



SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL

Public Safety and Human Services Committee

Agenda

Tuesday, July 27, 2021

9:30 AM

Remote Meeting. Call 253-215-8782; Meeting ID: 586 416 9164; or
Seattle Channel online.

Lisa Herbold, Chair
M. Lorena González, Vice-Chair
Andrew J. Lewis, Member
Tammy J. Morales, Member
Kshama Sawant, Member
Alex Pedersen, Alternate

Chair Info: 206-684-8801; Lisa.Herbold@seattle.gov

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Public Safety and Human Services Committee
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July 27, 2021 - 9:30 AM

Meeting Location:

Remote Meeting. Call 253-215-8782; Meeting ID: 586 416 9164; or Seattle Channel online.

Committee Website:

<http://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-safety-and-human-services>

This meeting also constitutes a meeting of the City Council, provided that the meeting shall be conducted as a committee meeting under the Council Rules and Procedures, and Council action shall be limited to committee business.

In-person attendance is currently prohibited per Washington State Governor's Proclamation 20-28.15, until the COVID-19 State of Emergency is terminated or Proclamation 20-28 is rescinded by the Governor or State legislature. Meeting participation is limited to access by telephone conference line and online by the Seattle Channel.

Register online to speak during the Public Comment period at the 9:30 a.m Public Safety and Human Services Committee meeting at <http://www.seattle.gov/council/committees/public-comment>.

Online registration to speak at the Public Safety and Human Services Committee meeting will begin two hours before the 9:30 a.m. meeting start time, and registration will end at the conclusion of the Public Comment period during the meeting. Speakers must be registered in order to be recognized by the Chair.

Submit written comments to Councilmember Herbold at Lisa.Herbold@seattle.gov

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Please Note: Times listed are estimated

A. Call To Order

B. Approval of the Agenda

C. Public Comment

Public Comment (20 Minutes)

D. Items of Business

1. Office of Inspector General Sentinel Event Phase 1 Report

Supporting
Documents: [Report](#)
[Presentation](#)

Briefing and Discussion (30 minutes)

Presenters: Inspector General Lisa Judge, Amy Tsai, and Miroslalva Meza, Office of Inspector General; Donna Moodie, Executive Vice President, Community Roots Housing; Saroeum Phoung, Founder and CEO, PointOneNorth Consulting LL; John Hollway, Executive Director, Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice

2. Seattle Fire Department RSJI Presentation

Supporting
Documents: [Presentation](#)

Briefing and Discussion (20 minutes)

Presenters: Fire Chief Harold D. Scoggins, Matthew Butler, and Julie George, Seattle Fire Department

3. [Res 32011](#) **A RESOLUTION approving the 2021-2026 revision to the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan.**

Attachments: [Ex 1 – City of Seattle 2021-2026 All-Hazards Mitigation Plan](#)

Supporting

Documents: [Summary and Fiscal Note](#)
[Amendment 1](#)

Briefing, Discussion, and Possible Vote (15 minutes)

Presenters: Director Curry Mayer, Seattle Office of Emergency Management; Lise Kaye, Central Staff

4. **Summary Findings on the Executive Order on Re-imagining Policing and Community Safety**

Supporting

Documents: [Central Staff Presentation](#)
[Executive Presentation](#)

Briefing and Discussion (45 minutes)

Presenters: Julie Kline, Sonny Nguyen, and Christina Grover-Roybal, Mayor's Office; Fire Chief Harold D. Scoggins and Jon Ehrenfeld, Seattle Fire Department; Interim Director Chris Lombard, Community Safety and Communications Center; Chris Fisher and Angela Socci, Seattle Police Department

E. Adjournment



Legislation Text

File #: Inf 1852, **Version:** 1

Office of Inspector General Sentinel Event Phase 1 Report



Kelly Kline, *Black Lives Matter Protest, Seattle WA, 2020*. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle

Wave 1: Downtown Protests May 29 – June 1

July 22, 2021



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Inspector General

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Letter from the Inspector General

This report represents the work of a Sentinel Event Review Panel including community members and Seattle Police Department (SPD) officers, who dedicated an incredible amount of their time and energy to engage in open, honest, and difficult dialogue around SPD actions during the course of the 2020 police protests and how the City can do better.

This report builds upon earlier work by my office on SPD use of less lethal weapons in protest response. At the outset, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) analyzed information gleaned from hundreds of Use of Force reports and hours of body-worn video, public commentary, complaints, and numerous other sources. That analysis identified five discernable “waves” of activity, each of which was punctuated by distinguishing moments that contributed to violent conflicts between and among protesters and SPD. This report presents the Panel’s recommendations related to the first of those waves. Subsequent reports addressing the remaining waves will be issued in the coming months. OIG is also producing an analysis of the collective events of 2020 from a crowd dynamics perspective with the assistance of Professor Clifford Stott, who has worked in the area of crowd psychology and policing in the global arena for decades. I hope this collective body of work leads to a fuller understanding of what took place last summer—and a deeper understanding of how we can collectively move forward.

These recommendations, which represent the consensus views of community members and SPD officers of varying ranks, would not have been possible without a peace and reconciliation approach to dialoguing. It is hoped that the peacemaking process used by the panel may provide a roadmap for other critical conversations between community and police, including but not limited to future sentinel event reviews.

I want to acknowledge and appreciate the deep commitment by the panelists who, in addition to their heavy emotional investment, met for more than 80 hours over the course of the first seven months, in addition to reviewing materials in preparation for those meetings. Another important contributor to this process was a planning group consisting of community and police representatives, who guided selection of the panel, facilitators, and incidents for review, to ensure that the process and attendant outcome was not determined by any one agency or voice. I also want to thank our facilitators, expert consultants, and my staff for their role in bringing together a product many months in the making. Panelists were not interested in participating in a process unless they believed it could result in meaningful change. That is an intention I share. During the course of this process, my office has been engaged in continuing conversation with SPD and other City stakeholders on the developing recommendations, and I will continue to use the authority vested with OIG to push for responsive and effective systemic reform.

In partnership,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lisa Judge".

Lisa Judge
Inspector General for Public Safety



Executive Summary

Background

The murder of George Floyd had a monumental impact on this country and internationally, and engaged wide segments of America in public dialogue about the role of race in every aspect of society. The implications of this event are still being felt even as this report is released. Like other departments in cities around the country, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) faced a complex and difficult challenge in the days after Mr. Floyd's murder. Namely, the City grappled with how to respond to ongoing community protests about the long history of abuse, excessive use of force, and deaths suffered by Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color at the hands of police. These protests also served as an urgent call for an examination of the institution of policing, to find a manner that would not further erode public trust, given these longstanding problems and concerns.

Sentinel Event Review (SER) aims to identify the causes and contributing factors to undesired incidents with the goal of prevention (see principles and goals in Table 1 below).¹ SER has been used extensively in aviation, health care, and manufacturing, among others, to identify root causes of tragedies and design improvements that will prevent their recurrence. The focus of SER is on fixing the system, not on assigning individual liability.

Table 1. Principles and Goals of Sentinel Event Review

Principles	Goals
Include SPD and community stakeholders	Focus on community perspectives and concerns; define implementable recommendations for SPD change
No assignation of individual blame	Identify root causes of negative outcomes
Learn from mistakes and best practices in other jurisdictions	Improve systems to reduce or prevent future negative outcomes or harm to the community
Support analysis with data and evidence	Increase legitimacy of government agencies and departments
Take action to correct identified issues	Facilitate community healing and mutual understanding

The SER Panel includes community members representing different lived experiences of Seattle and SPD officers at various command levels. The Panel was supported by the Inspector General, a team of Office of Inspector General (OIG) data analysts, and a group of experts in fields including crowd psychology, trauma stewardship, police crowd facilitation techniques, and civil rights law. The Panel was facilitated

¹ These fundamentals are a blend of "just culture" models from SER panels used in the health care and aerospace industries and the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance Sentinel Event Initiative. See <https://bja.ojp.gov/program/sentinel-events-initiative/sentinel-events>. Additional reference materials regarding SER can be found on the OIG website at www.seattle.gov/oig/sentinel-event-review.



by an expert in the use of SERs in criminal justice, and by the pioneer of a “peacemaking” process that enabled candid, respectful dialogue regarding the emotionally charged topics raised by the SER. The report represents the views and recommendations of the Panelists in their individual capacities, although each person brought their expertise from lived experiences, community affiliations, and organizational history with them.

Due to the massive number of protest days and uses of force, this first SER report focuses on key dates in the formative days of protesting, from May 29 – June 1, 2020. Additional reports will be issued covering subsequent significant moments from the 2020 protests.

Specifically, as the protests occurred over months in 2020, OIG data analysis identified five distinct “Waves” of activity. Each Wave represents a period of time with an increase in SPD uses of force and the occurrence of one or more critical events within the protests.

- Wave 1 (May 29 – June 1), the focus of this Report, comprises the period from the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis to the first set of demonstrations in Seattle, mainly in Downtown Seattle.
- Wave 2 (June 2 – June 7) includes events that occurred before the leaving of the East Precinct by SPD. During this period, the main demonstrations and confrontations shifted from Downtown to the East Precinct.
- Wave 3 (June 8 – July 2) includes events that occurred during the existence of the Capitol Hill Organized Protest (CHOP) and Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ).
- Wave 4 (July 3 – Oct 6) includes events after the East Precinct was reestablished.
- Wave 5 (Oct 6 – End of 2020) includes events after the creation by SPD Interim Chief of Police Adrian Diaz of the Community Response Group, tasked specifically with responding to demonstrations, among other duties.²

Incidents Reviewed in Wave 1, May 29 – June 1, 2020

Wave 1, the focus of this Report, reviewed the first significant protests in Seattle, mainly in downtown Seattle, between May 29 and June 1, 2020. The SER Panel identified Wave 1 events to review that provided them with a foundational understanding of the events, and also incidents identified with the assistance of a planning group of community, law enforcement, and other accountability stakeholder partners:

1. A group of individuals who traveled through the International District on May 29, vandalizing buildings without a meaningful response from SPD;
2. The escalation of widespread protests to violence and property damage on May 30, particularly in the downtown area;
3. A deployment of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray (i.e., “pepper spray”) by SPD that hit a child on the afternoon of May 30;

² <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/10/07/departments-launches-community-response-group/>



4. The incineration of a group of SPD vehicles parked near Westlake Park on the late afternoon of May 30, and the theft of three SPD rifles from one of the vehicles;
5. Two arrests of individuals on the night of May 30 in which an SPD officer appeared to place his knee on the head and neck of the individuals being arrested;
6. The arrest of two people on May 31 by an SPD bicycle squad assigned to facilitate a demonstration in Downtown Seattle; and
7. The “pink umbrella” Incident, a confrontation between SPD and community protesters that resulted in widespread deployment of CS gas (i.e., “tear gas”) and other less-lethal munitions in the neighborhood surrounding the SPD East Precinct Building on the night of June 1.

SER Panel Findings

A full understanding of these events would not be possible without the open discussion of institutional racism and the longstanding trauma and fear that many in community have experienced at the hands of law enforcement. It is with this mindset that the Panel sought to identify modifications to SPD behavior that would promote, facilitate, and enable peaceful protests while minimizing police presence. The Panel also sought to identify areas where SPD actions did not match community expectations, even when those actions were permitted by existing laws or SPD policies.

In all, the SER panel identified 54 recommendations designed to improve SPD’s response to protests in the future. They fall into five main areas:

- **Community Legitimacy** – Addressing the gap between what SPD may be permitted to do by law or policy (“structural legitimacy”), and what its officers need to do to meet the standards of justice expected by community (“perceived legitimacy”);
- **Situational Awareness** – Acknowledging the need for SPD to change its mindset when responding to protests where the police themselves are the focus of the protests, moving from a mindset of crowd management and control to one of crowd facilitation and crowd safety;
- **Communication and Community Engagement** – Improving the ability of SPD to communicate with communities and with protesters – not just during, but before and after protests;
- **Tactics and Equipment** – Improving tactics during crowd events, and understanding how arrests or uses of force on individuals committing low level offenses can result in the escalation of tensions rather than calming a crowd; and
- **Officer Wellness and Training** – Prioritizing officer wellness, recognizing that the long shifts and hostile environments that police can encounter during protests take a toll on officers that can have lasting undesirable consequences on their professional behavior and beyond.

The recommendations are laid out in detail below and summarized in Appendix G.



I. Introduction

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was murdered while in the custody of the Minneapolis Police Department. His death had a monumental impact on this country and internationally, and created a tipping point that engaged wide segments of America in public dialogue about the role of race in every aspect of society. On April 20, 2021, a jury found Derek Chauvin guilty of three charges in the death of George Floyd: second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter. The three other involved officers are scheduled to face trial in 2022. The implications of this event are still being felt even as this report is released.

Like other departments in cities around the country, SPD faced a complex and difficult challenge in the days after Mr. Floyd's murder. Namely, the City grappled with how to respond to ongoing community protests about the long history of abuse, excessive use of force, and deaths suffered by Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color at the hands of police. These protests also served as an urgent call for an examination of the institution of policing, to find a manner that would not further erode public trust, given these longstanding problems and concerns.

SPD responded to the 2020 protests with skills, strategies, and tactics developed over many decades of facilitating thousands of protests, enhanced by eight years of Consent Decree³ reform efforts. Those tactics not only proved inadequate for the protests of the summer of 2020 – as will be discussed in this report, they contributed to escalation of civil unrest and violence. By the end of 2020, there had been more than 750 deployments of physical force. Some controversial uses of “less lethal” chemical and physical munitions received national attention. Curfews were imposed, and parts of the city were occupied by community members who rejected government oversight in a standoff between community members and law enforcement that lasted for weeks.

In June 2020, the Mayor and City Council called upon the City's civilian police accountability system to provide recommendations to address the widely-decried City use of less lethal crowd control weapons, including the most controversial, CS gas, commonly known as “tear gas.”⁴ In response, OIG produced two reports over the summer on Crowd Management and Less Lethal Tools, and engaged in conversations with SPD and other stakeholders on how to improve City response.⁵

City leadership also asked OIG as the entity charged with systemic oversight to examine what went wrong from a systems perspective and make recommendations for changes in SPD responses to community demonstrations and protests. To do this, OIG conducted a SER that brought law enforcement and a diverse group of community members together to deliberate on system failures and finding a better path forward. SER has been used extensively in aviation, healthcare, and manufacturing,

³ United States of America v. City of Seattle, 12 Civ. 1282 (JLR), available at www.seattlemonitor.com/overview.

⁴ Those reports can be accessed at [Recommendations on "less lethal" weapons highlight difficult policy tradeoffs for SPD in use of force and crowd control \(sccinsight.com\)](https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OIG/Other/OIGReviewSPDCrowdPolicyLLWeapons081420.pdf).

⁵ Less Lethal Weapons Usage in Protests

(6/12/20). www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OIG/Other/LessLethalWeaponsUsage06122020.pdf; Review of the SPD Crowd Dispersal Policy and Less Lethal Weapons In Response to Ordinance 126102, www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OIG/Other/OIGReviewSPDCrowdPolicyLLWeapons081420.pdf, filed with the federal court overseeing the Consent Decree at Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 637.



among others, to identify root causes of tragedies such as plane crashes or accidental medical deaths and design improvements that will prevent such tragedies from recurring. The focus of SER is on fixing the system, not on assigning individual liability.

The SER panel comprises a dedicated and diverse group of community members and SPD representatives from throughout its ranks. This diversity of opinion on such strongly held and emotional topics presented obvious challenges to the creation of a supportive environment that enabled the sincere, honest and respectful exchange of views, but was essential to the generation of practical, implementable recommendations for change that have the potential to heal and improve relations between SPD and the community it serves. The use of peacemaking circles, discussed in more detail below, greatly facilitated the group's ability to remain connected during these difficult conversations.

The Incidents reviewed by the Panel revealed the gap between what SPD may be permitted to do by law or policy ("structural legitimacy"), and what its officers need to do to meet the standards of justice expected by the community ("perceived legitimacy"). When these two concepts are not aligned, a "legitimacy gap" is created that fosters misunderstanding and mistrust. To begin to close that gap, the change needed is not just in terms of strategies and tactics for how the police handle demonstrations in the future – though such changes are a necessary step to improving the quality of policing and rebuilding the community's trust in the SPD. Structural change that addresses the inequity and oppression that caused so many community members to protest in the first place is also needed. As one Panelist said, "we have to always remember why those people were out there protesting in the first place, and we have to get at those reasons, or we're just mowing the lawn, and the same grass is going to grow back."

This report captures the Panel's analysis and recommendations, but it should not be interpreted as official positions of their organizations or communities. The views of the Panelists on these topics are as diverse as their backgrounds and perceptions. The Panel recognizes that their views are based on an assessment of moments in time that cannot fully capture the range and breadth of experiences and incidents from 2020. However, hundreds of hours have been devoted to identifying systemic themes and concrete, actionable steps. These views are informed by the Panel members' diverse backgrounds and lived experiences.

Through the SER process, Panelists have come to a deeper mutual understanding of the challenges faced by members of our community and of the police officers who seek to assist them. The Panelists experienced the transformative possibilities when there is serious and respectful dialogue among diverse, caring individuals to create an environment of understanding, healing, mutual respect, and change. The protests of 2020 too often reinforced our cynicism and divisions rather than creating environments for such dialogue and collective problem-solving.

The Panelists intend that (1) the recommendations generated by the SER panel will help to restore and sustain such dialogue in the future, and create an environment in which all members of our community can contribute their full voices to community issues with emotional and physical safety; and (2) the lessons learned in this process, both about improvements in protest response and about community-government partnerships for problem-solving, will translate to other government review processes that would greatly benefit from community involvement.



II. Methodology

This section describes the development of the SER process, including the selection of Panelists.

Stages of Sentinel Event Review

This SER was divided into three stages:⁶

- In **Stage 1**, OIG researched and built evidence-based timelines of the Events and Incidents under review.⁷
- In **Stage 2**, the present phase represented by this report, OIG and expert moderators guide a panel of community and SPD stakeholders through the identified Incidents.
- In **Stage 3**, OIG will conduct audits and further systems review of issues identified by SER.

Working Groups

Development of the SER involved the efforts of three working groups, in order of involvement:

- **OIG** initiated the process by gathering data and input from numerous sources to describe and analyze the events of 2020, including conversations with community, public comment, news, social media, complaints to the Office of Police Accountability (OPA) about alleged officer misconduct, use of force data, SPD reports and video, claims and lawsuit information, and other sources.
- A **Planning Group** was convened comprised of stakeholders who assisted OIG in customizing and refining the SER methodology, identifying Panel membership and approving facilitators, and selecting the incidents for analysis.
- The **SER Panel** was identified with the assistance of the Planning Group. The Panel reviewed sentinel event incidents identified by the Planning Group (“Incidents”) and issued the recommendations in this report.

Planning Group Membership

It was important to the integrity of the SER process to directly involve community, law enforcement, and other stakeholders in the selection of the Panel, the facilitators, and incidents for review. Those decisions had a direct impact on the trajectory of the review, and it was important to have credibility and faith in the process by community and police to allow opportunity for meaningful change to occur.

The Planning Group included a mix of observing and participating representatives from community-based organizations, the Community Police Commission (CPC),⁸ SPD, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Seattle Police Monitoring Team, and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). Its membership has been dynamic, expanding as additional community members and perspectives are identified that bring value to the group’s discussions. As of May 2021, the Planning Group includes 24 members representing a wide cross-section of Seattle.

⁶ An overview of the SER process can also be found at www.seattle.gov/oig/sentinel-event-review.

⁷ The evidence-based timelines created by OIG are based on a methodology defined by Prof. Clifford Stott from Keele University in the UK.

⁸ One member is a Community Police Commission Commissioner who attended in her Mothers for Police Accountability capacity.



Panel Membership

The selection of the SER Panel was a collaborative process between the Planning Group and OIG. The Planning Group provided OIG with criteria for selecting a diverse set of community voices. OIG used these criteria, with assistance from the ACLU and the CPC, to identify about 100 organizations OIG initially approached to discuss participation in the SER. These organizations constituted a diverse set of identities, affiliations, and perspectives, including but not limited to: Black, African, Latinx, Native American, Pacific Islander, Asian, South Asian, and LGBTQ+, communities, business communities, representation from neighborhoods affected by the protests, faith-based organizations, minority bars, organizations serving vulnerable populations, seniors, youth, social and mental health services, among others. More than 30 organizations responded to OIG. Of those, five indicated they were not interested in participating, either because of the time/resource commitment required or an unwillingness to collaborate with SPD.

Ultimately, OIG convened a SER Panel of a total of twelve members: six community members representing different lived experiences of Seattle, five SPD personnel, and Inspector General Judge (see Appendices B and C).

Community members - The original community members represented different lived experiences of Seattle: a resident and grassroots organizer, a business owner and executive of a community-based organization, the executive director of a Business Improvement Area affected by the protests, the executive director of a non-profit serving an immigrant population, a Professor at the University of Washington Evans School of Public Policy and Governance, and the director of an organization that focuses on racial equity in Seattle.

Law enforcement members - The levels of rank represented by the SER Wave 1 SPD Panelists are Assistant Chief, Lieutenants, Sergeant, and Patrol Officer. These SPD representatives were identified by OIG and Police Chief Diaz due to their firsthand experience with the Incidents under review, and their formal and informal credibility within the Department to discuss and help implement useful recommendations.

Facilitators and Outside Experts

OIG recognized that Panelists would have to review large amounts of sensitive information, engage in difficult and contentious conversations, and work alongside other Panelists whose different life experiences and responsibilities might result in very different views of policing and community. The facilitators approved by the Planning Group included:

- Saroeum Phoung and Thary Sun Lim from PointOneNorth Consulting. Phoung and Lim have worked extensively with City and County agencies on reconciliation, trust-building, and restoration processes. For years, Phoung and Lim have been using a structured methodology called a “peacemaking circle” in community building and crime prevention efforts in Boston and Seattle. Here, it was used to build trust among panelists and create a safer environment to share, reflect and conduct the analysis.
- John Hollway,⁹ Executive Director of the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Hollway is a national thought leader on the

⁹ <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/profiles/560-john-hollway/profiles/quattroneaffiliated>



use of root cause analysis in criminal justice. In 2020, Hollway guided the Tucson Police Department and a diverse group of agency and community stakeholders through the review of two deaths of individuals in police custody.¹⁰ Hollway worked closely with the OIG team and Planning Group to design the SER process, and facilitated SER Panel conversations, including discussions on contributing factors and recommendations.

Early in the process, OIG consulted with community members, partners, and external consultants to ensure the process development started with a community-focused lens. OIG also engaged the assistance of Dr. Clifford Stott,¹¹ Professor of Social Psychology and a Dean of Research at Keele University in England. Stott provided technical advice on the creation of reliable data for crowd and policing analysis. He also provided educational materials to help Panelists understand the dynamics and context surrounding each of the Incidents being reviewed.

Peacemaking Process

Bringing together police and members of the community that were affected by police actions to develop solutions both find agreeable is inherently difficult and has the potential to bring up difficult emotions and traumatic memories. Panelists regularly engaged in challenging conversations and reviewed a considerable amount of sensitive and traumatizing material.

To help navigate these difficult conversations, OIG established peacemaking as a core component of SER. The peacemaking circle process is a framework for facilitating a supportive environment and encouraging open-mindedness. The process interrupts old patterns and assumptions that can block communication to create an opportunity for understanding, connection, and collaboration.

The Panel dedicated a portion of each working session to peacemaking circle activities. The first sessions focused on SER panelists getting acquainted, understanding each other's values, and creating shared principles to facilitate communication and collaboration. As the group moved forward, the peacemaking circle focused on deepening relationships, developing empathy, and building trust.

The Panel began with an 8-hour session devoted to peacemaking, followed by over 18 hours dedicated to peacemaking during its first 13 meetings. It was important for each person to express how they were present in the room and to share their history, vulnerabilities, and expectations to engage on inherently divisive topics that were foundational to many in the room. The peacemaking process has provided a positive example for future trust-building and healing processes between the community and SPD. OIG will continue to use the peacemaking circle framework in future SER work (for more information see Appendix D).

Identifying, Selecting, and Prioritizing Incidents

The Planning Group was integral to the prioritization and selection of incidents for review. The process, summarized in Figure 1 below, was as follows:


¹⁰ A copy of the output from the Tucson Sentinel Event Review Board on these cases can be found at [In_Custody_SERB_Final_Report_Sept_2020_Redacted.pdf \(tucsonaz.gov\)](#) (last accessed April 18, 2021).

¹¹ <https://www.keele.ac.uk/psychology/people/cliffordstott/>



1. **Data collection** - OIG collected data on potentially reviewable Incidents, analyzing patterns in use of force, incidents of notable public attention and concern, and other data sources.
2. **Incident selection** - The Planning Group then evaluated the incidents with a focus on undesirable outcomes that should not occur when community members are engaged in protected First Amendment activity. These include, but are not limited to, the commission of acts of violence, uses of force (whether by police or community members), injuries to individuals (community members or police), destruction of public or private property, and the creation of unsafe environments during public protests.
3. **Sentinel event review of Incidents** - Selected Incidents were then sent to the Panel for root cause analysis. The Panel also utilized its own collective expertise to assess which incidents to include or add for review.

Figure 1. Incident prioritization process.



Data Collection

OIG gathered extensive data and information from government agencies and public sources about incidents occurring between May 25 and November 11, 2020. Data sources included:

- **SPD data**
 - Individual reports of use of force, including officer statements;
 - Chain of Command reviews of individual uses of force;
 - Aggregated use of force data;
 - SPD body worn camera video (BWV);
 - SPD Incident Action Plans for all planned events;¹²
 - SPD Computer-Assisted Dispatch (CAD) logs and other communication logs;
 - SPD Human Resources data on reportable injuries;
 - Arrest data;
 - SPD personnel rosters (when available);
 - SPD training materials on crowd control, de-escalation, use of bikes for crowd control, etc.;
 - Current and previous SPD policies;
- **OPA data**
 - Investigation data and summaries;
 - Case summaries;

¹² Except for June 28, 2020.



- Videos, photos, and other materials used by OPA;
 - OPA Management Action Recommendations;
- CPC recommendations;
- City data on lawsuits filed related to police action during the protests;
- Department of Finance and Administrative Services data on claims filed for damages and injuries;
- Social media posts from community members, reporters, and city officials during each of the days under review, including Twitter Posts, YouTube videos, Facebook live streams and videos, and other data;
- News outlet articles, interviews, news coverage, and timelines;
- Public meetings in which community members provided individual accounts of their personal experiences and perceptions of the protests and SPD's protest responses; and
- Conversations with community and SPD personnel interviews conducted in 2020.

OIG used the data to analyze five months of demonstrations. OIG performed a trend and pattern analysis to map SPD uses of force across the period of review and identify protest events for further analysis. Uses of force (as reported and shared by SPD)¹³ were strongly correlated with other variables (e.g., arrests, injuries, complaints, etc.) and was an important factor for the Planning Group in selecting sentinel events.

Wave Identification

The OIG analysis organized protest-related activity into five Waves. Each Wave represented a period of time with an uptick in uses of force¹⁴ and the occurrence of one or more critical milestones and other related events within the protests (see Figure 2 below):

- **Wave 1 (May 29 – June 1)**, the focus of this Report, comprises the period from the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis to the first set of demonstrations in Seattle, mainly in Downtown Seattle.
- **Wave 2 (June 2 – June 7)** includes events that occurred before the leaving of the East Precinct by SPD. During this period, the main demonstrations and confrontations shifted from Downtown to the East Precinct.
- **Wave 3 (June 8 – July 2)** includes events that occurred during the existence of the Capitol Hill Organized Protest (CHOP) and Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ).
- **Wave 4 (July 3 – Oct 6)** includes events after the East Precinct was reestablished.


¹³ "Uses of Force" include the total number of instances in which SPD officers reported using force against individuals in the protests. Source: Force Review Unit report as of 11/05/2020.

¹⁴ In Wave 1, the total Uses of Force (UoF) was 233 (30% of the total for the 5-month period under review). The day with the highest reports of UoF was June 1 with 64. In Wave 2, the total UoF was 186 (24% of the total for the 5-month period). The day with the highest reports of UoF was June 7 with 77. In Wave 3, the total UoF was 37 (5% of the total for the 5-month period). The day with the highest reports of UoF was July 1 with 26. In Wave 4, the total UoF was 305 (39% of the total for the 5-month period). The day with the highest reports of UoF was June 25 with 102.



- **Wave 5 (Oct 6 to the end of 2020)** includes events after the creation by SPD Interim Chief of Police Adrian Diaz of the Community Response Group, tasked specifically with responding to demonstrations, among other things.¹⁵

Figure 2. Five Waves: Number of SPD uses of force May 30 to Nov. 5, 2020.



Incident Selection

The Planning Group used the information provided by OIG to identify specific Incidents that would be reviewed by the SER Panel. For Wave 1, the Planning Group chose to focus on May 30 and June 1, which included several contentious incidents that produced immediate and long-standing impacts on demonstrations throughout the summer. Out of all days in Wave 1, these two days accounted for:¹⁶

- Two thirds (67%) of all Uses of Force by SPD;
- Over seventy percent (71%) of the total arrests by SPD;
- Most (86%) of the injuries reported by SPD officers related to the protests, and
- A majority (12,798) of the estimated 19,000 civilian complaints filed with OPA.¹⁷

Of note, May 30 and June 1 also accounted for 20% of all uses of force by SPD related to protests from May 29 to December 31, 2020.


¹⁵ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/10/07/departments-launches-community-response-group/>; Federal Court Order, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6943709-Order-on-TRO-6-12-20.html>

¹⁶ Based on data available as of November 11, 2020.

¹⁷ Office of Police Accountability. 2020 Annual Report. April 2021. Pg. 10. <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/Reports/2020-Annual-Report.pdf>



Figure 3. Total uses of force from May 29 to June 1, 2020, as reported by SPD.



The Planning Group prioritized potential “reviewable Incidents” by looking for moments during the dates in question where:

- Individuals (either civilians or police) were injured;
- SPD officers acted in ways that deviated from SPD policies or procedures and that that contributed to the undesired Incident;
- SPD officers acted in ways that were consistent with SPD policies or procedures but nonetheless contributed to the undesired outcome; and/or
- Private or police public property was damaged during a demonstration or other crowd Incident.

The Planning Group further sought to prioritize:

- Incidents where the Panel would have the ability to hear from both civilians and police who participated in the Incident;
- Undesirable Incidents that rarely occur but have significant impact on perceptions of public safety, identified as “high impact/low frequency” (e.g., having six SPD squad vehicles incinerated and two rifles stolen from Police patrol vehicles during an assembly that had been declared unlawful); and
- Undesirable Incidents that may happen often and have individually minimal but collectively significant impact on perceptions of public safety, identified as “low impact/high frequency” (e.g., disrespectful language being used by SPD officers towards demonstrators).

Using these criteria, the Planning Group selected the following Incidents from Wave 1 for review by the Panel:

- A deployment of OC gas (i.e., “pepper spray”) by SPD officers on the afternoon of May 30 that affected a child in the crowd;
- The incineration of a group of SPD vehicles parked near Westlake Park on the late afternoon of May 30, and the theft of three SPD rifles from one of the vehicles;



- Two arrests of individuals on the night of May 30 in which an SPD officer appeared to place his knee on the head and neck of the individuals being arrested;
- The arrest of two people on May 31 by an SPD bicycle squad assigned to facilitate a demonstration in Downtown Seattle; and
- The “pink umbrella” Incident, a confrontation between SPD and community protesters that resulted in widespread deployment of CS gas (i.e., “tear gas”) and other less-lethal munitions in the neighborhood surrounding the SPD East Precinct Building on the night of June 1.

The Panel also had a voice in the selection process, and could decline to review an Incident or add other events it deemed helpful to deliberations as it delved into the available data and developed deeper understanding of events.

Panel Review

The SER Panel first met in January 2021 to begin analyzing the Wave 1 Incidents selected by the Planning Group. The Panel identified “Contributing Factors” that contributed to the undesired negative outcomes (e.g., violence and property damage). Next, the Panel made specific recommendations for change that would help SPD officers tasked with facilitating a public protest act in ways that would reduce the



likelihood of those undesirable outcomes happening again in the future.

The Panel acknowledged the errors made by SPD and other Contributing Factors that led to negative outcomes and stressed the importance of holding officers accountable, but did not discuss what discipline, if any, should be administered to individual officers. The Panel focused instead on the design of reforms that would help SPD to

respond to the next set of protests and achieve better facilitation and enabling of peaceful protests. The inclusion of SPD officers, including officers in leadership, ensured that such reforms were implementable.

SPD has engaged in a self-critique of many of the events reviewed by the Panel and has begun to implement improvements, at least in part as a result of the Panel’s discussions in advance of the release of this Report. OIG was also involved in conversations with SPD about improvements stemming from the OIG August 2020 report on crowd management and less lethal tools. Thus, the report may include recommendations that are already in place or are in the process of implementation. SPD’s continued willingness to engage in critical self-analysis, especially with community involvement in developing recommendations, as well as in implementing those recommendations, will be crucial to improving its relationship with the residents of Seattle in the future.

Contributing Factors

In the SER process, Contributing Factors are actions or circumstances that play a part in what led to a negative outcome. The identification of something as a contributing factor is not a value judgment



about whether the factor is positive or negative. For each specific Incident reviewed, the Panel identified associated Contributing Factors. During Panel deliberations, OIG provided Panelists with available video coverage of the event, including publicly available video from the Internet and SPD BWV and in-car video (ICV) where available. Together, the Panel watched the videos and discussed each Incident, listing Contributing Factors in the following categories:

- Communication
- Cultural leadership
- Operational supervision
- Tactics
- Policies and procedures
- Equipment
- Environment
- Other

The Panel tried to identify as many Contributing Factors as possible and differentiate between those that reflected individual behaviors and those that could not have been avoided as it crafted recommendations for change. It is important to note that a Contributing Factor is not an attribution of blame. For example, crowd behaviors contributed to how police responded, but recommendations are about how understanding those behaviors can result in improved police response, not an attempt to change crowd behavior.

The Panel felt that its review of the events of May 30 – June 1 would not be complete without additional insight into the events leading up to those dates, including the perspectives of both law enforcement and community voices from on-scene participants in the protests on those dates. To provide this, the Panel was fortunate to be able to speak with Seattle resident Omari Salisbury, who personally attended, recorded, and reported about many of the demonstrations, including the vandalism in the International District on the night of May 29, the downtown protests on May 30, and the “pink umbrella” Incident on the night of June 1. He provided observations and context regarding these events that video alone could not provide.

Once the Panel analyzed each of the reviewable Incidents and agreed on potential Contributing Factors, it drafted and refined recommendations for change that might prevent the recurrence of the specific contributing factors that were observed.

Training

In preparation for the review, OIG provided the Panel with a series of interactive presentations:

- An overview of the philosophy and structure of sentinel event reviews from John Hollway of the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School;
- A discussion on the law of protected First Amendment activities from Alison Holcomb of the ACLU of Washington;



- Presentations on SPD's current policies regarding (1) permissible uses of force and (2) existing policies and procedures regarding crowd management and crowd control;
- Education on peacemaking circles and their role in emotional healing from Saroeum Phoung and Thary Sun Lim at PointOneNorth Consulting; and
- Information sessions from the Trauma Stewardship Institute on the effects of trauma and some methods for coping with trauma.

Limitations

The Panel identified 53 contributing factors, leading to 54 recommendations for improvement for SPD and others. Even so, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the SER process.

First, the Panel's judgments of contributing factors and recommendations are based upon a data-driven analysis of Incidents. While the Panel has reached conclusions leading to specific recommendations, these conclusions do not necessarily determine the objective "truth" of the Incidents or their underlying causes. They are consensus products based on the data available to the Panel, and judgments about potential underlying factors that may - or may not - have played a role.

- Tens of thousands of individual actions contributed to the actions of SPD and the crowds of people protesting. It is impossible to capture all of them, or to know whether the intentions of any of them were pure or designed to interfere with peaceful protests.
- Uses of force, destruction of property and protests happened in multiple geographic locations. Because of this, the Planning Group was forced to select a sample of those things that it found to be impactful and representative of the whole, and may have missed other events that are worthy of review and response.
- The data available was incomplete:
 - Information from SPD regarding its officers' actions may have been improperly or inadequately documented,¹⁸ or inaccurately documented in SPD systems (e.g., incomplete or "rote" use force statements);
 - OIG was unable to contact every community group or individual that might have had insightful information, due to the number of potential individuals and OIG's dependence upon the willingness of individuals to reengage with moments that were, for many, traumatic;
 - Existing rules and regulations limited OIG's ability to access, use or record video from Seattle Department of Transportation or any other camera located in public spaces. The main source of government-produced



¹⁸ According to SPD's Force Review Unit, most statements by SPD officers related to uses of force were written an average of three (3) or more days after the actual use of force. This was often attributed to the long (12-18 hours or more) shifts that the Events imposed upon them during the periods of time under review.



video evidence used for analysis is SPD BWV cameras, with some additional video coming from ICV.

- The technology adopted by SPD limits the data saved. When BWV cameras are turned on, either by an officer or automatically by SPD, there is a one-minute “buffer” of video beginning one minute before the initiation of the camera that is retained. The buffered minute has video but not audio. This limited the Panel’s ability to fully perceive events and incidents through BWV.
- Video review is limited to the perspective available through the video camera and may not provide complete fields of vision. A BWV worn on an officer’s chest, for example, may not show what was in the officer’s field of vision at eye level.
- Existing rules and regulations limit the storage of public closed-circuit TV surveillance cameras.¹⁹ As a result, the Panel sometimes lacked a complete video of many Incidents that it evaluated.
- Community and police perspectives from the Panelists and others during discussions, some of whom participated in some of the Incidents, shed some light on the experiences and concerns of those involved. Nonetheless, they are not representative of all participants in the Incidents.

The Panel reviewed OPA reports but did not conduct additional interviews with officers involved in the Incidents in question (although SPD Panel and Planning Group members contributed their knowledge of events). As a result, it could only infer officers’ rationales for their actions based on the available documentation.

Addressing Institutional and Systemic Bias

Many on the Planning Group and Panel felt strongly that it was not possible to conduct a SER of the protests in 2020, or to understand the “root causes” of these protests, without acknowledging and grappling with the long and deeply ingrained history of racial inequalities in Seattle, and in the United States. It was important to the Panelists, the Planning Group, and OIG that the SER consciously engage with the context of institutional racism and the longstanding trauma and fear that many in the community have of police. At the same time, these groups recognized the limitations of a process that looks at a series of specific Incidents and the resulting inability to “solve” institutional racism or remedy hundreds of years of racial oppression solely through this process.

For the benefit of future SER groups, OIG describes here the various efforts that were undertaken to reach a consensus understanding of the depth and breadth of hurt that has been suffered by unjust police and community interactions. Whether these interactions were suffered personally by Panelists, inflicted by SPD upon others, or inflicted by other police officers in other communities, the combined impact of repeated exposure to abuses of power by police officers have created an insistence that SPD

¹⁹ The Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) has cameras installed throughout the City to monitor congestion, incidents, closures, and other traffic issues. These cameras provide the ability to see roads, providing engineers with the necessary information to manage an incident and identify alternate routes. Every camera is available for live viewing by the public via our Traveler Information Web Map (<http://web6.seattle.gov/Travelers/>). Chapter 14.12 of the Seattle Municipal Code, Collection of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes, prevents the storage of SDOT traffic video for policing purposes.



needs to embrace, acknowledge, and repudiate an older power dynamic. Instead, SPD must truly protect and serve the community in ways that are just, fair, and supportive.

Panelists agreed to proceed with an acknowledgment of the history and environment in which the protests occurred, and to try to perceive how that affected police and community relations and responses from both sides. They also attempted to identify moments during the protests where Black, Indigenous, other People of Color, and white individuals might perceive power dynamics or motivations of actors differently, and to be explicit in discussing those moments in the Report.

Unsurprisingly, engaging directly on the impact of police behavior on Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color communities proved to be difficult. Often, actions by SPD officers that were deemed “legal” or within the acceptable bounds of policy by SPD or OPA generated great anger and frustration among Panelists. At these times, many of the non-SPD panelists expressed feelings of being unheard, unacknowledged, and misunderstood, sustaining their belief that SPD still did not understand the true nature of their discontent, or the true basis of concern about institutional racism.

The Panel felt that building trust and understanding within the group was necessary to generate consensus recommendations, and so it paused to perform some additional inquiry into the role of race as a contributing factor in the protests. Panelists were led through a special peacemaking circle in which Panelists were invited to share the emotions that watching police uses of force brought forth for them. This led to the realization that even police acts that are not racially motivated on their face still carried significant emotional weight for Panelists of color, and evoked for them lifetimes of fear and pain from past personal and family interactions with police, including but not limited to SPD.

In addition to this special peacemaking circle, Panelist Dr. Karin Martin of the University of Washington led the Panel in a conversation on systemic racism, where Panelists spoke about their own experiences with race, revealing larger racial dynamics at play in society. Panelists reflected on definitions of systemic racism, institutional racism, and other vocabulary, and discussing each Panelist’s first awareness of race as a way of bringing to light each person’s particular experience related to race, while revealing racial dynamics in society that are larger than any given person. Panelists used <https://www.racialequitytools.org/glossary> to standardize the group’s vocabulary.

These conversations were (and continue to be) extremely challenging. They created a substantial hurdle to generating a shared understanding of the Incidents reviewed by the Panel – and therefore to the drafting of consensus recommendations. The damage that has been done – the damage that caused these protests in the first place, and the overall inability of SPD as a Department and the City of Seattle to immediately craft particularized responses to the needs of peaceful protestors while addressing threats to public order and safety – is deep and lasting. However, acknowledging the underlying Contributing Factor of institutional and systemic racism was critical to being able to move forward as a group.



III. Panel Recommendations

This chapter contains the Panel’s analysis of the police response to the protests and recommendations for policy change. The chapter is broken into two sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the protests along with recommendations stemming from an analysis of the protests on May 29 and May 30 (for a more detailed overview of protests across these two days, see Appendix E). The second section focuses on the specific Incidents identified by the Planning Group as pivotal moments for review. Therefore, the events and Incidents reviewed are as follows:

- A. **General Events** – General events providing context for SER Incidents
 - i. May 29 and 30 in general: Overarching Contributing Factors that permeated events of the initial protest days
 - ii. May 29, 2020: Organized Property Damage in the International District
 - iii. May 30, 2020: Protests and Escalation of Violence
- B. **Review of Specific Incidents** –SER analysis for each Incident prioritized by the Planning Group
 - i. Reviewable Incident #1: OC Spraying of Child, May 30
 - ii. Reviewable Incident #2: Police Vehicles Set on Fire, SPD Rifles Stolen, May 30
 - iii. Reviewable Incident #3: Officer Placing Knee on Individual’s Neck During Arrest, May 30
 - iv. Reviewable Incident #4: Bicycle officer altercation and arrest with pedestrian, May 31
 - v. Reviewable Incident #5: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident, June 1

Each of the incidents is explained and analyzed, with a more detailed discussion of the Contributing Factors and recommendations attributed to each Incident. Each event or Incident review is described in the following format:

- 1. **Description of Incident** – a short summary of the Incident (A more detailed narration of the daily events can be found in Appendix F.)
- 2. **Descriptive Analysis** – a summary of Panel discussion about the Incident
- 3. **Fishbone Diagram**²⁰ – a visual depiction of the Contributing Factors to the negative outcomes of the Incident, sorted by type of factor
- 4. **Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations** – a summary of all Contributing Factors and Recommendations identified by the Panel for the Incident.

Note that some of the Panel’s recommendations may have financial costs that the Panel has not attempted to calculate. In addition, many in the community are strongly against providing any additional financial resources to SPD. The Panel’s recommendations are intended to prevent the recurrence of negative outcomes of the protests in the summer of 2020 and the Panel takes no position on the allocation of City budget dollars to SPD or other important social services.

²⁰ A fishbone diagram, also known as an Ishikawa diagram, is a tool for visually explaining an event that had multiple possible causes. For additional information, see <https://asq.org/quality-resources/fishbone>.



General Events - May 29 Organized Property Damage in the International District and May 30 Protests and Escalation of Violence

May 29

On May 29, some of the first protests in Seattle following the murder of George Floyd by officers of the Minneapolis Police Department occurred starting in the International District and spreading to Downtown and Capitol Hill. The protests sent an early signal that tensions were high and typical crowd management or crowd control tactics by SPD might not be sufficient.

As the organized protests dissipated, a group of (mostly white) young protesters, filmed by an independent Seattle filmographer, destroyed numerous street fronts of commercial businesses along a 1.4 mile stretch of the International District. SPD did not engage with the group during this 45-minute period as it destroyed storefronts in a predominantly Asian community.

The Incident concerned both SPD and community members, as the group appeared well organized and orchestrated, wearing clothes that hid their identity, tearing down security cameras, and methodically moving from one building to the next. In addition, the lack of a visible SPD response to the group raised questions from skeptical Panelists about whether SPD would have responded more harshly to vandalism in a wealthier neighborhood by Black, Indigenous, or other People of Color.

May 30

On Saturday, May 30, a much larger group of approximately 5,000 protesters gathered in and around Westlake Park in the afternoon.

The crowd was far larger than SPD predictions at the start of the day, and the number of SPD officers deployed to Downtown appeared insufficient to safely manage the crowd. Fixed lines established by SPD to protect protesters from vehicular traffic and facilitate the ability to enter and exit the park instead became flash points for a crowd focused on illegitimate uses of police power. Crowd members were frustrated by police presence, particularly a police presence that limited their ability to move freely, prompting some of the protesters to chant and confront officers positioned in stationary lines.

As the crowd grew, the SPD officers remained in place on their lines. SPD operational leadership worried that attempts to move or disperse the crowd might provoke violence against the officers on site, while leaving the scene risked abandoning the Downtown area to the crowd, which SPD believed had the potential to become destructive after the looting that occurred the day before. Thus, despite SPD's goal of "minimal presence or contact with the crowd," its continued presence angered many protesters, some of whom became confrontational, even while other planned and unplanned events proceeded peacefully with positive SPD crowd facilitation.

In Westlake, at the intersections of 4th and 5th with Pine St., SPD issued an order for the crowd to disperse at 3:10 p.m., though its PA system appeared no match for the size and noise of the crowd even if the crowd had been compliant. Tensions continued to grow around Westlake Park until officers deployed CS gas, blast balls, and OC spray to disperse the crowd.



The CS gas dispersed large numbers of people, sending them in the direction of 6th Ave. Just before 4:00 p.m., a police vehicle on Pine now surrounded by protesters was set on fire. Shortly afterward, individuals began to attack and subsequently destroy a line of police vehicles parked on 6th Ave. SPD rifles were stolen from one of the police-patrol vehicles. That vehicle and several others were then set on fire, and continued to burn as SPD, overwhelmingly outnumbered and powerless to engage with the now-riotous section of the crowd, stayed in place near Westlake Park.

Protesters spread throughout the downtown area, further limiting the ability of the outnumbered SPD officers on the scene to respond to the expanding number of confrontations and acts of vandalism and looting that broke out amidst the protest. Police radio traffic, already complex across multiple police agencies assisting SPD, became even more disjointed as protests expanded to multiple locations, and the SPD Incident Commander returned to the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) to better evaluate and respond to protests citywide. Some protesters marched onto Interstate 5 (I-5), blocking traffic on the southbound lanes. Others headed towards SPD headquarters, where some launched paintballs and rocks at officers.

Mayor Durkan announced a curfew for the city beginning at 5:00 p.m., and an executive order prohibiting a range of weapons, including firearms, rocks, and flares. While the curfew made being on the streets of downtown technically illegal, it was increasingly difficult for protestors to leave the city, as the Westlake Metro station and Downtown sections of I-5 were temporarily closed, and King County buses stopped operating in the Downtown core.

Looting, vandalism, and peaceful protests in defiance of the curfew and the police department continued throughout the evening, leaving the City and SPD struggling to adapt their tactics for facilitating protests motivated by anger at the police themselves.

Analysis of Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 29-30, 2020

The Panel's analysis of the events of May 29 and 30 included an evaluation of the environment in Seattle and elsewhere that led to the protests occurring in the first place. As one community member said, "we can't forget why all these people were here, and what was motivating their behavior. We have to understand that, deal with that, and address that if we're going to get anywhere."

The Panel identified several common Contributing Factors that challenged SPD's ability to interact productively with Seattle's protesters and demonstrators. The Panel considered these to be "overarching" factors that are common to any one of the specific Incidents reviewed in this report.

Many of these factors were (and are) beyond the control of SPD. Even so, they can be expected to persist for the foreseeable future. The accompanying recommendations aim to facilitate understanding of the potential contributing factors so that they may be properly considered and addressed moving forward.

Police Violence and Systemic Racism

Police misconduct and systemic and institutional racism within everyday encounters provided the original stimulus for demonstrations and set the identity of the demonstrations, which were already defined by a perception of police illegitimacy. This made the protests on this day (and throughout Wave



1) a fundamentally different challenge than thousands of community events SPD had “managed” before. With this historical context and identity, SPD tactics that had allowed prior events to occur peacefully and safely were now more likely to escalate tension and increase the outpouring of anger and resentment rather than facilitate peaceful demonstrations.

Everyone involved in the protests was grappling with powerful emotions. While the protests created the impression of “community” as a single mind and voice against “police” as a unified force, the situation in Seattle was much more complex than that. Both within protest crowds and within the groups of police officers at the protests were individuals of varied and conflicting beliefs. While the police had protective equipment and munitions, they were vastly outnumbered by the angry crowd. Tensions were high for everyone involved, as lines of officers were confronted by lines of protesters.

COVID-19 and Social Media

Another unique factor affecting the protests was the COVID-19 global pandemic. Protests around the country during the summer of 2020 saw increased attendance. Publications attributed the impact of COVID-19 on protests to various causes, including, among others, how it highlighted racial disparity, greater availability of time from a public that was now working from home or experiencing higher unemployment, and more consumption of social media and news which connected the country in new ways.²¹

Smartphones and social media also contributed to the heightened tension and increased crowds on May 30. Images and messages on social media enhanced the speed and scale of the spread of global outrage at the murder of George Floyd. Social media also provided platforms that allowed community organizers and agitators to convene, and to move, in ways that complicated SPD efforts to engage supportively with crowds.

In part because of these the protests on May 30 – June 1 were of a volume and scope that was unprecedented for SPD. As one SPD Panelist noted, “these protests were events that you’d usually take six to eight months, maybe even a year, to prepare for. We had days.” Again, because police were the focus of the protests, community/police communications regarding these events were reduced.

Moreover, images of confrontations and conflagrations during these days, in Seattle and elsewhere, were broadcast widely through social media and traditional media, enhancing tensions among many participants on a daily basis. Events like the burning of a Minneapolis police building on May 28 heightened police fears of organized violence and arson among protesters, and the destruction of downtown Seattle buildings and SPD vehicles on May 29 and 30 upset and concerned community members, business owners and SPD alike. SPD officers who responded with uses of force and deployments of less-lethal munitions had a similarly galvanizing effect on protesters, who became more determined to protest by the day. Each new “back and forth” of violence or destruction was easily accessible and shareable on social media and broadcast by traditional media. Panelists described each subsequent day of protests pitting increasingly scared, angry, and exhausted community members

²¹ See, e.g., Maneesh Arora, *How the coronavirus pandemic helped the Floyd protests become the biggest in U.S. history*, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2020 6:00 AM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/05/how-coronavirus-pandemic-helped-floyd-protests-become-biggest-us-history/>; Paolo Gerbaudo, *The Pandemic Crowd: Protest in the Time of COVID*, Columbia Journal of International Affairs, <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/pandemic-crowd-protest-time-covid-19>



against increasingly scared, angry, and exhausted police, and contributing to the continuation of protests throughout the summer.

Communication and Crowd Facilitation Mindset

Communication between SPD and protest organizers *before* a protest can greatly help reduce the number of unexpected circumstances *during* a protest. “Any agency’s ability to successfully facilitate and de-escalate a demonstration will depend in large part on the relationship it has with the public before the event.”²²

In the past, it has been common for protest organizers to reach out to SPD and enlist its support in planning and holding a safe protest. Such was not the case in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. First, the protests were decentralized. Many appeared to grow organically, while others, such as the Westlake Park demonstrations on May 30, included a variety of different groups with different messages and perspectives. In a sign of the community’s current distrust of police and of SPD, many organizers refused to communicate with SPD, viewing them as part of the problem rather than a possible partner in the solution.

The absence of advance notice of protester intentions and goals forced SPD into a more reactive approach to crowd management rather than a proactive conversation about protest facilitation. This, coupled with the anti-police focus of the Events, created a “new normal” for protests that SPD was reacting to for the first time, in real time.

In response, SPD fell back on its standard tactics and procedures for “crowd management,” defined as “strategies and tactics that employ communication and dialogue with event leaders to obtain voluntary compliance with lawful orders and allow for minimal enforcement action”²³ and “crowd control and dispersal.” While these policies have helped hundreds of protests and demonstrations per year occur in Seattle without violence, the phrases “crowd management” and “crowd control” and the focus on “compliance with lawful orders” and “minimal enforcement action” are telling.

Panelists, several of whom were SPD officers, accepted the statements of SPD in support of First Amendment freedoms at face value and recognized the competing concerns of protecting personal safety and public and private property. But community members on the Panel noted that a policy of “crowd management” implies the authority to tell even a peaceful crowd where to go and what to do, and a shift to “crowd control” once an SPD officer determines in his or her discretion that such control is necessary. This reveals an underlying perspective of SPD that the community is permitted to act based on SPD’s authority, when in fact the Panel felt the opposite was true: SPD’s authority to act is predicated upon its actions being deemed legitimate by the community.

Certainly, there are reasonable limits that can and should be imposed on peaceful crowd behavior. As one Panelist pointed out, for example, it is essential that emergency vehicles always have a clear path to

²² “Policing Protests to Protect Constitutional Rights and Public Safety,” The Policing Project at NYU School of Law, October 2020, at 3. Available at <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/5f9af5fe6b0e0f0c265ffdb8/1603991043508/POLICING+PROTESTS+TO+PROTECT+CONSTITUTIONAL+RIGHTS+AND+PUBLIC+SAFETY+10-29.pdf>

²³ SPD Directive Number 21-00016, revised policy 14.090 – Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control, effective-date: 04/15/21. Draft, accessed on April 5, 2021.



hospitals and trauma centers for people in need. SPD likely has the legal authority to “manage” or “control” a crowd, and when individuals in that crowd create a danger to others, SPD should have the authority to address that danger in the least intrusive way possible.

But a “command and control” approach may not be productive in responding to the demands of a crowd whose anger has been fueled by perceptions of persistent, unaddressed and unjust police behavior, particularly towards Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color. It was the panel’s judgment that between May 30 and June 1, such an approach caused an escalation in the crowd’s anger and increased the potential for violence and destruction. The Panel felt that a new strategic framework and new policies and tactics are needed from SPD for protests where the police are the focus of the demonstration.

In any event, the inability of SPD to effectively communicate with community members – not just in the few days before May 30, but in the months and years before – contributed to a protest environment completely devoid of trust. As one SPD officer stated:

Effective communication is not going to happen when there is mistrust. And that mistrust has never been so blatant as it was during that time. Officers do so much, but it isn’t evident. A lot of people had been carrying things for a long time, and all the things of 2020 brought it to a boiling point. People aren’t willing to forget, and I am glad they aren’t because it is making us address what we do. So, we need to ask how we can effectively build trust within the community. As a police officer, I am not going to do it just by myself. I’m looking for people to partner with to help and build trust. Police brutality protests are met with more police brutality – where is that going to go? That’s going to lead to more anger and mistrust. I would like to continue to talk and hear what people think would work to communicate and build trust. But in the middle of a protest, that communication is not going to happen.

Several Panelists noted that the frustration of the protesters and the rising levels of confrontation were exacerbated by the silence of SPD officers in response to requests from people in the crowd asking officers to “stand with the crowd” in objecting to police brutality. It should be noted that the Chief of Police vocally and publicly described Mr. Floyd’s death as a “murder” on May 27,²⁴ and many officers stated that they personally found the actions of the Minneapolis Police Department officers in question to be outrageous and unacceptable. At the same time, many SPD officers in attendance at the protests felt unable to show any support for or solidarity with the crowds due to SPD’s policy of content neutrality, which precludes officers facilitating protests from signaling support for particular points of view expressed by protesters. Many officers interpreted this policy as preventing them from any outward show of support for the crowd’s views, including verbal statements against police brutality or physical demonstrations of support (e.g., “taking a knee”).

²⁴ Chief Carmen Best, *Chief Best’s Statement to Officers Regarding George Floyd*, SPD BLOTTER (May 27, 2020), <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/05/27/chief-bests-statement-to-officers-regarding-george-floyd/>.



Section 5.001-POL of the Seattle Police Department Policy Manual sets forth the policy for SPD conduct and professionalism. It states that:

The Department expects all employees to treat all people with dignity; *remember that community care-taking is at times the focus, not always command and control*; and that the guiding principle is to treat everyone with respect and courtesy, guarding against employing an officious or overbearing attitude and refraining from language, demeanor, and actions that may cause the individual feeling belittled, ridiculed, or intimidated.

(Emphasis added). Section 5.001-POL-10 adds that:

Employees on duty or in uniform will not publicly ridicule:

- i. The Department or its policies
- ii. Other Department employees
- iii. Other law enforcement agencies
- iv. The criminal justice system or police profession
- v. This applies where such expression is defamatory, obscene, undermines the effectiveness of the Department, interferes with the maintenance of discipline, or is made with reckless disregard for truth."

Section 5.001-POL-18 addresses "conflicts of interest" and further explains:

Employees will not associate with persons or organizations where such association reasonably gives the appearance of conflict of interest.

Employees will not engage in enforcement, investigative, or administrative functions that create or give the appearance of conflicts of interest.

Most Panelists did not consider public condemnation of the death of George Floyd to be an act that would "ridicule the Department, its employees or other law enforcement agencies." The Panel felt that "taking a knee" or standing publicly against police brutality, as Mayor Durkan, Chief Best and other SPD leaders stated, was a show of support for fair and just policing, and something SPD officers should do without reservation. In fact, the willingness of SPD officers to acknowledge the will of the crowd might have been viewed as an important co-operative perspective to address the crowd's anti-police frustration. However, SPD officers at "street level" during the days reviewed by the Panel were not given express guidance on this point.

In many crowd facilitation settings – for example, a demonstration on immigration issues – a show of support for one perspective or another by the police facilitating the protest could inflame or otherwise negatively impact the demonstration. Without clear guidance from SPD leadership on why these protests were different, and knowing they were likely being recorded by hundreds of cell phones at all times during the protests, officers overwhelmingly chose to follow the existing policy of content neutrality rather than share their feelings of support for the protesters' activities. The Panel's judgment was that in these early days of the protests, many in the crowd seemed to interpret the officers' silence as an alignment with, or at least a refusal to refute, the police brutality that was the source of the



protest. As a result, the silence of officers likely escalated tensions overall.

Of course, silence is preferable to a response from officers to community members that is disrespectful, sarcastic, or insulting, and the Panel reviewed several instances in which officers, while not expressing political opinions, nonetheless responded in anger to community members, using expletives or derogatory expressions. It would be naïve to think that officers are not affected by the words or actions of community members at these protests, and Panelists understood the human responses to exhaustion, fear, anger, and frustration on the part of everyone involved in these protests. It is one of the expectations of SPD officers that they rise above the invective while facilitating a protest. SPD acknowledges and accepts this responsibility, and it is an existing policy that “any time employees represent [SPD] or identify themselves as police officers or Department employees, they will not use profanity directed as an insult or any language that is derogatory, contemptuous, or disrespectful toward any person,”²⁵ regardless of the behavior that a community member is exhibiting. Despite this, Panelists witnessed numerous instances in which this policy was not followed. It is the behavior displayed by our officers when engaging with those members of our community that are the most aggrieved that demonstrates their true commitment to protect and serve our community, in all its complexity. Instances in which officers exhibit disrespect, frustration, or anger to members of our community – even after repeated extra-long and extra-stressful shifts in which they have been subjected to lengthy and repeated verbal assaults – simply cannot be tolerated, as they further undermine trust and underscore the divide between the community and the police that it is essential for the community to heal. SPD must find a more effective way of ensuring that this policy is followed by its officers as a matter of course.

Staffing

The Panel did not know what level of staffing might have been optimal for SPD on May 30, but acknowledged SPD’s awareness that its staffing was not sufficient for the protests that occurred. SPD should use the protests on May 30 as a baseline for what can be anticipated in the future and develop staffing plans for resource levels that would be needed to facilitate such protests using the other tactics described in this Report.

Future anti-police protests can be mobilized on very short notice via social media, and may occur at any time an officer anywhere in the country commits an egregious use of improper force, or is not held accountable for the officer’s actions in ways that communities find unjust. In such instances, SPD will need the ability to mobilize more officers, more rapidly, and with more flexibility than it was able to do on May 29 or 30.²⁶

It will be important that these officers receive appropriate training for these sorts of events – including commanders and supervisors, who should receive extra training on the supervision of officers during such events. If, as the Panel believes, it is reasonable to assume that protests of the size and type as the May 30 protests can occur again the future, SPD will need all of its officers to have the capacity to respond. As a result, it should ensure that all of its officers are trained in the psychology of crowds,

²⁵ Seattle Police Department Manual 5.001.10

²⁶ Currently, SPD’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Seattle Police Officers Guild (SPOG) allows for a minimum of 72 hours’ notice before an officer may be required to report for unscheduled duty; this may require negotiation between the City of Seattle, SPD, and the police union to enable SPD to meet the needs of this recommendation.



peaceful crowd facilitation, public safety, and other strategies and tactics set forth in this report and in evolving SPD policies and procedures.

The training should also ensure that officers from multiple departments can communicate in a secure and effective fashion, potentially taking advantage of new technologies to permit this even in the challenging environment of a large protest. SPD's Ops Center (SPOC) would have benefitted from an encrypted standardized alert messaging system (e.g., WhatsApp, Yammer, or other technology) that could replace radio communication during crowd facilitation events. The Panel would anticipate that such a system would:

- Be encrypted such that only users of the system could hear the communications;
- Be standardized such that all mutual aid agencies would be able to hear the communications;
- Permit sub-channels or sub-groups for units (e.g., Mobile Response Units or dialogue officers) with particular communication needs;
- Enable control of the system at the SPOC; and
- Ensure audio communication, including dictation, between officers and the SPOC so that officers do not need to read texts and can communicate while wearing gas masks, etc.

Contributing Factors and Recommendations – May 29-30

Given the highly emotional and deeply felt anti-police sentiment that animated the protests, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic and social media, the size of the crowd and the speed with which it came together, and the communication challenges described above, is it not surprising that SPD's preparation of "crowd management" and "crowd control" through the use of fixed lines that restricted the crowd's ability to move was ineffective in de-escalating tensions throughout the crowd, contributing to the ultimate acts of violence, uses of force, and property damage that were to come.



Figure 4. Overarching contributing factors by category.






Table 2. Table of Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations.

Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations	
Contributing Factors	Recommendation Summary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The protests were rooted in widespread outrage at repeated acts of police brutality committed by police departments in Minneapolis and across the country, including Seattle. SPD and its officers were targets of anger, frustration, and hate and some of their attempts to facilitate the protests were viewed by many as provocative acts that further agitated the crowd. This outpouring of community emotion in the wake of the killing of George Floyd created novel challenges for police seeking to facilitate community demonstrations.</i> <i>The COVID-19 global pandemic may have augmented feelings of anger, tension, frustration, and powerlessness among protesters.</i> <i>Smartphones and both open-source and encrypted social media, augmented by traditional media sources, may have been a factor in inflaming tensions and anti-police emotions among protesters.</i> <i>The SPD policy on “content neutrality” for officers staffing demonstrations may have limited interactions between officers and demonstrators and further angered some demonstrators.</i> <i>The protests that began on May 30 were decentralized, unpermitted, and often hostile to the SPD, and SPD lacked the time and the means of communication with community organizers to prepare for them effectively.</i> <i>Tensions and emotions were high for all participants – community and police alike – and neither “protesters” nor “police” had a unified identity or agenda shared by all of their members.</i> <i>The dispersal of protesters from the downtown Seattle area was complicated by</i> 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> To enable better interactions with demonstration organizers in advance of protests, SPD should build legitimacy through expanded community policing initiatives, including the expansion of foot patrols, and build deeper personal relationships between officers and individuals throughout the communities of Seattle. Engage in direct and ongoing community dialogue to understand and adapt to the diverse community perspectives about the institution of police. During crowd events, especially those directed at protesting police activity, SPD should alter its strategy for policing protests to focus more explicitly and comprehensively on the facilitation of peaceful assembly and ensuring the safety of protestors. The focus and mindset of SPD officers deployed to assist in crowd events should move away from “crowd management,” “crowd control,” and “law enforcement” to “facilitation of speech” and “crowd protection and safety.” Embrace procedures that visibly signal SPD’s commitment to ensuring the safe and peaceful gathering with the minimum necessary engagement of SPD officers, and limit that engagement to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoting the ability of individuals and groups to express First Amendment freedoms; Protecting the physical safety of individuals within as well as beyond the crowd and Preventing the destruction of public or private property. Modify SPD’s tactics of crowd facilitation to prioritize communication, de-escalation, and carefully conducted removal of those who are creating an immediate danger to



<p><i>the declaration of a curfew and the closing of multiple public transportation options.</i></p>	<p>others or causing destruction to property, allowing the rest of the event to continue undisturbed. These actions should be performed in ways that cause minimal interference with the acts of peaceful protesters.</p> <p>6. Modify SPD’s policy on content neutrality to permit officers staffing a public event focused on issues of policing to demonstrate solidarity with the crowd participants’ rights to protest if they choose. To ensure widespread and uniform adoption of the new policy, SPD should consider implementing universal training on the new policy and provide explicit messaging guidance to officers prior to such events, so that officers will know what words and actions will convey SPD’s position with regard to the protests.</p> <p>7. Eliminate disrespectful statements or actions from SPD officers to individuals or groups protesting.</p>
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Contributing Factors and Recommendations – May 29 Vandalism in International District

Table 3. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 29 Vandalism in International District.

May 29, 2020: Vandalism in the International District	
Contributing Factors	Recommendation Summary
<p>8. <i>A group of organized, predominantly white individuals vandalized businesses in the International District, escalating SPD concerns of anarchists with criminal intent participating in protests.</i></p> <p>9. <i>SPD’s loss of legitimacy (and related) community anger were enhanced by perceptions that SPD did not respond to those damaging property in the International District as aggressively as it would have in parts of Seattle that are predominantly white, or if the vandals had been people of color.</i></p>	<p>8. Use live CCTV footage and mobile SPD officers, whether on bicycles or in other vehicles, to rapidly intervene with and address groups destroying property.</p>



10. <i>SPD did not identify, engage with, or arrest the vandals at the time, and lacked investigative tools (e.g., closed circuit TV footage) to investigate them further.</i>	
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Contributing Factors and Recommendations – May 30 SPD Protest Tactics

Table 4. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 30 SPD Protest Tactics

May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics	
11. <i>SPD officers deployed in ways that limited crowd movement, creating inflexibility and conflict with the crowd and enhancing a feeling of an “us versus them” conflict.</i>	<p>9. SPD should provide officers with clear direction about SPD’s priorities in facilitating demonstrations, particularly when the institution of policing is the focus of the protest. SPD’s focus should be on facilitating access and safety for all. SPD should enhance the ability to address dangerous situations with minimal impact on peaceful demonstrators while minimizing the use of munitions or indiscriminate force.</p> <p>10. Rather than treating “the crowd” as a single entity with a unified purpose, or attributing the risk of violent behavior to the entire crowd when it may be only a few individuals, SPD should pursue a differentiated approach toward individuals within the crowd, and should avoid the use of undifferentiated munitions (e.g., CS gas) wherever possible.</p> <p>11. SPD should avoid the creation of immovable lines of officers at demonstrations and provide a mobilization plan for the deployment of bicycle or other mobile officers to ensure appropriate and rapid responsiveness to unplanned crowd events and ensure that the crowd can move in the direction(s) it wishes without undue danger from cars or other risks.</p>
12. <i>SPD did not provide sufficient officers to Westlake Park protests to facilitate effective crowd movement or to deter criminal activity.</i>	12. Establish a staffing model for crowd events such that protests of the size and scale of the Westlake protests can be suitably staffed with mobile officers and other facilitation while minimizing SPD intrusion into the protests.
13. <i>It is the belief of the Panel that some individuals in the crowd were provocateurs or agitators.</i>	



<p>14. <i>SPD officers held lines in part to protect protesters once violence and fires started, preventing them from directly addressing criminality.</i></p>	<p>13. Ensure that all SPD officers, not just those officers assigned to crowd facilitation teams, are trained in crowd psychology, crowd facilitation, public safety procedures and tactics, and the mobilization techniques likely to be used at future crowd events.</p> <p>14. SPD should use mobile response units (e.g., bicycle or other vehicles) that are distinct from crowd facilitation officers or “dialogue officers” to address agitators or instigators of violence in the crowd.</p>
<p>15. <i>Single channel radio communication led to an increase in radio silence, which contributed to a lack of operational awareness of the scene.</i></p>	<p>15. Evaluate whether an encrypted standardized alert messaging system (e.g., WhatsApp, Yammer, or other technology) could replace radio communication during crowd facilitation events.</p>
<p>16. <i>The SPD Incident Commander was in the field and unable to keep a broad perspective of all simultaneous protests occurring throughout Seattle. As a result, his ability to deploy officers effectively was limited.</i></p>	<p>16. Provide specific training, including scenario-based training on the management of large crowd events, and on the supervision of officers, for all SPD supervisors and above, including Incident Commanders and officers in the SPOC.</p> <p>17. Establish the Incident Command Post and communication lines to officers facilitating protests or demonstrations so that the Incident Commander can observe multiple events in different locations simultaneously and receive real-time updates about each event, from officers trained in the supervision of crowd events who are physically present at each protest or demonstration.</p> <p>18. The Mayor’s Office, SPD, SFD, the Department of Transportation and other departments should conduct appropriate scenario planning for disruptive protests. In particular the scenario planning should</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ensure that sufficient resources are deployed so that other SPD locations can protect and serve the people of Seattle in the event that public service from one or more of its buildings are disrupted by protests.• Ensure that sufficient public transportation exists to help protesters



	leave a protest where an unlawful assembly or curfew has been declared or a legal order to disperse has been issued.
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Review of Specific Incidents

After reviewing the protests and demonstrations of May 29 and 30, the Panel reviewed several specific Incidents prioritized by the Planning Committee for Wave 1. This section provides a more granular narrative description of each Incident and specific contributing factors and recommendations for each Incident that are designed to prevent the recurrence of similar Incidents during future crowd events.

While many of the recommendations in this section are not as wide-ranging as those listed above, the Panel feels that they may be equally important in preventing the escalation of tensions during crowd events. Each of these Incidents generated substantial agitation and anger, both at the time of their occurrence and in their review by the Planning Group and the Panel. Each day's events were cumulative, and the elimination of any individual act that inflamed tensions might have been sufficient to avoid the eruptions of violence that occurred late in each day.

Incident #1: OC Spraying of Child, May 30

Description of Incident

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on May 30, SPD officers were standing in a fixed line across 4th Ave. intended to keep vehicle traffic away from protests at Westlake Park and guide pedestrians to a different entrance to the park given the large crowds gathered there. A man attempting to walk past the line was prevented from doing so by SPD officers. The situation quickly escalated into an angry confrontation in which SPD Officers sprayed the man with OC spray and struck him with a 40mm foam bullet while the man threw what appeared to be his own can of OC spray at the officers before departing.

The fixed line of officers attracted a group of demonstrators who formed their own line and engaged with the SPD officers. The interactions were peaceful, though some in the crowd were verbally aggressive and insulting the officers.

Approximately 30 minutes later, the man who had thrown the OC spray can at the officers returned and verbally engaged with the officers who had sprayed him previously. SPD officers deemed his previous actions as assault. Without warning to the crowd, they pushed through the line of protesters and arrested the man. This sudden push into the line of protesters agitated the crowd, and a woman farther down the line refused to move back, grabbing an SPD officer's baton. When she did not immediately let go, SPD officers behind the front-line deployed OC spray towards the woman. The woman turned away from the spray, and an 8-year-old child who was standing behind her was also affected by the spray.

A video was posted on social media showing the child crying from the OC spray as others in the crowd tried to aid. The video was widely reviewed and led to more than 13,000 complaints to OPA.

Analysis

The Panel felt this arrest, while permissible under the law, was both undesirable from a community perspective and unproductive for SPD for several reasons. The initial engagement between the officer and the man was not one in which either person calmly and respectfully explained why they were doing what they were doing, or tried to defuse the rising anger. The man did not ask why he could not pass, and the officer did not explain. The officer's BWV did not show any indication of a warning to the man before OC spray was deployed. It was a swift altercation ending in a use of force.

Particularly when SPD or policing is the source of the protests, SPD should deploy its resources in ways



that facilitate the legitimate objectives of crowd participants, allowing individuals to enter and exit areas of protests as freely as possible while protecting protesters from vehicular traffic. Even when roads need to be closed to vehicular traffic, SPD should consider whether sidewalks need to be closed, absent imminent danger to pedestrians unrelated to vehicle traffic. When they do, officers should remain calm and patient, and explain to anyone seeking to enter blocked areas both the public safety rationale behind the blockage and alternative routes to assist in getting where they need to go.

SPD officers on the Panel referenced the “LEED” principles of communication as a technique for officers that might be helpful in instances such as this Incident. LEED – Listen and Explain with Equity and Dignity – is a technique for improving police communication with community members developed around 2012 by officers in SPD. It leverages psychological concepts of “procedural justice” to enhance police legitimacy, both with community members and internally among officers in the Department. Whether LEED or some other technique is used, ensuring that officers clearly, calmly, and respectfully articulate a public safety rationale for limitations and provide protesters with alternatives is essential to prevent a stand-off or escalation.

While improving the communication of the SPD officers is important, the Panel does not want to minimize the role that the individual who was arrested played in the altercation. He was disrespectful and quick to anger, and threw a can of OC spray at the officers. Such behavior should not be condoned, yet, SPD did not arrest the man at that time. The Incident would have ended there if the man had not returned to angrily re-engage with the officer.

When the man returned, he addressed the SPD officers in a loud, confrontational manner. This time, however, he remained several feet away from the officers and did not engage with them physically. While other protesters did appear to be attempting to hold him back from a greater escalation, his aggression was entirely verbal. Absent the context of his prior interaction with SPD, the individual did not appear significantly more aggressive than other protesters. Nonetheless, it likely appeared to onlookers that SPD officers responded with a greater use of force – pushing into the crowd with several other officers to arrest the man.

Perhaps if the officers’ actions had occurred at the same time the man had physically engaged with them, the crowd’s response would have been different. But because the officers arrested the individual for conduct that happened roughly 20 minutes prior, the arrest appeared to be a display of police force in response to mere verbal insults – what some police observers have labeled “arrest for contempt of cop” – rather than legitimate law enforcement action to reduce violence or promote public safety. Given the environment, SPD should have considered that the likely result of such a use of force might be increased agitation of the crowd rather than de-escalation.

It is certainly important for SPD officers to be able to address individuals, safely and efficiently, in the crowd who are agitating or inciting violence or other crimes and to separate them from peaceful people (a) before they create physical danger to others and (b) in ways that do not further agitate the crowd. The Panel is hopeful that dialogue officers (discussed below) and other recommendations from this report will assist with that.

It is also important that SPD officers consider the circumstances in which they are acting. SPD Panelists emphasized the need for SPD officers to improve their “situational awareness” and to think of the ramifications of their actions before they act. Before using force, SPD officers should consider how the specific use of force might affect (and potentially inflame) the crowd. Under circumstances like these,



officers may well conclude that while conduct might technically be “arrestable” under the law, the arrest should not be made until a later time, given the potential to inflame crowd. The physical distance between the subject and the officer, the need to move through other members of the crowd, the time that has passed since the offense was committed, the perception of those in the immediate vicinity, and the relative “pettiness” or “seriousness” of offense should all factor into the officer’s decision process.

The Panel also discussed whether the level of force used by the officer deploying OC was appropriate and whether other types of interactions would have de-escalated the Incident without affecting the child behind the agitated protesters on the line.

The Panel assumed the officer who deployed the OC spray in this instance gave truthful responses to OPA and the Force Review Unit during the interviews and written reports that the Panel reviewed.²⁷ If so, the officer did appear to include these considerations in his decisions, deploying two short bursts of OC spray and not using additional force. However, it is the Panel’s understanding that officers who are behind the front row on the line have larger OC spray cans (MK-9 canisters) that provide greater distance and “spread” than the smaller cans of OC spray (MK-4 canisters) given to SPD officers for daily use on their belts. The MK-9 canister has a range of up to 18 feet and is generally intended to be used from farther back behind a line or to reach farther into a crowd; had the officer used an MK-4 canister, it is possible that the smaller dispersal area would have satisfied the immediate safety goal of separating an SPD officer from the protestor grabbing his baton while avoiding the collateral injury to the child and others. (The Panel felt that this equipment change should be viewed as secondary, behind a shift in emphasis on officer de-escalation training.)

The Panel does not know if there are other equipment alternatives that might have improved the officer’s ability to target only the individual in question and minimize the risk of the child or others also being affected. One member of the Panel mentioned “pepper gel” products²⁸ that might advance this goal; the Panel has not examined such products and mentions them as a potential consideration only.

Ultimately, as will later be addressed in the altercation between bicycle officers and community members on the next day, while police actions like this may be legal according to the letter of the law, they may not be viewed as just by members of the community. Equally important, the arrest did not advance the tactical goals of SPD in facilitating peaceful protests. It was perceived by the nearby protesters as an arrest for disrespect towards the police, increasing their anger towards SPD. The fallout – deployment of pepper spray on protesters, including an 8-year-old, a viral video and thousands of outraged complaints – negatively impacted SPD’s legitimacy at protests in the days and weeks to follow. As such, this arrest ended up confirming skepticism and distrust of SPD in the eyes of protesters and served to reinforce the notion of SPD as an organization that exists to use force to suppress expressions of undesirable speech.

The Panel identified two other areas that it felt contributed to the undesirable events that occurred here. One involved the insufficient announcement of the declaration of unlawful assembly prior to SPD uses of force. The Panel reviewed video of SPD officers discussing an imminent declaration of unlawful assembly prior to the arrest of the man and the spraying of the child, but the actual declaration was not heard by the Panel. SPD officers on the Panel agreed that the PA systems SPD used to transmit dispersal orders to the crowds downtown on May 30 were inadequate to be heard over the noise generated by

²⁷ Use of Force Reports 05-30-2020; OPA Investigation Summary 2020OPA-0322

²⁸ See, e.g., <https://www.sabrered.com/pepper-gel-industry-leading-innovation-sabre>



the crowd. The Panel strategized a number of approaches to enhance the ability of SPD to communicate with everyone in the crowd, including those who might have hearing impairments.

At subsequent events, SPD used larger, professional PA systems to improve communication with protesters. SPD Panelists provided information that Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD), designed for communications with large crowds, have been acquired and are in use by SPD. The Panel notes that other jurisdictions have elected not to purchase LRAD devices over concern they can be weaponized or cause damage to the hearing of protesters close to where they are when deployed. If an LRAD is used, SPD should develop and publish written protocols governing its use that ensure it is not used in ways that may harm individuals within its range.

Where possible, SPD should position officers and loudspeakers in various locations at the demonstration to verify communications are clearly heard and understood by the crowd. SPD should verify instructions are heard on the police radio prior to further crowd facilitation acts by SPD.

The other issue reviewed by the Panel involved the use of, and need for batons by SPD officers at protests like this. The protesters in this instance were clearly angry and agitated, but they displayed no weapons, leading members of our Panel to ask why SPD officers had their batons out in the first place. Many on the Panel viewed this as an unsubtle threat of force that was unnecessary given the situation. Had the baton been sheathed, it would not have been as easily grabbed by the woman in the crowd, and the OC spray might not have been viewed as necessary by another officer.

SPD officers and supervisors on the Panel felt that the batons often did more harm than good. The batons issued for crowd events were longer and difficult to wear on the body and they were rarely used for any protective purpose. Instead, their primary use was to push members of the crowd in particular directions. Given SPD's desire to eliminate physical contact between officers and protesters, these officers felt it would be possible to severely curtail, and potentially eliminate, the presence of batons at crowd events without impacting public safety, including the safety of officers on the scene.



Contributing Factors and Recommendations: OC Spraying of Child, May 30

Figure 5. Contributing factors - OC spraying of child.






Table 5. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child

May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child	
<p>17. <i>The mood between officers and community members was already tense, emotional, and confrontational as a result of earlier incidents.</i></p> <p>18. <i>SPD established a static police line across 4th Avenue, which acted as a magnet for angry protesters and provided an outlet for increasing expressions of their frustration and anger.</i></p> <p>19. <i>SPD did not explain clearly and calmly to protesters the reasons for establishing the line, or for limiting pedestrian movements.</i></p>	<p>19. SPD should avoid the deployment of officers in ways that prevent pedestrian/crowd movement or that separate individuals from other areas of protest without a clearly articulated safety rationale.</p> <p>20. If short term closures of streets or blockages of specific intersections are necessary for the safety of the crowd, SPD should ensure that its officers can adequately inform individuals in the crowd of the reasons for the blockages and provide them with adequate alternative options to continue moving.</p> <p>21. SPD should ensure that all limitations on crowd behavior or conduct are designed to maximize the safety of individuals in the crowd, and that any communications about such limitations articulate that safety rationale in ways that emphasize LEED (Listening and Explaining with Equity and Dignity) principles. Specific messages should be conveyed in simple, layperson terms that are accessible to all, and should be focused on explaining the public safety necessity motivating the message.</p>
<p>20. <i>SPD did not effectively communicate with the crowd and did not effectively inform the crowd of its declaration of “unlawful assembly” or of the potential ramifications of that declaration.</i></p>	<p>22. Improve SPD’s capability to inform and communicate with demonstrators during group events in the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple modes of communication should be considered, including audio, video, other visual media (e.g., posters, banners, etc.), social media, and others; • The modes of communication and specific messages should be included in the Incident Action Plan created by SPD prior to events and updated throughout the pre-event planning phase;



	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The communications should be documented and recorded during the event, including by having officers certify their use on police radio that is retained by SPD; and• Their impact should be evaluated and specifically assessed in post-event review by SPD. <p>23. Procure a suitable audio device to ensure that the crowd can hear messages relevant to the event.</p>
<p>21. <i>The arrest of an individual by SPD inflamed nearby demonstrators, resulting in physical contact across the line between front-line officers and front-line protesters.</i></p> <p>22. <i>A baton held by an SPD officer on the line was grabbed by a protester, who refused a verbal order to let it go, causing an SPD officer behind the line to deploy OC spray against the individual.</i></p> <p>23. <i>The OC spray distributed to non-frontline SPD personnel spread more widely than the intended individual target.</i></p>	<p>24. Review SPD protocols related to the presence of batons and their use during crowd facilitation events, potentially eliminating their presence at such events unless justified by a specific and compelling public safety purpose.</p> <p>25. In considering whether to use force during a crowd event, SPD officers must evaluate whether the use of force can be limited to those against whom the force is justified, and ensure that the potential for collateral impact is minimized.</p> <p>26. Limit arrests during protests targeted at the police to individuals committing immediate or imminent harm to people or property, and do not arrest individuals for offenses committed at an earlier time unless they can be accomplished in a way that will not escalate emotions in the crowd.</p>



Incident #2: Police Vehicles Set on Fire, SPD Rifles Stolen, May 30

Description of Incident

SPD has a great deal of experience in crowd management and crowd control, overseeing thousands of events each year. Even so, SPD was unprepared for the combination of the sheer number of protesters in downtown Seattle on May 30 and the anger directed at SPD officers given the nature of the protests. Under these circumstances, SPD's normal tactics were inadequate to ensure public safety.

As protesters flowed into and around Westlake Park, SPD held a variety of static positions designed to limit vehicular traffic and ensure safe pedestrian entrance to and exit from the Park. For the most part, SPD officers remained silent as they were being engaged verbally by protesters, in part because of SPD's "content neutrality" policy, which prevents officers from making statements that might support or demean a protesting group. As a result, protesters frustrated about the arbitrary and inappropriate uses of police power in George Floyd's murder in Minneapolis, were met by unmoving, silent officers in riot gear preventing their free travel across public streets in Seattle. This turned static police lines into increasingly tense areas of confrontation.

As protesters were gathering, a group of SPD officers assigned to the protests drove into the Downtown area and parked their vehicles on 6th Ave., near Westlake Park. In one vehicle, three officers had brought their department-issued rifles, which they stored in the locked but unattended vehicle. Two of the rifles were in a cabinet designed to hold two rifles, while the other was in a bag in the back of the vehicle in the car.

After a series of escalations, SPD declared an unlawful assembly and issued a dispersal order. It is unlikely the order was heard by many in the crowd given the size and noise of the crowd and the AV system available to SPD at the time. As SPD deployed CS gas and blast balls, protesters were forced into Pine St. Lacking sufficient resources to both hold the intersection and move forward into Pine St., SPD remained in their lines rather than moving forward to disperse the crowd further. This left a group of highly agitated protesters next to a fleet of unattended police vehicles on Pine St. and 6th Ave., which became a target for their anger.

Shortly before 4:00 p.m., an individual sets a police vehicle on fire at 5th and Pine St. Soon after, around 4:15 p.m., a line of five police vehicles parked on 6th Ave were vandalized. Videos taken by people in the crowd²⁹ show individuals removing three rifles from the back of one of the vehicles. One of the rifles was quickly recovered, unloaded and returned to SPD shortly thereafter by a private security guard in the crowd and broadcasted live on local news. Of the other two rifles, one was later anonymously returned to the West Precinct, and the other was recovered from an individual currently facing criminal charges for the incident.

Individuals in the crowd continued vandalizing the vehicles and then set them on fire. The vehicles burned on the street for more than 20 minutes, until SPD was able to secure safe access for the Seattle Fire Department (SFD) to the area. The fires, as well as the seeming lack of SPD or SFD presence for an

²⁹ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) video is not stored in the City of Seattle, and therefore could not be used to trace the other stolen rifle.



extended period of time during these incidents, were indicators to the general public of the unrest and lack of control in Downtown Seattle.

Analysis

The Panel's discussion of this Incident focused specifically on concern about the ability of vandals to access unattended SPD patrol vehicles and to remove three rifles from one of the vehicles during the chaos. The instance in which an individual actually fired a live round from one of the rifles at the vehicle was particularly disturbing. If a private security guard with his own sidearm had not been there able to immediately recover, disarm, and return the rifle to SPD, the harm could have been far worse. As it was, another rifle remained stolen and missing for multiple days.

The Panel first discussed how to ensure patrol vehicles are not left unattended near crowd events. While the scope of these protests was beyond what was expected, it was also clear the SPOC was challenged in its ability to know exactly where all of its personnel and equipment were located as the protests evolved. This is an important issue for SPD moving forward.

SPD Panelists noted that on subsequent days, officers reporting to the protests were instructed to park their vehicles in a location that (a) was farther away from the protest locations and likely exit routes and (b) could be supervised so that vehicles were not left unattended. The Panel felt some form of this practice should continue. In instances where circumstances require officers to leave vehicles, it would be useful for SPD to have some way to access and move any SPD vehicles even if the officer to whom the vehicle has been issued are not able to return to it.

Panelists were unaware whether a specific system exists that could provide the SPOC with real-time positioning of all SPD "assets" deployed to facilitate crowd events, or what challenges might be involved in implementing such a system. However, in a world where every SPD officer is issued a cell phone, where Location Services allows for precise tracking of that phone, OnStar allows for GPD and remote access to locked vehicles, and where Bluetooth and other networks allow for location finders to be affixed to very small objects, it would seem this challenge is surmountable.

Most of the Panel discussion focused on the necessity and wisdom of bringing rifles to a protest, and the extent to which officers need access to such weapons at crowd events. The Panel acknowledged the need for SPD to be prepared for rare but terrible "mass shooter" events (e.g., the Las Vegas sniper who fired into a crowd at a music festival). At the same time, that rationale did not persuade many Panelists of the need for rifles to be in police vehicles that were left unattended near the protests. If SPD officers had been carrying them, their presence would have greatly escalated tensions with the crowd. And their removal from the vehicle greatly increased the danger to protesters.

Ultimately, many Panelists did not feel the potential "mass shooter" scenario justified the presence of these rifles in unattended police vehicles near the protests. The fact that the rifles were not part of SPD's crowd management/crowd control strategy on this day convinced these Panelists that other tactics for preparing for a "mass shooter" scenario should be pursued by SPD to ensure the large-scale safety of the event.



When rifles are kept in SPD vehicles, it is SPD policy³⁰ to store them in locked cabinets in a condition described as “patrol car ready,” meaning that the weapon has the safety on and is loaded without a round in the chamber so it is immediately ready for use when removed from storage. The Panel recognized seconds matter in emergencies, and there may be scenarios in which rapid access to loaded rifles might be necessary. Still, some on the Panel felt that the safety benefit of having unloaded rifles justified the slight time delay in loading and using the weapon in a time of need. Panelists also questioned whether the third rifle should have been in the vehicle, as it could not be contained within a locked cabinet. However, the locked containers were no guarantee, as they noted the relative ease with which vandals were able to break the locks on the rifle cabinet to remove the two secured rifles. Equipment improvements – for example, expanding the capacity of the cabinets and improving the lock mechanism – would reduce the likelihood of firearms being stolen in the future.

Several Panelists asked about the accountability measures SPD has to ensure that rifles or other firearms do not get lost, stolen, etc. Seattle Police Department Manual, 5.001 Section 2 states that officers must adhere to laws, City policy and Department policy. The proper securing of weapons is governed by Seattle Patrol Rifle Program- Operators Manual, 2010. Currently a failure to follow the Patrol Rifle Program Operators Manual is reviewable by OPA (when there is possible misconduct) or by SPD Chain of Command (in all other cases). The Panel recommends these reviews be performed regularly to incentivize and ensure accountability for the proper handling and storage of weapons at all times.

Finally, the Panel discussed the issues created by the inability of SPD to use CCTV footage to track the rifles that were taken from the patrol vehicle. The Panel understands the existing City rules prevent the storage of CCTV footage within the City, and the principles of privacy that led to the creation of those rules. There will always be tensions between privacy and public safety, and the City may continue to feel that the need for individual privacy is such that there should not be public safety exceptions like this one. At the same time, Panelists recognized that archived CCTV footage would have assisted SPD in its ability to locate its stolen rifle, minimizing the risk that the rifle could be used to injure someone. Enabling the use of CCTV footage for such legitimate public safety rationales, with strict safeguards, would be useful if it is politically feasible.

³⁰ Seattle Patrol Rifle Program- Operators Manual, 2010. Chapter 1, Patrol Car Ready Skill Steps and Chapter 5, Conditions of Carry. Patrol Car Ready is used in a patrol vehicle locking rack or cased in the trunk; the rifle will be administratively unloaded before transporting it back inside a precinct for storage. This means, weapon selector I on “safe,” there are no rounds in the chamber, bolt is closed to an in-battery condition, dust cover is closed, loaded magazine inserted into the weapon.



Contributing Factors and Recommendations: Police Patrol Vehicles set on fire, rifles stolen

Figure 6. Vehicles set on fire, rifles stolen contributing factors.






Table 6. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen

May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen	
<p>24. <i>Officers drove into the downtown protest area in police vehicles containing SPD-issued rifles. They left the vehicles unattended near a significant anti-police protest.</i></p> <p>25. <i>SPD's use of CS gas dispersed the crowd in the direction of unattended SPD police vehicles.</i></p> <p>26. <i>Rifles, including rifles kept in locked cabinets, within one of the police vehicles were stolen by individuals in the crowd.</i></p> <p>27. <i>The locks on the rifle cabinet did not prevent vandals from stealing the rifles contained within.</i></p> <p>28. <i>One of the rifles was not in a locked cabinet within the police vehicles.</i></p> <p>29. <i>While managing the crowds, the drivers of vehicles were assigned by SPOC to a role and location that prevented them from being able to move the vehicles before they were damaged by individuals in the crowd.</i></p>	<p>27. Identify a specific area for officers reporting for crowd facilitation duty to convene and leave their vehicles, providing a shuttle system for officers to and from the areas where they are deployed and supervision for the vehicles.</p> <p>28. If exigent circumstances prevent an officer from parking a vehicle at the designated area, officers should notify the SPOC of the location of the vehicle(s), and a designated officer should move the vehicle(s) to a designated safe area. (The Panel noted that this will require some method by which the designated officer can access a car left locked by the driving officer.)</p> <p>29. Ensure that any weapons or munitions brought to protests are securely stored and cannot be taken or used by anyone other than the officer to whom they were issued or other authorized SPD personnel.</p> <p>30. SPD officers attending protests should not leave rifles unlocked in unattended police vehicles.</p> <p>31. SPD should invest in rifle cabinets with locks that cannot be easily breached by others.</p> <p>32. SPD should consider the utility of "biolocks" on all rifles to ensure that only the officer who is issued the rifle can fire it.</p>
<p>30. <i>SPD lacked the ability to track precise locations of SPD officers, vehicles, or weapons. As a result:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Officers were not deployed as quickly or efficiently as possible;</i> <i>Unattended vehicles near the protests were not identified and moved prior to</i> 	<p>33. Implement a GPS system through the SPOC that allows Incident Command to know the precise location of every officer, vehicle, and lethal munition deployed during a crowd event.</p> <p>34. Seattle City Council should consider whether CCTV camera footage could be kept by a</p>



<p><i>being surrounded by unsafe crowd activity; and</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>A rifle taken from a patrol vehicle could not be tracked and found.</i>	<p>third party for a limited time, and accessible to SPD or other appropriate parties upon request for suitable public safety purposes, including the ability to track stolen police weapons that would pose an imminent danger to the community.</p> <p>35. Ensure that officers are held accountable for securing their weapons at all times, and that violations of SPD policies on these matters are investigated and enforced.</p>
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Incident #3: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest, May 30

Description of Incident

Downtown Seattle continued to be a chaotic environment into the early hours of May 31, 2020, with pockets of protesters being joined by dozens, and perhaps hundreds of individuals breaking into and stealing from stores and businesses throughout the area.

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on May 30, a 911 call was placed from a T-Mobile store at 1527 6th Ave. (between Pine and Pike Streets), reporting that a group of individuals had broken into the store and were stealing property. A squad of SPD bicycle officers, many of whom had been on duty for as many as 16 or more hours responded to the call. A crowd had gathered across the street from the T-Mobile, and video taken by bystanders showed that as the officers arrived, a number of people were running out of the store and away from police.

The officers dismounted and began trying to apprehend individuals fleeing from the store. One SPD officer grabbed a male in a white hoodie and pulled him to the ground. A second officer dismounted from his bike and began to assist the first officer with handcuffing the subject. As the handcuffing proceeded, the second officer's knee was resting on the subject's head and was very close to, and potentially on, the man's neck.

At that moment, another male in an orange hoodie and wearing a backpack ran out of the T-Mobile. The second officer jumped up from his position on the man in the white hoodie, and pulled the man in the orange hoodie down to the ground with the assistance of a third officer. The two officers worked to remove the individual in the orange hoodie's backpack so they could handcuff him. As with the prior arrest, the officer again put his knee on or very close to the subject's neck and shoulder blades.

A crowd had gathered around the T-Mobile store, and bystanders were loudly and angrily yelling at the officers to "get your knee off of his neck!" Body-worn video (BWV) captured the third officer saying to his colleague, "get your knee off his neck," to which the kneeling officer replied, "yup." The third officer then reached over and pulled his colleague's knee down to the middle of the man's back, between his shoulder blades. The man was handcuffed, and the officers immediately discontinued their use of force, helped the man up, and led the individual to an area with other arrestees.

A video of both arrests and the positioning of the second officer's knee was recorded by a community member and received substantial visibility on social media.

Analysis

In light of the way that George Floyd was killed, and how that death ignited the protests during which this incident occurred, the Panel felt the officer placing his knee near any individual's neck reflected at best a profound lack of situational awareness. It energized an already angry crowd in the moment and provided footage on social media that added fuel to the fire of protests in the days and weeks that followed.

Panelists were deeply disturbed by the imagery of the officer with his knee on the skull of the first man arrested, pressing his skull into the concrete sidewalk. The opportunity for serious injury to the



individual seems obvious, and while the Panel recognized that arrests are dynamic and unpredictable, and that suspects will resist the officers' actions, the potential for serious head injury outweighed the arrest for a small amount of stolen property.

When questioned by OPA, Officer NE#1 explained that he was acting in accordance with his training (from several police departments and the U.S. military), attempting to control the head of each individual being arrested to prevent them from being able to resist arrest. The officer denied having his knee on either man's neck, believing his knee was either on the head (in the case of the first man, in the white hoodie) or between the upper shoulder blades (in the case of the second man, in the orange hoodie) of each subject. He said he had no problem with WO#1 moving his knee down lower on the second man's back, particularly given the inflammatory nature of such a posture due to the method by which George Floyd had been killed.

NE#1 stated his objective was not to impair either man's ability to breathe, but simply to handcuff and move the men away as quickly and efficiently as possible – and the uses of force were brief and force was ended once each individual was handcuffed. He and other officers reported being the targets of many different types of projectiles thrown from the crowd, and he was aware that “seconds matter” in these sorts of arrests, where the crowd could easily get more agitated and seek to interfere in the arrests or harm the officers.

SPD policy for prone handcuffing – handcuffing a subject who is lying face down – explicitly prohibits a “carotid restraint,” or pressure on the neck designed to interrupt the breathing passage or blood vessels in the neck.³¹ It does not, however, expressly prohibit placing pressure on an individual's head.³² Statements from the review of the incident conducted by OPA that restraining the head was “not included in Department training and is largely discouraged”³³ but was not a prohibited practice. This was deeply disturbing to many Panelists. Prohibiting the ability of officers to place their body weight on any part of an individual above the shoulders would eliminate this concern without materially impacting the safety of the officer.

The Panel also discussed whether these arrests were necessary or desirable for SPD at all. The Panel appreciated the need for officers to use their discretion when approaching a scene where crimes are being committed and was reluctant to substitute their discretion for that of the SPD officers, but it questioned whether that discretion was used well here. Panelists recognized the need for SPD officers to protect public and private property. As one community member on the Panel pointed out, “once you walk into that T-Mobile store, you are no longer a protester. Now you're a looter, and the police have a job to do.” At the same time, Panelists expressed a strong belief that protecting lives was far more important than recovering stolen property. While Panelists did not object to the arrest of people who were stealing from the store, some did not feel that the theft of relatively inexpensive electronics was a suitable justification for the decision of SPD officers to use the tactics they did in this instance.

In this instance, the SPD bike officers simply responded to the scene and began arresting people. No Supervising Officer was on the scene, and the squad, which does train together, did not pause to create

³¹ SPD Use of Force Policy, SPD Manual 8.050. Prohibition of carotid restraint took effect on June 19, 2020.

³² D Training Unit, Prone Handcuffing training materials updated on April 20, 2017.

³³ OPA Director's Certification Memo 2020OPA-0324, page 5.



a tactical plan or agree on their approach to the scene. Some Panelists felt that a brief discussion among the officers before arriving on the scene might have established important context and a different approach to the scenario that would have prevented these uses of force.

Some Panelists who questioned the need for the arrests did so out of concern for the SPD officers involved. They asked whether arresting these individuals with force while getting pelted with debris by a hostile crowd subjected both the suspects and the police to an undesirable risk of injury for what amounted to a relatively small amount of stolen property. They wondered whether confronting individuals in the store and allowing them to leave without taking any of the store's property might have led to dispersal of the looters in a way that minimized the theft of property and reduced the use of force against fleeing suspects.

SPD officers on the Panel stated that officers in these situations are trained to be reactive – to only use the amount of force necessary to interrupt the criminal activity and apprehend the individual and not more. In this way, SPD said that it was the actions of the individuals that dictated the terms of engagement, not those of SPD. Many on the Panel viewed this as a shifting of responsibility for police uses of force onto others. In their view, it is SPD's responsibility to ensure that officer discretion on when and how to arrest is applied with greater situational awareness, and officers preparing for protest facilitation should be reminded that in circumstances like those of May 30, restraint is worth its weight in gold. The suggestion that SPD's officers are merely "reactive" serves to remove some of that discretion, rather than promote its proper use.

Panelists reflected concern that officers who had been on duty since the morning hours,³⁴ especially hours dedicated to facilitating a protest with plenty of anger directed at them and their position as police officers, might be more likely to treat the people running out of the T-Mobile store more aggressively. Other Panelists acknowledged the emotional and physical toll on the officers, but pointed out that police are trained to handle such situations, and that this was a larger issue in the days and weeks to come than on May 30, which was one of the first of many days of protest and resistance. Any further discussion would be speculative on the part of the Panel without additional interviews of the officers. Still, attention should be paid to officer well-being and the impact of such occurrences on their ability to act calmly and within the challenging parameters demanded by the situation over time.

One additional factor discussed by the Panel was whether the impact of a declaration of a curfew on the protests could really be known, or how it should be used in the future. The decision to declare a curfew is the Mayor's, and is not within SPD's ability to control, though SPD was consulted prior to the declaration in this instance.³⁵ Once the curfew was issued:

- Panelists noted that the curfew might have kept people from coming to the site of the protest or other event, believing the area to be unsafe;

³⁴ According to SPD records (Use of Force statements and the Incident Action Plan) for May 30, the first shift of officers participating in these events arrived at their precincts at approximately 7:00 a.m. and did not finish their shifts until 1:00 a.m. on the morning of May 31. Approximately 40% of participating officers had shifts that lasted longer than 15 hours, of which 5 hours required officers to wear full riot gear. For additional information regarding the physical and emotional impact of extended shifts in protest rotations, see https://www.stltoday.com/online/dojs-ferguson-after-action-report/pdf_d2a40881-df39-558c-8b7e-e54cc2906aa7.html.

³⁵ SPOC log entry 288, <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/05/31/chiefs-statement-on-may-30th-protests-downtown/>



- On the other hand, some might have been attracted to the area, either as observers or as people seeking to capitalize on the unrest in some way.
- On later days, some protesters made clear that their presence on the street was precisely to protest the curfew, which they viewed as an illegitimate restraint on their freedoms.

In theory, the curfew gives SPD the ability to arrest anyone on the street. In this instance, however, there were thousands of people throughout the downtown area, which far outmatched SPD's capacity to arrest. Given that SPD lacked the resources to enforce the curfew, the Panel doubted that its upside outweighed its negatives in this instance, and instead served to underscore how chaotic the situation had become and empower those who were seeking to contribute to the unrest.



Contributing factors and recommendations - Officer Placing Knee on Alleged Looter's Neck During Arrest

Figure 7. Officer placing knee on individual's neck during arrest contributing factors.






Table 7. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest

May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest	
31. <i>The Mayor declared a curfew at 5:00 p.m.</i>	36. The Mayor's Office and SPD leadership should critically examine the utility of a curfew and should exhaust other messaging options before declaring one. If a curfew is announced it should be limited in scope and clearly focused on public safety, rather than the deterrence of public protest.
32. <i>Individuals had broken into a store and appeared to be stealing property.</i> 33. <i>There was no SPD squad supervisor on the scene and responding bicycle officers did not form an incident plan before responding to the scene of the looting. Upon arriving, the bicycle officers immediately engaged forcibly with suspects running out of the T-Mobile store.</i>	37. SPD should establish protocols to guide officer responses to property crimes occurring during significant public disorder events. These protocols would, among other things, establish clear guidance for officers on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When to disperse and when to arrest individuals who may be committing property crimes during civil unrest; • How to conduct arrests of individuals who require prone handcuffing; and • How to arrest individuals committing property crimes without escalating tensions between SPD and observers of the arrest.
34. <i>Officers were in a hostile environment, being yelled at and receiving thrown projectiles from the crowd, and therefore were trying to act quickly.</i> 35. <i>An officer placed his knee on one subject's head and another subject's upper back/neck area while effectuating arrests.</i> 36. <i>SPD policy does not expressly prohibit restraining individuals by putting pressure on their heads.</i>	38. Modify the policy and training for prone handcuffing to eliminate body weight pressure being applied above the shoulders of a subject being restrained.
37. <i>Officers had been on duty for many hours and were frustrated, exhausted, and angry by the end of the night.</i>	39. Implement staffing schedules, and provide officers with breaks, food and water, and pre- and post-event wellness initiatives to help officers at crowd events – and especially at crowd events that are critical of SPD and policing – deal with exhaustion, stress, and primary or secondary trauma that might result from their participation at such events.



Incident #4: Bicycle officer altercation and arrest of pedestrian, May 31

Description of Incident

Protests resumed on May 31. That afternoon, a large group of protesters was peacefully marching northbound on 4th Ave. A squad of six SPD bicycle officers were facilitating the march by operating in “leapfrog³⁶” fashion, moving ahead of marchers to block vehicular traffic at intersections.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., the officers got on their bikes at Spring St. and moved north along with the marchers. The crowd was very large but moving calmly. The officers rode single file on the far right of the sidewalk, but even when pressed against the side of the buildings, pedestrians occasionally blocked their passage.

One individual was at the far right of the crowd, in the path of the advancing bicycle squad. As the bike line attempted to pass, the officers came into contact with the individual, who did not attempt to move out of the officers’ path.

It is difficult to see precisely what happened next due to limited view from body worn video located on officers’ chests, but as the fifth bicycle officer approached the individual, he reached out and pushed the individual slightly. The two became entangled and the officer dismounted (or fell) over the front handlebars while holding the individual, bringing both himself and the individual to the ground. The officer later claimed that his actions were a response to the individual punching him in the head, though this allegation could not be proved or disproved by the video reviewed by the Panel.

A crowd of demonstrators immediately and angrily gathered around the officers as they arrested the individual. At least two people from the crowd attempted to intervene in the arrest, one of whom was also arrested themselves.

The previously peaceful crowd became quite agitated, with signs, bottles, and a metal pan being thrown at the group of officers. The officers called for help, and a large number of additional bicycle officers appeared on the scene and created a protective perimeter around the area while the two individuals were being handcuffed. Ultimately over 30 officers were deployed, using OC spray and blast balls to disperse the crowd and send them moving down 4th Ave. in a far more agitated state. A single decision by an SPD officer had instantaneously transformed an otherwise peaceful march into an angry confrontation.

Analysis

Of all of the Incidents the Panel reviewed in Wave 1, this Incident proved to be particularly divisive for the Panelists. It is important that SPD understand why.

While some Panelists reflexively sided with the SPD officers and felt strongly that an individual had assaulted an officer and such actions should not ever be tolerated by SPD, others saw it completely differently. These Panelists saw this event as the most salient example of a regular practice of SPD

³⁶ A coordinated tactic where a portion of the squad advances faster to create cover (e.g. block vehicular traffic) while the other advances with the marchers.



officers misusing force, abusing their power and defending it through a transparently false post-hoc rationale. For them, it underscored the reasons the protests were necessary and further eroded SPD legitimacy.

The importance of understanding both of these perspectives is discussed below. The Panel was unanimous about three things related to this Incident:

1. One snap decision by an SPD officer instantaneously transformed an otherwise peaceful march into an angry confrontation, involving 30 SPD officers deploying OC spray and flashbangs and increasing tensions for the rest of the day;
2. The officer's decision to arrest the individual, which to many on the Panel was difficult to justify on its merits, conflicted in every way with the SPD's stated strategic and tactical goals for the day; and
3. The Incident could have been avoided entirely if the officers had simply taken a different route to their objective or paused for 10 seconds to dismount and walk their bikes.

The Panelists felt the mobility of the bicycle officers was by and large a positive; it allowed a smaller group of less obtrusive officers to facilitate the demonstration and allowed the crowd to move in different directions and still remain safe from vehicular traffic in the downtown area. Panelists appreciated that the relatively small number of officers helped reduce intimidation associated with heavy police presence. At the same time, the "leapfrogging" tactic required officers to move faster than individual marchers, creating the potential for contact and interference with slower-moving individuals in the crowd.

The Panelists did not disagree with the OPA review of the incident, which noted that "the officers had the legal authority to drive down the sidewalk and did so in a manner that allowed sufficient space between them and the individuals next to them." However, they noted that the individual appeared simply to be walking on the sidewalk, and the officers rode up to him from behind. As such, they viewed it as SPD's obligation to avoid the man, or to ask him to move in a calm and courteous fashion.

Whether the subject could or should have gotten out of the way of the officers or not, this interaction would not have occurred had officers not attempted to push past the individual on a crowded sidewalk.³⁷ The decision to move along the far-right side of the sidewalk, where there was very little space for the bicycles, left officers with no ability to attempt to avoid the individual who made contact with officers as officers could not move anywhere other than forward. They then chose not to slow or dismount their bikes to safely navigate the crowd. This contributed to the altercation's occurrence, which then engaged more than 30 SPD officers in an aggressive and counterproductive confrontation with a previously calm crowd for over five minutes. Thus, this decision not only deprived the officers of their mobility, but also of their efficiency.

³⁷ As explained by the SPD officers involved in the OPA report related to this Incident, SPF bicycle officers are trained on the importance of bicycle squads staying together and avoiding separation, especially in hostile crowds. 2020OPA-0332 Case Summary

<https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2020OPA-0332ccs122320.pdf>



Several of the officers involved stated that “shoulder-checking” was a well-known method for protesters to interfere with bike officers and break free of police control of the protest or commit crimes. Several Panelists were skeptical of the concept, and equally skeptical that it was occurring in this instance but acknowledged that officers are trained that such actions are unlawful and worthy of arrest.

The officer who made the arrest justified his actions by explaining that an individual with a potentially criminal motive was intentionally impeding his progress and threw a punch at his head. The Panel could not confirm whether that was true, though his credibility was undermined by the seemingly false statement in his report that the individual had “charged” him, which the Panel felt was disproved in its review of the video. Whether or not a punch was thrown, however, it is clear that the man had done nothing to prompt his arrest prior to the bicycle squad’s arrival, and that the squad’s conduct provoked whatever response the man provided. Indeed, the Panel noted how quickly this Incident occurred: less than 25 seconds before jumping/falling off his bike to arrest the marcher, Officer 5 had been standing in the crosswalk of 4th Ave. and Spring St. with no inkling of what was about to happen. Fewer than seven (7) seconds passed from the moment that Officer 1 contacted the individual until Officer 5 engaged with the individual and spontaneously decided to make an arrest.

Thus, SPD arguably initiated this Incident – and so the Panel’s question became “even if a punch was thrown, did this interaction further SPD or community objectives?” The clear answer to the Panel was that it did not.

The Panel agrees with OPA’s statement that “officers are not required – or expected – to stand by idly while they are being assaulted.”³⁸ However, officers are expected to “use de-escalation tactics in order to reduce the need for force when safe under the totality of the circumstances and time and circumstances permit.”³⁹ A single individual’s failure to give ground to the bicycle squad – even after receiving multiple requests or orders from the officers – did not need to end in the arrest of two people, use of a spit hood, the deployment of numerous blast balls, the further incitement of the crowd, and the confrontational deployment of more than 30 bicycle officers.

The Panel saw no evidence of any actual desire on the part of the individual to interfere with SPD’s actions – but if the individuals arrested truly did wish to disrupt the peaceful nature of the situation or SPD’s facilitation of the protests and protection of individuals in the crowd, their actions were a resounding success. None of these outcomes furthered SPD’s goal of facilitating a peaceful march. Whatever tactical purposes SPD hoped to achieve, the decision to arrest the individual incited far more aggression and took far more time than a decision to dismount, walk past the individual, and remount would have.

OPA appears to have reached the same conclusion, as its report of the incident reads: “The larger question that OPA has with this case and with other similar cases that have arisen during the course of the protests is not whether officers could act but, instead, whether they should have done so. OPA has seen a number of situations where officers made decisions to effectuate arrests and/or to use force and,

³⁸ See Seattle Police Manual section 8.100 – De-escalation 1.

³⁹ Seattle Police Manual section 8.100 – De-escalation 1.



as a result, tensions with demonstrators rose, leading to even more police action and, in most cases, even more force. For example, in this case, [Officer 5] indisputably had probable cause to make an arrest when the [individual] physically contacted him when he was riding by. However, in doing so, he set in motion a chain of events that resulted in projectiles being thrown at officers, less-lethal tools being used, and multiple arrests.”

What is more, given the context of two preceding days of forceful interventions by SPD, this Incident may well have added further to a growing sense among protesters that the SPD was “part of the problem” rather than a partner in the fight for social justice and against police brutality.

Putting aside the tactical futility of the officer’s action, what became clear as the Panel watched the video of this event was that Panelists had two very different interpretations of the same set of events. SPD officers saw a man deliberately impeding their progress with the intent of committing crimes within the protest, and then saw a man assault an officer. This, in their mind, justified immediate and aggressive conduct by the officers to indicate that such acts cannot and should not be tolerated.

Many Panelists saw this event quite differently, and it will be essential for SPD to understand their reactions if it is to reconnect and rebuild trust throughout the community. For these Panelists, what they believed they saw was a man walking down the street when a bike squad of cops bumped into him. When he did not immediately move out of the way, the perspective of these Panelists was the officer jumped on the man and arrested him, and then lied about it in the report.⁴⁰

Panelists explained that particularly for people of color, this scenario – police officers exercising their authority in ways that physically injure (and even kill) members of the community and then retreating to a false, reconstructed scenario and hiding behind imbalanced laws that protect their actions – has happened to people of color again and again. Thus, this event evoked many of the same emotions as watching George Floyd die in Minneapolis. It was extraordinarily evocative and infuriating, and the inability of SPD officers to understand the perspective – or even to acknowledge it – was deeply upsetting to them.

While many of the law enforcement Panelists understood this perception from community members, they nonetheless pointed to the existing laws, policies and procedures as the only “road map” available to them in terms of permitted behavior, and maintained that the actions in this Incident were within those policies. In this way, the situation is similar to the above Incident involving an Officer’s knee close to or resting on a subject’s neck – while the incident may have been “within policy,” it does not reflect an acceptable tactic in the eyes of the community, and while SPD may be justified in not punishing the officer for his actions, SPD still should change the policy to bring it into alignment with community perceptions of justice.

⁴⁰ Panelists agreed that these events may well have met the legal criteria for assault but differed as to who was assaulting whom. Many on the Panel viewed this much more as an assault by the SPD on an individual.



It will be challenging for SPD to regain the trust of community members unless and until line officers working in communities throughout Seattle understand this perspective held by many in impacted communities, explicitly acknowledge it, and engage about it openly and honestly.



Contributing Factors and Recommendations: Bicycle officer altercation and arrest with pedestrian, May 31

Figure 8. Bike officer altercation with pedestrian contributing factors.






Table 8. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests

May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests	
<p>38. <i>A standard operating procedure for SPD bicycle squads is to “leapfrog” ahead of the demonstration and block one-way streets to ensure the crowd does not march against traffic, which SPD considers a public safety concern.</i></p> <p>39. <i>SPD bicycle officers rode on the crowded sidewalk on 4th Avenue to reach their next destination.</i></p> <p>40. <i>“Shoulder-checking” is a perceived disruptive tactic used against bicycle officers to impede their progress in a protest.</i></p>	<p>40. Monitor crowd activities from a sufficient distance that physical contact between SPD and protesters is not required or likely to occur, unless an individual is an immediate physical danger to others.</p> <p>41. Train bicycle officers not to arrest individuals for passive resistance techniques like “shoulder-checking” unless the officer(s) determine that the acts are clear, deliberate, and intended to substantially interfere with the ability of the officer(s) to perform his or her immediate public safety responsibilities.</p> <p>42. When “leap-frogging” a protest, SPD officers should select alternative routes that minimize the likelihood of exposing officers or crowd participants to unnecessary risks.</p> <p>43. When a crowd prevents safe movement of bikes without contacting individuals in the crowd, SPD bicycle officers should consider dismounting and walking with bikes physically placed between officers and crowd members to minimize agitation and physical contact.</p>
<p>41. <i>The individual did not comply with alleged orders by police to yield to the bicycles, or move out of the way of bicycles after the first SPD rider passed.</i></p> <p>42. <i>An SPD officer spontaneously decided to arrest the individual rather than continuing with his role to facilitate the march.</i></p> <p>43. <i>Once the arrest began, the crowd and SPD embarked upon a path of mutual escalation.</i></p>	<p>44. SPD officers should improve their situational awareness, considering the relationship of their actions to the overall strategy and tactics of the event, and the support available to the officer(s) relative to the size of the event.</p> <p>45. Develop an arrest policy for each event and convey this to officers beforehand. Flexibility should exist in the tolerance of lower-level misdemeanors balanced against the priority for ensuring the strategic goals of the operation.</p>



Incident #5: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident, June 1

Description of Incident

Monday, June 1, 2020, marked Seattle’s fourth consecutive day of protests. As clashes between SPD and protesters continued, what had started as protests of police brutality in other jurisdictions became more focused specifically on improper uses of force by SPD, and the community’s desire to change SPD behavior. At the same time, SPD was concerned about the violence and disorder and the corresponding risk to people and property that had affected not just Seattle but many other cities on prior days.

The SPD East Precinct building at 12th Ave. and Pine St. had become a recurring focus of protestors in the preceding three days. SPD claimed to have received intelligence that the building might be a target for arson, imitating the destruction of a Minneapolis Police Department precinct building on May 28. The building was difficult to protect, and presented a substantial risk to nearby buildings if it caught on fire.

Despite these concerns, protest leaders negotiated with SPD Chief Best for permission to march to the East Precinct, and the Chief agreed. Shortly after 6 p.m., protesters marched peacefully eastbound on Pine St. SPD officers had deployed “fence lines” of officers in a protective perimeter one block away from the building in each direction. The lines were made of moveable interlocking metal racks similar to bicycle racks.

An estimated crowd of 7,000 marchers reached the west side of the police line at 11th Ave. and Pine St. just after 7:00 p.m. Conversations between SPD representatives and protest leaders took place, and shortly after 7:30 p.m., two members of SPD leadership took a knee with protesters. The crowd wanted to continue past the barricade to the East Precinct building, but SPD refused, holding the fence lines in place.

SPD’s stockpile of “less lethal” or crowd control munitions had been largely expended in the past three days. As a result, officers outside the East Precinct were more heavily reliant on CS gas than on other munitions. CS gas is a less targeted tool for addressing crowd behaviors. Once deployed, it can be dispersed in unpredictable ways by wind and other weather conditions, and its minute particulates render it able to seep into unintended areas.

The crowd of protesters continued to protest at the SPD barricade, and occasionally pushed the unstable fencing. To protect the line, SPD bicycle officers in “soft gear” (i.e., lacking protective padding or armor) stood immediately behind the fencing, within arms’ length of the protesters. At about 9:00 p.m., there were some attempts by the crowd to push through the barricade. The attempts were quickly halted by the officers on the scene.

While the situation then appeared to calm, these attempts to push through the line caused the SPD Incident Commander to authorize the dispersal of the crowd. Given the depleted capacity of OC spray, SPD chose to deploy CS gas. SPD officers wearing gas masks and carrying batons replaced the bicycle officers at the front of the line. In response, the crowd gathered together more tightly and opened several umbrellas.



There was little, if any communication between the SPD and the crowd as this transition was occurring. As on previous days, SPD’s audio system was insufficient as it could not be heard over the noise of the crowd, and once officers donned their gas masks, their ability to communicate with protesters was significantly reduced. As a result, no message was conveyed to the crowd that might have de-escalated the situation.

One protester opened a pink umbrella and held it out over the police line, very near the face of an SPD officer on the line. Umbrellas were viewed by SPD as a safety risk because they reduce visibility. The officer grabbed the umbrella and tried to pull it out of the protester’s hands as several officers nearby deployed OC spray at the protester with the umbrella. The spray hit a number of protesters in the area, causing them to retreat while inciting reactions elsewhere in the crowd, including a push forward at the line and several glass bottles and other projectiles being thrown by protesters standing further back in the crowd. This, in turn, prompted SPD officers to use CS gas, blast balls and smoke grenades to clear the crowd from the intersection.

Chaos ensued throughout the intersection and the park, as SPD officers extended their perimeter around the East Precinct. SPD declared a riot in the area at 9:28 p.m. as CS gas filled the air, drifting throughout the neighborhood and seeping into homes, making SPD and the East Precinct a flashpoint and symbol for police oppression in Seattle. As one resident angrily yelled at the officers that night: “I live here! You’re invading my neighborhood!”⁴¹

Analysis

The events of June 1 left many Panelists feeling that a substantial lack of trust permeated all the interactions at 11th Ave. and Pine St. The Panel was uniformly confused and confounded by the escalation of events that seemed easily avoidable, though Panelists did not see those events in the same way. At any point in the evening, the ability of police to view the crowd as peaceful in intent, not seeking to destroy the East Precinct or to refrain from escalating from soft gear to gas masks might have stopped this escalation of events. At any point in the evening, the ability of the crowd to perceive the police actions as self-protective and measured, rather than escalatory, might have done the same.

SPD officers found it difficult to understand how protests in the early part of the day could be facilitated peacefully and effectively by the very same officers who would be present at the “Pink Umbrella” Incident later in the day, when events went so awry. They also expressed concern that the crowd, after receiving a great deal of support from SPD (permitting the crowd to march from Westlake to the East Precinct, engaging with the protest leaders enroute, East Precinct leadership taking a knee, etc.) continued to want more, and was unwilling to stop at a line drawn within eyesight and earshot of the East Precinct building. Pointing not only to intelligence raising concerns about property damage and danger to life, but to the prior three days of rioting, arson and looting that had occurred, SPD’s actions were driven by a perceived need to protect the community around the East Precinct. “At some point, we

⁴¹ <https://twitter.com/heidigroover/status/1267679520011632641>



have to protect these buildings, and the buildings are part of a neighborhood, and we have to protect all of that,” said one officer.

But many Panelists questioned whether the East Precinct building was ever really in danger, as SPD feared. They saw no evidence from police intelligence or in video footage that there were actually instigators in the crowd on that night. As a result, several Panelists viewed this regrettable Incident as evidence of an SPD mindset that fundamentally distrusted the crowd’s motivations and misunderstood its actions. Panelists noted that one of the key motivators driving SPD’s decision-making was the need for the East Precinct to remain operational to protect the neighborhoods it serves. This struck many on the Panel as ironic given how events unfolded – but in any event, the Panel felt that scenario planning and proactive planning exercises to allow SPD to “game out” responses to protests that seek to shut down the East Precinct (and other key SPD and City landmarks) would help SPD leadership prepare for such scenarios in ways that would preserve important City services and minimize interference with the crowd.

It is difficult to know what was truly going through the heads of the community and police participants in these moments. But the acts of each group were understandable and predictable – and each act, received by a person on the other side of the fence line who was not predisposed to trust the other, escalated the tension and increased the likelihood of a violent confrontation.

It appeared to the Panel that the decision of the Incident Commander at 9:04 p.m. to don gas masks was something that could have been delayed or reversed. From the six minutes between the brief attempts of the crowd to push through the fencing at 9:04 p.m. until the deployment of CS gas at 9:10 p.m., the crowd did nothing that appeared to be provocative or violent, and thus the deployment of gas masks (which led to the crowd’s use of umbrellas as a defensive response to police stepping to the line in gas masks, which then led to the “flash point” of the officer grabbing the pink umbrella) was viewed by many on the Panel as the unnecessary instigating act. Had officers simply remained in their “soft gear” without masks, these Panelists felt, the crowd would simply have remained in place. They viewed SPD as the aggressor, escalating the Incident by donning gas masks and then unnecessarily deploying crowd dispersal munitions.

One difference between the police perspective and the perspective of many community Panelists is how SPD should assess the *potential* for violence and what steps it should take to prevent it. In a situation like the one described above, an officer may feel justified using force *before* the fence line is actually breached – to potentially thwart even greater harm or the potential to be overwhelmed.

Several Panelists felt this was not the right standard for measuring or justifying SPD uses of force – particularly given that the protests were a statement against police use of force and in support of the crowd’s desire to dictate which police actions are just, and which are not. These Panelists evaluated whether violence was *actually occurring* and did not view uses of force based on *potential* violence to be acceptable.

SPD officers did not share this perspective. They perceived the use of umbrellas as acts of aggression and escalation on multiple levels. First, the umbrellas blocked the officers’ view of the crowd, which



increased concerns for officer safety as the umbrellas could hide acts designed to damage or penetrate the fence. Second, the existence of umbrellas in the crowd suggested to SPD that individuals were acting in a calculated fashion to neutralize SPD tactics (particularly OC spray). This was particularly troubling to SPD Incident Command on June 1, when its stock of OC spray was limited. Without OC spray as a viable option, SPD incident commanders were left with two options for dispersing an unwilling crowd: (1) the less targeted and more debilitating CS gas or (2) physical force.

SPD’s inability to communicate with the crowd further exacerbated the situation. First, the audio-visual (AV) truck that SPD used at the time to communicate with the crowd was not present, and SPD officers believed it was inadequate for people in the crowd to hear given the size and noise of the crowd. For example, clearly broadcast and audible statements like “Due to specific threats that have been made suggesting an intention to cause damage to the East Precinct Building, which could in turn affect other nearby residences, SPD will erect barriers at 11th and Pine Street to ensure that protests remain a safe distance away from the East Precinct building, and to maintaining ingress/egress with suitable buffers for emergency vehicles or other public safety needs” would have been viewed favorably by many Panelists. Second, once the decision had been made to don gas masks, the ability of SPD officers to communicate with individuals in the crowd was virtually eliminated.

These failures of communication were regrettable, but the Panel viewed them as symptoms of a larger communication failure, which was the inability for SPD Incident Command to understand whether the crowd was *actually* intent on destruction or merely intent on peaceful demonstration. SPD officers who spoke to the Panel claimed that if the crowd had simply remained behind the fence line, “they could have stayed all night.” But because SPD could not discern the true nature of the crowd, it relied on a desire to prevent the worst-case outcome. Without any way to speak to people in the crowd, or gauge the emotion away from the fence line, SPD could not:

- Effectively establish trust with the crowd or explain its reasoning for establishing the fence line;
- Communicate to the crowd that SPD was prepared to permit the crowd to peacefully assemble at 11th Ave. and Pine St. so long as the fence line was not breached, nor of its plan to deploy CS gas if *and only if* individuals in the crowd made an effort to breach the fence line;
- Communicate the tactics that it would deploy in the event that the crowd attempted to breach the fence line, or provide advance notice of those intentions through any means other than putting on gas masks, which escalated the situation; or
- Engage with the crowd to evaluate the crowd’s true intentions, the presence of instigators or provocateurs, or evaluate the actual risk of damage to the East Precinct;

In discussing how to address this challenge, Dr. Clifford Stott suggested that the Panel and SPD look to the Swedish police, who have developed a group of specially trained “dialogue officers” connected by radio to the police incident commanders. The dialogue officers walk with protesters and have training in how to convey the perspectives, goals and likely actions of the crowd, and how to communicate with people in the crowd in ways that facilitate the protests, and convey advance notice of necessary



limitations on the crowd driven by public safety concerns. This helps all parties evaluate and manage circumstances as they evolve.

If it becomes necessary, the dialogue officers would inform the crowd of impending dispersal orders and the rationale behind those orders, to assist protesters in preparing for and avoiding activities that would cause the deployment of force. These officers could also identify and inform police about people in the crowd who are creating danger to others in ways that will facilitate their individual identification and removal from the protests when justified, and assist the crowd in safe and timely dispersal from an event. Perhaps most importantly, they are a source of vital information that was unavailable to Incident Commanders at the Incidents reviewed by the Panel – information that will allow SPD commanders to make better decisions about whether force, arrests, or dispersal are prudent. (Additional information is provided in Appendix A.)

SPD was very interested in this approach, and immediately began discussions with Swedish police, and police departments in the United Kingdom, to learn more and evaluate the feasibility of such an approach to future protests. The Panel is optimistic that such a reform will greatly improve future crowd events, and hopes that this is the first of many positive reforms to come from the SER.



Contributing Factors and Recommendations: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident, June 1

Figure 9. The “Pink Umbrella” incident contributing factors.






Table 9. Table of Contributing Factors and Recommendations, June 1, 2020: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident

June 1, 2020: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident	
<p>44. <i>SPD, aware of violence directed at police buildings in Minneapolis in recent days and aware that the East Precinct had been a site of previous demonstrations, perceived the need to protect the East Precinct and surrounding buildings from potential acts of arson.</i></p>	<p>46. Communicate in advance when it plans to create barricades or restrictions to protesters or marches. The reason for the creation of such zones should be clearly articulated and driven by a public safety rationale.</p> <p>47. Conduct appropriate scenario planning and provide sufficient resources so that other SPD locations can protect and serve the people of Seattle in the event that public service from one or more of its buildings are disrupted by protests.</p>
<p>45. <i>SPD established static fence lines that it was unwilling to move in a perimeter around the East Precinct. The fence lines prevented the crowd from freely gathering in front of the East Precinct building, and effectively placed police on an island, giving them no ability to retreat from the lines.</i></p> <p>46. <i>The fence lines were made of loosely interlocking metal gates (bicycle racks) that were easily moved, even without concerted crowd aggression. Members in the crowd expressed a desire to move through the fence, and on several occasions attempted to push through the fence. SPD did not have sufficient staffing to prevent this without the use of munitions.</i></p> <p>47. <i>To preserve the integrity of the fence against the crowd, police officers stood immediately behind the fence, reducing the physical space between officers and protesters.</i></p> <p>48. <i>An umbrella was pushed over the fence line and very close to the face of an SPD officer, blocking the officer’s view of the fence line. The officer pulled it away from the protester holding it, and the protester resisted surrendering the umbrella.</i></p>	<p>48. Construct barricades between protesters and critical pieces of the public safety infrastructure (e.g., the East Precinct) rather than using lines of officers. Such barriers should strike a balance between protecting the integrity of the facility and preserving its accessibility to the public.</p>



<p>49. <i>After three days of protests, protestors were aware of police tactics and the use of crowd control munitions, and many in the crowd had umbrellas, goggles, and other tools to limit the impact of these munitions upon them. While many protestors viewed these tools as purely defensive, many officers on the scene viewed them as equipment used to enable illegal or violent behavior, and to limit the ability to police to prevent crime and ensure the protection of the crowd.</i></p>	<p>49. SPD officers should be trained to realize that the existence of Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) or other defensive measures in a crowd of demonstrators, is not itself an aggressive measure requiring an escalating police response. The existence of these defensive measures may signify that existing less lethal munitions may not be effective, underscoring the need for improved communication and de-escalation efforts.</p> <p>50. SPD incident commanders should maximize the buffer space between officers and the crowd whenever possible.</p> <p>51. On-site incident commanders should carefully evaluate the context and threat from a crowd, with assistance from “dialogue officers” in the crowd.</p>
<p>50. <i>SPD had no useful mechanism for mass communication with the crowd at the line on 11th Ave. and Pine St., nor did the crowd have an effective means of communicating with SPD about its intentions.</i></p>	<p>52. Consider the creation of dialogue officers to ensure effective, real-time, de-escalatory communication between SPD and protesters.</p>
<p>51. <i>Officers’ crowd control munitions were depleted due to prior days of protests; as a result, officers had very little OC spray and were forced to rely more heavily on widely dispersing CS gas and less on the more targeted OC spray. Many of the CS gas canisters were provided by an outside agency and were not of a type that SPD purchased.</i></p> <p>52. <i>Once deployed, the spread of CS gas cannot be controlled and it is temporarily disabling to any individual exposed to it. Accordingly, SPD officers were ordered to don gas masks well in advance of the deployment of CS gas.</i></p> <p>53. <i>SPD responded to attempts to penetrate the fence line by placing officers at the front of the line wearing gas masks, as well as officers with 40MM “less lethal” munitions and SWAT gear. The gas masks escalated tensions with the crowd, and further reduced the ability of officers to communicate with the crowd.</i></p>	<p>53. Ensure access to adequate supplies of OC spray to ensure that CS gas is never deployed due to a lack of access to other more preferable or appropriate options.</p> <p>54. Implement OIG’s guidance on the use of CS gas set forth in Review of the SPD Crowd Dispersal Policy and Less Lethal Weapons, In Response to Ordinance 126102.</p>



IV. Conclusion

The protests that consumed Seattle on May 29 – June 1 were manifestations of a long-simmering frustration with many in Seattle – and in the nation – about the role of police in our communities. The issues they raise are emotional, deeply felt, and often divisive.

In moments of community divide, it can be helpful to remind ourselves of areas of agreement, and to restart the conversation from that point. The SER process began with the uniform agreement of a diverse set of stakeholders, including the Seattle Police Department, that the ability of Seattleites to give full voice to their First Amendment freedoms without fear of unwarranted police restrictions and in ways that ensure the physical and emotional safety of all involved and of the communities where the protests occur is critical. OIG, SPD, the Planning Group, and the Panel all held this as their primary goal. With this agreement, and a dedication to listening and respecting each other, the differences among individuals within the group remained substantial, but manageable.

During this process, Panelists – both community leaders and police officers – repeatedly found ways to discuss the challenging topics raised by these Events and Incidents, learning from each other how different people perceive the same events, and proposing improvements to the system that took these perspectives into account. One identifiable success from SER is the universal feeling of mutual respect that developed between Panelists on this difficult subject. It is hoped that these recommendations will lead to meaningful and lasting improvements within SPD that can help to rebuild the legitimacy of policing in the eyes of community.



Appendix A. Dialogue Policing

About this appendix

The information in this appendix is a lightly edited passage from HMIC (2009) *Adapting to Protest*. This was a report from the UK Police Oversight body that resulted from the death of a member of the public as a result of police use of force.⁴²

Adapted passage from HMIC (2009)

Due to public outrage over the police response to large-scale protests during the European Union Summit in Gothenburg in 2001,⁴³ Sweden developed a new approach to policing protest crowds which focused on improving communication between police and protest groups through the use of dialogue police. Called the “Special Police Tactic” (SPT), it was informed by research on crowd psychology⁴⁴ that identified the critical manner in which interactions between demonstrators and police governed the escalation of disorder.⁴⁵

Through dialogue, police can explore the intentions of protesters and better understand their aspirations. Any conditions or restrictions placed on demonstrations can be explained, discussed and negotiated. Fundamentally, the tactic recognizes that when police are uncompromising with protesters, the risk of injury to persons or property increases. However, when there is an open dialogue, the risk is reduced.

Where protest groups are unwilling to communicate with the police, the aim of the crowd communication enablers, or dialogue officers, is to begin a process of engagement with these groups which may lead to more meaningful communication and dialogue in the future.

The Role of Dialogue Officers

The ultimate objective for dialogue officers is to facilitate freedom of expression and peaceful protest and to reduce confrontation between crowds and police. The role of dialogue police can be summarized in five core functions, defined in the table below (see Table 10).

Table 10. Dialogue Police Functions

Function	Definition
Negotiation	To facilitate compromises and agreements between police commanders’ interest in getting the best tactical conditions, and the protesters’ interest to get best terms for their goal.

⁴² <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/adapting-to-protest-nurturing-the-british-model-of-policing-20091125.pdf>

⁴³ <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/15/eu.protests02/>

⁴⁴ RIOT PSYCHOLOGY (rageuniversity.com) <http://rageuniversity.com/PRISONESCAPE/PRISON%20RIOTS/RIOT%20PSYCHOLOGY.pdf>

⁴⁵ https://www.workingwithcrowds.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Dr_Clifford_Scott_Crowd_Psychology_and_Public_Order_Policing.pdf



Mediation	To explain the police point of view to groups of demonstrators and the demonstrators' view to the police, in order to increase mutual understanding and avoid stereotyping.
Initiation	To come up with possible solutions to avoid or minimize the risk for conflicts and confrontations.
Communication	To function as link between demonstrators and commanders in their exchange of information.
Sensing	To read moods and preparedness for action in the group of demonstrators and how that is affected by police activities and to inform commanders of consequences of different courses of actions in a short- and long-term perspective.

Dialogue officers work as dedicated units before, during and after events to establish links to protest groups, adopting a “community policing” style to engage with community groups and protest participants. They seek to create lines of communication and negotiation between police commanders and influential protesters during protest events. Since they have points of contact with protest groups, they can assist commanders by providing advice on, and negotiating potential impacts of, different courses of police action.

Levels of Dialogue

Dialogue pre-event

Dialogue between police and protesters before an event informs expectations and reduces the chance of action or conduct by either party during an event being interpreted as provocative, which in turn reduces the likelihood of a violent response. The initial dialogue allows police to explain the need for restrictions on an event and to facilitate the legitimate objectives of the organizers. Dialogue officers are also a useful resource for police commanders when scenario planning. Their knowledge of protest groups provides a more comprehensive and informed approach. Where groups are unwilling to engage prior to the event, the focus moves to engagement and co-operation once the event has begun.

Dialogue during the event

While other police are engaged in policing the event, dialogue officers are there to assist with communication between police and protesters. Without other operational taskings, they concentrate on establishing communication lines with protest representatives. Dialogue officers do not wear police uniform but are identifiable by yellow vests. As the dialogue officers are within or close to the protest crowd, they are better able to sense the mood of the crowd and to assess how police actions are perceived. As dialogue officers will often have had longterm contact with protest groups, they will be better able to interpret the mood and conduct of the group than someone who is unfamiliar with the group. Similarly, they can interpret and explain the actions of the police to organizers in an attempt to prevent negative responses from the protest crowd.



Dialogue post-event

Dialogue officers facilitate post-event reviews between police and protesters. These reviews offer the opportunity to discuss elements of policing operations which caused difficulty – or were felt to be provocative to protesters – and enables officers to discuss difficulties they experienced.

Evaluation

The work of dialogue officers is credited with minimizing (and in many cases averting) confrontations related to protests. The engagement of the dialogue officers with protesters offers the opportunity for both the police and protest groups to better understand the objectives and constraints that each face. While confrontation between protesters and police has not been completely eliminated in Sweden, the level of confrontation and disorder is markedly less than at comparable events in other countries. The knowledge of the dialogue police of protest groups and their actions has enabled the scale of police operations to be adjusted to the most appropriate level for the event. Potential disorder has been avoided through mediation, direct communication between organizers and dialogue officers and the development of increased levels of trust as a result of these ongoing interactions.

Associated research indicates that people who have early positive contact with the police are less likely to associate themselves with violent groups, or groups hostile to police. Although dialogue cannot completely prevent violence in crowds, it can have a positive effect on relationships between police and the crowd. Therefore, dialogue can also affect whether violence and disorder remain isolated or spreads throughout crowds or across multiple events. This depends on the crowd's perception of the legitimacy of police action.

Additional Information

Critical Incident Management Command Structures

In August of 2020, OIG published a [Review on SPD Crowd Dispersal Policies and Less Lethal Weapons](#). OIG found that SPD and other North American police departments, including those from Canada, use variations of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Incident Command System model (ICS) to plan and manage crowd events.

The SER Panel identified limitations related to the ICS model for managing public demonstrations. Particularly, the SER Panel identified a need to create a command structure based on competency for the role assigned rather than rank. Officers of a senior rank to those nominated to undertake an incident command role should not automatically assume superiority solely on the basis of rank or territorial responsibility. This system is already used by some police departments in Europe (see, e.g., the UK Gold Silver and Bronze Command Model -GSB).⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace. Produced on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland by the National Policing Improvement Agency. <https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2012/jan/uk-manual-public-order-2010.pdf>



Application to SPD

The UK and other European and Australian police forces have also developed similar units specifically designed to facilitate dialogue, as well as Critical Incident Management Command Structures that take dialogue units into account. During the SER process, with the assistance of OIG and crowd psychology expert Professor Stott, SPD began conversing with the Swedish Police and U.K. police to understand if and how the European approaches could be meaningfully applied within Seattle.



Appendix B. SER Participants

Names listed by role and alphabetically.

Name	Title	Role
Benalfew, Sophia	Executive Director, Ethiopian Community in Seattle	Panel Member
Brooks, John	Lieutenant, Seattle Police Department	Panel Member
Davis, Tyrone	Sergeant, Seattle Police Department	Panel Member
Dyment, James	Lieutenant, Seattle Police Department	Panel Member
Judge, Lisa	Inspector General, Office of Inspector General	Panel Member
Mahaffey, Thomas	Assistant Chief, Seattle Police Department	Panel Member
Martin, Karin	Assistant Professor, University of Washington	Panel Member
Moodie, Donna	Executive Director, Capitol Hill EcoDistrict	Panel Member
Roberson, Matthew	Officer, Seattle Police Department	Panel Member
Santillan, Alina	Director of Racial Equity, Seattle Center Cohort	Panel Member
Singh, Monisha	Executive Director, Chinatown-International District Business Improvement Area	Panel Member
Washington, Maurice	Community Advocate	Panel Member
Hollway, John	Associate Dean and Executive Director, Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School	Facilitator
Lim, Thary	Co-circle Keeper, CEO of PointOneNorth Consulting LLC.	Facilitator
Phoung, Saroeum	Circle Keeper, CEO of PointOneNorth Consulting LLC.	Facilitator
Rowe, Cassidy	J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School	Facilitator (staff)
Scott, Bessie	Former Community Police Commission Interim Executive Director	Project Pre-Planning
Ruiz, Isaac	Managing Attorney, Ruiz & Smart PLLC; former Community Police Commission Co-Chair	Project Pre-Planning
Stott, Clifford	Professor of Social Psychology, Dean for Research in the Faculty of Natural Sciences, and Director of the Keel Policing Academic Collaboration at Keele University	Subject Matter Expert
Hernandez Aldaco, Daniel	Policy and Data Analyst, Office of Inspector General	OIG Staff
McCracken, Conor	Policy and Data Analyst, Office of Inspector General	OIG Staff
Meza, Miroslava	Policy and Data Supervisor, Office of Inspector General	OIG Staff
Tsai, Amy	Deputy Inspector General, Office of Inspector General	OIG Staff



Appendix C. Short Biographies of Panel Members

Sophia Benalfew is the Executive Director of the non-profit Ethiopian Community in Seattle. She promotes the organization's overall mission through the provision of quality programs in education, health, and housing. She has extensive non-profit program management experience, including managing global programs, working across cultures, and grant writing and technical expertise in the fields of micro-insurance, financial inclusion, gender and resilience, and climate change. Prior to joining Ethiopian Community in Seattle, she worked for CARE and Oxfam America. She has degrees in management and public administration from Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia.

John T. Brooks is a Lieutenant, 29-year veteran, of the Seattle Police Department. He has served as a Police Officer, Sergeant and Lieutenant. His previous assignments include Patrol, SWAT, Anti-Crime, lead Tactics Instructor, Training, Mountain Bike, Ops Lt., member of the Force Review Board and Community Response Group. He is currently the Acting Captain of the Community Response Group, which he assisted in forming in 2020.

Tyrone Davis is a Sergeant with the Seattle Police Department which he joined in 1999. Davis has worked most of his career as an officer serving the diverse communities of the East Precinct, including assignments in Patrol, East Precinct Bike Squad, Community Police Team, and Anti-Crime Team, all involving close interaction with the community. As a Sergeant, he served the Office of Police Accountability as an Investigator for four years, where he conducted investigations into allegations of employee misconduct. Sergeant Davis is currently assigned to the Investigations Bureau with the Domestic Violence Unit. He is also a Board Member with the Department's Force Review Board, tasked with objective and critical analysis of the use of force incidents and events. Sergeant Davis was also a member of the Education and Training Section's Tactic Cadre. He taught officers in the classroom and, through scenario-based training environments, tactics with handling patrol-related calls for service, demonstration management, crisis intervention, and de-escalation. He is also a veteran of the United States Navy.

James K. Dymont is a Lieutenant, 28-year veteran, of the Seattle Police Department. He has served as a Police Officer, Sergeant, and Lieutenant. His previous assignments include Patrol, Mountain Bike, Anti-Crime, Gang Unit, Wellness, and Community Response Group. His current assignment is the Wellness Unit, which Dymont assisted in forming in 2019 and implementing in 2020. He is also an instructor for the Mountain Bike program and a bicycle crowd control instructor and served as the commander while assigned to the Community Response Group.



Lisa A. Judge is the Inspector General for Public Safety at the City of Seattle. For the past two and a half years, she has built a department dedicated to critically examining SPD use of force and improving its policies, practices, and culture. Along with the new Sentinel Event Review process, other ongoing projects at OIG include developing an officer peer intervention program, and developing an innovative training program with oversight partners and SPD for effective suspect and witness interviewing inspired by concerns of organizations like the Innocence Project. She spent over 20 years as a Tucson City attorney and in-house counsel for the Tucson Police Department, guiding police management in constitutional policing. She was an ACLU-approved trainer for court-ordered training on Fourth Amendment law and anti-bias for the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Lisa earned her Juris Doctor from the University of Arizona.

Thomas Mahaffey is an Assistant Chief with the Seattle Police Department which he joined in 1992. He started his career working with the many diverse communities of the East Precinct as a Patrol, Mountain Bike, Anti-Crime Team, and Field Training Officer. As a Lieutenant, Thomas served as a Watch Commander, Bike Squad Commander, and Operations Lieutenant, which included planning and leading numerous crime reduction initiatives, responses to significant protests, and managing large festivals and events. As Captain and West Precinct Commander, he served on multiple community councils and committees, such as the West Precinct Advisory Council and Chinatown/International District Public Safety Steering Committee. He championed the involvement of district patrol officers in engagement and problem solving with community stakeholders. Assistant Chief Mahaffey is a graduate of the University of Washington and has also completed the Senior Management Institute for Police, DEA Leadership Academy, and the Washington State Law Enforcement Leadership Course.

Karin D. Martin is an Assistant Professor for the Evans School of Public Policy & Governance at the University of Washington. Karin is a crime policy specialist whose areas of expertise are monetary sanctions, racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and decision-making in the criminal justice context. These issues come together in her current projects, which examine the use of money in punishment (e.g., fines, fees, restitution, etc.). She studied Psychology at Stanford University and worked in the non-profit sector in the San Francisco Bay Area before attending University of California, Berkeley, where she earned an MPP, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Public Policy. She was a post-doctoral scholar in the Psychology Department at UCLA where she was also a Fellow with the Center for Policing Equity. She was Assistant Professor of Public Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center of the City University of New York (2013-2017) and was a Visiting Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2016.



Donna Moodie is the owner of Marjorie restaurant, the executive director of the Capitol Hill EcoDistrict, and was recently named the new Executive Vice President of Community Development for Community Roots Housing. She has been a pillar of the community for many years, opening her first restaurant in Belltown in 1993 and leading neighborhood activism for the 20+ years she has been a Seattle resident. Her history of community work includes co-chairing the Mayor's Small Business Advisory Council, participating in the Central Area Land Use Review Committee, serving on the Seattle Center Advisory Commission, chairing the Central District Forum for Arts and Ideas Board, and consulting on business startups. She was also recently named one of Puget Sound Business Journal's 2020 Women of Influence.

Matthew Roberson is a Police Officer for the Seattle Police Department. He has worked with for the City of Seattle for 14 years—six years with Seattle Parks and Recreation as a youth program leader and the last eight years with the police department working in patrol, as a school emphasis officer, and running the Seattle Police Activities League (SEAPAL) youth program year-round. Outside of work, Officer Roberson has been a volunteer track coach for the Rainier Beach Community Center team for 15 years. He has a degree in history from Claremont McKenna College in California.

Alina Santillan is the Director of Racial Equity for the Seattle Center Cohort, a Fabian's Fund Board member, and a commissioner on the City of Seattle's Community Police Commission. As the Director of Racial Equity, his role is to facilitate and support intersectional anti-racism work within arts and culture organizations engaged in the Cohort. Cohort members work collectively to dismantle how white supremacy culture shows up in the arts and culture sector and strive to create actively anti-racist and equitable organizations. As a Board member for Fabian's Fund, he focuses on how to support Black and Brown communities' ability to thrive by addressing the disproportionate impact issues like mass incarceration, and the school-to-prison pipeline have on those communities. His lived experience as a Trans, Queer, Latinx person of color also allows him to connect with other communities impacted by systemic injustice. He brings experience in community organizing, non-profit fundraising, and culture change work to the Community Police Commission. Regardless of the system he is working within, he is fiercely committed to building authentic, long-lasting, and trusting relationships with under-invited communities, centering those voices most impacted by policing, and advocating for justice and equity throughout our city.

Monisha Singh is the Executive Director of the Chinatown-International District Business Improvement Area (CIDBIA), one of Seattle's ten BIAs contributing to neighborhood improvement and economic development. Monisha joined the CIDBIA in 2015 and has managed the neighborhood's street festivals and promotional events, curated the neighborhood's communication and marketing strategy, managed the neighborhood sanitation and public safety program, and advocates on behalf of businesses in an effort to create a clean, safe, and welcoming Chinatown-International District. Monisha is passionate about working with small businesses while protecting and promoting the cultural integrity of Chinatown-ID.



Maurice Washington is a social justice activist and community advocate. He was born and raised in Washington, DC, where he graduated high school and attended Prince George's Community College for Business Management for one year. Having an entrepreneurial spirit, he became the co-founder of an urban clothing line (City Style Clothing) in 1997. Moe moved to Seattle 20 years ago, where he soon started a catering business out of his loft along Airport Way. Not making the money he needed, Moe began to work for Swedish Medical Center, where he worked in Family Medicine, Heart Institute, Physical Therapy, Transplant Department, and The Cancer Institute. Working at the Cancer Institute inspired him to combine natural herbs with medical purposes into a tea tincture. Being an entrepreneur at heart, Moe became CEO and Founder of Brakamela Herb Tea, founded in 2020. Moe is also currently contracting at a biotech lab as a lab technician. He has been a member of the Masonic Fraternity Grand Lodge of Washington Jurisdiction for 16 years. In the summer of 2020, he took part in the Seattle protests in the wake of the Murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin and others. As the Co-founder of UFFN (United Family, Friends and Neighbors), Moe met numerous times with Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan, Police Chief Carmen Best, Fire Chief Harold Scoggins, Inspector General Lisa Judge, CPC Interim Executive Director Bessie Scott, and multiple Black/African American grassroots organizations, to bring change to the way racial Seattle policing is done in and to the communities of Seattle and the surrounding areas.



Appendix D. SER Peacemaking Circle Group Norms

As part of the SER peacemaking circles, the Panel agreed upon group norms and behavioral principles that would guide the group and assist its work in evaluating and analyzing Incidents that occurred during the protests of 2020. These group norms are set forth below. **How to address tension, disagreement, and/or conflict (when a guideline is broken):**

- Call it out/name it in a respectful way.
- Recognize subjectivity & objectivity.
- Agree as a group with decision-making process.

Guiding Principles/Group Norms:

- Respect the talking piece.
- Speak from the heart.
- Respect each other's thoughts.
- Respect each other's time.
- It takes time to build trust.
- Speak from your own perspective and use "I" statements.
- Encourage people to move up/move back.
- Practice compassionate curiosity.
- Listen through an objective lens (it's difficult to be objective at all times).
- Do not "drop a bomb" and leave.
- Try not to let your beliefs, experiences, and values cloud your own judgement when listening to others.
- Accept others' ideas and thoughts.
- Whatever is discussed stays in the circle.
- Speak clearly and not aggressively.
- Be mindful of the way we speak.
- Practice forgiveness.
- Come from a place of vulnerability.
- Be accepting of direct language so long as it is respectful.
- Be present and engaged.
- Be accepting of being uncomfortable.
- Do not take things personally.
- Be open and transparent.
- Discretion.
- Acknowledge risks of expressing opinions.
- Express disagreement that seeks to understand not silence.
- Keep an open mind.
- Assume good intentions.
- Inclusion.
- Stay curious.
- Confidentiality.
- Time Management.




Appendix E. Overall Description of Events May 29 and 30

May 29, 2020: Organized Property Damage in the International District

Protests and violence unfolded in Minneapolis and across the country following the murder of George Floyd. Protests began in downtown Seattle on Friday, May 29, 2020. Around 7:00 p.m., a group of over 150 individuals⁴⁷ gathered at Hing Hay Park in Seattle's Chinatown International District (see Figure 10 below). Originally, SPD had expected a small group (5-10 individuals) to gather at this location.⁴⁸ Based on that estimate, two bike squads and one Anti-Crime Team (ACT) were assigned to the event. Accounts from SPD officers and command⁴⁹ show that SPD personnel experienced hostility from protesters, and that SPD personnel on the scene believed that some members of the crowd were affiliated with anarchist groups like Antifa based on their appearance. This assessment prompted SPD chain of command to request more units and initiate the "Incident Command System," and to begin mobilizing other police resources from other duties to manage the emerging demonstration.

Figure 10. Map of SPD and protester positions, May 29, 2020, 7:00 p.m.



⁴⁷ <https://nwasianweekly.com/2020/06/blog-a-protest-transforms-seattles-chinatown-hope-and-perseverance/>

⁴⁸ Use of force Statement by a Lieutenant 1 on scene.

⁴⁹ SPD Use of Force Reports, May 29, 2020.



At 7:30 p.m., the demonstrators left Hing Hay Park and weaved through Downtown Seattle⁵⁰ chanting “Black Lives Matter” and “George Floyd.”⁵¹ As they progressed, SPD bike squads and additional units arriving on the scene sought to create mobile cordons that would separate the marchers from street front businesses along the route. Other SPD units created stationary police lines at various intersections to prevent traffic from endangering the marchers, and to prevent the demonstration from deviating off the main road.

In response to hostility expressed towards SPD officers,⁵² SPD removed the bike squads from alongside the progressing crowd.

At approximately 8:00 p.m., the protestors reached 5th Ave. and Madison St., where SPD had created a police line with bike officers to prevent the demonstration from progressing. This appears to have angered the protestors. Individuals in the crowd verbally berated SPD officers in the line and a window on an adjacent building was shattered. At roughly 8:30 p.m., SPD officers used OC spray (i.e., “pepper spray”) and “flash bang” devices⁵³ in an attempt to disperse the crowd.⁵⁴

After this SPD intervention, smaller groups of people began moving in different directions away from 5th Ave. Photos taken at the time show at least one individual in possession of an axe, which was used to smash a store window on 5th Ave. and Pike St. As the evening progressed people across the downtown area damaged private buildings and cars. This led the Seattle Fire Department (via social media) to advise all downtown business owners to “immediately secure all open areas . . . [and] remove all combustibles that cannot be secured.”⁵⁵

Around 11:00 p.m., SPD began tracking a group moving towards the King County Children and Family Justice Center, where individuals threw rocks and fireworks at the building,⁵⁶ while another group of around 100 individuals headed towards the SPD East Precinct.⁵⁷ SPD tried to direct people from downtown towards the International District.⁵⁸

Over the course of the evening, several buildings were damaged, including the Convention Center and a QFC on Capitol Hill. One group moved slowly down Jackson Street, smashing windows at Bank of America, Washington Federal, Seattle Vision Clinic, among others.⁵⁹

⁵⁰ SPD Blotter, May 29, 2020.

⁵¹ <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-break-windows-clash-with-police-in-downtown-seattle/>

⁵² Use of Force report by Officer 1, 05-29-2020. CAD log 05-29-2020.

⁵³ “Flash bang” devices are also known as Noise Flash Diversionary Devices (NFDD). They are ATF-controlled Class C explosive devices that emit a bright light and loud noise to distract and disperse crowds. See, e.g., “Performance Characterization Study: Noise Flash Diversionary Devices (NFDDs), DOJ Document No. 205642, accessible at <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205642.pdf>

⁵⁴ <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-break-windows-clash-with-police-in-downtown-seattle/>

⁵⁵ <https://twitter.com/SeattleFire/status/1266588744359874560>

⁵⁶ SPD Blotter for May 29, 11:19 p.m.


⁵⁷ Accounts in Use of Force Reports from May, 29, 2020

⁵⁸ Video report by Omari Salisbury from Converge Media. <https://youtu.be/pv5j15lonEU>

⁵⁹ <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-break-windows-clash-with-police-in-downtown-seattle/>



Figure 11. Route of vandals in the International District, May 29.



Another group that had broken off from the protests at Hing Hay Park was followed and chronicled by Omari Salisbury, an independent Seattle videographer and media executive who had attended the protests downtown. Mr. Salisbury was leaving the protests when he came upon the group at 5th Ave. and Jackson St., and walked with them to 7th Ave. and Pine St. Recording from his phone, he narrated a video of their actions as they systematically destroyed numerous street fronts of commercial businesses along a 1.4 mile stretch of the International District (See Figure 11 above). The group, made up predominantly of young white men, did not encounter the SPD during this 45-minute period. (Mr. Salisbury's video suggests that SPD did respond to the group's break-in of a Bank of America retail location but did not arrive until the group was several blocks away. The video did not show any observable attempt by SPD to apprehend the group, which was on foot.)

The group's destructive activity was troubling to many Panelists for various reasons. First, a group of predominantly white vandals was destroying storefronts in a predominantly Asian community.

Second, the group appeared to be well organized for this activity. The vandals wore clothes that hid their identity, they tore down security cameras, and they moved quickly from one building to the next. Mr. Salisbury referred to them as "professionals," and it was his opinion that the goal of this group was to foment discord and breed distrust between the community and the police.

Third, the Panel was concerned about the lack of an SPD response to this vandalism. Mr. Salisbury's video⁶⁰ followed the group for roughly five (5) minutes after they initially shattered the windows of the Bank of America only blocks from an existing Seattle Police presence. Near the end of the video he states "[a]t this point, I almost gotta think that, like, the police have just kind of said 'f**k it,' which very well might be the case. These guys have been out here for about 15 minutes. There has been zero presence."⁶¹

⁶⁰ [Anarchists leave a 1.4-mile trail of destruction in downtown Seattle last night. — Converge Media \(whereweconverge.com\)](https://www.whereweconverge.com/post/anarchist-leave-a-1-4-mile-trail-of-destruction-in-downtown-seattle-last-night)

⁶¹ Panelists noted the perceptions of others in the community that property destruction was more readily tolerated and less aggressively enforced by SPD outside the downtown area, and pointed to the annual "May Day" celebrations as examples of moments when predominantly white crowds are permitted to act in ways that protests predominantly made up of people of color would expect to be treated more severely. SPD did not agree with these perceptions but should nonetheless be aware of them and act in ways that will address them.



SPD has pointed out that it can be difficult in these situations to establish probable cause for an arrest of any individual vandal, particularly without the use of surveillance camera video recordings. While this may be accurate, many Panelists saw the non-existent SPD response as an example of a disregard for the safety of neighborhoods other than downtown that are populated by non-Whites, and repeatedly offered the perspective that if the vandals had been people of color, or if the vandalism had been in downtown Seattle rather than the International District, the SPD response would have been faster and more aggressive.

For both community and police, then, the events of May 29, including organized vandalism and SPD uses of force, set the stage for what was to become an escalating pattern of unpredictable crowd behavior emerging simultaneously in multiple parts of the city. The events increased tensions, mutual distrust and violence as protesters expressed rage at police and police sought to enforce the law and ensure order. SPD's fears of the riots and property damage that had occurred in Minneapolis, and the presence of anarchists set on fomenting the same, were seemingly confirmed, while community perceptions of racial disparities in policing were reinforced by the lack of SPD response to vandalism in the International District.

The events of May 29 also signaled that SPD's traditional law enforcement-based approach to crowd management and crowd control would not be productive in the days to come. As one SPD officer explained:

The night before, we were following a group [of demonstrators] headed to the SPD East Precinct headquarters. We are used to escorting groups like this and it's rarely a problem. But I decided to pull back our team so that it didn't seem like they were corralling people toward the precinct. Usually when we pull back everything is fine. But this time, when we disengaged and pulled back, the protesters started to confront us and attack. A patrol car got stuck with an officer, but we got it out. But that was when I realized that this was different. It was the first time we really realized that this really was directed at us and there were individuals intent on attacking us. It made doing our traditional job – of facilitating – difficult. Our usual tactics that would work, no longer did. . . we had to come up with different approaches for May 30 and beyond.

May 30, 2020: Protests and Escalation of Violence

SPD had prepared for at least two demonstrations Seattle protest organizers had planned for Saturday, May 30. The *Justice for George Floyd* group planned a demonstration for 12:00 p.m. at SPD Headquarters (5th Ave. and Cherry St.), and the group *Not This Time!* organized a demonstration beginning at 3:00 p.m. at Westlake Center (Pine St. between 4th Ave. and 5th Ave.)⁶² SPD established a command post in the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) to coordinate the various SPD deployments throughout the city. All other participating agencies, including Seattle Fire Department ("SFD"), had representatives at the SPOC to ensure a coordinated response among the agencies and their respective officers as needed.

⁶² <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protests-planned-in-seattle-on-saturday-over-george-floyd-death-in-minneapolis/>



Normal SPD event procedures placed the overall Incident Commander in the field to ensure that important operational decisions would include a real-time review of the scene. SPD initiated a dedicated radio communication channel⁶³ for the day's demonstration events at 6:00 a.m.⁶⁴ Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., SPD personnel assigned to this event received presentations and instructions at their Precincts on the Incident Action Plan.⁶⁵

As expected, protesters began gathering outside SPD Headquarters on 5th Ave. around 11:00 a.m.,⁶⁶ and by noon, the crowd was estimated at about one thousand protesters.⁶⁷ SPD officers, wearing protective equipment and using bikes and temporary fencing, created a police line preventing access to the building.⁶⁸ While protesters occasionally blocked the roadway, the situation remained calm and peaceful.

Around 1:00 p.m., protesters began to leave SPD Headquarters in groups, heading north on 4th and 5th Aves. toward Westlake Park, where the other demonstration was scheduled to start at 3:00 p.m.⁶⁹ While overall the crowd was peaceful, tensions were high. SPD radio communications reported a handful of individuals throwing bottles and rocks at officers at three intersections (5th Ave. and Cherry St., 5th Ave. and Madison St., and 5th Ave. and James St.),⁷⁰ though these reports could not be corroborated through other sources by the OIG data team.

By 2:00 p.m., SPD had placed multiple cordons around the Westlake area,⁷¹ limiting direct access to the main protest site on Pine St. through the intersections at 4th Ave. and 5th Ave. The only remaining entrance to Westlake Park was on its southern end, at the intersection of 4th Ave. and Pike St. (See Figure 12 below). Officers supervising these cordons indicated the intention was to provide safe and controlled ingress and egress to the park while keeping protesters moving with the one-way street traffic flow, which facilitates protester and vehicle safety.⁷²

⁶³ SPOC: Seattle Police Operations Center, coordinates Special Events Planning and Logistics support while serves as the primary representative and contact point of SPD. WSP: Washington State Patrol is the state police agency for the U.S. state of Washington. As of 2016 it had up to 1,100 troopers and 1,100 civilians

⁶⁴ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁶⁵ Source: SPD, [Incident Action Plan May 30 2020.](#); Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) Log May 30, 2020.,

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁶⁸ https://twitter.com/c_clarridge/status/1266801804722925568

⁶⁹ <https://twitter.com/amandamsnyder/status/1266825808292622337>; SPD Blotter May 30, 2020.


⁷⁰ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁷¹ Use of Force Report Lt. 2

⁷² SPD Personal Communication.



Figure 12. Map of downtown Seattle and SPD locations, May 30, 2020, 2:00 p.m.



One Panelist said that in his 25 years as a police officer,

[t]his [George Floyd] was one of the first times where every officer said ‘this is bad, this guy needs to go to jail.’ I have never seen a higher percentage of officers who felt this way.” At the same time, the officer said, due to SPD’s content neutrality policy, “We support [the protesters], we agree with you . . . but we can’t say that when we’re on the line because it’s part of our job. We aren’t allowed to be political. This was so unprecedented that everyone was like ‘oh my gosh this shouldn’t have happened.’ We were frustrated because we were angry too and why is the crowd throwing sticks at us? This happened in Minnesota, we agree with you, this was wrong.

As more and more protesters arrived, the roads around the cordons became clogged with people. While many chants came from the crowd, a persistent one was “let us through, let them through,” suggesting that some of the crowd’s agitation was being caused by the cordons and the limited access to Westlake Park.

Around 2:20 p.m., a man attempted to push past one side of an SPD line set up on 4th Ave and Pine St. An SPD officer pushed the man back twice; when then man stepped forward a third time and attempted to grab at the officer’s OC spray can, SPD officers used OC spray and a 40 mm launcher (i.e., foam bullet) to force him back and away from the line. In response, the man brandished an OC can of his own, throwing it at officers before leaving the area.⁷³

Roughly 20 minutes later, the man returned to the same police line and verbally antagonized the officers again. This time, he was arrested.⁷⁴ A group of officers suddenly and aggressively pushed into the entire crowd using their bicycles as shields, grabbed the targeted individual and retreated behind the police line. This arrest angered the crowd, resulting in an altercation in which SPD deployed OC spray that

⁷³ SPD BWV, BWV3 May 30, 2020

⁷⁴ SPD BWV, BWV1 May 30, 2020



affected an 8-year old child in the proximity of the intervention – an act caught on video and posted on social media, leading to thousands of complaints filed with SPD.⁷⁵ (This is one of the Incidents reviewed in greater detail by the Panel below.)

By 2:30 p.m., SPD estimated that the crowd had grown to 4,000 – 5,000 people, gathered near an erected platform.⁷⁶ The crowd was far larger than SPD’s predictions at the start of the day, and it was clear to SPD operational commanders that the number of SPD officers deployed to downtown was not sufficient to manage the crowd safely. The cordons established by SPD had gradually become “stand-off” lines where protesters gathered to chant and confront SPD officers. SPD officers reported that the crowd at 5th and Pine was becoming more “hostile,” so SPD moved bike officers to the area from 4th and Pine. Around 2:35 p.m., officers blocking the intersection at 5th Ave. and Pine St. moved to allow protesters to walk from Pine St. south on 5th Ave. Rather than moving south, however, the protesters remained, with more filling into the newfound space and protesters on the other side of the line getting more frustrated by the moving police line pushing them backwards. During this time, an SPD officer and a protester had a physical exchange, after which police deployed OC spray and blast balls and some protesters threw plastic and glass bottles.⁷⁷

As the crowd grew, the SPD officers remained in place on their lines. SPD operational leadership viewed the decision to have their officers remain in place in the lines as the best of a number of unsatisfactory alternatives. Attempts to move the crowd could provoke violence against the officers on site, and the number of officers on the scene was insufficient to control an angry crowd of the size that was present. At the same time, having SPD leave the scene risked abandoning the downtown area to the crowd, which was exhibiting a worrisome potential for violence that could endanger people and buildings.

SPD leadership sought to have “minimal presence or contact with the crowd” by remaining in place, but their unwillingness to move and the unwillingness of officers to constructively engage with the crowd continued to anger those who could not get access to the park (due to the limitation on movement) and those who were nearby (due to the refusal to engage with the crowd or leave the scene, which was viewed as defiance of the crowd by SPD). It also subjected the officers on the scene to a continuing risk of injury from thrown projectiles.

SPD officers deployed approximately 10 “blast balls” in the intersection to disperse the crowd at 5th Ave. and Pine St. after some protesters threw bottles at the officers.⁷⁸ While the explosions were outside Westlake Park, their sounds were heard inside the Park, causing fear and causing some within the Park to run away from the bangs.⁷⁹ As crowd psychologist Clifford Stott, who reviewed the events of the day on video, stated:

It’s evident that people didn’t really understand what those munitions were,
where they were coming from, but they heard the munitions, they heard loud

⁷⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1e4jRllU3I&feature=youtu.be> OPA opened a case and found that use of force was lawful and proper <https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2020OPA-0322ccs09-04-20.pdf>

⁷⁶ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/> <https://twitter.com/asiakmfields/status/1266872902873317376/photo/1>

⁷⁷ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁷⁸ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>; WSP Incident Timeline 5.30.2020. Body Worn Video _Clip_1_1__AXON_Body_2_Video_2020-05-30_1437

⁷⁹ <https://twitter.com/KOMOPopham/status/1266851885043970048?s=20> and <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1266847778442895363> (Cole Chow).



explosions and they turned and they ran away in fear. . . it's clear that the munitions and the explosions had a wider effect on the crowd as a whole. . .⁸⁰

While the munitions did initially disperse the crowd at 5th Ave. and Pine St., SPD cordons remained static and demonstrators moved back to the intersection. These uses of force seemed to energize rather than deter the protesters, who approached the police with hands up and open, chanting "hands up, don't shoot." These people, who were not throwing objects or physically engaging with SPD officers, were nonetheless subsequently subjected to SPD blast and gas munitions.⁸¹ This increased the crowd's rejection of SPD's legitimacy in this situation. As Professor Stott observed,

The [Westlake Park area] was fully packed with protesters now . . . the blast munitions [were] being counter-productive, given they were potentially deployed to disperse the crowd. What they've actually achieved is to increase the numbers there and indeed the density. Also interestingly what we see here is considerable levels of interaction initiated by protesters who come up to police and try to engage in verbal communication with them to talk to them about what they're doing, to express their anger about the illegitimacy about what the police are doing, and try to initiate forms of conversation and dialogue with police officers who are forming the cordon, but none of the video evidence shows any indication that any police officer engaged in any form of verbal communication with those protesters and I think that's really important. [There] is a relative lull from about 3:15 to around 3:20 when the protesters move back into this space and for at least 30 minutes there's no evidence of any major or further confrontation that takes place, so we've gone from a situation of escalated tension and conflictual interaction and gone back into a situation of relatively peaceful assembly in this location. . . There are protesters . . . moving around the crowd verbally gesticulating to de-escalate the situation, engaging with other protesters trying to calm them down, so there is evidence of de-escalation processes at work in this particular crowd. However, during this period of time . . . the police department is also mobilizing further resources into the intersection at 5th and Pine.⁸²

SPD issued another dispersal order at 5th Ave. and Pine St. at 3:10 p.m.,⁸³ though it was the belief of SPD officers on the scene that the order was unlikely to be widely heard or understood given the size and noise of the crowd and the PA system available to SPD at the time. Tensions continued to grow between the police line and the groups of demonstrators at 5th Ave. and Pine St.⁸⁴ Officers donned gas masks⁸⁵ and SPD and mutual aid forces⁸⁶ began to disperse all protesters from the intersection,⁸⁷ using

⁸⁰ Dr. Clifford Stott, Review of videos on May 30, 2020.

⁸¹ SPD BWV: _Clip_1_1__AXON_Body_2_Video_2020-05-30_1437, AXON_Body_2_Video_2020-05-30_1438.

⁸² Prof. Clifford Stott, personal communication to OIG.

⁸³ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁸⁴ <https://twitter.com/amandamsnyder/status/1266856841683722241>

⁸⁵ https://twitter.com/c_clarridge/status/1266858623344373760

⁸⁶ Mutual Aid refers to police departments from other jurisdictions, such as Bellevue Police Department, or from the state, such as Washington State Patrol (WSP). The obligation of one department to provide aid to another and the rules of engagement and command structure across departments is typically set forth in a Mutual Aid Agreement signed by both departments.


⁸⁷ Mutual Aid UoF Info January 8, 2021



CS gas (i.e., “tear gas,” blast balls, and OC spray).⁸⁸ Video footage from this location shows large numbers of peaceful protesters suffering from the effects of the gas.

The CS gas in particular effectively dispersed large numbers of people – but it sent them in the direction of 6th Ave., where a number of unmarked police vehicles were parked. Individuals began to attack and subsequently destroy these vehicles, and two SPD rifles were stolen from a police-patrol vehicle. One of the firearms was discharged into a patrol vehicle and was immediately recovered by the private security guard of a journalist covering the chaos.⁸⁹ The other gun remained at large for the next 24 hours.⁹⁰

Figure 13. Map of various protest group locations, afternoon/evening of May 30, 2020.



A few minutes before 4:00 p.m., one of the police vehicles was set on fire in front of Old Navy at the intersection of 5th Ave and Pine St. People began shattering store windows and breaking into businesses in the area, and sustained property theft and property damage occurred. Given the size of the crowd at Westlake Park, the number of individuals who were now engaged in violent acts of vandalism, and limitations on the number of SPD officers on the scene, no safety perimeter could be established around the fires. A decision was made by SPD to maintain the lines that kept many in the crowd away from the fires and allow the vehicles to continue burning,⁹¹ though eventually SFD was able to reach the fires with an SPD officer escort.⁹² Dozens of buildings in the area had their storefronts shattered and people entered and looted the stores.

Again, Omari Salisbury was on the scene and recording a video chronicle of events. He described the scene as follows:

The 30th was chaos. I don’t remember exactly how the Police positioned themselves there, but it was not a winning position initially. They were trying to block off multiple blocks, but they couldn’t hold that position because they were surrounded. People were coming

⁸⁸ <https://twitter.com/amandamsnyder/status/1266863963448307712>

⁸⁹ OPA Case 2020OPA-0329

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Complaint 6th USA vs Means, W. D. Washington, pages 6-8.

⁹¹ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁹² <https://www.kuow.org/stories/seattle-protest-over-george-floyd-leads-to-damage-arrests-may-30-31>



down 5th Ave. on both sides, the police were trying to hold the line, but they couldn't hold the line, and it was chaos.

I want to debunk the narrative that the protests devolved into riots. That's not true. The protests were peaceful. But we saw the makings of professional [anarchists] on the 29th. What people need to understand – the professionals don't like to deal with police. They like to create chaos and then let the general public get smacked by the police for that chaos. They were not there to loot. Looters are the lowest common denominator. They come late, last. I have on tape, at 6th and Pike, the corner of Nordstrom's, the people who were organized would bust things out, the police would constitute a line, and then the "professionals" would bust things out and then leave. The police are holding the line, and then you have people going into the Nordstrom's after the "pros" bust it open. The State Police came up, that field unit is there to bust heads, restore order. They are who you call when your police can't handle it. It was a few hours before you could say that order was restored, if you can call it that.

What you could see was police wanting to go to Nordstrom's, watching people jumping in and out. But [SPD was] holding the line. They were holding the line for peaceful protests.

The use of CS gas also had the effect of breaking the crowd up into different pockets that spread throughout the downtown area. This further limited the ability of the outnumbered SPD officers on the scene to respond to an expanding array of confrontations, vandalism and looting amid the increasingly unruly protests. As had happened on the 29th, protesters from the Westlake area split into many smaller groups who then roamed around the city. One group of protestors marched onto Interstate 5 (I-5), blocking traffic on the southbound lanes.^{93, 94} Others headed towards SPD headquarters, causing the SPD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to broadcast a regional mutual aid request seeking further support from other law enforcement agencies.⁹⁵ Ultimately, a crowd of approximately 1,200 protesters gathered outside SPD Headquarters, causing SPD officers inside the building to say they were "under siege."⁹⁶ SPD personnel at the front line radioed SPD Command⁹⁷ for backup as paintballs and rocks continued to be launched at officers, and assaults on officers and the presence of possible fire accelerants were also reported over SPD radio channels.⁹⁸

At 4:46 p.m., Mayor Durkan announced the implementation of a curfew for the city beginning at 5:00 p.m.,⁹⁹ and an executive order prohibiting a range of weapons, including firearms, rocks, and flares.¹⁰⁰ AlertSeattle sent a text message to city residents informing them of the curfew order. While the curfew made being on the streets of downtown technically illegal, it was increasingly difficult for protestors to

⁹³ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/01/timeline-of-events-on-may-30th-2020/>

⁹⁴ <https://seattlespectator.com/2020/06/03/photo-essay-seattle-5-30-protest/#modal-photo>

⁹⁵ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁹⁶ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

⁹⁷ SPD Command- Incident Command Staff coordinating the police action.

⁹⁸ SPD Blotter May 30.

⁹⁹ <https://www.kuow.org/stories/seattle-protest-over-george-floyd-leads-to-damage-arrests-may-30-31>

¹⁰⁰ https://durkan.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2020/05/0898_001.pdf



leave the city, as the Westlake Metro station and downtown sections of I-5 were temporarily closed and King County buses stopped operating in the downtown core.^{101, 102}

Unlike the vandalism and looting of downtown, there were other protest groups (on I-5, at SPD HQ, and at the King County Courthouse)¹⁰³ that remained peaceful. The *Not This Time!* protesters, for example, physically distanced themselves from the nearby conflict. They concluded their speeches and encouraged people to join them on a march to the courthouse, which hundreds if not thousands of people did. During that procession, demonstrators actively self-regulated within the crowd to maintain peaceful norms. SPD facilitated that march even though it was in defiance of the curfew that was then in place.

The demonstrations downtown gradually dissipated in the evening and night hours of May 30,¹⁰⁴ though groups of individuals remained in defiance of the curfew. SPD and media outlets continued to report incidents of vandalism, looting, public and private property damage, arson and other perceived threats.¹⁰⁵ SPD sent bike teams and officers to respond to these incidents, with Bellevue SWAT and Washington State Patrol (WSP) providing assistance.¹⁰⁶ I-5 northbound reopened at 11:11 p.m., with southbound I-5 reopening after 12:15 a.m.¹⁰⁷ At that time, volunteers were already picking up after protesters in downtown Seattle,¹⁰⁸ with more volunteers helping to clean the following morning.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰¹ Source: Seattle Department of Transportation, and Washington State Patrol.

¹⁰² <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protest-updates-as-the-country-reacts-to-the-death-of-george-floyd-follow-the-latest-developments-in-seattle-and-elsewhere/>

¹⁰³ <https://twitter.com/amandamsnyder/status/1266898238918914050>

¹⁰⁴ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

¹⁰⁵ SPD Blotter May 30.

¹⁰⁶ Bellevue Police Department Reports of Use of Force, Washington State Patrol Use of Force Statement. Source: SPD Force Review Unit.

¹⁰⁷ <https://twitter.com/wspd2pio/status/1266975486934040576>

¹⁰⁸ <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1266986867976626186>

¹⁰⁹ <https://twitter.com/mikevorel/status/1267144360606306304>




Appendix F. In-Depth Description of Reviewed Incidents

Incidents Reviewed

Incident #1: OC Spraying of Child, May 30

Before 3:00 pm on May 30, a group of SPD officers established a line facing south across 4th Ave. just to the west of Pine St. (see Figure 14 below.) The line was established to ensure that vehicles would not interfere with the protesters, and to enable protesters on 4th Ave. to safely enter Westlake Park for the demonstration scheduled there. However, it also acted to prevent individuals on Pine St. from walking to 4th Ave. While establishing the line, a number of community members were ushered by police from the north side of the police line towards Westlake Park so that they would not be caught behind the newly established line.

Figure 14. Map of SPD line where child was pepper sprayed, May 30, 2020.



As people were walking southbound from behind the line (i.e., from 4th Ave.) a male approached the front of the line walking eastbound along Pine St. He tried to walk past the line on the west sidewalk of 4th Ave., saying he wanted access to a rest room. The officer said, “stay back,” without further explanation, and pushed the man back with an open palm to the man’s chest. The man became enraged, and repeatedly yelled (with expletives), “don’t you touch me.” The officer responded, “I’m giving you an order, stay back.” The man persisted, getting very close to the officer and insisting that the officer keep his hands off the man. The officer pushed the man back harder. The man stepped forward again and continued to swear at the officer, saying “get your f***ing hands off of me,” at which point the officer used OC spray on the man and another officer used foam bullets fired from a 40mm launcher to push the man back. The man retreated, and after a few seconds produced what appeared to be his own can of OC spray, which he threatened to deploy against the officer. He then threw the can at the officer and left the scene.

Over the course of the next 20 minutes, a crowd gathered at the police line. Some held signs, and



several engaged angrily with the SPD officers. In the crowd were a father and his 8-year-old child. The two were standing behind a group of protesters that was engaging verbally with a line of nine SPD officers in protective gear (e.g., helmets and padding). The officers were not engaging with the protesters, but were standing in formation on the line facing south with their batons drawn.¹¹⁰ The father was pacing back and forth along the line, a few feet back from the line, challenging SPD officers to a fight and making other derogatory statements about SPD and the officers.

The protesters assembled very close to the officers, who held their batons in front of them. Several individuals in the crowd, including the father, were aggressive in their verbal criticisms and insults directed at the SPD officers, including calling them by name (SPD officers are required to keep their names and badge numbers visible during crowd facilitation) and threatening bodily harm to them.

At approximately 3:08 p.m., an SPD Lieutenant informed two SPD Sergeants that due to injuries suffered by officers earlier from projectiles, the demonstration occurring in the immediate vicinity was going to be declared an “unlawful assembly.” Not long after, the individual who had been OC sprayed (and who had thrown a can of OC spray at the officers) returned to the north side of the line and began swearing at the officer who had deployed OC spray, holding his phone out in front of him and challenging the officer verbally. A woman stood in front of him facing the officers, with her arms out to her sides and her palms open. She stated, “we’re just talking” to the officers and “don’t give them a reason” to the individual, in what appeared to be an attempt to prevent the situation from escalating on both sides.

An SPD officer recognized the individual as the man from the prior altercation. Although the altercation had taken place 20 minutes before, the officer could satisfy the legal requirements to arrest the man for assault (and potentially other offenses), based on the man pushing the officer, resisting orders, trying to grab the officer’s OC spray, and throwing his own at the officer. The officer explained this to a Sergeant on the scene and received permission from the Sergeant to arrest the man for those actions.

The officer communicated with his colleagues on the line and approximately one minute later, several officers on the right of the line forcefully pushed out into the crowd, grabbed the individual, and pulled him behind the re-formed police line, where he was arrested. At the same time, the entire line of SPD officers loudly yelled “MOVE BACK” and stepped forward with their batons held horizontally in front of them to forcefully push the whole crowd in front of the line back and create space between the police line and the protesters.

The reaction of the crowd, many of whom were not present for the prior acts leading to the arrest, was surprise, anger and defiance as the SPD line stepped forward into the crowd. A woman in the front line of the crowd tried not to move back, yelling “No, you move back.” Pushing back against the officers, she reached over and grabbed an officer’s baton, yelling again, “don’t push me. You move back.” An officer behind the front line responded by deploying OC spray to the woman’s head and face, causing her to release the baton and turn and move backward away from the police line. As the woman turned away, the father and child, who had been standing behind the protester, were affected by the OC spray as well.

The father and child also moved back away from the line, and a video was taken by another person in

¹¹⁰ Several of our panelists questioned the wisdom of a parent bringing a child to the front lines of a police protest, particularly as tensions escalated. We express no further comment on this and raise it simply to highlight the complex community dynamics at work.



the crowd of the child, loudly crying in discomfort, being tended to and having milk poured on his face. This was captured on video and was widely viewed on social media. The Seattle Office of Police Accountability (“OPA”) received more than 13,000 complaints about the incident.

The officer who deployed the OC spray told OPA he intended to spray only the woman grabbing the other officer’s baton, rather than the child. He further stated that at the time he deployed the spray, he could not see the child, as the child was smaller and hidden from his view. The officer who deployed the OC was behind the first line of police and the child was behind one line of protesters. BWV from multiple officers suggested the child would have been difficult to see from behind the first line of officers, but the Panel could not fully verify the officer’s statement, as the various BWV footage it reviewed was filmed by cameras at chest-level, not eye-level.

Incident #2: Police Vehicles Set on Fire, SPD Rifles Stolen, May 30

Protesters began to assemble in and around Westlake Park in the early afternoon of May 30, as protesters seeking to join the *Not This Time!* protests were joined by protesters walking to Westlake Park from the earlier protest at SPD Headquarters.

SPD Incident Command (IC) had been deploying officers to different locations (downtown and SPD Headquarters) to enable peaceful protests and minimize the risk of criminal activity,¹¹¹ and as protest groups moved from place to place, IC sought to ensure officers were deployed efficiently and effectively. As the scheduled time for the Westlake protests neared, a team of officers was dispatched to the Westlake protests; they drove in three patrol vehicles to their assigned location south of Westlake Park, and parked on Pine Street between 4th Ave. and 5th Ave., close to their posted location, at about 2:00 pm.¹¹²

By that time, SPD had placed multiple cordons around the Westlake area.¹¹³ SPD sought to minimize the risk that protestors would have unsafe contact with motor vehicle traffic in the area, in part by ensuring that the flow of pedestrians followed the existing traffic flow of one-way streets.¹¹⁴ This led an SPD Captain to position officers in a line at 4th Ave. and Pine St. that prevented people from entering Westlake Park and joining the protest if they approached from the west or the north. Other lines of SPD officers were created at the intersection of 5th Ave. and Pine St. that similarly restricted access to the Westlake area from the north and east (see Figure 15 below).

¹¹¹ Incident Action Plan 05-30-2020, IAP Objectives: “Provide for the safety of the general public, spectators, first responders, and participants during this statewide COVID-19 state of emergency which does not permit public gatherings; Facilitate citizen's right to peacefully express their First Amendment free speech rights within the parameters set forth by the Washington State Governor’s Stay at Home proclamation and the suspension of permitted events; Take enforcement action for violent crimes committed against persons or significant property damage, while ensuring arrests are conducted in a safe and effective manner and in accordance with training and law; Deter criminal activity and protect public and private property by providing a significant uniformed patrol presence; Minimize the disruption to traffic through the use of traffic diversion as required.”


¹¹² Use of Force Report, SWAT2 May 30, 2020, reports on cars been parked; Incident Action Plan May 30, 2020, assigned personnel their posts for the event, including the teams at Westlake; SPOC Log May 30, 2020, entries 151,158, reports on the arrival of teams to Westlake and their potential locations, including that of their vehicles.

¹¹³ Use of Force Report Lt. 2

¹¹⁴ Personal communication, Sentinel Event Review, session 9, March 1, 2021.



Figure 15. Map of SPD cordons and patrol vehicles, afternoon of May 30, 2020.



At 2:40 p.m. the SPOC instructed SPD bicycle officers to move the protesters southbound on both 4th Ave. and 5th Ave., and eastbound on Pine St. Two minutes later, officers were ordered to clear police patrols from Pine St.

Officers who had parked their vehicles on Pine St. moved them one block away, to the block of Pine St. between 5th Ave. and 6th Ave. One of the vehicles contained three SPD rifles. Two of these were stored in a locked cabinet in the back of the patrol vehicle. Because the cabinet only had capacity for two rifles, the third rifle was unlocked in a zippered bag in the back of the locked SUV.¹¹⁵

A group of protesters gathered on Olive Way between 4th Ave. and 6th Ave., remaining there until after 6 p.m. To protect these protesters from vehicular traffic on cross streets, SPD dispatched a group of officers to Olive Way, including the original drivers of the three patrol vehicles parked near the protest. The officers were issued “less lethal” munitions and were asked to support the SPD officers at the front of the line at 5th Ave. and Olive Way as “linebackers.”¹¹⁶ Given the requirement that SPD officers remain where they were assigned to assist with crowd management, the drivers of those vehicles were unable to return and move them (see figure 16).

SPD began a dispersal tactic at 5th Ave. and Pine St., deploying CS gas and flash bang grenades that forced protesters into Pine St. However, SPD lacked sufficient resources to both hold the intersection and move forward into Pine St., and so officers held back from further movement or crowd dispersal. The SPD decision to remain at the intersection rather than continue the dispersal left the now highly agitated protesters free to begin attacks on property, and the unattended police vehicles provided a target for their anger.¹¹⁷


¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Complaint 6th USA vs Means, W. D. Washington: “On May 30, 2020, three SPD officers were utilizing Vehicle 4. All three officers were issued rifles and had been asked to bring them with them when they deployed to the area of the protest. Two of the officers stored their rifles in locked rifle drawers in Vehicle 4, but there was not room for [the third officer’s] rifle, so she placed her rifle . . . in its rifle bag in the trunk/cargo area of the vehicle. The last time Vehicle 4 was moved, one of the officers parked it on 6th Avenue between Olive Way and Pine Street.”

¹¹⁶ “Linebackers” are SPD officers trained in the use of “less lethal” munitions whose role is to stand behind the initial police line, ready to deploy munitions if needed to protect protesters or officers.

¹¹⁷ SPD BWV: (a) _Clip_1_1_AXON_Body_2_Video_2020-05-30_1437, (b) AXON_Body_2_Video_2020-05-30_1438; CAD Log: 2020-05-30 Saturday log – Redacted.



Figure 16. Locations of SPD lines and unattended patrol vehicles, May 30.



1. At 2:42 p.m., SPD vehicles originally parked on Pine St. Between 4th Ave and 5th Ave are moved to 6th.
2. At 3:00 p.m., a protest organized by *Not this Time!* begins in Westlake Park.
3. At 3:05 p.m. officers establish a new line on 4th near Olive Way to block southbound traffic.
4. 3:10 p.m. A child is pepper sprayed close to a police line on Pine St. close to 4th Ave.
5. One SPD vehicle Parked on Pine St is vandalized and set on fire at 3:55 p.m.
6. Five SPD Vehicles on 6th Ave are set on fire at roughly 4:18 p.m.
7. Later in the evening, three King County Metro vehicles are set on fire within several blocks of the protest.

At 3:55 p.m., one of the SPD vehicles was vandalized and set on fire in front of the Old Navy store (511 Pine St., near 5th Ave.). The scene rapidly became more violent and destructive. Lacking a safe perimeter around the area, SPD allowed the vehicles to burn and, due to the lack of a safety perimeter around the area, refused a request from the Seattle Fire Department (SFD) to put the fire out at 4:00 p.m.¹¹⁸

Beginning around 4:14 p.m., a line of five police vehicles parked on 6th Ave were vandalized. Videos taken by people in the crowd¹¹⁹ show individuals removing three rifles from the back of one of the vehicles. One of the rifles was quickly recovered, unloaded and returned to SPD shortly thereafter by a private security guard in the crowd. Of the other two rifles, one was later anonymously returned to the West Precinct, and the other was recovered from an individual currently facing criminal charges for the incident.

Individuals in the crowd continued vandalizing the vehicles and then set them on fire. The vehicles caught fire and burned on the street for more than 20 minutes, until SPD was able to secure safe access for SFD to the area. By 5:53 p.m. SFD had extinguished the fires on Pine St. and those on 6th Ave.¹²⁰

Overall, at least eight (8) vehicles – six (6) SPD vehicles and two (2) King County Metro cars – were vandalized and incinerated during the day. The fires, as well as the seeming lack of SPD or SFD presence for an extended period of time during these incidents, were dramatic indicators to the general public of the unrest and lack of control in downtown Seattle.

¹¹⁸ <https://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2020/06/07/timelines-of-police-responses-to-demonstrations/>

¹¹⁹ CCTV video is not stored in the City of Seattle, and therefore could not be used to trace the other stolen rifle.

¹²⁰ SPD BWV: (Clip 2.1) AXON Body 2 Video May 30, 2020, 1558 (SFD 6th 4-46pm).




Incident #3: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest, May 30

Downtown Seattle continued to be a chaotic environment into the early hours of May 31, 2020. Pockets of protesters were joined by dozens, and perhaps hundreds of individuals breaking into and stealing from stores and businesses throughout the area.

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on May 30, a 911 call was placed from a T-Mobile store at 1527 6th Ave. (between Pine and Pike Streets), reporting that a group of individuals had broken into the store and were stealing property (see Figure 17 below). A squad of SPD bicycle officers responded to the call.

A crowd had gathered across the street from the T-Mobile, and as the officers arrived, a number of people were running out of the store and away from police.¹²¹ Bystanders on the scene filmed the interactions.¹²² The officers dismounted and began trying to apprehend individuals fleeing from the store. One SPD officer grabbed a male in a white hoodie and pulled him to the ground. A second officer, who was the subject of complaints and was referred to in the OPA report as “Named Employee #1” or “NE#1,” dismounted from his bike and began to assist the first officer with handcuffing the man.

Figure 17. Map of Westlake Area on May 30.



With the man face down on the sidewalk, the first officer straddled the man at the waist and pulled his arms behind his back so he could be handcuffed. NE#1 knelt at the man's head, facing the other officer. Telling the man to put his hands behind his back, NE#1 pushed the man's face down towards the sidewalk. The other officer repeated the instruction for the man to put his hands behind his back, and then NE#1 appeared to place his knee on the man's head or upper shoulder or neck.

¹²¹ A curfew had been declared from 5 p.m. on May 30 until 5 a.m. on May 31, making it illegal to be on the streets. SPD officers described “hundreds” of people on the street observing the T-Mobile looting and subsequent arrests. SPD officers were not attempting to carry out mass arrests of these individuals.

¹²² See, e.g., <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/seattle-police-video-kneeling-neck-george-floyd-video-protests-violent-riots-a9541226.html>.



As individuals continued to run out of the store and officers were being yelled at by onlookers, it appeared that NE#1's attention was split between the arrest and his surroundings. As he placed his hands on the man's head, he was holding an OC canister that he put back in his belt, and he was looking up and around him while his knee was on the man's head, rather than looking down at the man. As the handcuffing proceeded, NE#1's knee could be viewed on the man's lower head and, possibly his neck (though the Panel could not confirm this from the available video).

At that moment, another male in an orange hoodie and wearing a backpack ran out of the T-Mobile. NE#1 jumped up from his position over the man in the white hoodie, and pulled the man in the orange hoodie down to the ground with the assistance of a third officer, referred to by OPA as "Witness Officer #1" or "WO#1." NE#1 and WO#1 worked to remove Subject #2's backpack so they could handcuff him. As with the prior arrest, the man in the orange hoodie was face down on the street, with WO#1 straddling his waist and facing towards his head as he attempted to put on handcuffs. Again, NE#1 was at the man's head, facing WO#1. For a second time, NE#1 placed his knee in an area that appeared to be the top of the back and/or the neck of Subject #2.

At that time, bystanders were loudly and angrily yelling at the officers, repeatedly shouting at the officers to "Get your knee off of his neck!" BWV captured WO#1 saying to NE#1: "Get your knee off his neck," to which NE#1 replied: "Yup." WO#1 then reached over and pulled NE#1's knee down to the middle of the man's back, between his shoulder blades. The man was rapidly handcuffed, and the officers immediately discontinued their use of force, helped the man up, and led the individual to an area with other arrestees.

A video of both arrests and the positioning of NE#1's knee was recorded by a community member and received substantial visibility on social media.


Incident #4: Bicycle officer altercation and arrest with pedestrian, May 31

On the afternoon of May 31, 2020, a large group of protesters was peacefully marching northbound on 4th Ave. A squad of six (6) SPD bicycle officers on duty were facilitating the march by operating in "leapfrog" fashion, moving ahead of marchers to block vehicular traffic at intersections and ensure that protesters did not turn down one-way streets against the flow of traffic, which could cause injury and/or add disruption to traffic in the area. As the protesters progressed, the bicycle officers would move as a squad up to the next block to ensure continued safe passage for the protesters.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., the officers got on their bikes at Spring St. and moved north along with the marchers (see Figure 18 below). The crowd was very large but moving calmly. The officers rode single file on the far right of the sidewalk, essentially against the side of buildings along 4th Ave. Even when the officers were pressed against the side of the buildings, pedestrians occasionally blocked their passage.



Figure 18. Location of the bicycle altercation.



As officers approached people from behind, they reported that they “gave verbal orders to these individuals, to move to the side and out of the way and identified themselves as police.”¹²³

One individual, wearing a hooded jacket with the hood pulled up, with a backpack on and a duffle bag on his left shoulder, was at the far right of the crowd, in the path of the advancing bicycle squad. The first two bicycle officers appeared able to pass this individual with little or no contact. The third officer made contact with the individual and was forced to briefly put one foot down from the pedals of the bike. The officer remounted the bike and continued on. The fourth officer reached out while riding with his left hand, which he placed on the right shoulder of the individual, pushing the individual slightly to the left and creating enough space for his bike to move past. At this, the individual raised his arm as if exasperated by the officer’s contact.

The individual did not at any point turn back to see if other bicycles were coming and did not move to the left despite the contact from the first four officers. Officers in the squad viewed the individual’s actions as deliberate “shoulder-checking” of the officers as they rode past, describing this as a known tactic to slow down and separate officers in a single-file bicycle line and reduce their ability to direct the crowd at the front of the line, potentially allowing the demonstrators to commit crimes. There were also four people walking to the left of the individual, which could have made it difficult for him to move left, though the individual did not stop or make any outward effort to allow the officers to easily pass.

It is difficult to see precisely what happened next, as the BWV from the fifth and sixth officers were on their chests, and neither camera captured a perspective of the fifth officer’s head. As the fifth officer

¹²³ The Panel could not corroborate that these statements were made. The OPA report of this Incident concluded that while “the Body Worn Video (BWV) of this portion of the incident did not contain sound as it was recorded within the one-minute buffer period which the camera records prior to an officer activating the camera . . . that these orders were given does not appear to be in dispute given the totality of the evidence.”



approached the individual, it appears that the officer attempted to repeat the same maneuver as the officer in front, reaching out with his hand and pushing the individual slightly. The camera from the 6th officer (Officer 6) shows the bike handlebars of the 5th officer (Officer 5) getting entangled with the individual, and then Officer 5 grabbing the individual and dropping his handlebars, dismounting/falling over the front handlebars while holding the individual and bringing both himself and the individual to the ground.

Because Officer 6 had his chest bent down over his own handlebars, it is impossible to see what exactly happened between the individual and Officer 5. Officer 5 claimed that the individual had punched him in the head. The individual later claimed that he had simply been walking down the street and the officers ran into him, threw him down, and punched him repeatedly. On viewing the footage, the Panel could not see whether a punch was thrown.

Once Officer 5 brought the individual to the ground, Officer 4 (immediately in front of arresting Officer 5) got off his bicycle and turned toward Officer 5 and the individual, while Officer 6, the trailing officer, got off his bicycle and began blocking Officer 5 and the individual from the rest of the crowd. The crowd immediately and angrily gathered around the officers, with at least two people from the crowd rushing in and attempting to intervene in the arrest. One of those individuals was arrested after she attempted to grab the vest of Officer 5.

While on the ground, Officer 5 and the individual struggled, and Officer 5 punched the Subject twice in quick succession in the individual's upper shoulder/lower head area. While this was occurring, the crowd became quite animated, and signs, bottles, and a metal pan were thrown at the officers. SPD officers deployed OC spray, and people in the crowd responded in kind, spraying the officers with what was described by one officer as "bear spray" and in the OPA Case Summary Report as "some sort of pepper spray." One officer pushed his "emergency response" button, causing more than 30 additional SPD officers to appear on the scene and create a protective perimeter around the area while the two individuals were being handcuffed.

As officers were streaming to the scene, a protester opened an umbrella and pointed it towards the officers. This further heightened tensions for the police, since as one officer explained, "once that umbrella opens, now I can't see anyone's hands or anything going on behind that umbrella – it's really scary." This, coupled with continued physical abuse from protesters and thrown objects, led officers to deploy blast balls and forcibly extend their protective perimeter to the end of the block, which in turn sent a previously peaceful crowd down 4th Ave. in a state of extreme agitation.

As the second individual was being arrested, she asked what she had done. "I was standing up for someone," she said. One of the officers replied, "You interfered with a lawful arrest, that's why you're under arrest." "Well then maybe you shouldn't beat people, did you ever think of that?" was her reply.

Officer 5 and the two individuals being arrested were moved over to the side of the buildings as other officers arrived and began to move the crowd back. The first individual kept repeating "I didn't do nothing," and an officer's voice can be heard telling the individual to stop spitting at the officer. The individual was lowered to the ground and officers explained to him that they were putting a spit sock on him – a mesh hood that is designed to be breathable but to prevent the transmission of fluids from an individual's mouth and nose. The arrests were completed without further incident.



With the man face down on the sidewalk, the first officer straddled the man at the waist and pulled his arms behind his back so he could be handcuffed. NE#1 knelt at the man's head, facing the other officer. Telling the man to put his hands behind his back, NE#1 pushed the man's face down towards the sidewalk. The other officer repeated the instruction for the man to put his hands behind his back, and then NE#1 appeared to place his knee on the man's head or upper shoulder or neck.

As individuals continued to run out of the store and officers were being yelled at by onlookers, it appeared that NE#1's attention was split between the arrest and his surroundings. As he placed his hands on the man's head, he was holding an OC canister that he put back in his belt, and he was looking up and around him while his knee was on the man's head, rather than looking down at the man. As the handcuffing proceeded, NE#1's knee could be viewed on the man's lower head and, possibly his neck (though the Panel could not confirm this from the available video).

At that moment, another male in an orange hoodie and wearing a backpack ran out of the T-Mobile. NE#1 jumped up from his position over the man in the white hoodie, and pulled the man in the orange hoodie down to the ground with the assistance of a third officer, referred to by OPA as "Witness Officer #1" or "WO#1." NE#1 and WO#1 worked to remove Subject #2's backpack so they could handcuff him. As with the prior arrest, the man in the orange hoodie was face down on the street, with WO#1 straddling his waist and facing towards his head as he attempted to put on handcuffs. Again, NE#1 was at the man's head, facing WO#1. For a second time, NE#1 placed his knee in an area that appeared to be the top of the back and/or the neck of Subject #2.

At that time, bystanders were loudly and angrily yelling at the officers, repeatedly shouting at the officers to "Get your knee off of his neck!" BWV captured WO#1 saying to NE#1: "Get your knee off his neck," to which NE#1 replied: "Yup." WO#1 then reached over and pulled NE#1's knee down to the middle of the man's back, between his shoulder blades. The man was rapidly handcuffed, and the officers immediately discontinued their use of force, helped the man up, and led the individual to an area with other arrestees.

A video of both arrests and the positioning of NE#1's knee was recorded by a community member and received substantial visibility on social media.

Incident #5: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident, June 1

Monday, June 1, 2020, marked Seattle's fourth day of protests focused on police legitimacy (or the lack thereof) and the disproportionality of police responses to community behavior. In each of the prior days, protests had begun peacefully, only to escalate later in the day and night into violence and police uses of force, often directed at officers or property of the Seattle Police Department (e.g., the patrol vehicles set on fire on May 30).

Given the previous three days, it is likely that protesters were increasingly viewing the actions of the City and SPD on prior days as restricting the right to protest, and therefore were increasingly protesting the lack of perceived legitimacy of the SPD and the City of Seattle to impose limitations on the crowd's actions. On the other hand, SPD was quite reasonably concerned about the loss of order and the corresponding risk to people and property that had resulted on prior days, and its obligation to protect and serve the community. As SPD prepared for June 1 it anticipated a similar pattern of events and was



concerned that peaceful protesters would be replaced as the day went on with individuals more focused on violence and destruction toward police and other community institutions.

Demonstrations on Monday, June 1, began at noon with a vigil outside First African Methodist Episcopal Church in Seattle. Pastor Carey Anderson, protest organizer Andre Taylor, Police Chief Carmen Best, and Fire Chief Harold Scoggins addressed attendees. "We are talking today because of the continuous killing of black men and women needs to be addressed. We are here today because of the inhumane, unusual treatment of black and brown people in this country," said Pastor Anderson.¹²⁴

At 2:00 p.m., Mayor Durkan, Police Chief Best, and Fire Chief Scoggins held a press conference from the Emergency Operations Center in which they addressed the prior weekend's demonstrations, discussed preparations for future demonstrations, and announced a 6:00 p.m. citywide curfew.¹²⁵

Many protest organizers seemed to understand the potential for disorder to emerge again, and some restated their commitment to non-violent protests. At approximately 3:00 p.m., SPD gathered at Westlake Park.¹²⁶ Leaders of the march conveyed their desire for peaceful protests, saying to the assembled crowd "If you are here to riot, loot, cause problems, then go home!"¹²⁷ At 3:56 p.m., the protesters left Westlake Park and with the support and protection of SPD, traveled to Seattle City Hall, where speakers addressed the crowd before demonstrators marched back to Westlake Park.¹²⁸ According to SPD estimates, the number of marchers started at about 1,500 but grew rapidly; by 5:40 p.m., SPD reported that the crowd had roughly 7,000 participants. Organizers of the march informed SPD representatives of their intention to march to the East Precinct building at 1519 12th Ave. (between Pike St. and Pine St.).¹²⁹

The East Precinct had been a recurring site for protestors in the preceding three days, and SPD claimed to have received intelligence that the building might be a target for arson, imitating the destruction of a Minneapolis Police Department precinct building on May 28.¹³⁰ This was a matter of concern to SPD leadership, as the building itself was relatively unprotected and very close to other buildings. SPD deemed the building to (a) be difficult to protect and (b) present a substantial risk to nearby buildings if it caught on fire.¹³¹

Despite these concerns, protest leaders negotiated with Police Chief Best for permission to march to the East Precinct,¹³² and the Chief agreed. Shortly after 6:00 p.m., protesters marched peacefully eastbound on Pine St.

As the crowd moved toward the Seattle Police Department's East Precinct, SPD officers, concerned that the protesters intended to "capture" the East Precinct and "burn it down,"¹³³ deployed "fence lines" of

¹²⁴ <https://www.q13fox.com/news/prayer-vigil-at-seattle-church-promotes-peace-not-violence>

¹²⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n12ik35H4t4&feature=youtu.be>

¹²⁶ <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1267574346794455041>

¹²⁷ <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1267580080189960192>

¹²⁸ <https://twitter.com/HannaKIROFM/status/1267590755519918080>

¹²⁹ SPD Blotter June 1.

¹³⁰ The Panel was not provided with this "intelligence," and is unable to confirm its existence or its credibility. Many Panelists remain skeptical of its existence and view it as a justification for illegitimate limitations on public gatherings.

¹³¹ See, e.g., SPOC Log May 29, 2020, entry 61.; SPOC Log May 31, 2020, entries 212, 310, 342; Force Review Unit (FRU) Arrest Report for May 31, 2020; SPD Blotter June 29 and June 31, 2020; SPD presentation, Debrief of June 1, 2020, Event.


¹³² <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1267618361942237184>

¹³³ Use of Force Statement, Sgt3 June 1, 2020, at 5.



officers in a protective perimeter one block away from the building in each direction, with lines on the west side of 11th Ave. across Pine St; on the east side of 13th Ave. across Pine St.; on the south side of Olive St. across 12th Ave., and on the north side of 12th St. across Pike St. (see Figure 19 below). The fences were made of loosely interlocking metal racks approximately 6 feet in length and approximately 4 feet high – similar to bicycle racks or the barriers constructed near the stage at popular music concerts.

Figure 19. Map of SPD barrier placement at East Precinct, June 1, 2020.



At 7:11 p.m., the estimated crowd of 7,000 marchers reached the west side of the police line at 11th Ave. and Pine St.¹³⁴ Discussions between SPD representatives and protest leaders took place, and shortly after 7:30 p.m., East Precinct Captain Bryan Grenon and Lieutenant Paul Leung took a knee with protesters.¹³⁵ The crowd wanted to continue to the East Precinct building, but SPD refused, holding the fence lines in place. Protestors requested Mayor Durkan’s presence, but the Mayor did not appear. Protesters chanted “Where’s the mayor?”¹³⁶ and “Let us walk.”¹³⁷

SPD officers at the scene had been briefed on SPD’s concerns regarding potential crowd tactics and the risk of arson to the East Precinct, and on SPD tactics to move the demonstrators from the area if needed. The plan of action was to use less lethal munitions to disperse the crowd into Cal Anderson Park.¹³⁸

SPD’s stockpile of “less lethal” or crowd control munitions had been largely expended in the past three days, and the Department was reliant on mutual aid requests from other departments to replenish what

¹³⁴ SPD Blotter June 1.

¹³⁵ <https://twitter.com/choeshow/status/1267646433454206977>

¹³⁶ <https://twitter.com/heidigroover/status/1267658468413980675>

¹³⁷ <https://twitter.com/heidigroover/status/1267661343730962433>

¹³⁸ To the extent the stated tactical goal here is accurate, it would appear to have some flaws. The throng of marchers approached the police line from the west on Pine St, with Cal Anderson Park on their north (left) side. The edge of the park is a baseball field, with approximately 8-foot high chain link fencing across its southern border, making entry into the park impossible for anyone in the crowd who was on the street west of Pine St. Thus, the majority of the crowd could not enter the wide-open space of the park, and instead had nowhere to disperse except back down Pine St.



it could on short notice. As a result, officers outside the East Precinct shared a depleted stock of OC spray and were more heavily reliant on CS gas than during normal times – a less targeted tool for addressing violent demonstrators or looters, and one that would certainly have a negative impact on anyone in the vicinity of its use far beyond any single instigator of violence who was the target of SPD.¹³⁹

By 9:00 p.m., the crowd of protesters continued to protest at the SPD barricade, and was occasionally pushing the unstable fencing. To protect the line, SPD bicycle officers with helmets and in “soft gear” (i.e., regular uniforms, lacking protective padding or armor) stood immediately behind the fencing. These officers had very few options for movement, as they were unwilling to allow the crowd greater access to the East Precinct; accordingly, the protesters remained in place waiting for the police to allow them to pass.

As protesters chanted “let us through,” SPD radio transmissions at 9:04 p.m. reflect at least two efforts of a few individuals at the front of the crowd to push into the fence line.¹⁴⁰ These attempts were halted by the bicycle officers on the scene without further incident, and the crowd stayed behind the line in the moments that followed.

While the situation then appears to calm, these brief attempts to push through the line caused the SPD Incident Commander to authorize the use of OC spray, CS gas and blast balls if the crowd made further attempts to push through the line. Given depleted stocks of OC spray and the size of the crowds, the Incident Commander considered CS gas the most viable alternative. Officers were instructed to put gas masks on, and SPD officers wearing gas masks and carrying batons replaced the bicycle officers at the front of the line, who in turn donned their gas masks. Both publicly available and BWV footage shows this “change in posture” at the front of the line, as well as a group of officers in gas masks and hard gear assembling farther behind the barricades.¹⁴¹

The replacement of the bicycle officers with officers in gas masks and hard gear was interpreted by some in the crowd as a signal that more aggressive crowd control tactics, and likely gas, were about to be deployed. The crowd reacted with increased agitation and with the opening of several umbrellas.

There was little, if any communication between the SPD and the crowd as this transition was occurring. SPD lacked any sort of appropriate PA system that could be heard over the noise of the crowd, and what equipment they did have for broadcasting communications to the crowd was not physically present at 11th Ave. and Pine St. at that time. To make things worse, once officers donned their gas masks, their ability to communicate with protesters was significantly reduced. As a result, no message was conveyed to the crowd that might have de-escalated the situation and SPD’s self-protective rationale donning gas masks actually added to the likelihood that gas would be used and masks would be needed.

At approximately 9:09 p.m., as individuals stood by the fence chanting “take off your riot gear, we don’t see a riot here,” one protester held an opened pink umbrella out over the police line and very near the

¹³⁹ SPD, Combined Event Operations Center (EOC) emails.

¹⁴⁰ SPD reported that one of these attempts to breach the police line caused a section of fencing to tip over on top of an SPD officer, who then had to be rescued and the fencing restored. The Panel was unable to confirm this account, as no officer BWV was available until moments after this incident. The Panel did observe one attempt to push through the fence that was halted by SPD and Washington State Police, followed by roughly six (6) minutes of peaceful protesting at the line prior to the deployment of crowd control munitions by police.

¹⁴¹ <https://youtu.be/4IHbLRdi09Y>. The individual who took this video provides narration throughout. Notably, the individual mentions “a definite change in posture” and that the crowd “can expect next . . . tear gas . . . and possibly flash bangs . . . now that they brought out the troopers.” (Video around 2:10).



face of an officer on the line. The officer grabbed the umbrella out of the protester's hands. When the protester tried to pull the umbrella back, several officers nearby deployed OC spray in the direction of the protester with the umbrella.¹⁴² The spray hit a number of protesters in the area, causing them to retreat. This use of force incited reactions elsewhere in the crowd, however, causing a surge in another area of the line and several glass bottles and other projectiles being thrown by protesters standing further back in the crowd. This, in turn, caused SPD officers to use blast balls and CS smoke grenades, both of which were used to clear the crowd from the intersection.^{143, 144}

Chaos ensued throughout the intersection and nearby Cal Anderson Park, as SPD officers moved through the park and extended their perimeter around the East Precinct. At 9:28 p.m., SPD declared a riot in the area.¹⁴⁵ Ultimately, the neighborhood was flooded with CS gas.¹⁴⁶ The gas drifted throughout the neighborhood and seeped into homes, making SPD and the East Precinct a flashpoint and symbol for police oppression in Seattle. As one resident angrily yelled at the officers that night: "I live here! You're terrorizing my neighborhood!" The protests began to taper off after 10:30 p.m.

¹⁴² SPD BWV: AXON Body 3 Footage: 4:09:58 – Lt. yells "OC, OC." 4:10:00 – officer sprays

¹⁴³ https://www.reddit.com/r/Seattle/comments/gv0ru3/this_is_the_moment_it_all_happened/?utm_content=title&utm_medium=post_embed&utm_name=80928aa101ce46778c28ad2f173bb1c5&utm_source=embedly&utm_term=gv0ru3

¹⁴⁴ Many gas canisters were deployed using a high deployment ("overhand throw") method rather than the preferred low deployment ("bowling style") method. Officers stated that it was necessary to overhand throw past the officers in the front line to facilitate ground-level dispersal of CS gas in the crowd and to avoid accidental dispersal across the police line. Use of Force Statement, Sgt3 June 1, 2020; Use of Force Statement, Sgt4 June 1, 2020.

¹⁴⁵ SPD Blotter June 1.

¹⁴⁶ <https://twitter.com/heidgroover/status/1267686451472248832>



Appendix G. List of Recommendations by Theme

For convenience, OIG has grouped each recommendation in this report into one of five themes. These themes are:

- **Communication and Community Engagement** – recommendations for SPD to promote dialogue between police and community;
- **Priorities and Situational Awareness** – recommendations for improving SPD situational awareness and shifting from crowd management and control to crowd facilitation and crowd safety;
- **Tactics and Equipment** – recommendations for alternatives to tactics and tools used by officers that appeared to escalate tensions or otherwise contributed to negative outcomes;
- **Officer Wellness and Training** – recommendations for areas of opportunity to support both the department and individual officers in demonstrations; and
- **Coordination of City-wide Response / Suggestions to other Agencies** – recommendations related to other departments.

Many of the Panel’s recommendations could fit into two or more categories, highlighting the degree to which these subjects are interrelated. Additionally, most of the Panel’s recommendations touched on the theme of community legitimacy, or the gap between what SPD may be permitted to do by law or policy (structural legitimacy) and what officers need to do to meet standards of justice expected by community (perceived legitimacy). Because most of the Panel’s recommendations impact community legitimacy in some form, OIG has not included it in the table below.

Table 11. Recommendations by Theme

Recommendations	Related Incident (Recommendation #)
Communication and Community Engagement	
Enable better interactions with demonstration organizers in advance of protests, SPD should build legitimacy through expanded community policing initiatives, including the expansion of foot patrols, and build deeper personal relationships between officers and individuals throughout the communities of Seattle.	Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations (1)
Engage in direct and ongoing community dialogue to understand and adapt to the diverse community perspectives about the institution of police.	Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations (2)
Modify SPD’s policy on content neutrality to permit officers staffing a public event focused on issues of policing to demonstrate solidarity with the crowd participants’ rights to protest if they choose.	Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations (6)
Eliminate disrespectful statements or actions from SPD officers to individuals or groups protesting.	Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations



	(7)
Evaluate whether an encrypted standardized alert messaging system (e.g., WhatsApp, Yammer, or other technology) could replace radio communication during crowd facilitation events.	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (15)
If short term closures of streets or blockages of specific intersections are necessary for the safety of the crowd, SPD should ensure that its officers can adequately inform individuals in the crowd of the reasons for the blockages and provide them with adequate alternative options to continue moving.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (20)
Ensure that all limitations on crowd behavior or conduct are designed to maximize the safety of individuals in the crowd, and that any communications about such limitations articulate that safety rationale in ways that emphasize LEED (Listening and Explaining with Equity and Dignity) principles. Specific messages should be conveyed in simple, layperson terms that are accessible to all, and should be focused on explaining the public safety necessity motivating the message.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (21)
<p>Improve SPD's capability to inform and communicate with demonstrators during group events in the following ways:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Multiple modes of communication should be considered, including audio, video, other visual media (e.g., posters, banners, etc.), social media, and others; 2. The modes of communication and specific messages should be included in the Incident Action Plan created by SPD prior to events and updated throughout the pre-event planning phase; 3. The communications should be documented and recorded during the event, including by having officers certify their use on police radio that is retained by SPD; and 4. Their impact should be evaluated and specifically assessed in post-event review by SPD. 	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (22)
Procure a suitable audio device to ensure that the crowd can hear messages relevant to the event.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (23)
Communicate in advance when it plans to create barricades or restrictions to protesters or marches. The reason for the creation of such zones should be clearly articulated and driven by a public safety rationale.	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (46)
Priorities and Situational Awareness	
Alter SPD's strategy for policing protests to focus more explicitly and comprehensively on the facilitation of peaceful assembly and ensuring the safety of protestors. The focus and mindset of SPD officers deployed to assist in crowd events should move away from "crowd management,"	Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations (3)



“crowd control,” and “law enforcement” to “facilitation of speech” and “crowd protection and safety.”	
<p>Embrace procedures that visibly signal SPD’s commitment to ensuring the safe and peaceful gathering with the minimum necessary engagement of SPD officers, and limit that engagement to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting the ability of individuals and groups to express First Amendment freedoms; • Protecting the physical safety of individuals within as well as beyond the crowd and • Preventing the destruction of public or private property. 	<p>Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations</p> <p>(4)</p>
<p>Provide officers with clear direction about SPD’s priorities in facilitating demonstrations, particularly when the institution of policing is the focus of the protest. SPD’s focus should be on facilitating access and safety for all. SPD should enhance the ability to address dangerous situations with minimal impact on peaceful demonstrators while minimizing the use of munitions or indiscriminate force.</p>	<p>May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics</p> <p>(9)</p>
<p>In considering whether to use force during a crowd event, SPD officers must evaluate whether the use of force can be limited to those against whom the force is justified, and that the potential for collateral impact is minimized.</p>	<p>May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child</p> <p>(25)</p>
<p>SPD officers should improve their situational awareness, considering the relationship of their actions to the overall strategy and tactics of the event, and the support available to the officer(s) relative to the size of the event.</p>	<p>May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests</p> <p>(44)</p>
<p>SPD officers should be trained to realize that the existence of Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”) or other defensive measures in a crowd of demonstrators, is not itself an aggressive measure requiring an escalating police response.</p>	<p>June 1, 2020: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident</p> <p>(49)</p>
<p>On-site incident commanders should carefully evaluate the context and threat from a crowd, with assistance from “dialogue officers” in the crowd.</p>	<p>June 1, 2020: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident</p> <p>(51)</p>
<p>Consider the creation of dialogue officers to ensure effective, real-time, de-escalatory communication between SPD and protesters.</p>	<p>June 1, 2020: The “Pink Umbrella” Incident</p> <p>(52)</p>
Tactics and Equipment	
<p>Modify SPD’s tactics of crowd facilitation to prioritize communication, de-escalation, and carefully conducted removal of those who are creating an immediate danger to others or causing destruction to property, allowing the rest of the event to continue undisturbed.</p>	<p>Overarching Contributing Factors and Recommendations</p> <p>(5)</p>
<p>Use live CCTV footage and mobile SPD officers, whether on bicycles or in other vehicles, to rapidly intervene with and address groups destroying property.</p>	<p>May 29, 2020: Vandalism in the International District</p>



	(8)
Pursue a differentiated approach toward individuals within the crowd.	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (10)
Avoid the creation of immovable lines of officers at demonstrations and provide a mobilization plan for the deployment of bicycle or other mobile officers to ensure appropriate and rapid responsiveness to unplanned crowd events.	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (11)
Use mobile response units (e.g., bicycle or other vehicles) that are distinct from crowd facilitation officers or “dialogue officers” to address agitators or instigators of violence in the crowd. Mobile response units should remain out of sight and in reserve unless and until they are needed and engage in ways that permit individualized attention and minimize the impact on peaceful protestors and on the event in general.	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (14)
Establish the Incident Command Post and communication lines to officers facilitating protests or demonstrations so that the Incident Commander can observe multiple events in different locations simultaneously and receive real-time updates about each event, from officers trained in the supervision of crowd events who are physically present at each protest or demonstration.	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (17)
Avoid the deployment of officers in ways that prevent pedestrian/crowd movement or that separate individuals from other areas of protest without a clearly articulated safety rationale.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (19)
Review SPD protocols related to the presence of batons and their use during crowd facilitation events, potentially eliminating their presence at such events unless justified by a specific and compelling public safety purpose.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (24)
Limit arrests during protests targeted at the police to individuals committing immediate or imminent harm to people or property, and do not arrest individuals for offenses committed at an earlier time unless they can be accomplished in a way that will not escalate emotions in the crowd.	May 30, 2020: OC Spraying of Child (26)
Identify a specific area for officers reporting for crowd facilitation duty to convene and leave their vehicles, providing a shuttle system for officers to and from the areas where they are deployed and supervision for the vehicles.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (27)
If exigent circumstances prevent an officer from parking a vehicle at the designated area, officers should notify the SPOC of the location of the vehicle(s), and a designated officer should move the vehicle(s) to a designated safe area.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (28)



Ensure that any weapons or munitions brought to protests are securely stored and cannot be taken or used by anyone other than the officer to whom they were issued or other authorized SPD personnel.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (29)
SPD officers attending protests should not leave rifles unlocked in unattended police vehicles.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (30)
SPD should invest in rifle cabinets with locks that cannot be easily breached by others.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (31)
SPD should consider the utility of “biolocks” on all rifles to ensure that only the officer who is issued the rifle can fire it.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (32)
Implement a GPS system through the SPOC that allows Incident Command to know the precise location of every officer, vehicle, and lethal munition deployed during a crowd event.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (33)
Ensure that officers are held accountable for securing their weapons at all times, and that violations of SPD policies on these matters are investigated and enforced.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (35)
Establish protocols to guide officer responses to property crimes occurring during significant public disorder events. These protocols would, among other things, establish clear guidance for officers on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. When to disperse and when to arrest individuals who may be committing property crimes during civil unrest; b. How to conduct arrests of individuals who require prone handcuffing; and c. How to arrest individuals committing property crimes without escalating tensions between SPD and observers of the arrest. 	May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual’s Neck During Arrest (37)



Modify the policy and training for prone handcuffing to eliminate body weight pressure being applied above the shoulders of a subject being restrained.	May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest (38)
Monitor crowd activities from a sufficient distance that physical contact between SPD and protesters is not required or likely to unless an individual is an immediate physical danger to others.	May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests (40)
Train bicycle officers not to arrest individuals for passive resistance techniques like "shoulder-checking" unless the officer(s) determine that the acts are clear, deliberate, and intended to substantially interfere with the ability of the officer(s) to perform his or her immediate public safety responsibilities.	May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests (41)
When "leap-frogging" a protest, SPD officers should select alternative routes that minimize the likelihood of exposing officers or crowd participants to unnecessary risks.	May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests (42)
When a crowd prevents safe movement of bikes without contacting individuals in the crowd, SPD bicycle officers should consider dismounting and walking with bikes physically placed between officers and crowd members to minimize agitation and physical contact.	May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests (43)
Develop an arrest policy for each event and convey this to officers beforehand. Flexibility should exist in the tolerance of lower level misdemeanors balanced against the priority for ensuring the strategic goals of the operation.	May 31, 2020: Bike Officer Altercation and Pedestrian Arrests (45)
Conduct appropriate scenario planning and provide sufficient resources so that other SPD locations can protect and serve the people of Seattle in the event that public service from one or more of its buildings are disrupted by protests.	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (47)
Construct barricades between protesters and critical pieces of the public safety infrastructure (e.g., the East Precinct) rather than using lines of officers. Such barriers should strike a balance between protecting the integrity of the facility and preserving its accessibility to the public.	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (48)
SPD incident commanders should maximize the buffer space between officers and the crowd whenever possible.	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (50)
Ensure access to adequate supplies of OC spray to ensure that CS gas is never deployed due to a lack of access to other more preferable or appropriate options.	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (53)



Implement OIG's guidance on the use of CS gas set forth in Review of the SPD Crowd Dispersal Policy and Less Lethal Weapons, In Response to Ordinance 126102 .	June 1, 2020: The "Pink Umbrella" Incident (54)
Officer Wellness and Training	
Establish a staffing model for crowd events such that protests of the size and scale of the Westlake protests can be suitably staffed with mobile officers and other facilitation while minimizing SPD intrusion into the protests.	May 30, 2020 SPD Protest Control Tactics (12)
Ensure that all SPD officers, not just those officers assigned to crowd facilitation teams, are trained in crowd psychology, crowd facilitation, public safety procedures and tactics, and the mobilization techniques likely to be used at future crowd events.	May 30, 2020 SPD Protest Control Tactics (13)
Provide specific training, including scenario-based training on the management of large crowd events, and on the supervision of officers, for all SPD supervisors and above, including Incident Commanders and officers in the SPOC.	May 30, 2020 SPD Protest Control Tactics (16)
Implement staffing schedules, and provide officers with breaks, food and water, and pre- and post-event wellness initiatives to help officers at crowd events – and especially at crowd events that are critical of SPD and policing – deal with exhaustion, stress, and primary or secondary trauma that might result from their participation at such events.	May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest (39)
Coordinated City Response / Suggestions to other Agencies	
The Mayor's Office, SPD, SFD, the Department of Transportation and other departments should conduct appropriate scenario planning for disruptive protests. In particular the scenario planning should <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that sufficient resources are deployed so that other SPD locations can protect and serve the people of Seattle in the event that public service from one or more of its buildings are disrupted by protests; • Ensure that sufficient public transportation exists to help protesters leave a protest where an unlawful assembly or curfew has been declared or a legal order to disperse has been issued. 	May 30, 2020: SPD Protest Control Tactics (18)
Seattle City Council should consider whether CCTV camera footage could be kept by a third party for a limited time, and accessible to SPD or other appropriate parties upon request for suitable public safety purposes, including the ability to track stolen police weapons that would pose an imminent danger to the community.	May 30, 2020: Police Vehicles Set on Fire on Public Streets, Rifles Stolen (34)
The Mayor's Office and SPD leadership should critically examine the utility of a curfew and should exhaust other messaging options before declaring one. If a curfew is announced it should be limited in scope and clearly focused on public safety, rather than the deterrence of public protest.	May 30, 2020: Officer Placing Knee on Individual's Neck During Arrest (36)



Sentinel Event Review Wave 1 Report

Public Safety & Human Services Committee

July 27, 2021

What is a Sentinel Event Review (SER)?


- Examine significant events with negative outcomes (“sentinel events”) for systemic root causes, in order to prevent recurrence.
- Used in healthcare, airline, and other high-risk industries for decades—used more recently in policing such as for officer-involved shootings.
- This is the first known instance of applying SER to a rolling series of significant events.



“Focus on community perspectives and concerns; define implementable recommendations for SPD change.”

from SER Principles and Goals

Focusing on Community Perspectives



Forming Viable Consensus Recommendations



Peacemaking Circle

- Saroeum Phoung and Thary Lim of PointOneNorth Consulting facilitated a peace and reconciliation approach, to create a supportive environment for open conversations on difficult topics. **This is the first known use of Peacemaking in a sentinel event review.**

Panel meeting in community space donated by Donna Moodie.




Data Review & Incident Selection

SPD had over 750 protest-related uses of force in 2020. Periods of intense activity happened in five identifiable waves.




Level 1
Level 2
Level 3



Five Waves of Activity







Sources: 1. The Estimated Range of Protests shows the range - minimum and maximum - of the demonstration's size perceived by Seattle Police Department (Source: SPD Blotter.) 2. The Use of Force depicts the total uses of force per day. The orange circles the level-2 uses of force and the blue circle level-1 uses of force. There were no level-3 uses of force during this period, but this could change as investigations advance (Source: Force Review Unit report as of 11/05/2020.) 3. The arrests depicts the number of arrests per day (Source: SPD Blotter as of 11/05/2020.) 4. Officers injured depicts the max number between SPD's Blotter arrests reported injuries and SPD's HR reports of injured per day (Source SPD Blotter and SPD's reports on injuries as of 11/05/2020.) 5. OPA cases refer to the number of OPA cases received by the Financial Administrative Services related to demonstrations (Source FAS "Protest related claims" as 10/14/2020.) For both date refers to when the OPA cases were received and classified as demonstrations related. The date refers to when OIG received the complaints (Source OIG Call Log as of 20/11/2020.) 6. The Google searches per word are relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means there is no data for the term.



**Seattle Office of
Inspector General**

Wave 1 Incidents Reviewed



SER Process

John Hollway of the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice facilitated identification of Contributing Factors and Panel Recommendations.

Contributing Factor categories:

- Communication
- Cultural leadership
- Operational supervision
- Tactics
- Policies and procedures
- Equipment
- Environment
- Other



Seattle Office of
Inspector General



54 Recommendations: Five Themes

Community Legitimacy

- Addressing the gap between what SPD may be permitted to do by law and what is expected by community (structural vs. perceived legitimacy)

Situational Awareness

- Moving from a mindset of crowd management and control to one of crowd facilitation and crowd safety

Communication and Community Engagement

- Improving communication with communities and protesters before, during, and after protests

Tactics and Equipment

- Being aware of how certain tactics can escalate tensions

Officer Wellness and Training

- Recognizing the impacts of long shifts and prolonged hostile environments on officer wellness and behavior



Any Questions?

www.seattle.gov/oig/reports





Legislation Text

File #: Inf 1853, **Version:** 1

Seattle Fire Department RSJI Presentation

Seattle Fire Department Race & Social Justice Change Team

2020 Seattle City Council Update

2020 SFD RSJI Accomplishments

- Completed Four Important RETs
- Improved Communication and Collaboration with SFD Leadership
- Development of Cultural Competence through Department Wide RSJI Training
- Updated Hair and Uniform Policies – Culturally Progressive

2020 RSJ Challenges

- COVID-19 Impacts
- Employee Incidents that adversely impacted Race and Social Justice in the Department
- Data availability for research
- Implementation of solutions once problems have been identified via RETs.
- Communication with Leadership

Remedies to these challenges will include:

- Continued department wide training.
- Leadership engagement, leading by example.
- Accountability.
- Implementation of items identified in RETs and in conversations with leadership.

2020 Race and Equity Toolkits

- Equitable and consistent standards for participation on hiring panels
- Recruit School Retention
- Recruitment
- Executive Leadership Academy
- Hair and Uniform Policy

Consistent Standards For Participation On Hiring Panels

- The past policy for hiring panels had unintended negative RSJI consequences.
 - In order to establish diverse Oral Board Panels, engage in inclusive recruiting, and combat implicit bias, there was a need to change current policy for participation on hiring panels.
- Participation of members from underrepresented groups in recruiting and mentoring is vital for the department's BIPOC and female recruiting efforts.
- Dual participation in recruiting and on Oral Board Panels does not constitute a conflict of interest or violate the close personal relationships prohibition.

Outcome- *Women and people of color do not have to choose between participation in recruitment or participation on oral boards, they can do both.*

Recruit School Retention

- Competition for firefighting jobs in SFD is fierce. Due to a large number of applicants versus the small size of recruit classes (30-40 recruits), the vast majority of applicants are denied employment at some point in the hiring process.
- Graduation from the recruit training program should be reflective of an individual candidate's ability to meet established, evidence/job-based training requirements. Recruit graduation classes should be diverse.
- Graduation rates should not be influenced by implicit or explicit bias within recruit school, or inequitable practices. Strive for increased race and gender diversity.

Outcome - *Greater scrutiny regarding racial equity impacts and goals over time regarding POC and women in recruit school.*

Department Hair and Uniform Policy

- Historically hair and uniform policies have used words like “conservative style” that can have unspoken racial undertones.
- This required an update of the Department’s hair and uniform policy to create more inclusive language.
- Words from the policy such as “conservative style” which holds coded meanings that resulted in the policy not being inclusive to women and people of color have been retracted and the policy has been rewritten.
- Choices now exist for women with the dress uniform, rather than the one choice of fitting into a uniform that is tailored for a man

Outcome - *A more inclusive hair policy for People of Color. Greater uniform choices for women.*

Recruitment

- In the next five years retirements will significantly reduce the number of women and people of color in the department. Especially in the Officer level positions.
- In the past year alone, the number of Officers that are women and people of color has significantly declined.
- A survey regarding the biggest challenges to recruiting and hiring from diverse communities was conducted among the King County Fire Chiefs, their HR staff, and community members of color. It identified the following issues:
 - 22% Recruiting/Marketing practices
 - 22% Flawed Hiring practices
 - 18% Community Outreach
 - 12% Not changing the culture

- **Participation in a recruitment workgroup.**
 - **Identifying creative solutions to improve recruiting.**
- **Added a member of the City RSJI team on hiring panels.**
- **Workforce Development and Recruiting Plan**
 - **SFD Point person for recruitment and workforce development.**

Outcome - *Create and maintain an ongoing targeted recruitment strategy with adequate resources that builds a diverse workforce, reflects a culture of equity where all members of our community are welcomed, and creates and sustains a Department where women and people of color have equal opportunities for hire, career and salary growth.*

SFD UNIFORMED Workforce - January 14, 2019

Rank	Total	Male	Female	White	Black	Asian	Hispanic	AI/AN	NH/OPI	Two +	POC
CHIEFS	37	32	5	33	1	1	2	0	0	0	4
Fire	1	1			1						1
Assistant	3	3		3							0
Deputy	9	8	1	6		1	2				3
Battalion	24	20	4	24							0
OFFICERS	219	204	15	174	12	7	15	2	4	5	40
Captain	55	52	3	44	1	2	5	2		1	10
Fire Boat	8	8		5			2			1	2
Lieutenant	156	144	12	125	11	5	8		4	3	28
FIREFIGHTER	746	690	56	577	43	41	35	15	8	27	142
TOTAL	1002	926	76	784	56	49	52	17	12	32	186

SFD UNIFORMED Workforce - June 29, 2021

Rank	Total	Male	Female	White	Black	Asian	Hispanic	AI/AN	NH/OPI	Two +	POC
CHIEFS	36	31	5	31	1	1	2	0	0	1	5
Fire	1	1			1						1
Assistant	3	3		2						1	1
Deputy	9	7	2	6		1	2				3
Battalion	23	20	3	23							0
OFFICERS	222	211	11	180	13	6	12	2	3	6	42
Captain	55	53	2	45	3	2	2	2		1	10
Fire Boat	7	7		5			2				2
Lieutenant	160	151	9	130	10	4	8		3	5	30
FIREFIGHTER	739	683	56	553	45	45	38	14	9	35	186
TOTAL	997	925	72	764	59	52	52	16	12	42	233

Spirit of RSJ in 2020

- Fire Chief and Firefighters actively involved in community presence and handing out water to CHOP protesters
- Leading Regional RSJI participation with other local Fire Chiefs
- Department wide training; Cultural Competence with Dr. Hollins
- Race Conversations through Town Hall Meetings
- Covid Testing and Vaccination locations that considered Race and Social Impacts
- Transparency with RSJ and communication with SFD Leadership



Legislation Text

File #: Res 32011, **Version:** 1

CITY OF SEATTLE

RESOLUTION _____

A RESOLUTION approving the 2021-2026 revision to the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan.

WHEREAS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has established a policy that requires

recipients and potential recipients of Hazard Mitigation grant funding to have a Hazard Mitigation Plan;

and

WHEREAS, FEMA's policy requires that the City's All-Hazards Mitigation Plan be formally adopted by the

City Council and submitted for approval by FEMA through the State of Washington Military

Department, Emergency Management Division; and

WHEREAS, the City's All-Hazards Mitigation Plan is one in the suite of plans under the City's Comprehensive

Emergency Management Plan; and

WHEREAS, the Office of Emergency Management is responsible for the revision to the City's All-Hazards

Mitigation Plan every five years in coordination with representatives of City departments and external

partner organizations; and

WHEREAS, the Disaster Management Committee created by Seattle Municipal Code Section 10.02.060 has

formally reviewed and recommends adoption of the Plan; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR

CONCURRING, THAT:

Section 1. The 2021-2026 Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, dated February 1, 2021, attached to this resolution as Exhibit 1, has been reviewed and is approved.

Section 2. The City also approves such minor alterations to the Plan approved in Section 1 as are

requested by the State of Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division and FEMA and are determined by the Office of Emergency Management to be in the best interest of the City.

Adopted by the City Council the _____ day of _____, 2021, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this _____ day of _____, 2021.

President _____ of the City Council

The Mayor concurred the _____ day of _____, 2021.

Jenny A. Durkan, Mayor

Filed by me this _____ day of _____, 2021.

Monica Martinez Simmons, City Clerk

(Seal)

Attachments:
Exhibit 1 - City of Seattle 2021-2026 All-Hazards Mitigation Plan

CITY OF SEATTLE

2021-2026 ALL-HAZARDS MITIGATION PLAN



DRAFT 2/1/2021

V. 1.1

Prepared by:
City of Seattle
Office of Emergency Management

Vision, Mission, Guiding Principles

In an effort to align planning documents across all phases of emergency management, the City of Seattle Office of Emergency Management has collaboratively developed a vision, mission, and guiding principles that will provide a conceptual framework for all of the plans that support the City's emergency program, including the 2021 update of the City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan.

Vision

Disaster ready...prepared people, resilient community

Mission

We partner with the community to prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate the impacts of, and recover from disasters.

Guiding Principles

Comprehensive: We consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders, and all impacts relevant to disasters.

Progressive: We anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.

Risk-Driven: We use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.

Integrated: We ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of the community.

Collaborative: We create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.

Flexible: We use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.

Professional: We value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship, and continuous improvement.



City Council Resolution

To be added following approval

FEMA Letter of Approval

To be added following approval

Plan Adoption and Approval

44 CFR §201.6(c)(5) requires that the City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan be formally adopted by the Seattle City Council. Council formally adopted the 2021 update of the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan on [to be filled in following plan approval]. The plan adoption resolution follows.

This plan was approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency on [to be filled in following plan approval]. The official approval letter follows.

Acknowledgements

The City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan is an ongoing effort of the Seattle Office of Emergency Management to ensure the City's comprehensive approach to preparing for, mitigating the impacts of, responding to, and recovering from a disaster. Preparation of this document, and its continued improvement, requires participation and support from many individuals, agencies, organizations, and businesses. City departments, other agencies, and employees deserve recognition for their efforts to develop this plan.

Additionally, the City would like to acknowledge the efforts of the members of the Seattle Hazard Mitigation Work Group for investment of time and expertise in updating this plan.

Copies of this plan are available online at www.seattle.gov/emergency/publications or by request through the Seattle Office of Emergency Management Recovery and Mitigation Coordinator.

Record of Plan Update and Approval

The City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan is required to be updated once every five years and submitted to the City for adoption and the Federal Emergency Management Agency for approval. The City may update the plan on a more frequent basis as needed.

Date of Update	Date of City Adoption	Date of FEMA Approval
July 2009	September 14, 2009	October 14, 2009
May 2015	December 17, 2015	February 11, 2016
To be filled in following plan approval	To be filled in following plan approval	To be filled in following plan approval

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

City of Seattle Departments

ARTS	Office of Arts and Culture
CBO	City Budget Office
DON	Department of Neighborhoods
FAS	Seattle Department of Finance and Administrative Services
HSD	Human Services Department
ITD	Seattle Information Technology Department
OED	Office of Economic Development
OEM	Seattle Office of Emergency Management
OH	Office of Housing
OPCD	Office of Planning and Community Development
OSE	Office of Sustainability and Environment
SC	Seattle Center
SCL	Seattle City Light
SDCI	Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections
SDOT	Seattle Department of Transportation
SFD	Seattle Fire Department
SPD	Seattle Police Department
SPL	Seattle Public Libraries
SPR	Seattle Parks and Recreation
SPU	Seattle Public Utilities

Other

ADA	Americans with Disabilities Act
BIPOC	Black, Indigenous and people of color
BPA	Bonneville Power Administration
BRIC	Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities FEMA Grant Program
CIP	Capital Improvement Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
City	City of Seattle
COOP	Continuity of Operations



DMC	Disaster Management Committee
DMA	Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
DFIRM	Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map
EEB	Emergency Executive Board
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HMGP	Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
IOPE	Inclusive Outreach and Public Engagement Plan
MWG	Mitigation Work Group
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
PDMC	Pre-Disaster Mitigation Competitive Grant Program
PoS	Port of Seattle
Seattle HMP	City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan
SHA	Seattle Housing Authority
SHIVA	Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis
SNAP	Seattle Neighborhoods Actively Prepare
SPS	Seattle Public Schools
Stafford Act	Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988
SWG	Strategic Work Group

1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 describes the authorities and principles that provide the basis for the City of Seattle's (City's) mitigation program as well as provides a description of that organization and how the plan is organized to support it.

The City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan (Seattle HMP) is the guiding document for the City's hazard mitigation program. The plan's goal is to identify the hazards of which the City is at risk and identify a comprehensive strategy for minimizing potential losses and maximizing opportunity to increase the community's resiliency. This introductory chapter presents the authorities on which the City's mitigation program is based, the plan's purpose and scope, and plan organization.

1.1 Authority

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act), as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000), Public Law 106-390, and its implementing Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provisions, 44 CFR § 201, provide the legal authority for local hazard mitigation planning. The DMA 2000 requires state, local, and tribal governments to develop a hazard mitigation plan that identifies the jurisdiction's natural hazards, risks, vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies. The planning process requirements mandated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (outlined in 44 CFR §201.6) include the following activities:

- Document the planning process.
- Provide stakeholders with an opportunity to participate.
- Conduct and document public involvement.
- Incorporate existing plans and reports.
- Discuss continued public participation and plan maintenance.
- Provide a method for monitoring, evaluating, and updating the hazard mitigation plan.

Once complete, the hazard mitigation plan must be submitted to FEMA for approval. FEMA's approval of a hazard mitigation plan is a prerequisite for federal Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant program eligibility (outlined in 42 CFR §5165(a)).

The Seattle HMP was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Stafford Act, as amended by the DMA 2000, and the implementing 44 CFR § 201 provisions. The City will integrate appropriate Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards into mitigation projects and actions implemented as a part of the planning process. For example, alterations to existing facilities, such as seismic retrofits, will comply with all applicable federal accessibility requirements.

1.2 What is Hazard Mitigation?

Hazard mitigation is any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human life and property posed by hazards (44 CFR §201.2). Hazard mitigation activities may be implemented prior to, during, or after an event. However, it has been demonstrated that mitigation is most effective when based on an inclusive, comprehensive, long-term plan that is developed before a disaster occurs (2013 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan).

Additionally, hazard mitigation planning is one of the five mission areas presented in the National Preparedness Goal: Mitigation, Prevention, Protection, Response, and Recovery. The Seattle HMP is an integral piece of the larger emergency management picture and is intrinsically linked to other existing plans and emergency management activities.

Figure 1 illustrates these five emergency management mission areas and provides highlights of the plans that exist at the local, state, and federal level to support them.

Figure 1 - National Preparedness Goal Mission Areas and Supporting Plans



Mitigation planning is important because it not only encourages communities to become more flexible and adapt to change more easily, but it also:

- Guides mitigation activities in a coordinated and economic manner.
- Integrates mitigation into existing community plans/programs.
- Considers future growth and development trends.
- Makes a community more disaster resilient.
- Ensures eligibility for grant funding.

1.3 Purpose and Scope

1.3.1 Purpose

The Seattle HMP assesses the potential impact of the natural and human-caused hazards to the City of Seattle's (City's) communities and provides mitigation goals and strategies to reduce impacts. The Seattle HMP prioritizes the City's mitigation strategies and includes a comprehensive implementation plan. The overall purpose of the Seattle HMP is to strategically guide actions and investments in such a way as to reduce the impacts of natural and human-caused hazards on human life and property. The efforts that have contributed to the development of the Seattle HMP will lead to a safer, stronger, more survivable, and resilient city. The 2021 Seattle HMP is the required five-year update to the City of Seattle HMP prepared in 2015 and approved by FEMA in 2016. Keeping the Seattle HMP current is a good emergency management practice for the people of Seattle and allows the City to maintain its eligibility for state and federal mitigation funds that support the City's mitigation activities, such as:

- Seismic risk assessments.
- Facility seismic retrofit projects.
- Building redundant and resilient infrastructure.
- Planning for sea level rise and other impacts of climate change.
- Public education efforts surrounding risks of unreinforced masonry buildings.

The City has also focused on improving interdepartmental coordination in this update to ensure that the plan meets the needs of all City departments.

1.3.2 Scope

The Seattle HMP update covers the jurisdiction of the City and its departments, with the intent of benefitting all residents, businesses, and government and nongovernmental partners. It covers all areas within the City limits, as well as City department services and assets outside the City, such as municipal watersheds, water transmission pipelines, and dams.

Priority elements during this update process included:

- Creating dialogue around protecting the people of Seattle and building the City's resilience in the face of both smaller and catastrophic disaster risks.
- Developing an updated all-hazards mitigation plan that reflects the public and stakeholder input received.
- Ensuring that the process is conducted in accordance with FEMA's Local Multi-Hazard Planning Guidance (requirements identified in Title 44 CFR Part 201.6 and Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard ANSI/EMAP EMS 5-2019).


1.4 City of Seattle Hazard Mitigation Program

The Seattle HMP is just one aspect of the City's comprehensive approach to hazard mitigation, which includes Seattle residents, elected leadership, City departments, and community partners.

1.4.1 Organization

Figure 2 illustrates how the City organizes to ensure an engaged and collaborative approach to mitigation planning and program implementation. This organization is informally referred to in this plan as the City's mitigation program.

Figure 2 - City of Seattle Mitigation Program Organization



1.4.2 Roles and Responsibilities

Seattle Residents

Prepared and educated residents are a critical aspect of the City's resiliency, and the City actively encourages its residents to actively participate in efforts to minimize vulnerability to hazards by engaging in the following activities:

- Participate in the City's hazard mitigation program by engaging in the City's preparedness programs. More information can be found at <http://www.seattle.gov/emergency-management>.

Engage in personal and family preparedness and mitigation activities at home and at work.

Mayor and City Council

Seattle's elected leadership plays a key role in the City's mitigation program. As the City's elected representatives, they are responsible for making balanced policy decisions that enhance the City's resiliency. The Mayor and City Council perform the following activities in support of the City's mitigation program:

- Provide policy direction for the City's hazard mitigation program.
- Adopt the hazard mitigation plan.

Mitigation Work Group

The Mitigation Work Group (MWG) includes members from various City departments and key stakeholders and convenes regularly to monitor, evaluate, and implement the City's mitigation program. While one of the MWG's main purposes is to serve as the primary mechanism for City participation in updating the Seattle HMP, the City intends its role to continue throughout the planning cycle and serve as a driver for the program's success. Key roles of the MWG include:

- Support ongoing implementation of the City's hazard mitigation program.

- Provide input and technical support for update and maintenance of the Seattle HMP.

See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the role of the MWG in the 2021 update of the Seattle HMP.

Seattle Office of Emergency Management

The Seattle Office of Emergency Management (OEM) serves as the coordinating agency for the City's mitigation program. Under the direction of the OEM Director, the office facilitates mitigation activities, including updates to the Seattle HMP, and provides technical assistance to other City departments. The Director has delegated these coordination and facilitation tasks to the Recovery and Mitigation Coordinator. Key roles of OEM include:

- Facilitate the City's hazard mitigation program.
- Provide technical support to City departments regarding integration of hazard mitigation into department activities.
- Keep the Mayor and City Council apprised of the status of the City's hazard mitigation program.
- Serve as Applicant Agent on behalf of the City to apply for and manage grant awards under FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs.

Seattle Departments

The success of the City's mitigation program is dependent on mitigation being a shared endeavor across all organizational elements of the City. City departments are strongly encouraged to incorporate hazard mitigation into their plans and programs and be active participants in the City's efforts to enhance resiliency. Key roles of City departments include:

- Implement actions identified in the Seattle HMP.
- Incorporate hazard mitigation into other departmental planning efforts.
- Assign a representative to serve as a liaison to the MWG.

Community Partners

The City is committed to a collaborative mitigation program that strives to integrate with other community efforts to mitigate the impacts of hazards. While the scope of the Seattle HMP primarily includes City departments, the City will continue to look for opportunities to partner with private industry, nonprofit organizations, and community- and faith-based organizations in its mitigation program. Key roles of community partners include:

- Incorporate hazard mitigation into organizational and business activities.
- To the greatest extent possible, coordinate hazard mitigation activities with those of the City and other community partners.

See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how community partners were engaged in the 2021 update of the Seattle HMP.

1.5 Plan Organization

The 2021 update of the Seattle HMP is organized into the following sections:

- **Chapter 1 – Introduction.** Identifies the authorities on which the plan is based, describes the plan’s purpose and scope, describes how the plan is organized, and identified changes to the plan since 2015.
- **Chapter 2 – Planning Process.** Describes the process used to update the plan, including data sources and plan integration activities, outreach and engagement strategies, MWG activities, and plan development milestones.
- **Chapter 3 – Community Profile.** Provides a summary community profile for the City of Seattle including geographic, demographic, and economic characteristics that make the City unique. A full community profile is provided in the Seattle Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment document in Appendix A.
- **Chapter 4 – Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis.** Contains a summary of the hazards that could potentially impact the City, including a hazard ranking table. Full hazard profiles and vulnerability assessment information is provided in the Seattle Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment document in Appendix A.
- **Chapter 5 – Capability Assessment.** Identifies the existing mitigation capabilities of City departments and highlights mitigation accomplishments over the last planning cycle.
- **Chapter 6 – Mitigation Strategy.** Provides updated goals and objectives for the City’s mitigation program and identifies a comprehensive set of prioritized mitigation actions that would contribute to the City’s resiliency.
- **Chapter 7 – Program Implementation.** Describes the City’s plan for monitoring, evaluating, and updating the Seattle HMP over the next five-year period.

1.6 What’s New in the 2021 Update?

The 2021 update of the Seattle HMP includes the following major revisions to the 2015 plan:

- As part of the City’s ongoing enhancement of its emergency program, the Seattle HMP has been aligned with the current planning standards identified in the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).
- The complete text of the updated Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA) is included in Appendix A. No new hazards were identified, but the ranking of hazards changed, and more discussion of climate change was included.
- To increase public participation for the plan update, the City conducted a community survey that resulted in over 152 responses from across the City. The results of that survey are included in Appendix C.
- The methodology by which mitigation actions are identified and prioritized has been modified. A revised Mitigation Action Worksheet and instructions are provided in Appendix D.

Additionally, to aid in plan review and to ensure that all FEMA planning requirements are met, text box callouts have been inserted into the plan that identify the planning element, based on FEMA’s Local Mitigation Plan Review Tool, that is addressed in that particular section of the plan. The plan also strives to make robust use of internal call outs to ensure that plan users can easily find related information. For example, in Chapter 2, which addresses the planning process, the following text box appears:



FEMA

A1. Does the Plan document the planning process, including how it was prepared and who was involved in the process for [the City of Seattle]? (Requirement §201.6(c)(1))

The City is also in the process of seeking to renew accreditation through the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). EMAP includes a series of standards related to hazard mitigation and those standards are addressed throughout the plan.

2 PLANNING PROCESS

Chapter 2 provides a narrative description of the planning process the City conducted to ensure that the City's mitigation strategy was informed by input from key City departments, community partners, and the public. The process was based on principles of strategies for inclusive engagement and integration with existing planning efforts.



FEMA

A1. Does the Plan document the planning process, including how it was prepared and who was involved in the process for [the City of Seattle]? (Requirement §201.6(c)(1))

A local hazard mitigation plan's organization is driven by the needs of the local community. While the regional FEMA offices provide review and approval of hazard mitigation plans in order for local governments to apply for mitigation project funding, there is no required format for the plan's organization. The following guiding principles are recommended for the development of a local hazard mitigation plan:

- Focus on the mitigation strategy.
- Process is as important as the plan itself.
- Develop the plan in the way that best serves the community's purpose and people.

FEMA recommends nine tasks for developing or updating local hazard mitigation plans. Figure 3 illustrates the nine recommended tasks. Tasks 1 through 3 involve the people and process involved in the all-hazards mitigation plan development or update; Tasks 4 through 8 focus on the analytical and decision steps that need to be taken; and Task 9 includes suggestions for plan implementation.

Figure 3 - FEMA Recommended Local Mitigation Planning Tasks




Source: FEMA Local Mitigation Planning Handbook, March 2013

2.1 Planning Area

The planning area refers the geographic area covered by the plan (FEMA Local Mitigation Planning Handbook 2013). In the case of the Seattle HMP, the planning area includes all areas within the City limits, as well as City department services and assets outside the City, such as the municipal watersheds and dams.

See Figure 4 for a map of the planning area (not including assets outside the City).

2.2 Data Collection and Incorporation of Existing Plans

 FEMA	A4. Does the Plan describe the review and incorporation of existing plans, studies, reports, and technical information? (Requirement §201.6(b)(3))
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Data collection efforts for the Seattle HMP focused on documents pertaining to the planning area and examples of best practices in hazard mitigation planning. The primary source documents for the plan update were the 2015 Seattle HMP and the 2019 update of the Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA). Additionally, related emergency management plans, current county and state hazard mitigation plans, and City plans with relevant hazard mitigation topics, such as stormwater management, were reviewed as part of the data collection efforts. Examples of hazard mitigation planning best practices were also reviewed for their applicability to the Seattle HMP.

2.2.1 City of Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan 2015-2021

The primary source document for this update of the Seattle HMP mitigation strategy was the 2015 version of the plan. As part of the 2021 Seattle HMP update, the following actions were taken to ensure that the update reflected progress in the City's mitigation efforts and any changes in priorities:

- Review and refinement of 2015 plan goals and objectives by the MWG.
- Update of City department mitigation capabilities.
- Update of status for all mitigation actions identified in the 2015 plan.

2.2.2 Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA)

The SHIVA identifies Seattle's hazards and examines their consequences to facilitate smart decisions about how best to prepare for them. The SHIVA document is the foundation for all of the City's disaster planning and preparedness activities. The 2021 update of the Seattle HMP incorporates the most recent

version of the SHIVA. The 2019 SHIVA updates the version published in 2014. It meets FEMA and EMAP requirements, both of which publish standards to guide this work and provide quality and consistency across jurisdictions. It also meets the State of Washington's legal requirement that local governments identify and evaluate their hazards, as specified in Washington Administrative Code 118-30-070.

The following major changes were made as part of the 2019 SHIVA update:

- Added chapter on Cyber-attack / Disruption. The emphasis is on immediate dangers to the public.
- Combined Terrorism and Active Shooter Incidents into one Attacks chapter.
- Renamed Infrastructure Failures to Infrastructure and *Structural* Failures.
- Added new scenarios for Disease, Social Unrest, Infrastructure and Structural Failures, Cyber-attack/Disruption and Windstorms.
- Updated map of social vulnerability using model developed by the University of South Carolina.
- Incorporated research published between 2014 and 2018.
- Reassessed hazards.

OEM is constantly collecting information from partners to update the SHIVA. It is updated as needed but a major review occurs at least every four years.

See Appendix A for the full text of the SHIVA.

2.2.3 Citywide Emergency Management Program Multi-Year Strategic Plan 2019-2021

This strategic plan is intended to meet the vision of the citywide emergency management effort through a multi-year strategy, in coordination with key emergency management stakeholders, to include a vision, mission, guiding principles, goals, objectives, outcomes, ongoing activities and projects and accomplishment tracking. One of the three strategic priorities is focused on mitigation.

Strategic Priority #3: Support/Facilitate a more resilient community through innovative mitigation and recovery efforts

Many of the ongoing activities and projects identified to achieve this Strategic Priority #3 relevant to the Seattle HMP include:

- Annually provide briefing on the ability of the City to detect and act on Cyber-threats and hazards.
- Incorporate critical infrastructure planning into city-wide Capital Improvement Plan process to mitigate risk identified in SHIVA/THIRA.
- Continue teaching 'Home Retrofit Program' supported by plan sets managed and maintained by the Department of Construction & Inspection. OEM routinely delivers workshops for residents who are interested in retrofitting their homes for an earthquake.
- Provide training to the Disaster Management Committee on the hazards identified in this SHIVA.
- Conduct annual updates and scheduled major revisions to the Seattle HMP (current version).
- Provide annual training to key personnel in each department on FEMA Public Assistance policies, protocols, and administrative systems.
- Identify procedures and additional planning issues to enhance the Seattle Recovery Framework.

- Maintain and improve a hazard mitigation program that recognizes priorities, activities, and processes to lessen impacts on the Seattle community.
- Identify, apply for, and leverage funding and grants for prioritized mitigation projects.

Action items identified as supporting these objectives are incorporated into this mitigation plan by reference and include, but are not limited to the following:

- Create a strategic integration of the assets management system, Capital Improvement Program, and Seattle HMP.
- Encourage the Emergency Executive Board to adopt mitigation policies.
- Integrate citywide initiatives that enhance resiliency, such as mitigation planning, the race and social justice initiative, Climate Action Plan, and Comprehensive Plan.
- Strengthen awareness of and focus on health systems/disease prevention in the mitigation program.
- Provide training to the Disaster Management Committee on the hazards identified in the SHIVA.
- Create a business outreach plan to build awareness of hazards and the cost-benefit of preparedness.
- Encourage the chambers of commerce and other business advocates to sponsor business efforts to prepare for and mitigate the impacts of hazards.

2.2.4 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan

Hazard mitigation policy guidance for the State of Washington is provided in the 2018 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan. This plan was approved by FEMA on October 1, 2018, and identifies hazard mitigation goals, objectives, actions, and initiatives for the Washington State government. Implementation of the policy guidance provided in the plan will reduce damage and injury caused by natural hazards. The plan meets the requirements for an Enhanced State Plan under Interim Final Rule 44 CFR parts 201.4 and 201.5, published in the Federal Register by FEMA on February 28, 2002. By meeting the requirements of the regulations, the State of Washington as well as qualified local jurisdictions and nonprofit organizations that provide like-government services are eligible to obtain federal Hazard Mitigation Assistance grants. The State of Washington can seek higher funding for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program following a Presidential Disaster Declaration due to the enhanced portion of the plan (20 percent of federal disaster expenditures versus 15 percent with a standard plan) (Washington Military Department Emergency Management Division 2018).

The Seattle HMP was prepared in accordance with goals and objectives identified in the 2018 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan.

2.2.5 Integration with Other Plans and Programs

The City has a long-standing history of hazard mitigation planning at a range of scales, including the neighborhood, city, and regional contexts. Therefore, hazard mitigation policies, plans, and programs have successfully been incorporated into various community plans and emergency management activities. Table 1 summarizes key programs and plans that support existing mitigation actions and the actions that were taken to ensure that they were appropriately aligned, integrated, or referenced in this plan update.

Table 1 - Plan Review and Integration Actions

Plan/Study	Plan Alignment/Integration Action
2015 Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan	Superseded by this 2021 Seattle HMP update.
2019 Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA)	Serves as the basis for the hazards identified in this plan. The full text is included in Appendix A.
Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan	Reviewed to ensure consistency.
Seattle Disaster Recovery Framework	Reviewed to ensure consistency.
Seattle's Comprehensive Plan	Reviewed to ensure consistency. Further alignment efforts will be a focus of the 2024 major update
Seattle Climate Action Plan	Reviewed to ensure consistency.
King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan	Reviewed to ensure consistency.
Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan	Reviewed to ensure consistency.

2.3 Mitigation Work Group

The MWG was convened at the start of the Seattle HMP update project to facilitate City department and agency input to the Seattle HMP update. The MWG aided in the update of capabilities, review of mitigation goals and objectives, identification of mitigation strategies, refinement of mitigation review criteria, and prioritization and implementation of mitigation strategies. This planning process focused on improving interdepartmental coordination to ensure that the resulting document met the needs of all City departments.

2.3.1 MWG Members

The MWG consists of members from various City departments and key stakeholders such as the Seattle Public Schools, Seattle Housing Authority and Port of Seattle. MWG members serve as project liaisons to community groups and interests they represent. Working together, the MWG has established the following mission statement to guide its activities:

“It is the mission of the Mitigation Work Group to develop a comprehensive disaster mitigation program that 1) increases community resilience; 2) builds upon existing mitigation programs; 3) increases knowledge of all hazards to which the City is at risk; and 4) implements interim and long-term mitigation actions that maximize loss reduction.”

The members of the MWG who participated in the plan update and their associated organizations and departments are listed in Table 2.

Table 2 - Mitigation Work Group Members

Name	Organization	Department
Flossie Pennington	City of Seattle	Office of Arts and Culture
Dan Foley	City of Seattle	Office of Housing
Patrice Carroll, David Goldberg	City of Seattle	Office of Planning and Community Development
Kara Main Hester, Jennifer Devore	City of Seattle	Seattle Budget Office

Name	Organization	Department
Jae Lee	City of Seattle	Seattle Center
Jana Elliot, Brittany Barnwell	City of Seattle	Seattle City Light
Micah Chappell	City of Seattle	Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections, Planning and Development
Elenka Jarolimek, Julie Matsumoto	City of Seattle	Seattle Department of Finance and Administrative Services
Sarah Sodt	City of Seattle	Seattle Department of Neighborhoods
Lawrence Eichhorn, Mary Wylie	City of Seattle	Seattle Department of Technology
Pattie Quirk	City of Seattle	Seattle Department of Transportation
Andy Collins	City of Seattle	Seattle Fire Department
Jill Watson	City of Seattle	Seattle Human Services Department
Amanda Allen, Jessica Sidhu	City of Seattle	Seattle Office of Economic Development
Lucia Schmit, Erika Lund, TJ McDonald, Laurel Nelson	City of Seattle	Seattle Office of Emergency Management
Edie Gillis, Lylianna Allala	City of Seattle	Seattle Office of Sustainability and Environment
Jon Jainga, Cynthia McCoy	City of Seattle	Seattle Parks and Recreation
Carrie Chitty, Lt. Daniel Nelson	City of Seattle	Seattle Police Department
Dennis Reddinger	City of Seattle	Seattle Public Library
Michael Godfried	City of Seattle	Seattle Public Utilities
Addison Houston	King County	Public Health Seattle King County
Kati Davich	Port of Seattle	N/A
Jared Cummer	Seattle Housing Authority	N/A
Benjamin Coulter	Seattle Public Schools	N/A

2.3.2 MWG Meetings

Seattle HMP issues were discussed, and key deliverables were reviewed at the MWG's formal meetings. The MWG convened for a series of five meetings over the course of the project (see Table 3) where representatives from key City departments and other stakeholders had the opportunity to be briefed on project status, to assist in the plan update, and collaboratively work on plan content.

Table 3 - Mitigation Work Group Meeting Schedule

MWG Meeting	Date	Objectives
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 1 (in person)	January 27, 2020	Review plan process and MWG roles and responsibilities Present updated SHIVA Review status of 2015 Seattle HMP actions Review 2015 Seattle HMP actions Discuss Seattle HMP Capabilities
Planning process paused for Covid-19 response		


MWG Meeting	Date	Objectives
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 2 (online)	September 14, 2020	Present revised process, outreach Review Teams online platform Review and discuss outstanding Tasks
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 3 (online)	September 28, 2020	Confirm mitigation goals and objectives Present revised Mitigation Action Worksheet Develop department-specific mitigation actions
Mitigation Work Group Targeted Work Sessions (online)	November 2020	Meet with key departments to refine mitigation actions
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 4 (online)	November 4, 2020	Review outstanding tasks Updates and questions from MWG members
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 5 (online)	December 14, 2020	Review program implementation and monitoring
Mitigation Work Group Meeting No. 6 (online)	January 25, 2021	Review comments Finalize strategy

2.3.3 Planning Platform

Seattle HMP update process and draft documents were made available to the MWG through MS Teams, a web-based collaboration platform that allowed MWG members to work together virtually. The Teams platform included a project calendar, group email, SharePoint site, recordings of MWG meetings, chat, project team information, important links, and file management functionalities.

See Appendix B for documentation of all MWG activities.

2.4 Inclusive Outreach and Public Engagement

	<p>A2. Does the Plan document an opportunity for neighboring communities, local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities, agencies that have the authority to regulate development as well as other interests to be involved in the planning process? (Requirement §201.6(b)(2))</p> <p>A3. Does the Plan document how the public was involved in the planning process during the drafting stage? (Requirement §201.6(b)(1))</p>
---	--

A critical component of the Seattle HMP update effort is a robust stakeholder engagement process that provides “an opportunity for the public to comment on the plan during the drafting stage and prior to plan approval” (44 CFR §201.6).

2.4.1 Inclusive Outreach and Public Engagement Plan

To facilitate meeting this requirement, OEM developed an Inclusive Outreach and Public Engagement (IOPE) Plan and a designated a public comment period for the Draft Seattle HMP (see Table 4). The IOPE Plan, titled the Outreach and Engagement Plan (November 2020), provides a detailed approach to how

the project team would engage the public and key stakeholders in the Seattle HMP update process. Because of the COVID-19 Pandemic, outreach and public engagement was conducted online and was more narrowly focused than the previous update. The Plan is designed to meeting the following objectives:

- Raise awareness of hazard mitigation, the update process and when opportunities to provide input will occur.
- Provide the opportunity to all who live, work and play in Seattle to participate in the update process.
- Ensure a process that is open and transparent, culturally sensitive, accessible, and ensures that input is considered.
- Gather input in ways that are safe for staff and the public during the COVID-19 Pandemic.
- Ask for input where the public feedback can authentically influence the plan.

See Appendix C for the full Inclusive Outreach and Public Engagement Plan and materials.

2.4.2 Engagement Strategies

In September 2020, the planning process was restarted. The following strategies were used to raise awareness about the Seattle HMP update and gather feedback on the Draft Seattle HMP:

Make Information Available on OEM Public Website

OEM established space on their public website to share information about the HMP. The website included the following:

- Project description
- Downloadable one-page summary about the Seattle HMP update
- Dedicated email address (HazardMitigationPlanUpdate@seattle.gov)
- Narrated presentation about the Draft Seattle HMP
- Draft Seattle HMP and instructions on how to submit comments
- Link to a Public Survey about priorities for future City/ community hazard mitigation partnerships

Online Stakeholder Meetings

In addition to the MWG, other stakeholders had an opportunity to provide input during development of the plan. The information about the Draft Seattle HMP will be presented during online meetings of following key stakeholder groups to solicit input and feedback:

- Seattle Disaster Management Committee
- Strategic Work Group
- Emergency Executive Board
- Community Safety Ambassadors

Traditional and Social Media

The broader public will be invited to learn about the project, opportunity to comment on the Draft Seattle HMP and respond to community partnership polling question. The following media will be used to communicate with the broader public:

- OEM general email list
- OEM Newsletter
- Posts on OEM social media
- Press release to various media outlets

Community Survey

A community survey was conducted as part of the outreach for the Draft Seattle HMP. The survey was designed to solicit input from Seattle residents on their perceived concern regarding various hazards, importance of different risk reduction strategies, and which community services were most important to protect through mitigation.

In total, 152 people responded to the community survey. Key findings included:

- Highest level of concern about earthquake and disease outbreak hazards.
- Most important risk reduction strategies were regulation and structural projects.
- Top four community services that should be protected through mitigation were: health/ mental health, homelessness service/emergency shelter, food assistance/ food banks, and affordable housing/ housing assistance.

Table 4 - Stakeholder and Public Outreach Activities

Activity	Timing	Description
Project paused due to COVID-19 Pandemic (March – August 2020)		
OEM Website update	September 2020	Website is updated with HMP description and timeline.
OEM Newsletter	September 2020 and January 2021	HMP information included in the September newsletter distributed to 6000+ people.
Community Survey	November 2020	OEM shares survey about community priorities on website, social media, newsletter.
Stakeholder Meetings (SWG, DMC)	November/ December 2020	Briefings at scheduled meetings to raise awareness and get input on HMP
Public Comment Period (2 weeks)	January 2021	Post HMP on OEM website Solicit public comments on the Draft HMP.

Outreach for Draft Plan	January 2021	OEM email notices, newsletter, press releases, stories to solicit comment on Draft HMP
DMC Review and Approval	February 2021	Final HMP is submitted to DMC
EEB Review and Approval	April 2021	Final HMP is submitted to EEB


2.5 Plan Development and Review

The Seattle HMP development process was conducted according to the process outlined above and described in detail in FEMA’s Local Mitigation Planning Handbook. Update of the City’s mitigation strategy was treated as the plan’s primary purpose and the plan serves as the written record of the comprehensive planning process. In addition, the Seattle HMP reflects the City’s current needs and hazard concerns. The development of the Seattle HMP update occurred over a 14-month period from January 2020 to February 2021. The plan development was conducted through a series of seven steps as detailed in Table 5. Many of the steps occurred concurrently. Table 5 also illustrates the corresponding FEMA local mitigation planning task for each Seattle HMP development milestone. The requisite State Hazard Mitigation Officer and FEMA review periods occurred during the Draft and Final Seattle HMP steps.

Table 5 - Seattle HMP Update Timeline

Seattle HMP Update Development Milestone	Corresponding FEMA Recommended Local Mitigation Planning Task¹	Timeline
1. Data Collection and Document Review	Task 1 – Determine the Planning Area and Resources	January 2020
2. Mitigation Working Group Coordination	Task 2 – Build the Planning Team	January 2020 – January 2021
3. Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach	Task 3 – Create an Outreach Strategy	October 2020 – January 2021
4. Hazard Mitigation Strategy Update	Task 4 – Review Community Capabilities Task 6 – Develop a Mitigation Strategy	September 2020 – December 2020
5. Draft Hazard Mitigation Plan	Written documentation of the planning process (all tasks)	January 2021
6. Final Hazard Mitigation Plan	Written documentation of the planning process (all tasks)	February 2021
7. Plan Adoption	Task 8 – Review and Adopt the Plan	March -July 2021
Notes: Task 5 – Conduct a Risk Assessment was completed through the separate SHIVA process. Task 7- Keep the Plan Current and Task 9 – Create a Safe and Resilient Community are part of the plan implementation process.		

Figure 4 - Seattle HMP Planning



3 COMMUNITY PROFILE

Chapter 3 provides a summary of the community profile provided in full in the Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA). The City's mitigation strategy is designed to be reflective of the unique characteristics of the community as an economic and cultural hub in the region.

Seattle is an 84-square-mile isthmus sitting between Puget Sound to the west and Lake Washington to the east. Elliott Bay, an extension of Puget Sound, is located in the middle of the City, giving Seattle an hourglass shape. Downtown is located in this narrow section, which results in many major transportation routes and services competing for land where there is the least space.

Seattle is a hilly city. Many roadways, especially in the downtown, Capitol Hill, Beacon Hill, Queen Anne, West Seattle, and Magnolia neighborhoods have steep inclines that can become hazardous and/or impassable in slippery driving conditions. There are 193 miles of waterfront, 53 of which are tidal. The Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT) owns, inspects, maintains, and/or operates nearly 280 bridges spanning either natural or artificial barriers, 58 of which are designated vital lifeline structures. Two floating bridges, the Evergreen Point or Albert D. Rossellini (SR-520) and Lacey V. Murrow (I-90) bridges, are the most direct vehicular corridors linking Seattle to the neighboring eastside cities of Bellevue, Kirkland, and Mercer Island. The combination of hilly terrain, barriers, like waterbodies and elevated roadways, and the convergence of transportation pathways in constricted areas makes Seattle vulnerable to hazards like earthquakes that can damage the transportation system in key spots. The importance of these water and slope barriers on emergency response cannot be overstated. The arrangement of hills and water has dictated where transportation routes and large facilities can be located. The resulting patterns create a relationship between the natural and built environments that are fundamental to Seattle's hazard vulnerability.

With over 747,300 residents as of 2019, Seattle is the largest municipality in the Pacific Northwest. In normal times large numbers of people work in or visit Seattle.

Seattle also is home to the main campuses of three major universities: University of Washington, Seattle Pacific University, and Seattle University. In addition, Seattle Colleges, a multi-college district, serves Seattle and its surrounding communities at three comprehensive college campuses and five specialty training centers and has a combined enrollment of 45,000, operates three campuses located in West Seattle, Capitol Hill, and Northgate. The total combined student population for all of these universities and colleges is approximately 102,000.

Seattle is a center for cultural, governmental, and economic activity. It is both a city of neighborhoods with vibrant individual identities and one of the most trade dependent cities in the United States. One in three jobs relies on international trade.

The Seattle-King County area attracts more than 21.3 million overnight visitors each year (as of 2018). Major venues for conferences, conventions, and special events include the Washington State Convention and Conference Center, a wide variety of local hotels, the Bell Harbor International Conference Center, CenturyLink Field Events Center, and the Seattle Center (site of the 1962 World's Fair).

The city is also home for several professional sport teams including: the Mariners at Safeco Field (seats 54,000) and the Seahawks and Sounders at CenturyLink Field (seats 67,000). The renovated Climate

Pledge Arena on the Seattle Center Campus will open in 2021 will be the home arena of the NHL Seattle Kraken (seats 18.000).

King County has a total of 24 hospitals and three stand-alone emergency departments, including 14 in the City of Seattle. Of the 24 hospitals, there is a pediatric hospital, three psychiatric hospitals, and a Veteran's Administration hospital. King County has nine designated trauma hospitals, including one Level I adult and pediatric regional trauma center in the City of Seattle (Harborview Medical Center).

The number of cruise ships that use the Port of Seattle has grown in recent years. Eight major cruise lines used the Seattle facilities in 2012 and in 2019 there were 213 sailings with 1,208,590 passengers.

See Chapter 3 of the SHIVA including a more detailed community profile.

4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

4.1 General

Seattle is a vibrant city, yet it faces hazards that threaten the very tissue of our community. Seattle can reduce hazard impacts and this document is where we start. The Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA) identifies Seattle's hazards and examines their consequences so we can make smart decisions about how best to prepare for them.

This document is the foundation for the City's disaster planning and preparedness activities. The City hopes the rest of the Seattle community will use it in the same manner. The Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (SHIVA) is a community document. OEM is constantly collecting information from partners to update it. It is updated as needed but, a major review occurs at least every four years.

The SHIVA is intended to serve as the risk assessment portion of the Seattle HMP and provides the foundation for the rest of the mitigation planning process, which focuses on identifying and prioritizing actions to reduce hazard risk. The SHIVA is intended to guide the mitigation strategy outlined in this plan and is hoped to provide insight for other City planning efforts including future updates of the Comprehensive Plan.

The SHIVA, as the City's risk assessment, is intended to accomplish the following:

- Describe hazards. Includes a description of natural and human-caused hazards that may impact the City. Each hazard includes information on the following:
 - **Location.** What areas of the City are most likely to be impacted?
 - **Extent.** What is the expected magnitude of the hazard?
 - **Previous occurrences.** What is the history of the hazard?
 - **Probability of future events.** What is the likelihood of the hazard occurring in the future?

Additionally, the SHIVA summarizes the City's vulnerability to identified hazards including potential impacts and losses that may result.

The 2019 update of the SHIVA replaces the version published in 2014. It meets the requirements of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), both of which publish standards to guide this work and provide quality and consistency across jurisdictions. It also meets the State of Washington's legal requirement that local governments identify and evaluate their hazards, as specified in WAC 118-30-070.

See Appendix A for the full text of the SHIVA.

2020 An Unprecedented Year

The 2019 SHIVA does not reflect the major incidents Seattle experienced in 2020 pandemic, wildfire smoke, civil unrest, and the West Seattle Bridge closure. The timing of this update has not allowed us to adequately reflect and integrate those events in this HMP. As the disasters, response and recovery from these events are assessed and better understood, changes to the SHIVA and the Seattle HMP may be desired or needed.

4.2 Climate Change

The climate has been changing over the past few decades and is projected to change into the future at an increasing rate. Climate change is caused by the build-up of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. According to 2014 data from the Seattle Office of Sustainability and Environment, 66% of the city's GHG emissions comes from road transportation, 32% comes from commercial and residential buildings, and 3% from waste management. Seattle has set a goal to reduce carbon emission by 58% by 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2050 (with 2008 emissions as the baseline year), in hopes to reduce the future effect of local climate change. Further, the Seattle City Council passed a resolution in 2017 stating the city's commitment to uphold the Paris Agreement, meaning Seattle will take steps to ensure that future warming is limited to 1.5°C. Despite these local efforts to reduce GHG emissions, climate change is caused by global GHG emissions that continue to rise. Further, the Seattle City Council passed a resolution in 2017 stating the city's commitment to uphold the Paris Agreement, meaning Seattle will take steps to ensure that future warming is limited to 1.5°C. Despite these local efforts to reduce GHG emissions, climate change is caused by global GHG emissions that continue to rise.

Climate change presents Seattle with many challenges: flooding, summer heat and drought, rising sea levels, heightened wildfire risk, and declining snowpack. Seattle will also experience indirect impacts. These could include higher commodity prices, increased migration and increased economic and political instability across the globe. The primary effects for the Puget Sound region include:

- **Temperature.** The Puget Sound region is projected to warm between 4.2°F and 5.5°F on average by the 2050s.
- **Sea Level Rise.** The projected range of sea level rise for Seattle is as low as 4 inches, and as high as 56 inches by 2100 (dependent on land movement). Rising sea levels lead to an increased risk of coastal flooding and landslides.
- **Snowpack.** Seattle's water system and power system are dependent on Cascade Mountain snowpack and glacial melt. Mountain snowpack is projected to decline 42-55% by 2070 creating water management challenges. The impact of the decline in snowpack on the city's water supply system has been somewhat mitigated by a dramatic decline in per-capita water usage despite a rise in Seattle's population.
- **Streamflow.** Due to the decreased snowpack and early spring melting, streams that rely on snowmelt are projected to experience peak streamflow earlier in the year, and for some rivers, dry years are becoming drier. Seattle's watersheds will become more reliant on rain than on snowpack. Winter streamflow is projected to increase by about 28% to 34% by 2080, while summer streamflow is projected to decrease by 24% to 31% by 2080.
- **Precipitation.** Heavy rainfall events are expected to become more severe for Washington State. The number of days with more than one inch of rain is estimated to increase 6% to 20% by the 2050s. While projections of seasonal precipitation are mixed, most models point towards drier summers. Drier summers, with more severe precipitation events in other seasons leading to an increased risk of urban flooding and landslides, and more costly stormwater management.
- **Air Quality.** Increasing air temperatures, longer periods of heat, and drier summers have the potential to increase ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter accumulation. Summer deaths attributed to ozone are projected to increase to 132 per year by 2050.

4.3 Geophysical Hazards

These hazards originate in the movement of earth. They destroy the built environment over large areas and can cause huge casualties. While they are impossible to prevent there is a lot Seattle can do as a community to decrease their consequences.

4.3.1 Earthquakes

Earthquakes are Seattle's most significant hazard. No other hazard has the combination of likelihood and potential destructiveness. Seattle is at risk for earthquakes from three sources: 1) deep earthquakes like those that damaged the City in 1949, 1965 and 2001; 2) shallow earthquakes along the Seattle Fault; and 3) megathrust earthquakes that could reach magnitude 9.0 but would originate outside Seattle. The Seattle Fault is Seattle's most dangerous source. The Seattle Fault last ruptured in 900AD causing a 7.2 magnitude earthquake, massive landslides, and a tsunami. The major consequences are building collapse, lateral spread (where the ground permanently shifts under buildings), landslides, fires, liquefaction (where the ground turns liquid under buildings) and potentially a tsunami. Casualties could exceed 1,000 people and economic damage could easily run into billions of dollars. Seattle has been preparing for earthquakes for many years by enhancing building standards, retrofitting Infrastructure and facilities, and educating the public.

4.3.2 Landslides

Landslides are a common Seattle hazard especially when ground water is saturated in the winter. Landslides can always be deadly but more commonly they destroy buildings, block roads, and sever lifelines. The greatest risk is when a storm or earthquake triggers a swarm of landslides throughout the city within several days. The biggest swarm was in 1997 when 300 landslides happened in less than four weeks. A Seattle Fault earthquake could cause massive landslides. The last one in 900 AD caused whole forested hillsides to slide into Lake Washington. The City of Seattle addresses its landslide hazard by mapping its landslide prone areas and through its building codes. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has created a gauge to show when Seattle has a heightened risk of landslides.

4.3.3 Tsunamis and Seiches

Tsunamis are a rare but potentially catastrophic hazard in Seattle. They are most often caused by earthquakes and landslides. Tsunamis that originate in the Pacific Ocean do not pose a major threat to Seattle because Puget Sound's shape and complex shoreline will break them up before they reach Seattle. The most dangerous tsunamis are generated locally. A Seattle Fault earthquake presents the greatest potential for a tsunami in Seattle. A large landslide could also trigger a tsunami. A landslide triggered a tsunami in the Tacoma Narrows in 1949. A seiche is a standing (vertical) wave produced by the sloshing of an enclosed water body like a lake, bay, reservoir, or river. The cause can be either earthquake shaking or storms. They are rare occurrences in this area. An 1891 earthquake produced an eight-foot seiche on Lake Washington and the 1964 Alaskan quake generated seiche that damaged property on Lake Union. In 2002 another seiche occurred in Lake Union due to an earthquake in Alaska. Seattle uses tsunami risk as a criterion in siting critical facilities, but it has not pursued additional tsunami or seiche preparedness measures because a tsunami 1) will strike the shoreline within seconds or minutes of being created, 2) will probably occur immediately after a massive earthquake and 3) happen rarely.

4.3.4 Volcanic Hazards

Volcanic material from Mt. Rainier washing down through the Duwamish River and ashfall are the most significant volcanic threats to Seattle. During an eruption, Mt. Rainier's glaciers could melt, mix with volcanic debris and flow down the valleys surrounding it. These flows are called lahars. Based on geologic evidence a lahar from Mt. Rainier would bury low-lying areas west of the mountain but would stop short of Seattle. In the days that follow, rain and erosion could wash the sediment down the Duwamish creating a major navigation and environmental hazard.

Severe ashfall is unlikely in Seattle. Our area's prevailing winds blow from west to east and will probably move ash away from Seattle, but it is possible that rare easterly winds could occur during an eruption producing an ashfall in Seattle. Seattle will need to support more heavily impacted neighbors, cope with transportation closures and help displaced people after an eruption or lahar. Seattle has not undertaken specific volcanic mitigation measures.

4.4 Biological Hazards

Biological hazards occur from natural matter in our world such as bacteria, viruses, insects, or animals. The only biological hazard identified for Seattle is disease/pandemic influenza (including bioterrorism).

4.4.1 Disease/Pandemic Influenza (including bioterrorism)

Seattle like all other cities is facing increased exposure to new diseases. The rapid increases in personal mobility, the proximity of people to livestock and global urbanization have created conditions in which it is possible for new diseases, especially influenza, to emerge and spread around the world in days. Global outbreaks are called pandemics. When a new disease emerges, human beings have no immunity against it. This condition increases the chance individuals will get sick when they come into contact with the disease and increase the severity of their symptoms if they do. The potential consequences of disease outbreaks include:

- Patients overwhelming local hospital and health care providers.
- Inability to request mutual aid assistance if impacts involve multiple communities.
- Contaminated water supplies.
- Threats to critical infrastructure if essential operators are absent in high numbers.
- Widespread mental health impacts.
- Closure of community services, schools and larger public events.

Public Health – Seattle & King County has developed plans to attempt to slow the spread of disease by closing public gathering places, increasing the space between people ('social distancing') and opening additional care facilities. Bioterrorism is the use of a biological agent as a weapon to cause fear, illness, or death. Seattle has not experienced a bioterrorist attack but being a densely populated urban hub makes it an attractive target.

4.5 Intentional Hazards

These are hazards that some person or group seeks to cause. Often the perpetrators want to disrupt the flow of normal community life, sometimes they want to cause property damage, and other times they

want to hurt people. The adversarial nature of these hazards makes them especially unpredictable and therefore dangerous. Law enforcement is primary in the response to these hazards.

4.5.1 Social Unrest

Social unrest includes riots, civil disorders, strikes, and mass civil disobedience. Seattle is the central stage for political and social activity in the Puget Sound region and the hub of its social activities. This condition makes social unrest likely to occur in Seattle. Most recent incidents were caused by anarchist groups. The largest centered on the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting. Most of Seattle's incidents have targeted property but assaults and one death has occurred. Most incidents can be handled by the Seattle Police Department, but large ones like the WTO protests require outside assistance and can shut down large areas of the City. Most incidents occur in the downtown area and on Capitol Hill.

4.5.2 Attacks

Attacks can be perpetrated by many different actors with different motivations, but all use violent and destructive tactics to cause harm to people and/or property. Some actors include terrorists (domestic and international), violent extremists, and targeted violent offenders. Examples of tactics are mass shootings, bombings, arson, murder, kidnapping, hijacking, or skyjacking. Not all attacks are politically motivated, some are based on personal grievances. Most attacks happen in public gathering places or institutions, of which Seattle has many. The threat of attacks has grown with the interconnectedness of the internet and social media.

The Puget Sound region has active far-right and eco-terrorist groups, and has experienced activity related to international terrorist groups. Seattle has a heightened eco-terrorism risk. In 2001 the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) firebombed the University of Washington's Center for Urban Horticulture. The number of mass shootings in the U.S. has increased over the past decade. Seattle has experienced three mass shootings in recent history, and an active shooter situation at Seattle Pacific University. In today's security conscious, post-9/11 environment, the main threat appears to be attacks using small-scale tactics such as shootings or vehicle ramming.

Attacks are almost impossible to predict. In the aftermath of 9/11, national security focus shifted to terrorism involving chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and explosive and cyber means. Locally, Seattle Public Schools are undertaking heightened security measures. The City has been the recipient of several federal grants to bolster local security.

4.5.3 Cyber-attack and Disruption

To function as a modern city, Seattle is highly dependent on digital systems and the internet. Disruptions to cyber infrastructure can include internet outages, release or deletion of sensitive data and information, compromised infrastructure or services, or physical destruction. Digital systems can face intentional attacks from small scale hackers to sophisticated nation-state actors. Cyber disruption can also occur from human errors or from another hazard (e.g. earthquake). Seattle's utility infrastructure uses Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems to run and maintain basic functions. SCADA systems are generally outdated and vulnerable to hacking, especially if they are connected to the internet.

The likelihood of attack and disruption is increasing as more products and services connect to the internet. The City of Seattle experiences minor hacking attempts daily but has never experienced a major cyber-attack. However, limited information technology resources make a large attack a possibility and large-scale ransomware attacks have recently halted city functions in other areas of the U.S.

4.6 Transportation and Infrastructure Hazards

This section comprises failures in the built environment. Their causes are mostly accidental but can be deliberate when used as a means for terrorism. Engineering advances have dramatically improved safety, but Seattle still has many older transportation and infrastructure systems that were not built to modern safety standards. These systems require extra maintenance.

4.6.1 Transportation Incidents

Seattle is a hub for land, sea, and air transportation giving it an inherent exposure to accidents. One of the city's deadliest disasters was a plane crash that occurred in 1943, killing 32, including people on the ground. The South of Downtown (SODO) area is the most vulnerable because it is a hub for all major transportation modes, but our bridges and tunnels also have heightened risk. Transportation accidents are usually limited in size but can cause high fatalities, fires, hazardous materials incidents, power outages, transportation network disruptions, and infrastructure failures.

4.6.2 Fires

Multi-block and high-rise fires are now rare in the U.S. due to better fire code enforcement, but having a large concentration of high-rise buildings, hotels, entertainment venues and industry makes Seattle vulnerable. In the 1970's several single-room occupancy hotels burned with high fatalities. Seattle also has a large port making marine fires a danger and an underground electrical distribution network that can cause extended outages when fires occur in it. Fires are especially dangerous when they are ignited by other hazards like earthquakes and civil disorders because many fires can ignite in a short period while responders are already occupied.

4.6.3 Hazardous Material Incidents (including Wildfire Smoke)

Seattle is a regional industrial center and major transportation hub raising its exposure to hazardous materials incidents that release toxic chemical, combustible, nuclear, or biological agents into the environment. Seattle has not had any truly disastrous hazardous materials incidents but has had several close calls with fuel tanker explosions and a fire at a UW biology lab. There has been an increase in the transport of highly flammable crude oil through Seattle in recent years. Most incidents happen at fixed sites, but those that occur during transport are often more dangerous because they occur in uncontrolled, public spaces.

Smoke from wildfires has become a recurring seasonal air quality hazard in the western United States and British Columbia. In the Puget Sound region in 2018, wildfire smoke led to 24 days of poor air quality, including nine days that were considered either unhealthy for sensitive groups or unhealthy for everyone. In 2020, wildfire smoke led to a record-breaking number of days of poor air quality, including many days that were considered unhealthy for everyone. This smoke created additional risk for people with COVID-19 and worsened symptoms.

4.6.4 Structural Collapse and/or Failure

Structural collapse or failure includes buildings, dams, and other critical infrastructure such as bridges, and water, sewer, or power lifelines. There are no dams in Seattle, but the City owns a dam south of the city. If this dam failed, the biggest consequence would be flooding in the Duwamish Valley. Seattle is especially vulnerable to bridge collapse due to central role they play in connecting Seattle's transportation network to other areas. Western Washington has had four high profile bridge collapses since 1940. The Seattle Department of Transportation has an active bridge inspection and retrofit program. Regular inspections of the West Seattle High-Rise Bridge indicated accelerated growth of new and existing structural cracks resulting in its closure to all vehicle traffic on March 23, 2020. The City chose repair/strengthening over replacement, pushing for bridge reopening in 2022.

4.6.5 Power Outages

Power outages are a type of infrastructure failure but are treated as a separate hazard due to the complexity of their consequences. The 2003 Northeast Blackout highlighted the fragility of the U.S. power system. Seattle experienced a week-long power outage from a winter storm in December 2006. Since the wide-spread 2006 outage, Seattle City Light (SCL) has acquired a new power management system that allows it to isolate outages and respond faster. It has also improved fire suppression in its underground electrical system. In the 1980's and 1990's several fires in the underground system caused extended outages in major parts of downtown. About half of Seattle's power is purchased from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), making the city vulnerable to disruptions in other areas of the Northwest. While much of BPA's infrastructure is aging, they have been a leader in seismic upgrades to their critical infrastructure. Climate change is projected to decrease hydropower generation in the summer by mid-century.

4.7 Weather

Severe weather events are frequent hazards in Seattle. Except for flooding, they have citywide impacts that vary from minor to debilitating. Their consequences mount the longer they go on. Forecasters are getting better at predicting these events and their severity. The extra time reduces vulnerability by allowing the public and institutions more time to prepare.

4.7.1 Excessive Heat

Excessive heat events (EHE) can be an extremely deadly hazard. More than 700 people died during the 1995 Chicago heat wave. Because Seattle has a generally mild climate, most people are not acclimatized when EHEs do occur. The temperature itself is just one factor driving the consequences of EHEs. The other important factors are the season, difference between the pre-event and event temperatures, the event duration, nighttime cooling, wind and humidity. Meteorologists can accurately forecast the development of an EHE and the severity of its associated conditions with several days of lead time. The National Weather Service (NWS) has developed a Heat Health Watch/Warning System that tailors excessive heat guidance to specific regions in the country. EHEs are projected to become more intense in the future due to climate change. The most vulnerable people in EHEs are the elderly, infants, the homeless, the poor, and people who are socially isolated.

4.7.2 Flooding

Seattle is susceptible to four flood types: coastal flooding (including king tides), riverine, urban, and dam failure. Atmospheric rivers are storms that occur when the Jet Stream brings moist air from the tropics into the Northwest. They can cause extended periods of heavy rain that can cause riverine and urban flooding. Recent weather patterns have produced very high intensity rain cells, sometimes over narrow geographic storm-tracks.¹ These storms release larger amounts of rain, in short periods of time, which the drainage systems cannot always handle adequately.

- Coastal flooding happens during storms and especially high tides (called ‘king tides’). When the two coincide, the consequences are more severe. Sea level rise will make coastal flooding worse.
- Riverine flooding happens mostly along Seattle’s creeks. The South Park neighborhood is in a 500-year floodplain. Most of Seattle’s floodplains are very narrow.
- Urban flooding occurs when heavy rain overwhelms the drainage system. Seattle’s drainage systems were designed and originally built for longer duration and lower intensity rainstorms. The City has developed mitigation measures like detention ponds to decrease the consequences of urban flooding. The City of Seattle owns dams outside the city limits. Dam failure is mostly a hazard outside the city. The greatest risk is the Howard Hanson Dam. It discharges into the Green River and the Duwamish. Studies suggest that the likelihood of flooding on the Duwamish due to a dam failure is low.

4.7.3 Snow and Ice

Seattle’s winter weather is generally mild. When Seattle does receive snow, accumulations can be large. The consequences are especially severe if the snow lingers for more than several days or triggers secondary hazards like power outages. Seattle has heightened vulnerability to snow and ice storms because of its hilly topography and lack of dedicated snow removal equipment (Seattle has to repurpose general use equipment to plow snow). The City prioritizes major roads and is not able to plow residential streets. Extended snow can lead to severe transportation challenges. Excessive cold exacerbates risks to human health and safety when electric heating sources are inoperable. In 2008 several people died in King County due to carbon monoxide poisoning when they used charcoal grills indoors to heat their homes. Snow load has caused roof collapses in Seattle and rapidly melting snow has caused urban flooding and landslides.

4.7.4 Water Shortages

Seattle can experience water shortages during the summers that follow winters with low snowpack, because nearly all of Seattle’s water comes from watersheds in the Cascades that accumulate their supply from melting snow. Snowpack is projected to decline in future years due to climate change. The main shortage impacts are reduced stream flows for salmon, usage restrictions, and economic hardship for businesses that require large amounts of water. In 2006, Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) updated and adopted a plan to respond to and mitigate water supply problems. Water shortages also have consequences for power. Seattle City Light (SCL) faces challenges during water shortages because most power in the Northwest is generated by hydroelectric dams. During water shortages not as much water is available to turn generators to make electricity. To meet demand SCL must buy more expensive power from outside the region. Besides climate, water shortages can be caused by main breaks. These

shortages due to infrastructure failures are usually localized and short but could be longer if they are the caused by another hazard like an earthquake.

4.7.5 Windstorms

Windstorms with wind speeds equaling those of category one hurricanes can strike Seattle. Sustained winds of 85 miles per hour were recorded in the Seattle area in 1993 and 2006. Seattle's most damaging storm was the 1962's Columbus Day Storm. Windstorms cause power outages, structural damage, transportation blockages, and coastal flooding. Fall and winter is the most common time for windstorms, but the occasional out of season storms can be the most dangerous. Falling trees account for most damage. Windstorms often accompany other weather hazards producing complex emergencies that can include landslides, urban flooding, snow and extreme cold. Windstorms can damage structures with speeds as low as 32 mph. Seattle's new building code requires new structures to withstand 85 mph gusts. The City of Seattle has programs for vegetation management that serve to mitigate damage to electrical systems during windstorms. This tree trimming program intensified after the 2006 storm that caused lengthy power outages.

4.8 SHIVA Scoring Methodology

Each hazard has been evaluated using its Most Likely and Maximum Credible scenarios. Both scenarios are evaluated using twelve parameters developed from EMAP and FEMA standards. Ten of these twelve parameters are "base parameters" that directly affect the community, e.g., health effects. Each of these ten base parameters was assigned a score from one through five. The ten base parameters were averaged for a "Base Score" for each of the two scenarios.

The remaining two parameters, "Frequency" and "Cascading Effects," function as multipliers. These two parameters were also assigned a score of one through five. The two scores were added to get a "Combined Multiplier."

The "Base Score" was then multiplied by the "Combined Multiplier" to get a Scenario Ranking. Finally, the Scenario Rankings for the two scenarios were summed and added to the "Future Emphasis" parameter to get a Combined Ranking. The equation is written below.

Scenario Ranking = Average (Base Parameters) * Sum (Multipliers)

Combined Ranking = (Scenario Ranking – Most Likely) + (Scenario Ranking – Maximum Credible) + Future Emphasis

Draft scores were assigned by Office of Emergency Management staff with suggestions from the Office of Emergency Management Strategic Working Group.

4.9 Risk-Driven Planning

OEM uses hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis as the basis for all plan development, including the Seattle HMP. The mitigation strategy presented in Chapter 6 of this plan is based on the principles of maximizing loss reduction and the data presented in the SHIVA provides the City with the data necessary to identify goals, objectives, and actions that will be most effective. Some concepts in the SHIVA that were key considerations in developing the 2021 update of the Seattle HMP include:

- Earthquakes are Seattle’s top hazard. No other hazard has the combination of likelihood and potential destructiveness.
- Seattle is a hub for land, sea and air transportation giving it an inherent exposure to accidents.
- Seattle is vulnerable to bridge collapse due to central role they play in Seattle’s transportation network. Failure of multiple bridges could result in “islandization” of the community.
- Snow and ice storms rank second. Individually they are less damaging than a powerful earthquake, but they are much more frequent.
- Infrastructure failure is the third biggest risk due to infrastructure’s dependence on networked computers systems that are exposed to attack. The chance of successful, large scale attack is small, but its consequences would be severe.
- A combination of resource concentration, geography and lack of reserve capacity in our transportation system will make access to critical resources a challenge in a disaster.
- Our most vulnerable people live toward the outskirts of the city and along the Rainier Valley.
- Climate change will broadly affect most of the hazards Seattle experiences


See Appendix A for the full text of the SHIVA including a more detailed risk assessment.

Table 6 - Hazard Ranking

	Most Likely Scenario														Maximum Credible Scenario																		
	Geographic Scope	Duration	Health Effects	Displacement	Economy	Environment	Structures	Transportation	Critical Services	Confidence in Govt	Base Score	Frequency (F)	Cascading Effects (CE)	Multiplier (F + CE)	Subtotal	Geographic Scope	Duration	Health Effects	Displacement	Economy	Environment	Structures	Transportation	Critical Services	Confidence in Govt	Base Score	Frequency (F)	Cascading Effects (CE)	Multiplier (F + CE)	Subtotal	Future Emphasis	Combined Ranking	
Earthquakes	5	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	2.3	4	4	8	18.4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.0	2	5	7	35	3	56.4
Snow & IceStorm	5	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2.2	5	2	7	15.4	5	4	2	3	3	2	2	4	3	3	3	3.1	3	3	6	18.6	5	39.0
Windstorms	5	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2.1	5	2	7	14.7	5	2	2	3	3	2	3	4	4	3	3.1	3	3	6	18.6	3	36.3	
Power Outages	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1.8	5	2	7	12.6	5	4	2	4	3	1	2	3	3	5	3.2	3	3	6	19.2	3	34.8	
Cyber-attack/Disruption	5	4	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	3	2.1	3	1	4	8.4	5	4	2	5	4	3	1	4	4	3	3.5	2	4	6	21	5	34.4	
Landslides	4	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	1	1	2.1	5	1	6	12.6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3.0	2	4	6	18	3	33.6	
Disease Outbreaks	5	5	4	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2.2	4	1	5	11.0	5	5	5	5	4	1	1	3	3	3	3.5	3	2	5	17.5	5	33.5	
Flooding	5	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2.0	5	1	6	12.0	5	4	2	4	3	2	3	4	3	3	3.3	2	3	5	16.5	5	33.5	
Excessive Heat Events	5	3	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2.0	5	1	6	12.0	5	4	4	4	3	2	1	3	3	3	3.2	3	2	5	16	5	33.0	
Tsunamis and Seiches	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	2	1	1	2.2	2	2	4	8.8	4	2	4	5	4	3	3	4	3	3	3.5	2	4	6	21	3	32.8	
Infrastructure & Structural Failure	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	1.9	5	2	7	13.3	4	5	3	4	3	3	2	4	3	5	3.6	1	3	4	14.4	5	32.7	
Fires	2	2	2	4	1	1	2	2	2	1	1.9	4	2	6	11.4	2	4	4	3	3	2	2	4	2	3	2.9	2	4	6	17.4	3	31.8	
Transport Incidents	1	1	3	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1.5	5	2	7	10.5	3	2	4	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	2.6	2	5	7	18.2	3	31.7	
Water Shortages	5	5	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	2.4	5	2	7	16.8	5	5	1	3	3	3	2	1	3	3	2.9	2	2	4	11.6	3	31.4	
Social Unrest	3	1	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	2.2	5	2	7	15.4	5	3	3	5	3	1	3	2	2	5	3.2	2	2	4	12.8	3	31.2	
Attacks	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	1.8	5	2	7	12.6	4	2	3	3	2	1	2	4	4	3	2.8	2	1	3	8.4	5	26.0	
HazMat Incidents	3	1	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	1	2.2	3	2	5	11.0	3	3	2	2	3	4	2	3	2	5	2.9	1	3	4	11.6	3	25.6	
Volcano Hazards	2	5	1	4	3	2	3	2	3	1	2.6	2	1	3	7.8	5	5	2	2	3	2	4	5	2	1	3.1	1	3	4	12.4	3	23.2	

5 CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

Chapter 5 identifies the City's existing mitigation capabilities. These are the plans and policies, programs, and projects that are currently in place to reduce the City's vulnerability to hazards. It also includes key mitigation accomplishments that have been completed since the last plan update in 2015. As mitigation actions identified in the City's mitigation strategy (Chapter 6) are completed, they become new mitigation capabilities.

 FEMA	C1. Does the Plan document each [City department's] existing authorities, policies, programs and resources and its ability to expand on and improve these existing policies and programs? (Requirement §201.6(c)(3))
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5.1 General

The City of Seattle has a long history of commitment to neighborhood, citywide, and regional hazard mitigation planning. Existing hazard mitigation authorities, policies, plans, programs, and resources have reduced impacts from hazards. Where possible, City departments will leverage existing programs to implement mitigation actions (see Chapter 6). Utilizing existing authorities, policies, plans, and programs will provide the best value to the City of Seattle and build on programs already supported by Seattle communities and policymakers.

This chapter identifies planning and regulatory, administrative and technical, financial, education, and outreach capabilities to mitigate hazards; describes recent mitigation accomplishments; and identifies the City's participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in accordance with the Disaster Mitigation Act (see 44 CFR § 201.6(c)(3)). Seattle hazard mitigation capabilities include the following:

- **Plans and Regulations.** Plans, policies, codes, and ordinances that prevent and reduce the impacts of hazards. Examples of plans and regulations include Seattle's Comprehensive Plan, the City of Seattle Stormwater Management Plan, the Seattle Building Code, and the Seattle Environmentally Critical Areas Code.
- **Administrative and Technical.** Staff, their skills, and tools that can be used for mitigation planning. Examples of administrative and technical capabilities include Seattle Department of Planning and Development dedicated staff to building code enforcement and the OEM – SHIVA.
- **Financial.** Funding resources that can be utilized for hazard mitigation. Examples of financial capabilities include the Seattle Capital Improvement Program, the Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy, and federal funding programs such as the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).
- **Education and Outreach.** Education and outreach used to communicate hazard-related information and increase community preparedness and resiliency. Example of education and outreach include Home Retrofit Program.

CAPABILITY HIGHLIGHT

Unreinforced Masonry Building Retrofit Policy Development

Unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs), are old brick buildings typically built prior to 1945. Because these buildings were not built using modern building codes, they are much more likely to experience damage or collapse during an earthquake. Most URMs have brick walls and wood-frame floors and roofs. A tell-tale sign of URM construction is what's called header courses- lines of bricks turned on end. Seattle has an estimated 1,164 URMs throughout the city, and many can be found in historic neighborhoods such as Pioneer Square, the International District, Capitol Hill, Columbia City and Ballard.

Right now, there are no retroactive regulations in the City of Seattle requiring owners of URMs to upgrade their buildings through seismic retrofitting. However, property owners who decide on a major renovation, re-occupy a vacant URM, or change the use occupancy of a URM may be required to comply with seismic regulations in the current Seattle Building Code.

The City has been working for many years to develop a policy, program, and funding to seismically retrofit URMs. Prior to COVID-19, SDCI was working with the Mayor's Office and City Council to draft a joint resolution to begin the process to develop and implement a mandatory URM upgrade program. This work was planned to be undertaken in 2020 and would have taken into consideration the recommendations from the 2017 report prepared by the URM Policy Committee. However, these efforts have been placed on hold as the City focuses its resources on response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City will continue to consider the development of a URM policy and identify funding opportunities to implement retrofits. Key resources to support ongoing and future work on URM policy include:

- [Recommendations from the Unreinforced Masonry Policy Committee to the City of Seattle](#) (2017)
- [Updated Confirmed URM List](#) (SDCI, December 2020)
- [Funding URM Retrofits](#) (National Development Council, 2019)
- Update Draft Technical Standard to reflect anticipated changes in seismic retrofit codes on the national level (future work)

A new state program, C-PACER (Property Assessed Clean Energy and Resiliency), could provide low cost, long-term loans for commercial properties for qualified building improvements. The C-PACER program aims to address the significant needs for property owners to finance energy efficiency upgrades, renewable energy improvements, stormwater management, water conservation, and resiliency retrofits to address vulnerabilities to earthquakes and other natural disasters. Although the State cannot currently support this new program because of the fiscal shortfalls brought on by COVID-19, counties can take steps to establish a program.

5.2 FEMA Funded Hazard Mitigation Projects

Table 7 identifies FEMA-funded hazard mitigation projects conducted in the City of Seattle from 1999 to 2020.

Table 7 - FEMA Funded Hazard Mitigation Projects 1999-2020

Project	Funding Source	Award Date	Award Total	Lead Department	Status
Duwamish Head Stabilization Project	HMGP - DR 1159	Mar-1999	\$2,187,500	SPU [DWU]	Completed - Won engineering award!
North Queen Anne Dr. Bridge Seismic Retrofit	HMGP - DR 1361	Aug-2002	\$1,200,000	SDOT	Completed
Low Income Home Seismic Retrofit	HMGP - DR 1361	Jan-2003	\$1,000,000	SPD/OEM	Completed
Mitigation Plan Development	HMGP - DR 1361	Oct-2003	\$100,000	SPD/OEM	Completed
South Lake Union Armory Building Seismic Retrofit	PDMC 2005	Nov-2005	\$713,229	Parks	Completed
Gas Shut Off Valve Project	HMGP - DR 1671	Sep-2008	\$200,000	FFD	Completed
Queen Anne Community Center Seismic Retrofit	HMGP - DR 1671	Aug-2008	\$ 780,000	Parks	Completed
Post Alley Areaway Seismic Retrofit	HMGP - DR 1682	Oct-2010	\$589,055	SDOT	Completed
Urban Flood Hazard Identification Project	HMGP - DR 1817 & 1825 5% Funding	Nov-2010	\$208,500	SPU	Completed
Jefferson Community Center Seismic Retrofit	HMGP - DR 1817 and 1825	May-2011	\$1,371,198	Parks	Completed
Mitigation Plan Update and Seismic Assessment	PDMC 2011	Nov-2011	\$379,220	OEM & FFD	Completed
URM Public Education and Outreach	HMGP Dr 4056 5% Funding	Jul-2012	\$71,905	DPD	Completed
Columbia St. Areaway Seismic Retrofit	HMGP DR 4243	May 2017	\$1,737,885	SDOT	Completed
Bremer Apartments Seismic Retrofit	PDMC 2018	May 2020	\$5,016,312	OEM	Grant Awarded
8th Ave NW Bridge Seismic Retrofit	HMGP DR 4309	Oct 2020	\$2,691,045	SDOT	Grant Awarded
Funding Notes HMGP = Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. State/FEMA funding generated from Presidential Disaster Declarations. PDMC = Pre-Disaster Mitigation Competitive Grant Program. FEMA funding made available for national competition. BRIC = Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities. FEMA funding made available for national competition.					

Source: City of Seattle Office of Emergency Management.

5.3 Citywide Organization Capabilities

5.3.1 Race and Social Justice Initiative

The Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative (RSJI), launched in 2005, is a citywide effort to end institutionalized racism and race-based disparities in City government. RSJI builds on the work of the civil rights movement and the ongoing efforts of individuals and groups in Seattle to confront racism. The Initiative's long-term goal is to change the underlying system that creates race-based disparities in our community and to achieve racial equity. The City's RSJI internally focused work includes core team, change teams, employee training and RSJI Toolkit. Since 2014 RSJI has expanded to include more community partnerships and collaboration with BIPOC communities to guide City investments to achieve equity.

- **Core Team.** A Citywide team of about 30 people that works with key stakeholders on RSJ issues. Provide Citywide technical assistance and strategic planning support; Communicate/facilitate. Team members lead RSJI orientations and workshops for City staff.
- **Change Teams.** This group of employees in each department supports RSJI activities. They work together to extend RSJI's reach in departments, strengthen each departments capacity, offer expertise, work to address departmental issues, and build momentum to advance RSJI throughout the organization.

Training. City employees and volunteers who sit on City boards and commissions have access to trainings on various RSJI topics such as implicit bias, leading with race, how to apply the RSJI toolkit.

- **RSJI Toolkit.** This tool is designed to assist departments to analyze the racial equity impact of policies, programs, initiatives, and budget issues.

5.3.2 Citywide Plans and Regulations

The City has a foundation of long range, citywide policy and strategic plans that guide growth and City investments in infrastructure, services, and other assets. These plans require substantial interdepartmental collaboration and provide guidance for more detailed functional and operational plans. Some, adopted by ordinance, have statutory authority. Others, adopted by resolution, and are less binding and more aspirational. The following plans and regulations help the City achieve mitigation goals and actions.

Seattle 2035 Comprehensive Plan (OPCD, 2016)

Comprehensive Plan, a 20-year vision and roadmap for Seattle's future. The Comprehensive Plan guides City decisions about where to accommodate and plan for new jobs and residences, how to improve the transportation system, and where to make capital investments such as utilities, sidewalks, and libraries. It provides a framework to guide most of Seattle's big-picture decisions on how to manage growth to achieve environmental sustainability, racial equity, shared prosperity, and healthy and vibrant neighborhoods. As required by Washington's Growth Management Act, the plan must undergo a major review and update every 8 years. The next major update must be adopted by June 2024.

Move Seattle 10-Year Strategic Vision (SDOT 2015)

Move Seattle sets out a 10-year plan for a transportation system that meets present demands while looking ahead to future needs for a safe, affordable, connected system that works for people regardless of mode choice.

Parks and Open Space Plan (SPR 2017-2022)

This six-year plan documents and describes SPR's facilities and lands, looks at Seattle's changing demographics, and lays out a vision for the future. The 2017 Plan is required by the Washington State Recreation and Conservation Office (RCO) to maintain the City of Seattle's eligibility for state grants and funding programs that will help realize outdoor recreation capital projects and open space acquisition projects.

Climate Action Plan (OSE 2013)

This plan focuses on city actions that reduce greenhouse emissions and support vibrant neighborhoods, economic prosperity, and social equity. Actions are focused on areas of greatest need and impact: road transportation, building energy and waste. The plan also includes actions that will increase Seattle's resilience to the likely impacts of climate change.

Urban Forest Stewardship Plan (OSE 2013)

This plan set four goals for Seattle's urban forest: create an ethic of stewardship about the urban forest among City staff, community organizations, businesses, and residents; strive to replace and enhance specific urban forest functions and benefits when trees are lost, and achieve a net increase in the urban forest functions and related environmental, economic, and social benefits; Expand canopy cover to 30 percent by 2037; and increase health and longevity of the urban forest by removing invasive species and improving species and age diversity"

Consolidated Plan for Housing and Community Development (HSD 2018-2022)

This plan includes guidance for the allocation of an estimated \$17 million of federal grant and program revenue funds [approximately \$9.8 million in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, \$4.2 million in HOME program funds, \$796,000 in Emergency Shelter Grant Program (ESG) funds and \$2.3 million in Housing Opportunity for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) funds] from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Plan outlines strategies to address the housing, homeless, community and economic needs of the City's low and moderate-income residents and neighborhoods over the next five years.

Land Use Code (SDCI, OPCD)

The Land Use Code regulates the use and development of land in Seattle. SDCI reviews permit applications to make sure they comply with this code. With input from residents, designers, developers, and other interested stakeholders, City planners draft amendments to update the code to better address Seattle's land use policies.

Building Code and Residential Code (SDCI)

The Seattle Building Code (SBC) provides minimum requirements for design and construction of new buildings. The Seattle Residential Code (SRC) provides minimum requirements for design and construction of single-family houses, duplexes, and townhouses with no more than three stories and with separate entrances. Seattle has adopted the 2015 International Building Code and 2015 Residential Code with amendments specific to our city.

Stormwater Code (SPU & SDCI)

The stormwater code contains regulations to protect people, property and the environment from damage related to stormwater runoff. Seattle's stormwater code also satisfies the City's obligation to comply with our Municipal Stormwater Discharge National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit, issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology.

Shape Our Water (SPU 2023-2053)

This community-centered project will plan for the next 50 years of resilient drainage and wastewater systems. As Seattle faces powerful forces like climate change and rapid growth, future investments in water systems will transform the city. This effort will look beyond pipes and green infrastructure to see the broader role in people's lives, including safer neighborhoods, deeply rooted communities that resist displacement, thriving local businesses, and healthy and fun public spaces.

5.3.3 Voter Approved Property-Tax Levies

Many projects and programs are funded by special purpose voter-approved property tax levies. In Seattle, these funds have been an important source of funding for hazard mitigation. Seismic retrofits of transportation infrastructure, libraries, community centers are examples of mitigation projects included in these initiatives. Planning projects to be included in upcoming levies typically begins two to three years prior to the ballot date. The City also prepared a consolidated plan to document how it plans to spend federal funding provided through a number of programs.

Housing Levy (expires 2023)

Approved by Seattle voters in August 2016, the 7-year, \$290 million levy Seattle Housing Levy provides funding to provide, produce, and/or preserve affordable housing in Seattle and to assist low-income Seattle residents. The Levy funds five programs: Rental Production and Preservation, Operating and Maintenance, Homeownership, Acquisition and Preservation, Homelessness Prevention and Housing Stability Services. OH administers all 2016 Seattle Housing Levy programs except the Homelessness Prevention and Housing Stability Program, which is administered by the HSD.

Move Seattle Levy Fund (expires 2024)

Approved by Seattle voters in November 2015, the 9-year, \$930 million Levy to Move Seattle provides funding to improve safety for all travelers, maintain our streets and bridges, and invest in reliable, affordable travel options for a growing city. The levy provides roughly 30% of the City's transportation budget and replaces the 9-year, \$365 million Bridging the Gap levy approved by voters in 2006.

Families and Education Levy Fund (expires 2025)

Approved by Seattle voters in November 2018, the 7-year, \$619 million Families, Education, Preschool and Promise Levy will partner with families and communities to advance education equity, close opportunity gaps, and build a better economic future for Seattle students. A portion of levy funds is allocated to the Seattle Preschool Program Provider Facilities Fund to support capital projects that improve quality or help providers meet preschool facility licensing standards, expand space in existing SPP preschool facilities, start new facilities, either from the ground up or by substantially remodeling existing buildings to use as part of SPP.

Libraries for All Levy (expires 2026)

Approved by Seattle voters in August 2019, the 7-year, \$219.1 million Libraries for All Levy restores core Library services cut during the Great Recession, invests in critical systems' needs, and support the changing needs and interests of the communities we serve. Funding for earthquake retrofit of the historic Columbia, Green Lake and University branches were included.

Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy (expired)

In the aftermath of the 2001 Nisqually earthquake, in 2004 Seattle voters approved a 7-year, \$167 million Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy to provide funding to strengthen the City's ability to respond after a major disaster. Funds were used to renovate or replace all 32 neighborhood fire stations, build a new joint training facility for Seattle Fire and Seattle Public Utilities, construct a new fire alarm center and City emergency operations center, harden fire hydrants so firefighters can draw water directly out of eight City reservoirs, place emergency generators at community centers, and place emergency supply caches in four areas of the City.

Seattle Parks District Funding (no expiration)

Approved by Seattle voters in 2014, the metropolitan park district is authorized by Chapter 35.61 of the Revised Code of Washington. The Seattle Park District has the same boundaries as the City of Seattle and the Seattle City Council members serve as the Park District's Governing Board. Property taxes collected by the Seattle Park District will provide funding (\$55 million in 2019) for City parks and recreation including maintaining parklands and facilities, operating community centers and recreation programs, and developing new neighborhood parks on previously acquired sites. Seattle Parks and Recreation develops a 6-year Park District budget. However, planning for the next 6-year budget (2021-2026) has been delayed due to challenges in getting community input during COVID-19.

5.3.4 Community-led City Investments

For many years the City has directed City funds to support community-initiated capital projects and education programs. One of the earliest initiatives, the Neighborhood Matching Fund, was created in 1988 to provide matching dollars for neighborhood improvement, organizing, or projects developed and implemented by community members. The number of community grants and the funds allocated has grown. Communities are not only initiating capital projects implemented by City departments, but increasingly communities are leading the implementation of larger capital projects that involves land, buildings, and other physical structures. While programs are still evolving, there is an opportunity to share the City's mitigation goals and values to protect community-led investments and assets from hazards and future disasters.

Equitable Communities Initiative (\$30 million in FY 2021)

This fund, new in 2021, will focus on ensuring that BIPOC communities thrive. It will be guided by a community-led Equitable Communities Initiative Task Force who will receive the technical assistance of at least 18 City Departments. Potential areas for investment include building opportunity, inclusive economy, community wealth building, preserving cultural spaces, community wellness and climate justice. Task force recommendations could include expanding current programs, refocusing current City investments, creating new programs or investments or pilots, capacity building for community-based organizations, and identifying new and complementary opportunities for investment by philanthropy, regional, state or federal partners.

Strategic Investment (Anti-Displacement) Fund (\$30 million in FY 2021)

This fund, new in 2021, will support strategic investment in areas at high risk of displacement or in areas of low access to opportunity that present unique opportunities for transformational equitable development. This would include areas with significant planned public investment like light rail station areas and parks, where increased access to opportunities will likely also increase displacement pressure. This fund will focus on sites and projects with the potential to achieve multiple community benefit outcomes through mixed-use and mixed-income development that creates opportunities for housing, affordable commercial and cultural space, public open space, and childcare.

Participatory Budgeting (\$18 million in 2021)

This program, new in 2021, will engage communities in a participatory budgeting process. About \$17 million will fund successful project proposals for implementation of community safety strategies.

Equitable Development Initiative (\$5.6 million in 2021)

Equitable Development Initiative (EDI) invests in community-led efforts aimed at addressing issues of racial equity, social justice, economic mobility, and residential, cultural and commercial displacement. The Equitable Development Framework guides how the City prioritizes its work; shapes its budgets, policies, programs, and investments; and structures the implementation of targeted strategies and equitable development projects by using clear objectives for reducing disparities and achieving equitable outcomes for marginalized populations. OPCD coordinates this initiative.

Community Grants (\$5.0 million in 2021)

Community Grants support to local grassroots projects within neighborhoods and communities by providing funding to implement community-driven improvement or education projects such as community infrastructure, public space, and public health. The programs that support this work include Neighborhood Matching Fund, Duwamish River Opportunity Fund, Find It Fix, Healthy Food Fund. DON also administers grants for the 135 designated Community Emergency Hubs. DON manages these grants.

Environmental Justice Fund (\$500,000 in 2020)

The Environmental Justice Fund is a grant opportunity for community-led projects that improve environmental conditions, respond to the impacts of climate change, and get us closer to achieving environmental justice. Community members and Seattle City Council worked together to create the Environmental Justice Fund in 2017. Seattle's Environmental Justice Committee plays a critical role in overseeing the fund to ensure the experiences and priorities of BIPOC communities shape the work. OSE manages this fund.

5.4 Department-Specific Capabilities

Departments are listed alphabetically by acronym.

5.4.1 Office of Arts and Culture (ARTS)

The Office of Arts & Culture (ARTS) envisions a city driven by creativity that provides the opportunity for everyone to engage in diverse arts and cultural experiences. The office promotes Seattle as a cultural destination and invests in Seattle's arts and cultural sector to ensure the City provides a wide range of high-quality programs, exhibits and public art. ARTS includes eight programs: Cultural Partnerships, Communications and Outreach, Equity and Youth, Cultural Facilities Operations, Public Art, Artwork Conservation, Administrative Services, and Cultural Space. These programs are supported by two funding sources: Arts and Culture Fund (funded through the City's admission tax revenues) and the Municipal Arts Fund (supported by the 1% for Arts contributions from City capital projects).

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Public Art	Administrative and Technical Financial	Oversee the City's public art collection. Manage the Municipal Arts Fund for the commission, purchase, and installation of public art. Funding through 1% for Art ordinance that requires eligible City capital projects to contribute 1% of their budgets to the Municipal Arts Fund. Provides professional assessment, conservation, repair, and routine and major maintenance of permanently-sited works of art. As of 2020 the public art collection includes 400 permanently-sited and 3,200 portable works of art and periodic temporary art installations. All public art installations are subject to regulation by Seattle Municipal Code and ADA guidelines. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTS created an Inspection List for integrated public portable artworks to prioritize damage assessments after a disaster. 	All Hazards
Cultural Facilities Operations	Administrative and Technical	Provide operational support for Langston Hughes Performing Arts Institute. Support the operation and programming of ARTS at King Street Station, including a public cultural space, office space for ARTS, and meeting spaces. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTS worked with SDOT and FAS to completely renovate and retrofit 7,500 sf 3rd floor of King Street Station including stabilization support beams and an updated sprinkler system. Renovations completed in 2019. 	Earthquake Fire

5.4.2 City Budget Office (CBO)

The City Budget Office (CBO) is responsible for developing and monitoring the City's annual budget, carrying out budget-related functions, overseeing fiscal policy and financial planning activities, policy analysis, and preparing legislation for City Council review. CBO provides strategic analysis relating to the use of revenues, debt, long-term issues, and special events. The office also provides technical assistance, training, and support to City departments in

performing financial functions. The Innovation and Performance team is also in CBO, supporting and advancing initiatives by using data and design to solve problems.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Oversight of City Fiscal Policy and Financial Planning	Financial	Provide strategic analysis and oversight for financial functions within the city. Work closely with all city departments in their fiscal policy and financial planning. One primary example would be the monitoring and development of the budget for Seattle's Capital Improvement Program (CIP) which allocates funds to rehabilitate, restore, improve, and add to the City's capital facilities. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and development of the budget for Seattle's 2020-2025 Capital Improvement Program (CIP), which identifies City investments including projects that mitigate hazards. 	All Hazards

5.4.3 Department of Neighborhoods (DON)

The Seattle Department of Neighborhoods provides resources and opportunities for community members to build strong communities and improve their quality of life. With more than 180 neighborhoods in the city, the department plays a key role in helping neighbors develop a stronger sense of place, build closer ties, and engage with their communities and city government.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Historic Preservation Program	Regulatory	Designate and protect more than 350 historic structures, sites, objects, vessels, and eight historic districts. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A number of historic buildings have undergone, or are in the process of undergoing, seismic renovation from damage sustained during the Nisqually earthquake. 	Earthquake
Historic Preservation Program	Education and Outreach	Provides technical assistance for historic preservation. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provided technical assistance to University of Washington for a comprehensive multi-building approach to URM upgrades; provided education resources/best practices/technical assistance in presentations given at URM related conferences and symposiums. 	Earthquake
Community Liaison Program	Education and Outreach	Manage Community Liaisons (CL). CLs are independent contractors who are expert community navigators who provide a number of outreach services in historically underrepresented communities: translations, proofreading, interpretation, facilitation (in native language), constituent support at City-hosted events, feedback and expertise on cultural concerns and barriers, reports of participant feedback and concerns, and community workshops. In 2018, Community Liaisons worked with 15 City departments on 48 outreach and engagement projects.	All Hazards

Community Grants Program	Financial	<p>Provide support to local grassroots projects within neighborhoods and communities by providing funding to implement community-driven improvement projects. The programs that support this work include Neighborhood Matching Fund, Duwamish River Opportunity Fund, Find It Fix It, Healthy Food Fund. Communities could propose mitigation projects through these programs. DON also administers grants for the 135 designated Community Emergency Hubs. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2020, awarded \$33,360 grant to develop five additional emergency hubs, translate current Hub brochure and videos into multiple languages, and provide interpretation at 2021 outreach events. In 2015, awarded \$15,000 to the South Park Area Redevelopment Committee and South Park Senior Citizens to develop more stable food sources for the Senior Center Meal Program. 	All Hazards
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5.4.4 Finance and Administrative Services (FAS)

The Seattle Department of Finance and Administrative Services (FAS) has the most diverse set of responsibilities of any City department. FAS combines the functions from the former Fleets and Facilities Department and the former Department of Executive Administration with the revenue forecasting, debt management, and tax policy functions that were previously performed by the former Department of Finance. It also houses the Customer Service Bureau, Neighborhood Service Centers, and manages the Find It, Fix It app. As a result, the department provides a variety of services to City departments and the public, including citywide operational responsibilities for accounting, payroll, licensing, revenue collection and processing, animal services, weights and measures, treasury activities, purchasing, construction and consultant contracting, risk management, the City's financial management and personnel data systems, and management of City real estate, buildings, and vehicles, as well as construction and renovation of fire stations as part of the Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy. FAS-managed facilities and IT infrastructure. Schedule 1 facilities are comprised of existing and future office buildings located in downtown Seattle, including but not limited to City Hall, the Seattle Municipal Tower and the Justice Center. Schedule 2 facilities are comprised of existing and future structures, shops and yards located throughout Seattle, including but not limited to City vehicle maintenance facilities at Haller Lake and Charles Street, FAS shops located at Airport Way S., fire stations, police precincts including the animal shelter, and other FAS managed facilities used for City Services.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	<p>Develops capital projects for FAS-managed facilities and IT infrastructure, and coordinates with CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The renovation and seismic retrofit of Fire Station 5 was completed in 2018. 	All Hazards
Seismic Program	Administrative and Technical	<p>Perform seismic assessment to identify seismic risk at FAS facilities. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A seismic assessment of the North Precinct was performed in 2019. 	Earthquake

Facilities and Emergency Response Program (Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy)	Financial	<p>Manage the voter-approved Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy. The levy provided \$167 million to enable the Seattle Fire Department to be more resilient in dealing with crisis situations, especially those that could damage critical department assets and disrupt emergency operations. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The construction of Fire Station 22 was completed in 2017. The construction of Fire Station 32 was completed in 2017. 	All Hazards
Mail Safety Protocol	Administrative and Technical	<p>Implement bomb detection procedures to screen incoming package for potential threats. Employees are trained in procedures to safely handle suspicious packages in coordination with SPD. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trained mailroom staff to be aware of what to look for in a suspicious mail or package. Conducted training for City Departments by the USPS Postal Inspectors and Seattle Police Bomb Squad on what they should be looking for and what to do if they find something suspicious. Training was completed in October 2018. 	Attacks
Safe and Healthy Buildings for City Workforce	Administrative and Technical	<p>Manage 120 City facilities to be safe and healthy buildings for the City workforce. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implemented safety protocols in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. To improve indoor air quality HVAC filters were upgraded to MERV-13 in 2020. 	Disease Outbreak

5.4.5 Human Services Department (HSD)

The Seattle Human Services Department (HSD) is one of the largest contributors to Seattle's safety net. HSD operates programs, provides services and is responsible for investing more than \$120 million in contracts to more than 170 community-based human service providers that support the city's most vulnerable each year. Through the lens of racial equity, HSD supports programs, initiatives and policies that prepare youth for success, support affordability and livability, address homelessness, promote public health and promote healthy aging.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Aging Disability Services	Planning, Administrative, Education and Outreach	<p>Prepare clients and home care agencies in Seattle and King County to be ready in case of a disaster. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the Area Agency on Aging (AAA) for Seattle and King County, developed the Area Plan 2020-2023, which includes an Emergency Response Plan. Developed COVID-19 care guidance on various topic areas and provided to home care agencies, case managers and case managed clients. Planning unit worked closely with King County housing providers on resident signage, 	All Hazards

		<p>education and face covering use. Collaborated with Public Health to address availability of influenza vaccinations for underinsured and uninsured for 2019-2020 season.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed Respiratory Health during Wildfire Smoke Exposure Self-Management Plan. • Coordinate disaster response plans with home care agency directors. • Maintain list of high-risk clients that is used to prepare for and respond to disasters to include weather, wildfire smoke, and changes to roads (e.g., closure of Viaduct). • Provide emergency preparedness information to clients and help clients with personal emergency plans. Distributed Red Cross emergency kits to clients and staff. 	
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5.4.6 Seattle Information Technology Department (ITD)

The Seattle Information Technology Department (ITD) manages the City's information technology infrastructure and performs strategic information technology planning. ITD coordinates strategic technology direction for the City by developing common standards, architectures, and business solutions to deliver City services more efficiently and effectively; builds and operates the City's corporate communications and computing assets, which include the City's telephone, radio, and email systems, networks, and servers; and oversees development of the Democracy Portal, a project to improve the City's government access television station and its accompanying web site by providing new programming, live Web streaming of City Council meetings, live "webcasting" and interactive services that allow residents to access government information and contact decision makers.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Puget Sound Regional Interoperability Committee	Technical	Plan interoperable infrastructure initiatives across King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties. Tri-County Regional Interoperability, which links the radios from King County, Snohomish County, Tacoma, and the Port of Seattle with conventional radio in Pierce County, Washington State Patrol, and the Federal Integrated Wireless Network.	All Hazards
Regional Communications Board	Administrative	Govern the King County public safety radio network. The Seattle Information Technology Department operates a portion of the radio network system, including nine radio sites and 6,000 800-megahertz public safety radios that link every police and fire agency in the County, as well as Seattle Public Utilities.	All Hazards
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	<p>Propose capital projects and coordinate with FAS and CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Replacement of two old radio towers in Northeast and West Seattle. • Establishment of two separate data centers with 50 miles of separation. • Cloud infrastructure and data back up in place. 	Earthquake

King County Emergency Management Advisory Committee	Administrative	Participate in the ICC EMAC Critical Infrastructure Workgroup. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Series of Cybersecurity “Emerald Downs” exercises and workshops to advance the understanding of county and local government responsibilities. Securing funding through State Homeland Security Grants. 	Cyber-attack and Disruption
2020 ITD Digital Security & Risk Register	Administrative	Perform an annual assessment of 73 CIS/NIST framework risk controls. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ITD Digital Risk Register Report Projects: Fire Eye, Zen GRC 	Cyber-attack and Disruption

5.4.7 Public Health – Seattle & King County (PHSKC)

Public Health – Seattle & King County (PHSKC) provides public health services for the City, including services for children and youth, persons with chronic disease, and communicable diseases; immunization services; environmental health services; public health emergency preparedness; emergency medical services; violence and injury prevention services; a medical examiner; nutrition support services; and tobacco prevention programs.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Health Code and other codes	Regulatory	Has legal authority over Code of the King County Board of Health. Updated 2018, and King County Code Title 12: Public Peace, Safety, and Morals. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Board of Health Code was updated in 2018. 	All Hazards
Emergency Program	Planning, Administrative, Regulatory	Maintain Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 8 of Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) Basic Plan: Health, Medical, and Mortuary Services and has a designated emergency manager and section to handle emergency management. Implements a training and exercise program to support the general public’s health and safety by training Public Health staff on their role in an emergency and disaster. Maintains a well-developed risk communication plan. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ESF-8 Basic Plan updated 2018. ESF-8: Environmental Health Emergency Response Annex updated 2018. ESF-8: Medical Countermeasures Annex updated 2018. Isolation and Quarantine Plan updated 2017 Mass Fatality Management Plan updated 2018 Equity Response Annex updated 2019 Environmental Health Services Division 24HR Emergency Notification Reporting Line established Nov. 2019. 	All Hazards

Services for Vulnerable Populations	Administrative/ Technical	Provide equitable health services, through Healthcare for the Homeless program, to vulnerable populations through engagement with homeless service providers. In addition, Environmental Health Services Division's Community Toxics, Science, and Policy Section provides homeless service providers with guidance and resources to ensure implementation of proper sanitation and hygiene measures within shelters and unsanctioned encampments. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2017-2020 Hep-A vaccination strategy, coordinating with homeless service providers to hold Hep-A vaccination clinics for individuals living as homeless. Sanitation & Hygiene Guidance for Homeless Service Providers; issued Oct. 2019. 	Disease Outbreak
Climate Change & Health	Planning	Adopted PHSKC Blueprint for Addressing Climate Change in 2018. This outlines core PHSKC functions, strategies, and actions to develop internal expertise, analyze gaps and opportunities for prioritizing work, and build on current programs and projects to address climate change impacts on health and equity.	Climate Change, All Hazards

5.4.8 Office of Economic Development (OED)

The Office of Economic Development (OED) seeks to foster an inclusive economy that grows family-wage jobs and increases wealth among underserved communities. OED invests in four primary program areas all targeting underserved populations: supporting entrepreneurs; building healthy and vibrant neighborhood business districts; developing the talent of youth and adults; and partnering with key industry sectors. The core services OED provides capitalize on Seattle's economic strengths, particularly in the industry areas of manufacturing and maritime, technology, startups, restaurants, health care, life sciences and global health, clean technology, and the creative economy.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Neighborhood Business Districts	Financial, Education and, Outreach	Support small businesses and neighborhood business districts through direct funding and technical support. Work through business district organizations and business improvement associations (BIAs) to distribute information and provide assistance. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In response to COVID-19, the OED expanded the Small Business Stabilization Fund to provide relief for small businesses financially impacted by the virus. To date, the department has provided \$10,000 grants to over 706 	Disease Outbreak Fire HazMat Incident

		<p>businesses from high risk of displacement/highly disadvantaged areas and anticipates investing an additional \$5 mill to stabilize small businesses in the city of Seattle.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2020 OED established the language access resource line to support small business owners with resources and information in over 8 different languages. • OED has also hosted webinars directed at small businesses and business outreach organizations to provide information about resources, organize outreach and direct technical assistance to small businesses in need. • OED has distributed information via social media, e-newsletters, ethnic media, and via partners' electronic communication channels. • In response to incidents such as fires and explosions within business districts (Ballard & Chinatown-ID fires and Greenwood gas explosion) OED staff have provided direct technical assistance to businesses to make insurance claims and apply for FEMA and SBA resources. 	
Special Events	Regulations	Support special events through advocacy and permit coordination to encourage and maximize positive business, economic, and cultural activity while ensuring public safety.	All Hazards

5.4.9 Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

The Seattle Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is responsible coordinating the City's resources and responsibilities in dealing with all aspects of emergencies. Its basic mission is devoted to citywide disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. It places a strong emphasis on individual and community preparedness and provides a key liaison function between the city and its state and federal emergency management counterparts.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Hazard Vulnerability and Risk Technical Expertise	Technical	<p>Provide information and expertise about hazard vulnerability and risk. Update the Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Assessment (SHIVA) every four years. The SHIVA identifies Seattle's hazards and examines their consequences providing a foundation for the City's disaster planning and preparedness activities. Provide technical assistance on hazards and vulnerability to support emergency management planning, projects and other implementation. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updated the SHIVA in 2019. • Created and updates Hazard Explorer, an online GIS resource providing accessible mapped data of various hazards. • Participated in pilot of One Concern, a disaster simulation tool. • Participated in beta-test for Shake Alert Earthquake Early Warning system to deliver early warning of impending hazardous ground shaking to key public safety officials. • Ongoing. Participated in standing working groups focused on specific hazards such as Tsunami Working Group. 	All Hazards

Hazard Mitigation Grant Funding and Program Coordination	Planning and Administrative	Manage applications and administration of State/FEMA Mitigation grants on behalf of the City. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Between 2016 and 2020, the City was awarded approximately \$9.4 million in grant funding for mitigation projects. 	All Hazards
Emergency Management Stakeholder Coordination	Planning and Administrative	Convene internal and external stakeholders to support the City's emergency management functions, including mitigation. City stakeholders include Mitigation Work Group, Strategic Work Group, Tsunami Working Group and the Executive Emergency Board. External stakeholder groups include the Disaster Management Committee, and Community Safety Ambassadors. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participate in the interdepartmental Climate Justice Working Group created in 2020. 	All Hazards
Comprehensive Emergency Plans	Planning	Maintain a suite of plans that guide the city in its mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a disaster. These include Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, Seattle Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and Seattle Disaster Recovery Framework. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopted the Seattle Disaster Recovery Framework in July 2015. Adopted an updated Seattle Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and Emergency Operations Plan in December 2017. 	All Hazards

5.4.10 Office of Housing (OH)

The mission of the Seattle Office of Housing (OH) is to support the preservation and production of affordable housing through long-term loans to mission-based multifamily developers in Seattle. The Office of Housing also provides home repair and weatherization programs for lower-income residents. A guiding principle of OH is to create a more equitable and affordable community through affordable housing investments.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Capital Financing and Resources	Regulatory Financial	Serve in the capacity as a lender and compliance monitor for the production of affordable rental housing in the City. Works in close partnership with a network of mission-based non-profits and provides resources and investment for housing initiatives. Resources could potentially provide funding for seismic reinforcement in affordable housing projects. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2020, received FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant funding on behalf of Community Roots Housing for The Bremer Project, a seismic retrofit of an identified URM building of affordable housing. First time this was done and OH is exploring other opportunities to replicate this model. In 2016, voters approved a six-year \$290 million Affordable Housing Levy to create or preserve affordable housing for seniors, low- and moderate-wage workers, and formerly homeless individuals and families. Also, will provides 	Earthquakes

		<p>assistance to more than 900 first-time low-income home buyers and emergency rental assistance to more than 6,500 households.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2018 the City enacted Mandatory Affordable Housing that requires new commercial and multifamily residential development contributes to affordable housing expanding OH's financial resources. 	
HomeWise Weatherization Program	Technical	<p>Provide weatherization services to income eligible households to install improvements such as insulation, duct and air sealing, ductless heat pumps, new hot water tanks, furnace repair or replacement, new kitchen and bathroom fans, and new energy efficient refrigerators. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2019, the OH Weatherization Program expended \$4.74 million in grant funds and completed the upgrades in 97 single-family homes which benefited low-income renters and homeowners. Also provided weatherization services to nine (9) affordable apartment buildings that contained 469 units. 	Climate Change

5.4.11 Office of Planning and Community Development (OPCD)

The Office of Planning and Community Development (OPCD) supports thriving communities through an integrated and equitable approach to planning and community investment. OPCD works across City departments to assess community needs, prioritize resources, and develop a vision for how Seattle grows to ensure that we are coordinating and implementing our plans with a cohesive vision. We are working toward a city that is inclusive, affordable, vibrant, interconnected, and innovative. We partner with neighborhoods, businesses, agencies and others to bring about positive change and coordinate investments for Seattle communities.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Seattle Comprehensive Plan	Plans and Regulations	<p>Maintain the Comprehensive Plan, a 20-year vision that guides City big-picture decisions on how to grow while preserving and improving our quality of life. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopted Seattle 2035 in 2016, an update of the plan to guide how Seattle will grow by 70,000 households and 115,000 jobs over the next 20 years. 	All Hazards
Community Planning	Plans and Regulations	<p>Lead community planning processes in multiple neighborhoods each year. The City engages organizations and individuals to come together to shape the future of their neighborhood by setting long range goals and policies, designing strategies, and coordinating city investments.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2018 OPCD adopted a community prioritization process that includes "environmental burdens" and "public safety concerns" as two factors to determine where community planning resources will be focused. 	All Hazards

5.4.12 Office of Sustainability and Environment (OSE)

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Seattle Climate Action Plan	Planning and Administrative	Implement the Seattle Climate Action Plan (2013) and Climate Action Strategy (2018) to reduce Seattle's greenhouse gas emissions, including goal assessment, action planning, community outreach, and performance measurement. The Seattle Climate Action Plan (CAP) provides a coordinated strategy of short- and long-term City actions to reduce GHG emissions while also supporting other community goals, including building vibrant neighborhoods, fostering economic prosperity, and enhancing social equity. The CAP focuses on road transportation, building energy, and waste as well as actions that will increase our community's resilience to the likely impacts of climate change.	All Hazards
Food Access Action Plan	Planning and Administrative, Financial	Provide direct benefits that increase purchasing power of residents experiencing food insecurity to afford healthy food through Fresh Bucks and Emergency Grocery Vouchers. Implement Seattle's Food Action Plan, a five-year plan, adopted in 2013 containing 40 actions to increase access to get more healthy food to more Seattle residents, expand opportunities to grow food in the city, strengthen our regional food economy, and reduce food related waste.	All Hazards
Duwamish Valley Program and Action Plan	Planning and Administrative	Co-lead (with OPCD) a multi-department effort to mitigate the combined impacts of environmental inequities, climate change, and systemic racism in South Park and Georgetown. Implement the Duwamish Valley Action Plan that includes 87 City and community-led actions in seven priority areas: Healthy Environment, Parks & Open Spaces, Community Capacity, Economic Opportunity & Jobs, Mobility & Transportation, Affordable Housing, and Public Safety. Plan promotes collaboration and guides the City's work and investments in the Duwamish Valley. interdependence. The program also supports community-led projects funded by the Duwamish Valley Opportunity Fund (DVOF). Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since 2015 the DVOF has granted \$1.1 million to 37 community projects including several to mitigate hazards related to flooding, excessive heat events and hazardous materials. • Between 2016 and 2018, the City invested over \$2M in investments to respond to community priorities. • Release the Duwamish Valley Action Plan in 2018. 	All Hazards

5.4.13 Seattle Center (SC)

Seattle Center (SC) is a valued civic asset with community roots that reach back in time to native tribes and pioneers. Today, the 74-acre campus is the region's top visitor destination. Over 14,000 events presented on the campus each year, attracting millions of Seattle residents, arts patrons, out-of-town guests, and global travelers. The Seattle Center grounds and venues support an extraordinary level of arts, cultural, sports, educational and tourism activities. The City looks forward to celebrating the opening of Climate Pledge Arena in 2021 as a world-class venue for sports and entertainment. The

Arena, housed in the landmarked Century 21 Coliseum building that dates to the 1962 World's Fair, represents nearly \$1 billion in private investment, and its operation will support the continued vibrancy and sustainability of Seattle Center for decades to come.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	<p>Develops capital projects and coordinates with CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seismic retrofit and deferred major maintenance of the Mercer Garage • Relining of existing Seattle Center owned sewer main lines • Roof replacements at Cornish Playhouse and the Seattle Children's Theatre • Monorail deferred major maintenance including update of electrical rooms and seismic evaluation of the Seattle Center station • Preservation and redevelopment of the historic Century 21 Coliseum roof, superstructure and façade to reopen as Climate Pledge Arena in 2021 	All Hazards

5.4.14 Seattle City Light (SCL)

Seattle City Light (SCL) was created in 1902 to provide affordable, reliable, and environmentally sound electric power to the City of Seattle and neighboring suburbs. Owned by the community it serves, Seattle City Light is a nationally recognized leader in energy efficiency, renewable resource development, and environmental stewardship. Seattle City Light provides electric power to more than 360,000 residential, business, and industrial customers. Its service area of 131.3 square miles includes the City of Seattle, areas north of Seattle, including the city of Shoreline and parts of Lake Forest Park, and areas south of Seattle, including the cities of Burien, Tukwila, and SeaTac. To serve these customers, City Light owns, maintains, and operates a multi-billion-dollar physical plant that includes: a power generation system consisting of seven hydroelectric plants on the Pend Oreille, Skagit, Cedar, and Tolt rivers; 656 miles of high-voltage transmission lines linking these plants to Seattle; a distribution system with 15 major substations and more than 2,500 miles of overhead and underground cable; a state-of-the-art System Operations Center coordinating the City's electric system; and billing and metering technology tracking approximately 461,000 accounts.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Mitigation Policy	Planning and Administrative	<p>Conduct structural mitigation, security, and non-structural mitigation projects as facility upgrades are made. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Created the Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Planning (Information Technology Division) • Installed a fail-over redundancy system with backup at an off-site location for data systems. 	All Hazards

Dam Safety Program	Planning and Administrative	<p>Oversee the Dam Safety Program involving the coordination, monitoring, and oversight of activities for six major dams to reduce the risk and impacts from dam failure due to natural and man-made hazards. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vulnerability and threat assessments for the Skagit and Boundary Hydroelectric Projects and the Cedar Falls/Tolt dams. ▪ Skagit Spillway Gate seismic strengthening at Ross and Diablo dams. ▪ Hillside and slope stabilization at Boundary, Diablo, and Ross dams. ▪ Equipment installation and monitoring to detect dam movement, measure high flows, and dam failure at Cedar Falls and Boundary dams. ▪ Annual dam safety inspections by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). ▪ Procedures for dam inspections following events ▪ Emergency Action Plans for facilities. ▪ Annual update/tests of emergency procedures. 	All Hazards
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	<p>Develop capital projects and coordinate with CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. CIP projects repair, upgrade, and expand SCL's physical plant, and implement a variety of safety improvements, mitigation activities, and licensing requirements. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed a joint assessment project for the Cedar Falls/Tolt Dams. 	All Hazards
Hazard tree mitigation (vegetation management) near SCL Right-of-Way	Administrative and Technical	<p>Identify and abate hazard from trees that are likely to fail and cause power outages in all the identified areas. SCL maintains over 300,000 trees adjacent to 1700 miles of distribution power lines throughout Seattle, Burien, Lake Forest Park, Normandy Park, Renton, SeaTac, Shoreline, Tukwila, and unincorporated King County. Also, SCL manages vegetation along 657 miles of transmission power lines passing through five counties across Washington State. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identified all areas that need vegetation management. 	Fires, Landslides, Power Outages, Snow and Ice Storms, and Windstorms
Remove/sample PCB transformers	Administrative and Technical	<p>Ensure full compliance with laws and regulations for all transformers. The PCB master plan was completed in 2014 and software to track the PCB concentration of all transformers was implemented in 2015. SCL is replacing transformers that need critical attention and establishing procedures for transformer inspections. SCL will complete the project by 2021.</p>	Earthquakes, Snow and Ice Storms, and Windstorms
Charging Stations	Administrative and Technical	<p>Make available a charging station to deploy throughout the greater Seattle area.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locate two mobile trailers. • Purchase equipment for the mobile units. • Complete the study on most vulnerable areas in Seattle. • Deployment of mobile unit procedures. 	Climate Change

5.4.15 Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections (SDCI)

The Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections (SDCI) develops, administers, and enforces standards for land use, design, construction, and housing within the Seattle city limits. SDCI is also responsible for long-range planning, including Seattle's Comprehensive Plan and related projects- transportation improvements, neighborhood business revitalization, and downtown and waterfront planning.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Seattle Unreinforced Masonry Retrofit Policy (in development)	Regulatory	<p>This policy is under development to mitigate the risks associated with Unreinforced Masonry (URM) structures in the City. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalized list of confirmed URM buildings. • Supported National Development Council (NDC) efforts to develop financing report for URM retrofit. • Provided support for Alliance for Safety, Affordability, and Preservation (ASAP!) for development of permitting processes. • Worked with OEM to continue URM Retrofit policy development. 	Earthquakes
Emergency Response and Recovery Roles	Administrative	<p>Provide rapid assessment of damaged buildings following earthquakes. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained appropriate staff to conduct ATC-20 building safety assessments. • Trained appropriate staff on required NIMS Incident Command System courses. • Trained appropriate staff on EOC procedures and WebEOC. 	Earthquake
Environmentally Critical Areas (ECA) Code	Regulatory	<p>Administer the ECA Code which governs areas of Seattle that provide critical environmental functions. For example, wetlands can protect water quality and provide fish and wildlife habitat. The ECA code also addresses areas that represent particular challenges for development due to geologic or other natural conditions. The goal of the ECA regulations, (Seattle Municipal Code [SMC] Chapter 25.09) is to effectively protect these areas and to protect public safety, while allowing reasonable development. Specific hazard-related areas identified include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geologic hazard areas including landslide-prone areas, liquefaction-prone areas, peat-settlement-prone areas, seismic hazard areas, and volcanic hazard areas. • Flood-prone areas. 	Earthquakes Flood Landslides Volcanic Hazards
Floodplain Management	Regulatory	<p>Administer the City's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established and maintained eligibility in the Regular Phase of the NFIP since 1977. • Maintains a National Flood Insurance rate map for properties identified as flood prone. These Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps (DFIRMs) have been updated and will go into effect August 19, 2020. Interim regulations were adopted in Aug 2020 and permanent regulation will be adopted in Feb 2021. • Public outreach through a Community Assistance Visit will occur prior to adopting the updated mapping. 	Flood

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 25.06, as amended by Council Bill Number 114503 (2003), is the floodplain management chapter; it was reviewed and found to be fully compliant with the NFIP and State floodplain management regulations. The Municipal Code Chapter 25.06 was amended by Ordinance 125781 (Council Bill 119420) to update the referenced vertical datum. 	
Codes, Regulations, Rules, and Memos	Regulatory	<p>Develops, adopts, and enforces codes, ordinances, and policies that regulate construction activities of new and existing buildings. The selected codes, regulations, rules, and memos mitigate damage caused by natural disasters. Key mitigation rules, memos, codes, and policies for which the department is responsible including Directors Rules, Client Assistance Memos, Seattle Construction Codes, Seattle Municipal Code, and other policy provisions. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updates to the building code to reflect changes tsunami standards in the International Building Code. 	All Hazards
Landslide Awareness Program	Education and Outreach	<p>Conduct public outreach with the intent of providing expert advice for property owners to manage landslide-prone areas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducted public meetings. Updated ECA Steep Slope Area Mapping Units. Updated ECA known landslide area mapping GIS information. 	Landslide

5.4.16 Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT)

SDOT's mission is to deliver a transportation system that provides safe and affordable access to places and opportunities. SDOT develops, maintains, and operates a transportation system that promotes the mobility of people and goods, and enhances the quality of life, environment, and economy of Seattle. Services are coordinated and delivered through 10 divisions that respond to changes in the function and use of the transportation system and the evolving needs of the businesses and people of the City of Seattle.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Levy to Move Seattle	Financial	Fund bridge seismic retrofit program through this voter-approved transportation levy.	Earthquake
Move Seattle: 10-Year Strategic Vision for Seattle	Planning	This plan identifies actions to accomplish policies in the Comprehensive Plan and the Puget Sound Regional Council's Transportation 2040 plan, as well as integrate the City's 4 modal plans .	All Hazards
Transportation Asset and Performance	Planning and Administrative	This program focuses on getting the best results of performance for the prevention, improvement, and operation of infrastructure assets given the resources available.	Infrastructure and Structural Failure

Management Program			
Landslide Mitigation Program	Planning, Administrative and Technical	<p>Conduct studies and direct CIP funds towards high priority arterial streets vulnerable to landslides. Track ongoing clean-up and maintenance costs associated with slide area and develop draft standards for tailoring streets and drainage in residential areas. Recent right-of-way landslide repair projects include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 - Soldier Pile Walls at various sites along 9700 block to 10300 block of Rainier Ave S • 4 – Gravity walls at various sites along 9700 block to 10300 block of Rainier Ave S • Soldier Pile wall at 10400 block 47 Ave SW • Soldier Pile wall at 9400 block California Ave SW 	Landslides
Areaways Program	Administrative and Technical	<p>Identify and implement mitigation projects for areaways - usable space, generally in the street right-of-way, constructed under sidewalks, and between the building foundation and the street wall. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring Program – An extensive monitoring system has been installed in the most critical areaways in the Pioneer Square District • Inspection – Condition inspection was performed on areaways in the International District. This inspection provides an important benchmark for determining deterioration. • Reconstruction – elimination of areaway hazard Columbia St. 	Infrastructure and Structural Failure
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	<p>Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NE 45th St Viaduct (East Approach) • Fairview Ave Bridge (East and West) • Landslide Mitigation Projects. • Areaway Projects 	Earthquakes

5.4.17 Seattle Fire Department (SFD)

The Seattle Fire Department (SFD) has 33 fire stations located throughout the City. SFD deploys engine companies, ladder companies, and aid and medic units to mitigate loss of life and property resulting from fires, medical emergencies, and other disasters. SFD also has units for hazardous materials responses, marine responses, and high-angle and confined-space rescues. In addition, SFD provides leadership and members to several disaster response teams: FEMA Washington Task Force 1 Urban Search and Rescue, USCG Area Maritime Security Committee, and regional wildland firefighting through the Washington State Fire Mobilization Plan. SFD's fire prevention efforts include: fire code enforcement; inspections and plan reviews of fire and life safety systems in buildings; public-education programs; regulation of hazardous materials storage and processes; and regulation of public assemblies. FAS manages the construction, maintenance, and mitigation of all SFD facilities.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Fire Prevention Division	Regulatory	<p>The Fire Prevention Division (FPD) administers the SFD fire prevention program to provide a reasonable level of life safety and property protection from the hazards of fires, explosions, and dangerous conditions, including releases of hazardous materials for Seattle's residents, workers, and visitors. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> From 2016-2020 approximately 3,300 facilities that store, dispense, use, or handle hazardous materials were inspected annually by the SFD Operations Division; the FMO processed approximately 300 new hazardous materials operational permit applications annually during the same period. Additionally, the FMO received and issued approximately 2,200 temporary permits related to hazardous activities annually primarily related to hot work (i.e., cutting, welding, and roofing operations). Provided oversight to testing and repairs for over 27,500 fire protection systems in the City of Seattle. More than 4,000 deficient systems were reported and repaired annually. Conducted over 1,600 compliance inspections annually to resolve complex or difficult fire code violations. Inspected over 430 high-rise buildings annually in Seattle to ensure fire and life safety in these uniquely risky structures. 	Fires HazMat Incidents
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)	Planning	<p>This inter-jurisdictional public/private mitigation partnership is managed by the SFD and addresses hazardous materials issues. The Seattle LEPC actively participates with regional and state partners in the Washington State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). The goal of the SERC is to plan for and mitigate the effects of a release or spill of hazardous materials. Recent accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2020 the Seattle LEPC received and distributed approximately 700 U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Guidebooks to response agencies in the City of Seattle. These books provide responders with recommendations for initial identification and isolation actions when responding to hazardous materials incidents. 	HazMat Incidents
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	Proposes capital projects and coordinates with FAS and CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments.	All Hazards

5.4.18 Seattle Police Department (SPD)

The Seattle Police Department's (SPD) primary mission is to prevent crime; enforce the law; and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD is specifically charged with the enforcement of Title 11 (City of Seattle Traffic Code), Title 12 (City of Seattle Criminal Code), Revised Code of Washington Title 9A (Criminal Code), and statutes in Washington Code 9 (specified sections dealing with Criminal Law). Consistent with its mission, SPD has lead agency responsibility for all criminal investigations, to include civil disorder, bomb threats, and terrorism incidents as codified in Article VI of the Seattle City Charter. SPD operates within a framework that divides the city into five geographical areas called "precincts." These precincts define east, west, north, south, and southwest patrol areas, with a police station in each.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Incident Management Team	Technical/Operational	Participates in the regional multi-discipline Type 3 Incident Management Team. Maintains a cadre of personnel to effectively manage major incidents or disasters and conducts regular training and exercises.	All Hazards
Washington State Fusion Center	Administrative	Stage representatives with the Washington State Fusion Center to ensure interagency communication and collaboration in preparedness, prevention, and response efforts as they relate to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. The Fusion Center supports public safety and homeland security missions.	Attacks
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	Proposes capital projects and coordinates with FAS and CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments.	All Hazards

5.4.19 Seattle Public Libraries (SPL)

The Seattle Public Library, founded in 1891, includes the world-renowned Central Library, 26 neighborhood libraries, a robust "virtual library" available 24/7 through the Library's popular website, a Mobile Services division, as well as leased storage and shops space. The Central Library provides library services for downtown residents and workers, is a hub for planning and developing systemwide programs and services, critical computer and Wi-Fi access for people without internet service, community meeting rooms and an auditorium for cultural and educational programs. The 26 neighborhood libraries provide services and programs close to where people live, go to school and work, and serve as neighborhood anchors for lifelong learning, civic engagement, and economic vitality. In 2019, The Seattle Public Library (SPL) hosted nearly five million in-person visitors and circulated 12.6 million items. More than 12,000 attended the Library's adult learning programs, 34,000 attended STEM-focused Summer of Learning activities and over 1,200 attended homework help sessions. The 2008 Library Levy, known as "Libraries for All", increased the amount of physical space by 80%. The next 2012 Library Levy provided funding to maintain the five new and 22 updated libraries. The 2019 Library Levy focuses on asset preservation and includes seismic retrofits at three century-old Carnegie-era branches.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Library Levy	Financial	The 2019- 2026 voter-approved Library Levy funds capital projects, services and programs at all 27 libraries. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Included funding for seismic retrofits for three Carnegie-era branches (Green Lake, University and Columbia) 	Earthquakes
Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	Develops capital projects for library facilities and coordinates with CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. Recent accomplishments include:	Earthquakes

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recent CIP was informed by an SDCI URM building survey that identified seven unreinforced masonry (URM) libraries. Three libraries were identified as high vulnerability (Green Lake, University and Columbia) and four libraries were medium vulnerability. 	
Library Programs	Education and Outreach	Host a variety of educational displays and programs which in past have programs related to disaster preparedness, earthquakes, and other mitigation-related topics.	All Hazards

5.4.20 *Seattle Parks and Recreation (SPR)*

Seattle's Department of Parks and Recreation (SPR) works with all City residents to be good stewards of the environment and to provide safe, welcoming opportunities to play, learn, contemplate, and build community. Seattle Parks and Recreation manages 400 parks and open areas in its approximately 6,200-acre park system. This includes 224 parks, 185 athletic fields, 112 neighborhood play areas, nine swimming beaches, 18 fishing piers, four golf courses, and 22 miles of boulevards. Other Department of Parks and Recreation facilities include 151 outdoor tennis courts, 24 community centers, eight indoor and two outdoor swimming pools, 27 wading pools, a nationally recognized Rose Garden, and the Seattle Aquarium. The Woodland Park Zoological Society operates the zoo with financial support from the City.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
Asset Management Plan (AMP)	Planning	Maintain and update AMP actions to keep the SPR assets in safe and operable condition and to maintain a Tier 1 sheltering system. Recent accomplishments include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation of Emergency Generators at Tier 1 Emergency Shelters at Garfield Community Center and Southwest Teen Life Center and Pool Helene Madison Pool seismic upgrade Hiawatha Community Center seismic upgrade Magnolia Community Center seismic upgrades Magnuson Building 11 seismic retrofit Cal Anderson Fountain discharge retrofit Freeway Park Fountains (3) retrofit Emma Schmitz Memorial Park seawall 	All Hazards
Urban Forest Management	Maintenance	Maintain healthy forest canopy, provides slope stability in environmentally critical areas and reducing carbon in air.	Windstorms, Snow and Ice, Power Outages, Heat Events, Landslides

Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Financial	Develops capital projects and coordinates with CBO to prepare the CIP, a six-year financial planning tool that identifies future capital investments and potential strategies for funding those investments. SPR uses the AMP which measures each potential capital project by criteria including safety, asset preservation, race and social justice, legal obligation, and improvements in efficiency to set priorities for capital projects.	All Hazards
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5.4.21 Seattle Public Utilities (SPU)

Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) is comprised of four major utilities: water, drainage, wastewater, and solid waste. The water utility provides a reliable water supply to more than 1.5 million customers in King County; the drainage utility manages stormwater; the wastewater utility collects and disposes of sewage and storm water; and the solid waste utility collects and disposes of recycling, yard waste, and residential and commercial garbage. SPU's mission is to provide vital services to the community that are equitable, environmentally responsible, and resilient. Resilience is a system's ability to incur fewer negative impacts and recover more quickly from stresses and shocks, while adapting to new conditions and opportunities. As a community-centered utility, SPU seeks to proactively address community needs and risks to improve resilience.

Existing Mitigation Capability	Capability Type	Description	Hazard Mitigated
General Response Planning, and Response Capabilities	Planning, Administrative and Technical	<p>SPU assesses and mitigates hazard risks to minimize disruptions to water supply, drainage, wastewater, and solid waste services. Accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated SPU's Continuity of Operations Plan (2018, 2021). Completed SPU's Emergency Management Logistics Plan (2020). Completed the first Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (2018). Completed the Water Utility's Emergency Response Plan (2020) and Risk and Resilience Assessment (2020) per America's Water Infrastructure Act. Updating Damage Assessment Plan and Training Program (2-year cycle). Completed the Ship Canal Water Quality Incident Management Plan (2020). Completing the Solid Waste Management Plan Amendment (2021) that incorporates resilience to hazards. Updated the Solid Waste Debris Management Plan including contracts (2018). SPU's Wet Weather Readiness and Response Program responds to in-city flooding. SPU's Spill Response Team responds to spills impacting drainage and wastewater, and water systems. SPU's Watershed Wildland Fire Team responds to wildfire in the municipal watersheds. SPU's Operation Response Center (24-hour dispatch) with expanded remote working capabilities and with backup at the North Operations Center. 	All Hazards
Emergency Preparedness	Education and Outreach	<p>SPU supports employees, the public, customers, and partners in being prepared. Accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employee preparedness programs, including annual field crew trainings and a Continuity of Operations Plan exercise (2020). 	All Hazards

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manages an alert and warning system for SPU, AlertSeattle. SPU is community notification capable. SPU has developed tools and resources to assist employees and community members. Distributed "SPU for 2" Preparing for the Big One booklet, guides and other materials during preparedness campaigns to encourage staff and their communities to prepare for disasters or emergencies. Continuing partnerships with local community leaders and businesses for Partners in Preparedness annual event and the Annual Night Out Ambassador Program. 	
Stormwater and Wastewater Planning and Programs	Planning and Regulatory	<p>SPU manages wastewater, storm water, and water quality programs and capital projects. These programs are in part required under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System and a Consent Decree with the Department of Justice, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology. Accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completing a Wastewater System Seismic Assessment (2021). Analyzed risk and likelihood of failure for many types of wastewater and drainage assets and have begun capital planning, to address vulnerabilities. Revised storm water code (2021) and Directors Rule to protect against flooding, pollution, landslides, and erosion. Performed Structural Storm Water control projects that include flood mitigation through the use of Green Stormwater Infrastructure. Completion of the Wastewater System Analysis (2019), which in part analyzed sewer system flooding and sewer backups. Completion of the Drainage System Analysis (2020), which in part analyzed property and road surface flooding. Implementing the Plan to Protect Seattle's Waterways (2015), which reduces combined sewer overflows that occur during storm events. 	Storms, Flood, Earthquake, Landslides
Water System Seismic Mitigation Program	Administrative, Technical and Financial	<p>Seattle Public Utilities (SPU) completed its first water system seismic vulnerability assessment in 1990. This comprehensive assessment evaluated essentially all of SPU's water system storage reservoirs and tanks, pump stations, transmission pipelines, and support buildings and facilities. The 1990 seismic vulnerability assessment was the impetus for a seismic upgrade program that led to approximately \$100 million of seismic upgrades and facility replacements.</p> <p>Since the 1990 study was completed, there have been several significant developments that affected SPU's seismic mitigation program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major earthquakes in Northridge, Kobe, Christchurch and Tohoku that show water systems remain highly vulnerable to large earthquakes. The realization that the many Western Washington crustal fault zones, including the Seattle Fault Zone that runs directly below Seattle, are active. The Uniform/International Building Code has significantly evolved since 1990. Earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe that has performed exceptionally well in Japan is now available in the United States. <p>In 2018, SPU completed a new water system seismic vulnerability assessment that incorporated the developments listed above. The most significant finding of the 2018 study is that SPU's transmission and distribution pipeline systems would be expected to sustain significant damage during a catastrophic earthquake. Restoring even minimal service to all of SPU's customers may take months. Additionally, several facilities that were previously believed to be seismically robust were identified as seismically vulnerable to the stronger ground motions that are now believed possible.</p>	Earthquake, Landslide

		<p>The water system seismic mitigation program direction was updated to reflect the 2018 seismic study findings. In addition to instituting new seismic pipeline standards for all water mains, several critical transmission pipeline locations and critical facilities were identified for seismic upgrade. Earthquake emergency preparedness and response measures are also being augmented.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed seismic upgrades to four terminal reservoirs. • Completed water system seismic vulnerability assessment and updated seismic mitigation plan. • Developed and instituted seismic design standards for water mains. • Installed earthquake resistant ductile iron pipe in areas subject to pipe damaging permanent ground displacements. • Wrote earthquake hazard-specific response plan for the water system. • Began developing post-earthquake isolation and control plan to mitigate pipeline damage effects. • Identified pipeline emergency repair material deficiencies and developed plan to obtain these materials. • Initiated Trenton, Magnolia, Riverton and Eastside Tank seismic upgrade projects. • Installed drains in ongoing landslide area to reduce ongoing sliding and reduce potential sudden slides in a seismic event. • Initiated more comprehensive/detailed study of SPU water system transmission pipelines. 	
Dam Safety Program	Planning and Administrative	<p>SPU monitors 14 dams to ensure safe operation of reservoirs and storm water detention systems. Accomplishments include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Emergency Action Plans for SPU Dams. Updated Annually, Rewritten every 5 years. • Tabletop and Functional Exercises with Emergency Action Plans for SPU Dams. • Completion of SF Tolt Dam Surveillance and Monitoring Report to FERC (annually). • Physical Modeling of Tolt Dam Valve 15 for extreme hydraulic conditions. • 2019 SF Tolt Emergency Action Plan Full-Scale Exercise. • 2018 SF Tolt Inundation Study (identify flooding risks). • 2017 SF Tolt Ring Gate Rehabilitation. • 2017 SF Tolt Part 12D Follow-up Investigations including Tolt Spillway Condition Assessment and Hydraulic Modeling. • Critical Infrastructure Protection: security enhancements at SPU facilities. 	Flood, Dam Failure
Climate Change Adaptation Program	Planning and Administrative	<p>SPU is committed to understanding and preparing for the impacts that climate change will have on our communities, infrastructure, and essential services, and to reducing the utility's contribution to climate change by: 1) Assessing potential impacts to the water supply, drainage, wastewater, and solid waste systems; tidally influenced infrastructure; and integrating this information into the decision-making process; 2) Collaborating with water utilities, academia, philanthropy, City departments and other regional public agencies, community-based organizations, and the science community locally and nationally to enhance Seattle's capacity to prepare; 3) Centering frontline communities in the planning and preparedness process.</p> <p>Assessments of potential climate change impacts by SPU include:</p>	Drought, Flood, Wildfire, Excessive Heat Events

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeated scientific study of hydrology and water supply, as well as water demand. • Study of extreme precipitation events and their effects on urban drainage. • Mapping of exposure to sea-level rise. • Mapping of urban heat islands and exposure to heat stress. • Evaluation wildfire risk in the municipal watersheds and implementation of climate-adaptive forest management. <p>Measures to reduce vulnerability could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New infrastructure projects and modifications to existing infrastructure and facilities. • Changing the way infrastructure is operated to reflect changing conditions. • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions through fleet electrification and facility improvements. • Embedding climate information into asset management decision-making tools. • Developing early-warning systems for urban flooding. • Amending or implementing new regulations, codes, and policies. • Supporting capacity building in frontline communities. 	
Facility Capital Improvements	Financial	<p>SPU CIPs allocate funds to rehabilitate, improve, and add to SPU's capital facilities for water, drainage and wastewater, and solid waste utilities. SPU CIP Facilities Projects related to hazard mitigation include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Watershed Headquarters Building (2018) that serves as an incident management center for wildfire and other incidents. • New North Transfer Station (2016) is built to current seismic standards with emergency backup generator. • New Morse Lake Pump Plant (2015) to provide access to water when the lake level is low due to drought. 	Earthquake, Wildfire, Drought

5.5 Continuity of Operations Planning

One notable city-wide planning capability is the requirement that all City departments maintain Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans. These plans play a key role in mitigating the impacts of hazards by ensuring that departments are planning to minimize the potential disruption to their essential functions that may result from a disaster. Key plan information includes:

- Identification of department essential functions.
- Identification of alternate facilities that can be used if the department's normal facility is damaged or uninhabitable.
- Establishment of recovery time objectives for essential functions.
- Assignment of roles and responsibilities for continuity operations.

COOP plans are a vital part of the basic foundation that supports the City's response to and recovery from disasters. Without them, work following a major event is made much more difficult and chaotic. With them our efforts in restoring services and bringing a sense of normalcy to the City will happen quicker and minimize the long-term impacts that disasters have on communities.


5.6 Coordination with Community Partners

The City of Seattle is not alone in its efforts to create a more resilient community through hazard mitigation and will actively pursue strategies to ensure effective coordination and integration with the private sector, both for-profit and not-for-profit, including the County's critical infrastructure, key resources, other business and industry components, and not-for-profit organizations (sometimes called nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including those serving special needs populations, engaged in mitigation activities. These efforts are ongoing, and the City has proactively identified enhanced coordination with community partners as a mitigation action in this update of the plan (OEM1).

Table 8 - Community Partners by Sector

Education Seattle Public Schools Seattle Colleges University of Washington Seattle University Seattle Pacific University	Business and Industry Greater Seattle Business Association Seattle Chambers of Commerce Port of Seattle Local Businesses
Finance Area Financial Institutions	Healthcare Area Hospitals and Healthcare Facilities
Private Utilities Puget Sound Energy Seattle Steam Telecommunications Providers	Transportation Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad King County Metro Seattle-Tacoma International Airport Sound Transit Washington State Ferries

5.7 National Flood Insurance Program Participation

 FEMA	C2. Does the Plan address each jurisdiction's participation in the NFIP and continued compliance with NFIP requirements, as appropriate? (Requirement §201.6(c)(3))
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The Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections manages the City's NFIP. The City has established and maintained eligibility in the Regular Phase of the NFIP since 1977. Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 25.06 is the floodplain management chapter.

On February 19, 2020, FEMA published a Flood Hazard Determination adopting a new Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) and Flood Insurance Study (FIS) for all jurisdictions in King County, including Seattle. FEMA requires that all jurisdictions within King County adopt the new FIRM and FIS within six months which was August 19, 2020. Additionally, local FEMA officials reviewed Seattle's floodplain regulations and this review directed the minimum amendments to the Floodplain Development Regulations (SMC 25.06) to meet 44 CFR Section 60.3 (d and e) for the August 19, 2020 deadline.

In addition to adopting the new FIRM and FIS, the City of Seattle is required to have floodplain regulations that apply to the new maps that did not apply to the existing 1995 FIRM and FIS. These requirements come from the NFIP regulations in Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Specifically, 44CFR section 60.3e contains regulations for coastal high hazard flood zones, which were not identified on the 1995 maps. These coastal flood zones are designated as VE zones on the new FIRM.

Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 25.06 was amended by Council Bill Number 119832 (2020) to adopt new interim Floodplain Development Regulations and floodplain maps, and these took effect on August 23, 2020. These interim regulations will be effective for approximately six months while the City works on permanent regulations.

The most recent Community Assistance Visit by the Washington State Department of Ecology was conducted on August 6, 2008, and the City was certified as a participant in good standing in the NFIP. A new Community Assistance Visit has not yet been scheduled.

Within the Seattle city limits, there are currently twelve properties identified as Repetitive Loss and one property identified as Severe Repetitive Loss according to NFIP criteria.

6 MITIGATION STRATEGY

6.1 General

Chapter 6 describes the City of Seattle's mitigation strategy which is the primary focus of the City's mitigation planning efforts. This strategy represents the blueprint for the approach chosen by the City to reduce or prevent losses flowing from hazards identified in the SHIVA.

The strategy is made up of three main required components: mitigation goals and objectives, mitigation actions, and a mitigation action plan for implementation (see Figure 5). These components provide the framework to identify, prioritize, and implement actions to reduce risk from hazards.

Figure 5 - Mitigation Strategy Process



6.1.1 Maximizing Loss Reduction


While this mitigation strategy is meant to be comprehensive in nature and address all hazards identified in the SHIVA, the City also recognizes that there are some hazards that pose greater risk to the community in terms of potential losses both in terms of impact to life and to property and the environment. In the City of Seattle's case, the hazard identified as having the potential for the greatest impact to life and property is earthquake. This focus on reducing the City's vulnerability to seismic events is due to following drivers:

- Earthquakes are Seattle's top hazard with the highest combination of likelihood and potential destructiveness.
- Seattle's built environment, which includes vulnerable infrastructure and building types such as unreinforced masonry buildings, creates an increased risk.

The City continues to reduce vulnerability to seismic risk through the Seismic Retrofit Facilities Improvement Program. This program, managed by the Department of Finance and Administrative Services, provides the City with an opportunity to address facilities at risk and support decision making regarding seismic retrofit projects. The mitigation strategy outlined in this chapter will inform how to increase the City's resiliency and reduce the risk of downtime to critical City services post-earthquake.

In addition to a focus on areas of greatest loss, the planning process includes tracking of repetitive loss. Although Seattle does not have a large exposure to repetitive losses due to river flooding, as many communities do (see Section 5.7 on National Flood Insurance Program), as part of the annual review process the City will revisit and address any recurring loss trends that emerge across all hazards.

6.2 Mitigation Goals

 FEMA	C3. Does the Plan include goals to reduce/avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified hazards? (Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(i))
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Mitigation goals are intended to represent what the City seeks to achieve through mitigation plan implementation. The goals are general guidelines and provide a framework for identification of more detailed objectives and actions. The MWG reviewed the goals and objectives from the 2015 plan update and confirmed these goals and objectives for the 2021 update.

GOAL 1: Protect life and safety and promote community resiliency.

- Objective 1.1: Conduct hazard specific public outreach to vulnerable areas.
- Objective 1.2: Reduce the possibility of damages and losses resulting from disease/pandemic hazards.
- Objective 1.3: Promote community resiliency through a comprehensive approach to preparing for the impacts of a changing climate.
- Objective 1.4: Increase the resiliency of the City's food system.
- Objective 1.5: Enhance the City's response capacity.

GOAL 2: Safeguard critical infrastructure and ensure continuity of service.

- Objective 2.1: Ensure system redundancies and backup power are available to support key City functions.
- Objective 2.2: Ensure protection of the City's information technology infrastructure.

GOAL 3: Protect public and private property.

- Objective 3.1: Reduce the possibility of damages and losses to City facilities and infrastructure from earthquakes and other geo-physical hazards.
- Objective 3.2: Reduce the possibility of earthquake-related damages and casualties due to Unreinforced Masonry Buildings.
- Objective 3.3: Reduce the possibility of damages and losses resulting from weather hazards.
- Objective 3.4: Reduce the possibility of damages and losses resulting from transportation and infrastructure hazards.
- Objective 3.5: Reduce the possibility of damages and losses resulting from intentional acts of destruction.
- Objective 3.6: Ensure that City building codes reflect the latest standards in seismic safety.

GOAL 4: Protect the natural environment and cultural and historic resources.

- Objective 4.1: Determine the earthquake vulnerability of historic landmarked properties.
- Objective 4.2: Reduce the use of or minimize the impacts of the use of potentially hazardous substances in City operations.


GOAL 5: Ensure a resilient economy.

- Objective 5.1: Collaborate with local business to promote hazard mitigation.

GOAL 6: Promote a collaborative and integrated mitigation program.

- Objective 6.1: Incorporate hazard mitigation into other City plans and programs.
- Objective 6.2: Engage external partners in the City's mitigation planning process.

6.3 Mitigation Actions

 FEMA	C4. Does the Plan identify and analyze a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects for the [City of Seattle] being considered to reduce the effects of hazards, with emphasis on new and existing buildings and infrastructure? (Requirement §201.6(c)(3)(ii))
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A mitigation action is a specific action, project, activity, or process taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their impacts. Implementation of mitigation actions helps achieve the City’s mitigation goals and reduce vulnerability to threats and hazard identified in the plan. Mitigation plan regulations require the City to identify and analyze a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects to reduce the impacts identified in the City’s risk assessment.

See Appendix A for the full text of the SHIVA.

6.3.1 Review of 2015 Hazard Mitigation Actions

As part of the mitigation strategy update, all mitigation actions identified in the 2015 plan were evaluated to determine what the status of the action was and whether any ongoing or incomplete actions should be included as actions in the 2021 plan update.

See Table 9 for an overview of the status of all actions from the 2015 plan update.

Table 9 - Status of 2015 Mitigation Actions

Actions are listed alphabetically by department acronym.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
DON-1	Conduct survey of landmarks/historic district resources that have had seismic upgrades/life safety upgrades.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Part of the work conducted in DPD-1.
DPD-1	Prepare comprehensive list of unreinforced masonry buildings.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Current department is SDCI.
DPD-2	Update Seattle structural codes to current standards	Plans and Regulations	Ongoing	Current department is SDCI. New seismic standards will be adopted in 1Q 2021. Updates to the structural codes happen regularly. Unclear at this point what structural code changes will be required for future updates.
DPD-3	Identify City-owned unreinforced masonry buildings.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Current department is SDCI. Information will be used to prioritize retrofits of City-owned URM buildings.
FAS-1	Develop analytical tools to support the asset planning program.	Plans and Regulations	Complete	Completed seismic risk assessment demonstration project completed along with 2015 Seattle HMP update. The project developed a practical screening methodology that can be utilized city-wide to evaluate seismic risks, prioritize mitigation actions and reduce seismic risk over time. Carried forward in the 2021 Seattle HMP as a capability.
FAS-2	Seismic upgrade of Charles Street – Fleets Vehicle Maintenance.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	High priority but on hold pending funding. Dropped and replaced with FAS 1 - Initiate feasibility studies to determine seismic upgrade of critical facilities. This is an ongoing action to conduct assessments and studies to address the earthquake hazard.
FAS-3	Continue the Emergency Generator Program.	Infrastructure/Capital Project,	Ongoing	Use excess capacity on the Seattle Animal Shelter emergency generator to support other critical operational functions. This a non-structural project to address power outages related to Winter Storm, Earthquakes, etc. High priority but on hold pending funding. Electrical components will be evaluated to ensure proper sizing for capacity requirements. This determines costs for potential upgrades.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
FAS-4	Investigate and perform feasibility studies of new technologies for hazard mitigation.	Assessments and Studies	Ongoing	Dropped and replaced with FAS 2 - Install ShakeAlert technology into express elevator in SMT. This is non-structural project to be completed in next 1-3 years to address earthquake hazards. This project is ongoing through Q2, 2021. Anticipated costs to be \$15,000 and funded through operations budget. Project co-sponsored by OEM to connect city facilities to the USGS supported earthquake early warning system.
FAS-5	Seismic upgrade of South Precinct.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	Dropped and replaced with FAS 1 - Initiate feasibility studies to determine seismic upgrade of critical facilities. High priority but on hold pending funding.
FAS-6	Complete ASCE 31-03 Tier 2 seismic studies on (10) critical FAS facilities.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Conducted detailed study of Charles Street Vehicle Maintenance Garage and South Precinct. Using the ASCE 31-03 methodology, CD was able to conduct more in-depth review of facilities for structural deficiencies and provided prescriptive retrofit recommendations for future capital projects. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as a Capability.
FAS-7	Conduct a workshop to share methodology and lessons learned from the seismic risk assessment demonstration project with other departments and building owners	Education and Awareness	Complete	Seismic Prioritization Workshop brought together approx. 70 stakeholders throughout the city to share and exchange mitigation projects, challenges, and successes. Participants included facility planners, asset managers, emergency managers for entities with a portfolio of multiple buildings. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as a Capability.
HSD-1	Increase the quantity and quality of food available through the emergency food system for people at risk for food insecurity. Through the 3-year investment period work with selected agencies to increase coordination, efficiency, and resiliency of the food system.	Plans and Regulations	Complete	Increased access to healthy foods via HSD and OSE contracts and partnerships, and other City departments. Examples include funding for food banks, congregate meal programs, bulk buy food ordering to purchase discounted food for distribution to food banks and meal programs, investments in farm-to-table programs, new BIPOC grassroots projects.
ITD-1	Upgrade essential network routers, firewalls, and switches for City of Seattle information technology systems.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	Dropped due to ongoing standard IT upgrades and no definable project
ITD-2	Add upgrades to SONET as necessary to improve capacity of existing fiber optic network.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	Dropped due to ongoing standard IT upgrade and no definable project
ITD-3	Upgrade telecommunications systems: Implement Unified Communications System	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Implemented new City of Seattle digital telecommunications technology

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
ITD-4	Creation of citywide next generation data center site and a secondary alternate data center site for the City of Seattle.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Stood up new data centers, West and East.
ITD-5	Implement controls on City owned desktop systems that enforce policy and prohibit installation of non-approved applications.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Prevents employees from loading and using unauthorized software
ITD-6	Implement technology for the detection of command and control computer traffic for compromised desktop systems.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Provides network & system monitoring, security and risk oversight for cybersecurity
ITD-7	Implement technology to routinely inventory installed, non-Microsoft applications to determine to the extent to which upgrade or patching is required. Transition the information to operations for patch/upgrade of the systems.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Provides IT work management system to manage applications, network, systems, and devices
OEM-1	Identify opportunities for integration of community partners into the City's mitigation planning program	Education and Awareness	Ongoing	OEM worked with Community Roots, an affordable housing developer/provider, to secure FEMA funds to complete a seismic retrofit of one building in their portfolio.
OEM-2	Tailor public education messaging to emphasize earthquake preparedness and mitigation in programs delivered in liquefaction-prone areas of the city and on the OEM website.	Education and Awareness	Ongoing	Between 2015 and 2020, OEM conducted approximately 140 public education programs at locations with identified liquefaction prone areas. All of these programs included information on earthquake risk and preparedness. Ongoing but not emphasis on liquefaction areas. Hazard explorer.
OEM-3	Strengthen awareness of and focus on health systems/disease prevention in the mitigation program.	Education and Awareness	Ongoing	Public health impacts associated with fire smoke and pandemic have become more urgent based on recent events. Learnings from these incidents will shape future education and awareness efforts.
OEM-4	Encourage the chambers of commerce and other business advocates to sponsor business efforts to prepare for and mitigate the impacts of hazards. (Ref: City-wide Emergency Management Multi-Year Strategic Plan 2015 – 2017 Action Item 6.c.2.)	Education and Awareness	Complete	OEM led 277 business preparedness programs between 2015 and 2020. In 2018 OEM developed a "Preparing Your Workplace" guide with input from small businesses and promoted to chambers and business improvement areas in the city.
OSE-1	Develop Climate Preparedness Strategy	Plans and Regulations	Ongoing	Scope, policies and plans in development. Office is not resourced to work on preparedness and under-resourced for mitigation.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
P&R-1	Assessment and seismic retrofit of the North Shops (Densmore)	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	A roof project on the facility included seismic Work. North Shops building now meets current seismic code.
P&R-2	Conduct an assessment of remaining Parks Community Centers and pools for seismic retrofit and other renovations needed for service as secondary emergency shelters.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Study of pools completed. Bids put out on seven pool buildings. Seismic retrofits completed on two pools, and studies completed on five other pools. Seismic upgrades to Madison, structural work done at Queen Anne, damaged and rotting beams identified in assessments. Seismic retrofits will be made to roofs of pools when it is time for replacement. Community Centers: Loyal Heights, South Park, Magnolia, Hiawatha, Ballard, Ravenna Eckstein conducted seismic evaluations for these locations. Project in design and planned to begin construction at Magnolia and Hiawatha CC. Queen Anne and Madison pools are now safer and less life safety risk. More in line with current seismic code. Magnolia and Hiawatha CC will now meet current seismic code.
P&R-3	Identify illicit/improper drainage systems by private residents, impacting steep slope areas (in conjunction with SDOT and SPU).	Plans and Regulations Education and Awareness	Ongoing	More work needed. No active projects and no illicit connections fixed. SPR and SPU coordinating on project in Deadhorse Canyon to potentially address drainage impacting steep slopes. Coordination ongoing between departments. Carried forward to 2021 Seattle HMP.
SC-1	Design and install a dedicated power supply and emergency generator and transfer switch in the Seattle Central Armory	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Incomplete	No activity on this project since fail to receive a grant. Carried forward to 2021 Seattle HMP.
SC-2	Conduct an electrical assessment/study to determine the best options for installing generators for in key facilities.	Assessments and Studies	Ongoing	need emergency generator for CUP and replace existing generator for Playhouse, which is obsolete, and no replacement parts are available. Completed campus wide preliminary electrical assessment.
SC-3	Reroof and make minor electrical, plumbing and storage improvements to the Seattle Center Pavilion to allow it to be used for sheltering purposes in inclement weather and other hazard conditions.	Infrastructure/Capital Preparedness and Response	Incomplete	Project dropped. Building demolished as part of new Arena.
SCL-1	SCL Systems Operations Center seismic retrofit design	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	2018: Current estimate is \$5 million. 2019 - fully designed and put out to bid. Construction in 2020.
SCL-2	Seismic review of vaults and substations to update 1993 study	Assessments and Studies	Incomplete	Determine if this study still needed. Retrofit design work at individual substations is ongoing.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
SCL-3	Substation seismic upgrade	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	In year 4 of a 15-year process to re-do base isolation. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as an Action.
SCL-4	Hazard tree mitigation (vegetation management) near SCL Right-of-Way	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Ongoing	Required regular maintenance work. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as a Capability.
SCL-5	Provide seismically designed storage racks for critical parts and supplies	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Incomplete	No recorded progress to date.
SCL-6	Secure tall furniture at SCL facilities	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Incomplete	No recorded progress to date.
SCL-7	Map cell towers and identify feeders	Assessments and Studies	Incomplete	Currently no capacity to do this project.
SCL-8	Remove/sample PCB transformers	Natural Systems Protection	Ongoing	2019 - part of normal business practice; consider moving to capability section
SCL-9	Preposition supplies needed for restoration efforts at secure locations	Preparedness and Response	Ongoing	2019 - part of normal business practice; consider moving to capability section
SCL-10	Install impact recorders at substations	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Incomplete	Need for action to be determined.
SCL-11	Conduct study of downstream consequences from dams to update and improve inundation maps	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Dam Safety Program produced new dam failure inundation models for federally licensed dams; notification and evacuation application tested in 2019. Provides more detailed illustration of risk and timing of inundation for public notification and evacuation planning.
SCL-12	Retrofit electrical transmission towers in Snohomish County against landslide damage.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	2018: Project designed, and application submitted for FEMA funding. 2019: Project pending funding. Currently an alternate for HMGP funding.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
SDOT-1	Bridge Seismic Retrofit Phase III	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Ongoing	Seismic retrofits for 16 bridges were included Move Seattle Levy. 2 bridge - Construction completed for Cowen Park Bridge, Howe St. Bridge 2 bridges - Design completed & waiting for approval to AD and go to construction: SW Andover Pedestrian Bridge, 8th Ave. NW/NW 133rd St. Bridge 13 bridges - Seismic recommendations reports completed & design and construction deferred due to insufficient funding: Fremont Bridge, Ballard Bridge, Delridge Way Pedestrian Bridge, 15th Ave. NE/NE 105th St. Bridge, 1st Ave. S. Viaduct/Argo Bridge, 4th Ave. S. Viaduct/Argo Bridge, 4th Ave. S. Bridge (Main to Seattle Blvd), McGraw St. Bridge, W., Admiral Way N. Bridge, Admiral Way S. Bridge, N. 41st Pedestrian Bridge, 15th Ave. NW/Leary Way Bridge
SDOT-2	Conduct a Transportation Operations Center implementation assessment to combine the Traffic Management Center (TMC), dispatch, construction coordination, customer inquiry and call center, and emergency operations functions into a 24/7 work center.	Assessments and Studies	Complete	Assessment is complete in 2016. Department readiness and response communications have been streamlined and improved. Response times improved. Incidents in the right of way cleared more efficiently. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as a Capability.
SDOT-3	Traffic Management Center (TMC) expansion to 24/7 operations (TMC expansion construction, FTE).	Infrastructure/Capital Preparedness and Response	Complete	SDOT's TOC continues to be a critical tool in managing and responding to the City's transportation network. Other agencies such as WSDOT and KC Metro rely on the TOC for regional coordination efforts. Carried forward in 2021 Seattle HMP as a Capability.
SDOT-4	Conduct a security threat assessment of the Seattle rail corridor to identify risk associated with new volume of oil train movement.	Assessments and Studies	Incomplete	While the risk still exists, SDOT does not own the assets and is a support agency. With the layers of regulations related to the rail system, and no authority, SDOT's efforts would be applied to other projects.
SDOT-5	Implement Seattle rail corridor access control measures (fencing, security cameras, improved right of way management).	Non-Structural Mitigation Measures	Incomplete	While the risk still exists, SDOT does not own the assets and is a support agency. With the layers of regulations related to the rail system, and no authority, SDOT's efforts would be applied to other projects.
SDOT-6	Conduct a Seattle earthquake damage spot arterial repair planning/exercise.	Preparedness and Response	Incomplete	The need to test post-earthquake arterial spot repairs still exists. Carried over to 2021 Seattle HMP as an Action.
SDOT-7	Separation of rail and arterial right-of-way for S. Lander Street Grade.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Complete	Improved reliability of a key east/west arterial in the SODO area. Eliminated the potential for pedestrian/vehicle and train collisions.

Action No.	2015 Mitigation Action	Type of Action	Status	Comments
SPU-1	Develop a plan to protect the drinking water system from earthquakes.	Plans and Regulations	Complete	The completed seismic study provides a good understanding of how the drinking water system will be impacted by a catastrophic earthquake. Based on these findings, SPU has developed a short- and long-term plan, for the next 50 years, that provides a steady path for making significant investments to improve seismic resilience.
SPU-2	Improve Thornton Creek Confluence to reduce upstream flooding and downstream flows.	Infrastructure/Capital Project Natural Systems Protection	Complete	The project removed an undersized culvert, restored the creek channel and provided increased flood storage by removing four homes and 2 acres of fill, which allowed for reconnection of 2.5 acres of floodplain habitat.
SPU-3	Accelerate flooding and sewer backup prevention projects in the Broadview and South Park neighborhoods.	Infrastructure/Capital Project	Incomplete	The South Park Flood Control Pump Station when complete will facilitate drainage to the Duwamish when the tide is high, reducing flooding. The pump station project is in construction and is scheduled to be complete by end of 2021. The South Park Conveyance Project partners with SDOT to improve streets with pavement and provide drainage infrastructure to convey flows safely to the pump station; this project will complete design in 2021 and will be in construction for two years, completing in 2023. The 12 th Ave NW Basin Drainage Improvement project builds drainage infrastructure to address priority flooding areas in the Broadview area. Design completes in 2021 and construction will continue through 2022. Carried forward in this 2021-26 HMP as an action item.
SPU-4	Create a comprehensive emergency plan for maintaining and restoring essential services in emergencies.	Plans and Regulations	Complete	The CEMP was prepared by SPU Emergency Management to provide planning and program guidance for implementing emergency management programs and plans. The CEMP assists SPU to maintain the capability to provide critical services during an emergency or large-scale disaster.
SPU-5	Prepare for water supply and utility system threats that may occur from climate change.	Plans and Regulations Natural Systems Protection	Ongoing	A climate change analysis for the City of Seattle water supply was completed for the 2019 Water System Plan. Progress and next steps are detailed in the plan.

6.3.2 2021 Mitigation Actions

In order to achieve the mitigation goals identified above, the City has identified a comprehensive series of mitigation objectives and supporting actions that are focused on reducing vulnerability and maximizing loss reduction. The actions can typically be broken out into the following types of activities:

- **Plans and Regulations.** Regulatory actions or planning processes that result in reducing vulnerability to hazards.
- **Assessments and Studies.** Actions taken to better understand the potential impacts of identified hazards. An example would be seismic studies of City facilities.
- **Infrastructure/Capital Projects.** Actions taken to modify existing buildings or structures to protect them from a hazard.
- **Non-Structural Mitigation Measures.** Physical actions taken that don't include structural modifications. An example would be efforts to secure furniture or installation of backup generators.
- **Natural Systems Protection.** Actions that, in addition to minimizing hazard losses, preserve or restore the functions of natural systems.
- **Education and Awareness.** Actions taken to inform and educate residents, elected officials, and property owners about hazards and potential ways to mitigate them.

All mitigation actions identified in the plan are addressed in the Mitigation Implementation Plan provided in Section 6.5. The actions include both interim- and long-term strategies for reducing vulnerability to hazard.

6.3.3 2021 Mitigation Actions by Hazard

The 47 mitigation actions identified in the 2021 update of the Seattle HMP are intended to address natural, technological and human-caused hazards. The HMP is comprehensive in addressing all of the hazards identified in the SHIVA, and the inclusion actions to address multiple hazards.

See Table 10 which identifies which hazards are addressed by each mitigation action.

Table 10 - Mitigation Actions by Hazard

Hazard <i>listed in order of ranking in SHIVA</i>	FAS			HSD	ITD	OEM				OPCD	OSE	SCL							SDCI	SDOT					SPL	SPR						SPU																
	1	2	3	1	1	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	1	2	3	4	5	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
All Hazards				X	X	X	X			X														X																								
Earthquakes	X	X	X					X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X				X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X		X	X		X
Snow and Ice Storms	X																	X							X					X																		
Windstorms	X																	X											X				X									X		X				
Power Outages	X																	X		X												X		X										X				
Cyber-attack/ Disruption																																																
Landslides																													X	X					X						X						X	
Disease Outbreaks																																																
Flooding										X																	X		X			X				X		X	X					X	X			
Excessive Heat Events										X															X				X							X												
Tsunamis and Seiches																															X				X													
Infrastructure & Structural Failures										X										X	X	X	X				X	X				X								X						X		
Fires, Including Wildfire																																					X					X						
Transport Incidents																			X	X																												
Water Shortages																											X				X								X		X		X		X			
Social Unrest																																																
Attacks																																																
Haz Mat Incidents																										X																						
Volcano Hazards																																																

6.4 Evaluating and Prioritizing Mitigation Actions

Once mitigation actions were identified, the MWG, and other key stakeholders went through the exercise of evaluating and prioritizing each action to determine which actions are most suitable for the City to implement. A Mitigation Action Worksheet was developed for each action that included the following information:

- Description of the action.
- Action status.
- Type of action.
- Mitigation goals supported by the action.
- Lead and supporting departments.
- Timeline for implementation and expected life of the action.
- Hazards addressed by the action.
- Anticipated cost and funding source.
- Race and Social Justice Focus Areas.
- Location description.
- Geographic area (citywide, district, neighborhood) that will benefit from this action.

See Appendix D for a sample worksheet, worksheet instructions, and completed worksheets for all actions identified in the plan.

6.4.1 STAPLEE Analysis

In addition to the information developed above, each action was self-evaluated using STAPLEE criteria as described in Table 11. Evaluators were asked to rate each STAPLEE criteria to come up with a total score that determined the relative suitability of each action.

Table 11 - STAPLEE Criteria

STAPLEE Criteria	Evaluation Rating
S: Is it Socially acceptable?	High Medium Low
T: Is it Technically feasible and potentially successful?	
A: Does the responsible agency/department have the Administrative capacity to execute this action?	
P: Is it Politically acceptable?	
L: Is there Legal authority to implement?	
E: Is it Economically beneficial?	
E: Will the project have either a neutral or positive impact on the natural Environment? (score a 3 if positive impact, 2 if neutral impact)	

6.4.2 Mitigation Effectiveness Analysis

In addition to the STAPLEE analysis, MWG members rated each action on criteria for effectiveness in achieving loss reductions or other City goals listed in Table 12.

Table 12 - Mitigation Effectiveness Criteria

Criteria	Evaluation Rating
Will the implemented action result in lives saved?	High Medium Low
Will the implemented action result in a reduction of disaster damage?	High Medium Low
Will the action provide multiple community benefits beyond mitigation?	High Medium Low
Will the action involve collaboration between City departments and/or the community?	High Medium Low
Will the action reduce hazard vulnerability for BIPOC communities?	High Medium Low

The STAPLEE and Mitigation Effectiveness ratings for each mitigation action identified in this plan will serve as one of the tools the City uses in prioritizing what mitigation actions it wishes to pursue during the next planning cycle. Of course, actions may also become a higher priority based on available funding, emerging hazards, or because they align with priorities identified in other planning efforts.

FEMA regulations do not require a formal cost-benefit analysis for hazard mitigation plans; however, a formal cost-benefit analysis of mitigation measures is required in order to be approved for Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funding. Therefore, a more formal cost-benefit analysis will be conducted as a component of any future mitigation grant applications.

6.5 2021-2026 Mitigation Implementation Plan

The mitigation implementation plan (Table 13) lays the groundwork for how the mitigation plan will be incorporated into existing planning mechanisms and how the mitigation actions will be prioritized, implemented, and administered by the City. The implementation plan includes both short-term strategies that focus on planning and assessment activities, and long-term strategies that will result in ongoing capability or structural projects to reduce vulnerability to hazards.

The “Loss Avoidance Rating” shown in Table 13 is derived from two mitigation effectiveness criteria:

- Will the implemented actions result in lives saved?
- Will the implemented action result in a reduction of disaster damage?

Each project was scored as follows:

- High + High = score of 6



- High + Medium = score of 5
- Medium + Medium = score of 4
- High + Low = score of 3
- Medium + Low = score of 2
- Low + Low = score of 1

See Appendix D for more details. It contains Mitigation Action Worksheet instructions and detailed Mitigation Action Worksheets for the 47 actions listed in Table 13.

Table 13 - 2021-2026 Mitigation Implementation Plan (by Department)

Lead Depart/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
FAS1	Modify the Seattle Animal Shelter electrical system to accommodate excess power from emergency generator.	New	Non-Structural Measures	Life and Safety Property Protection	Seattle Animal Shelter and Capital Development	3-5 years	TBD	No	2
FAS2	Seismic Retrofit Facilities Improvement Program	Potential	Assessments and Studies	Life and Safety	N/A	5 years +	TBD	No	5
FAS3	Install ShakeAlert Technology into SMT Elevators.	New	Non-Structural Measures	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection	Facility Operations	1-3 years	\$15,000	Yes	2
HSD1	Develop a strategic feeding plan to increase capacity for emergency feeding.	New	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety	OSE, DON	1-3 years	TBD	Anticipated	2
ITD1	Create stand-alone Communication Site on Wheels to provide localized communications via radio, cellular, Wi-Fi and Point to Point Network.	New	Non-Structural Measures	Life and Safety	SCL, SDOT, SFD, SPD, SPU, FAS, SP&R, HSD, SDCI	1-3 years	\$ 600,000	No	6
OEM1	Expand partnerships for community-led mitigation projects.	New	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Property Protection Natural Resource Protection Resilient Economy	DON, OH	3-5 years	TBD	No	4
OEM2	Undertake an analysis to better integrate equity into hazard mitigation program.	New	Assessments and Studies	Integrated Planning		3-5 years	TBD	No	2
OEM3	Update Home Retrofit Education Program materials and guidance to reflect latest changes in design and permitting.	Existing	Education and Awareness	Life and Safety Property Protection	SDCI	3-5 years	TBD	No	5
OEM4	Ongoing support for URM Retrofits	Existing	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Property Protection		1-3 years	TBD	No	6

Lead Dept/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
OPCD1	Provide policy guidance regarding resilience, climate adaptation, and hazard mitigation in the Comprehensive Plan Update.	New	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Integrated Planning Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Resilient Economy Natural Resource Protection	All Depts	1-3 years	\$ 500,000	Anticipated	1
OSE1	Duwamish Valley Program Resilience and Adaptation Planning will study potential for creating a "resilience district" and the construction of protective multi-purpose sea-level rise infrastructure.	New	Assessments and Studies	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Resilient Economy Integrated Planning	OPCD, SPR, SPU, SDOT, OH, MO	< 1 year	\$600,000	Yes	3
SCL1	SCL Systems Operation Center Seismic Retrofit	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Resilient Economy		1-3 years	\$ 2,700,000	Anticipated	4
SCL2	Seismic Review of Vaults & Substations, an update of a 1993 study.	Existing	Assessments and Studies	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection		1-3 years	\$ 200,000	Anticipated	4
SCL3	Seismic upgrade of 14 substations.	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection		3-5 years	\$ 8,400,000	Yes	4
SCL4	Non-structural Mitigation at SCL Facilities to install seismically designed storage racks for critical parts and supplies, and secure furniture.	Existing	Non-Structural Measures	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection		1-3 years	TBD	Yes	3
SCL5	Install Seismic Impact Recorders at Substations.	Existing	Non-Structural Measures	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection		1-3 years	TBD	No	3
SCL6	Map Cell Towers & Identify Feeders.	Existing	Assessments and Studies	Critical Infrastructure Protection		1-3 years	TBD	Yes	3
SDCI1	Ongoing Support for URM Retrofits to update URM inventories and proposed technical standard.	Existing	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Property Protection		3-5 years	TBD	Yes	6

Lead Depart/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
SDOT1	Seismically retro fit a 66-year old timber and steel seawall that support the roadway and sidewalk of N. Northlake Way.	New	Infrastructure/Capitol Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Natural Resource Protection	SDCI	1-3 years	\$ 20,000,000	Anticipated	3
SDOT2	Strengthen and seismically upgrade the West Seattle High Bridge.	New	Infrastructure/Capitol Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Resilient Economy Integrated Planning	WSDOT, US Coast Guard, Port of Seattle, NW Seaport Alliance	1-3 years	\$ 47,000,000	Anticipated	6
SDOT3	Post-Earthquake Arterial Damage Spot Repair Planning and Exercise.	New	Education and Awareness	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Resilient Economy Property Protection		< 1 year	\$80,000	No	4
SDOT4	Bridge Seismic Retrofit Program has identified 14 bridges for retrofits. 10 bridges are funded by Move Seattle Levy, and 4 bridges are in need of funding.	Existing	Infrastructure/Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Resilient Economy		1-3 years	\$37,260,000	Yes	5
SDOT5	Vision Zero is a plan to reduce speed limits and add pedestrian signals to reduce ped/vehicle collisions which have increased during the pandemic.	Existing	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection	SFD, KC, WSDOT	3-5 years	\$ 75,000,000	Yes	5
SPL1	Seismic Retrofit of three historic libraries-Green Lake, U-District and Columbia City.	New	Infrastructure/Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection		3-5 years	\$13,800,000	Yes	6
SPR1	Improvements to community centers to ensure they can serve as Clean Air and Cooling Centers .	Existing	Infrastructure/Capital Projects		SCL, OEM, HSD	3-5 years	TBD	Anticipated	3
SPR2	Mitigate Impacts to Park Property and Assets Resulting from Flooding, High Tides and Sea Level Rise.	Existing	Assessments and Studies	Property Protection Natural Resource Protection	SPU	< 1 year	TBD	Yes	2

Lead Depart/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
SPR3	Seismic Retrofits of SPR Programmed Buildings	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Property Protection Natural Resource Protection	Office of Emergency Management/ Facilities and Administrative Services	<1 year	\$10,000,000 - \$20,000,000	Anticipated	6
SPR4	Mitigation of Potential Damage to Environmentally Critical Areas from weather-related hazards.	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Integrated Planning	Seattle Parks and Recreation Facilities.	3-5 years	\$ 5,000,000	No	5
SPR5	Steep Slope Restoration of Coastal and Inland Areas	Existing	Natural System Protection	Natural Resource Protection Life and Safety Property Protection	Finance and Performance Management/ Green Seattle Partnership	< 1 year	\$ 6,000,000	No	3
SPR6	Mitigate Impacts to Park Property and Assets Resulting from Water Shortage by maintaining and strategically updating the water shortage contingency plan and implementing water reuse.	New	Natural System Protection	Natural Resource Protection	SPU	< 1 year		Yes	2
SPU01	Evaluate Wastewater Pump Stations for flooding and sea-level rise as they are upgraded or replaced. Potentially impacted pump stations will be modified to improve reliability and increase capacity.	New	Assessments and Studies	Critical Infrastructure Protection		1-3 years	\$ 100,000	Yes	2
SPU02	Seismic Upgrade and Rehabilitation for Eastside Reservoir in Bellevue and Riverton Reservoir in SeaTac.	New	Infrastructure / Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection		3-5 years	\$ 24,000,000	Anticipated	5
SPU03	Augment Water Pump Station with Emergency Generators.	New	Infrastructure / Capitol Projects	Critical Infrastructure Protection		3-5 years	\$ 1,000,000	Anticipated	3
SPU04	Magnolia Elevated Tank and Trenton Standpipes Recoating and Seismic Upgrade.	New	Infrastructure / Capitol Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection		3-5 years	\$ 23,000,000	Anticipated	3

Lead Depart/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
SPU05	Complete the Shape Our Water Integrated Plan for drainage and wastewater systems that will assess impacts of flooding, sea-level rise, earthquakes, and identify investments to improve system and community resilience. Project implementation will follow plan completion.	New	Plans and Regulations	Integrated Planning Resilient Economy Natural Resource Protection Property Protection Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection	SDOT, SPR, OPCD, DON, King County, community, and private sector stakeholders	1-3 years and beyond for implementation	TBD	Yes	5
SPU06	Install Piezometers / leachate extraction wells on east slope of Kent Highland Landfill to monitor the stability of the slope and mitigate slope failure risk.	New	Plans and Regulations	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection	WADOE, USEPA	1-3 years	\$ 200,000	Yes	5
SPU07	Implement flooding and sewer backup projects in Broadview, South Park and Beacon Hill neighborhoods.	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Property Protection	SDOT	Immediate	\$ 20,000,000	Yes	3
SPU08	Add system capacity and resilience to climate change impacts, and decrease polluted runoff, through funding community-identified green stormwater infrastructure projects.	New	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Property Protection Natural Resource Protection Integrated Planning		3-5 years	\$ 20,000,000	Yes	2
SPU09	Develop a Wildfire Strategic Plan to study potential wildfire impacts on water supply watersheds, identify, and implement mitigation strategies.	New	Plans and Regulations/Ca pital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Natural Resource Protection Resilient Economy Integrated Planning	USFS, Washington State University, University of Idaho, SCL	1 year for the plan and beyond for implementation	TBD	Yes for Plan, TBD for mitigation strategies	5
SPU10	Perform seismic assessment of Cascade Dam and design seismic upgrade.	New	Assessments and Studies	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Natural Resource Protection Resilient Economy		0-5 years and beyond	TBD	Anticipated	6
SPU11	Begin implementing short- and long-term Water System Seismic Upgrade Plan to improve water system seismic resilience.	Existing	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Resilient Economy Integrated Planning		0-5 years and beyond	TBD	Anticipated	6


Lead Depart/ Action #	2021-2026 Mitigation Action	Action Status	Type of Action	Goals Supported	Supporting Departments	Timeline	Anticipated Cost	Funding Available	Loss Avoidance Rating
SPU12	Design of the Landsburg Flood Passage Project that will allow flood waters and large woody debris to pass around the dam to prevent dam failure.	New	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Natural Resource Protection		1-5 years	TBD	Anticipated	6
SPU13	City acquired a 0.9 acre residential parcel to create the Lake City Floodplain Park to restore and reconnect floodplain in the North Branch of Thornton Creek. When complete it will contain floodplain and upland habitat and increase access to open space for the Lake City community.	New	Natural System Protection Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Life and Safety Property Protection Natural Resource Protection Integrated Planning	SPR, Mid Sound Fisheries Enhancement Group	1-3 years	TBD	Anticipated	2
SPU14	Cedar Falls Power Service Upgrade that will improve quality, capacity, and redundancy of electrical service for the Cedar River Watershed. Phase I of a potential 2 phase project.	New	Natural System Protection	Critical Infrastructure Protection	SCL	1-3 years and beyond	\$12,000,000	Yes	5
SPU15	Comprehensive Peak Flow Program to replace undersized culverts in the drinking water watersheds to account for flood events and near-term climate change.	New	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Critical Infrastructure Protection Natural Resource Protection		1-5 years and beyond	\$2,000,000	Anticipated	2
SPU16	Study and design of a project to increase storage capacity for the Chester Morse Reservoir during drought conditions and provide new opportunities to lower the reservoir more quickly during flood conditions in the fall and winter.	New	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Natural Resource Protection	SCL	1-5 years	TBD	Anticipated	4
SPU17	Design and repair/replace of the Tolt Dam Spillway used to release water from the Tolt Reservoir in flood and other emergency conditions.	New	Infrastructure/ Capital Projects	Critical Infrastructure Protection Property Protection Natural Resource Protection	SCL	1-5 years	\$9 –22,000,000	Yes	6

7 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Chapter 7 provides an overview of the overall strategy for plan maintenance and outlines the method and schedule for monitoring, updating, and evaluating the plan. The chapter also discusses incorporating the plan into existing planning mechanisms and how to address continued public involvement.

The Seattle HMP is intended to be a “living” document that will help inform all interested parties about the City of Seattle’s natural hazard mitigation policies and projects. It will be reviewed and updated on a regular basis. The mitigation strategy will guide for City of Seattle departments in determining projects and priorities for FEMA assistance and other mitigation funding.


7.1 Plan Adoption

 FEMA	E1. Does the Plan include documentation that the plan has been formally adopted by the [Seattle City Council]? (Requirement §201.6(c)(5))
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44 CFR §201.6(c)(5) requires that the Seattle HMP be formally adopted by the Seattle City Council. City Council formally adopted the 2015 update of the Seattle HMP on [INSERT DATE]. This plan was approved by FEMA on [INSERT DATE].

See the front matter of this plan for adoption and approval materials.

7.2 Keeping the Plan Current

 FEMA	A6. Is there a description of the method and schedule for keeping the plan current (monitoring, evaluating and updating the mitigation plan within a 5-year cycle)? (Requirement §201.6(c)(4)(i))
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7.2.1 Monitoring and Evaluating the Plan

OEM is responsible for coordinating annual review of the Seattle HMP and making appropriate revisions. On an annual basis, OEM will gather monitoring information and convene the MWG to review the plan to ensure that all information is current.

Prior to the MWG meeting, departments will track and report the following information on those mitigation actions for which they are the lead:

- Mitigation accomplishments for completed actions, including documentation of actual losses avoided and benefits achieved.
- Overall status of mitigation actions, including justification for any cancelled actions.
- Status of funding for mitigation actions, such as the CIP, levies, and other grant funding.

The MWG will meet to consider the following and determine if any interim changes to the Seattle HMP are needed:

- Emerging or increasing hazards (e.g., wildfire smoke), damage trends and repetitive losses.
- Identification of new mitigation needs and potential new mitigation opportunities and actions.
- Changes in membership to the MWG.
- After-Action Reports or lessons learned reports issued to inform what new initiatives or actions should be added, or how to integrate mitigation into any recovery efforts. A specific mitigation

question was added to the After Action Report survey to capture mitigation actions identified from real world events and exercises.

- Regional perspectives from external partners.
- Major updates of long-range policies and plans underway where mitigation principles or actions can be more fully integrated (e.g., comprehensive plan, climate action plan, capital improvement plan, major levy funding plans, zoning and building codes).
- Potential community partnerships and investments in community-led projects.
- Supporting OEM’s equity analysis of mitigation program and actions, as well as learning from relevant analyses from other equity initiatives such as OPCD Equitable Development Initiative, Risk of Displacement Indicators and OSE Environmental Justice Committee.

The results of the annual review will be compiled into an Annual Mitigation Status Report that will be made available to key stakeholders and the public.

7.2.2 Updating the Plan

Every five years, OEM and the MWG will conduct a revision of the plan based on a thorough evaluation and community engagement. The MWG will develop an updated set of proposed mitigation actions based on emerging needs and the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the plan and its component actions. The resulting draft plan will be made available for public comment. After the public comments have been reviewed and adjudicated, the plan will be approved by the groups identified in External Plan Review and Approval Summary table in the City of Seattle Emergency Management Planning Policy.

Work on the next update of the Seattle HMP will begin in 2025 and will be adopted in 2026. OEM intends to use the process described in Section 2.0 of this document with some modifications. The future process may include more in-person meetings and public outreach that was not possible in 2020 because of the pandemic.

7.3 Continued Public Involvement



A5. Is there discussion of how the [City of Seattle] will continue public participation in the plan maintenance process? (Requirement §201.6(c)(4)(iii))

Public involvement is a key component of the plan implementation and update process. The City will prepare and make available via the OEM website an Annual Mitigation Status Report providing an update on the implementation of the current Seattle HMP. OEM’s monthly newsletter offer additional opportunities to highlight progress of individual mitigation projects.

The DMC is a broad stakeholder group of senior City staff, emergency management professionals and engaged community volunteers that support the City’s Emergency Management Programs. This group is another way to raise awareness or get feedback on mitigation projects and issues on a continuous basis.

OEM has included a mitigation action to expand partnerships between the City and community-based organizations to plan, fund and implement mitigation projects. Implementation will involve targeted outreach to high priority community service organizations. In coming years, the City will make investments in more community-led projects. This could lead to increased level of community involvement in mitigation projects and programs.



RECORD OF CHANGES

Change Number	Section	Date of Change	Individual Making Change	Description of Change

APPROVALS AND ADOPTION RECORDS

Approval/Adoption Body	Date of Action	Notes

SUMMARY and FISCAL NOTE*

Department:	Dept. Contact/Phone:	CBO Contact/Phone:
Office of Emergency Management	Curry Mayer/206-684-0437	Kara Main-Hester/206-684-8746

1. BILL SUMMARY

Legislation Title: A RESOLUTION approving the 2021-2026 revision to the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan.

Summary and background of the Legislation: The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) has recently completed a 5-year revision to the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan (HMP) and seeks City Council approval of the document. The HMP lays out mitigation goals, strategies, and an implementation plan to reduce the potential impact of natural and human-caused hazards. This document is one in the suite of plans that makes up the City's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires adoption of a local hazard mitigation plan that meet federal requirements in order to apply for FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant funding.

2. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Does this legislation create, fund, or amend a CIP Project? ___ Yes **X** No

3. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Does this legislation amend the Adopted Budget? ___ Yes **X** No

Does the legislation have other financial impacts to the City of Seattle that are not reflected in the above, including direct or indirect, short-term or long-term costs?

Is there financial cost or other impacts of *not* implementing the legislation?

A FEMA-approved plan allows the City to receive FEMA hazard mitigation grant funding. Without adoption of a plan meeting FEMA requirements, the City will miss the opportunity of applying for potentially millions of dollars in grant funding.

4. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

a. Does this legislation affect any departments besides the originating department?

If this legislation to approve the hazard mitigation plan is not passed, several departments will miss the opportunity to apply for FEMA hazard mitigation grant funding. Three departments currently have grant applications under review by FEMA:

Parks & Recreation - Hiawatha Community Center Seismic Retrofit Project - \$700 K
SDOT - Northlake Retaining Wall Seismic Retrofit Project - \$17.6 million
SPU - Tolt Water Supply Pipeline Seismic Resiliency Project - \$2.9 million

b. Is a public hearing required for this legislation?

No.

c. Is publication of notice with *The Daily Journal of Commerce* and/or *The Seattle Times* required for this legislation?

No.

d. Does this legislation affect a piece of property?

No.

e. Please describe any perceived implication for the principles of the Race and Social Justice Initiative. Does this legislation impact vulnerable or historically disadvantaged communities? What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?

No negative impacts expected. On the contrary, the HMP incorporates RSJI considerations in several ways, including conducting a community survey as part of the planning process asking what community services are the most important to project through mitigation projects (e.g. affordable housing, food banks).

f. Climate Change Implications

1. Emissions: Is this legislation likely to increase or decrease carbon emissions in a material way?

No.

2. Resiliency: Will the action(s) proposed by this legislation increase or decrease Seattle's resiliency (or ability to adapt) to climate change in a material way? If so, explain. If it is likely to decrease resiliency in a material way, describe what will or could be done to mitigate the effects.

The HMP would be expected to help increase resiliency, since the mitigation strategy contains projects aimed at climate adaptation.

g. If this legislation includes a new initiative or a major programmatic expansion: What are the specific long-term and measurable goal(s) of the program? How will this legislation help achieve the program's desired goal(s).

N/A

List attachments/exhibits below:

RESOLUTION 32011 PROPOSED AMENDMENT 1

Amendment Name: Mitigation Planning for Flight Disaster and for Excessive Heat Events

Sponsor: Councilmember Herbold

Effects Statement: Requests the Office of Emergency Management develop a strategy to brief communities located under flight paths on existing planning pertaining to plane crash hazard mitigation and report back to the City Council on planning deficiencies identified by those communities. Also requests the Office of Emergency Management to coordinate a citywide effort to identify approaches and projects which can mitigate the impacts of excessive heat on vulnerable populations within the City of Seattle

Proposed Amendment:

Insert two recitals after the third existing recital as follows:

WHEREAS, the City’s All-Hazards Mitigation Plan is one in the suite of plans under the City’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan; and

WHEREAS, as cited in the City’s All-Hazard Mitigation Plan, Seattle’s Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis identifies Seattle as a hub for land, sea, and air transportation, giving the City an inherent exposure to transportation incidents including plane crashes; and

WHEREAS, as cited in the City’s All-Hazard Mitigation Plan, Seattle’s Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis reports that excessive heat events are projected to become more intense due to climate change, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations including the elderly, infants, the homeless, the poor, and people who are socially isolated; and

Insert two new Sections after Section 2 as follows:

Section 1. The 2021-2026 Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, dated February 1, 2021, attached to this resolution as Exhibit 1, has been reviewed and is approved.

Section 2. The City also approves such minor alterations to the Plan approved in Section 1 as are requested by the State of Washington Military Department, Emergency Management

Division and FEMA and are determined by the Office of Emergency Management to be in the best interest of the City.

Section 3. The City Council requests that the Office of Emergency Management develop a strategy to brief communities in the City of Seattle under the Sea-Tac International Airport and King County International Airport flight paths on information on existing City, County, and Port of Seattle planning that may relate to plane crash hazard mitigation and, following such briefings, report back to the City Council via Clerk File on deficiencies identified by those communities for the Office of Emergency Management’s consideration in a future plan.

Section 4. The City Council requests that the Office of Emergency Management coordinate a citywide effort to identify approaches and projects which can mitigate the impacts of excessive heat on vulnerable populations in Seattle. The Office of Emergency Management should engage multiple City departments, community-based organizations, private sector partners and other subject matter experts including Public Health Seattle & King County and the Office of Sustainability and Environment to scope realistic and implementable strategies and approaches and identify needed public and private funding for those strategies.



Legislation Text

File #: Inf 1851, **Version:** 1

Summary Findings on the Executive Order on Re-imagining Policing and Community Safety



SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL
CENTRAL STAFF

Reimagining Policing and Public Safety: Executive Order 2020-10 & Alternative 911 Response

AMY GORE AND GREG DOSS, ANALYSTS

PUBLIC SAFETY AND HUMAN SERVICES

JULY 27, 2021

Contents

- Resolution 31962 and Executive Order 2020-10
- What Works Cities Sprint
- Mobile Crisis Response Program Design
- Non-Crisis Alternative 911 Response

Resolution 31962

Key Components of Resolution 31962 (Adopted 08/10/20)

1. Create a new civilian-led department that will take a holistic approach to public safety. Consider moving civilian functions such as 911 Communications, Parking Enforcement, Harbor Patrol and the Office of Emergency Management.
2. Intention to work with the Council, Mayor's Office, and community to determine the enforcement practices that should be deprioritized based upon a disproportionate impact on Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC) communities.
3. A request that the Chief of Police undertake a 9-1-1 call response analysis.

Executive Order 2020-10 (1/2)

Key Components of Executive Order 2020-10 (Issued 09/30/20)

Outlined strategies “to reimagine policing and community safety by centering the voices of Black, Indigenous, and People of Color communities...”

1. Establish a Community Safety Work Group (WG) and SPD Functional Analysis Interdepartmental Team (IDT)
2. Conduct Community Outreach and Engagement - Initiate and support a community outreach and engagement process to solicit input.
3. SPD Analysis – An analysis of data and current SPD functions, practices, and policies, with a focus on what might be eliminated, reduced, civilianized, or expanded.

Executive Order 2020-10 (2/2)

4. Rethinking Policing and Reimagining Community Safety - Explore and solicit community input on models of community policing informed by evidence-based best practices.
5. Advocating for Changes to State Law - Changes to state law that support the effort to reimagine community safety in Seattle and improve accountability, oversight and transparency of police policies and practices.
6. Establishing a Functional Transfer IDT - Support the successful transfer of functions out of SPD, as informed by community input and approved by the Mayor and Council. Including SPD Victim Advocates, 9-1-1 Communications Center, Parking Enforcement Officers, and the Office of Emergency Management.


Crisis Response System

A critical component of reimagining policing and public safety is developing a Crisis Response System which minimizes or eliminates armed officer response to non-medical behavioral health crises and non-crisis 911 calls.

Crisis Response What Works Cities -Sprint Key Themes from Providers

- Some vulnerable individuals and their families do not want to call 911 for fear that police engagement will exacerbate a crisis or create harm.
- Some vulnerable individuals will not trust a uniformed provider (any uniform) because they may perceive the provider as representing a government system that may ultimately cause them harm.
- An individual in crisis may ask to be left alone. If not providing a threat to themselves or others, then providers must be able and willing to do this.
- Provider access to an individual's case history is important to program success.
- Racial equity is advanced when crisis and alternative responses extend to low level criminal violations such as trespassing.

Crisis Response System



Mobile Crisis Response Design (1/2)

Situation Types – What types of calls are directed to the program?

- Medical
- Criminal
- Crisis

Program Access – How is the team dispatched?

- 911
- Direct Line
- Self Dispatch through Scanner

Program Coverage – Where and when is the program available?

- Hours
- Geography

Operation – Who operates the program?

- Municipality
- Partner Organization
- Hybrid

Mobile Crisis Response Design (2/2)

Staffing – Who staffs the team?

- Sworn Officers
- EMT
- Firefighters
- Clinicians and Mental Health Professionals
- Designated Crisis Responders
- Peers

Police Participation – Are police involved in the program?

- Police-led
- Co-Responder
- Community-Led

Services – What services are provided by the team?

Throughput – Where can the team refer people?

Mobile Crisis Response Comparison (1/3)

	Crisis Response Unit (Seattle, WA)	Health One (Seattle, WA)	Mobile Crisis Team (Seattle, WA)	CAHOOTS (Eugene, OR)	STAR (Denver, CO)	Crisis Response Unit (Olympia, WA)
Access	911	911	Referrals from first responders, the King County Crisis Connections Line and DCRs	911 Dispatch Direct Line	911 Dispatch Direct Line	911 Dispatch Police Scanner Officer referral
Crisis Type	Mental Health Crisis	Medical	Any individual who is experiencing a behavioral health crisis including mental health and/or substance use crisis.	Behavioral Health Crisis Trespass (criminal call)	Assist Intoxicated Person Suicidal Series Welfare Check Indecent Exposure Trespass (criminal call) Unwanted Person (potential criminal call) Syringe Disposal	Behavioral Health Crisis
Coverage	24/7 City-wide	Pioneer Square, Downtown core Belltown, Capitol Hill, Ballard, U-District, South Seattle	24/7 County-wide	24/7 City-wide	M – F 10AM to 6PM Police District (PD) 6 PD 1 – Precinct 123 PD 2 – Precinct 211 PD 3 – Broadway Corr.	M-T 7AM to 8:40PM F-S 10AM to 8:40PM Downtown Core

Mobile Crisis Response Comparison (2/3)

	Crisis Response Unit (Seattle, WA)	Health One (Seattle, WA)	Mobile Crisis Team (Seattle, WA)	CAHOOTS (Eugene, OR)	STAR (Denver, CO)	Crisis Response Unit (Olympia, WA)
Staffing	Trained Officer Mental Health Professional	2 Firefighters and MHP/Case Manager	Behavioral Health Specialists	EMT, First Responder, RN, or Licensed Health Care Practitioner, City as a Transportation Officer	EMT, MHP and Peer Support Navigator	Behavioral Health Specialists
Operations	Operated by Seattle Police Department, with MHP contracted	Operated by Seattle Fire Department, MHP/Case Manger contracted	Operated by Downtown Emergency Services Center under contract	Operated by White Brid Clinic under contract	Operated by Mental Health Center of Denver under contract	Initially operated by Recovery Innovations International under contract, then transition to City employees
Police Participation*	Lead	None	None	None	None	None

* All programs utilize police as backup, as needed.

Mobile Crisis Response Comparison (3/3)

	Crisis Response Unit (Seattle, WA)	Health One (Seattle, WA)	Mobile Crisis Team (Seattle, WA)	CAHOOTS (Eugene, OR)	STAR (Denver, CO)	Crisis Response Unit (Olympia, WA)
Services	Crisis Intervention	Low-Acuity Medical Connect to Services System Navigation	Connect to Services Transport to Services	Varies	Crisis de-escalation Connection System navigation Access to low barrier treatment options, Transport to services	Proactive Outreach Crisis counseling Conflict resolution and mediation Greif/Loss Substance abuse Housing crisis Harm Reduction First aid and non- emergency medical care Resource connections/referrals Transport to services

Other Alternative 911 Responses (Non-Crisis) (1/2)

- Community Responders could be dispatched for calls related to non-violent quality-of-life concerns and low-level community conflicts that do not require a behavioral health crisis intervention. Examples include homelessness, wellness checks, disturbances, intoxicated persons, suspicious persons, disorderly conduct, noise complaints, juvenile disturbances, or trespassing.
- The Law Enforcement Action Partnership (LEAP) and Center for American Progress (CAP) note that a Community Responder role could be filled by a Violence Interrupter or Credible Messenger. These individuals would have specific skill sets designed to address issues that do not require an armed response (e.g., dispute resolution).

Other Alternative 911 Responses (Non-Crisis) (2/2)

- Administrative Responders could answer calls that require police reports such as accidents without injuries; minor theft from purses, cars, and homes; and destruction of property.
- Specialized Civilian Responders could answer non-criminal calls that require specific tasks such as clearing debris from waterways (currently performed by SPD Harbor Patrol) or directing traffic in the event of major vehicular accidents. While not in the 911 Response category, the Council has considered whether the City might increase the use of Parking Enforcement Officers for special events work.

Questions?

SPD Reimagining Executive Order - Final Report Summary

Council Briefing – July 27, 2021



Executive Order to Reimagine Policing and Community Safety in Seattle

Established an interdepartmental team to:

- Conduct community engagement and outreach
- Analyze current SPD functions and practices
- Explore alternative models of community policing and response

Work Beyond the Executive Order

- HSD conducted RFP to invest \$10.4 million into community safety capacity building
 - The RFP resulted in over 70 applications for more than three times the available funds
 - these investments mostly work on upstream prevention and restoration efforts and it is unlikely that these investments will become emergency response options in the near term
- What Works Cities sprint: Staff from MO, Council, Central Staff, SPD, SFD, OIG, HSD, and service providers participated in a six-week sprint to learn more about alternative emergency responses that have been successful in other cities
- External Engagements
 - NICJR
 - Accenture

Community Outreach Summary

- **Community is not a monolith.** Recommendations and priorities were different with different constituent groups. As we develop new strategies, we must include feedback from a broad coalition of constituents and continue to center and uplift Black and brown voices when reviewing responses.
- **Public safety extends beyond policing.** Stakeholders strongly supported expanded or new funding opportunities for youth violence prevention, youth employment, homeless outreach services, affordable housing (particularly tiny house villages), and mental health resources. SPD patrol officers are often ill-equipped to help residents make connections to these resources.
- **People want a more visible patrol presences.** Residents shared a desire for SPD to return to “foot beats” and build opportunities for neighborhoods to develop deeper relationships with the officers that serve them. This recommendation became more prevalent when staffing shortages required that Community Police Team officers be redeployed to patrol operations.
 - This is not currently possible given present staffing constraints.

Key Findings

- SPD staff shortages in the past 17 months translate to an estimated loss of over 300,000 officer hours a year
- Per the NICJR analysis and SPD internal analysis up to 12% of calls for service can be responded to without SPD involvement **in the near-term**
- With further analysis, it is likely that additional calls can be diverted without compromising safety for both responders and subjects
- **Person down calls** and **Priority Three welfare checks** have been identified as the first tranche of calls with the potential to be diverted from a sworn response
 - These types of calls accounted for over 23,000 service hours between 2017 and 2019.
- *There is an immediate need to identify an alternative response that can take non-criminal calls to alleviate the strain on SPD sworn staffing resources.*

SPD Staffing and Fiscal Analysis

- SPD is currently net negative 188 officers between 2020 and 2021 (286 separations and 89 hires)
- These separations translate to over 300,000 lost service hours, annually
- For 10 out of the past 11 months, SPD has not met the 7-minute performance metric for emergency (Priority 1) calls or the 15-minute metric for urgent calls (Priority 2) in any month
- In 2021, SPD has been on Priority Status at some point more than 5 days a week on average
- Transferring responsibilities and developing alternative responses is necessary to ensure that calls receive responses and SPD can prioritize their over-stretched staff time appropriately

Considerations for NICJR Report

- NICJR analysis did not take into consideration local legal limitations (i.e., RCW requirements) or labor implications when determining what can and cannot be offloaded
- Special events hours included off-duty work hours logged by Patrol Officers, these hours do not pull from on-duty resources but must be logged for officer safety and deconfliction
- Seattle is obligated to ensure safety for all responders and ensure there is no reason to anticipate potential harm for both responder and subject, NICJR did not conduct these analyses

“The concept of risk, however, is missing from the NICJR analysis. It is overly simplistic – both conceptually and analytically – to arbitrarily group calls into different response tiers based on their general textual description...certain call characteristics are correlated with risky or dangerous situations. The broad concept of a tiered response model should be enhanced by layering a risk lens – grounded in data – to help ensure cities are not increasing their liability by sending individuals to situations where prior knowledge would have suggested a reasonable person to anticipate potential harm – for both the responder and the subject.”

- Dr. Henry P. Alpert

NICJR Call Analysis (2017-2019)

- NICJR conducted a review of calls and identified 174 call types as “Tier 1” or candidates for alternative responses without sworn officers
 - These 174 call types represent 689,245 dispatch events and **850,157 officer service hours** between 2017 and 2019
- SPD further examined the Tier 1 calls and confirmed that of the 174 identified by NICJR, 28 call types may not need SPD response
 - These 28 call types represents 12% of total calls (143,780 calls) and 6% of total officer service hours (141,884 hours)
 - **This includes some person-down and welfare check calls**
 - Person-down calls alone accounted for 23,427 hours between 2017-2019
- SPD agrees that some portion of the 101 other call types could be appropriate for alternative responses on a longer time horizon – given that both statutory and labor issues will need to be addressed
- Some groupings of calls – specifically traffic stops – are already being reviewed in collaboration with the Office of the Inspector General, and SPD believe this broader, Seattle-specific work should inform any redesign of the approach to these call types.

New Alternate Response Triage Model Proposal

- NICJR and SPD analysis of SPD calls indicated that 12% of current calls for service could be diverted to an alternate response in the near-term
- Community outreach indicated that people are supportive of developing alternate responses
- HSD RFP did not surface any proposals that could implement a community-led emergency response in the near-term, Seattle needs to be responsive and develop interim alternative responses for person-down and welfare check calls while these community responses are scaled up


Proposal: ***Develop an alternate response option to triage some non-criminal non-health emergency calls currently***

Health One vs. SPD Crisis Team vs. Triage Model

	Health One	SPD Crisis Team	Triage Model
Dispatch	FAC, SFD Operations, self-dispatch	Respond when available upon request of patrol to small and with limited hours for dispatch via CSCC	CSCC (primary), FAC/SPD/SFD Operations (secondary)
Staff	SFD firefighters and HSD case managers	One CIT Certified Sworn Officer and one Mental Health Professional	TBD: including outreach workers, MHPs, peer support/navigators
Call Nature	Primarily lower acuity with co-morbidities: depression, anxiety, general SI, intoxication, SUD crisis, chronic mental health	Support SPD patrol when higher level of crisis is exhibited and a likely need for court or service provider interaction. Priority 1 Welfare Checks	Assessment of Low to moderate acuity individuals with NO imminent medical concern, violence, weapons, or active criminality. Priority 3 Welfare Checks
Length of Engagement	On-scene response, plus follow-up and short-term case management	Mid-term level of engagement to stabilize and redirect to service providers, make DCR referrals, tailor response plans, triage all crisis calls	Immediate on-scene response and assessment to determine best secondary response: MIH, Health One, CRT, SFD, SPD referrals, etc.
SPD Involvement	Infrequent. Periodically for involuntary detention, crisis response	Responds to patrol requests for support and tracks all outcomes and dispositions for SPD Crisis calls	Likely more frequent: criminal trespass, involuntary detention, co-response for safety concerns

Person-down & Welfare Check Calls

- For 2018-2020 SPD averaged 2770 priority three (lowest) welfare check requests
- For the same time period, SPD averaged 4,110 person down calls per year.
- Most of these calls (60%) resulted in a final disposition of "assistance rendered"
- Less than ten percent resulting in a final disposition that indicates an officer was needed and only two percent resulted in any type of arrest



Anticipated Staffing Structure

- Civilian forward, with proficiency/experience in:
 - Crisis response and de-escalation
 - Homeless outreach and chemical dependency
 - Social service / healthcare system navigation
 - Peer support / lived experience
- Robust links with existing teams: Mobile Crisis Team, Crisis Response Unit, Health One, CSOs, DSA, etc.
- Initial build-out: city employees, with future opportunities to contract with or incorporate community-based partners

Operations

- Primarily dispatched via CSCC and/or the fire alarm center
- Focus on on-scene non-medical triage, non-criminal intervention, and system navigation
- Because most clients will have longer-term need for follow-up and referral, back-end case management is key.
 - This is a proven strategy for low-acuity health calls handled by Health One
- Initial focus on daytime/early evening hours, when most of these calls occur
- Working with labor, SFD and SPD, but initial focus on “person down” and welfare check calls, with possibility for later expansion and refinement

CSCC Dispatch Protocol System

- Proposal would fund an IT project to build out a criteria-based dispatch system.
 - \$340K to build out the system
- Develop protocol in collaboration with labor for call takers to assist in decision making on which resources should be dispatched.
- Provide a baseline tool for refinement of dispatch as more resources come online for alternate response models.

Additional Investments in Community Safety

- **Regional Peacekeepers Collective:** Investing \$2 million into a pilot program to address the steep rise in gun violence using a public health approach
- **Community Service Officer Expansion:** Adding an additional CSO unit to increase the number of hours that CSOs are available as well as provide more support to patrol officers with increased coverage and availability
- **Health One Expansion:** Q4 – anticipated late Nov. '21

Questions?

