proposition authorizing the County to levy additional regular property taxes each year for exactly six consecutive years beginning in 2025 for collection beginning in 2026 on taxable property within the County in amounts up to twenty-five (25) cents per thousand dollars of assessed valuation pursuant to RCW 84.52.069 for expenses incurred in the provision of emergency medical services.
2. This Agreement shall commence upon its signing by both parties. This Agreement shall terminate when all property taxes levied by King County under this Agreement have been collected and the proper share transferred to the City.
3. Upon approval by the qualified electors of King County of the authority for additional regular property tax levies as set forth in RCW 84.52.069 and paragraph 1 of this Agreement, the County shall transfer to the City all revenues collected pursuant to the county-wide EMS levy from taxable property located within the legal boundaries of the City.

The total amount transferred shall not be less than the smaller of the following:

- a) All revenues that could be collected under a county-wide EMS levy from taxable property located within the legal boundaries of the City at a beginning 2026 levy rate of twenty-five (25) cents per thousand dollars of assessed valuation, accounting for historical rates of undercollection and adjusting in subsequent years per the growth limit factor of 1% plus new construction; or
- b) The amount identified for the corresponding tax collection year as “Projected Net Seattle Property Taxes” set forth in the King County 2026-2031 “Emergency Medical Services Levy Overview – Proposed Financial Plan (March 2025 Forecast)” dated May 7, 2025 attached as Exhibit 1; or
- c) All revenues that could be collected under a county-wide EMS levy from taxable property located within the legal boundaries of the City at the highest levy rate that the county is allowed to impose under state law, accounting for historical rates of undercollection.

In any year in which the County has imposed the highest levy allowed under state law, but the distribution of assessed value growth would result in a net transfer of money from the rest of King County to Seattle under “b” above, then Seattle agrees to receive its transfer under “c” above.

4. Transfer of the revenues set forth in Paragraph 3 above shall be administered by the King County Finance and Business Operations Division of the Department of

Executive Services in the manner and at such times as the County transfers revenues produced pursuant to levies listed in or authorized by RCW 84.52.043, provided if the amount to be transferred requires a payment in excess of the actual EMS levy revenues collected within the legal boundaries of the City, the additional transfer amount shall be distributed in the same manner as King County distributes taxes for an annexation.

5. All revenues received pursuant to the county-wide EMS levy and this Agreement shall be used only for the provision of emergency medical care or emergency medical services as specified in RCW 84.52.069(5) and shall be deposited into a special revenue account established by the City for that purpose. The City shall provide the county a report describing the City's use of the proceeds annually.

6. In return for the County's agreement to impose taxes and transfer tax proceeds as set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the City gives its approval by ordinance for the submission to the qualified electors of King County of the county-wide multi-year additional property tax levy proposition for emergency medical services described in Section 1 above.

7. Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to prohibit the City from levying an annual tax levy pursuant to RCW 84.52.052 or a levy pursuant to RCW 84.52.069 to fund emergency medical services.

8. The parties hereto expressly reserve for themselves the right to amend this Agreement. No amendment hereto will be effective unless it is in writing and signed by the authorized representatives of the parties hereto.

KING COUNTY

THE CITY OF SEATTLE

By: \_\_\_\_\_

By: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Acting under authority of

Acting under authority of

Ordinance \_\_\_\_\_

Ordinance \_\_\_\_\_

Approved as to form:

Approved as to form:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prosecuting Attorney

\_\_\_\_\_  
City Attorney

**EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES LEVY OVERVIEW - (March 2025 Forecast) - 25.0 cents**

5/7/2025

	2026 Proposed	2027 Proposed	2028 Proposed	2029 Proposed	2030 Proposed	2031 Proposed	2026-2031
<b>REVENUES</b>							
Countywide Assessed Value (EMS Only)	900,361,839,667	932,621,368,969	966,950,031,725	998,753,254,891	1,042,177,421,775	1,075,460,988,298	
Countywide EMS Levy	225,090,460	230,462,234	235,080,343	239,706,406	244,405,893	249,182,917	1,423,928,253
Levy Rate	0.25000	0.24711	0.24312	0.24001	0.23451	0.23170	
Proportion	34.90%	35.05%	35.21%	35.40%	35.49%	35.64%	
Projected Net Seattle Property Taxes	78,556,571	80,777,013	82,771,789	84,856,068	86,739,652	88,808,792	502,509,883
<b>Seattle Revenue</b>	<b>78,556,571</b>	<b>80,777,013</b>	<b>82,771,789</b>	<b>84,856,068</b>	<b>86,739,652</b>	<b>88,808,792</b>	<b>502,509,883</b>
Proportion	65.10%	64.95%	64.79%	64.60%	64.51%	64.36%	
Projected Net King County Property Taxes	146,533,889	149,685,221	152,308,554	154,850,339	157,666,242	160,374,125	921,418,370
Projected King County Other Revenue	3,848,000	3,529,000	3,487,000	3,236,000	3,236,000	3,236,000	20,572,000
<b>King County Revenue</b>	<b>150,381,889</b>	<b>153,214,221</b>	<b>155,795,554</b>	<b>158,086,339</b>	<b>160,902,242</b>	<b>163,610,125</b>	<b>941,990,370</b>
<b>TOTAL REVENUE</b>	<b>228,938,460</b>	<b>233,991,234</b>	<b>238,567,343</b>	<b>242,942,406</b>	<b>247,641,893</b>	<b>252,418,917</b>	<b>1,444,500,253</b>
<b>EXPENDITURES</b>							
<b>Total City of Seattle</b>	<b>(78,556,571)</b>	<b>(80,777,013)</b>	<b>(82,771,789)</b>	<b>(84,856,068)</b>	<b>(86,739,652)</b>	<b>(88,808,792)</b>	<b>(502,509,883)</b>
Advanced Life Support Services -- King Count	(77,697,276)	(81,190,874)	(84,896,835)	(88,551,633)	(92,313,037)	(96,332,593)	(520,982,249)
Basic Life Support Services -- King County	(41,556,724)	(43,447,554)	(45,454,830)	(47,432,115)	(49,466,952)	(51,643,497)	(279,001,672)
Regional Services	(18,954,061)	(19,816,472)	(20,731,993)	(21,633,834)	(22,561,925)	(23,554,650)	(127,252,935)
Strategic Initiatives	(1,258,488)	(1,303,968)	(1,407,434)	(1,458,311)	(1,507,840)	(1,557,582)	(8,493,623)
<b>Total King County EMS Fund</b>	<b>(139,466,549)</b>	<b>(145,758,868)</b>	<b>(152,491,092)</b>	<b>(159,075,893)</b>	<b>(165,849,754)</b>	<b>(173,088,322)</b>	<b>(935,730,479)</b>
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>(218,023,120)</b>	<b>(226,535,882)</b>	<b>(235,262,881)</b>	<b>(243,931,961)</b>	<b>(252,589,406)</b>	<b>(261,897,113)</b>	<b>(1,438,240,362)</b>
<b>DIFFERENCE Revenues/Expenditures</b>	<b>10,915,340</b>	<b>7,455,353</b>	<b>3,304,462</b>	<b>(989,555)</b>	<b>(4,947,513)</b>	<b>(9,478,197)</b>	<b>6,259,891</b>
<b>Year End RESERVES (not cumulative)</b>	<b>(60,859,012)</b>	<b>(62,410,543)</b>	<b>(64,070,543)</b>	<b>(65,694,193)</b>	<b>(67,364,460)</b>	<b>(43,272,080)</b>	<b>(69,149,312)</b>

## **SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE**

<b>Department:</b>	<b>Dept. Contact:</b>	<b>CBO Contact:</b>
City Budget Office	Andrew Dziedzic	Andrew Dziedzic

### **1. BILL SUMMARY**

**Legislation Title:** AN ORDINANCE relating to emergency medical services; authorizing execution, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, of an agreement with King County regarding the imposition and allocation of property tax revenues generated by a six-year, voter-approved King County-wide tax levy for emergency medical services; approving the submittal by King County of a proposition to the voters seeking authority to levy those additional taxes; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

**Summary and Background of the Legislation:** This Council Bill signals the City’s legislative approval for King County to proceed with a 2025 ballot measure that would authorize a six-year property tax levy to support emergency medical services. The City’s approval is required by RCW 84.52.069 even though the levy will be Countywide.

In 2019, King County voters last passed a six-year levy renewal to fund Medic One/Emergency Medical Services throughout the County. The last year for which taxes will be collected on that levy is 2025. Because the City’s Medic One operation is separate from the County’s EMS program, the City and County have executed Interlocal Agreements, whereby the County transfers to the City a portion of EMS tax revenue based on the assessed value of taxable property within the city limits.

The legislation also authorizes the execution of an Interlocal Agreement between the City and King County with regard to Medic One/Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Specifically, the Interlocal Agreement gives the County approval to submit a proposition on the November 4, 2025 ballot seeking authority to levy 25 cents per thousand dollars of assessed property value in order to fund County-wide emergency medical services. In addition, the Agreement allocates the City of Seattle’s share of EMS tax revenue based on the assessed value of taxable property within the city limits.

### **2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM**

**Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?** ☐ Yes ☒ No

### **3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

**Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City?** ☒ Yes ☐ No

Expenditure Change (\$); General Fund	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	0	0	0	0
Expenditure Change (\$); Other Funds	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	0	0	0	0

Revenue Change (\$); General Fund	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	75,328,512	76,204,471	78,229,050	80,880,898
Revenue Change (\$); Other Funds	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Positions	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	0	0	0	0
Total FTE Change	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	0	0	0	0	0

### 3.a. Appropriations

☐ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes appropriations.

**Appropriations Notes:** Appropriations in the 2026 Proposed Budget will include programming backed by revenues resulting from a levy renewal by the voters.

### 3.b. Revenues/Reimbursements

☒ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes revenues or reimbursements.

#### Anticipated Revenue/Reimbursement Resulting from This Legislation:

Fund Name and Number	Dept	Revenue Source	2025 Revenue	2026 Estimated Revenue
General Fund (00100)	SFD	EMS Levy	0	\$75,328,512
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>0</b>	<b>\$75,328,512</b>

**Revenue/Reimbursement Notes:** According to the City's adopted April forecast, the endorsed levy will generate approximately \$75.3 million in Medic One revenue in 2026.

This levy replaces an existing levy ending in 2025. Only revenues associated with the passage of the new levy are noted in this document. This legislation does not appropriate funds or directly levy taxes. It is projected that the endorsed levy will generate approximately \$75.3 million in Medic One revenue in 2026. Those funds will be included in revenue projections in the 2026 Proposed Budget.

### 3.c. Positions

- ☐ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes positions.

### 3.d. Other Impacts

**Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.**

No.

**If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.**

None.

**Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.**

Seattle Fire Department emergency medical services and staff would be affected should the King County Medic One/EMS levy renewal not reach the ballot or fail.

**Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.**

N/A

## 4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

- a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?**

No.

- b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?**

No.

- c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?**

No.

- d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.**

- i. **How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.**

This legislation would support current levels of service for emergency medical services.

- ii. **Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.**

N/A

- iii. **What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?**

None planned, as this legislation would support current levels of service for emergency medical services.

**e. Climate Change Implications**

- i. **Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.**

None, as this legislation would support current levels of service for emergency medical services.

- ii. **Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**

None, as this legislation would support current levels of service for emergency medical services.

- f. **If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?**

N/A

- g. **Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?**

N/A

## 5. ATTACHMENTS

**Summary Attachments:** None.



# Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Levy Renewal

Chief Harold Scoggins,  
Seattle Fire Department

# Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Levy

- The King County EMS Levy first began in 1979 and was most recently approved by voters for a six-year levy cycle in 2019.
- This levy specifically funds EMS services across King County.
- The City is being asked **to execute an Interlocal Agreement** that will transfer a portion of revenue to Seattle, based on the Assessed Value (AV) of taxable property within city limits.
- The **King County Council will vote in July** to consider placing the levy on the November ballot.

# Levy Renewal and the City Budget

- **SFD's 2025 Adopted Operations budget is \$261M**
  - Approximately 73% of Operations is EMS related
  - In 2025 SFD received \$64.3M from the EMS levy; approximately 1/3 of the City's EMS operations
- **The 2026 Endorsed Budget assumed the EMS Levy would be renewed, and budgeted available General Fund revenues to address costs.**
  - There is no new unprogrammed money; 100% of the EMS levy revenue supports SFD's emergency medical services

# Proposed EMS Levy and City Revenues

The Medic One/EMS Levy Advisory Task Force, 20-body group comprising elected and appointed officials from around the county, developed the details of the levy over a year of meetings



## Current 2020-2025 Levy

Total Revenues for Seattle: **\$399 Million**

Average Property Tax Rate (over six years):  
\$0.257 per \$1,000 AV



## Proposed 2026-2031 Levy

Total Revenues for Seattle: **\$479 Million**

Average Property Tax Rate (over six years): \$0.25  
per \$1,000 AV



# Questions?



June 6, 2025

## MEMORANDUM

**To:** Public Safety Committee  
**From:** Karina Bull, Analyst  
**Subject:** 2026-2031 Emergency Medical Services Levy

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On June 10, the Public Safety Committee (Committee) will discuss and possibly vote on [Council Bill \(CB\) 120996](#) regarding a King County ballot measure to renew the countywide, six-year Medic One/Emergency Medical Services Levy (EMS Levy), in amounts up to \$0.25 per \$1,000 assessed value (AV) on all taxable property within King County, for collection beginning in 2026.

CB 120996 would:

1. Authorize an Interlocal Agreement (ILA) between the City of Seattle (City) and King County on the imposition and allocation of property tax revenues generated by the proposed EMS Levy; and
2. Approve King County's submittal of the ballot measure for the proposed EMS Levy at the next general election on November 4, 2025.<sup>1</sup>

The current EMS Levy expires on December 31, 2025. If passed by King County voters, the proposed EMS Levy would generate a projected \$1.4 billion over a six-year period (2026-2031) to support countywide emergency medical services, including \$479 million for the City's Medic One/EMS program coordinated by the Seattle Fire Department (SFD).<sup>2</sup> For a Seattle homeowner with a \$919,296 median AV, the initial levy rate of \$0.25 per \$1,000 AV would cost \$230 in 2026.

### Background

King County's Medic One/EMS system provides residents of Seattle and King County with lifesaving, prehospital emergency care through an internationally recognized, tiered regional response system. This system relies on coordinated partnerships with fire departments, paramedic agencies, dispatch centers, and hospitals. The City operates and funds a Medic One emergency services program that is separate from the King County program but is part of the regional delivery system.<sup>3</sup> While emergency medical services within Seattle are coordinated through SFD, all Medic One system staff receive the same training and work with similarly equipped medic vehicles.

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<sup>1</sup> See CB 120996: [Attachment 1 - 2026-2031 EMS Levy ILA between KC and Seattle](#) and [Attachment 1 Exhibit 1 - MS Levy Overview and Proposed Financial Plan \(King County March 2025 Forecast\)](#).

<sup>2</sup> The projected revenues for the proposed EMS Levy six-year collection period (2026-2031) are based on the King County March 2025 Forecast. The projected revenues for Seattle during this six-year period are based on the City's Adopted April 2025 Forecast which yields a lower revenue forecast (\$479 million) for Seattle than the King County projection (\$502.5 million).

<sup>3</sup> Other Medic One system partners include South King County Medic One (Kent), Redmond Medic One, Vashon Medic One, Bellevue Fire Medic One, and Shoreline Fire Medic One.

The Medic One/EMS system includes Basic Life Support (BLS) and Advanced Life Support (ALS) services:

- **BLS personnel** are usually the first to arrive on scene and provide intermediate basic life support medical care (e.g., advanced first aid, CPR) to stabilize the patient. BLS is staffed by firefighters training as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), certified by the state and are required to complete initial and ongoing training.
- **ALS personnel** are paramedics that respond to about 25 percent of calls for service and usually arrive second on scene to provide emergency care for critical or life-threatening injuries and illness. Paramedics receive more than 2,500 hours of intensive training through the University of Washington/Harborview Medical Center Paramedic Training Program.

King County's Medic One/EMS program is primarily funded through a countywide, voter-approved EMS Levy that has typically been approved for six-year periods. All EMS Levy revenue collected from taxable property in Seattle is transferred to the City, per an ILA between the City and King County, and is used solely for SFD's Medic One/EMS program.

[King County Proposed Ordinance 2015-0119](#) includes the proposed EMS Levy for 2026-2031. [King County Proposed Ordinance 2025-0118](#) includes the proposed EMS Levy Strategic Plan, which is the primary policy and financial document for the EMS system.<sup>4</sup> To place the proposed EMS Levy on the November 4, 2025, ballot, King County Council must pass these ordinances no later than August 5, 2025.<sup>5</sup>

## **CB 120996**

CB 120996 would (1) authorize the execution of an ILA between the City and King County on the imposition and allocation of property tax revenues generated by the proposed EMS Levy; and (2) approve King County's submittal of the ballot measure for the proposed EMS Levy at the next general election on November 4, 2025. The proposed EMS Levy would impose additional property taxes for six consecutive years (2026-2031) on taxable property within King County at a rate not to exceed \$0.25 per \$1,000 of assessed property value. Levy proceeds would fund the provision of emergency medical services throughout King County.

1. The ILA would signify the City's approval of the proposed EMS Levy and require King County to transfer to the City all EMS Levy revenues collected from taxable property within the legal boundaries of Seattle. This transfer would be consistent with the past practices of prior levies.

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<sup>4</sup> See the [King County Council Staff Report](#) that accompanies these ordinances for more information.

<sup>5</sup> The deadline for King County Elections to receive the effective ordinances is August 5, 2025. Therefore, the last regular King County Council meeting to vote on the legislation with maximum processing time (25 days) is July 8; the last regular King County Council meeting with minimum processing time (10 days) to pass the legislation as an emergency is July 22, 2025; and the last special King County Council meeting to pass the legislation as an emergency is August 5, 2025.

2. The City's approval of the ballot measure for the proposed EMS Levy would allow the measure to be placed before King County voters. Under RCW 84.52.069, King County may not place a renewal measure on the ballot until it has obtained approval in the form of an ordinance from 75 percent of the cities that are located within its boundaries and have more than 50,000 residents.<sup>6</sup> CB 120996 would provide such authority on behalf of the City.

The Medic One/EMS Advisory Task Force (Task Force), which is charged with reviewing and endorsing broad policy decisions for the EMS system, oversaw the development of the proposed EMS Levy.<sup>7</sup> The Task Force consists of elected and appointed officials from King County, cities, and fire districts to represent those who administer, authorize, and are served by the system. The City's Fire Chief, Harold Scoggins, serves on this Task Force.

### 2020-2025 EMS Levy

The City Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the current six-year levy will have generated a total of \$399 million for SFD's emergency medical services with an average rate of \$0.24 per \$1,000 AV. Table 1 shows the annual revenue totals and levy rates for the current EMS Levy. The increasing value of property in Seattle has allowed the City's revenue share to increase even though the property tax rate has declined over time.

*Table 1. Current 2020-2025 EMS Levy Revenue and Levy Rates*

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 est.	6-Year Total & Average Rate
<b>Revenue Actuals</b>	\$66.8M	\$69.5M	\$67.8M	\$63.5M	\$66.9M	\$64.3M	\$399M
<b>Levy Rate<sup>8</sup></b>	\$0.265	\$0.260	\$0.250	\$0.210	\$0.230	\$0.220	\$0.240
<b>Projected Net Total EMS Levy Revenue for Seattle: \$399 million</b>							

### 2026-2031 EMS Levy

CBO projects that the proposed levy would generate a projected six-year total of \$479 million for SFD's emergency medical services with an average levy rate of \$0.23 per \$1,000 AV. Table 2 shows the projected revenue totals and levy rates for the proposed EMS Levy.

*Table 2. Proposed 2026-2031 EMS Levy Revenue and Levy Rates*

	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.	2030 est.	2031 est.	6-Year Total & Average Rate
<b>Revenue Forecasts</b>	\$75.3M	\$76.2M	\$78.2M	\$80.9M	\$82.9M	\$85.9M	\$479.4M
<b>Levy Rate</b>	\$0.250	\$0.240	\$0.240	\$0.230	\$0.220	\$0.220	\$0.230
<b>Projected Net Total EMS Levy Revenue for Seattle: \$479 million</b>							

<sup>6</sup> The following cities have a population over 50,000: Auburn, Bellevue, Burien, Federal Way, Kent, Kirkland, Redmond, Renton, Sammamish, Seattle and Shoreline.

<sup>7</sup> See [2026-2031 Medic One/EMS Levy Planning Process](#).

<sup>8</sup> See [City Tax Comparisons – King County Assessor](#).



CBO projects that the proposed levy would cost a homeowner in Seattle an average of \$252 per year based on median AV, resulting in a total six-year cost of \$1,511. Table 3 shows the projected costs for homeowners in Seattle based on median AV.

*Table 3. Proposed 2026-2031 EMS Levy Cost to Homeowner*

	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.	2030 est.	2031 est.	6-Year Average Cost & AV
<b>Cost to Homeowner</b>	\$230	\$238	\$247	\$257	\$264	\$275	\$252 (total \$1,511)
<b>Median Home AV</b>	\$919,296	\$978,131	\$1,040,731	\$1,107,338	\$1,178,208	\$1,253,613	\$1,079,553
<b>Projected Net Total EMS Levy Cost for Homeowner in Seattle: \$1,511</b>							

### Fiscal Impacts

Based on the City's Adopted April 2025 Forecast, CBO projects that the proposed EMS Levy would generate approximately \$75.3 million in 2026 for SFD's Medic One/EMS services. These funds would be included in revenue projections for the Mayor's 2026 Proposed Budget and would fund a portion of SFD costs for emergency medical services. General Fund resources would make up the difference.

For reference, the 2025 Adopted Budget includes over \$261 million for SFD operations and nearly 25 percent (\$64 million) of this amount is funded by EMS levy revenue. As 74 percent of SFD's responses are for emergency medical services, the bulk of SFD's operations costs are related to services covered by the EMS Levy.

### Next Steps

The Committee will discuss and may vote on CB 120996 at its meeting on June 10, 2025. If the Committee votes to recommend passage of CB 120996 at this meeting, the City Council could vote on the bill as early as June 17, 2025.

cc: Ben Noble, Director  
Lish Whitson, Supervising Analyst



## Legislation Text

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**File #:** CB 120994, **Version:** 1

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### CITY OF SEATTLE

### ORDINANCE \_\_\_\_\_

### COUNCIL BILL \_\_\_\_\_

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Tracking Devices; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

WHEREAS, on February 28, 2023, the City Council passed Ordinance 126776, adopting the original

Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Tracking Devices technology; and

WHEREAS, subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), which section was enacted by

Ordinance 125376 and last amended by Ordinance 125679, states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance"; and

WHEREAS, the functionality defined in the original tracking devices SIR will change pending a \$250,000

Washington State Department of Commerce Law Enforcement Pursuit Technology grant that will assist local law enforcement in vehicle pursuit mitigation; and

WHEREAS, a category of GPS trackers (police pursuit management technology) is utilized to tag and track fleeing vehicles as a safer alternative to vehicle pursuits; and

WHEREAS, in accordance with RCW 10.116.060.2.d, which requires agencies to "develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options," this specialized GPS tracker allows the Seattle Police Department (SPD) to track the precise location of a vehicle for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime has been established and accomplish the task of recovery or arrest without the need for initiating or continuing a vehicle pursuit; and

WHEREAS, SPD is considering a pilot for 25 SPD patrol vehicles to be equipped with GPS tracker launchers, deployed throughout the patrol operations bureau precincts; and

WHEREAS, all sworn SPD officers will be trained in the use of pursuit mitigation GPS trackers, ensuring compliance with recent state law updates regarding pursuit mitigation; and

WHEREAS, pursuit mitigation GPS trackers will be monitored by the Real Time Crime Center and information will be relayed to patrol units in the field; and

WHEREAS, no changes will be made to the previously approved requirements related to covert tracking systems; NOW, THEREFORE,

**BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF SEATTLE AS FOLLOWS:**

Section 1. Pursuant to Ordinances 125376 and 125679, the City Council approves use of the Seattle Police Department's Tracking Devices and accepts the updated 2025 Surveillance Impact Report for this technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 1, and the Executive Overview for the same technology, attached to this ordinance as Attachment 2.

Section 2. Any act consistent with the authority of this ordinance taken after its passage and prior to its effective date is ratified and confirmed.

Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect as provided by Seattle Municipal Code Sections 1.04.020 and 1.04.070.

Passed by the City Council the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025, and signed by  
me in open session in authentication of its passage this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_

President \_\_\_\_\_ of the City Council

Approved /      returned unsigned /      vetoed this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_

Bruce A. Harrell, Mayor

Filed by me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

\_\_\_\_\_

Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

(Seal)

**Attachments:**

Attachment 1 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Tracking Devices

Attachment 2 - 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview: Tracking Devices

## 2025 Surveillance Impact Report

# Tracking Devices

## Seattle Police Department

### Surveillance Impact Report Versions:

- 2022 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Tracking Devices adopted by [Ordinance 126776](#) on 2/28/2023.
- 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Tracking Devices

# Surveillance Impact Report (“SIR”) overview

## About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the “Surveillance Ordinance,” on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City’s executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in [Seattle IT Policy PR-02](#), the “Surveillance Policy”.

## How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department (“Seattle IT”). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

## Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.

Upcoming for Review	Initial Draft	Open Comment Period	Final Draft	Working Group	Council Review
The technology is upcoming for review, but the department has not begun drafting the surveillance impact report (SIR).	Work on the initial draft of the SIR is currently underway.	The initial draft of the SIR and supporting materials have been released for public review and comment. During this time, one or more public meetings will take place to solicit feedback.	During this stage the SIR, including collection of all public comments related to the specific technology, is being compiled and finalized.	The surveillance advisory working group will review each SIR’s final draft and complete a civil liberties and privacy assessment, which will then be included with the SIR and submitted to Council.	City Council will decide on the use of the surveillance technology, by full Council vote.

# Privacy Impact Assessment

## Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment (“PIA”) is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

## When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

## 1.0 Abstract

### 1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Seattle Police Department (SPD) utilizes geolocation trackers to track and locate vehicle information during criminal investigations. Geolocation trackers are devices that SPD utilizes as a tool to locate and track the movements and locations of vehicles. Covert trackers are utilized only after obtaining legal authority via a court order or consent, and once the consent or terms of the order have expired all data collected is maintained only in the investigation file.

A category of GPS trackers (police pursuit management technology) are utilized to tag and track fleeing vehicles as a safer alternative to vehicle pursuits. In accordance with RCW 10.116.060.2.d, which requires agencies to “develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options,” This specialized GPS tracker allows SPD to track the precise location of a vehicle for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime has been established and accomplish the task of recovery or arrest without the need for initiating or continuing a vehicle pursuit.

## **1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.**

Tracker technology directly tracks and collects location information of vehicles and indirectly tracks and collects the same information about individuals. Despite the requirement that covert trackers be utilized only pursuant to a search warrant or with consent, this could raise potential privacy concerns, such as general surveillance or tracking of the general public.

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers also directly track and collect location information of vehicles and, indirectly, their occupants. While this technology is limited by policy to vehicles for which there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause, they could raise potential privacy concerns, such as general surveillance or tracking of the general public.

## **2.0 Project / Technology Overview**

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview gives the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed

### **2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.**

Trackers allow SPD to remotely track vehicles electronically and to locate vehicles and individuals that are sought in connection with an active criminal investigation. They are utilized in these cases with the consent of a witness, a confidential informant, or within the scope of a judicially issued search warrant. They may also be used as a police pursuit management tool, where they can provide a critical alternative to high-speed pursuits that can endanger the safety of both residents and police personnel. Without this technology, SPD would be unable to collect important evidence in some criminal investigations and subject community members to the dangers of high speed pursuit situations.



## 2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

The primary benefit of the covert tracking systems is in the gathering of evidence used in the resolution of criminal investigations. Proper gathering of location evidence of criminal activity by the police supports SPD's mission to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety. "The value of employing electronic surveillance in the investigation of some forms of serious crime, in particular organized crime, is unquestionable. It allows the gathering of information unattainable through other means."<sup>1</sup>

In the case of the United States vs. Katzin, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled law enforcement officials are allowed to use location tracking devices to trace a suspect's vehicle and monitor their activity once a warrant is properly obtained—which prevents law enforcement from trampling on a person's Fourth Amendment rights that protect them from "unreasonable searches and seizures."<sup>2</sup>

GPS pursuit mitigation tracking devices also offer an alternative to the need for vehicular pursuit of suspect vehicles. This only occurs when an officer has the equivalent of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing (including fleeing temporary detention like a traffic stop) and the apprehension of the fleeing suspect is needed but the danger of a pursuit is not reasonable. The device is then removed, and the location tracking ends at the point at which police detain the suspect vehicle. The vehicle-mounted GPS launcher has the ability to tag, track, and locate without compromising officer and community safety. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) recently conducted a study that showed that, "when properly deployed, (it) had a positive impact on the pursuit outcome for apprehensions."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic\\_surveillance.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <https://info.rastrac.com/blog/police-gps-tracking>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250549.pdf>

### **2.3 Describe the technology involved.**

Covert tracking technology consists of interconnected hardware and software. The hardware, a real-time tracking and data logger, is a compact unit that adheres to or rides along with a targeted vehicle. These trackers are location tracking devices that report latitude and longitude coordinates on a pre-determined schedule that can be adjusted by users remotely. The hardware also logs high temperature alerts, low battery alerts, device removal, power/shut down alerts and battery level. The software consists of an online portal that collects the information captured by the hardware, and allows for graphic representation of that information, including mapping of locations and movement, alerts for established events (i.e., a vehicle has moved beyond an established boundary, etc.), and scheduling of “check-ins” (the reporting interval records the locations set in seconds, minutes or hours).

The data captured by a device is downloaded out of the online portal after the conclusion of a tracking schedule (due to the expiration of a search warrant or an investigation) and is provided to the Officer/Detective leading the investigation. The data is then purged from the software and the hardware is reset for future deployment, meaning no data captured is stored in any location other than the investigation file. This is in keeping with Washington State Retention Schedule for Records Documented as Part of More Formalized Records ([GS2016-009](#)). It requires that such records be retained “until verification of successful conversion/keying/transcription then destroy.”

In the beginning of 2020, cellular providers in the USA announced that the existing 3G cell networks would be decommissioned in 2022 as the newer 5G networks were phased in. Many of the existing SPD tracking devices were tied to the older 3G network and have been or will need to be replaced with similar-functioning updated 5G versions of the same location tracking technology.

In the case of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers, the GPS launcher deploys a GPS tracking tag onto a suspect vehicle. Once the GPS tag is attached to the vehicle, it communicates positional data to a mapping platform in real time. Law enforcement can then plan and coordinate an informed tactical response to make a safe arrest while maintaining community and officer safety. It is important to note that the GPS tag has a limited battery life (approximately 8 hours), preventing the possibility of long-term surveillance.

### **2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department’s mission.**

Utilizing location tracking devices to locate vehicles in pursuit of an investigation helps SPD to mitigate serious and/or violent criminal activity and reduce crime.

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers allow SPD to effect the arrest of fleeing suspects in vehicles without the need for vehicle pursuits that can place the public, the suspect, and officers, in danger.

## 2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

Maintenance and utilization of covert vehicle trackers is managed by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit (TESU).

For deployment of location covert trackers for investigations by TESU, the requesting Officer/Detective completes requests for deployment (including a Request Form that must be completed, which includes the active search warrant number). A TESU supervisor then approves the request before a tracking device is assigned and deployed to an investigating Officer/Detective. All requests are filed with TESU and maintained within the unit, available for audit.

The hardware and software for GPS pursuit mitigation tracking systems are managed by the RTCC and deployed on police vehicles and via handheld launchers. Individual deployment of the GPS tracking units is determined by the police officer involved in determining probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop of a vehicle.

## 3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

### 3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

Each application of covert tracking technology is screened by the TESU supervisor and held to a legal standard of consent or court issued search warrant. The process is as follows: one member of the Unit is tasked with receiving requests for deployment (including a Request Form that must be completed by the requesting Officer/Detective, which includes the active search warrant number). A TESU supervisor then approves the request before a tracking device is assigned and deployed to an investigating Officer/Detective. All requests are filed with TESU and maintained within the unit, available for audit.

Prior to deployment of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers, officers must establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop of a vehicle. At that point, officers will have the discretion to deploy the GPS pursuit mitigation trackers if it appears the vehicle may flee. Additionally, if an officer engages in a pursuit with a vehicle, they can deploy a tracker and terminate the pursuit, relying on the tracker to follow the vehicle.

### **3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.**

Covert tracking devices are only utilized with express consent or search warrant authority. SPD must comply with all legal requirements for securing consent or a search warrant (see [US v. Jones](#) and [State v. Jackson](#)).

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are only deployed when an officer has established reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop of a vehicle, the same standard as established by RCW 10.116.060.

### **3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.**

Unit supervisors are responsible for screening all deployments as well as ensuring that staff receive adequate training specific to the involved technologies.

TESU personnel are trained by the vendor in the use of the hardware and software. When an Officer/Detective requests and deploys a tracking device from TESU, TESU personnel train the Officer/Detective in the tracker's use.

If the geolocation tracking device is being utilized pursuant to a search warrant, the warrant dictates the scope and parameters of the information collected.

[SPD Policy 6.060](#) requires that "information will be gathered and recorded in a manner that does not unreasonably infringe upon: individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy."

Officers are required to be trained in the policies and use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers prior to deploying the equipment. Officers are trained by the Education and Training Section using training developed by SPD in collaboration with the technology vendors. Use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers is monitored using the vendor software, as well as integrations to the Real Time Crime Center, and documented in police reports stored and maintained in the SPD RMS. Use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are reported via radio as soon as feasible and use acknowledged by an SPD supervisor.

## 4.0 Data Collection and Use

### 4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

Officers/Detectives obtain search warrants or consent to deploy vehicle tracking devices. The information is gathered consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon “individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy.”

Vehicle tracking data is temporarily stored by third-party vendors (as described in 2.3 above), until the schedule for collection of data has expired (per the search warrant or consent authorities), at which time all data collected is downloaded and attached to the investigation file. This is in keeping with the [Washington State Local Government Common Records Retention Schedule](#) Disposition Authority Number GS2016-009 Rev. 0, governing retention of records documented as part of more formalized records, and requiring that SPD “retain until verification of successful conversion/keying/transcription, then destroy.”

The only data collected by the GPS pursuit mitigation tracker is date, time, location (to include latitude/longitude), remaining battery life, the speed of the tag when moving, all of which is retrieved from the tracker itself. No other data is pulled in by GPS pursuit mitigation trackers.

### 4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

Equipment deployment is constrained to the conditions stipulated by the consent or court order providing the legal authority. All deployments of tracking technology are documented and subject to audit by the Office of Inspector General and Federal Monitor at any time.

Data collected is provided to the case Detective for the investigation and no data is retained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit.

The GPS pursuit mitigation tracker is applied to the vehicle in question by aiming with the launcher. No other information about the vehicle is collected. If a vehicle is inadvertently tagged, the tracker will be retrieved as quickly as possible and deactivated by the officer. Such deployments will be documented.

#### **4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?**

Officers/Detectives will provide written consent and/or a court approved warrant for covert vehicle tracking technology deployments, via the Request Form process. The Technical and Electronic Support Unit Supervisor will screen all tracking technology deployments to ensure that the appropriate authorities are in place before approving deployment of tracking technology.

Officers who have established probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle are able to deploy GPS pursuit mitigation trackers. Use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are reported via radio as soon as feasible and use acknowledged by an SPD supervisor.

#### **4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?**

Trackers are used, as appropriate, when supported by a search warrant or consent (of a witness or a confidential informant), in conjunction with an active investigation, or when use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers is needed to prevent the need for the pursuit of a vehicle for which there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop. The length of time that any one covert tracker might be utilized in an investigation is established, and constrained, by parameters established within the requisite search warrant. The battery of a GPS pursuit mitigation tracker is about eight (8) hours.

#### **4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?**

Temporary.

#### **4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?**

Physical objects involved in covert tracking deployments are unmarked as their purpose is in support of covert investigations.

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are visible, as they are normally launched to attach to the rear of a vehicle, in plain view of the public. It is marked with a 10-digit serial number and barcode.

#### **4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?**

Only authorized SPD users can access the vehicle tracking devices or the data while it resides in the system. Access to the vehicle tracking systems/technology is specific to system and password-protected.

Data removed from the vehicle tracking system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems, [SPD Policy 12.080](#) - Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, [SPD Policy 12.110](#) - Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and [SPD Policy 12.111](#) - Use of Cloud Storage Services.

Data collected by the deployment of a GPS pursuit mitigation tracker is used by SPD personnel to track and locate vehicles for which there is probable cause or reasonable suspicions. These personnel may be patrol, investigations, or RTCC staff capable of broadcasting tracking information to responding units. OIG personnel will also have access for audit purposes.

Information regarding the track is included in police reports stored in the SPD RMS.

#### **4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.**

No entity, other than SPD personnel, utilize vehicle tracking technology. OIG personnel will have access for oversight requirements.

#### **4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?**

To deploy and utilize vehicle trackers, Officers/Detectives must submit a request form that requires proof of consent or search warrant, and active investigation, as evidenced by a GO number. After the scheduled parameters for collection of data expire, data is downloaded from the supporting software, and included in the investigation file. At that point, only SPD personnel involved in the investigation have access to this information.

When an officer has established probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a vehicle, the threshold for deployment and use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers will have been met.

#### **4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?**

Only Technical and Electronic Support Unit personnel have access to vehicle tracking equipment and services. Deployment of vehicle trackers follows a specific process (see 2.5 above) that requires consent or search warrant documentation. Access to data is documented with TESU and is made available to any auditing authority.

Only personnel with approved accounts in the GPS pursuit mitigation tracking system will have access to the data. The GPS pursuit mitigation tracking system and associated accounts will be managed by the RTCC system administrator.

## **5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion**

### **5.1 How will data be securely stored?**

Data is securely stored by the vehicle tracking technology vendor and will be transferred to the case investigator only via Seattle Police Department owned and authorized technology. At that time, vehicle tracking data collected by the tracking device is downloaded from the vendor software and resides only with the investigation file.

GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data is stored on the AWS gov-cloud certified infrastructure and encrypted against unauthorized access. Vendors are required to be SOC2/Type II certified to meet City cybersecurity requirements.

### **5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?**

TESU keeps logs of vehicle tracking device requests, deployments, and access to the equipment. The Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can access all data and audit for compliance at any time.

GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data retention standards are set by Seattle PD. Upon written authorization, technology vendors will delete data and verify such.



### 5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon “individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual’s right to privacy”.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

### 5.4 Which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

SPD’s Intelligence and Analysis Section reviews the audit logs and ensures compliance with all regulations and requirements.

Audit, Policy & Research Section personnel can also conduct audits of all data collection software and systems. Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor can audit for compliance at any time.

RTCC System Administrators will manage the GPS pursuit mitigation tracking system to ensure that the retention requirements meet those of SPD.

## 6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

### 6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

No person, outside of SPD, has direct access to the covert tracking units or the data. Data obtained from the system may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by these tracking devices may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provide by [SPD Policy 12.055](#). This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data will be shared with neighboring law enforcement agencies as needed for operational purposes. As tracked vehicles leave the City limits, it will become necessary for partner law enforcement agencies to have the tracking information to assist with tracking and apprehension. Conversely, other agencies using GPS pursuit mitigation tracking systems may need to share their tracking information with SPD as their tracked vehicles enter the City limits.

As the GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data is included in SPD police reports, the above listed agencies will also have access via investigative files.

## 6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigation, and to comply with legal requirements.

For GPS pursuit mitigation tracking, data sharing is critical, as fleeing suspects often cross jurisdictional boundaries, necessitating interagency cooperation.

## 6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes ☒ No ☐

### 6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [28 CFR Part 20](#). In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

## 6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Research agreements must meet the standards reflected in [SPD Policy 12.055](#). Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of [28 CFR Part 20](#). In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of [WAC 446-20-260](#), and [RCW Chapter 10.97](#).

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which Tracking Devices may be used.

**6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.**

Tracking devices capture location information as it moves in relation to GPS satellites as it moves locations. They may also rely on cellular technology to track its location. The devices do not check for accuracy, as they are simply capturing a live information and sending position information. They are not interpreting or otherwise, analyzing any data they collect.

For GPS pursuit mitigation tracking, officers arriving at the site of a tracked vehicle will validate the vehicle they observe matches the description of the vehicle for which there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion (including license plate where possible), prior to taking any additional enforcement action.

**6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.**

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

## **7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance**

**7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?**

Covert tracking devices are only utilized with express consent or search warrant authority. SPD must comply with all legal requirements for securing consent or a search warrant; see, [US v. Jones](#) and [State v. Jackson](#)). GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are only utilized when there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a vehicle has been involved in a crime, consistent with the RCW governing vehicle pursuits by law enforcement.

**7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.**

[SPD Policy 12.050](#) mandates that all employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

**7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.**

Privacy risks revolve around improper collection of location information of members of the general public. As it relates to covert tracking, SPD mitigates this risk by deploying them consistent to the stipulations outlined in the Washington Privacy Act, [Chapt. 9.73 RCW](#), and only by consent and/or with authorization of a court-ordered warrant. For GPS pursuit mitigation trackers, deployment is limited to vehicles for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion has been established. Additionally, the limited battery life of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers reduces the likelihood of inadvertent tracking of uninvolved parties. The ACLU cited this limitation in their letter addressing the use of GPS pursuit mitigation as a reason they are not concerned with civil liberties related to the use of this technology.

[SMC 14.12](#) and [SPD Policy 6.060](#) direct all SPD personnel to “any documentation of information concerning a person’s sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.”

Additionally, [SPD Policy 5.140](#) forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

#### **7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?**

Inherent in information obtained through covertly tracking members of the public is the risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge and that their Fourth Amendment protections against “unreasonable searches” may be violated. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes (i.e., maintenance of all requests, copies of consent forms and warrants) that allow for any auditor, including the Office of Inspector General and the federal monitor, to inspect use and deployment of tracking devices. The potential of privacy risk is mitigated by the requirement of consent and/or court ordered warrant before the technology is utilized.

The use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers is limited to vehicles for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion has been established, the same standard set forth in state law for justification of vehicle pursuits. By tracking such a vehicle, it is possible to, by default, track the occupants of that vehicle. However, such occupants would be the subjects of a criminal investigation, either listed as suspects or eliminated through investigative efforts. The same concerns and mitigations listed above for covert tracking systems apply to GPS pursuit mitigation trackers.

In 2014, Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst for the ACLU, wrote an opinion letter supporting the use of Starchase, a GPS pursuit mitigation tracking vendors long as the technology is used as intended in the exigent moments surrounding a police stop and pursuit, and not to subvert what would otherwise require a warrant. In 2022, Mr. Stanley reaffirmed this position, saying “I have not heard of any civil liberty issues with that technology.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> ACLU “GPS Bullets’ Allow Police To Shoot a Tracker Onto a Car, Jay Stanley

## 8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

### 8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Each unit maintains logs of deployment. These logs are available for audit, both internally and externally.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests “for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies.”

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD’s Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

The technology vendor does not provide records to anyone other than Seattle PD, except by department preauthorized data sharing agreements.

### 8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

No formal audits exist for covert tracking device deployments; however, requests to utilize covert tracking devices, as well as logs of deployments, are kept within each unit, and are subject to audit by the unit supervisors, Office of the Inspector General, and the federal monitor at any time.

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers create a record of the deployment, to include the dates, times, locations (including latitude/longitude). These records are maintained in accordance with the Department’s retention requirements and can be view at any time by the Office of the Inspector General.

# Financial Information

## Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

### 1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

#### 1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current ☒ potential ☐

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
	June 2025	\$250,000			Dept of Commerce Law Enforcement Pursuit Tech

Notes:

#### 1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
\$37,500				

Notes:

If the GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are determined to be a worthwhile program, the ongoing cost to maintain the 25 launchers' subscriptions is \$37,500.



### **1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology**

Cost savings may be seen in reduced liability from decreased number of vehicle pursuits, which often result in litigation. Additionally, pursuits often result in damage to city owned equipment, specifically police cars. This technology can reduce those costs as well by negating the need for pursuits.

### **1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities**

Additional grants may be available in the future to provide ongoing funding, should the department decide to increase or continue the deployment.

## Expertise and References

### Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report (“SIR”). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

### 1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use
Tacoma Police Department	Deputy Chief Paul Junger	Pursuit mitigation.

### 2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

### 3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any authoritative publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link
GPS Bullets’ Allow Police to Shoot a Tracker Onto a Car	American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)	<a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/gps-bullets-allow-police-shoot-tracker-car">https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/gps-bullets-allow-police-shoot-tracker-car</a>
Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment	Police Executive Research Forum	<a href="https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250549.pdf">https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250549.pdf</a>

# Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) and engagement for public comment worksheet

## Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit (“RET”) in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

## Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments’ (“Seattle IT”) Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

## Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative (“RSJI”) is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

### 1.0 Set Outcomes

**1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?**

- ☐ The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.
- ☐ There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
- ☐ The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
- ☐ The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

**1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?**

None, per ACLU letter.

**1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?**

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

None.

**1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?**

☒ all Seattle neighborhoods

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ballard                | <input type="checkbox"/> Northwest   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Belltown               | <input type="checkbox"/> Madison Park / Madison Valley                         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Beacon Hill            | <input type="checkbox"/> Magnolia  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Capitol Hill           | <input type="checkbox"/> Rainier Beach   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central District       | <input type="checkbox"/> Ravenna / Laurelhurst                                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia City          | <input type="checkbox"/> South Lake Union / Eastlake                           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delridge               | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> First Hill             | <input type="checkbox"/> Southwest   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Georgetown             | <input type="checkbox"/> South Park  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Greenwood / Phinney    | <input type="checkbox"/> Wallingford / Fremont                                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International District | <input type="checkbox"/> West Seattle  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interbay               | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual Aid) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> North                  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outside King County (Mutual Aid)           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Northeast              |  |

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use here.

**1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?**

No information at this time.

**1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?**

The technology will be equally deployed throughout the city to maximize availability for needed deployments.

**1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

None.

**1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?**

None identified.

**1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you can / have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.**

There is potential for officers to default into a pursuit in an effort to apply the tag. This can be addressed by policy and training.

## **2.0 Public Outreach**

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR.


## **3.0 Public Comment Analysis**

The public comment period was April 14, 2025 to April 28, 2025.

### **3.1 Summary of Response Volume**

### 9. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Age Range


● Prefer not to identify	6
● Under 18	0
● 18 - 44	51
● 45 - 64	12
● 65+	0



### 11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

[More details](#)


● Prefer not to say	18
● Woman	25
● Man	10
● Non-binary or gender non-conforming	9
● Transgender	1
● Not listed	0




### 12. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

[More details](#)

● Prefer not to identify	13
● Black / African American	1
● Hispanic / Latino	0
● Asian / Asian American	7
● Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0
● Indigenous	2
● White or Caucasian	42
● Another race/ethnicity	1
● Other	0





### **3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?**

Please see Appendix B.

### **3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?**

Please see Appendix B.

### **3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?**

Please see Appendix B.

### **3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.**

Please see Appendix B.

### **3.5 General Surveillance Comments**

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Please see Appendix B.

## **4.0 Response to Public Comments**

### **4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?**

## **5.0 Equity Annual Reporting**

### **5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?**

Metrics on covert tracking technology are gathered by the OIG for their annual surveillance technology audits.

Usage reports on GPS pursuit mitigation trackers will be available through the RTCC information portal and reports.



# Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

## Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group (“working group”), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

“Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement.”

## Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR. Please consult [Ordinance 126776](#) adopted by the City Council on 2/28/23 to view the original Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment.

## Appendix A: Glossary

**Accountable:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

**Community outcomes:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

**Contracting equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

**DON:** “department of neighborhoods.”

**Immigrant and refugee access to services:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle’s civic, economic and cultural life.

**Inclusive outreach and public engagement:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

**Individual racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

**Institutional racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

**OCR:** “Office of Civil Rights.”

**Opportunity areas:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

**Racial equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person’s race.

**Racial inequity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person's race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

**RET:** "racial equity toolkit"

**Seattle neighborhoods:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.


**Stakeholders:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

**Structural racism:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

**Surveillance ordinance:** Seattle City Council passed ordinance [125376](#), also referred to as the "surveillance ordinance."

**SIR:** "surveillance impact report", a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance [125376](#).

**Workforce equity:** (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.



## **Appendix B: Public Comment Period (4/14/25 to 4/28/25)**

Dear Seattle City Leadership,

Here is my public comment on the Material Updates to the proposed new SPD Tracking Devices Surveillance Impact Report (SIR).

### **Highest Concern - Huge Change Necessitates New Standalone SIR, Not Material Update:**

First and foremost, this proposed change should not be happening via a Material Update to an existing SIR. The changes described by SPD are not an update to an existing technology but instead are entirely new technology and so should have it's own standalone fresh SIR. The new pursuit trackers are from a completely different vendor (likely StarChase) and are not inter-operable with the existing undercover covert location trackers SPD uses (CovertTrack). The pursuit trackers are also: managed by a different team in SPD (RTCC, not the TESU); don't have a formal check-in/-out paperwork process and instead are solely used under (supposedly) exigent circumstances; have a different legal threshold for when they are used (probable cause/reasonable suspicion, not warrant/consent higher threshold); and would be expected to have have vastly different duration of deployment & success criteria (near-term apprehension, not primarily to gather data for a longer-term investigation). Additionally, the City's own tracked-changes document shows that they replaced all of their answers to every question in the SIR, which that alone should justify a standalone new SIR, not a Material Update process. Moreover, the Racial Equity Toolkit (RET) include in the SIR seems to have had all it's answers replaced such that they *\*only\** are regarding the pursuit trackers and the covert trackers are no longer even included in the RET. Similarly, the Financial Information section was also replaced such that it too seems to *\*only\** cover the pursuit trackers, not the covert trackers. In multiple places throughout the SIR, SPD does not clearly distinguish whether statements they made are referring to covert or pursuit trackers (especially later into the SIR). Given the final SIR that is approved by City Council is legally binding, there should not be any ambiguities. Clearly this is more than sufficient evidence that the pursuit trackers should be split off and have their own new standalone SIR created, not poorly glued onto the covert trackers SIR via the Material Update process.

### **Pursuit Location Trackers Concerns & Recommendations**

1) **Dangerously Lowers Standard for SPD Engagement:** Wider scope of "reasonable suspicion" and "may flee" lowers the existing bar in SPD's Police Manual and increases the likelihood of escalation of violence in police encounters.

- (a) Item 3.2 of the revised SIR says that, in order to deploy the pursuit trackers, "officers must establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop of a vehicle. At that point, officers will have the discretion to deploy the GPS pursuit mitigation trackers if it appears the vehicle may flee."
- (b) SPD's Police Manual (13.031-POL-2) says that sworn employees may not initiate a pursuit unless: "...There is reasonable suspicion to believe that a person in the vehicle has committed or is committing a **violent offense or sex offense** (RCW 9.94A.030); **and The person poses a threat of death or serious physical injury to others** such that, under the circumstances, the public safety risks of failing to apprehend or identify the person are greater than inherent risk of pursuit driving;..." [bolding mine, reference: <https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/tree/documents/2042751> ]
- (c) Both unnarrowed "reasonable suspicion" and "may flee" is SIR greatly lower the existing threshold for SPD's level of engagement with residents.

- (d) Using the threshold of reasonable suspicion at a traffic stop means that SPD could deploy a tracker against residents stopped for low-level traffic violations and not wanted in connection with a violent or sexual offense nor posing a threat to others, simply for avoiding eye contact or other neurodivergent behavior that frequently is misunderstood by officers as suspicious or dangerous [ <https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/8688572/caught-in-the-net-police-powers-of-investigation-and-the-risks-for-autistic-individuals> ]
- (e) Even the act of firing the tracker at the vehicle, especially if the resident's vehicle had come to a stop, increases the likelihood for escalation of violence since the the resident may think that the sound they heard and the thud on their vehicle was SPD opening fire on them and they may in turn respond with more violence.
- (f) If the purpose of pursuit trackers is to avoid high speed pursuits, then the trackers should only be deployed under at least the same existing legal threshold for when SPD would otherwise initiate a high speed pursuit.
- (g) The 2014 ACLU National post referenced by SPD in the revised SIR specifically says it should only be used "in police chases that commence when a police officer has the equivalent of probable cause", so SPD's proposed threshold is below the minimum level stated by their own reference [ <https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/gps-bullets-allow-police-shoot-tracker-car> ]. In addition to stating probable cause is the minimum, please note that the ACLU National letter also said "chases that commence", not "will commence", because the legal standard should not rely on guesswork and officer biases - "may flee" is a completely unacceptable legal threshold to use.

**Recommendation:** SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, replace "may flee" with "is currently fleeing" and remove "reasonable suspicion" and instead require at the minimum "probable cause" before a pursuit tracker can be deployed.

2) Won't Reduce SPD High-Speed Pursuits: The revised SIR doesn't require SPD to terminate the pursuit once the tracker is deployed and SPD officers also have a history of engaging in uncalled for high speed pursuits.

- (a) The revised SIR only says that officers **can** terminate a pursuit after the tracker is deployed. The SIR does not say officers must terminate the pursuit.
- (b) And multiple SPD officers have a history of engaging in uncalled for high speed pursuits, which shows a department-wide problem, and this only includes the sustained OPA findings in the last couple of years (so not counting the situations that weren't reported to OPA):
  - 2024OPA-0012: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2024OPA-0012ccs7-2-24.pdf>
  - 2024OPA-0044: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2024OPA-0044ccs5-23-24.pdf>
  - 2024OPA-0225: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2024OPA-0225ccs1-31-25.pdf>
  - 2023OPA-0015: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2023OPA-0015ccs090823.pdf>
  - 2023OPA-0056: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2023OPA-0056ccs081723.pdf>

- 2021OPA-0528: <https://www.seattle.gov/documents/departments/opa/closedcasesummaries/2021opa-0528ccs060922.pdf>
- 2021OPA-0281: <https://www.seattle.gov/documents/departments/opa/closedcasesummaries/2021opa-0281ccs032922.pdf>
- 2021OPA-0063: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2021OPA-0063ccs111821.pdf>
- 2020OPA-0407: <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2020OPA-0407ccs012921.pdf>

**Recommendation:** SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require that SPD terminate the pursuit once the tracker is deployed.

3) **Irresponsible Use of City Funds:** The cost information provided by SPD is both incomplete and appears inflated; plus pursuit trackers require a subscription for which SPD has no funding source.

- (a) It's completely irresponsible to sign the City up for yet more recurring costs for more cop tech toys while the City is facing a historical deficit.
- (b) SPD deleted both the initial acquisition and annual maintenance & licensing cost of the undercover covert trackers which were included in items 1.1 and 1.2 of the Financial Information section of the revised SIR. Presumably SPD is not throwing away their covert trackers and surely the vendor is not providing location services for free, so the Financial Information section is now incomplete.
- (c) SPD says the direct initial acquisition cost for the system is \$250,000 (which doesn't include professional services, like vendor-provided installations or training) and they'll have 25 pursuit trackers, which equals \$10,000 per tracker launcher system. However, other cities are paying around \$5,000 - \$6,000 per launcher system acquisition [see: <https://www.policemag.com/vehicle-ops/article/15347647/pursuit-tracking> and <https://www.tontitown.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/10b-Star-Chase.pdf> ]. This means SPD's listed direct acquisition cost is roughly \$100,000 over the expected cost. So the Financial Information SPD provided appears to be inflated.
- (d) Additionally, the recurring annual cost is listed by SPD as \$37,500 (or \$1,500 per tracker) lists the annual funding source as "Unknown". This means that SPD will use state grant money to acquire hardware that then also signs the City up for recurring additional costs that have no funding source.
- (e) The 2017 Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment referenced by SPD in the revised SIR states that "The GPS tags are consumables that must be replaced after use. The tags, once deployed/used, are recovered and sent back to StarChase for either refurbishment or replacement" [ <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250549.pdf> ]. However, SPD does not mention this in the SIR, nor did SPD clarify whether or not there is any additional cost associated with refurbishment or replacement of each tracker. This is another way the fiscal information is incomplete.
- (f) The ineffectiveness of pursuit location trackers combined with their cost is why multiple other municipalities have not renewed their contracts [see: <https://www.tmj4.com/news/i-team/praised-milwaukee-police-starchase-pursuit-program-shelved> and <https://oaklandside.org/2024/07/22/oakland-police-pursuits-starchase/> ]

**Recommendation:** SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require that the Financial Information section must be updated to reflect real actual totals and breakdowns of the cost for both the pursuit trackers and undercover location trackers.



## Undercover Covert Location Trackers

1) Covert Trackers Used for Non-Felony Investigations: Nothing limits or prohibits SPD from using undercover location trackers for non-felony criminal investigations.

- (a) The UN ODC report cited by SPD in the SIR, states that "The use by law enforcement of electronic surveillance should not be an investigative tool of first resort, instead its use should be considered when other less intrusive means have proven ineffective or when there is no reasonable alternative to obtain crucial information or evidence" and "In general, the principles or policy considerations which limit the use of electronic evidence surveillance in the investigation of serious crime include ... Proportionality: that the intrusion into privacy is proportionate to the seriousness of the suspected offence and the evidence it is anticipated will be obtained" [[https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic\\_surveillance.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf)].
- (b) Nothing explicitly requires that SPD's use of undercover location trackers is proportional to the crime or otherwise limited to specific types of crime.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, limit the use of undercover location trackers to only "violent offenses" or "most serious offenses", as defined in RCW 9.94A.030.

2) Abuse of Covert Trackers for Personal Use: These devices could be used as tools of domestic violence, stalking, and blackmail.

- (a) The Seattle Surveillance Ordinance doesn't address individual City employees acting outside the scope of what's been approved via the Ordinance; so an individual officer using one of these covert trackers to surveil their current partner, ex-partner, or dating prospects is not illegal under the Ordinance.
- (b) Similarly, an individual officer could use one of these covert trackers to surveil, say, a journalist who has written harsh exposé on the officer or the SPOG, and that is not illegal under the Ordinance.
- (c) The Surveillance Ordinance lacks preventions, protections, remedies, and penalties for these types of situations.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, explicitly add a provision that the use of tracking devices except pursuant to that defined in the final SIR exposes the individual officer to criminal or civil liability.

3) True Consent Frequently Impossible: Given the power imbalance between an SPD officer and member of the public, many people would not feel they have the power to deny the request for consent-based usage of these tracking devices. It may not take much for people to feel coerced into giving consent, even if it puts their own life in danger.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require legal representation for all consent-based use of the undercover location tracking devices.

4) Excessive Data Sharing: Nothing prohibits the propagation of the geolocation data from these devices, such as to partner agencies uninvolved with the investigation and/or to Fusion Centers. This is specially concerning when that location data was for a case where charges were dropped; or the data was shared before it gets validated via the court proceedings process (so the evidence in the location might be so poor



in quality to not be admissible in court but is already shared with an outside agency or Fusion Center in that unvalidated state). It would also be concerning if the location data was shared without a warrant. Recommendation: SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, prohibit SPD from sharing location data attained from covert tracking devices without a warrant or when the charges are dropped. This includes not sharing such data with Fusion Centers.

5) Predictive Policing: Predictive policing is highly biased by its very nature and it has a high likelihood of endangering & ruining the lives of innocent people. So it's very concerning that nothing prohibits SPD from feeding location data from covert tracking devices into predictive policing software.

Recommendation: Ban predictive policing.

6) No Data Localization: The online portal mentioned in item 2.3 in the SIR is hosted externally to the SPD network and very likely isn't even hosted inside WA state. This means that the manufacturer (CovertTrack) would have access to all the GPS data being collected by the device; and that data isn't protected by the Keep WA Working Act or the WA Shield Law. And the SIR doesn't include what security controls are in place to prevent the public from accessing the portal.

Recommendation: SPD must not deploy trackers. If City Council approves of this anyways, then at a minimum, require that the data generated by the covert trackers is entirely collected, processed, and stored only within WA state.

Please seriously consider my public comment. Thank you


Demographic Questions:

9. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Age Range




11. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Gender

[More details](#)




12. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Which race (s) / ethnicity (or ethnicities) do you identify as

[More details](#)



## 10. OPTIONAL Demographic Question: Neighborhood

[More details](#)



ID	What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?	Do you have any additional concerns about the use of technology (in case you ran out of space in section one)	What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/questions re what value do you see in this technology?	What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?	Do you have additional comments/considerations that leadership should take into account when making a decision about this technology?	Do you have any additional comments or questions?
1	This is such a gross violation of civil rights. Police especially SPD will use this in any way they please and puts people who are for example exercising protected rights to free speech and assembly at risk for unethical tracking.		Absolutely none. For SPD to abuse their already extensive power to wreak havoc		The best interest of its constituents and not what SPOG lobbies for new toys		
2	We already live in a surveillance state with a violent and dangerous police force. SPD are known for being reckless with vehicles. Empowering them to mark more "suspected criminal" cars will lead to more reckless car chases and violence against pedestrians, as well as encroaching on people's basic rights to dignity, privacy and due process.		None.		I would appeal to their moral values and ask them to think of their constituents. What will actually keep people safest? Not allowing unlimited police supervision!		

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3	This will cost the SPD and taxpayers far too much money to defend. "Reasonable Suspicion" is too low a standard, too ambiguous, and will likely bring about quick lawsuits. There is precedent for requiring a much higher standard of probable cause and warrants for this type of surveillance in other cities that will, no doubt, be cited in cases against SPD if this were to be implemented.	It's also wrong and quite chilling to want to allow this sort of surveillance against citizens on the whim of police officers in the field at any given moment.			You conscience. The rights that you yourselves would want if you found one of these trackers on your car, your spouse's car, or your child's car. Or, if none of that gets through, the money this will cost the city to defend.		

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4	Placing a tracking device on a vehicle should require a signed search warrant from a judge. "Reasonable suspicion" is not sufficient to permit the installation of a tracking device on a vehicle, and constitutes an unreasonable search under the 4th Amendment. Since the search is unconstitutional, it cannot be lawful, therefore police officers who install a tracking device without a warrant should be tried and convicted personally for stalking under state law RCW 9A.46.110.		Tracking devices and other invasive surveillance technology are not necessary. The police should focus on making the best use of the tools they have.		City leadership should focus on keeping the police department accountable for their actions and acting in the best interests of the people they ought to be protecting. Expanding the police's use of surveillance technology, if anything, increases the risk that officers abuse their power and do harm.		
5	Without probable cause, then it's a privacy violation.	So many civil liberty violations on the premise of this. Too many to list here.	None. Just another tool for the police to over-utilize on mostly innocent people.		Pay attention to civil liberties.		

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6	This is a blatant attempt to track anyone Trump doesn't like. "Reasonable" means absolutely nothing when citizens are already being disappeared by law enforcement. This is obviously a fascist move.		There is no value in the use of this technology.		Consider whether you have the moral integrity to stand up to what Trump is doing. Grow a spine.	Take into account that if you allow this to go ahead, you are capitulating to a fascist regime.	
7	This will be used to harm our communities and enforce nothing but racism and more violence against our neighbors.	Don't let the cops have trackers the cops are literally killing people constantly.	Put trackers on cop cars and let the people they endanger keep track of them	I see no value in surveillance that only serves to divide us and shatter us and disempower us.	Consider the vulnerable people who will be harmed with the misuse of the power of this technology by an institution that continues to misuse its power and technology. Consider all the vulnerable people who won't be helped at all by this technology. Consider how this is just another gift to protect business and ingrained power, and harm our communities.	Just don't, you know it is wrong, and if you don't, you are a blind fool.	You are our government, you need to protect us.
8	It can give law enforcement an easy way to track any vehicle. "Reasonable suspicion" is a low standard that allows for a breach of privacy.		None, the community will be more unsafe because of this technology				

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9	This can be used to target innocent people. Don't let w surveillance state become a reality				How this can disproportionately be used in a buased way based on suspicion instead of fact		
10	Fascism		Not much		Right to privacy	Misuse possibilities are massive and life changing	Who watches the watchers
11	With "reasonable suspicion", the threshold of justification is low and these can easily be abused by SPD for stalking exes and other unethical surveillance, which there are multiple recorded instances of with SPD with other surveillance technology. These technologies have not been shown to decrease high speed pursuits and there is always a power imbalance where it is very difficult for a person to not consent to a tracker		I see this as harmful and not beneficial to the public in Seattle		Do not spend more resources giving SPD more surveillance technology which doesn't actually improve public safety, instead use those resources to directly help people in need		



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12	Both Covert Trackers and Pursuit Mitigation Trackers raise serious civil liberties concerns. Covert Trackers enable warrantless, mass surveillance with little oversight, while Pursuit Mitigation Trackers escalate interactions and create unnecessary danger during traffic stops. SPD's history of misusing surveillance tools makes the use of these technologies especially troubling.		There is no demonstrated value in either of these technologies that outweighs the risks. SPD has provided no data proving Pursuit Mitigation Trackers reduce police pursuits or improve safety. Covert Trackers only serve to expand surveillance with minimal effort or oversight, undermining community trust. If these tools were effective, SPD should be able to show clear, peer-reviewed evidence of improved safety or reduced pursuits. Instead, they are seeking broad authorization based on vague claims. Given SPD's documented record of ignoring pursuit policies and misusing data systems, these technologies are likely to be abused.		City leadership should consider the broader impact on civil liberties, public safety, and community trust. These tools enable more surveillance and more escalation, not less. SPD has repeatedly ignored policies and oversight; adding new technologies without strong accountability only compounds the problem. Consent to surveillance is not valid when there is a power imbalance, as the ACLU has pointed out. "Reasonable suspicion" and "may flee" are dangerously low thresholds that open the door to overreach and discrimination. These tools should be rejected outright—not regulated or reformed.		Why is the public comment period so short for such significant surveillance technologies? The rushed timeline suggests a lack of transparency and a disregard for meaningful community engagement. SPD should not be trusted with expanded surveillance authority without clear, proven benefits and real accountability mechanisms.

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13	The degree of government surveillance is already way too great. It does not need to be expanded.		None. The police already have enough tools at their disposal to initiate traffic stops, and have demonstrated willingness to manufacture probable cause.		Consider that the expansion of police power and surveillance under the current government, one that is rife with abuses of power, is a disaster in the making.		
14	<p>Government surveillance is increasingly correlated with demonstrable violations of civil liberties. Further, the bar for StarChase is so incredibly low and subject to bias, poor judgment, and straightforward mistakes that will inevitably harm our most vulnerable neighbors and community members.</p> <p>Our community does not need increased surveillance. Our community will not benefit from living in greater fear of the police than we already do. The harms that will surely come from this far, far, far exceed the potential benefits of the use of such technology.</p> <p>SPD, do NOT do this.</p>	Yes. Use of this technology only increases harm to our community. SPDs role should be to decrease harm, not increase it.	I see value only in the rarest of cases ("rare" meaning not even once per year in the state of WA). And in those cases, the very highest standards, and the most scrupulous and thorough judicial review should be required. Such reviews should be so strict that more often than not, a warrant is denied.		Listen to your community members and legal experts who are making the case that this is a very bad idea. Do NOT proceed with use of this technology.	This will make us less safe. Do NOT do this. Please.	Please, do NOT do this.

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15	<p>Covert trackers increase the number of people under SPD surveillance by making it a lot easier for SPD to surveil people. Needing to have cops follow a car means SPD has to be very selective about who it surveils and creates a really high bar for surveillance. Being able to just put a tracker on a car &amp; not devote cops means SPD doesn't need to be so selective and lowers the bar for surveillance. The use of covert trackers not being limited to investigations of certain crimes demonstrates how these trackers increase the number of people being surveilled. Approval for covert trackers should be revoked due to this expansion.</p> <p>A member of the public can't genuinely consent to SPD placing a covert tracker due to the power imbalance between SPD and the member of the public. Any request by SPD to place a tracker is inherently coercive especially since SPD is allowed to lie to the public/use deception while members of the public can't legally do the same. If approval for covert trackers does not get revoked, use of them should be limited to court orders.</p> <p>Pursuit mitigation</p>	<p>The SIR's framing of RCW 10.116.060. 2.d as requiring police departments to acquire new pursuit mitigation technologies is so misleading that it could be considered a lie. That RCW merely states that after initiating an individual pursuit, the police should try to end that pursuit as soon as possible based on available options. The RCW doesn't say anything about acquiring additional options or expanding what options are available to each police department.</p>	<p>None. Police pursuits are incredibly dangerous and should be legislated out of existence, but these trackers will not reduce pursuits.</p>		<p>Why is the city considering technology (pursuit mitigation trackers) that does not reduce pursuits &amp; can potentially create pursuits?</p> <p>Why is the city giving SPD technology (covert trackers) that increase the number of people being surveilled and lower the threshold for someone to be surveilled by making surveillance so much easier?</p> <p>Why is the bar for use of both technologies so low? Covert trackers not requiring a court order and being available for any type of investigation. Pursuit mitigation trackers being allowed for pre-crime scenarios of thinking a vehicle "may flee" and for all types of crime based on nothing more than a single officers hunch.</p> <p>4th amendment impacts of allowing police to track a vehicle for up to 8 hours based on nothing more than an officers hunch.</p> <p>Burden pursuit mitigation trackers place on members of the public to know exactly what is going on at all time.</p> <p>Why is SPD getting more toys supposedly to eliminate pursuits when SPD does not follow existing policy restricting pursuits?</p> <p>Why would SPD end pursuits due to a GPS tracker being on a car when SPD's history</p>	<p>SPD's ability to use covert trackers should be revoked, and SPD should not be allowed to acquire pursuit mitigation trackers.</p>	<p>The public comment period being so short suggests that the city doesn't actually want to hear from the public on these technologies.</p>

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	<p>trackers don't decrease police pursuits. SPD didn't submit any research indicating that these trackers cut down on the number of pursuits, duration of pursuits, or speed of pursuits. SPD has a history of officers engaging in dangerous pursuits that are not are barred by existing policy and not disciplining (or very lightly disciplining) those officers. SPD even has even pursued a vehicle through a crowded park and off a pedestrian bridge even though SPD was tracking it via Onstar/GPS &amp; Onstar offered to remotely disable the vehicle.</p> <p>Pursuit mitigation trackers have the potential to increase police pursuits by allowing SPD to use them on vehicles that "may flee." Firing a tracker at the vehicle of someone that is currently complying is an escalation by SPD. Pursuit mitigation trackers hold members of the public to a much higher standard than SPD. SPD can use them for "reasonable suspicion" which is effectively a hunch or if they have a hunch/guess/claim that the member of the public "may flee" in the future. This is an incredibly low bar that's purely based on a single cop's perception (or</p>				shows they pursue cars being tracked by GPS.		

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	<p>claimed perception) and not based on actual facts. The member of the public is expected to know that what suddenly hit their car is a pursuit tracker fired by SPD and respond accordingly. If a member of the public panics &amp; drives away because they thought what just hit their car was something else, they're facing charges of attempting to flee.</p> <p>Pursuit trackers currently have an 8 hour battery life. This opens the door for SPD to use them not to end a pursuit, but to surveil someone for a few hours without the person knowing based on nothing more than a hunch. This seems like a clear violation of the 4th amendment.</p>						

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16	I'm concerned that these technologies will encourage unsafe and unreasonable police pursuits. There are several examples of SPD inappropriately pursuing vehicles, and my concern is that these technologies will encourage more of this action. SPU hasn't provided any information showing that this technology will reduce the number of pursuits. I would like to see time, energy, and money focused on reducing the number of pursuits rather than investing in this technology.	I am very concerned that this gives too much room for police to surveil the public. I am extremely concerned that use of this technology could escalate traffic stops. If someone doesn't know it's a tracker getting shot at their car, or if someone is in any way under informed about what is going on or experiencing any power dynamic between themselves and police which favors the police, this will escalate a situation. As the ACLU pointed out in a 2022 comment, it's very unlikely that someone could legitimately consent to SPD putting a tracking device on their vehicle.	There is no demonstrated value, and there is no clear, peer reviewed evidence showing that this technology will reduce police pursuits or improve safety in our city.	No.	Please consider the environment of fear and distrust that this will foster in our city if these technologies are implemented. People are already scared. This will make things worse. These technologies need to be completely rejected. We need effective solutions to makeign Seattle safer.	No.	Why is the public comment period so short? Have you consulted with community members of different races and ethnicities about how this would impact them and questions they have? Have you considered the valid points and concerns raised by ACLU? Have you considered the worst case scenario of what would happen if a police officer disobeying orders had these technologies at their disposal?

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17	I think the wording is way too vague. "May flee" means that a officer can guess and judge a presumed innocent person. I also think that in a pursuit, if the GPS pursuit mitigation trackers are deployed, the offer MUST stop the pursuit. Not "can", which allows the officer to waste resources and continue to endanger people around them by continuing the pursuit. Also, for data storage, if the tracker is used because of a consenting witness, when will the data be deleted? Where will deployments that tag the wrong vehicle be documented?		Stopping high speed pursuits that harm citizens.		The lack of data. Thus far we only have the word of SPD that this has "positive outcomes" but until they can point to numbers that show this can decrease the number of high speed pursuits AND that those decreases resulted in higher safety, I do not believe them.		
18	Concern for privacy		None. There is already plenty		Consider the people who will be affected by this. The people who will be targeted by cops		

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19	<p>Covert trackers require either a court order/warrant or “consent” to be installed. As the ACLU pointed out in its June 2, 2022 comments on group 4b surveillance technologies (page 94), it is highly unlikely a person can legitimately consent to SPD placing a tracking device due to the power imbalance between SPD and the person. This difference in power means any request by SPD is naturally coercive/comes with a threat making a consent illegitimate.</p> <p>SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits.</p>	<p>These are a way for police to escalate traffic stops and create high speed pursuit situations. This places a massive burden on the member of the public whose car SPD shoots at to know in the moment that what was fired was a GPS tracker. Some people will panic and try to flee because they won't have enough information to know what is happening.</p> <p>Police pursuits are incredibly dangerous and should be eliminated. But, these trackers won't cut down on pursuits by SPD, SPD will be free to continuing pursuing someone even after shooting a pursuit</p>	I see no value for the people of Seattle with this technology.				



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		mitigation tracker.					

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20	I am very concerned about SPD's history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife & her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws & share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws.	SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits. The biggest pursuit mitigation tracker company, StarChase, has been around for almost 20 years which is more than enough time to study whether these trackers actually reduce pursuits.	None.	No.	Human rights. Privacy and freedom from surveillance and biased targeting		

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21	SPD has a history of abusing surveillance tools, they do not need access to this type of technology, "reasonable suspicion" is too broad of a scope and will endanger vulnerable populations		none, this will harm populations that SPD already discriminates against.		SPD previously pursued a vehicle that was being tracked via GPS into a crowded park & off a pedestrian bridge even though the vehicle was equipped with Onstar which was tracking the vehicle for SPD & offered to remotely shut down the vehicle. Having access to technology doesn't deter their behavior.		

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22	<p>I have myriad concerns about putting this tech in the hands of the police department. SPD has shown time &amp; time again that they can not be trusted to use surveillance technology in a responsible or legal way. The department has been marred by more scandals than I can count &amp; faced an injunction from the DOJ. Giving these officers carte blanche to conduct mass surveillance on Seattlites with a laughably low threshold to justify is not only a violation of our rights to privacy but also sets a dangerous precedent that plummets us ever closer to fascism and the mass surveillance state. This is a huge waste of taxpayer money &amp; will not reduce high speed chases. It also endangers citizens who may naturally panic when they are being shot at without warning by police officers. This is a foolish idea that is out of step with what the people of Seattle want. Do not give the police guild city funds for this unnecessary unsafe tool that will be used to infringe on the rights of everyday people.</p>				<p>It will end up costing the city well beyond the already exorbitant price tag for this 'new toy' via the onslaught of lawsuits the PD will be subjected to when they invariably use this surveillance technology in inappropriate &amp; illegal manners, as they have repeatedly demonstrated when given other surveillance technologies.</p>		

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23	SPD should not have either of these technologies. It should not be allowed to purchase pursuit mitigation trackers, and its ability to use covert trackers should be revoked. SPD should not be able to surveil so many people at once and it's unlikely that people will be able to give consent due to power imbalance with police. Police will coerce them into allowing covert trackers. For pursuit mitigation trackers, "Reasonable suspicion" is an incredibly low threshold, cops have claimed things like averting eye contact or shaking hands are reasonable suspicion. And, "may flee" is even lower, it is a cop guessing what might happen. SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits.		No value. Too much police surveillance and dangerous technology.		Both technologies share the issue of SPD's history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife & her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws & share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws. Police pursuits are incredibly dangerous and should be eliminated. But, these trackers won't cut down on pursuits by SPD, SPD will be free to continuing pursuing someone even after shooting a pursuit mitigation tracker. SPD pursues who it wants to regardless of policy or technology.		

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24	It's unnecessary surveillance that has the vast potential for abuse by officers. There is no data that this technology helps reduce police pursuits. What it does do is give officers new tech to abuse and intimidate citizens. As the city grapples with budget constraints, particularly public schools, road conditions, and housing services, it is unconscionable that SPD wants to spend city budget on gadgets with no practical benefit.	It gives police too much power to stalk and surveil people and a dangerously low bar for employing the technology against any citizen at will. It gives officers the tools for abuse, not safety.	None. There is no value in SPD being able to track citizens. No good can come of this.		Consider how the technology can likely be abused or weaponized against civilians. Consider: Is there data proving the effectiveness of the technology? There is not in this case. Also consider how the funds can be used to actually serve the public (schools, infrastructure, housing), not just SPD's desire for shiny new toys.		Why does SPD really want these new gadgets? It certainly isn't to protect us.

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25	Mis-use and abuse of the technology by SPD officers (SPD has a long history of this!). The general increase in surveillance technology, which has been proven to be targeted unfairly towards minority communities. Waste of resources. We don't need this technology to make Seattle safer, and SPD officers will still have high speed chases, it's what they love to do		None		Please consider that a large and diverse coalition pushes back against new surveillance technologies every time SPD tries to waste our taxpayer money on them. No means no, we don't want or need more surveillance tech!		

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26	<p>Covert Trackers – GPS trackers SPD installs as part of an investigation without the vehicle owner’s knowledge. Covert trackers require either a court order/warrant or “consent” to be installed.</p> <p>- As the ACLU pointed out in its June 2, 2022 comments on group 4b surveillance technologies (page 94), it is highly unlikely a person can legitimately consent to SPD placing a tracking device due to the power imbalance between SPD and the person. This difference in power means any request by SPD is naturally coercive/comes with a threat making a consent illegitimate.</p> <p>- Remote tracking, like covert trackers, increase the number of people being tracked by police because the barriers to the police using them are so low. Police are free to assign officers to follow/surveil someone, we’ve all seen this in various movies. Having officers follow/surveil someone is very resource intensive which limits the number of people the police can subject to such invasive surveillance creating some protection against mass surveillance. Covert trackers don’t require much in the way of officer time and allow for police</p>	<p>Pursuit Mitigation Trackers (aka StarChase) Pursuit Mitigation Trackers – Are projectiles that police shoot at cars SPD wants to acquire and be able to use these trackers any time there’s “reasonable suspicion” a vehicle was involved in a crime or if a cop thinks a car “may flee” a traffic stop. This is absurdly broad. “Reasonable suspicion” is an incredibly low threshold, cops have claimed things like averting eye contact or shaking hands are reasonable suspicion. And, “may flee” is even lower, it is a cop guessing what might happen. SPD has not provided any data</p>	None.	<p>Both Technologies</p> <p>Both technologies share the issue of SPD’s history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife &amp; her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws &amp; share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws.</p>	<p>The civil rights of and consent its citizens?</p> <p>How the SPD’s history of abusing these technologies makes issuing them additional capacity to do so an absurd proposal?</p>	<p>How about you actually start investing in our communities, instead of pretending to be the progressive leaders you are while making this city friendly only to corporations and the police?</p>	



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	departments to greatly increase the number of people they surveil.	showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits. The biggest pursuit mitigation tracker company, StarChase, has been around for almost 20 years which is more than enough time to study whether these trackers actually reduce pursuits. These are a way for police to escalate traffic stops and create high speed pursuit situations. This places a massive burden on the member					

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		<p>of the public whose car SPD shoots at to know in the moment that what was fired was a GPS tracker. Some people will panic and try to flee because they won't have enough information to know what is happening. Police pursuits are incredibly dangerous and should be eliminated. But, these trackers won't cut down on pursuits by SPD, SPD will be free to continue pursuing someone even after shooting a pursuit mitigation tracker. SPD pursues who it wants to regardless of policy or technology. To put it another way, cops don't become cops to not engage in</p>					

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		<p>high speed pursuits. Some examples: SPD pursued a vehicle that was being tracked via GPS into a crowded park &amp; off a pedestrian bridge even though the vehicle was equipped with Onstar which was tracking the vehicle for SPD &amp; offered to remotely shut down the vehicle. SPD pursued a vehicle running stop signs and red lights despite being told by their superior to stop. SPD continuing a pursuit despite being order to stop, again SPD driving 3x the speed limit and running red lights without authorization for a pursuit. SPD invented probable cause to chase the</p>					

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		wrong car at 100 mph through South Seattle The current battery life of these trackers is 8 hours which opens the door for police to misuse them to spy on people based on the incredibly low bar of “reasonable suspicion” SPD’s reference to RCW 10.116.060. 2.d in the material update is incredibly mis-leading. The RCW directs police departments to end each individual pursuit as soon as possible based on available options, it does NOT direct, authorize, or encourage police departments to acquire additional surveillance tech.					

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27	i don't think it's acceptable to track people without their knowledge and I think it'd be a waste of funds that could go into supporting the community better		I don't.		Consider the people. y'all already have a bad relationship w/the people this would make it worse.		
28	This is a waste of tax payer dollars, is the opposite of living in a "land of the free," is rife for abuse, and violates citizens privacy		Less than none		This will decrease investments in the city from domestic and international companies who don't want their rights and privacy violated indiscriminately		

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29	I dont think this is a good use of taxpayer money and I think it's a gross violation of my civil rights. Having an item placed on a car without the driver's knowledge or consent feels like entrapment and makes me feel as though my local police have nefarious motives. I don't see a world in which placing a tracker on a car is going to prevent police from giving chase if that car flees- I think they will just give chase but have a lower chance of losing the car. Either way it's dangerous, but trackers set a precedent of unmanned surveillance that I'm just not comfortable with as a citizen. It does not make me feel safer and makes me wonder what better uses the money for these could go to.				I would want city leadership to consider the privacy, safety, and trust of the citizens of its city. We're in a weird time in history and I think increased surveillance isn't always the answer.		
30	This is a privacy and safety issue. No one consents to being tracked. Police pursuits are regularly risky to everyone involved and the public. I believe the police can do their job without this technology.		None				

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31	The review process of new policing technologies needs more oversight. This is potentially very dangerous technology	Too much power given to law enforcement in an increasingly fascist administration	For tracking animals, not humans.		Instead of using this tech on civilians, we should be able to track police movements around the city. At all times.	Don't allow SPD to incorporate new surveillance tech like this without robust civilian and city oversight	
32	Misuse of funds that could be allocated to better things. Long history of SPD frightening misuse of technology to illegally spy for personal reasons, ex girlfriends, wives, domestic violence victims. Do not allow this.	Absolutely no to Covert Trackers and Pursuit Mitigation Tracker. Remote tracking, like covert trackers, increase the number of people being tracked by police because the barriers to the police using them are so low. Mass surveillance is not safety it's a gross overstep of police power and will drag in innocent citizens.	None currently. The spd already has the largest budget of any department in the city. They have more than enough to work with currently. If they cannot do their jobs with current funding, I honestly question their ability to do their jobs at all.		The SPD has so much money and technology at their disposal currently. How can they possibly justify more funding at this time to possibly be mis handled and used to surveil innocent law abiding citizens. Its already shown a history of doing so.		

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33	Privacy, abuse of power, a slippery slope for a hyper surveillance state that doesn't actually protect people. It protects assets of the state. The judgement that police officers make in pursuits have led to a lot of harm than good.		None.	Nope. Don't approve of this.	Think about the lack of ethics when technology is used in policing. There are no guardrails with even existing technology around surveillance and it hasn't even held police officers accountable to their constant overreach or when they've endangered people.	Consider REAL solutions that curb crime like affordable housing, living wages, affordable food, accessible transit, free/affordable healthcare, free/affordable schooling... When people's material needs are met, there is less inclination to commit crimes.	
34	SPD is a department with a long history of abusing technology and power for nefarious purposes.	This is a terrible idea. They are rushing the approval process. whatever benefit it MIGHT provide (and the jury is VERY out on that) is overwhelmed by its potential for abuse.	Aside from increasing the surveillance state? NONE	Stop throwing money at this terrible department. Spend it on the homeless instead		Look at the record of this department when it come to creepy abuse of power!	Spend the money on folks that need it,



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35	SPD has a record of racial discrimination and violations of civil rights. We have the right to be free of invasive surveillance, and the allowed justifications for use of these technologies are incredibly broad.	No.	None at all.	No.	Our civil rights, the current political climate trend towards authoritarianism and government overreach, and SPD's long history of civil rights violations.	No.	No.
36	Misuse and abuse of the technology. The waste of tax payer money to fund and implement this. No support showing this technology would actually improve SPD's ability to keep civilians safe.		None.		SPD's long track record of abuse of power and funds. This technology would disproportionately hurt marginalized groups within our community.		I urge you to not approve the implementation of this technology.
37	Police misuse and disproportionate harm to BIPOC community just as we see in other police incidents		None		Actually hold a vote for use of tax dollars!	More studies that are impartial	
38	SPD has proven time and time again that they can't be trusted to responsibly use technology like this. Please do not approve.		None. Warrants are needed to track members of the public—random officers should not have access to these trackers.		Do not approve.		

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39	<p>Police are known to be more violent and aggressive to strangers and family than the average person by several degrees of magnitude. Giving them free rein to stalk and harass any woman and any person they like without the accountability of a warrant seeking process is going to enable abuse. Seattle PD in particular is exceptionally untrustworthy with surveillance and good judgement and has a long history of abusing their privileges to stalk women and kill women.</p> <p>Giving a group known to be full of abusers and stalkers more tools to stalk and harass women is a form of Boleyn r against your constituents I don't know how you can justify. Have some decency and stop rolling over to hand money over to a government entity that's had open DOJ investigations longer in tenure than most of you council members have been alive.</p> <p>This is extremely cowardly and irresponsible.</p>		<p>This will provide the police with even more institutional support to harass and assault women with cover of the city council. How many dead grad students do you need splattered across Capitol Hill before you have the common sense to stop this before it even comes up a vote?</p> <p>You should be ashamed of this. It should make you sick of yourselves.</p>	<p>I want to know how council members will stand to personally profit from this and after filling out this form that's what I'll look into next.</p>	<p>How many more women would you like to see dead at the hands of spd? Because this will empower these predators to escalate the existing culture of harassment and her blood will be on your hands.</p>		

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40	The barrier to using this technology is too low. The police do not need to be surveilling anyone in this manner.	The SPD does not have the trust of their community. They have used their power and force in unreasonable ways	None		That it's going to be too easy for the police to track anyone and everyone for any reason they deem fit.		
41	I do not trust these technologies in the hands of SPD or any state force.		None.		That money should be used to fund state workers, educators, and support public housing.	What could be better used with that money and build trust in our communities: investment in our wellbeing.	
42	I do not support this technology. The money for this would be better fit for affordable housing.		None		This is not what money should be spent on		

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43	<p>I'm concerned that this technology will be abused, particularly without consent for Covert Trackers. This is a breach of privacy. In situations where such technology is abused, I imagine SPD officers can use it on anyone (e.g. ex-romantic partners) for non-professional reasons. As someone who has dealt with a stalker, this causes feelings of fear, not safety.</p> <p>Pursuit Mitigation Trackers are also another form of technology that can be easily abused. 'Reasonable suspicion' to use such technology on a suspect is too subjective. Due to human and systemic biases, the chance is too great that the suspect is innocent, and that funds would be wasted on projectiles.</p> <p>More than anything, these forms of technology do not make me feel safer.</p>		To stalk people		Such forms of technology only exacerbates public fear, rather than making people feel safer.		

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44	<p>I have major concerns about and oppose the use of this technology.</p> <p>Covert Trackers Covert Trackers – GPS trackers SPD installs as part of an investigation without the vehicle owner’s knowledge. Covert trackers require either a court order/warrant or “consent” to be installed.</p> <p>As the ACLU pointed out in its June 2, 2022 comments on group 4b surveillance technologies (page 94), it is highly unlikely a person can legitimately consent to SPD placing a tracking device due to the power imbalance between SPD and the person. This difference in power means any request by SPD is naturally coercive/comes with a threat making a consent illegitimate. Remote tracking, like covert trackers, increase the number of people being tracked by police because the barriers to the police using them are so low. Police are free to assign officers to follow/surveil someone, we’ve all seen this in various movies. Having officers follow/surveil someone is very resource intensive which limits the number of people the police can subject to such invasive surveillance creating some protection against mass</p>	<p>Pursuit Mitigation Trackers (aka StarChase) Pursuit Mitigation Trackers – Are projectiles with GPS trackers that police shoot at cars SPD wants to acquire and be able to use these trackers any time there’s “reasonable suspicion” a vehicle was involved in a crime or if a cop thinks a car “may flee” a traffic stop. This is absurdly broad. “Reasonable suspicion” is an incredibly low threshold, cops have claimed things like averting eye contact or shaking hands are reasonable suspicion. And, “may flee” is even lower, it is a cop guessing what might happen. SPD has not provided any data</p>	Absolutely none.		<p>Both Technologies Both technologies share the issue of SPD’s history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife &amp; her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws &amp; share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws.</p>		

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	surveillance. Covert trackers don't require much in the way of officer time and allow for police departments to greatly increase the number of people they surveil.	showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits. The biggest pursuit mitigation tracker company, StarChase, has been around for almost 20 years which is more than enough time to study whether these trackers actually reduce pursuits. These are a way for police to escalate traffic stops and create high speed pursuit situations. This places a massive burden on the member					

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		<p>of the public whose car SPD shoots at to know in the moment that what was fired was a GPS tracker. Some people will panic and try to flee because they won't have enough information to know what is happening. Police pursuits are incredibly dangerous and should be eliminated. But, these trackers won't cut down on pursuits by SPD, SPD will be free to continue pursuing someone even after shooting a pursuit mitigation tracker. SPD pursues who it wants to regardless of policy or technology. To put it another way, cops don't become cops to not engage in</p>					

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		<p>high speed pursuits. Some examples: SPD pursued a vehicle that was being tracked via GPS into a crowded park &amp; off a pedestrian bridge even though the vehicle was equipped with Onstar which was tracking the vehicle for SPD &amp; offered to remotely shut down the vehicle. SPD pursued a vehicle running stop signs and red lights despite being told by their superior to stop. SPD continuing a pursuit despite being order to stop, again SPD driving 3x the speed limit and running red lights without authorization for a pursuit. SPD invented probable cause to chase the</p>					



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		wrong car at 100 mph through South Seattle The current battery life of these trackers is 8 hours which opens the door for police to misuse them to spy on people based on the incredibly low bar of "reasonable suspicion" SPD's reference to RCW 10.116.060. 2.d in the material update is incredibly mis-leading. The RCW directs police departments to end each individual pursuit as soon as possible based on available options, it does NOT direct, authorize, or encourage police departments to acquire additional surveillance technology. RCW 10.116.060. 2.d – "(d) As soon as					

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		practicable after initiating a vehicular pursuit, the pursuing officer, supervising officer, if applicable, or responsible agency shall develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options, such as the use of the pursuit intervention technique, deployment of spike strips or other tire deflation devices, or other department authorized pursuit intervention tactics; and”					

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45	My primary concern is that SPD has a history of lack of any real accountability. The use of this technology gives officers yet another way to covertly monitor citizens. Given the blatant lawless behavior of SPD within the recent past (~5years), it seems ridiculous to give them additional access to things like covert trackers.				I would caution city leadership about the risks of misuse. This is just waiting for additional monitoring of people unrelated to crime. For example: an officers ex wife		

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46	<p>Oh my god so many! What on earth does - reason to believe someone may flee a traffic stop - mean?? It's a traffic stop..... Now we're tracking cars? That MAY flee? Excuse me? I'm concerned about the wide-openness of this proposal, the absolute lack of consideration for all the other actually useful things this money could be spent on, the disregard for people's privacy. I'm concerned about the mental cognition of city council to even suggest this. Are you all ok???</p>		Absolutely none.		<p>Literally all the other things the City could be spending this money on, and all the other ways that are PROVEN to keep communities safe and create material safety. Including, but not at all limited to - funding secure housing, food access, universal healthcare and childcare, education and schools, literally the list goes on. I would love City leadership to consider defunding the police and prisons, consider DECREASING the ways we can find to punish people, and consider... not passing this... and stop this kind of wild obsession with surveillance technology.</p>		<p>Just why? Why on earth is this being proposed in the first place?</p>

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47	<p>First of all, members of the public cannot consent to covert trackers because the very clear, obvious power imbalance between police and members of the public carries implied coercion. Freely given consent is impossible. Secondly, justification for use of pursuit mitigation trackers is ridiculously and dangerously broad - "reasonable suspicion" is an incredibly low barrier to use and "may flee" is a low standard subject to interpretation and abuse. Use of pursuit mitigation trackers also places a heavy, undue burden on members of the public who may see something fired at their car and panic or not know what happened. In this way, use of the pursuit mitigation trackers might incite the very conditions meant to qualify their use. The high likelihood of trackers being fired and hitting a different car than intended, with their battery life of 8 hours, means a serious risk of unjustified surveillance, pursuit, and danger of someone uninvolved with the suspected or alleged crime, and a violation of their rights. Additionally, the impact assessment SPD performed on pursuit mitigation trackers did not show ANY</p>		None.		<p>Demonstration of evidence of its benefit. The very real impairment of the rights of members of the public to not live under surveillance. The history of SPD's abuse of power. The waste of taxpayer dollars on useless and unproven technology that puts the city, with its budget shortfall that has threatened to close essential life-giving services such as summer camps for disabled children, at the risk of expensive lawsuits for improper, harmful, and unjustified use of this technology.</p>		

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	evidence that use of pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce pursuit frequency, duration, or speed. The killing of Jaahvi Kandula and public reporting on SPD's routine abuse of power to speed at lethal speeds without justification should not become an excuse for taxpayer dollars to be used to expand unnecessary surveillance. The attempt to purchase new surveillance technology based on an incorrect citation of the revised code of Washington— 10.116.060.2.d directs police departments to end pursuit as soon as possible and does not direct, authorize, or encourage police departments to purchase or expand surveillance technology— gives me alarm, distrust, and suspicion and does not make me feel trusting or confident of the police departments and officers involved.						
48	The low bar of reasonable suspicion combined with the history of SPD misuse of technology, the ease of misuse, and the lack of evidence that pursuits decrease with use of trackers		None		The danger that surveillance tools can have and the ability to misuse the technology		

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49	<p>All of the suggested trackers and related technology give way too much power to SPD to track any given driver/vehicle without the knowledge and consent of the driver. As the ACLU pointed out in its June 2, 2022 comments on group 4b surveillance technologies (page 94), it is highly unlikely a person can legitimately consent to SPD placing a tracking device due to the power imbalance between SPD and the person. This difference in power means any request by SPD is naturally coercive/comes with a threat, making a consent illegitimate. Furthermore, a report from The Pew Charitable Trusts concluded that remote tracking, like covert trackers, increase the number of people being tracked by police because the barriers to the police using them are so low. Lastly, SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits. The biggest pursuit mitigation tracker company, StarChase,</p>		Absolutely none.		What reputable evidence do you have that this will increase the safety of the general public in Seattle?		

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	has been around for almost 20 years which is more than enough time to study whether these trackers actually reduce pursuits.						
50	This level of surveillance tech is far too easy to abuse. Inappropriate use of surveillance tech by police to stalk and intimidate civilians extrajudicially is already a problem- this will make it far easier to do so.				Private citizens' right to privacy and to have freedom of movement without additional layers of surveillance forced on us.		



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51	<p>Both technologies represent an over extension of appropriate policing tooling and techniques. There is little to no evidence demonstrating how they will solve for the undefined problems or what the success metric even is - what is the criteria to allow this? At what point is it scrapped?</p> <p>It promotes "lazy policing" where we simply violate privacies because of a "hunch". The bar is incredibly low to access these, and it essentially takes a "this person is a white male around 6'" description and let's cops track any white male who is around 6'. This sounds absurd, but this is the power being provided. We have already seen numerous scenarios where tools are actually harming investigations as they're triggering false positives. Too much data is not always a good thing.</p> <p>These technologies have shown to be actively harmful with cops chasing down a car... that was the wrong car... at 100mph. And there is a known history of the abuse of power to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife &amp; her friends histories, share</p>		No value	<p>1. What is the threshold for allowed power handed to cops</p> <p>1.a. How is this being defined, tracked</p> <p>1.b. What is the plan to regulate this? Will this be removed as an option?</p> <p>2. Who regulates this technology? This should be a 3rd party such as an auditor.</p> <p>3. This technology should be removable from any policing toolkit.</p> <p>4. What is the justification to allow this? What data points are looking to be solved? How do you know that this is the solution</p> <p>5. What is the problem statement? Is it an actual problem? What are the underlying causes? What other solutions exist within existing toolkit? How are they being utilized to solve for</p>	The known discrimination of cops, history of abuse of technologies, the lack of enforcement of regulations and the known abuse of subsequent power, and to consider success metrics from previous allowances, a deep evaluation of the problem and the questions listed above		

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	information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws & share health information. The known discrimination of cops will only empower them to further attack marginalized people.						

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52	<p>SPD wants to acquire and be able to use these trackers any time there's "reasonable suspicion" a vehicle was involved in a crime or if a cop thinks a car "may flee" a traffic stop. This is absurdly broad. "Reasonable suspicion" is an incredibly low threshold, cops have claimed things like averting eye contact or shaking hands are reasonable suspicion. And, "may flee" is even lower, it is a cop guessing what might happen.</p> <p>The current battery life of these trackers is 8 hours which opens the door for police to misuse them to spy on people based on the incredibly low bar of "reasonable suspicion"</p>	<p>Both technologies share the issue of SPD's history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife &amp; her friends' histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws &amp; share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws.</p>	none	no	<p>SPD's reference to RCW 10.116.060.2.d in the material update is incredibly mis-leading. The RCW directs police departments to end each individual pursuit as soon as possible based on available options, it does NOT direct, authorize, or encourage police departments to acquire additional surveillance technology.</p>	<p>SPD pursues who it wants to regardless of policy or technology. To put it another way, cops don't become cops to not engage in high speed pursuits. Some examples:</p> <p>SPD pursued a vehicle that was being tracked via GPS into a crowded park &amp; off a pedestrian bridge even though the vehicle was equipped with Onstar which was tracking the vehicle for SPD &amp; offered to remotely shut down the vehicle.</p> <p>SPD pursued a vehicle running stop signs and red lights despite being told by their superior to stop. SPD continuing a pursuit despite being ordered to stop, again SPD driving 3x</p>	<p>SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. The Pursuit Technology Impact Assessment that SPD references did not examine whether or not these trackers reduce the number of pursuits, the duration of pursuits, or the speed of pursuits.</p>

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						the speed limit and running red lights without authorization for a pursuit SPD invented probable cause to chase the wrong car at 100 mph through South Seattle	
53	This is extravagant and unnecessary. We should not be spending money or time on fortifying tbd surveillance capabilities of spd or anyone.	This is not the world we want to build. Go read 1984 or watch a Black mirror episode, whatever will convince you.	It only serves fascism! There is no value for the community.		Our funds could be better spent in so many other places - education, housing / support for unhoused folks, road repair.	The people don't want it. LISTEN TO US, you're supposed to work for us.	Do the right thing.

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54	This technology is a blatant overreach/abuse of power, violation of privacy and will be used to perpetuate systemic racism, endangering innocent citizens based on the judgement of solely the bias of an officer and not on an actual fact or evidence.	Yes I worry about the unconstitutional and unethical precedent this would set regarding a citizen's right to privacy and due process before judgement.	Absolutely none.	N/a	The consequences of their actions on society and democracy as a whole, as well as the impact to the daily lives of everyday Americans. This is only to stoke fear and to further the corruption of an already corrupt and obsolete agency.	Leadership should consider spending the excessive amount of money they wish to throw at surveillance technology and invest it into the community, as well as our deteriorating roads and infrastructure.	N/a
55	I have concerns about this tech! Tracking tech does not keep us safer. It targets people more than helps. It strengthens a surveillance state that gets co-opted to target immigrants, to target people coming to Washington for reproductive health care, etc. we can reduce violence and crime by building stronger healthier communities by attending to needs people have and building relationships, not by continuing to militarize our police.		I don't. I don't want it. As a long time seattle resident and homeowner and community member, as UW employee, and a woman, I don't feel this tech will make a better safer Seattle.		Please don't invest in tech that continues to surveil and criminalize, leading more people into an already overcrowded and traumatic jail system. Invest in community programs! Invest in housing! Invest in public transit and health care and food banks! Invest in de escalation trainings!		

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56	<p>This technology will be used to violate civil rights and widen the already unethical imbalance of power the police hold in this city. This technology is unproven and on its basis, explicitly intends to violate the right to privacy of the constituency. Cops are not superheroes and do not need superpowers to do their jobs. They are public servants, and should be serving their communities, not wasting taxpayer money on toys they will only use to abuse. We have more than enough precedent and evidence to show that SPD cannot be trusted with this tech, as there are still members of the force under investigation for violations like stalking, racism, and domestic abuse using the technology already at their disposal.</p>		<p>Racist profiling and abuse of power, which seem to be among of the few values SPD holds.</p>		<p>This tech will be used to violate the laws and liberties that protect your constituency. It would be in the City leaderships interest to avoid further lawsuits against SPD, and to protect and serve the citizens they have been elected by. Supporting this tech is supporting racism, abuse of power, and violence against innocents.</p>	<p>Look at the world we live in. You will also have to answer for your actions someday. Do you want this to be one of them?</p>	

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57	Broad use of this technology will erode the rights of Seattlites to travel freely without surveillance or obstruction.	I don't think the Seattle police department has a trustworthy enough record when it comes to surveillance of its citizens. This is police over reach.	Only value is to prop up the militarized police state. Invest in human services, mental health services, addiction services and homes for the unhoused instead. Our city deserves better than this.	The only value of this technology is in creating an ever more militarized police force that is untrusting of the citizens they are supposedly there to protect. The Seattle police don't even handle violent crimes appropriately and they want us to give them the opportunity to track us? No thank you.	Implicit bias in Americans has been shown to mean that people who live on the margins of society and those who are most vulnerable end up bearing the brunt of this burden. We cannot trust these officers to have this kind of power		
58	Abuse of civil rights and misuse and abuse by police		No value		History of abuse of technology and overreach by SPD combined with lack of evidence for the value of these technologies		
59	This technology increases surveillance and unwarranted tracking, which historically adversely affects Black and Brown communities. It allows officers to use their own biased judgement to track people, and there have been cases of officers using such judgement against their superiors' orders.	This technology is a dangerous step forward into surveillance fascism. Allowing police to use such tracking technology opens the door for terror organizations such as ICE to do the same.	None		Consider people's right to privacy and life without surveillance. Consider how any increase in police technology inevitably causes more violence and aggression towards Black and Brown people.		

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60	I do not trust the Seattle Police department to use tracking technology responsibly, especially during a time when any form of protest is increasingly criminalized.		I can imagine some, but it is not worth the cost/risk.		Using the budget on housing.		
61	I strongly oppose the purchase and use of tracking devices by SPD. Police have too much discretion on when to use these technologies, and the potential for abuse is too high. Covert trackers will allow for police departments to greatly increase the number of people they subject to surveillance. At a time when surveillance is increasingly being used to attack our society's most targeted groups, SPD should be given less power to surveil and track people, not more.	There are numerous documented cases where SPD personnel have abused their power to spy on people and misuse data. Trusting SPD to use this technology ethically is misguided at best, and at worse, puts people already in danger of SPD "misconduct" in even more peril.	I see no value in spending money on and entrusting this technology to a department that has a long history of abuse and misconduct of their power.		Privacy, ethics, safety, potential for abuse and misuse, the increasingly chilling overreach of federal agencies creating agreements with local police forces to share information in order to target oppressed groups. These tracking devices have NO place, given these terrible risks to public safety and especially those already marginalized groups.		



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62	Incredible abuse of power. SPD have proven time and again the general public's safety is not at the forefront of their concern. With the dramatic authoritarian moves the current US administration is making, the last thing we need is to open the door for more overreach by an already overfunded and harmful agency.		None.		Both technologies share the issue of SPD's history of misusing police systems to spy on people. Consider the direction this is taking policing in our communities.		You should be focusing your time and energy on reallocating funds away from policing and towards community assistance programs. The data is available to you. Supporting communities reduces crime. The government should support its people, not terrorize them.

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63	<p>I am concerned about the cost of these two new pieces of technology and the privacy implications of their use. There is not sufficient evidence of the benefit of these devices to support paying for them.</p> <p>Additionally, the barrier to be allowed to track someone's location is very low. There is little rational and process needed to allow an officer to use these gps trackers.</p> <p>How is the location data transmitted and stored. Is the data encrypted? Is the data stored? Is the data stored - long term, short term, encrypted? Who has access to this data? Can people request for their data to be deleted? Can people request to know if they have ever been tracked by the police? Will there be logging and auditing about the deployment of these devices?</p>				<p>The cost, efficiency, potential for abuse, security of the data, auditing and logging of the data, and the procedures of when the devices should be deployed to be considered by city leadership.</p> <p>I also want city leadership to consider alternatives to these pieces of new technology.</p>		Why was this announced with so little time for public comment?
64	<p>SPD does not need to secretly track people or track cars 8 hours after a traffic stop. This is a violation of our privacy and if SPD can't do their jobs without it then they should get better at their work.</p>		None it's just another surveillance tool abuser cops will use to harm us.		That their constituents deserve privacy and to not be harassed by cops.		Don't pass this bill. Don't give SPD these trackers.

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65	<p>I have many concerns about overreach of power by SPD in the use of these technologies. In the instance of covert trackers, there is no real way for people to consent to their use. Police are trained to talk to citizens in ways that enable them to twist someone's words and claim they had "consent," but in most cases this is not actually consent.</p> <p>An example:  Cop: "Do you mind if I install this?"  Citizen: "No" (Does this mean, "no, don't install it"? "No, I don't mind"? The cops will always pick the first of these.)  OR  Citizen: "Yes." (Does this mean, "yes, it's fine" or "yes, I mind if you install it and I don't want you to"?  Once again, cops will always pick the first version, which affirms what they want.)</p> <p>Beyond this, SPD has been consistently shown to overstep and abuse their power, which presents grave concern about the use of the above and pursuit mitigation trackers/StarChase as well.</p> <p>If SPD is empowered to use pursuit mitigation trackers in any case of "reasonable suspicion," we already know racial profiling will be involved. This term is not defined for</p>		<p>Frankly, I don't see value in the use of this technology. There is no study or data to prove that they have made citizens safer. Show me that, and maybe I'll change my mind.</p>		<p>Surveillance culture is extremely dangerous to all citizens. Your job should be to protect the people of your city, not continue padding the police budget for gadgets that will not effectively improve public safety.</p>		<p>I continue to be disappointed by city council decisions that give the police department more power and funding but do not actually address the problems of the city. Solutions have been brought forward that would arise from communities in need -- for example, ways to help our unhoused population that offer them a route towards employment and permanent shelter -- and instead, money gets spent on the police department and other organizations to sweep people's shelters. This is a death sentence for some, and for others a giant setback when they might have been closer to acquiring housing, getting clean, finding</p>

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	<p>a reason -- because police will use any cue (example: "they wouldn't meet my eyes") to suspect someone. Furthermore, firing something at a citizen's car is going to cause confusion, fear, and will escalate a situation. This puts the citizen in danger (SPD can claim they "fled" if they feared they were being shot at, and then they might actually be shot), puts bystanders in danger (just look at all the instances of cops hitting people and endangering people by pursuing chases), and puts officers in danger if they engage in pursuit. There are too many instances to count of police pursuing vehicles through public areas, walking paths, off of bridges, etc.</p> <p>Beyond this, there are numerous documented instances of SPD using their power and other tools at their disposal to stalk people, misuse and break privacy laws such as HIPAA, or otherwise look into someone's private information without consent or lawful reason.</p>						<p>employment, etc. I expect better of the council, and I hope that more humane, community-based decisions are implemented .</p> <p>As far as this relates to tracking devices, the council should spend more time researching and reaching out to the community to find out what measures should be implemented , rather than handing another expensive device over to the police department to misuse.</p>

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66	I see a large possibility for abuse if there is no opportunity provided for informed consent of tracking. I see a large possibility for endangerment of the public with projectile-based GPS trackers with no declaration of intent.		I do not see value in this use of the technology without oversight or informed consent. I do not see the value of tracking technology delivered in a kinetic approach that may confuse members of the public with hostile weapons fire.		I would be very hesitant to grant more tracking technology to SPD without firm data that the use of these technologies would show a reduction in crime or an increase in positive benefit.		
67	both of these technologies have high risk of being used for surveillance. With SPDs history of misuse of technologies like this i do not support the use of this technology as it could lead to the police spying on citizens. it also does not prevent or stop high speed chases which are where most accidents happen. it is not a necessary technology.		none		why they feel the need to be surveilling their citizens rather than supporting programs that would actually help make peoples lives materially better.		

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68	I am concerned with giving SPD any additional ability to surveil the people of Seattle, as they have not demonstrated in the past that they are responsible stewards of sensitive data and technologies. There are many examples of officers misusing surveillance technology to track ex-girlfriends, stalk an ex-girlfriends, dig into their spouse & her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and so on.	I am concerned about the process the city is using to consider these powerful technologies. Why only two weeks for public comment and no public hearings? Why is this considered a material update and can circumvent the complete review process?	I don't see any value. It is expensive tech and SPD's claims that "pursuit mitigation" trackers will result in less dangerous police pursuits seems to not be backed by any empirical evidence.	Why do we keep funneling more city funds into police technologies when we could instead by building-up the very popular and effective non-police emergency response parts of the city such as the CARE department?	In this moment of authoritarian federal rule, the technologies we need you to be investing in are: non-police community-based safety, housing, mental health services, food security – not more creepy policing tech.	Show some backbone and just say no to SPD for once. Many of you have already way over-estimated and misunderstood the "public safety mandate" that you believe you were elected with, and you will not survive the next election unless you start understanding and funding public safety that is not police-based. This unnecessary and intrusive tech request from SPD is a great place to start.	
69	SPD has already proven irresponsible with GPS trackers. This will not make law enforcement safer.		This type of surveillance has no meaningful benefit to society.		Look at the facts. This tech has not improved outcomes where it was trialled.		

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70	SPD has not provided any data showing that pursuit mitigation trackers actually reduce the number of pursuits. There should be evidence of this technology benefitting the community, and we have been offered none. Who is fact checking these assumptions? Since we can only assume that pursuit mitigation trackers may decrease the number of pursuits, particularly the ones that end up damaging the community and dehumanizing individuals accused of crime, because there is no data to prove it...hence it not being a fact, only an assumption.		I do not see any value. Only more room for violence, danger and damage to our community.	“Reasonable suspicion” is an incredibly low and broad threshold, left to the individuals who, realistically, are the reason this technology could be being sought out, since they apparently can't drive. There is actual evidence of SPD officers driving unsafely (with their knees, distracted driving, etc), committing absurd and heinous traffic violations (crashing into other vehicles, unauthorized pursuits, going 77MPH in a 30 MPH zone with no lights on...) How are members of the community supposed to trust that the people who have behaved in the aforementioned ways have the ability to discern what is “reasonable suspicion”?	Does this technology actually make our communities safer, and will it actually do what it is being advertised as doing (I.e decreasing the amount of public pursuits).		

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71	I am extremely concerned about the adoption of these stupid surveillance technologies; they are obviously a waste of money and just another tool for SPD to harass, abuse, intimidate, and harm people here. Stop wasting our resources on this crap and actually support people's lives like through food, housing and healthcare, not greater criminalization by violence abusive police.	Yup, I'd love for cops to not be able to arbitrarily shoot surveillance darts at whatever cars they like!	I'm sure police will have fun shooting them at cars. And it will make the company that makes them richer, and give the cops even more of our city's budget. (this is facetious)		Stop harassing us, the people who actually live here in Seattle, and actually invest in our community rather than greater tools to control and punish us.	SPD has a long, long history of violence, abuse and lack of accountability. Stop giving them resources!	
72	How is it legal to track citizens without a warrant? It seems like an overreach of police authority.	It's a fishing expedition.	I dont		Why would this ever be constitutional without a warrant? It's just a lawsuit waiting to happen		



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73	Unnecessary surveillance and violation of privacy.	It will 100% be used with a racial bias.	Absolutely none.	I cannot believe we're wasting tax dollars on this when that's literally not the answer to reduce crime. Crime is reduced when proper needs of civilians are met such as affordable housing, health care, and food and water. We should be putting resources into that or universal basic income than unlimited surveillance in a job that only requires 90 hours of training.	We've poured billions of dollars into policing in seattle. If it was gonna work, it would've worked by now. We need to try other avenues.		When are we going to discuss Universal basic income?

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74	I am concerned about the extremely low bar for "suspicious behavior" required to deploy these technologies. I am concerned that, once in place, these trackers can be used beyond the timeframe of a pursuit incident. I am concerned about the imbalance of power in any conversation between SPD officers and citizens that created pressure to consent to installation of a tracking device, and I am concerned about trackers that can be used without due process in "emergency" situations. I am concerned that this technology will encourage high speed chases, and SPDs troubling record of fatal outcomes resulting from high speed chases in which they have been involved.		None.		I would like to tell City Leadership that we have community based programs and resources that are already proven to have good outcomes and that we should invest in those vs unproven technology that further empowers SPD (which is still operating under a federal consent decree) to act with impunity.		
75	This technology will be unfairly used against minority populations and lower income groups.		None		I want them to consider who is really benefiting from this technology and who largely pays the price.		

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76	Covert trackers that the SPD installs are done so without the owners consent. I am concerned about increase in surveillance technology in general, but especially among the SPD who have a history of misusing police systems to spy on people. SPD cops have been caught misusing systems including to stalk an ex-girlfriend, dig into their wife & her friends histories, share information about a domestic violence investigation, and break HIPAA laws & share health information. Even the OPA has misused data and broken HIPAA laws.		Until the SPD gets rid of their guilds and have better systems of holding police officers accountable, I don't see any value in giving them more surveillance power.		Accountability systems to the misuse of tools already available to the SPD. And the role police guilds play in protecting officers from the consequences of this misuse of power.		

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77	This technology serves to increase policing and surveillance rather than improving the lives of Seattlites. It allows SPD to react to bias and prejudice to make the decision of whether someone is "likely to flee a traffic stop." We don't need this, surveillance is fascist, this isn't Seattle.				You represent the people, not the wealthy's property.		

## 2025 Surveillance Impact Report Executive Overview

# Tracking Devices

## Seattle Police Department

### Surveillance Impact Report Versions:

- 2022 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Tracking Devices adopted by [Ordinance 126776](#) on 2/28/2023.
- 2025 Surveillance Impact Report: Seattle Police Department Tracking Devices

## Overview

The Operational Policy statements in this document represent the only allowable uses of the equipment and data collected by this technology.

The purpose of this Executive Summary is to highlight policies, technology and practices regarding the surveillance technologies under Council review. This document outlines information, including policies and practices, about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. All information provided here is contained in the body of the full SIR document but is provided in a condensed format for easier access and consideration.

### 1.0 Purpose

Seattle Police Department (SPD) utilizes geolocation trackers to track and locate vehicle information during criminal investigations. Geolocation trackers are devices that SPD utilizes as a tool to locate and track the movements and locations of vehicles. Trackers are utilized only after obtaining legal authority via a court order or consent, and once the consent or terms of the order have expired all data collected is maintained only in the investigation file.

A category of GPS trackers (police pursuit management technology) is utilized to tag and track fleeing vehicles as a safer alternative to vehicle pursuits. In accordance with RCW 10.116.060.2.d, which requires agencies to “develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options,” this specialized GPS tracker allows SPD to track the precise location of a vehicle for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime has been established and accomplish the task of recovery or arrest without the need for initiating or continuing a vehicle pursuit.

Tracker technology directly tracks and collects location information of vehicles, and indirectly tracks and collects the same information about individuals. Despite the requirement that trackers be utilized only pursuant to a search warrant or with consent, this could raise potential privacy concerns, such as general surveillance or tracking of the general public.

GPS pursuit mitigation trackers also directly track and collect location information of vehicles and, indirectly, their occupants. While this technology is limited by policy to vehicles for which there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause, they could raise potential privacy concerns, such as general surveillance or tracking of the general public.

### 2.0 Data Collection and Use

Covert tracking technology consists of interconnected hardware and software. The hardware, a real-time tracking and data logger, is a compact unit that adheres to or rides along with a targeted vehicle. These trackers are location tracking devices that report latitude and longitude coordinates on a pre-determined schedule that can be adjusted by users remotely. The hardware also logs high temperature alerts, low battery alerts, device removal, power/shut down alerts and battery level. The software consists of an online portal that collects the information captured by the hardware, and allows for graphic representation of that information, including mapping of locations and movement, alerts for established events (i.e., a

vehicle has moved beyond an established boundary, etc.), and scheduling of “check-ins” (the reporting interval records the locations set in seconds, minutes or hours).

The data captured by a device is downloaded out of the online portal after the conclusion of a tracking schedule (due to the expiration of a search warrant or an investigation) and is provided to the Officer/Detective leading the investigation. The data is then purged from the software and the hardware is reset for future deployment, meaning no data captured is stored in any location other than the investigation file. This is in keeping with Washington State Retention Schedule for Records Documented as Part of More Formalized Records ([GS2016-009](#)). It requires that such records be retained “until verification of successful conversion/keying/transcription then destroy.”

In the beginning of 2020, cellular providers in the USA announced that the existing 3G cell networks would be decommissioned in 2022 as the newer 5G networks were phased in. Many of the existing SPD tracking devices were tied to the older 3G network and have been or will need to be replaced with similar-functioning updated 5G versions of the same location tracking technology.

Officers/Detectives obtain search warrants or consent to deploy vehicle tracking devices. The information is gathered consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon “individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy.”

Vehicle tracking data is temporarily stored by third-party vendors (as described above), until the schedule for collection of data has expired (per the search warrant or consent authorities), at which time all data collected is downloaded and attached to the investigation file. This is in keeping with the [Washington State Local Government Common Records Retention Schedule](#) Disposition Authority Number GS2016-009 Rev. 0, governing retention of records documented as part of more formalized records, and requiring that SPD “retain until verification of successful conversion/keying/transcription, then destroy.”

Physical objects involved in covert tracking deployments are unmarked as their purpose is in support of covert investigations.

In the case of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers, the GPS launcher deploys a GPS tracking tag onto a suspect vehicle. Once the GPS tag is attached to the vehicle, it communicates positional data to a mapping platform in real time. Law enforcement can then plan and coordinate an informed tactical response to make a safe arrest while maintaining community and officer safety. It is important to note that the GPS tag has a limited battery life (approximately 8 hours), preventing the possibility of long-term surveillance.

## 3.0 Data Minimization & Limitations

Each application of covert tracking technology is screened by the TESU supervisor and held to a legal standard of consent or court issued search warrant. The process is as follows: one member of the Unit is tasked with receiving requests for deployment (including a Request Form that must be completed by the requesting Officer/Detective, which includes the active search warrant number). A TESU supervisor then approves the request before a tracking device is assigned and deployed to an investigating Officer/Detective. All requests are filed with TESU and maintained within the unit, available for audit.

Equipment deployment is constrained to the conditions stipulated by the consent or court order providing the legal authority. All deployments of tracking technology are documented and subject to audit by the Office of Inspector General and Federal Monitor at any time.

Data collected is provided to the case Detective for the investigation and no data is retained by the Technical and Electronic Support Unit.

Prior to deployment of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers, officers must establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop of a vehicle. At that point, officers will have the discretion to deploy the GPS pursuit mitigation trackers if it appears the vehicle may flee. Additionally, if an officer engages in a pursuit with a vehicle, they can deploy a tracker and terminate the pursuit, relying on the tracker to follow the vehicle.

## 4.0 Access & Security

### Access

Only authorized SPD users can access the vehicle tracking devices or the data while it resides in the system. Access to the vehicle tracking systems/technology is specific to system and password-protected.

Data removed from the vehicle tracking system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely input and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

All SPD employees are backgrounded and access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including [SPD Policy 12.040](#) - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, [SPD Policy 12.050](#) - Criminal Justice Information Systems, [SPD Policy 12.080](#) – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, [SPD Policy 12.110](#) – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and [SPD Policy 12.111](#) – Use of Cloud Storage Services. Unit supervisors are responsible for screening all deployments as well as ensuring that staff receive adequate training specific to the involved technologies.

TESU personnel are trained by the vendor in the use of the hardware and software. When an Officer/Detective requests and deploys a tracking device from TESU, TESU personnel train the Officer/Detective in the tracker's use.

If the geolocation tracking device is being utilized pursuant to a search warrant, the warrant dictates the scope and parameters of the information collected.



Data collected by the deployment of a GPS pursuit mitigation tracker is used by SPD personnel to track and locate vehicles for which there is probable cause or reasonable suspicions. These personnel may be patrol, investigations, or RTCC staff capable of broadcasting tracking information to responding units. OIG personnel will also have access for audit purposes.

Patrol Supervisors will monitor the deployment of GPS pursuit mitigations trackers. The use of GPS pursuit mitigation trackers will be documented in the incident/offense report.

[SPD Policy 6.060](#) requires that “information will be gathered and recorded in a manner that does not unreasonably infringe upon: individual rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Washington, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; the right to petition government for redress of grievances; and the right to privacy.”

## Security

Data is securely stored by the vehicle tracking technology vendor and will be transferred to the case investigator only via Seattle Police Department owned and authorized technology. At that time, vehicle tracking data collected by the tracking device is downloaded from the vendor software and resides only with the investigation file.

## 5.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

No person, outside of SPD, has direct access to the tracking units or the data.

Data obtained from the system may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney’s Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office
- King County Department of Public Defense
- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, [Chapter 42.56 RCW](#) (“PRA”). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department ([RCW 10.97.030](#), [SPD Policy 12.050](#)). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per [SPD Policy 12.080](#), the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests “for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies.”

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Discrete pieces of data collected by these tracking devices may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, and in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by [SPD Policy 12.050](#) and [12.110](#). All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly executed research and confidentiality agreements as provided by [SPD Policy 12.055](#). This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices. Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigation, and to comply with legal requirements.

GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data will be shared with neighboring law enforcement agencies as needed for operational purposes. As tracked vehicles leave the City limits, it will become necessary for partner law enforcement agencies to have the tracking information to assist with tracking and apprehension. Conversely, other agencies using GPS pursuit mitigation tracking systems may need to share their tracking information with SPD as their tracked vehicles enter the City limits.

As the GPS pursuit mitigation tracking data is included in SPD police reports, the above listed agencies will also have access via investigative files.

## 6.0 Data Retention

[SPD Policy 7.010](#) governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with [SPD Policy 6.060](#), such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy ([SPD Policy 5.001](#)), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in [SPD Policy 5.002](#).

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

SPD's Intelligence and Analysis Section reviews the audit logs and ensures compliance with all regulations and requirements.

Audit, Policy & Research Section personnel can also conduct audits of all data collection software and systems. Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of

Inspector General and the federal monitor can audit for compliance at any time.

RTCC System Administrators will manage the GPS pursuit mitigation tracking system to ensure that the retention requirements meet those of SPD.

## **SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE**

<b>Department:</b>	<b>Dept. Contact:</b>	<b>CBO Contact:</b>
Seattle Police Department	James Britt	Geoffrey Detweiler

### **1. BILL SUMMARY**

**Legislation Title:**

AN ORDINANCE relating to surveillance technology implementation; authorizing approval of uses and accepting the 2025 updated surveillance impact report and 2025 executive overview for the Seattle Police Department's use of Tracking Devices; and ratifying and confirming certain prior acts.

**Summary and Background of the Legislation:** The original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Tracking Devices (Ordinance 126776) was adopted by the City Council on February 28, 2023. Subsection 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) states that "[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance."

SPD utilizes geolocation trackers to track and locate vehicle information during criminal investigations. Geolocation trackers are devices that SPD utilizes as a tool to locate and track the movements and locations of vehicles. Trackers are utilized only after obtaining legal authority via a court order or consent, and once the consent or terms of the order have expired all data collected is maintained only in the investigation file. SPD is seeking a \$250,000 Washington State Department of Commerce Law Enforcement Pursuit Technology grant that will assist local law enforcement in vehicle pursuit mitigation. SPD acquiring pursuit mitigation GPS tracker launchers qualifies as a material update, therefore requiring this proposed legislation. SPD is seeking this grant and tool in accordance with RCW 10.116.060.2.d, which requires agencies to "develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options." This specialized GPS tracker allows SPD to track the precise location of a vehicle for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime has been established and accomplish the task of recovery or arrest without the need for initiating or continuing a vehicle pursuit. SPD is proposing a pilot for 25 SPD patrol vehicles to be equipped with GPS tracker launchers, deployed throughout the patrol operations bureau precincts. All sworn SPD officers will be trained in the use of pursuit mitigation GPS trackers, ensuring compliance with recent state law updates regarding pursuit mitigation. Pursuit mitigation GPS trackers will be monitored by the Real Time Crime Center and information will be relayed to patrol units in the field.

### **2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM**

**Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project?**

☐ Yes ☒ No

### 3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation have financial impacts to the City?

☒ Yes ☐ No

Expenditure Change (\$); General Fund	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
Expenditure Change (\$); Other Funds	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	\$250,000*				

Revenue Change (\$); General Fund	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
Revenue Change (\$); Other Funds	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
	\$250,000*				

Number of Positions	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.
Total FTE Change	2025	2026 est.	2027 est.	2028 est.	2029 est.

\* This funding was accepted and appropriated via the 2024 Q3 Grant Acceptance, Ordinance 127149.

#### 3.a. Appropriations

☐ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes appropriations.

#### 3.b. Revenues/Reimbursements

☐ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes revenues or reimbursements.

#### 3.c. Positions

☐ This legislation adds, changes, or deletes positions.

#### 3.d. Other Impacts

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to The City of Seattle, including direct or indirect, one-time or ongoing costs, that are not included in Sections 3.a through 3.c? If so, please describe these financial impacts.

The \$250,000 Washington State Department of Commerce Law Enforcement Pursuit Technology grant covers the first two years of the project. If effective, there will be ongoing costs of \$37,500 annually if the technology is retained after the first two years of subscription.

Cost savings may be seen in reduced liability from decreased number of vehicle pursuits, which often result in litigation. Additionally, pursuits often result in damage to city owned equipment, specifically police cars. This technology can reduce those costs as well by negating the need for pursuits.

Additional grants may be available in the future to provide ongoing funding, should the department decide to increase or continue the deployment.

**If the legislation has costs, but they can be absorbed within existing operations, please describe how those costs can be absorbed. The description should clearly describe if the absorbed costs are achievable because the department had excess resources within their existing budget or if by absorbing these costs the department is deprioritizing other work that would have used these resources.**

The subject equipment will be purchased using funding provided by the Washington State Department of Commerce under the Law Enforcement Vehicle Pursuit Technology grant program. This funding was accepted and appropriated via the 2024 Q3 Grant Acceptance (ORD. 127149).

**Please describe any financial costs or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation.**

SPD policy restricts officers from engaging in vehicle pursuits unless certain criteria are met. The devices funded through this legislation will provide a way for officers to track suspected criminals without engaging in vehicle pursuits, which could reduce the risk to the public and potential claims costs.

**Please describe how this legislation may affect any City departments other than the originating department.**

N/A

#### **4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS**

- a. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?**  
No.
- b. Is publication of notice with The Daily Journal of Commerce and/or The Seattle Times required for this legislation?**  
No.
- c. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?**  
No.
- d. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative.**

- i. **How does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? How did you arrive at this conclusion? In your response please consider impacts within City government (employees, internal programs) as well as in the broader community.**

The Surveillance Ordinance is designed to address civil liberties and disparate community impacts of surveillance technologies. The Surveillance Impact Review included in the attachments, as required by the Surveillance Ordinance, includes a Racial Equity Toolkit review adapted for this purpose.

- ii. **Please attach any Racial Equity Toolkits or other racial equity analyses in the development and/or assessment of the legislation.**

N/A

- iii. **What is the Language Access Plan for any communications to the public?**

N/A

**e. Climate Change Implications**

- i. **Emissions: How is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way? Please attach any studies or other materials that were used to inform this response.**

N/A

- ii. **Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.**

N/A

- f. **If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s)? What mechanisms will be used to measure progress towards meeting those goals?**

N/A

- g. **Does this legislation create a non-utility CIP project that involves a shared financial commitment with a non-City partner agency or organization?**

No.

## 5. ATTACHMENTS

**Summary Attachments:** None.

June 4, 2025

## MEMORANDUM

**To:** Public Safety Committee  
**From:** Tamaso Johnson, Analyst  
**Subject:** Council Bill 120994 – SPD Tracking Devices Material Update SIR ORD

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On June 10<sup>th</sup> the Public Safety Committee (Committee) will have a discussion and possible vote on Council Bill (CB) 120994, authorizing approval of and accepting the Seattle Police Department's (SPD's) 2025 updated surveillance impact report (SIR) and executive overview for use of tracking devices. The Committee received an initial briefing from SPD on this technology prior to transmission of this legislation on May 13, 2025. The bill is intended to meet the requirements of Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 14.18, Acquisition and Use of Surveillance Technologies, which requires City of Seattle departments intending to acquire surveillance technology to obtain advance Council approval of that acquisition.

This memorandum (1) provides background on this technology and prior Council authorization, (2) describes the effect of CB 120994, and (3) discusses next steps.

### Background

Vehicular tracking devices utilize geolocation technology (e.g. Global Positioning System or "GPS") to collect and transmit precise location information about a subject vehicle. These devices generally fall into two categories: covert and non-covert. Covert trackers can be attached to a target vehicle out of view of the occupant(s) and provide information on the movements of the vehicle without the occupant(s) knowledge. Covert trackers may be utilized by law enforcement during the course of criminal investigations. SPD policy requires either a warrant or consent prior to the use of covert tracking devices. Pursuit mitigation trackers are non-covert technology typically deployed by law enforcement in the form of a projectile fired from an on-vehicle or handheld launcher that contains a GPS transmitter and is designed to attach to a target vehicle on contact. Pursuit mitigation devices are intended to allow law enforcement to obtain continuous short-term location information about vehicles that are suspected to be involved in a crime, obviating the need for direct vehicle pursuits that may endanger suspects, officers, and bystanders. Pursuit mitigation tracking devices are currently in use by a number of law enforcement agencies around the country, including six Washington State agencies.<sup>1</sup>

SPD's use of tracking devices, not including pursuit mitigation technology, was previously authorized by Council passage of [Ordinance 126776](#) on February 28, 2023.

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<sup>1</sup> See SPD 5/13/2025 presentation: <https://seattle.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=14171322&GUID=17C2C098-85C1-4C2D-B81C-E5C016687984>



## **CB 120994**

### **Authorizing Pursuit Mitigation Technology**

SPD is currently authorized to use covert tracking devices, pursuant to Ordinance 126776. Acquisition of pursuit mitigation tracking technology would constitute a “change in the purpose or manner” of tracking device technology deployment by SPD, and therefore requires additional Council authorization of a material update to the SIR under the Surveillance Ordinance.<sup>2</sup> CB 120994 would authorize SPD use of pursuit mitigation technology, such as StarChase, which SPD is planning to immediately acquire should this legislation be approved. StarChase is a pursuit mitigation technology that consists of a GPS-enabled projectile (“dart”) propelled by a compressed air launcher which is designed to attach to a target vehicle by means of adhesive and/or magnets and provide short-term location tracking. The tracking dart, containing GPS tracking unit and battery with an estimated eight hour run time, can be deployed by a handheld launcher resembling a rifle or by a vehicle-mounted launcher affixed to the front of a police vehicles. The SIR describes a planned deployment of 25 StarChase units over the initial two year period.

SPD pursuit mitigation tracking devices would be managed by the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) and data captured via this technology would be analyzed through the RTCC using vendor software. Data transmitted by the darts include date, time, location, battery life, and vehicle speed. This data would be directly accessible by authorized patrol, investigations, and RTCC staff, as well as Office of Inspector General staff for the purpose of conducting audits. Officers trained in use of vehicle pursuit mitigation technology would be authorized to deploy trackers in instances where a determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to stop a vehicle has been made.

### **Fiscal Impact**

The Summary and Fiscal Note for this legislation states that the first two years of costs associated with the acquisition and deployment of pursuit mitigation technology, estimated at \$250,000 total, will be covered by a grant awarded to SPD by the State Department of Commerce.<sup>3</sup> Costs to maintain this technology beyond the initial two year period are estimated at \$37,500 per year ongoing, which would come from the General Fund if other fund sources are not identified.

### **Next Steps**

The Committee will have a summary briefing, discussion, and possible vote on this legislation on June 10<sup>th</sup>.

cc: Ben Noble, Director

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<sup>2</sup> See: Seattle Municipal Code 14.18.020F.

<sup>3</sup> These grant funds were included in the 2024 Year-End Grant Acceptance Ordinance (Ord. 127149) passed by Council on November 21, 2024.

# Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) Material Update

*Seattle Police Department (SPD) Tracking Devices SIR*

*June 10, 2025*

# Reminder: Purpose of Proposed Legislation

- Original Surveillance Impact Report (SIR) for Tracking Devices technology was passed by the City Council on **2/28/23** (Ordinance 126776).
- SPD has received a **\$250,000 grant** from the WA State Dept. of Commerce for Law Enforcement Pursuit Technology, which will help local law enforcement mitigate vehicle pursuits.
- SPD acquiring pursuit mitigation GPS tracker launchers qualifies as a material update, therefore requiring this proposed legislation.
- Section 14.18.020.F of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) states that "*[a]ny material update to an SIR, such as to change the purpose or manner in which a surveillance technology may be used, shall be by ordinance.*" SMC 14.18 does not require material updates to go through the same process as the original SIR.





# What is the Material Update?

- SPD is seeking this tool in accordance with RCW 10.116.060.2.d, which requires agencies to *“develop a plan to end the pursuit through the use of available pursuit intervention options,”* ensuring compliance with recent state law updates regarding pursuit mitigation.
- This specialized GPS tracker allows SPD to track the precise location of a vehicle for which probable cause or reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime has been established and accomplish the task of recovery or arrest without the need for initiating or continuing a vehicle pursuit.
- **25 SPD patrol vehicles will be equipped with GPS tracker launchers.**
- All sworn SPD officers will be trained in the use of pursuit mitigation GPS trackers.
- Pursuit mitigation GPS trackers will be monitored primarily by the Real Time Crime Center and information will be relayed to patrol units in the field. Patrol units can also monitor the trackers' location directly if RTCC is unavailable.

## SENATE BILL REPORT SI 2113

As Passed Senate, March 4, 2024

### Title:

**Brief Description:** Concerning vehicular pursuits by peace officers.

**Sponsors:** People of the State of Washington.

### Brief History:

**Committee Activity:** Law & Justice: 2/28/24, 3/01/24 [DP, DNP, w/oRec].

**Floor Activity:** Passed Senate: 3/4/24, 36-13.

### Brief Summary of Initiative

- Expands authorization for vehicular pursuits by allowing an officer to conduct a vehicular pursuit where there is reasonable suspicion a person has violated the law.
- Modifies the risk assessment for engaging in vehicular pursuits by providing that an officer may not engage in a vehicular pursuit unless the person poses a threat to the safety of others and the safety risks of failing to apprehend or identify the person are considered to be greater than the safety risks of the vehicular pursuit under the circumstances.

# Follow up

## How long has StarChase been in business?

- 2011

## What is the effectiveness rate?

- Through 2023, Starchase reports agencies across the US had a 92% tag adhesion rate and an 86% apprehension rate on deployment of their tags.
- In WA state that number is lower. Utilizing reporting data from 14 agencies from April 2024 to April 2025, the success rate is 52%. For the local report, success was defined as adhesion and suspect in custody. The most recent agency to deploy, KCSO, reports they have 100% success, with 5 tags deployed, adhered, and suspects in custody.

## What are the metrics for success?

- Starchase reports that adhesion and arrests are the metrics most used. SPD PA&R research scientists will look for other metrics that show effects based on the deployment of Starchase.



# Questions



## Legislation Text

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**File #:** Appt 03175, **Version:** 1

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Appointment of Shon Fitzgerald Barnes as Seattle Police Chief.

The Appointment Packet is provided as an attachment.

# **City of Seattle**



**Chief of Police**

**Seattle Police Department**

**Confirmation Packet  
May 20, 2025**

**Shon Fitzgerald Barnes**





May 20, 2025

The Honorable Sara Nelson  
President, Seattle City Council  
Seattle City Hall, 2nd Floor  
Seattle, WA 98104

Dear Council President Nelson:

After an extensive national search for a leader who possesses the strength, knowledge, and dedication to effective and equitable police work needed to ensure that the Seattle Police Department continues to excel, it is my pleasure to transmit to the City Council the following confirmation packet for my appointment of Shon F. Barnes as Chief of Police.

The materials in this packet are divided into three sections:

1. **Shon F. Barnes**

This section contains Chief Barnes' appointment, oath of office form, resume and the press release announcing his appointment.

2. **Background Check**

This section contains the report on Chief Barnes' background check.

3. **Competitive Exam**

This section contains the results of the competitive exam as required by Article Vi, Section 3 of the City Charter.

The search for Seattle's next police chief was led by two nationally respected law enforcement leaders, former Interim Chief Sue Rahr and former Chief Kathleen O'Toole. The search began in mid-2024 to recruit the highest-qualified candidates nationwide. Fifty-seven applications were received from throughout the United States and narrowed to a list of 44 qualified candidates. The top four candidates were invited to take a competitive exam in November, as required by the [City Charter](#), and three candidates passed the exam. Those names were forwarded to me for my consideration and final selection. During the search process, and as part of the Charter-required competitive exam, we sought insight and feedback from diverse community members. Last year, my office hosted six neighborhood "Safer Seattle" community forums focused on public safety, and public comment and feedback from these meetings helped shape the [job description](#) for the Chief of Police position.

The City of Seattle, its residents, and the sworn and civilian staff who make up the Seattle Police Department are ready for a police chief who is a forward thinking, effective, and thoughtful leader – one who is nationally recognized for community-oriented and collaborative policing. Seattle has set clear expectations that our next leader must guide the Seattle Police Department to invest in community engagement and partnerships, focus on innovation, and utilize research and data in crime prevention strategies to improve public safety. Our city deserves a police chief who will be the driving inspiration to transform and enhance the department's culture, continue to build community relationships, and address public safety challenges through evidence-based practices to make all those who live, work, and visit Seattle safe. Shon Barnes is such a leader, and the one Seattle needs.

Chief Shon Barnes has been dedicated to policing for 25 years. His entry into policing began while he was a high school teacher and realized he could have a greater impact as a police officer. His law enforcement career began with the Greensboro Police Department in North Carolina where he eventually was promoted to Captain. Chief Barnes left Greensboro to accept appointment as a Deputy Chief of Police in Salisbury, North Carolina, and then diversified his experience as the Director of Training and Professional Development with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability in Chicago.

Immediately preceding his appointment as Interim Chief in Seattle, Mr. Barnes served as the Chief of Police for Madison, Wisconsin where he was a nationally recognized leader for implementing crime reduction strategies that dramatically decrease violent and property crime. He is committed to the concepts of inclusivity and diversification of the police department's sworn and civilian staff. He is a mission-driven leader who leads through data-driven strategies and by employing technology to reduce crime. His message is clear – the police department cannot combat crime alone and must commit to partnerships and building relationships to keep communities safer.

Chief Barnes holds a Ph.D. in Leadership Studies, a Master of Science in Criminal Justice, and a BA in History and Pre-Law. He has participated in ongoing professional education with the Senior Management Institute for Police, the Southern Police Institute, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is a subject matter expert for the U.S. Department of Justice on police leadership, critical incident review, use of force practices, and constitutional police standards. In addition, he was inducted into the George Mason University Center for Evidence-based Crime Policy Hall of Fame, which recognized his use of data analytics and evidence-based policing. He has been identified as a National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science Scholar and a member of the National Policing Institute's Council on Policing Reforms and Race. Barnes is a cofounder of the 54th Mile Project and has helped develop a national training curriculum on police and race.

In the time since I appointed Shon Barnes to serve as Interim Chief, he has dedicated considerable effort toward fostering relationships with both internal and external stakeholders. He has worked build rapport with a variety of community groups in every Council District, including the African American Advisory Council, the Downtown Seattle Association, the American Jewish Committee of Seattle, View Ridge Community Council, Eritrean community leaders, Chinatown International District community leaders, Leschi Community Council, Business Improvement Associations, along with the Precinct Advisory Councils. He has joined in local community events, like Morning Service at First AME Church, and participated in community safety walks, including in Belltown and the University District.

Chief Barnes has also made it a point to engage with public safety partners, including the leadership at the Office of Police Accountability, the Community Police Commission, and the Inspector General for Public Safety, as well as his fellow City department directors. Further, Chief Barnes has developed connections with fellow regional criminal justice partners at the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, the Office of Adult and Juvenile Detention, the Seattle City Attorney's Office, the King County Sheriff's Office, the Washington State Patrol, the University of Washington Police Department, University of Washington Medicine, and the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission. It is clear that the Chief's over 300 engagements within the first 100 days have laid a strong foundation for transforming police-community relations and improving overall public safety strategies.

After reviewing Chief Barnes's application materials and reflecting on your interactions with him during the first 100 days of his appointment, I'm confident you will agree that he will provide the leadership we need as our permanent Chief of Police.

If you have any questions about the attached materials or need additional information, Chief Public Safety Officer Natalie Walton-Anderson would welcome hearing from you. I appreciate your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bruce A. Harrell". The signature is written in a dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Bruce A. Harrell  
Mayor of Seattle

## **SECTION**

### **A**



**City of Seattle**

Mayor Bruce Harrell

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May 13, 2025

Shon F. Barnes  
Seattle, WA  
Transmitted via e-mail

Dear Shon,

It gives me great pleasure to appoint you to the position of Chief of Police of the Seattle Police Department at an annual salary of \$361,862.

Your appointment as Chief is subject to City Council confirmation; therefore, you will need to attend the Council's confirmation hearings. Once confirmed by the City Council, you will serve at the pleasure of the Mayor.

Your contingent offer letter provided employment information related to the terms of your employment, benefits, vacation, holiday and sick leave.

I look forward to working with you in your role as Chief and wish you success. We have much work ahead of us, and I am confident that the Department will thrive under your leadership.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bruce A. Harrell". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Bruce A. Harrell  
Mayor of Seattle

cc: Seattle Department of Human Resources file



## City of Seattle Department Head Notice of Appointment

<b>Appointee Name:</b> <i>Shon Fitzgerald Barnes</i>	
<b>City Department Name:</b> <i>Seattle Police Department</i>	<b>Position Title:</b> <i>Chief of Police</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Appointment</b> OR <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Reappointment</b>	<b>City Council Confirmation required?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<b>Appointing Authority:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> City Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <i>Fill in appointing authority</i>	<b>Term of Position: *</b> Council Confirmation <b>to</b> Mayor's Discretion <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Serving remaining term of a vacant position</i>
<p><b>Background:</b> Chief Shon Barnes has been dedicated to policing for 25 years. His entry into policing began while he was a high school teacher and realized he could have a greater impact as a police officer. His law enforcement career began with the Greensboro Police Department in North Carolina where he eventually was promoted to Captain. Chief Barnes left Greensboro to accept appointment as a Deputy Chief of Police in Salisbury, North Carolina, and then diversified his experience as the Director of Training and Professional Development with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability in Chicago.</p> <p>Immediately preceding his appointment as Interim Chief in Seattle, Mr. Barnes served as the Chief of Police for Madison, Wisconsin where he was a nationally recognized leader for implementing crime reduction strategies that dramatically decrease violent and property crime. He is committed to the concepts of inclusivity and diversification of the police department's sworn and civilian staff. He is a mission-driven leader who leads through data-driven strategies and by employing technology to reduce crime.</p> <p>Chief Barnes holds a Ph.D. in Leadership Studies, a Master of Science in Criminal Justice, and a BA in History and Pre-Law. He has participated in ongoing professional education with the Senior Management Institute for Police, the Southern Police Institute, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is a subject matter expert for the U.S. Department of Justice on police leadership, critical incident review, use of force practices, and constitutional police standards. In addition, he was inducted into the George Mason University Center for Evidence-based Crime Policy Hall of Fame, which recognized his use of data analytics and evidence-based policing. He has been identified as a National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science Scholar and a member of the National Policing Institute's Council on Policing Reforms and Race. Barnes is a cofounder of the 54th Mile Project and has helped develop a national training curriculum on police and race.</p>	
<b>Authorizing Signature:</b>  <b>Date Signed:</b> May 20, 2025	<b>Appointing Signatory:</b> <i>Bruce A. Harrell</i> <i>Mayor of Seattle</i>

\*Term begin and end date is fixed and tied to the position and not the appointment date.



CITY OF SEATTLE ▪ STATE OF WASHINGTON  
OATH OF OFFICE

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State of Washington

County of King

I, Shon Fitzgerald Barnes, swear or affirm that I possess all of the qualifications prescribed in the Seattle City Charter and the Seattle Municipal Code for the position of Chief of Police; that I will support the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Washington, and the Charter and Ordinances of The City of Seattle; and that I will faithfully conduct myself as Chief of Police.

---

Shon Fitzgerald Barnes

Subscribed and sworn to before me

this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2025.

[Seal]

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Scheereen Dedman, City Clerk

## **Shon F. Barnes Ph.D.**

Chief of Police (Madison, WI)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

October 6, 2024

City of Seattle  
700 5<sup>th</sup> Avenue,  
Suite 5500  
Seattle, Washington, 98104

Dear Executive Search Committee,

I am honored to submit my cover letter and resume in consideration for the position of Police Chief for the City of Seattle. My cover letter and resume, reflect my readiness, fortified by a wealth of life experiences and a comprehensive background in police leadership, to steer a forward-thinking, community oriented, and pioneering police force through an exciting and rapidly changing landscape. My extensive background in community and problem-oriented policing aligns seamlessly with Seattle's commitment to fostering a secure and inviting environment for every resident. Over my 24-year tenure as a law enforcement officer and executive, I have cultivated a policing ethos underpinned by robust mentorship, continuous education, notable professional achievements, and rich experiential learning. This ethos is encapsulated in my belief that effective policing should be collaborative, neighborhood oriented; community focused (business, educational, and residential); problem-oriented; and based on the most current empirical research available to quickly reduce crime, and harm to the community, while elevating public confidence in police services.

Currently, I hold the position of Chief of Police at the Madison Police Department in Wisconsin. My tenure began in December 2020, during a pivotal time when the department sought to mend its relationship with the community after a tragic incident involving an officer and an unarmed African American teenager. This event, coupled with a rise in both property and violent crimes, underscored the urgent need for change. In my role, I have initiated a transformation within the department, prioritizing community trust and community engagement. My efforts in restructuring and implementing strategic initiatives have not only been recognized on a national level but have also significantly contributed to the enhancement of public safety in Madison. My policing philosophy is deeply anchored in the principles of the constitution, which I regard as the foundational minimum rather than the limit of our duty. This guiding principle ensures that our department's actions consistently respect and protect the rights and dignity of those we serve.

Over a three-year period, the implementation of the Stratified Model of Crime Reduction significantly decreased crime rates across several major categories within our community. Notably, there was a 40% decrease in auto thefts, a 19% decrease in reports of shot fired, a 36%



decrease in burglaries, and a remarkable 67% decrease in homicides. A key aspect of this success was the department's commitment to community partnership, focusing on diversion programs aimed at reducing arrests by addressing crime's underlying causes. Initiatives included programs for addiction diversion, strategies to prevent crimes related to homelessness, a juvenile restorative justice program, and a mental health co-responder model. Additionally, the department established an employee mental wellness program, which includes two mental health days annually and a mandatory session with a therapist. These measures have fortified the department, enabling it to effectively navigate the challenges of the 21st century and enhance the safety and well-being of our city.

One initiative exemplifying our commitment to safety is Vision Zero, a strategy rooted in data analysis with the ambitious goal of eradicating traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries across all modes of transportation, including roads, bike paths, and sidewalks. Vision Zero endeavors to enhance the safety of all city inhabitants, irrespective of their mode of transit—be it walking, cycling, driving, or using public transportation. It particularly targets areas with a high incidence of injuries, aiming to reduce life-threatening accidents and serious harm. Our department diligently disseminates crucial, up-to-date data pinpointing where investments in time and resources can significantly elevate the safety of the most dangerous intersections and roadways. Furthermore, we are acutely aware of the socioeconomic and racial disparities within different communities and are dedicated to prioritizing improvements in economically disadvantaged areas that are part of the high injury network. Ensuring equity remains a principal concern for my administration and consistently guides our conversations, decisions, and enhancements.

In my role as a leader and change agent, I have fostered a departmental philosophy that prioritizes unwavering commitment to engaging with the community, implementing sound policing practices, and devising strategies that effectively address the most pressing issues in policing to include gun violence, the opioid crisis, and retention, recruitment, and morale. I consider myself privileged to have been a part of two exemplary police departments, led by individuals who are deeply invested in the welfare of the community we are sworn to protect.

Throughout my professional journey, I have consistently embraced every chance to enhance my expertise in police management and leadership. As an alumnus of the Southern Police Institute's Administrative Officer's Program at the University of Louisville, where I graduated in 2012, I had the honor of being chosen as the president of the alumni association for the term 2017-2018. In this capacity, I represented a network of over 300 law enforcement executives. Together with my board, we successfully organized a national police leadership conference addressing critical issues such as Opioid Abuse and Drug Enforcement, fostering Community-Police Relations, and strategies for Crime Reduction.

My educational pursuits also include graduating from the esteemed Senior Management Institute for Police, an initiative of the Police Executive Research Forum. My commitment to advancing law enforcement through scholarly research was recognized in 2015 when I was appointed as a National Institute of Justice LEADS Scholar. This accolade was in recognition of my work in leading research focused on the application of technology to mitigate crime and the societal impact of substandard police practices. To deepen my understanding of the intricacies of police work and its effects on communities, I pursued further education at the historically black college

and university (HBCU) of North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University. There, I achieved a doctoral degree and contributed to academic literature with a dissertation that explored the nuances of racial disparities and profiling in the context of police traffic stops.

Understanding the critical balance between meeting community needs both service-oriented and safety-focused and upholding our legal responsibilities in a fair and just manner is paramount. In my tenure as Police Chief, I have spearheaded several policy reforms that have markedly decreased risks to both our residents and the department. These reforms encompass the establishment of threat assessments for the execution of search and arrest warrants, the imposition of stringent restrictions on no-knock search warrants, the curtailment of searches during pretextual traffic stops, the introduction of a duty-to-intervene mandate, the formation of a peer-support and crisis negotiation team, and the enforcement of compulsory emotional intelligence training for all personnel. The well-being of our police force is of utmost concern to me, recognizing that the quality of our service is intrinsically linked to the safety and wellness of our officers. My commitment to this cause was exemplified in 2016 when I participated in the Officer Safety and Wellness Group, part of President Obama's 21st Century Policing Report, and subsequently presented my insights on enhancing officer safety and welfare at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.

Embracing Mayor Harrell's One Seattle vision, I am committed to steering the Seattle Police Department (SPD) with steadfast dedication to safety, accountability, and innovation. My approach to leadership is deeply rooted in collaboration, engaging with community leaders, advocacy groups, and government entities to forge and execute strategies that address intricate issues effectively. My professional history is a testament to my enduring dedication and achievements in modern police leadership, showcasing a track record of success at local, national, and international stages. My portfolio presents a suite of pioneering leadership methodologies and experiences, meticulously curated to prepare for the esteemed role of your Police Chief. I hold immense pride in my dual role as a scholar and practitioner within the law enforcement field, equipping me with a comprehensive perspective on the expectations of a Mayor, City Council, Police Department, and our community.

With an ardent desire to contribute my skills and fervor for civic duty to the position of Seattle Police Chief, I am motivated by the city's staunch commitment to safety, reform, and forward-thinking practices. I am ready to shoulder the responsibility of guiding the SPD towards a groundbreaking chapter in law enforcement. The prospect of discussing how my skill set dovetails with the Seattle Police Department's requisites and the community it pledges to serve is one I anticipate with great enthusiasm. I stand at the precipice of a new professional epoch, poised and thrilled to embark on this journey.

I appreciate your attention to my application and eagerly anticipate your response. I am excited about the opportunity to engage in the forthcoming selection process.

Sincerely,

*Shon F. Barnes*

Chief Shon F. Barnes Ph.D.

**Shon Fitzgerald Barnes Ph.D.**

**Education**

- 2014- 2018      **Ph.D. Leadership Studies:** (Concentrations: Community and Civic Engagement, Strategic Planning, Police Disparities, and Organizational Change) Awarded Magna Cum Laude, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, Greensboro, North Carolina.
- 2004- 2007      **Masters of Science, Criminal Justice,** Awarded Magna Cum Laude University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
- 1993-1997      **Bachelor of Arts History/Pre-Law,** Elizabeth City State University, Elizabeth City, North Carolina.

**Professional Education**

- Summer 2014      **Senior Management Institute for Police,** 54<sup>th</sup> Session  
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).
- Fall 2012      **Southern Police Institute,** 128<sup>th</sup> Administrative Officers' Course.  
University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
- Spring 2023      **Federal Bureau of Investigations',** Session 81, Law  
Enforcement Executive Session, Quantico, Virginia.

**Managerial and Supervisory Police Command Experience**

**February 2021-Present**

**Chief of Police, Madison, Wisconsin**

Chief of Police for the Madison Police Department, an organization that prides itself on its educated and varied team committed to community engagement. Our uniformed professionals, both men and women, are dedicated to providing exemplary police services, safeguarding the legal rights of all individuals. Embracing diversity as a fundamental principle, MPD is lauded nationwide for its inclusive workforce, with approximately 21% of commissioned staff being people of color and 28% identifying as female. This reflects our unwavering commitment to equality and representation in law enforcement. The annual budget is approximately \$84 million. Cross- Functional Command Experience, Initiatives, and Accomplishments include:

- Implemented the Stratified Policing Model, a method grounded in evidence that weaves problem-solving, crime analysis, and accountability into the fabric of its operations. This model is designed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of crime reduction efforts while promoting community engagement. It integrates seamlessly with the agency's structure, aiming to fortify the influence of law enforcement on public safety and community ties.

- Additionally, the department has undergone a reorganization to better support its non-commissioned personnel and has developed its inaugural comprehensive strategic plan. This plan is focused on diminishing crime rates and elevating public satisfaction with police services.
- The annexation of the Town of Madison's Police Department has expanded police coverage and resources.
- The department has been restructured to embody the principles of the 21st Century Police Report, with a commitment to data-driven policing to foster transparency and community trust.
- Collaborative partnerships with local businesses and nonprofits have been established to enhance community-police relations and boost officer morale.
- The M.O.R.E Program was initiated to promote diversity within the department, reflecting the community it serves. A strategic alignment between the department and the community on crime prevention has led to notable reductions across all major crime categories.

**September 2020- January 2021**

**Director of Training and Professional Development, Chicago, Illinois**

As the Director of Training and Professional Development under the Deputy Chief Administrator at the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), my role encompasses overseeing the training and professional development within the agency. My core responsibilities involve assessing the training needs of the agency's staff to devise programs aligned with our goals and initiatives. I am tasked with creating course outlines, developing training materials, and selecting the most effective instructional methods. I deliver comprehensive training programs across various platforms, covering key areas such as interviewing techniques, evidence assessment, legal case analysis, and report writing. To ensure the training's impact, I conduct thorough evaluations and collaborate with executive staff to refine developmental strategies, thereby enhancing training opportunities. I innovate educational methods to boost and assess staff performance empirically, curate supervisory principle curricula, and stay abreast of policing and accountability trends to update our training accordingly. Additionally, I manage the engagement of vendors, consultants, and speakers to enrich our training programs and presentations. Cross- Functional Command Experience, Initiatives, and Accomplishments include:

- The Training Plan section of the City of Chicago's Consent Decree has been successfully submitted, meeting the provisional compliance requirements.
- Additionally, the COPA Academy has undergone a reorganization to adopt a Problem Based Learning Model for instruction, enhancing the educational approach and methodology.

**April 2017-September 2020**

**Deputy Chief of Police, Salisbury, NC**

As the Deputy Chief of Police, I developed a strategic plan aimed at transforming and administering a community-focused police agency, achieving full CALEA accreditation in the process. My responsibilities included overseeing daily operations to enact the principles of the 21st Century Report on Policing, while also providing counsel to the Police Chief. I was instrumental in integrating and directing the department's crime control strategy, as well as spearheading our community engagement initiatives. My role extended to acting as the intermediary for the department's Public Safety Partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative in collaboration with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of North Carolina. As a central figure in Salisbury, the administrative hub of Rowan County, I engaged with a

vibrant and varied community. Cross- Functional Command Experience, Initiatives, and Accomplishments include:

- Introduced Stratified Policing, encompassing Problem-Oriented Policing, Strategic Accountability, and Crime Analysis, alongside a structural reorganization to tackle issues such as gun violence, eroding community relations, and the advancement of officers.
- These measures resulted in a significant decrease in violent crime, with homicides dropping by 45% and shootings by 60% in CY2018, followed by a further 65% reduction in homicides in 2019.
- Additionally, the Cure Violence Model was adopted during the "2019 Summer Cease Fire" in partnership with the Salisbury NAACP Chapter, leading to a remarkable outcome of zero homicides during the 90-day trial.
- As President of the Southern Police Institute Alumni Association, I spearheaded a national police conference that addressed critical law enforcement challenges identified by a survey among 300 law enforcement executives, focusing on Police Reform, Community-Police Relations, Recruiting and Retention, and Evidence-Based Crime Reduction Strategies.
- The department also revitalized the "Neighborhood Oriented Policing" model, aligning it with the patrol beat reorganization plan, which empowered officers to manage smaller neighborhoods and be accountable for resolving local issues, reinforcing the principle that "Every officer has a neighborhood, and every neighborhood has an officer."
- My expertise in Community Policing was recognized with an invitation to participate in a focus group at the International Association of Chiefs of Police's Institute for Community Police Relations, established in response to the 21st Century Report on Police Reform, with the aim of fostering trust between police departments and communities through evidence-based practices.

**November 2000- April 2017**

**Greensboro Police Department (NC)**

Police Captain: From 2013 to 2017, I held the position of commanding officer for three divisions within Greensboro, North Carolina—the state's third-largest city and ranked 69th nationwide. My responsibilities included overseeing the department's performance evaluation system, orchestrating and supervising the training programs, and providing counsel to the Chief of Police regarding community relations and strategic objectives. Greensboro, with a population of 277,000 and a density of 2,098 individuals per square mile, is served by a police department comprising over 800 staff members, 700 of whom are sworn officers, operating on a budget of \$67 million. In my capacity as commanding officer, I was responsible for managing annual budgets between \$10 and \$13 million. The Greensboro Police Department prides itself on being the inaugural CALEA Accredited agency in North Carolina—a testament to our commitment to excellence, with commanding officers being instrumental in maintaining this status through successive reaccreditation efforts. Cross- Functional Command Experience, Initiatives, and Accomplishments include:

**Captain of the Training Division:** This position serves as the Commanding Officer of the division responsible for the selection and review of candidate backgrounds, training, education, and maintaining the certification of 700 sworn police officers.

- Spearheaded a comprehensive overhaul of the police recruit selection process and the Police Academy's training program, enhancing the curriculum with additional hours dedicated to conflict resolution and communication skills. This initiative represented a complete transformation of the traditional 24-week police academy structure.
- Furthermore, I introduced the principles of procedural justice throughout the police department, ensuring that our in-service training was in harmony with the foundational principles of the 21st Century Report on Policing.
- Committee Chair tasked with revising the performance evaluation system for all police department personnel, culminating in the creation of a new evaluation tool that is consistent with the City of Greensboro's Human Resources guidelines and the strategic reform objectives of the Greensboro Police Department.
- In my role as a Specialized Subject Control and Arrest Techniques Instructor, I am responsible for educating police recruits on constitutional Fourth Amendment rights, laws pertaining to arrest, search, and seizure, as well as defensive strategies and officer safety protocols.

**Captain of the Southern Patrol Division:** This position is a Division Commander and is responsible for directing and administering the management functions of a patrol division. Functions include providing leadership in directing subordinates, administering programs, and developing goals for assigned operations as well as supervision of all law enforcement activities.

- Spearheaded a targeted problem-oriented policing initiative aimed at curbing crime and social unrest at Heritage House Apartments, a complex notorious for the highest incidence of emergency calls and social disorder within Greensboro.
- This multifaceted community policing effort unfolded in three strategic phases: firstly, pinpointing and dismantling the local drug and prostitution rings; secondly, fostering a leadership framework within the community; and thirdly, forging collaborative partnerships with neighborhood churches under the banner of P.A.C.T (Police and Church Together).
- The successful execution of this project culminated in a marked decrease in criminal activity and emergency service calls to the area.
- In recognition of the positive impact generated by the Heritage House Problem-Oriented Policing Project, I was honored with the "Police Officer of the Year" award for 2014 by the Randleman Road Business Association.

#### **United States Department of Justice: Civil Rights Division**

##### **Subject Matter Expert: Police Leadership, Critical Incident Review, Use of Force**

- Perform in-depth analyses of significant events that include police use of force, authority misuse, and breaches of constitutional policing standards.
- Review and appraise the efficacy of police leadership, supervisory roles, internal procedures, and force deployment strategies.
- Act as a knowledgeable authority on empirical policing methods and superior law enforcement protocols.
- Offer guidance on adhering to stipulated consent decree mandates and regulatory compliance.
- Preserve the integrity of sensitive information and uphold the security clearance protocols for U.S. Department of Civil Rights inquiries.

## **International Police Organizational Reform Experience**

### Bamako, Mali (West Africa)

The Southern Police Institute, in collaboration with the U.S. Embassy in Bamako, Mali, crafted a specialized training program to bolster the Security Governance Initiative's National Police Reform. The focus of this program was on conducting thorough Background Investigations for both the National Police Force and the Gendarmerie, Mali's elite police unit.

Delivered in Bamako in October 2018, the training equipped Malian law enforcement personnel with essential skills to effectively assess potential recruits. Additionally, Gendarmerie members were included to foster better integration and cooperation with the National Police, especially in rural investigations where their jurisdiction lies.

This initiative is a key component of the sustained partnership between the U.S. and Malian governments, aiming to enhance the recruitment process's integrity and oversight as part of the broader human resources reforms initiated by the Security Governance Initiative since 2015.

## **Professional Contributions**

- **Publications.**

- Miller, K, Danielson, S, and Barnes, S., (2013). Making Leadership Count: Implementing Effective Partnerships and Alternative Organizational Structures to Address Complex Problems. Case Analyses of Two Child Development-Community Policing Partnerships in North Carolina. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Session on Police Leadership.
- Barnes, S "Implementation of Procedural Justice in Police Agencies" cited in; Novak, K. J., Cordner, G. W., Smith, B. W., & Roberg, R. R. (2017). Police & society (7th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barnes, S. F. (2018, March 2). Police Community Relations: A study of racial disparity and the effects of hot spot policing leadership strategies (Doctoral dissertation, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, 2018)
- Barnes, S. F. (2018) "Profile of the 21st Century Leader." A paper of the BJA Executive Session on Police Leadership. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice; and St. Petersburg, FL: Center for Public Safety Innovation, St. Petersburg College.
- Barnes, Shon F. "Mastering New Essentials: Leader Skills 5." BJA Executive Session on Police Leadership, The BJA Executive Session on Police Leadership, 1 Mar. 2018, [bjaexecutivesessiononpoliceleadership.org/BarnesBestGainerAudios.html](https://bjaexecutivesessiononpoliceleadership.org/BarnesBestGainerAudios.html)

- **Presentations.**

- 1<sup>st</sup> Annual American Society of Evidence Based Policing Conference: Evaluating Predictive Policing Analytics Software Presentation and Panel Discussion (Phoenix, Arizona).
- 2018 International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference-Research Advisory Committee: Title: An Overview of Police Led Research (Orlando, Florida).
- George Mason University 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Criminal Justice and Public Policy Symposium. Presentation Title: Community Police Relations and the Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Racial Disparity in Traffic Stops (Arlington, Virginia).
- Global Perspectives on Police, Law, & Society: Common Ties against Communities of Color, presentation and panel discussion, at Howard University (Washington, DC).
- Barnes, S. F. (2018, May 09). LEADS Scholar Spotlight: Predictive Policing Algorithms. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1J-JzQusjfU&t=4s>.

- **Professional Organizations & Activities.**

- CNN Special Guest Correspondent
- University of Chicago Police Leadership Academy Committee Member
- New York University Policing Project Health Check Advisory Board.
- 21<sup>st</sup> Century Report on Policing: Pillar 6 National Officer Safety and Wellness Working Group (Washington DC)
- President of the Southern Police Institute Alumni Association (2017-2018)
- Police Executive Research Forum Immigrant Advisory Committee Member
- International Association of Chiefs of Police: Research Advisory Committee
- Prince Hall Free and Accepted Masons
- 32<sup>nd</sup> Degree Scottish Right Consistory
- Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc.
- Alpha Phi Sigma Criminal Justice Honor Society
- National Institute of Justice Federal Grant Reviewer



- **Honors and Awards**

- 2015 National Institute of Justice, Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science (LEADS) Scholar. In 2014, NIJ collaborated with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to select and honor law enforcement officers committed to using evidence and data to inform law enforcement policy and practice.
- United States Selective Marine Corps Reserve Medal First Award
- Outstanding Dissertation Award for the College of Arts and Sciences 2018, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.
- 2023 HBCU Living Legend Award
- Finalist for the Superintendent of Police (Chicago, Illinois)
- 2024 George Mason University's Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, Policing Hall of Fame Inductee
- 2024 Radford University's Center for Police Practice, Policy and Research, Excellence in Policing Award



## Press Release

### For Immediate Release

#### Contact Information

Jamie Housen

[jamie.housen@seattle.gov](mailto:jamie.housen@seattle.gov)

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## Mayor Harrell to Appoint Shon Barnes Seattle's Next Chief of Police

**Currently the Madison, Wisconsin Chief of Police, Barnes brings to Seattle a record of accomplishment, including implementing solutions that have driven a 67% decrease in homicides, a 40% decrease in auto thefts, and a 19% decrease in reports of shots fired so far in 2024, as well as advancing strategies to build an inclusive police service where 28% of officers are women.**

**Seattle** – Today, Mayor Bruce Harrell announced the appointment of Shon Barnes as the next Chief of the Seattle Police Department (SPD), following a national search. Barnes has served as the Chief of Police for Madison, Wisconsin since 2021, and is a nationally recognized leader in reducing crime, improving community-police relations, and driving culture change. Mayor Harrell will welcome Chief Barnes to Seattle with a public event in January, and Chief Barnes will begin a series of meetings with community members in city neighborhoods.

“Earlier this week, under tragic circumstances, the nation received its introduction to Chief Shon Barnes. We all saw firsthand what our team has known since we began this recruitment process – that Chief Barnes possesses the impressive leadership capabilities, compassionate approach, and dedication to effective police work needed to continue moving our Police Department forward,” **said Mayor Harrell.** “I’ve spoken with Madison Mayor Satya Rhodes-Conway to express my condolences and support as they process this week’s tragedy and to share my continued commitment to fighting for solutions to the gun violence epidemic that impacts every corner of our country through our shared work with the U.S. Conference of Mayors.”

**Mayor Harrell continued,** “Chief Barnes will bring proven experience and a forward-looking vision to help us realize our **One Seattle** commitment to safety for every person in every neighborhood. I would like to thank Chief Sue Rahr for her strong leadership this year, both in the department and throughout this search. We took a different approach to this search process than those of the past, as we sought to seek out and recruit the best possible chief for SPD’s future. I am confident Chief Barnes is that leader, and that he can further advance positive strides in public safety in Seattle, rooted in innovation, accountability, and community partnership.”

In Madison, Chief Barnes implemented evidence-based approaches to partner with the community, achieved significant decreases in crime, and led strategic initiatives to improve the effectiveness and diversity of the department. He has over 12 years of police command-level experience, including patrol, training, and recruitment, and served as a civilian police accountability executive in Chicago, where he helped meet the training plan requirements of a federal consent decree.

“I am truly honored to accept this position and thank Mayor Harrell for his trust and confidence. The mayor and I share a vision that crime prevention and community safety is a shared responsibility and that every community member plays a role in keeping Seattle safe,” **said incoming Chief Shon Barnes.** “My family and I are excited about the opportunity to integrate into Seattle’s vibrant community, known for its diversity, innovation, and resilience. I look forward to working alongside the dedicated men and women of the Seattle Police Department to uphold these core values.”

Under Chief Barnes, so far in 2024, Madison has seen a 67% decrease in homicides, a 40% decrease in auto thefts, a 36% decrease in burglaries, and a 19% decrease in reports of shots fired. As Seattle seeks to build an inclusive police service for people of all backgrounds, Chief Barnes brings proven experience advancing the Madison Police Department’s inclusive workforce initiative that has resulted in 28% of officers being women.

Barnes participated with the officer safety and wellness committee that was part of President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. He has served as a subject matter expert for the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and been recognized for his accomplishments and scholarship by the National Institute of Justice and Radford University’s Center for Police Practice, Policy and Research. Earlier this year, he was inducted into the Policing Hall of Fame at George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy.

“Chief Shon Barnes is a nationally recognized leader and innovator, but I mostly admire his authenticity and values. He is highly principled, fair, and sincere. He has consistently demonstrated great care for his personnel and the communities they serve,” **said former SPD Chief Kathleen O’Toole.** “I have no doubt that he will receive a warm welcome in Seattle and provide the stable, effective leadership that SPD deserves.”

The search for Seattle’s next chief began in mid-2024, led by current Interim Chief Sue Rahr and former Chief Kathleen O’Toole, two widely respected law enforcement leaders who recruited candidates from around the country to ensure Seattle received the highest quality applicants.

There were 57 total applications received from across the United States which were reviewed and narrowed to a list of 44 qualified candidates. The top four candidates were invited to take a competitive exam in November, as required by the [City Charter](#). Three candidates – Chief Barnes; Nicholas Augustine, Assistant Chief of the Montgomery County, Maryland, Department of Police; and Emada Tingirides, Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department – passed the exam and were forwarded to Mayor Harrell for his consideration and final selection.

The search process was designed to recruit qualified individuals and encourage talented law enforcement leaders to apply. During the search process, and as part of the Charter-required competitive exam, the mayor sought insight and feedback from a diverse collection of community members. Earlier this year, the mayor’s office hosted six “Safer Seattle” [community forums](#) focused on

public safety. These meetings were held downtown and in the Bitter Lake, South Park, Rainer Beach, Central District, and Queen Anne neighborhoods. Public comment at these meetings and responses to an online survey helped shape the [job description](#) for the Chief of Police position.

“I am very excited to see Chief Shon Barnes join the Seattle Police Department! He has achieved a national reputation for his focus on research and innovation while remaining centered on the core values of community policing. His skills and knowledge are just what SPD needs to take it to the next level,” **said Interim Chief Sue Rahr**. “I look forward to collaborating with him over the next several weeks to ensure a smooth transition in late January. The people of Seattle and the men and women of SPD are very lucky to gain such a knowledgeable and talented new leader!”

Sue Rahr was appointed interim chief of the Seattle Police Department in May 2024 and was not a candidate for the permanent position. Under Rahr’s leadership, SPD has made significant progress in recruiting more officers, deploying crime prevention technology, supporting the expansion of diversified response options, and launching place-based crime reduction strategies.

Rahr will continue to advise and support the department during the transition to Chief Barnes.

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### About Chief Barnes



Chief Barnes has a 24-year history as a police officer. He began his career with the Greensboro, North Carolina Police Department, where he rose to the rank of Captain. Following that role, he served as Deputy Chief of Police in Salisbury, NC, and then as Director of Training and Professional Development with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability in Chicago, IL. He has served as Madison, Wisconsin’s Chief of Police since 2021.

Barnes holds a Ph.D. in Leadership Studies from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, a Master of Science in Criminal Justice from the University of Cincinnati, and a BA in History/Pre-Law from Elizabeth City State University. He has also participated in ongoing professional education with the Senior Management Institute for Police, Southern Police Institute, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Chief Barnes has served as a subject matter expert for the U.S. Department of Justice on police leadership, critical incident reviews, use of force practices, constitutional policing standards, and compliance with federal consent decrees.

He has been recognized as a National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science Scholar and is a member of the National Policing Institute’s Council on Policing Reforms and Race. Barnes was named an HBCU Living Legend in 2023. He was inducted into the George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy Hall of Fame in 2024, an honor recognizing his use of data analytics and the evidence of what works best in policing.

In 2020, Barnes walked the 54-mile route from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama with Chief Tarrick McGuire of the Arlington, Virginia police department and Dr. Obed Magny to commemorate the historic 1965 civil rights march led by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Barnes is co-founder of the 54th Mile Project and has helped develop a national training curriculum on police and race.

Chief Barnes is married to Dr. Stephanie Dance-Barnes, a leader in higher education and expert in cancer biology, and together, they have three children.

###

## **SECTION**

### **B**



# Memo

**Date:** 4/29/2025  
**To:** Jeremy Racca, Chief of Staff and General Counsel  
**From:** Pam Inch, Senior Executive Recruiter  
**Subject:** Qualification of **Shon Fitzgerald Barnes**

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The Seattle Department of Human Resources has received a copy of Shon Fitzgerald Barnes' certification as a Peace Officer from the State of Washington. The certification includes:

- A check of criminal history, any national decertification index, commission records, and all disciplinary records by any previous law enforcement
- Inquiry to the local prosecuting authority in any jurisdiction in which the applicant has served as to whether the applicant is on any potential impeachment disclosure list
- Inquiry into whether the applicant has any past or present affiliations with extremist organizations, as defined by the commission
- A review of the applicant's social media accounts
- Verification of immigrant or citizenship status as either a citizen of the United States of America, lawful permanent resident, or deferred action for childhood arrivals recipient
- A psychological examination administered by a psychiatrist licensed in the state of Washington
- A polygraph or similar assessment administered by an experienced professional with appropriate training

Chief Barnes has met both the Washington State and the city's standards to serve as the Seattle Police Chief.

**Cc:** Personnel File



June 6, 2025

Council President Sara Nelson  
Councilmember Rob Saka  
Councilmember Mark Solomon  
Councilmember Joy Hollingsworth  
Councilmember Maritza Rivera  
Councilmember Cathy Moore  
Councilmember Dan Strauss  
Councilmember Robert Kettle  
Councilmember Alexis Mercedes Rinck

Dear Members of City Council:

Thank you for this opportunity to respond in writing to questions concerning selected topics of interest in advance of the June 10<sup>th</sup> Public Safety Committee meeting. The focus of these questions aligns seamlessly with issues I have been working on since Day One of my tenure, and I am pleased to be able to report to this Committee perspectives that have shaped my first months in Seattle, the significant steps I and my team have taken towards our collective goals of improving the operational and administrative functioning of the Seattle Police Department, and to preview work well underway and upcoming across each of SPD's priority areas: Crime Prevention, Community Partnerships, Retention and Recruitment, Employee Safety and Wellness, and Continuous Improvement.

For ease of presentation and given the overlapping themes of many of the questions provided, I have organized my response by topic area, rather than to each question individually, to ensure I provide as comprehensive and coherent a response as I am able on this timeline. At the same time, to ensure that I am also answering specific questions raised by individual councilmembers, I have tailored my responses so as to reference each concern.

I look forward to our upcoming discussion.

Respectfully,

Shon F. Barnes Ph.D.  
Chief of Police  
Seattle Police Department



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## 1. Community Partnerships

### a. CM Kettle Question c:

***A cornerstone of public safety is public outreach and understanding a community, a neighborhood, or a city's concerns or needs with respect to its safety. Can you outline your beliefs on this topic?***

### b. CM Rivera Question b:

***What is your approach to community policing and how will you bring that to Seattle? What will that look like and what can the public expect to see in the coming weeks, months, years? How will you address the public safety issues by neighborhood?***

### c. CM Rinck Question f:

***The last five years have been turbulent for SPD, and many have pointed to a resultant loss of trust with the community. Sue Rahr has said that improving trust starts by building better trust within SPD's ranks and moving from there. As you continue to do this, what would the next steps for building trust with community look like to you?***

At the heart of any successful public safety strategy is a clear understanding of the community's concerns, values, and lived experiences. As the Chief of Police, I firmly believe that the voice of the community is not just important—it *is foundational*. Public safety cannot be achieved without public trust, and public trust cannot be built without active, continuous, and authentic community engagement.

My philosophy of community-oriented policing is rooted in principles that are harm-focused, intelligence-led, and neighborhood-oriented—whether residential, business, educational, or civic. It must be problem-oriented, evidence-based, and, most importantly, sustainable. The goal is not to treat symptoms temporarily but to understand the underlying root causes of crime and disorder so that communities are not repeatedly subjected to the same harm(s) they have unfortunately grown accustomed to.

The first step in truly engaging any community is to understand the historical and contemporary challenges that impact police legitimacy, especially among communities that have long borne the brunt of misinformed policies and harmful practices. To put this into perspective, consider that in 1972 there were approximately 300,000 people incarcerated in the United States. Today, there are over 2.3 million. An additional 6 million Americans are on probation or parole and more than 70 million have experienced some

form of contact with the criminal justice system. These are not just statistics—they represent lives, families, and entire communities whose trajectory has been altered.

The Equal Justice Initiative reports a 240% increase in the incarceration of women over the last two decades, 70% of whom are mothers. These outcomes have generational cultural, economic, and social consequences. Law enforcement, as the most visible arm of government, has often been the face of these outcomes. As a police chief, I acknowledge these truths. They are essential to understanding community concerns, especially in cities like Seattle, where history and policy have shaped deep-rooted perceptions and relationships.

My belief is simple: you cannot understand a community from a distance. As police officers, and especially as leaders, we must be proximate. This principle informs our strategy at every level. Precinct commanders are empowered to engage at the sector, neighborhood (e.g. Micro Community Policing Plan areas), and beat level, working directly with the community to understand their specific needs. Officers are encouraged, and expected, to spend time in communities when not responding to calls for service. Proximity is essential to effective problem-solving. When we are not present, we miss important contextual details and, more critically, we miss opportunities to connect with the people we serve.

To support this, I have authorized a comprehensive staffing study aimed at reassessing our resource allocation to ensure officers have the time and flexibility to be present in their communities. It is my hope that this study will inform innovation in this area, providing framework to foster agility, perhaps around reshaping precinct boundaries, patrol deployment, and beat structures so that we can better serve each neighborhood's unique needs based on the evidence. This may also reduce the volume of community concerns escalated to city leadership by creating more direct, local points of contact.

More specifically in answer to CM Rivera's question about actions, to build on this philosophy, we are piloting a Police Neighborhood Resource Center. This initiative places officers directly within communities—physically and relationally—by establishing local offices where community members can speak directly with a designated officer. This program is designed to build relationships, not just respond to emergencies.

We are also developing a Community CompStat model in partnership with the Department of Neighborhoods. This monthly meeting will bring together community members, precinct commanders, and city partners to review data and discuss the issues that matter most to the people who live and work in our neighborhoods. Unlike traditional CompStat models, which often focus narrowly on crime trends, this approach emphasizes collaboration,

transparency, and co-produced solutions. It's a first for Seattle, and an important step forward.

To further enhance communication, I have hired a Chief Communications Officer with a clear mandate: develop systems for precinct-level communication through blogs, updates, and community meetings. These platforms allow us to explain not just what we are doing, but why. They also ensure city leadership, particularly the Mayor's Office and City Council, are informed partners in our work.

Public safety cannot be achieved without procedural justice. Community members must believe that our actions are fair, our decisions are neutral, and that we are committed to treating all people with the dignity and respect they deserve. We demonstrate this by how we respond to concerns, how we allocate resources, and how we communicate the results of our work. To CM Rinck's question, this is how we build trust.

Community policing is not a seasonal initiative, but rather a continuous commitment to listening, improving, and adapting. Each precinct in Seattle is tasked with developing Problem-Oriented Policing Plans and Micro-Community Policing Plans in collaboration with academic partners like Seattle University. This ensures that our strategies are data-informed, research-backed, and grounded in real community input.

My approach to public outreach and understanding community concerns is not just philosophical—it is operational. It is built on proximity, communication, collaboration, and sustained engagement. As Chief of Police, I remain committed to ensuring that every community in Seattle feels heard, respected, and protected. True public safety is not just about enforcement—it's about trust, and trust begins with listening.

**d. CM Rinck Question e:**

***I was interested to read about the type of school resource officer program that you used to supervise. One thing that struck me was that most of what you described – de-escalation, talking to parents, mediation, etc. These are things we are already doing within the Seattle schools through civilian violence interrupter and restorative justice programs. What do you think about this approach? What are the pros and cons of running this type of program through civilian channels versus through the police department?***

When implemented effectively, school resource officer programs function as partnerships that leverage various community resources. The fundamental concept is that police officers serve as conduits for resources designed to support student success. The focus of these programs should not be on determining who leads the restorative justice or

intervention process; rather, the priority should be on enhancing student outcomes. I often hear responses asserting, “we’re already doing this” when examples arise of how different organizations, including police departments, address challenges in the community. While I appreciate these efforts, there is always room for improvement. If we are already engaged, the question should shift to how we can enhance our efforts and collaborate more effectively.

Crime prevention is a collective responsibility, not solely the duty of the police department. It is essential to recognize that we often serve as the first responders to symptoms of underlying social issues and, as police officers, we bear the responsibility of providing resources to those in need. There are no disadvantages to working collaboratively with the community to better serve our students. Throughout my career, I have rejected the divisive mindset of “us versus them,” believing instead that the community and the police should work together as allies.

The Seattle Police Department that I envision is one that genuinely values partnerships. We see ourselves not as part of the problem, but as part of the solution. Under my leadership, we have acknowledged the missteps and shortcomings of not just our department but also other police agencies across the nation. However, we can no longer shoulder the entirety of public safety issues alone; commitment to moving forward alongside our community is crucial. As a police chief who began my career as a public school teacher, specifically teaching 10th-grade U.S. history, I take immense pride in collaborating with our school systems to create an environment where students feel safe—a sanctuary conducive to their academic, social, and emotional well-being.

It’s time to transcend the old debates of pros and cons, civilians versus police, and recognize that police officers are humans too. Many of us have children, loved ones, and relatives in the school system, and many, like myself, have backgrounds as teachers, coaches, or administrators. To dismantle existing barriers, I need strong support from our city council. Unfortunately, when elected officials—who are, in essence, part of the policing command structure—view the police as adversaries rather than partners, it undermines our ability to forge meaningful collaborations and implement successful programs.

Let me be unequivocal: I support the school resource officer program, and I have developed a vision for what this initiative could look like. However, as a servant leader, I recognize that my vision must not be the sole guiding force. The program should reflect the collective vision of all stakeholders involved, including teachers, students, parents, administrators, and elected officials. Together, we can craft a program that serves as a national model for others to emulate.

A successful SRO program must be rooted in a student-centered approach that prioritizes safety while fostering a welcoming, inclusive, and supportive learning environment for all students, regardless of background or identity. Rather than serving as enforcers of discipline for school administration, SROs should operate as part of a broader student support system, with their role focused strictly on emergency response, violence prevention, and safety planning. To fulfill this mission effectively, all SROs must receive comprehensive training in adolescent development, trauma-informed care, mental health awareness, cultural competency, de-escalation, and restorative justice. These training components are essential to ensuring that officers are prepared to work within an educational environment and are aligned with the values of equity and fairness.

Critically, SROs will not be involved in routine disciplinary actions, as those remain the responsibility of school administrators. Instead, their role will center on building trust through community engagement and relationship-building efforts, including mentoring programs, participation in school events, and delivering gang and drug intervention education. Transparency and accountability are also foundational to the program's success, which is why regular reviews will be conducted in partnership with school leadership, parents, students, and civil rights organizations. Additionally, SROs will be expected to provide consistent communication through forums such as PTA meetings and other school-based gatherings.

Ultimately, the goal is to maintain school safety while reinforcing trust, dignity, and equitable treatment for all students, fostering a culture that supports growth and community confidence.

Turning to the second part of the question, non-profit associations are significant partners working with unsheltered, mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal justice diversion and reentry programs. These associations greatly assist by focusing on reducing harm, working directly with those in need, and knowing what is most needed at any given time, and they understand that needs are generally immediate in response to a crisis.

Community Violence Interrupter programs (CVI) are important in public safety. A successful public health model treats violence like a contagion<sup>1</sup> and comprises three components: Street Community Violence Interrupters, Community Outreach Workers, and Community Therapists. These form concentric rings working with individuals, with issues, with communities. To be successful, CVI needs all three components. One component of

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<sup>1</sup> [Cure Violence Global — Stopping the Spread of Violence](#)

CVI are credible messengers, embedded in community, they engage with individuals, working to break the cycle/spread of violence.

I have worked in three departments that have used CVI, in conjunction with other non-profits, to impact violence. To be successful, CVI must have a clear mission and work closely with the City and non-profits. However, as described in detail above, I do not believe that one approach should necessarily be chosen over the other; there is enough work for both CVI and SROs to collaborate, connect, and ultimately improve the safety of our students.

## **2. Accountability and Continuous Improvement**

### **a. CM Kettle Question a:**

***What is your direct experience, if any, working with police accountability partners? If no direct experience, can you speak to the issue generally?***

Civilian oversight of law enforcement has evolved over the decades in response to community concerns and incidents of police misconduct. The earliest recorded attempts at civilian oversight date back to the 1920s, with the Los Angeles Bar Association establishing a committee to document police misconduct complaints in 1928.<sup>2</sup> Yet it was not until the mid-20th century that more formal structures emerged, such as the first civilian review board in Washington, D.C., established in 1948 in response to complaints about excessive force used by police against African Americans.<sup>3</sup> These developments reflect a broader movement towards police accountability and community engagement.

I believe that civilian oversight agencies (e.g., police accountability partners) have been instrumental in addressing these issues by reducing workloads for law enforcement officers and providing a mechanism for public complaints. The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) recognized my contributions in this effort as the only active police chief in the country that has previously worked in civilian oversight as an accountability partner. NACOLE is a prominent organization dedicated to promoting effective civilian oversight of law enforcement agencies across the United States.<sup>4</sup> Founded in 1995, NACOLE serves as a resource for communities seeking to enhance police

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<sup>2</sup> Walker, S. (2006). The history of citizen oversight. In J. Cintrón Perino (Ed.), *Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement* (pp. 1-10). ABA Publishing.

<sup>3</sup> Alpert, G. P., & Dunham, R. G. (1997). *Policing urban America*. Waveland Press. (General reference for police accountability)

<sup>4</sup> National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). (n.d.). About NACOLE. Retrieved June 1, 2025, from [https://www.nacole.org/about\\_nacole](https://www.nacole.org/about_nacole) ([https://www.nacole.org/about\\_nacole](https://www.nacole.org/about_nacole))



accountability and transparency through civilian oversight mechanisms, including review boards, ombudsman systems, and other forms of independent examination of police practices.<sup>5</sup>

Previously, I held the position of Director of Training and Professional Development for the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) in Chicago, Illinois. While at COPA I was responsible for overseeing the development and delivery of training programs aimed at ensuring that the staff and stakeholders involved in police accountability were well-equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge. This role involves designing training modules that address various aspects of police accountability, including investigative techniques, community engagement, and understanding police policies and practices.

I firmly support police accountability. The civilian oversight of police actions, particularly when investigations are carried out by qualified, trained, and impartial bodies, ensure that such inquiries are both thorough and timely. Throughout my career, I have actively advocated for stronger civilian oversight mechanisms and have taken on speaking engagements, including keynote addresses at the National Organization of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement conference in Chicago in 2024 and the International Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement conference in Kingston, Jamaica, in 2025. Recognized as an expert in this field, I have assisted several communities in understanding how effective civilian oversight can harmonize with police accountability. For instance, I collaborated with the Rochester, New York, police department to conduct a virtual panel with community members, educating them on how the accountability process could foster mutual benefits for both the department and the community.

It's also important to fully define what "accountability" means. For many people, police accountability hinges on the actions taken to punish officers who fail to follow proper procedures and strict adherence to the law. I agree that there is a place for a punitive response, under certain circumstances. I also believe that true police accountability begins long before any incidents arise that draw scrutiny from oversight bodies. For me, police accountability encompasses not only the officers' commitment to the department, but the department's commitment to its officers – i.e., the proactive measures that equip officers with the essential tools, training, teamwork, technology, and time they need to perform their duties effectively and appropriately. It should go unremarked that this premise is explicit in paragraph 221 of the Consent Decree, which holds the City responsible for providing SPD with the necessary support and resources to meet its commitments to reform – commitments that are now engrained in the policies,

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<sup>5</sup> Eck, J. E. (2018). Police accountability: Why is it important? Harvard Kennedy School. <https://pksoi.army.mil/documents/168530/754507/Police+Accountability.pdf>

procedures, and operations of the department and that will continue to require support and resources. I want to thank Council for its work to ensure the necessary resources and legal frameworks that empower our work and ensure the safety of community members. By passing ordinances aimed at addressing quality-of-life issues, such as prostitution and drug use, or advancing legislation that enhances our ability to recruit and retain a qualified workforce, the city council plays a vital role in defining what police accountability means in practice.

I welcome the opportunity to engage with our accountability partners, as we all share a collective responsibility to ensure that policing in Seattle is conducted in a manner that is fair, just, and legitimate, ultimately bolstering the integrity of the city government. Through collaboration and open dialogue, we can build a system of law enforcement that better serves and reflects the values of the communities we protect. In 2020, as the Chief of Police for the Madison Police Department in 2020, I supported the city's decision to establish an independent monitoring system to enhance police accountability. Upon my arrival, I promptly reached out to the civilian oversight board, only to find that they were not yet organized and prepared to begin collaborative efforts with the police department. Following several unsuccessful attempts to engage with the oversight board, an independent monitor was finally hired in 2023, three years after the establishment of the Office of Independent Monitor. However, it took an additional year for the office to build its staff, and by the time I departed in 2025, the office had neither accepted nor reviewed any complaints. Consequently, I was not afforded any direct experience as a police chief working alongside an independent monitor or civilian oversight body during my tenure in Madison.

In contrast, my experience with civilian oversight in Seattle has been markedly different. Since my appointment, I have actively engaged with all three independent accountability partners and have focused on building strong relationships with them. This collaboration has provided me with the opportunity to review adjudicated cases and submit my recommendations regarding disciplinary actions. I recognize that relationship building is an ongoing process, and I am pleased to report that our partnerships are both solid and effective. I look forward to advancing our collaborative efforts within the City of Seattle.

While I understand that disagreements may arise from time to time, I am confident in my ability to communicate my perspectives clearly and professionally. Should any situations present disruptions or confusion regarding the findings of our accountability partners, I am poised to navigate these challenges constructively. My goal is to foster an environment of transparency and mutual respect, ensuring that we can work together effectively to enhance police accountability and maintain the trust of the community we serve.

**b. CM Rinck Question h:**

***When talking about police accountability, I thought it was really interesting that you're the only chief who has also worked for civilian oversight. Our accountability system has been hamstrung by a police contract that doesn't allow for our landmark accountability ordinance to go into effect so the system can work as designed. What can you do as Chief to ensure accountability is taken more seriously by the department?***

It is clear that we share an ongoing commitment to accountability in its myriads of forms. As discussed above, police accountability encompasses not only back-end measures in the form of consequences for out of policy behavior, but also the proactive measures that equip officers with the essential tools, training, teamwork, technology, and time they need to perform their duties effectively and appropriately. The department holds itself accountable through many systems of critical self-analysis, such as the Force Investigation Team, the Force Review Board, our on-going commitment to analyzing performance to achieve better outcomes, and our regular engagement with the Community Police Commission and the Office of the Inspector General to collaborate on ways we can improve. This is wholly consistent with the department's commitment to continual improvement, having emerged from the Consent Decree as a learning organization. All of this exists upstream of discipline, which ultimately is the backstop of accountability.

The public entrusts law enforcement with significant authority to ensure safety and maintain order. With this authority comes the responsibility to act with integrity, fairness, and professionalism. While most interactions between police personnel and the community are conducted appropriately, there are occasions when the public justifiably question the use of police authority. Unfortunately, there are also instances where this authority is misused.

To uphold public trust and maintain our department's professionalism, it is essential to have a fair and effective system of corrective action. The most successful system combines the reinforcement of core values with clearly established behavioral standards. Every member of the Seattle Police Department must adhere to the policies, rules, and regulations that define our professional expectations. Given the dynamic nature of policing, it is impossible to foresee every situation an officer may encounter. Therefore, employees must exercise sound judgment and common sense in their decision-making.

Our officers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty, integrity, respect, trust, accountability, and stewardship. In turn, they deserve to be treated fairly and respectfully by their peers, supervisors, and accountability partners. The department has a duty to clearly communicate its expectations and ensure that the consequences of failing to meet them are well-defined. While setting expectations is straightforward, determining the appropriate disciplinary response can be complex. Factors such as situational circumstances, intent, and prior performance must be carefully evaluated.

Consistency and fairness are the cornerstones of effective corrective action. Consistency means holding all employees equally accountable for misconduct, while fairness requires an assessment of the circumstances leading to the behavior and applying consequences that reflect this understanding. Discipline decisions should be guided by a balanced consideration of several key factors:

- **Employee Motivation** – Officers are expected to act in the public interest. A policy violation committed in an effort to achieve a legitimate public safety goal will be weighed differently than one driven by personal gain or malice. While innovation in problem-solving is encouraged, violations of constitutional rights or fundamental policing principles cannot be justified.
- **Degree of Harm** – The consequences of an error must be considered, including financial costs, physical harm, and damage to public trust. Serious misconduct, such as criminal behavior or excessive use of force, demands a strong disciplinary response to reinforce public confidence in the department's integrity.
- **Experience and Training** – Officers with less experience or those in unfamiliar roles may be given more leeway for judgmental errors. Conversely, experienced officers who make errors inconsistent with their training and expertise should expect greater accountability.
- **Intentional vs. Unintentional Errors** – Mistakes happen, and unintentional errors, particularly those resulting from split-second decisions or momentary lapses, will generally be met with corrective rather than punitive measures—unless they become habitual. However, intentional violations of law, policy, or ethical standards warrant more severe consequences. Acts of dishonesty, theft, or physical abuse are wholly incompatible with the responsibilities of policing and will not be tolerated.
- **Employee's Past Record** – Whenever legally and ethically permissible, an employee's prior performance history will be considered. A history of repeated violations may warrant progressively stricter consequences, while a record of commendable service may be factored into the disciplinary response.

All disciplinary decisions will be based on a comprehensive evaluation of the relevant factors, ensuring that consequences are applied fairly and proportionally. The rationale for corrective actions will be clearly articulated to reinforce transparency and accountability.

The Seattle Police Department has a proud tradition of service, integrity, and professionalism. To preserve and enhance that tradition, every employee must take responsibility for upholding the highest standards of conduct. By maintaining these standards, SPD will continue to serve as a national model for exceptional policing.

Finally, it is my understanding that the vast majority of the Accountability Ordinance is fully in effect; indeed, the ordinance was recently amended on the recommendation of our accountability partners. While there are certainly legitimate labor considerations, which the Ordinance fully recognizes<sup>6</sup>, I am heartened by the Federal Monitoring Team’s assessment of the current state of accountability in Seattle:

After reviewing the past and current state of the Seattle police accountability mechanisms, we agree with a report completed by 21CP Solutions in 2019 that “[t]he **City of Seattle has one of the most multi-layered and sophisticated oversight systems in the United States** [and]...[t]he current state of accountability appears to be quite effective...” [internal citation omitted]. Further, we agree with the majority of stakeholder opinions reported herein that the Accountability Triad is positioned to provide sustainable oversight in the future – even if there is potential for future internal and external challenges and interagency conflict.<sup>7</sup>

In other words, even as the Department of Justice’s 2011 investigation found that Seattle’s accountability processes were “sound and that the investigations of police misconduct complaints are generally thorough, well-organized, well-documented, and thoughtful,” the work Seattle has done since has only strengthened this system.

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<sup>6</sup> “Provisions of the ordinance introduced as Council Bill 118969 subject to the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, chapter 41.56 RCW, shall not be effective until the City completes its collective bargaining obligations.” <https://www.seattle.gov/a/83748>.

<sup>7</sup> 2023 [Seattle Accountability System Sustainability Report](#) at 6.

c. CM Rinck Question I:

***You did your dissertation on racial profiling in traffic stops, and we have data from the consent decree that shows that SPD still stops and searches Black and Indigenous people at much higher rates than white people, even though white people are more likely to have weapons. How are you planning to work to improve SPD's record in this area?***

There is no question that racial disparities exist at all levels of the criminal justice system, and certainly in the area of enforcement; there is also no question that bias – implicit or, too often, explicit – plays a factor in perpetuating those disparities. At the same time, it is also true that many of the disparities we see in policing are not caused by policing; rather, any intellectually rigorous approach to examining disparities in policing must also account for disparities far upstream of policing (housing, education, healthcare) that in turn feed those factors that are the most significant drivers of criminal behavior – all fundamentally rooted in poverty. Systemic disparities across all facets of our society should not land solely at the feet of police to absorb; the impact of centuries of systemic racism cannot be undone by a simple policy, or training, or even the strictest of accountability measures. Nor is disparity even one that lends itself to easy calculations; while a common approach, the practice of simply using census-based comparisons to discern equity in particular outcomes has been roundly rejected as a methodology. See, for example, the federal monitor's [2022 Comprehensive Assessment](#) at p. 16:

As the previous Monitor observed, comparing police activity to population provides a “generalized type of analysis that does not tell us much about what is driving disparity.” Further, determining the extent of racial disparity caused specifically by policing is difficult to quantify. **Directly comparing stop or frisk rates to the racial composition of Seattle's population does not, by itself, render conclusions on biased-policing or tell us the amount of disparity caused specifically by SPD's practices, because racial disparities evident in police data may be impacted by societal inequities, not just by the actions of individual subjects or officers.**

(Bolded in the original.)

As commended by both the DOJ and the Monitor, SPD has developed robust programs that use advanced analytics (propensity score matching) to create quasi-experimental approaches to digging into disparities in its data, particular with respect to those actions that depend heavily on officer discretion (such as the decision to stop a subject or the decision to frisk). Yet even this methodology is not discrete enough to capture subtle nuances in a particular encounter that may influence an officer one way or another.

I will continue to lean into and advance SPD's work to reduce any disparities in its data that are caused by officer decision-making through the continued heightened analysis at the individual event and systemic levels (supervisor reviews of stops and detentions, bias reviews by chains of command, OPA review, and OIG review), supporting SPD's analytics team as it continues to refine its approach to the data, and – critically – through my commitment to community policing and bringing officers together with the communities they serve.

**d. CM Rinck Question i:**

***There has been a lot of news coverage about former Officer Kevin Dave, who hit and killed Jaahnavi Kandula in a crosswalk while speeding to answer a call. It came out that SPD was aware of Dave's problematic history as a police officer in Tucson, Arizona, where he was fired for failing to meet their standards for recruits and also had an alleged drunk driving incident on his record. It seems like this was a huge oversight on SPD's part that unfortunately led to death of a young woman going about her day. Are you planning to look into SPD's backgrounding process as part of responding to this failure. How else can we safeguard against this happening again?***

The death of Jaanavi Kandula is a tragedy that impacted our local communities, her family and her community in India, SPD employees, and ultimately, the involved former officer in many ways – exacerbated by the horrific comments captured on the body-worn video of an officer wholly unrelated to the event.

As this matter is in litigation, I am limited in the extent to which I can discuss specific allegations that may be at issue in this case. Indeed, I do not even have all of the facts that have been subject to discovery. Just as I expect a full briefing from the City's Attorney's Office in the coming months, I understand that City Council will likewise be briefed in Executive Session and questions about what happened and any causal factors are best addressed in that context. Until then, I would encourage all of us not to rely exclusively on media reports for a comprehensive understanding of this truly tragic incident.

Without implying any opinion as the process previously in place, SPD's new backgrounding model and implementation of eSOPH, an automated case management system, has not only made the backgrounding process more efficient, but more organized. This should improve accuracy, clarity, and consistency in hiring practices.

e. CM Rinck Question g:

***With the consideration of the research that has come out from the National Institute of Criminal Justice Reforms stating that one half of all call types are best responded to by civilian responders, are there plans to listen to both SPD command staff as well as leading researchers? How will your approach to leadership include the research and data that will ensure a team-oriented approach, including civilian responders?***

I support a diversified response plan, with the right resource – CARE, SFD, Patrol, CSOs, Crisis Response Teams, SWAT, ABS, Harbor, and potentially a wide-variety of community responders – being deployed at the right time for the right reason. On civilian response, the department has invested heavily in its Community Service Officer program, championed under a prior iteration of City Council, and in addition to regularly utilizing CSOs, works alongside (and diverts responses to) CARE responders routinely.

With respect to the work of NICJR and, in particular, SPD's engagement of NICJR to examine opportunities for building out alternative response programs, it's important to ensure that we are all operating off a common understanding of the NICJR report and SPD's work to facilitate and build on that report - particularly insofar as very few of those initially involved in this work remain with the City. (One independent analysis of this work that I found particularly useful in navigating diverse perspectives around the report and its findings can be found at <https://sccinsight.com/2021/11/11/understanding-the-nicjr-report/>.)

At the outset, SPD *agreed* with the premise of the report in that there are without question calls for service that default to SPD, but which ultimately do not need a police response. SPD's concerns with the report, and particularly about relying exclusively on this report to radically shift dispatch protocols, were not rooted in any fundamental disagreement about the value of non-police response services; rather, SPD had concerns about (1) broad inferences from the limited values of initial call type and call disposition as to the necessity for police intervention (i.e., the methodology did not account for the quality of the response that may impact the ultimate disposition) and (2) determining from these limited data call sets that could be shifted from police categorically, rather than based upon factors and circumstances unique to each call.

As originally proposed in SPD's response to SLI SPD-017-A-001, SPD undertook to build upon the work of NICJR to develop a more nuanced model for identifying call triage that better accounted for the inherent risks that can come with any call for service. This model – the Intelligent Risk Management (IRM) system – was the brainchild of SPD's Senior



Director of Performance Analytics and Research (Loren Atherley), formed the basis for Dr. Atherley's dissertation research (undertaken under the tutelage of one of modern policing's foremost scholars at Cambridge University (UK) and with advisory support from academic experts at leading institutions in the United States.<sup>8</sup> I am extremely proud to report that, just this week, SPD and CARE have begun implementation of this system with the support of nearly \$700,000 in grant funding (originally through the Bureau of Justice Assistance and subsequently picked up by the National Policing Institute).

Rather than using categorical distinctions to discern the routing of calls, this IRM system is a technology solution designed to support 911 call takers in making evidence-based decisions about appropriate emergency response resources. The system uses Natural Language Processing to analyze call audio in real-time, providing a risk forecast that helps identify when it's safe to dispatch non-police responders. This human-machine interface serves as intelligent decision support rather than replacing human judgment, creating cognitive synchronism when the system and call taker agree, and prompting deeper consideration when they disagree.

Technical implementation of the IRM system involves several Amazon Web Services components working together to process emergency calls. The system transcribes live call audio, analyzes the text using a machine learning model trained on historical call data, and displays a visual risk assessment on a simple web interface. The display shows which response tier is recommended (police response, co-responder assisted police response, police assisted co-response, or deferred response) along with the confidence level of that recommendation, all updating in near real-time as the call progresses.

Evidence-based response is critical because the current system relies heavily on professional judgment, which can be inconsistent and vulnerable to human factors like fatigue or bias. With 97% of calls resolving differently than their initial classification (one difficulty with validating the NICJR report based on the data available at the time), and over 42,000 possible permutations of call characteristics, human judgment alone cannot reliably identify the appropriate response in every situation. The IRM system standardizes risk assessment while keeping a human in the loop, allowing for both consistency and flexibility in emergency response decisions.

The grant award to operationalize Seattle's IRM demonstrates the potential impact of this approach, not just in Seattle but throughout the field of emergency response. By providing

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<sup>8</sup> I do want to note, responsive to the reference to the research community, that many who are active in this research space are members of SPD, including Dr. Atherley – widely considered one of the leading scholars in modern police theory and who, alongside myself, is a member of the George Mason University Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame. It was in part the caliber of SPD's research team that initially drew my interest to Seattle.

objective, data-driven support for call triage decisions, the IRM system enables more efficient allocation of emergency resources, potentially recovering up to 26% of police capacity currently spent on non-police matters. This technology represents a significant advancement in public safety management, allowing communities to deploy the right resources to the right situations while maintaining safety for both responders and the public they serve.

I trust that this work demonstrates SPD's commitment to advance the goals around alternative response articulated in Executive Order 2020-10, a commitment that I wholeheartedly support. That said, I am mindful that I cannot work outside of existing laws, including labor laws governing bodies of work and prohibitions against skimming. Whatever I would personally like to do, I cannot change existing structures on my own without city support and agreement between many interested parties. In fact, the primary authority for collective bargaining is the Labor Relations Policy Committee, or LRPC, which currently includes five members of City Council and five members of the Executive, who jointly hold far more sway in changing bodies of work.

### **3. Leadership Principles**

#### **a. CM Kettle Question b:**

***Often we get focused on specific issues and challenges that arise. More broadly, though, it's important to understand your leadership principles, approaches, and lessons learned over the course of your career. Can you speak to this point?***

#### **b. CM Solomon Question a:**

***At the South Precinct community meeting, you [Chief Barnes] shared your priorities as Chief of Police for our City. May you please share these priorities with my colleagues and briefly remark on how or why they were chosen? (CM Solomon)***

Throughout the course of my 25-year career in policing—and a lifetime of service that includes time as a U.S. Marine, public school teacher, and athletic coach—I have learned enduring lessons that continue to guide me as a leader. These lessons have not only contributed to my professional success but have also shaped my approach to leading with purpose, clarity, and compassion.

Leadership begins with self-awareness. I have come to understand that knowing oneself—both strengths and limitations—is foundational to effective leadership. With this

understanding, I have always sought to build teams that are well-rounded and diverse in human, technical, and conceptual skills. Setting the example is critical. I strive to maintain a positive and grounded outlook, especially in challenging times. While I never deny the reality of difficult situations, I recognize that people often look to me to gauge whether to remain calm or panic. Emotions are contagious, and as a leader, I must choose to spread optimism, confidence, and purpose.

A key element of modeling the way also lies in decision-making. Over the years, I have learned the value of discernment in when and how to act. I make routine decisions quickly to maintain momentum, but take a more deliberate, thoughtful approach with complex or high-stakes choices. The ability to strike this balance has been critical in fostering trust and consistency throughout my career. A safe and vibrant city cannot be achieved by police alone—it requires the participation and commitment of all stakeholders, from community members to civic partners. My role is to unite people around that shared vision and to inspire collaboration at every level, and welcome respectful disagreement and diverse perspectives. Innovation is born from challenge and conversation. I have made it a point to surround myself with the best and brightest minds in law enforcement, encouraging them to challenge traditional approaches and bring forward new ideas.

This openness has led to improved processes, policies, and outcomes. The status quo should never be a destination; it should be a launching pad for constant growth. I envision a Seattle Police Department that is known for being innovative and forward-thinking. Empowering others is not only a core leadership principle but a necessity in any large, complex organization. I believe in the importance of clear, transparent communication—early and often. People are more effective when they feel informed, trusted, and valued. I also believe leadership should exist at every level of the organization. When tasks are clearly communicated, supervised effectively, and held to high standards, individuals are given the space to grow, excel and lead. Empowered employees become the backbone of a high-functioning department, and it is my duty to create the conditions for their success.

Perhaps most importantly, I believe in knowing and caring for the people I serve and lead. Leadership is not only about strategy—it's also about humanity. One of my departmental priorities is employee safety and wellness, a commitment that spans five dimensions: mental health, spiritual wellness, physical health, financial health, and social health. These are the principles I have followed. Modeling the way, inspiring a shared vision, challenging the process, encouraging others to act, and enabling the heart are more than abstract concepts. They are the lived values that have guided me from the classroom to military service, and from the patrol car to the Chief's office. Leadership is not about titles or ranks—it is about service, integrity, and the willingness to learn and grow alongside

those you lead. I remain committed to these principles, not only as a police chief but as a lifelong servant to the communities I am honored to serve.

Finally, I have made it clear to my leadership team and indeed, the whole department, that Crime Prevention, Community Partnerships, Retention and Recruitment, Employee Safety and Wellness, and Continuous Improvement, are **departmental priorities**, not Chief's priorities. While I may have set these priorities, they need to be owned at every level of the department and should continue to shape how we approach our missions.

Crime Prevention, Community Partnerships, Retention and Recruitment, and Continuous Improvement are addressed throughout this document, but I would like to share a little more on Employee Safety and Wellness specifically in response to CM Solomon, and why that priority is so important to me.

I had the profound opportunity to serve on President Obama's Taskforce on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing<sup>9</sup>, where I was assigned to Pillar Six: Officer Wellness & Safety. Prior to working on this report, I was honestly not previously focused on this critical aspect of policing. This collaborative experience was transformative and employee wellness has become a core value to me, both personally and professionally.

Though there is still much work to be done, I want to commend SPD for its commitment over the past eight years to zealously pushing the business case for building out its wellness services and for highlighting the significant risk management value of investment in this area. Though these are not my words, I could not agree more with SPD's past advocacy, and (with apologies for the length but with the earnest ask that you take to heart), borrow here from its 2019 business case to advance officer wellness as a pillar of broader enterprise risk management:

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***“The expectation that we can be immersed in suffering and loss daily and not be touched by it is as unrealistic as expecting to walk through water without getting wet.”***

Occupational safety has long been an unquestioned priority for law enforcement generally. Recognizing the physical demands of the job, many agencies equally prioritize the physical health of their officers through either mandatory physical fitness requirements or incentive packages to maintain a level of physical well-being. Yet despite the overwhelming body of research showing the psychological damage caused, acutely and cumulatively, by the vicarious trauma to which officers are routinely exposed, the

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<sup>9</sup> <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-J36-PURL-gpo64136/pdf/GOVPUB-J36-PURL-gpo64136.pdf>

undeniable interplay between mental health and physical well-being, and the impact of both on officer performance, it has only been relatively recently that the urgency of prioritizing first responder mental health has been advanced as an integral and equally critical component of comprehensive police reform.

The integrity of officer wellness to comprehensive reform efforts is evidenced through the evolution of DOJ investigations and actions since the issuance of the Final Report of President Obama's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing, published in 2015. This report, which now sets the standards on which federal consent decrees are based, calls out Officer Wellness as a key pillar of reform, on equal footing with other core pillars reflected in consent decrees prior to 2015. For example, whereas Seattle's consent decree focuses almost exclusively on issues concerning transparency and accountability in police/community interactions and operations, consent decrees implemented in the years following show the increasing awareness to holding jurisdictions and agencies equally accountable to their officers – to ensure that officers are receiving not just the training they need to provide the community the safe and Constitutional policing it deserves, but the support they need to mitigate against the daily trauma they are expected to bear. See, for example, the DOJ's 2017 Findings Letter into the practices of the Chicago Police Department:

*Policing is a high-stress profession. Law enforcement officers often are called upon to deal with violence or crises as problem solvers, and they often are witness to human tragedy. ... The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing put it well, noting that "the 'bulletproof cop' does not exist. The officers who protect us must also be protected – against incapacitating physical mental, and emotional health problems as well as against the hazards of their job. Their wellness and safety are crucial for them, their colleagues, and their agencies, as well as the well-being of the communities they serve."*

This is echoed in a report from DOJ to Congress in support of the Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act of 2017, signed into law in January 2018 with broad bipartisan support:

*Good mental and psychological health is just as essential as good physical health for law enforcement personnel to be effective in keeping our country and our communities safe from crime and violence. An officer's mental state affects his or her behavior in a variety of situations and can influence decision-*

*making and judgment. However, the current state of support for officer wellness nationally is disjointed and faces both cultural and logistical obstacles.*

*The daily realities of the job can affect officers' health and wellness. They face a constant need to be vigilant, long hours and shift work, exposure to the daily tragedies of life, and regular interaction with people who are in crisis or hostile toward them. Patrol officers face a national undercurrent of heightened public scrutiny of the profession that overshadows the legitimacy of their individual efforts. ... All of these things added to the ordinary hassles of the workplace and their personal lives can lead to cumulative stress and burnout.*

*Officers anticipate and accept the unique dangers and pressures of their chosen profession. However, people under stress find it harder than people not experiencing stress to connect with others and regulate their own emotions. They experience narrowed perception, increased anxiety and fearfulness, and degraded cognitive abilities. This can be part of a healthy fight-or-flight response, but it can also lead to significantly greater probabilities of errors in judgment, compromised performance, and injuries. **Failing to address the mental health and wellness of officers can ultimately undermine community support for law enforcement and result in officers being less safe on the job.***

Officer wellness matters. The impacts, neurobiologically, psychologically, behaviorally, and organizationally of job-related stress are undisputed in the literature:

- Decades of research supports that diminished mental health in first responders is attributable, directly and indirectly, to the vicarious trauma first responders, and those in their support, experience as a routine part of the job. Indeed, increasingly, jurisdictions are recognizing, as a rebuttable presumption, PTSD in first responders as an occupational injury resulting from cumulative exposure to trauma. (In Washington, e.g., see RCW 51.08 et seq.)
- Unmitigated/treated, vicarious trauma can manifest in poor officer behavior/performance and an unhealthy organizational culture in numerous ways:
  - **Performance:** Decrease in quality/quantity of work, low motivation, task avoidance or obsession with detail, working too hard, setting perfectionist standards, difficulty with inattention, forgetfulness.

- o **Morale:** Decrease in confidence, decrease in interest, negative attitude, apathy, dissatisfaction, demoralization, feeling undervalued and unappreciated, disconnected, reduced compassion.
- o **Relational:** Detached/withdrawn from co-workers, poor communication, conflict, impatience, intolerance of others, sense of being “the only one who can do the job.”
- o **Behavioral:** Calling out, arriving late, overwork, exhaustion, irresponsibility, poor follow-through.

These traits spread, polarizing employees between those who are underperforming and those who perceive themselves (often inaccurately) to be overperforming. This polarization can further manifest in distrust between ranks, a sense of isolation, and spiral throughout the organization, impacting not only organizational performance and reputation, but also the ability of the organization to attract and maintain a high-quality workforce, and ultimately, community safety.

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SPD has done good work in this area and our Employee Support Services Bureau, housed off-site from SPD, is developing well. But we must do more. It is my belief that, fundamentally, we cannot talk about changing the organizational or occupational culture of policing without also talking about officer wellness.

#### **4. Crowd and Demonstration Facilitation**

##### **a. CM Rivera Question a:**

***What are your strategies for crowd control, de-escalation, and handling protests? What methods have you found to be successful in your career and will/can they be implemented in Seattle?***

Throughout the course of my career, I have had the opportunity to manage all manners of protests and demonstrations, including many that can evoke strong passion, such as protests involving white supremacy, Black Lives Matter, Confederate statue sympathizers, pro-choice and anti-choice activists, and, during my time as Chief in Madison, demonstrations at the state capitol building that involve unique security considerations. I understand from science and my own personal experience that maintaining an open dialogue with community and the news media before, during and after demonstrations, and balancing

the rights of demonstrators with the rights of the community at large, protecting people first and property second is sound thinking in this regard.

To advance learning around effective strategies for crowd control, de-escalation, and handling protests, I worked with the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice (“Quattrone Center”) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School to facilitate a sentinel event review (SER) around the protest events of 2020, which I understand served as the model for the SER conducted by the Office of the Inspector General here. MPD provided the Quattrone Center with more than 1600 pages of MPD documents related to the protests as well as more than 625 hours of closed-circuit television (CCTV) video, more than 30 hours of radio transmissions, and the ability to interview MPD officers who participated in the protests at all levels of the organization, from patrol officers to the event commanders. MPD invited a highly diverse group of community and law enforcement stakeholders to conduct the SER, identify contributing factors and generate specific recommendations for crowd management reform. These individuals came from a wide variety of backgrounds and experiences; several of them participated in the protests, and indeed, some of them may have designed or organized protests.

The following are methods and lessons that I subscribe to, most of which, if not all, are already engrained in SPD’s policies and training, but deserve mention here:

1. Police departments should emphasize a “less is more” approach to protest events, particularly when police themselves are the focus of the protest. Police presence in fixed lines, dressed in tactical gear, can serve as a flashpoint for protestors, and should be minimized to the extent possible.
2. Departments must communicate more effectively with the community before, during and after protest events. Building trust and effective lines of communication between the police and diverse segments of the community takes time; it cannot wait until the moments, hours, or even days immediately prior to a protest. Rather, those lines of communication must exist well before protests erupt (“you cannot establish a relationship in the middle of a crisis”).
3. Departments should regularly educate the community about their strategy and tactics for supporting protests.
4. Departments should engage with community leaders before individual protests to facilitate protest objectives. When police officers engage with protest organizers and establish safety guidelines this will allow the protestors to achieve their goals with minimal police engagement, limited only by the



requirement that the community – including protesters – be protected from harm.

5. Departments should provide additional crowd control training to all officers and incident command training to all senior command staff officers. While all officers receive basic crowd control training during their time in the police academy, crowd events have typically been evolving and more complex, particularly in large urban settings. Advanced training will help officers beyond the normal scope of basic crowd management, and joint training allows officers the benefits of understanding command staff decision making processes which aid in quick execution of orders.
6. Departments should work with community leaders to create Community Dialogue Representatives (CDRs) who can improve communication on behalf of protesters while protests are occurring and who can relay necessary context to officers to understand when it might be necessary to intercede and when the crowd could self-regulate and ensure continued calm. This concept is similar to SPD's POET officers but also brings in community members as partners.
7. Departments should focus on proportional reactions to intercede against instigators of violence and determining where action should be taken to decrease the risk of harm to individuals, against instigators of property damage.
8. Departments should continue to refine their tactics for responding to protest events, including emphasizing mobility, proportional reaction focused on instigators only, and real-time, plain language communication with observers explaining the public safety rationale for police actions.
9. Departments should track uses of force carefully and review them promptly. Immediately after protests are over, departments should engage in internal reviews with participating officers to continually reinforce, improve and refine its tactics. These processes and the outcomes they generate should be made public to rebuild trust and legitimacy with the community. (SPD's commitment to quality improvement is evidenced through the Force Review Board reviews specific to crowd management events and by its willing participation in sentinel event reviews conducted by the Inspector General.

The strategies for crowd control, de-escalation, and handling protests listed above or recommendations are generated from my experience as a 25-year career police officer and Chief and my review of academic literature in this area. These recommendations can have great impact on the community, increasing the mutual understanding between the diverse

views held throughout Seattle and our police department which is committed to facilitating the expression of those views in ways that ensure the safety of all.

**b. CM Hollingsworth Question c:**

***What is your leadership approach when it comes to crowd management, de-escalation, while respecting First Amendment rights?***

SPD remains steadfast in our commitment to protecting the constitutional rights of all individuals, especially the First Amendment rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and petitioning the government. These rights are foundational to our democracy and central to the values we uphold as a police department.

As someone who has long believed in the power of respectful discourse and peaceful protest, I am guided by the principles of the “Madison Method,” a philosophy shared with me by one of my mentors, former Madison Police Chief David C. Couper. This approach emphasizes de-escalation, restraint, and the essential duty of law enforcement to protect—not hinder—the exercise of free expression.

As the Chief of police for the Seattle Police Department, I operationalize my leadership approach when it comes to crowd management, de-escalation, while respecting First Amendment rights through six core principles:

1. **Protecting Constitutional Rights:** Our officers are trained and expected to safeguard the rights of individuals to protest peacefully and express their views openly.
2. **Impartiality and Neutrality:** We remain neutral in all demonstrations, regardless of the content or cause, ensuring our actions reflect fairness and professionalism.
3. **Open Dialogue:** Communication is key. We engage with protest organizers, participants, and media before, during, and after events to foster mutual understanding and avoid conflict.
4. **Monitoring and Balancing:** While we monitor protests to ensure public safety, we are also committed to balancing the rights of demonstrators with those of community members and local businesses.
5. **Restraint in the Use of Force:** Our priority is always the safety of people over property. We instruct our officers to use the least amount of force necessary and to avoid escalation whenever possible.
6. **Continuous Improvement:** We continually evaluate and refine our strategies for managing demonstrations to better serve our community and uphold public trust.

**c. CM Saka Question c:**

***The current May Day rallies and counter protests are still fresh and ongoing. To date, what are your reflections on how SPD handled the unrest that ensued and going forth, what are the learnings to ensure the safety of all?***

We are still gathering the complete constellation of facts and circumstances around that event for a variety of reviews, but notably this was one of the very few times since 2020 that SPD has used force at any level in the crowd management context. With every incident of this kind, we review the entirety of circumstances and seek to understand if there are improvements that can be made to how we approach future events of this nature.

While I can't speak to the legitimacy of or concerns around individual arrests or incidents of force – not only because I don't yet have all of the facts, but because I am precluded by the Accountability Ordinance from issuing any statements prejudging actions that are under review – I can offer two observations: (1) given the limited notice SPD received about this event, and thus the limited window for planning, I do believe that SPD's operations center and incident command did important work to of design and implement an operations plan, with the additional context that (2) SPD was operating on a paper-thin margin in staffing with competing events at the Seattle Center and Lumen Field already taxing our staffing. With this in mind, I believe that, by and large, officers appropriately met their responsibility of facilitating the First Amendment rights of all involved.

That said, I do not take lightly the concerns that have been raised, and I am certainly well aware that any arrest that calls for team tactics can raise questions, no matter how lawful or how well orchestrated. I also acknowledge that in such a polarized setting, it is easy to perceive police as morally or philosophically aligned with one side or another. I do want to emphasize that – unlike those in non-enforcement positions who may speak freely as to their personal views on the content of expression – SPD, as the enforcement arm of the government – must remain content neutral in its actions, responding to behaviors rather than speech. While others have commented on the complexity of permitting controversial speech in one of the City's LGBTQIA+ neighborhoods, it is our obligation to preserve the first amendment free speech rights of all involved.

The event remains under review of the Crowd Management Force Review Board, which is currently gathering and analyzing reports and videos. I also believe the Office of the Inspector General is planning a Sentinel Event Review to help bridge the mutual understanding of the event between community and the city. We look forward to participating in and learning from those results, once again for continual improvement.

d. CM Rinck Question k:

***Regarding the new less lethal weapons legislation, you've said that you think SPD should be able to use blast balls, but that you also want to ensure that in crowd management situations things never reach the point of needing to use them. What is your plan to avoid the use of these kinds of weapons?***

The Seattle Crowd Management policies that have been developed over many years, in collaboration with the Inspector General, the Office of Police Accountability, and the Community Police Commission, as well as the Department of Justice and the Federal Monitoring Team, are consistent with my philosophy and experience with crowd management.

Overall, the police approach must be one of flexibility and modulation and ideally members of an event or demonstration would self-regulate without the need for police intervention beyond simple facilitation of traffic control. As discussed above, we instruct our officers to use the least amount of force necessary and to avoid escalation whenever possible. To make this a reality on a continuing basis requires ongoing training and support.

I recognize the deep emotions these moments of civil unrest can bring. We hear our community, and we are committed to showing up with empathy, professionalism, and a dedication to protecting the rights of all.

5. Legitimacy

a. CM Hollingsworth Question a:

***Community trust in SPD remains fragile especially among marginalized communities. How do you plan to rebuild trust in the department without asking communities to "do the work" of reconciliation themselves? What specific steps have you taken so far, or what steps do you see necessary, to demonstrate that rebuilding trust that is tied to real outcomes and institutional change?***

b. CM Hollingsworth Question d:

***How have you established meaningful communication with community members during your time in Seattle so far, especially those with history of marginalization or harmed by policing?***

Policing is a public service—one that cannot succeed without trust, cooperation, and engagement from the communities we serve. In particular, our relationships with marginalized and historically disenfranchised communities remain fragile, and I acknowledge that rebuilding trust in the Seattle Police Department (SPD) requires more than good intentions or symbolic gestures. It requires sustained effort, operational changes, and a commitment to showing up consistently, transparently, and with humility.

As someone who comes from a marginalized community myself, I deeply understand the frustration of waiting for institutions, not just the police, but government more broadly, to show up for our neighborhoods in the same way they show up for others. That understanding shapes my leadership. It is why I have made it clear that under my command, this department will rebuild trust one neighborhood, one block, and one person at a time if necessary. There is no single strategic plan or quick fix for this work. If there were, every city in America would be using it. The divide between police and community—particularly among communities of color—has deep historical roots. But I believe there is a path forward.

That path begins with acknowledgment. We must recognize the role that law enforcement—and other public institutions—have played in producing unequal outcomes. The rise in incarceration, disproportionate policing, and economic and social dislocation in certain communities is not an accident of history. It is the result of policies and practices that have too often failed to value the dignity and humanity of every person equally.

Rebuilding trust means we must listen, and we must be proximate, as I discussed above. You cannot understand the needs of a community from behind a desk. Officers need time and space to engage with communities outside of emergency calls. Again, that's why I have authorized a staffing study to explore ways to realign our resources so that our officers have more time for proactive engagement; that's why I'm committed to a community policing model that prioritizes neighborhood-based sector and beat-level connections. These aren't just patrol strategies—they're opportunities to build relationships and deepen understanding. Programs like the Community CompStat discussed above and my commitment to communication and transparency through the hiring of a Chief Communications Officer will help connect SPD to community, and community to SPD.

I often use the analogy of building a bridge to describe trust-building. But what is often forgotten is that a bridge must be built from both sides. That doesn't mean placing the burden of reconciliation on communities. It means police must lead by acknowledging the past, being transparent in the present, and investing in long-term change. Communities are not responsible for repairing the harm done to them. That work begins with us.

Operationally, we are moving forward with this vision in several ways. Each SPD precinct is now required to host regular community meetings—not just within department buildings, but out in the neighborhoods we serve. Our Relational Policing Unit will be dedicated to creating direct, meaningful opportunities for officers, detectives, special teams, and command staff to engage with the public.

This department is adopting what I call a "Policing Forward" mindset—a renewed commitment to collaborative problem-solving and public safety that reflects the complexity of our city and the diversity of its people. We understand that Seattle is not a monolith; communities have different needs, histories, and concerns. That's why our approach must be flexible, inclusive, and focused on partnership.

Ultimately, the goal is to reduce harm and improve lives through sustained, community-driven solutions. These solutions require trust. And trust requires action—not once, not occasionally, but every day. I believe SPD is up to the task. We believe in the power of proximity, the value of engagement, and the promise of rebuilding trust—not just with words, but with meaningful outcomes and institutional change.

Since coming to Seattle in February, I have engaged in many community events and meetings, engaging with and hearing from a wide range of community members. The welcome has been overwhelmingly positive and I will have much work to do in the coming months and years to deepen relationships with individuals and communities in Seattle. I am humbled that so many have shared their stories with me and honored that many have chosen to listen. This relationship building will be continuous throughout my tenure as this job is about people.

## **6. Crime Prevention**

### **a. CM Hollingsworth Question b:**

***Gun violence – particularly with youth – and property crime remain at an all-time high. How have you addressed these issues while avoiding over-policing or disparate outcomes (or how do you plan to)? What prevention-oriented public safety strategy ideas do you have that can balance law enforcement with social services?***


### **b. CM Saka Question f:**

***Gun violence continues to pose a serious threat to public safety in Seattle, disproportionately impacting youth and marginalized communities. What specific, measurable actions will you take as Chief to reduce gun violence citywide? How will you collaborate with***


**community partners, public health agencies, and other stakeholders to implement a holistic and sustainable approach? Additionally, how would you approach possible uses of emerging technologies and new data-driven tools to further enhance public safety and operational efficiency while safeguarding civil liberties?**

Gun violence is a serious problem in Seattle, with too many shots fired in too many neighborhoods. I am also aware that perceptions of crime drive fear and feelings of being safe as much as actual crime – ultimately, we must address both. So, as I provide updates on crime data, I remain cognizant that every violent crime has a victim, for whom the trends and percentages of statistics are inherently meaningless. Within that context, while crime spiked in the post-COVID era and remains high in overall historical context, both property and violent crime rates in 2025 are *declining*.<sup>10</sup>


The two charts below show that both 2025 crime rates are lower than 2024 and the five-year weighted average, both for property and violent crime.



<sup>10</sup> [Crime Dashboard - Police | seattle.gov](#)



Crime is trending in the right direction. In 2025 by the end of May shootings and shots fired shows a decline of 19%; homicides are down 21% for the same time period.<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> [Crime Dashboard - Police | seattle.gov](https://crime.seattle.gov/)



To continue the downward trend SPD is implementing a coordinated, evidence-based crime and harm reduction strategy. This strategy is a holistic, view of the factors that contribute to crime, disorder, and quality of life. This is a strategy and actions taken by SPD in partnership with communities and service providers to reduce and deter criminal activities *before* they occur. This approach combines multi-disciplinary proactive measures, community engagement, and strategic planning to create safer environments. Here are some key aspects of police crime prevention:

1. **Community Engagement:** Develop and sustain strong relationships with community members to foster trust and cooperation. SPD's Relational Policing and Community Outreach Bureau is actively building partnerships, including mentoring, victim services, community service officers, and crime prevention education.<sup>12</sup> The Demographic Advisory Councils help ensure no group is underrepresented.<sup>13</sup> The core premise is every officer is a community policing officer.
2. **Education and Awareness:** Inform the public about crime prevention techniques and encourage them to proactively protect themselves and their property.<sup>14</sup>
3. **Community-Oriented Policing (COP):** A strategy that encourages building strong relationships between the police and the community to collaboratively address crime and safety issues.<sup>15</sup>
4. **Problem-Oriented Policing (POP):** A strategy that focuses on specific community issues and developing targeted solutions to address them (See Appendix A for an example). This might involve addressing recurring problems at certain locations or dealing with specific individuals who repeatedly cause trouble.<sup>16</sup>
5. **Focused deterrence:** A crime prevention strategy also known as "pulling levers," that targets specific high-risk individuals or groups to prevent future criminal behavior, particularly violence.<sup>17</sup> It has shown efficacy for repeat offenders who use firearms or are involved in drug activity.

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<sup>12</sup> [Relational Policing/Community Outreach | Seattle Police Foundation](#)

<sup>13</sup> [Demographic Advisory Councils - Police | seattle.gov](#)

<sup>14</sup> [Crime Prevention - Police | seattle.gov](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Home | COPS OFFICE](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Center for Problem-Oriented Policing | ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing](#)

<sup>17</sup> [Home - National Network for Safe Communities \(NNSC\)](#)

6. **Evidence-Based Policing (EBP)** : An approach that emphasizes the use of empirical research and data analysis to guide decision-making, policies, and practices within police departments.<sup>18</sup>
7. **SafeGrowth Environmental Design**: Implementing Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, which involve modifying the physical environment to reduce opportunities for crime. This can include better lighting, surveillance, and community spaces designed to deter criminal behavior.<sup>19</sup>
8. **Continuous improvement** : The concept of building into policing ongoing efforts to enhance police services, processes, and outcomes through systematic evaluation and incremental changes. Key elements:
  - a) **Regular Assessment**: Continuously evaluating current practices, policies, and outcomes to identify areas for improvement.<sup>20</sup>
  - b) **Evidence-Based Decisions**: Using evidence to inform changes and measure the effectiveness of new strategies.<sup>21</sup>
  - c) **Employee Engagement**: Involving police officers and staff in the improvement process to leverage their insights and foster a culture of innovation
  - d) **Training and Development**: Providing ongoing training to ensure that officers are equipped with the latest skills and knowledge.
  - e) **Feedback Mechanisms**: Establishing channels for receiving feedback from the community and officers to guide improvements.

This approach to crime and community partnership is part of the Seattle-Centric Policing approach SPD is implementing this month. Seattle-Centric Policing is a comprehensive plan focused on reducing harm and crime while enhancing the quality of life for Seattle residents. It is built on the collaborative efforts of the community, government, services, and non-profit organizations. By fostering integrated partnerships, Seattle-Centric Policing can create a safer and more vibrant city. The plan applies strategies proven effective in reducing crime and harm.

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<sup>18</sup> <https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/>

<sup>19</sup> [SAFEGROWTH® - HOME](#)

<sup>20</sup> <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41887-022-00073-y>

<sup>21</sup> [Continuous Improvement Self-Assessment Matrix \(CI SAM\)](#)

Seattle-Centric Policing centers on sustained community<sup>22</sup> involvement and partnership-driven solutions. The Seattle community naturally leads these initiatives, focusing on strategies and incidents that impact the city. Working in coordination reduces greatly the chance of over-policing. In terms of engaging with at risk youth, this really falls to community and service providers. If a youth is arrested, then the appropriate resources should engage to assist the youth towards being successful and not continue to be involved in illegal activity.

In Seattle, the collaboration between community members, city officials, and the police is vital for reducing crime and harm. By fostering strong partnerships and building trust with neighborhoods and working closely with organizations like the Seattle Department of Neighborhoods and Community Engagement Coordinators, our capacity increases. These relationships are essential for effective problem-solving, as they enable open communication and mutual understanding. Together, they address local issues, enhance safety, and improve the quality of life for all residents, demonstrating the power of collective effort and shared responsibility.

Seattle-Centric Policing leverages existing programs (Precinct Advisory Councils, Community Micro-Policing Plans, Police Neighborhood Resource Center Pilot, Community Advisory Councils) and in conjunction with city departments – like the Department of Neighborhoods – continuously seek additional community partnerships.

Addressing CM Saka's question on technology, I approach advancements in a crawl-walk-run manner, meaning that Seattle has invested heavily in critical technology to enhance public safety through the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), which I describe more fully below. I believe the department needs to show mastery of that technology and explore its possibilities responsibly before immediately reaching for more. That being said, I do advocate for crime reporting enhancements in the section immediately below, supported by additional technology.

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<sup>22</sup> Community inclusive of neighborhoods, informal and formal community associations, and the business community.

**c. CM Saka Question d:**

***This Council has invested in advanced public safety tools such as Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR), Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), and the Real-Time Crime Center, recognizing their value as force multipliers. As Chief, how do you plan to strategically leverage these technologies to prevent and respond to crime? Additionally, what emerging technologies or data-driven tools would you prioritize to further enhance public safety and operational efficiency?***

The Real Team Crime Center (RTCC) began operation May 20, 2025, with an operating schedule of 9:00-5:00, and only connects to city purchased cameras, including 15 in the Chinatown International District, 10 cameras on North Aurora (a SOAP area), and nine cameras downtown on Second and Third Avenues. Thirty-four cameras remain to be installed in these three areas. This represents a small section of Seattle streets, with all cameras oriented into public space and digitally masked when the cameras could intrude into private areas, such as residential windows. None of these cameras have license plate reading (ALPR) capability – all ALPR technology is deployed in patrol vehicles. RTCC has a standard operating procedure that ensures ordinance requirements are followed.

These technologies provide real-time video capability for emerging critical events as well as backend support for investigations. SPD has always had the capacity to gather video evidence but the addition of RTCC analysts means that video can be quickly and efficiently reviewed. A prime example of this capability was the investigation into the recent triple homicide, which led to relatively quick arrests of suspects. While there were no city cameras in the area, analysts were able to support detectives by reviewing private camera footage made available to investigators. This support reduced investigative time from weeks to days, providing the leads that led to successful arrests.

Some highlights from the first few weeks of operation: the RTCC provided evidence on a stolen vehicle, which was returned to its owner and the suspect identified and arrested (for both violation of a no-contact order and the vehicle theft); shots fired from a moving vehicle were captured, providing information for follow up; and a pedestrian hit-and-run was recorded with a vehicle description for follow up. These anecdotes are only some of the more than 50 incidents RTCC has been able to materially assist. Additionally, the RTCC has been able to determine that crimes *did not occur* as described by 911 callers, which meant that units could stand down and move on to the next call. This real time ability to “teleport” to the scene and validate or disprove will make patrol response more efficient and directed and will also support the goal of the RTCC to promote “precision policing,”

which ultimately should lead to fewer unnecessary intrusions on members of community. Moving forward, I would like to integrate private cameras with the RTCC to have better situational awareness citywide, which was previously authorized under the Surveillance Impact Report.

In terms of additional technology, both CARE and SPD support investing in an automated phone system for the non-emergency line, supported by a virtual assistant, that can route callers to the help they need. Additionally, if that system would estimate hold wait times and offer the possibility of a call back, customer satisfaction could be greatly increased.

Currently, the non-emergency line is answered by call-takers at CARE. Once screened to ensure it is not an emergency, these calls are routed to SPD's Internet and Telephone Reporting Unit (ITRU), where officers take the report over the phone. Although CARE has been working hard to ensure 24/7 coverage of the non-emergency line and wait times are trending down (to just under seven minutes on average), there are many callers that get frustrated, hang up, or resort to re-calling 911, which creates different inefficiencies.

Similarly, I would support the expansion of the Find-It/Fix-It application for general open air drug use and general disorder. If that were to occur, I would also request that SPD be granted access to the data in that system for planning purposes.

**d. CM Rinck Question b:**

***Given that there is no evidence that CCTV cameras reduce violent crime, why did you recommend camera installation in the three West Seattle neighborhoods that are currently experiencing an uptick in gun violence? What noise detection software and equipment are you considering using in Seattle?***

The City's camera deployment strategy is driven by data showing concentrations of violent crime; your question notes that there is an uptick in crime in neighborhoods where cameras are being considered. Additionally, while the placement of cameras is evidence-based, several City Council members have specifically requested the implementation of this technology in their districts.

I am also not actively considering the use of additional noise detection software and equipment although some City Councilmembers have stated that such technologies could be beneficial, primarily for monitoring engine noise in residential areas. Any plan would need to be vetted through the Surveillance Ordinance, as appropriate, which would directly involve Council in the decision-making. Additionally, Executive support would be required.

Lastly, there *is* evidence that CCTV cameras reduce violent crime, as events that lead to continued violence may be interrupted.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, robbery can be reduced with the use of such technology.<sup>24</sup> While no single technology is the panacea for improving public safety, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) recently published a technical report evaluating implementation in several large US cities and found efficacy, with qualifications, for reducing crime. Specifically, the report concluded:

Of primary importance is the fact that public surveillance technology is viewed as a potentially useful tool for preventing crimes, aiding in arrests, and supporting investigations and prosecutions. While the technology and its applications are not without limitations, it is noteworthy that stakeholders across a wide array of vested interests were generally supportive of public video surveillance. These views were largely—but not consistently—supported by impact analyses. Analysis results indicate that cameras, when actively monitored, have a cost-beneficial impact on crime with no statistically significant evidence of displacement to neighboring areas.<sup>25</sup>



<sup>23</sup> Piza, E., Welsh, B., Farrington, D. and Thomas, A. (2019). CCTV Surveillance for Crime Prevention: A 40-Year Systematic Review with Meta-Analysis. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 18(1): 135-159

<sup>24</sup> Priks, Mikael. (2015) The Effects of Surveillance Cameras on Crime: Evidence from the Stockholm Subway. *The Economic Journal*, 125 (November), pg. 289–305.

<sup>25</sup> Nancy, LaVigne, S. Lowry, J. Markman, A. Dwyer. Evaluating the use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention. Final Technical Report, September 2011. COPS Office, US DOJ.

Overall, the department's approach to surveillance technology (as discussed more comprehensively above) is to continually evaluate the efficacy of each program or system. If it works, the technology will be retained; if not, reinvestments would be considered.

**e. CM Rinck Question c:**

***Are there plans for SPD to change their plans for CCTV cameras and RTCC, as well as eliminating ALPR retention times for non-hits in light of the reporting from media outlets such as 404 Media that the data is being utilized by ICE and the federal government, even when the data is being collected by police departments in Sanctuary Cities?***

SPD and I share legitimate concerns about the misuse of surveillance data. Our ethos is written on the wall of the RTCC: "Great power requires greater responsibility." As part of the Surveillance Ordinance process and in collaboration with the Executive and City Council, SPD has made every effort to mitigate the likelihood of inappropriate sharing of our data. While the question did not reference a specific article, circumstances in which data was inappropriately used for immigration purposes or reproductive/gender affirming care seem to be primarily due to direct data sharing by a department with immigration officials, out-of-state agencies, or data sharing with third party aggregators, neither of which occur in Seattle.

Both ALPR and CCTV systems are managed through a single vendor, Axon. SPD negotiated systemic changes to the master services agreement with Axon (which also includes BWC, ICV, and all collected digital evidence), that includes:

- Agreement that all data belongs to the City of Seattle and no data will be shared without express permission. Some vendors share information with national databases; Axon does not and SPD will not.
- Any request for SPD data will be referred to SPD as the owner of the data.
- Agreement that in the event a warrant or other legal mechanism is received by Axon, Axon will take legal measures to avoid providing data. In the event a legal gag order accompanies the warrant (typically such an order would pertain to the target, not the owner of data), Axon will take the same legal measures. In the event they cannot quash the warrant and are compelled to disclose our data, they will inform us of what action they were compelled to take once the gag order is lifted.
- Specific references to the need to protect data in the contexts of immigration, gender-affirming care, and reproductive rights.

SPD does not share data with third party companies and SPD does not respond to federal administrative warrants (per law and policy). Because SPD has taken all the precautions it can to mitigate the risks of inappropriate use and because of the huge value SPD has already seen with the use of the new technologies, SPD intends to hold the current course and continue to evaluate.

When evaluating technology such as ALPR SPD is acutely aware of the concerns around data sharing and standing agreements between agencies and private vendors. SPD is frequently approached by companies offering such services and we take all these concerns into account before ever considering or doing business with these companies.

**f. CM Rinck Question d:**

***Given the millions of dollars that SPD is spending on these pilot surveillance technologies, what is the rationale behind the increase in surveillance technology over addressing root causes of violence and crime such as spending this money on food access, housing, and meeting people's needs which decreases the likelihood of crimes occurring?***

While crime is declining, Seattle has experienced continually high levels of gun violence and unusually high homicides, which impact our communities of color disproportionately. Indeed, in 2025, 46% of fatal shootings and 49% of non-fatal shootings are people of color. From a policing perspective, the efficacy of the RTCC and associated technologies should help mitigate violent crime, particularly gun violence. That is our goal – to save lives.

While SPD absolutely supports programs that support and help stabilize our communities in terms of food insecurity, inadequate affordable housing and shelter, and other basic human needs, the funding priorities are determined by Council, not the department, during the budgeting [process](#).

**g. CM Rinck Question a:**

***Seattle has rejected ShotSpotter at least three times now, but last year the City Council approved using CCTV cameras, a new Real Time Crime Center, as well as a big expansion of license plate readers. How do you approach the use of surveillance technology for policing and weigh its pros and cons?***

Technology should never replace community centered policing. In any organization, technology is a set of tools. It can augment, automate, and analyze information and data,



freeing up staff to do other activities (e.g. typed reports with carbon copies have been replaced with a records management system). In policing, technology should never replace connecting with community or limit building partnerships with organizations and services that seek to prevent crime and victimization.

The use of surveillance technology in policing is a complex and evolving issue that requires a careful balance between public safety and civil liberties. On one hand, surveillance tools such as body-worn cameras, license plate readers, and predictive analytics can significantly enhance law enforcement capabilities. These technologies can help deter crime, provide critical evidence in investigations, and increase accountability and transparency within police departments. Technology is used for both criminal investigations and to evaluate police practices. For instance, body cameras have been shown to reduce both use-of-force incidents and investigate complaints of misconduct, fostering greater trust and transparency between law enforcement and the communities they serve.

I recognize the deployment of surveillance technology also raises significant ethical, legal, and social concerns. Foremost among these is the potential for infringement on individual privacy rights. Without clear policies and oversight, surveillance tools can be misused or disproportionately targeted at marginalized communities, exacerbating existing inequalities and eroding public trust. In Seattle, more than a decade of work with the US DOJ consent decree, city accountability partners, and city ordinances have developed robust operating procedures to ensure this technology is appropriately used and not misused. This includes transparent policies on data collection, storage, and usage; independent oversight bodies to monitor compliance and investigate misuse; and meaningful community engagement to ensure that the deployment of these tools aligns with public values and expectations. Additionally, law enforcement agencies must be held accountable for how they use surveillance data, and there should be clear avenues for redress when rights are violated.

Ultimately, the goal should be to harness the benefits of surveillance technology while applying it appropriately. This requires a commitment to ethical policing practices, continuous evaluation of technological impacts, and a willingness to adapt policies as new challenges and insights emerge (e.g. the city is researching AI, evaluating appropriate use with associated policies). By doing so, law enforcement can leverage innovation to enhance public safety while upholding the fundamental rights and freedoms that define a democratic society.

#### **h. CM Rinck Question j:**

***Last year we saw a crackdown on Third Avenue in downtown to deal with public drug use, drug markets, public disorder, etc. We also saw much of that unsavory activity move to Chinatown and the CID, and there was eventually another crackdown there. But often people are just continually moving from neighborhood to neighborhood as different hot spots are targeted. Is there a more durable solution beyond hot spot zones and what do you see as SPD's role in that?***

A common concern with place-based approaches such as hot spot policing is that they will not actually reduce crime and disorder, but instead just push or displace the activity to places nearby (so-called spatial displacement). A number of literature reviews, however, suggest that immediate spatial displacement is uncommon in place-based interventions. In the hot spots systematic review, just 1 of the 19 studies found evidence of significant displacement, and there the amount of crime displaced was less than the crime prevented in the target area.<sup>26</sup>

A separate systematic review of displacement in policing interventions found little evidence of displacement and some evidence of diffusion of crime-control benefits.<sup>27</sup> A diffusion of crime-control benefits refers to situations in which areas surrounding a targeted hot spot also show improvement, despite not receiving the intervention.<sup>28</sup> These positive spillover effects of hot spot interventions make place-based interventions even more efficient and can be explained, in part, by offenders' overestimating the size of target areas. That is, they think crime prevention strategies are being implemented where they are not. Additionally, the same opportunities for offending may not be present in the areas surrounding the hot spot site, which also decreases the likelihood of immediate spatial displacement.<sup>29</sup>

The results in Seattle are consistent with the theory and the research. The Seattle Police Department launched the Downtown Activation Team (DAT) initiative on September 9,

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<sup>26</sup> Braga, Anthony A., Andrew V. Papachristos, and David M. Hureau. 2010. "The Concentration and Stability of Gun Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980–2008." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 26(1): 33–53.

<sup>27</sup> Bowers, Kate, Shane Johnson, Rob T. Guerette, Lucia Summers, and Suzanne Poynton. 2011. "Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits among Geographically Focused Policing Interventions." *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 7(3).

<sup>28</sup> Clarke, Ronald V., and David L. Weisburd. 1994. "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement." In Ronald V. Clarke (ed.), *Crime Prevention Studies*, vol. 2 (pp. 165–184). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

<sup>29</sup> Weisburd, David, Laura A. Wyckoff, Justin Ready, John E. Eck, Joshua C. Hinkle, and Frank Gajewski. 2006. "Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner? A Controlled Study of Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits." *Criminology*, 44(3): 549–592.

2024, in the Pike/Pine and 3rd Avenue areas, expanding to Chinatown/International District (CID) on November 1, 2024. This initiative partners with community agencies and city stakeholders to implement three daily intervention efforts at designated hot spot locations.

As SPD endeavors to do with all its initiatives, the Crime Analysis team within the Performance Analytics and Research division evaluated the initiative's effectiveness using Causal Impact implementation of Bayesian structural time-series to assess changes in violent crime rates and community-generated calls for service.

The result of this research is compelling:

The Downtown Activation Team initiative has demonstrated immediate effectiveness in reducing both violent and property crimes across intervention locations

Analysis of crime data across all intervention areas reveals consistent reductions in both violent and property crimes, with no apparent evidence of displacement effects. The Downtown Activation Team's targeted approach has yielded positive results in Pike/Pine, 3rd Avenue, and Chinatown/International District simultaneously, demonstrating that crime reduction in one area does not lead to increases in neighboring locations. This pattern suggests that the intervention strategy is effectively addressing underlying factors contributing to criminal activity rather than simply shifting illegal behaviors from one location to another. The uniform decrease in community-generated calls for service further supports this conclusion, indicating a genuine improvement in public safety conditions throughout the downtown corridor rather than a geographical redistribution of criminal activity. However, the diminishing impact over time suggests that adaptations to implementation efforts may be necessary to sustain long-term crime reduction benefits.

My conclusion is that for each treatment or intervention we implement, it is important to measure the effectiveness and if changes need to be made, to agilely adapt the treatment. Here, the DAT has been very effective, but the impacts are diminishing. Therefore, we need to change things up, implement, and continue to measure. That is an evidence-based approach and one that will make Seattle safer.

## 7. Employee Wellness

### a. CM Saka Question a:

***Changing organizational culture has been an elusive goal for this department. What specific changes do you plan to implement at SPD in your first year and over the course of your tenure to continue changing the culture? What lessons from Madison do you believe are applicable here, and what have you learned about Seattle that requires a different approach?***

The issue of workplace culture is a topic that is deeply concerning to me and one that I think must be addressed in order to move forward with enthusiasm and purpose.

Reflecting on my tenure at SPD, four things are evident to me:

1. The overwhelming majority of individuals who have dedicated their careers to SPD, sworn and professional, are dedicated and mission-oriented public servants who are committed to serving the residents of Seattle with dignity and compassion.
2. The emotional strain of the past five years, impacted by shifting public sentiments, leadership turnover, significant loss of staffing, and the accompanying pressures of overtime and workload, are real.
3. Notwithstanding, there is a palpable sense of optimism, aided by the support of City leaders and the relief that comes as we add officers to our ranks at unprecedented levels, and it is time to move on.
4. As we turn the corner on hiring and look to a new day, it is time to reset clear expectations around how each and every member of this department contributes to the success of this organization, ensuring that we not only treat every member of the public with the highest levels of professionalism and courtesy but that these same expectations carry through to how we interact with and support each other.

Workplace culture, I have read, “is like the wind. It is invisible, yet its effect can be seen and felt. When it is blowing in your direction, it makes for smooth sailing. When it is blowing against you, everything is more difficult.”<sup>30</sup> Whether it is affirmatively driving a healthy culture by fostering a sense of equity, inclusion, and belonging, or guarding against an unhealthy work environment by allowing exclusion, conflict, inequity, or mistreatment to go unchecked, we are all responsible for ensuring that SPD is a place where all employees are safe, supported, and accountable to each other. Especially as we welcome so many

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<sup>30</sup> Walker and Soule, Harvard Business Review, June 2017.

new members to our department, as we reconcile generational differences in expectations and norms, and as we recover to a point of staffing relief, committing to a workplace culture grounded in wellness and respect that can be the tailwind behind us will be of paramount importance. This is not only key to our success, we owe it to ourselves and to each other.

With surveys cross-industry showing the extent and impact of toxic work environments, I know this is not an issue unique to SPD or to any particular organization or field, but it is an immediate concern to address. I will do so in an evidence-based manner, rooted in a commitment to wellness, guided by assessment of present state, clear expectations as to employee communications and behaviors, training and mentoring to those standards, continual review, and accountability of us all, to us all.

To effectively address organizational culture within the Seattle Police Department and foster a professional culture, it's crucial to establish a comprehensive code of conduct alongside a strategic plan for cultural change.

Below are lessons learned throughout my time as a police chief and my code of conduct philosophy, followed by an outline for implementing cultural transformation within the Seattle Police Department. While many of the concepts are currently part of SPD Policy, they do not stand together as a united structure.

### **Code of Conduct for Seattle Police Department**

#### **Preamble:**

The Seattle Police Department is committed to maintaining the highest standards of professionalism, integrity, and respect. All employees are expected to adhere to the following code of conduct to promote a healthy, inclusive, and safe work environment.

#### **1. Respectful Communication:**

- All employees must communicate respectfully and professionally, both verbally and in writing.
- Harassment, discrimination, or inappropriate comments (including jokes) based on gender, race, sexual orientation, or any other personal characteristic will not be tolerated.

#### **2. Professional Behavior:**

- Employees are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that reflects dignity and respect towards colleagues, the public, and the agency.

- Employees should avoid behaviors that promote a toxic work environment, including bullying, harassment of any type, retaliation, and intimidation.

### **3. Accountability:**

- All employees have a duty to intervene and a responsibility to report observed misconduct or violations of the code of conduct at the first available opportunity. Failing to do so may result in disciplinary action.

- Anyone found to violate this code will be subject to appropriate disciplinary measures, up to and including termination.

### **4. Commitment to Equity and Inclusion:**

- The department commits to equity, diversity, and inclusion. Every employee should actively work to create an environment where everyone feels valued and respected.

- Employees are encouraged to participate in cultural diversity training and contribute to diversity initiatives within the department.

### **5. Professional Development:**

- All employees are encouraged to engage in ongoing professional development and training. Attendance and participation in training related to workplace conduct and professionalism are mandatory.

- Supervisors and leaders are held to a high standard and should model appropriate behavior and demand a culture of professionalism.

### **6. Healthy Work Environment:**

- The Seattle Police Department supports work-life balance and mental health. Employees should make use of available resources, such as counseling services and wellness programs.

- Employees should address conflicts immediately and constructively. Employees should seek mediation from direct reports when necessary.

### **7. Commitment to Ethical Standards:**

- All employees must adhere to ethical standards of law enforcement and conduct, ensuring honesty, integrity, and transparency in all actions.

Please also see my response above to the department's priority of Employee Wellness.

## 8. Retention and Recruitment

### a. CM Saka Question e:

***Seattle has made strides in rebuilding its police force following the staffing losses during the 2020 pandemic, but challenges remain. What are your top priorities and strategies for strengthening the recruitment pipeline, including both new officer candidates and lateral hires? How will you ensure that these efforts promote diversity, high professional standards, and community trust?***

Following the historic levels of attrition experienced in the aftermath of the events of 2020, SPD has been focused on rebuilding staffing levels through an overhauled recruitment plan and a renewed focus on retention. These efforts are now bearing fruit with hiring on a record pace year-to-date and attrition trending down, with 84 hired to date, amounting to 46 net new officers YTD. We are on a course to hire 180 officers, which, for context, is a record number of hires in a single year since 1998, and likely ever in SPD's history.<sup>31</sup> By demonstrating value, respect, and a sense of mission for SPD's employees, SPD expects this downward trend in attrition to continue; in addition, SPD projects that its new recruit classes will continue to trend more diverse than the city or county as a whole (of note, 58% of SPD's recruits in 2024 identified as BIPOC). Further, as part of its continued participation in the 30x30 Initiative, SPD continues to focus on female recruitment.

SPD has significantly streamlined its hiring pipeline through bold process improvements and technology integration. The Background and Polygraph Team now operates on a biweekly eligibility register cadence, cutting time-to-hire and improving efficiency. By shifting to a largely virtual backgrounding model and implementing eSOPH, an automated case management system, the department has accelerated applicant processing. Additional virtual tools have enhanced communication, transparency, and flexibility across the hiring workflow. These innovations have improved candidate experience and positioned the department to compete more effectively in today's fast-moving hiring landscape.

Importantly, SPD is moving forward with a new recruiting agency that is developing new branding. Epic Recruiting is a leader in the field of law enforcement recruiting, dedicated to enhancing diversity and ushering in the next generation of law enforcement personnel. With a mission to provide comprehensive recruiting solutions, Epic Recruiting leverages a unique four-step process encompassing strategy, production, website design and

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<sup>31</sup> SPD hiring data only goes back to 1998. We are looking at other city records to validate further. The prior record was 117 officers hired in 2008.

management, as well as digital recruiting through online campaigns and social media management. SPD's image is built through the great work done by our officers every day, and through the authentic stories and faces of the sworn employees who serve this community. Epi is striving to showcase these stories and faces to attract new officers to be a part of SPD, as we work toward the goal of being fully staffed. This new push will focus on officers capable of performing the rigors of police work, with a focus on diversity in all its forms, such as racial, ethnic, gender diversity, as well as diversity of thought and experience.

To sustain the department's hiring and retention progress, continued support from policy makers remains essential. Public messaging that affirms officers and promotes a shared sense of purpose directly contributes to morale and long-term retention. Ongoing funding for hiring and marketing initiatives has shown measurable success and is needed to maintain applicant interest and hiring momentum. Timely settlement of labor agreements is also important, as it signals respect for our workforce and helps position the department as a competitive employer. Together, these actions will reinforce the department's efforts to build and retain a strong and stable workforce moving forward.

**b. CM Saka Question b:**

***The 30x30 Initiative aims to increase the percentage of women in policing to 30% by 2030, and this council has made it a priority by funding a dedicated position last year. What specific steps will you take to actively support this initiative and help increase the number of female officers in the department? Given that the gender balance in hiring has not improved, how will you allocate the significantly large, new advertising budget (\$6M) to more effectively recruit women? What lessons from past marketing efforts will you apply to ensure better outcomes?***

The 30x30 Initiative is a grassroots coalition founded in 2018, organized through the Policing Project at NYU School of Law, that initially focused on addressing the chronic under-representation of women in policing and the implications for public safety and has since broadened to focus on increasing diversity generally within police departments.

Although SPD's more recent recruit classes reflect the racial and ethnic diversity we strive for (see discussion above, with 58% of recruit classes comprising individuals identifying BIPOC), recruitment of women has continued to remain stubbornly plateaued. That said, it is important to note that the recruitment of women into policing is by no means an SPD-specific challenge – nor, as initiative leadership will emphasize, should the titular aim to see recruit classes comprise 30% women by 2030 be overstated as a “benchmark” for success under the initiative. With recruit classes nationally – as in Washington – holding



steady at around 13-15% female, with market research reflecting generational shifts by Millennials and Gen Z'ers away from the type of shift-based, paramilitary structure of the traditional police department, and as the glass ceilings in areas of higher learning and the private sector continue to fracture (indeed, with women now overrepresented in many fields of higher learning), the Initiative itself acknowledges that while meaningful from the perspective of critical mass in shaping organizational culture, the 30% mark is likely unachievable in current market conditions. This is likely particularly true for large urban departments, which despite offering unique opportunities also come with unique risks and cost of living challenges that may render them less attractive to younger officers.

For these reasons, the 30x30 Initiative is less about meeting raw numbers than it is “mak[ing] law enforcement a profession where qualified women who are drawn to it feel welcomed and supported while ensuring agencies address their unique needs and foster their success.” To that end, while SPD was compliant with all “Immediate Action” recommendations of the initial assessment conducted upon joining the 30x30 Initiative (the Phase I Report), SPD has since broadened its focus to better understand the subjective experience of women at SPD. In August 2023, SPD contracted with researcher Dr. Lois James at Washington State University, who conducted focus groups and interviews with small groups of women employees (the Phase II Report). Several major themes – all consistent with those reported in national studies across sectors – emerged, reflecting the factors that can either “push” or “pull” women from the workplace, including a masculine culture, heightened expectations for women, and double standards; challenges navigating pregnancy and childcare; greater barriers to promotion and positions of leadership; and exclusion and pigeon holing.

To address these concerns, in January 2024 SPD established an employee-led, interest-based, cross-rank/position and position internal 30x30 Workgroup with a designated mission: to advocate for and implement measures to mitigate the documented external challenges that pull women out of the workplace, internal challenges that push women out of the workplace, and to create a healthy, safe, respectful, and equitable environment where all members of the department can grow and thrive. Areas of focused attention over the past year include exploring the feasibility of childcare support, undertaking several women-focused recruitment initiatives to further reach potential candidates, streamlining the application process, and again contracting with Dr. James to further dig into any disparities in promotion or assignment. SPD has twice ([February 2024](#); [May 2024](#)) presented to City Council’s Public Safety Committee on its continuing efforts and, pursuant to Ordinance 127026, reports regularly to Council on its recruitment and retention efforts.

Under my leadership, SPD will continue to work closely with the national 30x30 Initiative, its executive team, and others engaged in the academic and research community to ensure that SPD is on top of emerging market research to guide innovation in recruitment. I have also directed our HR team that before any woman is removed from candidacy in late stages of the hiring process, I or Deputy Chief Yvonne Underwood will review that applicant's file to ensure that we are not unnecessarily or inappropriately disqualifying individuals based upon measures that do not reflect upon one's fitness to serve. As part of my commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace culture, we will be focusing on reforming our promotion and assignment practices to ensure consistency, transparency, and procedural justice in how decisions are made.

I also want to highlight the emerging partnership between SPD and the Seattle Police Women's Alliance, modeled after the Seattle Fire Department Women's Alliance, dedicated to supporting, mentoring, and championing women and non-binary members of SPD. Current partnerships include supporting the Alliance in providing all-women defensive tactics training courses, study groups for promotional exams, and mentorship programs by women, for women. It is my commitment to work with this association to build trust and support their work and their membership.